NBER Working Papers by Richard Rosen

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Working Papers

May 2005Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Merger Waves
with Gary Gorton, Matthias Kahl: w11364
In this paper, we present a model of defensive mergers and merger waves. We argue that mergers and merger waves can occur when managers prefer that their firms remain independent rather than be acquired. We assume that managers can reduce their chance of being acquired by acquiring another firm and hence increasing the size of their own firm. We show that if managers value private benefits of control sufficiently, they may engage in unprofitable defensive acquisitions. A technological or regulatory change that makes acquisitions profitable in some future states of the world can induce a preemptive wave of unprofitable, defensive acquisitions. The timing of mergers, the identity of acquirers and targets, and the profitability of acquisitions depend on the size of the private benefits of con...
April 1995Banks and Derivatives
with Gary Gorton: w5100
In the last ten to fifteen years financial derivative securities have become an important, and controversial, product for commercial banks. The controversy concerns whether the size, complexity, and risks associated with these securities, the difficulties with accurately reporting timely information concerning the value of firms' derivative positions, and the concentration of activity in a small number of firms, has substantially increased the risk of collapse of the world banking system. Despite the widespread attention to derivatives, there has been little systematic analysis. We estimate market values and interest-rate sensitivities of interest rate swap positions of U.S. commercial banks to empirically address the question of whether swap contracts have increased or decreased system...
December 1992Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of Banking
with Gary Gorton: w4247
In the last two decades U.S. banks have become systematically less profitable and riskier as nonbank competition has eroded the profitability of banks' traditional activities. Bank failures, insignificant from 1934, the date the Glass-Steagall Act was passed, until 1980, rose exponentially in the 1980s. The leading explanation for the persistence of these trends centers on fixed-rate deposit insurance: the insurance gives bank shareholders an incentive to take on risk when the value of bank charters falls. We propose and test an alternative explanation based on corporate control considerations. We show that managerial entrenchment, more than moral hazard associated with deposit insurance, explains the recent behavior of the banking industry.

Contact and additional information for this authorAll publicationsWorking Papers only


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