NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Working Papers by Oriana Bandiera

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Working Papers

March 2017CEO Behavior and Firm Performance
with Stephen Hansen, Andrea Prat, Raffaella Sadun: w23248
We measure the behavior of 1,114 CEOs in Brazil, France, Germany, India, UK and US using a new methodology that combines (i) data on every activity the CEOs undertake during one workweek and (ii) a machine learning algorithm that projects these data onto scalar CEO behavior indices. Low values of the index are associated with plant visits, and one-on-one meetings with production or suppliers, while high values correlate with meetings with high-level C-suite executives, and several functions together, both from inside and outside the firm. We use these data to study the correlation between CEO behavior and firm performance within the framework of a firm-CEO assignment model. We show results consistent with significant firm-CEO assignment frictions, which appear to be more severe in lower-in...
December 2013Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work
with Renata Lemos, Andrea Prat, Raffaella Sadun: w19722
We present evidence on the labor supply of CEOs, and on whether family and professional CEOs differ on this dimension. We do so through a new survey instrument that allows us to codify CEOs’ diaries in a detailed and comparable fashion, and to build a bottom-up measure of CEO labor supply. The comparison of 1,114 family and professional CEOs reveals that family CEOs work 9% fewer hours relative to professional CEOs. Hours worked are positively correlated with firm performance, and differences between family and non-family CEOs account for approximately 18% of the performance gap between family and non-family firms. We investigate the sources of the differences in CEO labor supply across governance types by exploiting firm and industry heterogeneity, and quasi-exogenous meteorological and s...
January 2011Matching Firms, Managers and Incentives
with Andrea Prat, Luigi Guiso, Raffaella Sadun: w16691
We exploit a unique combination of administrative sources and survey data to study the match between firms and managers. The data includes manager characteristics, such as risk aversion and talent; firm characteristics, such as ownership; detailed measures of managerial practices relative to incentives, dismissals and promotions; and measurable outcomes, for the firm and for the manager. A parsimonious model of matching and incentive provision generates an array of implications that can be tested with our data. Our contribution is twofold. We disentangle the role of risk-aversion and talent in determining how firms select and motivate managers. In particular, risk-averse managers are matched with firms that offer low-powered contracts. We also show that empirical findings linking governanc...

Bandiera, Oriana, Luigi Guiso, Andrea Prat, and Raffaella Sadun. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives." Journal of Labor Economics (forthcoming). citation courtesy of

September 2001From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
with James E. Anderson: w8469
Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We provide conditions under which a Mafia emerges, persists and is stable. Mafias are most likely to emerge at intermediate stages of economic development. Private enforcers might provide better enforcement to the rich than would a welfare-maximizing state - hence the State may find it difficult to replace the Mafia or competitive private enforcers.

Published: Anderson, James E. and Oriana Bandiera. “Private Enforcement and Social Efficiency." Journal of Development Economics 77 (2005): 341-366.

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers onlyInformation about this author at RePEc

 
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