NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Working Papers by A. Mitchell Polinsky

Contact and additional information for this authorAll papers and publicationsWorking Papers onlyWorking Papers with publication info

Working Papers

December 2012Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages
with Steven Shavell: w18594
December 2006Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks
with Steven Shavell: w12776
November 2005The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
with Steven Shavell: w11780
March 2005A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies
with Daniel L. Rubinfeld: w11227
September 2004Optimal Fines and Auditing When Wealth is Costly to Observe
w10760
The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable
w10761
December 2003Remedies for Price Overcharges: The Deadweight Loss of Coupons and Discounts
with Daniel L. Rubinfeld: w10162
March 1999The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
with Steven Shavell: w6993
February 1999Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement
with Steven Shavell: w6945
November 1997On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence
with Steven Shavell: w6259
January 1994Should Employees be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability
with Steven Shavell: r1839
December 1993Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?
with Steven Shavell: w4586
October 1993Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs
with Daniel L. Rubinfeld: w4507
September 1992Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges
with Steven Shavell: w4176
June 1991A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders
with Daniel L. Rubinfeld: w3739
February 1991Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
with Yeon-Koo Che: w3634
September 1990Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines
with Steven Shavell: w3429
January 1990A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals
with Steven Shavell: w3232
March 1987Optimal Liability when the Injurer's Information about the Victim's Loss is Imperfect
w2174
December 1986A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs
with Daniel L. Rubinfeld: w2114
February 1986The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation in the Theory of Liability
with Daniel L. Rubinfeld: w1834
Detrebling versus Decoupling Antitrust Damages: Lessons from the Theory of Enforcement
w1846
1986Fixed Price Versus Spot Price Contracts: A Study in Risk Allocation
w1817
July 1982The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment
with Steven Shavell: w0932
Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power
with William P. Rogerson: w0937
September 1981Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs
with Steven Shavell: w0742
July 1981Risk Sharing through Breach of Contract Remedies
w0714
1981The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines
with Steven Shavell: r0136
December 1980On the Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules
w0286
March 1980Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies
w0463
1980Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting
w0420
April 1979Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines
w0338

Contact and additional information for this authorAll papers and publicationsWorking Papers onlyWorking Papers with publication info

 
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