NBER Working Papers by Michele Boldrin

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Working Papers

December 2006Growth and Intellectual Property
with David K. Levine: w12769
Intellectual property (IP) protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. Optimal policy depends on the quantitative strength of these two forces. We give a quantitative assessment of current IP policies. We focus particularly on the scale of the market, showing that as it increases, due either to growth or to the expansion of trade, IP protection should be reduced.
February 2005Fertility and Social Security
with Mariacristina De Nardi, Larry E. Jones: w11146
The data show that an increase in government provided old-age pensions is strongly correlated with a reduction in fertility. What type of model is consistent with this finding? We explore this question using two models of fertility, the one by Barro and Becker (1989), and the one inspired by Caldwell and developed by Boldrin and Jones (2002). In the Barro and Becker model parents have children because they perceive their children's lives as a continuation of their own. In the Boldrin and Jones' framework parents procreate because the children care about their old parents' utility, and thus provide them with old age transfers. The effect of increases in government provided pensions on fertility in the Barro and Becker model is very small, and inconsistent with the empirical findings. The ef...

Published: Michele BOLDRIN & Mariacristina DE NARDI & Larry E. JONES, 2015. "Fertility and Social Security," JDE - Journal of Demographic Economics, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES), vol. 81(3), pages 261-299, September. citation courtesy of

August 1997Social Security and Retirement in Spain
with Sergi Jimenez-Martni, Franco Peracchi: w6136
We describe the historical evolution of the Spanish Social Security system and its current organization. Our attention concentrates on the main public pension scheme for private employees in the manufacturing and service sector (RGSS) which covers by far the largest majority of Spanish workers. After describing the way in which pension and retirement decisions are regulated by this system, we try to compute the incentives to early retirement it provides to different kinds of individuals. We show that the Spanish SS legislation generates strong incentives to retire early and that Spanish workers tend to do so. In particular, our findings support the idea that pensions-induced incentives matter for the labor supply behavior of" Spanish workers. While the Spanish system does not pay a part...

Published: Social Security and Retirement in Spain, Michele Boldrin, Sergi Jimenez-Martin, Franco Peracchi. in Social Security and Retirement around the World, Gruber and Wise. 1999

September 1995Asset Pricing Lessons for Modeling Business Cycles
with Lawrence J. Christiano, Jonas D.M. Fisher: w5262
We develop a model which accounts for the observed equity premium and average risk free rate, without implying counterfactually high risk aversion. The model also does well in accounting for business cycle phenomena. With respect to the conventional measures of business cycle volatility and comovement with output, the model does roughly as well as the standard business cycle model. On two other dimensions, the model's business cycle implications are actually improved. Its enhanced internal propagation allows it to account for the fact that there is positive persistence in output growth, and the model also provides a resolution to the 'excess sensitivity puzzle' for consumption and income. Key features of the model are habit persistence preferences, and a multisector technology with li...

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