NBER Working Papers by Loriana Pelizzon

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Working Papers

January 2013Measuring Sovereign Contagion in Europe
with Massimiliano Caporin, Francesco Ravazzolo, Roberto Rigobon: w18741
This paper analyzes the sovereign risk contagion using credit default swaps (CDS) and bond premiums for the major eurozone countries. By emphasizing several econometric approaches (nonlinear regression, quantile regression and Bayesian quantile regression with heteroskedasticity) we show that propagation of shocks in Europe's CDS has been remarkably constant for the period 2008-2011 even though a significant part of the sample periphery countries have been extremely affected by their sovereign debt and fiscal situations. Thus, the integration among the different eurozone countries is stable, and the risk spillover among these countries is not affected by the size of the shock, implying that so far contagion has remained subdue. Results for the CDS sample are confirmed by examining bond spr...
July 2010Econometric Measures of Systemic Risk in the Finance and Insurance Sectors
with Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W. Lo: w16223
We propose several econometric measures of systemic risk to capture the interconnectedness among the monthly returns of hedge funds, banks, brokers, and insurance companies based on principal components analysis and Granger-causality tests. We find that all four sectors have become highly interrelated over the past decade, increasing the level of systemic risk in the finance and insurance industries. These measures can also identify and quantify financial crisis periods, and seem to contain predictive power for the current financial crisis. Our results suggest that hedge funds can provide early indications of market dislocation, and systemic risk arises from a complex and dynamic network of relationships among hedge funds, banks, insurance companies, and brokers.
October 2005Pillar 1 vs. Pillar 2 Under Risk Management
with Stephen Schaefer: w11666
Under the New Basel Accord bank capital adequacy rules (Pillar 1) are substantially revised but the introduction of two new "Pillars" is, perhaps, of even greater significance. This paper focuses on Pillar 2 which expands the range of instruments available to the regulator when intervening with banks that are capital inadequate and investigates the complementarity between Pillar 1 (risk-based capital requirements) and Pillar 2. In particular, the paper focuses on the role of closure rules when recapitalization is costly. In the model banks are able to manage their portfolios dynamically and their decisions on recapitalization and capital structure are determined endogenously. A feature of our approach is to consider the costs as well as the benefits of capital regulation and to accommodate...

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