NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Working Papers by Krishna Palepu

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers only

Working Papers

July 2004The Evolution of Concentrated Ownership in India Broad patterns and a History of the Indian Software Industry
with Tarun Khann: w10613
As in many countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Sweden), concentrated ownership is a ubiquitous feature of the Indian private sector over the past seven decades. Yet, unlike in most countries, the identity of the primary families responsible for the concentrated ownership changes dramatically over time, perhaps even more than it does in the U.S. during the same time period. It does not appear that concentrated ownership in India is entirely associated with the ills that the literature has recently ascribed to concentrated ownership in emerging markets. If the concentrated owners are not exclusively, or even primarily, engaged in rent-seeking and entry-deterring behavior, concentrated ownership may not be inimical to competition. Indeed, as a response to competition, we argue t...

Published:

  • Khanna, Tarun and Krishna G. Palepu. "Globalization and Convergence In Corporate Governance: Evidence From Infosys and The Indian Software Industry," Journal of International Business Studies, 2004, v35(6,Nov), 485-507.
  • Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, 2005. "The Evolution of Concentrated Ownership in India: Broad Patterns and a History of the Indian Software Industry," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 283-324 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

February 1999Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors, and Corporate Governance
with Tarun Khanna: w6955
We examine the interaction between three kinds of concentrated owners commonly found in an emerging market: family-run business groups, domestic financial institutions, and foreign financial institutions. Using data from India in the early 1990s, we find evidence that domestic international investors are poor monitors, and that foreign institutional investors are good monitors. Whereas affiliates of those groups that attract foreign institutional investment are no more difficult to monitor than are unaffiliated firms, we find that group affiliation reduces the likelihood of foreign institutional investment. More transparent groups (where greater transparency is proxied for by a lower incidence of intra-group financial transactions) are more likely to attract such investment. We conclude...

Published:

  • Khanna, Tarun and Krishan Palepu. "Is Group Affiliation Profitable In Emerging Markets? An Analysis Of Diversified Indian Business Groups," Journal of Finance, 2000, v55(2,Apr), 867-891.
  • Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, 2000. "III. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP: 9. Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Intermediaries, and Corporate Governance," NBER Chapters, in: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pages 265-294 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

May 1990Does Corporate Performance Improve After Mergers?
with Paul M. Healy, Richard C. Rubak: w3348
We examine the post-acquisition operating performance of merged firms using a sample of the 50 largest mergers between U.S. public industrial firms completed in the period 1979 to 1983. The results indicate that merged firms have significant improvement in asset productivity relative to their industries after the merger, leading to higher post-merger operating cash flow returns. Sample firms maintain their capital expenditure and R&D rates relative to their industries after the merger, indicating that merged firms do not reduce their long-term investments. There is a strong positive relation between postmerger increases in operating cash flows and abnormal stock returns at merger announcements, indicating that expectations of economic improvements underlie the equity revaluations of the me...

Published: JFEC, Vol. 31, no. 2 (1992): 135-176.

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers only

 
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