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NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Working Papers by Karl Walentin

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Working Papers

June 2010DSGE Models for Monetary Policy Analysis
with Lawrence J. Christiano, Mathias Trabandt: w16074
Monetary DSGE models are widely used because they fit the data well and they can be used to address important monetary policy questions. We provide a selective review of these developments. Policy analysis with DSGE models requires using data to assign numerical values to model parameters. The chapter describes and implements Bayesian moment matching and impulse response matching procedures for this purpose.

Published: DSGE Models for Monetary Policy Analys is, joint with Mathia s Trabandt and Karl Walentin, in Benjamin M. Friedman, and Michael Woodford, editors: Handbook of Monetary Economics , Vol. 3A, The Netherlands: North-Holland.

March 2010Involuntary Unemployment and the Business Cycle
with Lawrence J. Christiano, Mathias Trabandt: w15801
We propose a monetary model in which the unemployed satisfy the official US definition of unemployment: they are people without jobs who are (i) currently making concrete efforts to find work and (ii) willing and able to work. In addition, our model has the property that people searching for jobs are better off if they find a job than if they do not (i.e., unemployment is 'involuntary'). We integrate our model of involuntary unemployment into the simple New Keynesian framework with no capital and use the resulting model to discuss the concept of the 'non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment'. We then integrate the model into a medium sized DSGE model with capital and show that the resulting model does as well as existing models at accounting for the response of standard macroeconomi...
May 2007Financial Frictions, Investment and Tobin's q
with Guido Lorenzoni: w13092
We develop a model of investment with financial constraints and use it to investigate the relation between investment and Tobin's q. A firm is financed partly by insiders, who control its assets, and partly by outside investors. When their wealth is scarce, insiders earn a rate of return higher than the market rate of return, i.e., they receive a quasi-rent on invested capital. This rent is priced into the value of the firm, so Tobin's q is driven by two forces: changes in the value of invested capital, and changes in the value of the insiders' future rents per unit of capital. This weakens the correlation between q and investment, relative to the frictionless benchmark. We present a calibrated version of the model, which, due to this effect, generates realistic correlations between invest...

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers onlyInformation about this author at RePEc

 
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