NBER Working Papers by Anup Malani

We develop a model where products liability trials provide information to consumers who are not parties to the litigation. Consumers use this information to take precautions against dangerous products. A critical assumption is that consumers cannot differentiate between firms that have never been sued and firms that have been sued but settled out of court. In this framework, we show that perfectly accurate courts do not maximize information to consumers and thus welfare, contrary to Kaplow and Shavell (1994). More accurate courts provide more information only if producers go to trial. Greater accuracy, however, encourages producers of dangerous products to settle and hide their type. When courts are perfectly accurate, all low quality producers settle. And given the lack of any informatio...

There is considerable debate about the impact of health care reform on the growth in medical spending. Medical innovation is thought to be a central contributor to that growth. We argue that there is a unique linkage between reforms that affect output markets for medical care and medical R&D costs. This linkage is due to the fact that potential consumers of medical care are also potential participants in clinical trials that are required to develop new medical products. Therefore, reforms that increase the quality or reduce the price of already developed treatments reduce the incentive of patients to participate in trials of experimental treatments. This delays development and reduce the returns to in innovation. We provide evidence of this “subject market effect” by considering the i...

When SARS struck Taiwan in the spring of 2003, many people feared that the disease would spread through the healthcare system. As a result, outpatient medical visits fell by over 30 percent in the course of a few weeks. This paper examines how both public information (SARS incidence reports) and private information (the behavior and opinions of peers) contributed to this public reaction. We identify social learning through a difference-in-difference strategy that compares long time community residents to recent arrivals, who are less socially connected. We find that people learned from both public and private sources during SARS. In a dynamic simulation based on the regressions, social learning substantially magnifes the response to SARS.

While conducting empirical work, researchers sometimes observe changes in outcomes before adoption of a new treatment program. The conventional diagnosis is that treatment is endogenous. Observing changes in outcomes prior to treatment is also consistent, however, with anticipation effects. This paper provides a framework for comparing the different methods for estimating anticipation effects and proposes a new set of instrumental variables that can address the problem that subjects' expectations are unobservable. The paper uses this framework to analyze the effect of tort reform on physician supply and finds that accounting for anticipation effects doubles the estimated effect of tort reform.