NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Working Papers by Andres Almazan

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Working Papers

December 2007Financial Structure, Liquidity, and Firm Locations
with Adolfo de Motta, Sheridan Titman, Vahap Uysal: w13660
This paper investigates the relation between a firm's location and its corporate finance decisions. We develop a simple model where being located within an industry cluster increases opportunities to make acquisitions, and to facilitate those acquisitions, firms within clusters maintain more financial slack. Consistent with our model we find that firms that are located within industry clusters tend to make more acquisitions, and have lower debt ratios and larger cash balances than their industry peers located outside clusters. In addition, we document that firms in growing cities and technology centers also maintain more financial slack. Overall, these findings, which reveal systematic patterns between geography and corporate finance choices, suggest the importance of growth opportunities ...
November 2007Firms' Stakeholders and the Costs of Transparency
with Javier Suarez, Sheridan Titman: w13647
We develop a model of a firm whose production process requires it to start and nurture a relationship with its stakeholders. Because there are spillover benefits associated with being associated with a "winner," the perceptions of stakeholders and potential stakeholders can affect firm value. Our analysis indicates that while transparency (i.e., generating information about a firm's quality) may improve the allocation of resources, a firm may have a higher ex ante value if information about its quality is not prematurely generated. The costs associated with transparency arise because of asymmetric information regarding the extent to which stakeholders benefit from having a relationship with a high quality firm. These costs are higher when firms can initiate non-contractible innovative inve...

Published:

November 2003Firm Location and the Creation and Utilization of Human Capital
with Adolfo de Motta, Sheridan Titman: w10106
This paper presents a theory of location choice that draws on insights from the incomplete contracts and investment flexibility (real option) literatures. We provide conditions under which human capital is more efficiently created and better utilized within industrial clusters that contain similar firms. Our analysis indicates that location choices are influenced by the extent to which training costs are borne by firms versus employees as well as by the uncertainty about future productivity shocks and the ability of firms to modify the scale of their operations. Extensions of our model consider, among other things, endogenous technological choices by firms in clusters and how behavioral biases (i.e., managerial overconfidence about their firms' prospects) can affect firms' location choice...

Published: Andres Almazan & Adolfo De Motta & Sheridan Titman, 2007. "Firm Location and the Creation and Utilization of Human Capital," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(4), pages 1305-1327, October.

Stakeholder, Transparency and Capital Structure
with Javier Suarez, Sheridan Titman: w10101
Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates information about them. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However, when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively general conditions, good news improves these terms of trade less than bad news worsens them, implying that increased transparency can lower firm value. In addition, we show that transparency can reduce the incentives of firms and stakeholders to undertake relationship specific investments. The negative effects of transparency can lead firms to pass up positive NPV investments that require external funding and to ...

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers only

 
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