NBER Publications by Yuliy Sannikov

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Working Papers and Chapters

May 2012Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey
with Markus K. Brunnermeier, Thomas M. Eisenbach: w18102
This article surveys the macroeconomic implications of financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to persistence and when combined with illiquidity to non-linear amplification effects. Risk is endogenous and liquidity spirals cause financial instability. Increasing margins further restrict leverage and exacerbate downturns. A demand for liquid assets and a role for money emerges. The market outcome is generically not even constrained efficient and the issuance of government debt can lead to a Pareto improvement. While financial institutions can mitigate frictions, they introduce additional fragility and through their erratic money creation harm price stability.
September 2009Dynamic Incentive Accounts
with Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik: w15324
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the optimal contract in a setting where the CEO can affect firm value through both productive effort and costly manipulation, and may undo the contract by privately saving. The optimal contract takes a surprisingly simple form, and can be implemented by a "Dynamic Incentive Account." The CEO's expected pay is escrowed into an account, a fraction of which is invested in the firm's stock and the remainder in cash. The account features state-dependent rebalancing and time-dependent vesting. It is constant...
November 2007Real Options in a Dynamic Agency Model, with Applications to Financial Development, IPOs, and Business Risk
with Thomas Philippon: w13584
We study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms' dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the decrease in the age of IPOs.
July 2004A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure
with Peter M. DeMarzo: w10615
We consider a principal-agent model in which the agent needs to raise capital from the principal to finance a project. Our model is based on DeMarzo and Fishman (2003), except that the agent's cash flows are given by a Brownian motion with drift in continuous time. The difficulty in writing an appropriate financial contract in this setting is that the agent can conceal and divert cash flows for his own consumption rather than pay back the principal. Alternatively, the agent may reduce the mean of cash flows by not putting in effort. To give the agent incentives to provide effort and repay the principal, a long-term contract specifies the agent's wage and can force termination of the project. Using techniques from stochastic calculus similar to Sannikov (2003), we characterize the optimal c...

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