NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Publications by Stefan Reichelstein

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February 1995Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment
with Aaron S. Edlin: w5007
We consider a bilateral trading problem in which one or both parties makes relationship-specific investments before trade. Without adequate contractual protection, the prospect of later holdups discourages investment. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to investing, and can freely renegotiate them after uncertainty about the desirability of trade is resolved. We find that such contracts can induce one party to invest efficiently when either a breach remedy of specific performance or expectation damages is applied. Specific performance can also induce both parties to invest efficiently, provided a separability condition holds. In contrast, expectation damages is poorly suited to solve bilateral investment problems.

Published: American Economic Review, vol. 86, no. 3, pp. 478-501, June 1996. citation courtesy of

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers onlyInformation about this author at RePEc

 
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