NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Publications by Qinghua Zhang

Working Papers and Chapters

June 2009China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption
with Hongbin Cai, J. Vernon Henderson: w15067
This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003--2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a "two stage auction". The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively fe...
April 2006The Thick Market Effect on Housing Markets Transactions
with Li Gan: w12134
This paper provides a search model for housing market where the number of buyers and/or sellers plays very important role. The model makes three testable predictions: (1) the unemployment rate has a negative impact on the trading volume and the sale prices of the housing market; (2) a larger housing market has a lower average sale price, shorter time-to-sale and smaller price dispersion, in addition to a lower vacancy rate. (3) In a larger housing market, when the unemployment rate goes up (or down), the sale price decreases (or increases) by a smaller percentage than in a smaller market. All three predictions are supported by a panel dataset of the Texas city-level housing markets.

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