NBER Publications by Paul Ellickson
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Working Papers and Chapters
| March 2010 | Estimating Network Economies in Retail Chains: A Revealed Preference Approach
with Stephanie Houghton, Christopher Timmins: w15832
We measure the effects of chain economies, business stealing, and heterogeneous firms' comparative advantages in the discount retail industry. Traditional entry models are ill-suited for this high-dimensional problem of strategic interaction. Building upon recently developed profit inequality techniques, our model admits any number of potential rivals and stores per location, an endogenous distribution network, and unobserved (to the econometrician) location attributes that may cause firms to cluster their stores. In an application, we find that Kmart and Target benefit most from local chain economies; Wal-Mart's advantage is more global. We explore these results with counterfactual simulations highlighting these offsetting effects. |
| January 2001 | Patient Welfare and Patient Compliance -- An Empirical Framework for Measuring the Benefits from Pharmaceutical Innovation
with Scott Stern, Manuel Trajtenberg
in Medical Care Output and Productivity, David M. Cutler and Ernst R. Berndt, editors
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| January 1999 | Patient Welfare and Patient Compliance: An Empirical Framework for Measuring the Benefits from Pharmaceutical Innovation
with Scott Stern, Manuel Trajtenberg: w6890
The main goal of this paper is to develop an empirical framework for evaluating the patient welfare benefits arising from pharmaceutical innovation. Extending previous studies of the welfare benefits from innovation (Trajtenberg, 1990; Hausman, 1996), this paper unpacks the separate choices made by physicians and patients in pharmaceutical decisionmaking and develops an estimable econometric model which reflects these choices. Our proposed estimator for patient welfare depends on (a) whether patients comply with the prescriptions they receive from physicians and (b) the motives of physicians in their prescription behavior. By focusing on compliance behavior, the proposed welfare measure reflects a specific economic choice made by patients. We review evidence that the rate of noncompli... |
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