NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Publications by Luis Cabral

Contact and additional information for this authorAll papers and publicationsWorking Papers onlyWorking Papers with publication info

Working Papers and Chapters

April 2013Competitors, Complementors, Parents and Places: Explaining Regional Agglomeration in the U.S. Auto Industry
with Zhu Wang, Daniel Yi Xu: w18973
Taking the early U.S. automobile industry as an example, we evaluate four competing hypotheses on regional industry agglomeration: intra-industry local externalities, inter-industry local externalities, employee spinouts, and location fixed-effects. Our findings suggest that inter-industry spillovers, particularly the development of the carriage and wagon industry, play an important role. Spinouts play a secondary role and only contribute to agglomeration at later stages of industry evolution. The presence of other firms in the same industry has a negligible (or maybe even negative) effect on agglomeration. Finally, location fixed-effects account for some agglomeration, though to a lesser extent than inter-industry spillovers and spinouts.
April 2011Comment on "How Entrepreneurs Affect the Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity"
in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity Revisited, Josh Lerner and Scott Stern, editors
March 2004The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay
with Ali Hortacsu: w10363
We propose a basic theoretical model of eBay's reputation mechanism, derive a series of implications and empirically test their validity. Our theoretical model features both adverse selection and moral hazard. We show that when a seller receives a negative rating for the first time his reputation decreases and so does his effort level. This implies a decline in sales and price; and an increase in the rate of arrival of subsequent negative feedback. Our model also suggests that sellers with worse records are more likely to exit (and possibly re-enter under a new identity), whereas better sellers have more to gain from buying a reputation' by building up a record of favorable feedback through purchases rather than sales. Our empirical evidence, based on a panel data set of seller feedback h...

Contact and additional information for this authorAll papers and publicationsWorking Papers onlyWorking Papers with publication info

 
Publications
Activities
Meetings
NBER Videos
Data
People
About

Support
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138; 617-868-3900; email: info@nber.org

Contact Us