NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Publications by J. Michael Finger

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Working Papers and Chapters

January 1996The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade?
with Ann Harrison
in The Political Economy of American Trade Policy, Anne O. Krueger, ed.
Import Protection for U.S. Textiles and Apparel: Viewed from the Domestic Perspective
with Ann Harrison
in The Political Economy of Trade Protection, Anne O. Krueger, Editor
May 1994The MFA Paradox: More Protection and More Trade?
with Ann Harrison: w4751
The textile industry's political power stemmed from its importance in southern states plus the power of the Southern delegation in the U.S. Congress in the 1960s. The strongest resistance to the industry's pressure for protection came from the foreign policy interests of the Executive branch. A constellation of influences explains why negotiated, or voluntary export restraints (VERs), sanctioned by international agreements (the Multi-Fiber Arrangement) was the form protection took. First, the Japanese industry, at the time the world's leading textile exporter, already in the 1930s had exhibited a willingness to accept negotiated agreements to trade disputes. Second, the U.S. Executive, having been a leader in establishing the GATT system to control the sort of unilateral restrictive ac...
1981The Industry-Country Incidence of "Less than Fair Value" Cases in US Import Trade
in Export Diversification and the New Protectionism: The Experience of Latin America, Werner Baer and Malcolm Gillis, eds.

Contact and additional information for this authorAll papers and publicationsWorking Papers onlyWorking Papers with publication info

 
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