NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Publications by Gergely Ujhelyi

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers only

Working Papers and Chapters

May 2012Men, Women, and Machines: How Trade Impacts Gender Inequality
with Chinhui Juhn, Carolina Villegas-Sanchez: w18106
This paper studies the effect of trade liberalization on an under-explored aspect of wage inequality – gender inequality. We consider a model where firms differ in their productivity and workers are differentiated by skill as well as gender. A reduction in tariffs induces more productive firms to modernize their technology and enter the export market. New technologies involve computerized production processes and lower the need for physically demanding skills. As a result, the relative wage and employment of women improves in blue-collar tasks, but not in white-collar tasks. We test our model using a panel of establishment level data from Mexico exploiting tariff reductions associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Consistent with our theory we find that tariff reduc...

Published: Juhn, Chinhui & Ujhelyi, Gergely & Villegas-Sanchez, Carolina, 2014. "Men, women, and machines: How trade impacts gender inequality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 179-193. citation courtesy of

December 2006Regulating Misinformation
with Edward L. Glaeser: w12784
The government has responded to misleading advertising by banning it, engaging in counter-advertising and taxing the product. In this paper, we consider the social welfare effects of those different responses to misinformation. While misinformation lowers consumer surplus, its effect on social welfare is ambiguous. Misleading advertising leads to overconsumption but that may be offsetting the under-consumption associated with monopoly prices. If all advertising is misinformation then a tax or quantity restriction on advertising maximizes social welfare. Other policy interventions are inferior and cannot improve on a pure advertising tax. If it is impossible to tax misleading information without also taxing utility increasing advertising, then combining taxes or bans on advertising with oth...

Published: Glaeser, Edward L. and Gergely Ujhelyi. "Regulating Misinformation." Journal of Public Economics 94, 3-4 (April 2010): 247-257. citation courtesy of

Contact and additional information for this authorAll NBER papers and publicationsNBER Working Papers only

 
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