NBER Publications by Erin Troland

Most interpretations of prevalent counterinsurgency theory imply that increasing government services will reduce rebel violence. Empirically, however, development programs and economic activity sometimes yield increased violence. Using new panel data on development spending in Iraq, we show that violence reducing effects of aid are greater when (a) projects are small, (b) troop strength is high, and (c) professional development expertise is available. These findings are consistent with a "hearts and minds" model, which predicts that violence reduction will result when projects are secure, valued by community members, and implementation is conditional on the behavior of non-combatants.

This paper explores the relationship between economic activity and political violence through the lenses provided by several different mechanisms. Investment as a predictor of future violence implies that low private sector investment today provides a robust indicator of high violence tomorrow. “Rent-capture” or predation asserts that economic programs and business investment will increase violence by increasing extortion by insurgents. “Hearts and minds” counterinsurgency has been asserted to link economic activity to political violence in three ways, through an opportunity cost mechanism by which improved economic conditions reduce the cost of rebel recruitment; through a “hope and gratitude” effect by which development assistance generates support for government, reducing cooperation wi...