NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

NBER Publications by David Lucca

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Working Papers and Chapters

June 2014The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation
with Amit Seru, Francesco Trebbi: w20241
This paper traces career transitions of federal and state U.S. banking regulators from a large sample of publicly available curricula vitae, and provides basic facts on worker flows between the regulatory and private sector resulting from the revolving door. We find strong countercyclical net worker flows into regulatory jobs, driven largely by higher gross outflows into the private sector during booms. These worker flows are also driven by state-specific banking conditions as measured by local banks’ profitability, asset quality and failure rates. The regulatory sector seems to experience a retention challenge over time, with shorter regulatory spells for workers, and especially those with higher education. Evidence from cross-state enforcement actions of regulators shows gross inflows in...
January 2012Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence From Banking
with Sumit Agarwal, Amit Seru, Francesco Trebbi: w17736
US state chartered commercial banks are supervised alternately by state and federal regulators. Each regulator supervises a given bank for a fixed time period according to a predetermined rotation schedule. We use unique data to examine differences between federal and state regulators for these banks. Federal regulators are significantly less lenient, downgrading supervisory ratings about twice as frequently as state supervisors. Under federal regulators, banks report higher nonperforming loans, more delinquent loans, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower ROA. There is a higher frequency of bank failures and problem-bank rates in states with more lenient supervision relative to the federal benchmark. Some states are more lenient than others. Regulatory capture by industry constituent...
September 2009Measuring Central Bank Communication: An Automated Approach with Application to FOMC Statements
with Francesco Trebbi: w15367
We present a new automated, objective and intuitive scoring technique to measure the content of central bank communication about future interest rate decisions based on information from the Internet and news sources. We apply the methodology to statements released by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) after its policy meetings starting in 1999. Using intra-day financial quotes, we find that short-term nominal Treasury yields respond to changes in policy rates around policy announcements, whereas longer-dated Treasuries mainly react to changes in policy communication. Using lower frequency data, we find that changes in the content of the statements lead policy rate decisions by more than a year in univariate interest rate forecasting and vector autoregression (VAR) models. When we est...

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