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ABSTRACT

Theoretical rationales for employer-provided pensions often focus on their ability to increase employee effort and selectively retain quality workers. We test these hypotheses using rich administrative data on public school teachers around the pension-eligibility threshold. When teachers cross the threshold, their effective compensation drops by over 50 percent of salary due to sharply reduced pension accrual rates. Standard economic models predict this compensation reduction should decrease teacher effort and output, yet we observe no such decline. This suggests that yearly pension accruals near retirement do not meaningfully increase effort. Similarly, if pensions selectively retained better teachers, we would expect average teacher quality to decline when the retentive incentive disappears at the threshold. Instead, we find no change in the composition of teacher quality, suggesting pensions do not selectively retain higher-performing workers in late career.

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1 Introduction

Public sector defined benefit pensions represent one of the largest fiscal challenges facing state and local governments, with unfunded liabilities totaling over a trillion dollars (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011; The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2024). The high cost and fiscal pressure of these plans have sparked intense policy debates about their value, sustainability, and impact on public services (Poterba, 2014; Brainard and Brown, 2021). Central to these debates is whether pensions, beyond providing retirement security, actually deliver on their other purported benefits: namely, improving the quality and productivity of the workforce (Lazear, 1979; Mitchell, 2019).

Nowhere are these questions more salient than in public education, where managing the quality of the teacher workforce is a primary policy objective. Decades of research have established that retaining high-performing, effective teachers is crucial for student learning and human capital development (Chetty et al., 2014c; Hanushek, 2011; Kraft et al., 2020). Pensions are frequently defended as a key, if costly, tool for achieving this goal, particularly for mid-career and experienced educators (Koedel et al., 2013a; Chingos and West, 2015). Proponents argue that these retirement systems improve teacher *effort* and help to *selectively retain* the most effective educators over time (Morrissey, 2017; Goldhaber et al., 2016).

In this paper, we empirically investigate these two core explanations. Both mechanisms rest on specific theoretical foundations that we test.

First, pensions may increase worker *effort*, as predicted by several models. The gift exchange model proposes that pension accruals elicit reciprocity, with workers returning exceptional effort when accruals are generous, and scaling back their effort in response to pay reductions (Akerlof, 1982). Morale models predict a similar dynamic, where morale and effort rise and fall proportionally with effective pay (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Additionally, a deferred compensation model we explore in this paper proposes that pensions can improve effort even without dismissals. Notably, these various models all predict pensions improve teacher effort before retirement eligibility, but not after.

Second, pensions may improve productivity by influencing worker *composition* by differentially retaining high performers. The underlying model posits that higher-performing workers have a stronger preference for pension income than lower-quality ones. Workers who are diligent, conscientious, or patient may value pension income more than others, so establishments that offer pensions will differentially retain better workers (Gustman et al., 1994; Morrissey, 2017; Weller, 2017). If true, this model predicts that high-performing teachers (as measured by value-added), would exhibit especially high attrition when the retentive influence of pensions drops sharply at the retirement eligibility threshold.

We test these two hypotheses—namely that pension accruals increase *effort* and promote *selective retention* for public school teachers around retirement.[1] Understanding these effects for teachers, a large segment of the public sector workforce, can inform the design of their compensation policies and offer insights potentially relevant to other settings with similar employment structures.

The rationales we examine are common in public discourse about whether employers should use pensions in place of other retirement alternatives. A consulting firm advises its clients that "pension plans can increase staff productivity," implicitly invoking the "effort" hypothesis (BP Consulting, 2022). Citing the "selection" hypothesis, Economist Monique Morrissey writes that "pensions are the single most important tool for recruiting and retaining" excellent workers (Morrissey, 2017).[2] These claims are echoed by policymakers. Rick Cost, a public school manager, states that pensions are a "valuable tool in attracting and retaining outstanding teachers" (Badertscher, 2013).

While intuitive, the effort and selective retention rationales for pensions have received little empirical testing. Assessing the impact of pensions on effort and selective retention is key to understanding the benefits they confer on organizations and society more broadly. Measuring the causal effect, however, is quite challenging. Pension enrollment is not random, and there are few natural experiments to shed light. Data on pension eligibility and worker productivity, moreover, are not readily available to researchers.

We address these obstacles using administrative data from public schools, which offer several key advantages. First, the threshold provides a sharp decline in pension payments while other aspects of the work setting evolve smoothly, providing a quasi-experimental setting. Second, since public schools employ over half of government workers, the setting provides large samples of relevant workers with accompanying statistical clarity (Blumerman, 2012). Third, while output is

[1]A thorough cataloging of rationales can be found in Gustman et al. (1994). These include that pensions may improve retention by young workers and encourage retirement by older ones. The retirement rationale is especially important in physically taxing professions like military service and firefighting. Historically, pensions began as a way for the Roman Empire to ease aging soldiers out of battle and into retirement. Glaeser and Ponzetto (2014) proposes a political economy rationale for modern pensions, suggesting that politicians use pensions to win support from public workers, a politically powerful group, with benefits whose costs are less visible to taxpayers.

[2]Similarly, researcher Christian Weller argues that employers offer pensions "to achieve labor management goals, such as recruiting and retaining the best people for the job" (Weller, 2017). BP consulting argues that offering a pension will "helps you recruit the finest personnel" and "retain your high-performers" (BP Consulting, 2022).

unobservable to researchers in many work settings, schools collect annual achievement records, offering psychometrically validated measures of output. Together, these features provide an excellent setting for understanding the effect of the pension threshold on teacher effort and selective retention in late career.

We exploit these advantages by assembling administrative staffing records and constructing an array of effort and output measures for teachers in North Carolina. We estimate each teacher's yearly effect on students' math and reading skills, as well as on important "non-cognitive" skills (Jackson, 2018; Petek and Pope, 2023).[3] We estimate yearly effects and use them to construct forecast-unbiased measures of teacher productivity, following Chetty et al. (2014b). These measures allow us to examine "effort" (the potentially *transient* component of productivity) and "quality" (the *predictable* component).

Public school teachers in North Carolina are automatically enrolled in the state's pension plan. Teachers become eligible to receive a pension annuity when they meet certain age and years-of-service requirements. These requirements create a notch that provides empirical leverage, as crossing the retirement threshold sharply reduces both effective compensation (which may affect effort) and the retentive influence of pensions (which may affect the composition of workers).

First, we examine the "effort" hypothesis. Before reaching the notch, teachers effectively earn an additional 70 percent of their salary through pension accruals each year. When they cross the eligibility notch, however, accruals fall substantially, cutting their effective pay by 56 percent of salary. The models we discussed before—reciprocity, morale, and deferred compensation—all predict effort will decline in response to this sharp reduction in effective pay at the threshold.

Contrary to these predictions, however, we find no such decline in measures of output or effort as teachers cross the threshold. Using difference-in-differences designs, we compare individual teachers' yearly value-added as they approach and cross the threshold. Productivity evolves smoothly, despite the sharp drop in pension compensation. Moreover, teacher absences (a negative marker of effort) *decrease* slightly post-threshold, contrary to the prediction of the effort hypothesis. These findings suggest that pension accruals do not appear to increase teacher effort near retirement.

Next, we turn to the hypothesis that pensions selectively retain higher performing teachers. This hypothesis posits that teacher quality correlates with preferences for pension income. If true, high-performing teachers would exhibit excess attrition at the notch, since they were artificially

[3] All skills are mediated by cognition, making "non-cognitive" skills a useful but inaccurate handle for the concept.

retained by pension incentives that sharply diminish at the threshold. To test this hypothesis, we measure retention changes at the eligibility notch for teachers with high and low value-added. This design provides a strong test because the pension's retentive effects are especially salient to teachers at the notch.

We find similar retention probabilities around the notch for high and low-performing teachers, and their retention odds change by the same magnitude at the notch. This pattern implies that pensions exert approximately the same retentive effect on teachers, regardless of their productivity. This suggests that preferences for pension income among experienced teachers are not strongly correlated with their productivity. Consequently, these pension features do not appear to influence workforce composition through differential retention near retirement.

Our results should be interpreted with several important considerations in mind. First, our findings apply specifically to public school teachers in a setting with low dismissal rates; thus, the effort results may not generalize to dissimilar settings, including those with high dismissal rates.[4] Second, our analysis of workforce composition focuses on retention among those who have already chosen to become and remain teachers for some time, and so it does not directly test how pensions affect initial career choices into teaching.[5] Finally, our effort analysis relies on teachers who remain employed past retirement eligibility; thus, it uses a selected sample that may differ from those who retire at that threshold, who may have responded differently to the pension incentives.

This paper advances the literature on human resources management and improves our understanding of how pensions may affect worker productivity and selective retention near retirement (Lazear and Oyer, 2007; Hoffman and Tadelis, 2021). Similar to De Ree et al. (2018), we find that large unconditional payments do not improve teacher effort or output.[6] Past work has focused on the role pensions play in shaping labor supply (Brown, 2013; Manoli and Weber, 2016; Ni et al., 2021; Johnston and Rockoff, 2022). Closest to our work are studies examining the effect of pensions on teacher selection, though these often examine different aspects, such as initial career choice or overall turnover patterns, rather than retention specifically at the eligibility notch. Koedel et al. (2013b) compares the value-added of teachers who retire at different points in their careers; Goldhaber and

[4] Using CPS data from 2010–2024 on workers aged 50 and older, we find the layoff rate is 2.3 percent within the private sector, and 1.0 percent for public school teachers. Access to pension systems is increasingly concentrated in the public sector, however, and public sector workers 50 and older have near identical dismissal rates as public school teachers.

[5] While we believe the pension benefits are more salient near retirement than at job entry, we cannot rule out alternate responses to pensions when potential teachers enter the workforce.

[6] By contrast, several authors show that conditional payments (performance pay) can improve teacher selection and effort (Mbiti et al., 2019; Brown and Andrabi, 2020; Biasi, 2021; Leaver et al., 2021; Johnston, 2024).

Grout (2016) finds that higher-output teachers are significantly less likely to select defined-benefit pension plans; and Mahler (2018) finds that highly productive teachers have lower turnover than less productive teachers late in their careers.

Our paper contributes by empirically testing how the pension threshold affects teacher effort and selective retention around retirement. Our approach leverages detailed administrative data and quasi-experimental designs, allowing for a transparent estimation of these effects in our setting. The measures underpinning our analysis are particularly comprehensive: for effort, we examine yearly value-added in cognitive and non-cognitive skills as well as changes in work absences; for selective retention, we analyze patterns based on state-of-the-art forecast-unbiased value-added scores that reflect teachers' predictable impacts on students' cognitive and non-cognitive skills.

Though past theoretical work has posited that pensions improve employee effort and workforce selection, our findings for public school teachers near retirement do not provide evidence supporting these specific mechanisms. Because modern pensions are increasingly concentrated in the public sector, in which low dismissal rates and rigid compensation are common, the results are likely representative of settings in which pensions are now most common.

2 Theoretical Framework and Application

This section outlines the key models underlying the effort and selection hypotheses of pension provision. We examine how these theories apply to our setting of public school teachers and demonstrate how they predict changes in teacher effort and selection at the retirement eligibility threshold.

2.1 Models Supporting the Effort Hypothesis

Here we present several theoretical models that predict pensions will enhance worker effort before the threshold, but not after. These models lay a foundation for our investigation into the relationship between pension programs and teacher productivity.

2.1.1 Models of Deferred Compensation

Models of deferred compensation are the most frequently cited class of models positing that pensions improve effort by increasing the cost of departure for workers. This classic rationale for pension provision argues that pensions create large, backloaded payments to workers, incentivizing them to maintain employment and avoid shirking (Lazear, 1979; Gustman et al., 1994). Once a worker crosses the retirement threshold, this incentive disappears as the backloaded payments have already been secured.

However, pensions are now most common in settings where dismissal is relatively rare, potentially weakening this rationale. We document this fact by comparing dismissal rates in the private and public sectors using the Current Population Survey.[7] We find that among workers aged 50 and older, the layoff rate is 2.3 percent for the private sector, and 1.0 percent for both public school teachers and other public sector more generally. The lower dismissal risk for public employees suggests the deferred compensation channel may be weaker than in private employment. The similar dismissal rates among teachers and other public employees, however, suggest our findings may generalize to other public settings (Zook, 2023).

2.1.2 A Model of Deferred Compensation without Dismissals

While dismissal has been a core component of traditional deferred compensation models, we show that dismissals are not necessary for pensions to increase worker effort.

Our model proposes that a worker's performance affects the welfare she derives from her job. Intuitively, when a worker exerts effort, she enjoys good rapport with her colleagues and managers. Conversely, when she shirks, she faces a tense work environment with disapproving colleagues. Thus, effort (shirking) increases (reduces) the utility a worker derives from continued employment at her current job.

Ordinarily, workers are tempted to shirk, with the knowledge they can find a new job if the work environment sours from low effort—but pensions fundamentally alter the calculus. By making job changes more costly, pensions encourage workers to maintain a pleasant work environment through greater effort. The model has similarities to relational contracting models in which non-contractible actions are enforced through repeated play (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989). Intuitively, pensions make a repeated game with the employer more attractive and therefore more likely, which elicits additional effort (Kreps et al., 1982).

[7] Using CPS data from 2010–2024, we calculated the share of labor-market participants who report being unemployed due to layoff. We identified teachers using the occupation variable and government employment from the "class of worker" question. The sample was limited to those in the labor force between ages 50 and 70, resulting in 22,237 observations of public school teachers.

In short, our model demonstrates that pensions can encourage effort, even without the threat of dismissal, by lengthening the preferred duration of the employment relationship. This magnifies the benefits of effort before the pension threshold.

This theory extends the traditional efficiency wage model to settings with strong job protections, offering a potential explanation for why employers might offer pensions even when dismissal is rare. It also provides an additional theoretical foundation for examining effort effects of pensions in public sector settings, like our study of teachers.

We present a formal mathematical model of this theory in online Appendix C. In our empirical analysis, we examine how effort and productivity change at the retirement eligibility threshold, where the incentive to maintain long-term employment greatly diminishes. According to our model of deferred compensation without dismissals, we would expect to observe a decrease in effort at this point, as teachers experience a dramatically reduced incentive to exert costly effort to maintain a positive work environment.

2.1.3 Models of Morale and Reciprocity

A broader class of efficiency wage models posit that effort responds to the generosity of compensation (Katz, 1986). The canonical model by (Akerlof, 1982) proposes that the labor market can be understood as a system of gift exchange between workers and employers. Whether by deeply ingrained reciprocity motives or notions of fairness, workers respond to generous payments by providing more effort than the minimum required, with workers "gifting back" exceptional effort for generous pay.

Morale models predict the same pattern. Namely, generous payments improve worker morale which elicits greater effort and dedication. The inverse is that, when compensation falls, workers scale back their effort and commitment accordingly (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Fehr et al., 1993; Mas, 2006). Indeed, fear of lowering morale and thus reducing effort is among the most cited rationales for nominal wage rigidity (Campbell III and Kamlani, 1997; Bewley, 1998).

A key consideration in applying these models is how teachers perceive their pensions, whether as lump sum payments or yearly accruals. A core economic principle is that people make decisions on the margin, comparing the cost and benefit of incremental actions, rather than making all-or-nothing choices. This classic economic principle, pioneered by Marshall (1890), has been extended to labor supply decisions by scholars like Edgeworth (1881), Robbins (1930), and Hicks (1932).

In the context of pensions, this suggests that teachers rationally respond to annual pension accruals rather than viewing their pension as a fixed lump sum received at career's end. Indeed, pensions are designed to shape teachers' decisions using marginal incentives, encouraging retention up to the eligibility threshold and then encouraging retirement thereafter (Gustman et al., 1994; Koedel and Podgursky, 2016). This premise is particularly plausible in our setting, as teachers are a professional group known to be highly attuned to the specific rules and eligibility thresholds of their retirement systems. Our empirical analysis supports this view, showing the lowest attrition where the pension's retention incentives are highest and a sharp increase in attrition once those incentives cease, which indicates that teachers are attuned to these marginal payments. This understanding of how teachers perceive pension accruals forms the foundation for our subsequent empirical analysis.

In our empirical analysis, we examine how effort and productivity change at the retirement eligibility threshold, where generous pension accruals cease. Specifically, before teachers reach the threshold, they accrue 71 percent of their final salary in future pension wealth per year. After reaching the threshold, that accrual falls to 15 percent of final salary. The result is that teacher compensation falls by approximately 56 percent of salary at the retirement threshold. According to reciprocity and morale models, we would expect a sharp reduction in effort and productivity at this point, as teachers experience a significant effective pay cut.

In summary, each of these models—morale and reciprocity, deferred compensation, and efficiency wages without dismissals—converge on the same prediction: namely, worker effort will decline at the retirement eligibility threshold when pension accruals stop.

2.2 Models Supporting the Selection Hypothesis

2.2.1 Models of Distinct Preference

The primary model supporting the selection hypothesis proposes that preferences for pension compensation are positively correlated with worker productivity. This theory suggests that pensions can serve as a mechanism for differentially attracting and retaining more productive workers by appealing to their distinct preferences (Gustman et al., 1994; Morrissey, 2017; Weller, 2017).

The core idea is that certain worker characteristics associated with higher productivity—such as diligence, conscientiousness, and patience—may also predispose individuals to value pension benefits more highly. For instance, more conscientious individuals might view pensions as a responsible way to prepare for the future, consistent with their general tendency to be thorough and mindful of long-term consequences.

As a result, organizations offering pension plans may naturally attract a pool of applicants with these desirable traits. Moreover, once employed, these highly productive workers are more likely to remain with the organization to fully realize their pension benefits.

Typically, employers can only manage a workforce using observed characteristics. The hope of this theory is that unobservably better workers endogenously select into and remain with the organization. If true, a pension would achieve automatically what attentive workforce management could not.

Applying this theory to our study context, the selection hypothesis predicts a specific pattern of teacher retention around the pension eligibility threshold. If teacher quality is indeed correlated with a preference for pensions, we would expect two outcomes: First, pensions would have an especially strong retentive effect on more productive teachers approaching the threshold. Second, at the threshold, the removal of this strong retentive force would cause a sharper increase in retirements among these high-performing teachers compared to their peers. This would result in excess retirements of talented workers at the eligibility threshold.

To test this prediction, we measure the change in retention rates that occurs at the pension threshold for teachers of different value-added. The model suggests that highly effective teachers will exhibit a larger change in retention rates at the threshold.

3 Retirement System for Teachers in North Carolina

North Carolina's teacher pension follows a pattern shared by defined-benefit pension systems across the country. In broad strokes, employees accrue service credits that increase their pension annuity as they remain with the employer. Teachers become eligible to draw their pension annuity when they reach age and years-of-service requirements. These requirements form the thresholds that serve as an empirical instrument for identification. Teachers in North Carolina become eligible to draw their annuity when

(1) they have 30 years of experience at any age,

(2) they are 60 years old and have at least 25 years of experience, or

(3) they are 65 years old with at least 5 years of experience.

The relevant threshold for 76 percent of teachers is 30 years of experience. The relevant threshold for another 16 percent of teachers is age 60 and 25 years of experience. The thresholds have not changed over the observation window, which we confirm by examining biennial pension records published by the national teachers' union at the Library of Congress. At least since 1982 through the end of our observation period, the eligibility thresholds have remained the same.

Teachers also have thresholds for early retirement eligibility. Under early retirement, a teacher can claim a pension annuity early, but her annuity is penalized. In North Carolina, a teacher can claim early at age 60 with at least 5 years of service or at age 50 with at least 20 years of service. This, again, has been constant since at least 1982. If a teacher takes early retirement before age 60, her yearly pension annuity is penalized by 5 percent per year that she is shy of 30 years of service credit.[8] If a teacher claims early retirement in her 60s, she faces a 3 percent penalty for each year she is short of 65. We do not observe a measurable retention effect for the early-retirement threshold so we focus the analysis on the normal-retirement threshold.

Once a teacher is eligible to retire and claims her retirement benefit, she receives a yearly payment of an amount:

$$P_{js} = FAS_j \times (1.82\% \times s_j) \tag{1}$$

That is, an eligible teacher j with years of service s, receives a pension annuity P that is the product of her final average salary calculated at retirement (FAS_j), her years of service (s_j), and a multiplier parameter determined by the state (1.82%). At retirement, her replacement rate will be ($1.82\% \times s$) and she will receive that share of her final average salary each year for the rest of her life. States and programs calculate the final average salary by slightly different formulas. In North Carolina, "final average salary" (FAS_j) is calculated as the average of a teacher's highest consecutive four years of salary prior to retirement. As an example, if a teacher retires with 30 years of experience, and her final average salary is \$80,000, her replacement rate would be $30 \times 1.82\% = 54.6\%$ and she would therefore receive $54.6\% \times \$80{,}000 = \$43{,}680$ per year in retirement.[9]

We consider how pension rules shape a teacher's incentive to maintain employment. We first compute the claiming age that maximizes the present value (PV) of benefits for retirees at each level of experience. We calculate the present value of pension wealth accrued over time for an

[8]The penalties are determined by a table that lacks a straightforward formula (North Carolina Department of State Treasurer, 2023).

[9]That amount is normally adjusted each year for cost of living based on the consumer price index and whether investment returns of the fund would cover the expense increase calculated by the state's actuaries.

archetypal teacher who begins employment at age 24 (the modal start age in our data), works continuously, and uses the optimal claiming age.[10] The optimal claiming age may differ depending on a teacher's discount rate, with impatient teachers maximizing their present value by claiming earlier but reducing their total benefits in retirement. We show the returns at two plausible discount rates, 3 and 5 percent.[11] We calculate the marginal pension incentives for retention each year, presented in Figure 1. We express incentives as the percent of a teacher's final average salary (FAS) that she earns in present-value pension wealth by working one additional year. As an example, we find that in the year a teacher vests, her pension incentive is "25," meaning that the teacher accrues 25 percent of her FAS in present-value pension wealth by working in the year she vests.

As seen in Figure 1, pension wealth spikes at five years of service, when teachers vest, and again at twenty years when teachers become eligible for early retirement.[12] Marginal returns are especially high between 21 years and 25 years of experience as the penalties for early retirement phase out. Teachers can claim full retirement at age 60 when they complete 25 years of experience. This reduces the marginal incentive somewhat because teachers do not need to work 30 years of service or wait until age 65 to claim. After teachers reach 30 years of experience, they experience a "pension cliff" in which the effective compensation from pensions falls by 56 percent of final salary.[13]

The key takeaway for our purposes is that teachers receive significant pension wealth in the years before teachers reach the retirement eligibility threshold and their effective compensation falls precipitously when they reach the threshold.

North Carolina allows teachers to cash in unused sick and personal days to increase their years-of-service credits by up to two years. Teachers can exchange 20 unused sick days for a month-of-service credit. Because teachers in North Carolina receive up to 40 days of leave each year and only use 22.5, the modal retirement is two years before the posted service requirement. We confirm this prediction with the timing of departures, which jumps at 28 years of experience, two years before the posted 30-year requirement. We incorporate data on absences to predict which teachers are eligible to claim early, which we describe in greater detail shortly.

[10]When calculating the present value of pension wealth, we assume a life expectancy of 85 (the relevant life expectancy for college-educated women). Varying life expectancy produces similar results—teachers who expect to live longer behave like those who have smaller discount rates.

[11]See Giglio et al. (2015) , Best et al. (2018), Ericson and Laibson (2018), and Johnston (2024) for evidence on discount rates. Authors tend to find discount rates of 5 percent per annum with Giglio et al. (2015) finding long-run discount rates closer to 3 percent per annum.

[12]If a teacher has 20 years of experience, she can claim early retirement at age 50.

[13]In the last year before a teacher becomes retirement eligible, they earn 69.7 percent of their final average salary in pension wealth. The next year, they earn just 13.8 percent of their final salary, constituting an effective decline in their compensation of 56 percent of salary.

4 Data and Sample Construction

4.1 Data

We use administrative records from the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC), covering staffing and students in North Carolina from 2000 through 2018. The dataset includes several key components. Staffing records include yearly employment of teachers in public schools, allowing us to identify when a teacher leaves the public school system. Our analysis focuses on teachers in grades 4 through 8 who teach tested subjects.[14] We also have information on teacher characteristics, including age and experience (based on pay codes). These enable us to determine each teacher's placement around the pension eligibility threshold each year. We have information on teacher absences for sickness, vacation, and the like for the years 2000 through 2008. We use these as a measure of effort and to calculate how many days of unused sick leave each teacher has, which can be transformed into experience credit when teachers retire. Finally, we examine output using detailed achievement and behavior records for students. We link student outcomes to teacher assignments using class assignments for each. These allow us to connect students' outcomes to their relevant teachers, even in higher grades.

4.2 Constructing Value-Added Measures

Student i is assigned to classroom $c = c(i,t)$ in school $k = k(i,t)$ in year t. Each classroom has a single teacher $j = j(c(i,t))$, though teachers may have multiple classrooms. We model student achievement as depending on observed student characteristics, X_{it}, his teacher's value-added VA_{jt}, school effects, μ_k, time effects, μ_t, classroom effects, θ_{ct}, and a randomly distributed error term, $\tilde{\epsilon}_{it}$.[15] Formally:

$$\begin{aligned} A^*_{it} &= \beta_s X_{it} + \nu_{it}, \\ \nu_{it} &= f(Z_{jt};\alpha) + \mu_{jt} + \mu_k + \mu_t + \theta_{ct} + \tilde{\epsilon}_{it}. \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

[14] This implies that we use math and reading test score data for students from grades 3 through 8. Because classroom identifiers appear in the data late, we use years 2007-2018 to construct teacher value-added.

[15] Specifically, we include ethnicity, gender, gifted designation, disability designation, whether the student is a migrant, whether the student is learning English, whether the student is economically disadvantaged, test accommodations, age, and grade-specific cubic polynomials in lagged math and lagged reading scores.

We model teachers' value added as a flexible function, $f(\cdot)$, of teacher experience, Z_{jt}, and μ_{jt} is teacher j's value-added in year t, excluding the return to experience.[16] We follow Chetty et al. (2014a) in allowing a teacher's effectiveness to "drift" over time. We use math and English test scores (standardized at the state-level to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 in each grade-by-year) to measure academic achievement in each subject. Teachers may also affect students' behavioral outcomes like truancy and disciplinary infractions, markers of important so-called non-cognitive skills (Jackson, 2018; Petek and Pope, 2023).[17] We measure teachers' impact on the first principal component of a behavioral index, including students' log absence rate, an indicator for in-school suspensions, and an indicator for out-of-school suspensions. As teachers may have direct control over current discipline enforcement, we follow Gilraine and Pope (2021) and also use the lead of this behavioral principal component when the focal teacher no longer mediates discipline enforcement. To avoid the possibility of the future teacher impacting our measure, we net out the students' subsequent class' current average of the same measure.

We estimate our model in three steps. In the first, we estimate the coefficients on student characteristics by regressing academic achievement or behavioral skills on a set of student characteristics and classroom fixed effects. In the second step, we project the residuals ($\hat{\nu}_{it}$) onto teacher fixed-effects, school fixed-effects, year fixed-effects, and the teacher experience return function. In the final step, we form our estimate of teacher j's value-added in year t (VA_{jt}) as the best linear predictor based on prior data in our sample (the prediction includes the experience function). When examining effort, we use yearly student residuals associated with each teacher to capture the part of productivity that, like effort, can potentially change from year to year. When examining quality selection, we use forecast-unbiased predicted teacher VA to capture durable teacher quality.

4.3 Unused Absences

Teachers in North Carolina need 30 years of service to be eligible for full retirement at any age. In practice, however, they can exchange unused leave for up to two years of credit towards their years-of-experience requirement.

[16] We model the experience return function as a vector of experience indicators for each of the first 6 years of teaching and an indicator for years of experience beyond that.

[17] "Non-cognitive" skills are called such in an attempt to distinguish them from traditional academic skills like reading and mathematics. The term is somewhat imprecise since all human skills are mediated by cognition, whether they be intellectual, behavioral, social, attitudinal, or physical. In this paper, we tend to use "behavioral" skills to draw the contrast with traditional measures of achievement, sometimes lapsing into the well-understood lexicon of cognitive and non-cognitive.

Each year, teachers in North Carolina receive up to 26 days of vacation leave, 12 days of sick leave, and 2 personal days. In total, young teachers are credited 28 full-day absences, and those with at least 20 years of experience are credited 40 full-day absences. We predict each teacher's full retirement eligibility date using her years of service and absence history, which we observe from 2000 to 2008. We sum absences each year and calculate the mean number of absences teachers have over the years we observe them. On average, teachers take 22.4 full days off per year (where the school year has 185 days), which means that the average teacher accrues 360 unused absences by their 28th year.

It takes 20 unused absences to earn one month of credit towards their years-of-experience requirement. While the average teacher accumulates enough saved absences to potentially retire 18 months before completing 30 years of classroom teaching, precise conversion calculations are challenging since we only observe nine years of work histories for teachers near retirement. We find that teachers with no more than 25 absences per year are most likely to leave the workforce with 28 years of work experience, and those with more than 25 absences are most likely to leave the workforce with 29 years of experience. Even when we look at teachers with absences above the 90th percentile, they are most likely to retire with 29 years of service. We use our measures of absences for each teacher to impute their expected retirement eligibility date.[18]

5 Design and Results

5.1 Effort Effects of Pensions

Remember that one of the theoretical rationales for provision is that pensions elicit additional effort from employees by improving morale, fostering reciprocity, and magnifying the downside of departure (Lazear, 1979; Gustman et al., 1994; Ruhm, 1994; Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Katz, 1986; Fehr et al., 1993; Mas, 2006). The panel dimension of our data allows us to observe yearly measures of effort and output for public school teachers in North Carolina. If effort slackens when a teacher reaches retirement eligibility, it implies that large pension payments have successfully elicited additional effort before the threshold.

Using the age and experience of each teacher, we calculate her distance to the relevant retirement-

[18] The 25-absence threshold did best predicting whether teachers retire at age 28 or 29 years of service, though our findings about effort and selection remain consistent when using different absence thresholds.

eligibility threshold. To do so, we calculate three values: (1) the employee's distance beyond the 30-years-experience cutoff, (2) the employee's distance beyond the age-60-and-25-years-experience cutoff, and (3) the employee's distance beyond the age-65-and-5-years-experience cutoff. The teacher needs only meet one threshold to be eligible for retirement, so a teacher's effective distance to retirement eligibility is the most positive distance to any threshold. Those with a distance greater than or equal to zero are retirement eligible, and those with negative values are not yet eligible to retire.

Thus, this analysis covers teachers who work past a retirement threshold, experiencing a sharp decline in total compensation. Our focus on teachers' changes in output and effort across these thresholds provides clear evidence of whether these teachers respond to the effort incentives embedded within the pension system at the point when those incentives are most salient. Unfortunately, it precludes us from examining the effort hypothesis for teachers who never surpass a retirement threshold.

We model the outcome variable E_{jt} (measures of effort for teacher j in year t) as a function of the teacher's distance to the retirement eligibility threshold while accounting for teacher fixed-effects:

$$E_{jt} = \alpha_j + \tau_t + \sum_{m \in PRE} \lambda_m \times \mathbf{1}(t - t_i^* = m) + \sum_{m \in POST} \pi_m \times \mathbf{1}(t - t_j^* = m) + \varepsilon_{jt} \quad (3)$$

Here, the indicators $\mathbf{1}(t - t_i^* = m)$ refer to event-time dummies that equal one if a teacher is exactly m years from retirement eligibility, and zero otherwise. The variable t_i^* represents the time at which a teacher becomes eligible for retirement. The first sum includes pre-eligible event years so that the λ_m coefficients capture pre-eligible trends in effort. The second sum includes post-eligible event time. We exclude a dummy for the period $m = -1$ so that period is the omitted category and the implicit reference for comparison.

If pensions elicit greater effort by teachers, we expect that the π_m coefficients would be *negative* when the outcome is positively related to effort (like yearly value-add) and *positive* when the outcome is negatively related to effort (like teacher absences). We use the average of teacher j's student achievement residuals from equation (2) in year t to measure her productivity that year in our primary analysis, as they do not directly depend upon the teacher's past effort.[19] We demean E_{jt} by year to accommodate possible year effects.

To show how effort and productivity evolve as teachers cross the retirement threshold, we

[19] In table A1 we show the results from a similar exercise using teachers' estimated value-added using only past years of data.

present estimates from equation (3) in Figure 2. Specifically, we show how teachers' math value-add, reading value-add, behavioral value-add, and absences evolve around the retirement eligibility threshold. In each of the value-added measures, we see teacher output evolving smoothly as they gain experience. At the threshold, we do not observe any significant deviation in the trend, suggesting that effort does not fall at retirement eligibility. We find that teachers have, likewise, a smooth evolution of yearly absences as they approach the eligibility threshold, and we do not find an increase in absences as teachers cross the retirement threshold. In total, this suggests pensions do not elicit additional effort, as predicted by theory, through enhanced morale, reciprocity motives, or by deferring compensation.

We pool the estimates to summarize the results with a difference-in-differences specification of the form:

$$E_{jt} = \alpha_j + \tau_t + \pi \times POST_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jt}, \tag{4}$$

Again, α_j denotes teacher fixed-effects and τ_t denotes year fixed-effects. In essence, we measure how teacher effort and productivity change on average with retirement eligibility. The estimates make careful comparisons using individual fixed effects, essentially measuring how an individual's effort changes on average at the threshold. Because the values evolve smoothly over time, we also include a time-trend control in one robustness specification and a teacher-specific pre-eligibility trend in a third specification. In each, we find no statistically significant change in measures of effort and productivity at the threshold. Crossing the threshold is associated with a 0.0021 (0.0067) effect on math value-add, a -0.0048 (0.0057) effect on reading value-add, a 0.0003 (0.0091) effect on contemporaneous behavioral value-add, and a 0.0048 (0.0136) effect on persistent behavioral value-added. We find a -1.04 (0.323) day effect on teacher absences which does not correspond to value-add increases and runs counter to the effort hypothesis of pension provision. This is especially surprising because teachers have an incentive to take fewer vacation days before they are pension-eligible since saved vacation days act as credits toward retirement eligibility. This same pattern is visible in each threshold, with reductions in absences ranging from 0.7 to 1.0 days across the different thresholds.

Three personnel theories predict that effort will fall at the threshold: the theory of worker morale from compensation, the theory of reciprocity and gift exchange, and the theory of deferred compensation. The fact that we observe no decrease in effort or productivity at the threshold implies that, in this context, these channels do not operate to increase teacher effort through these mechanisms.[20]

5.1.1 Robustness

We explore several variations to test the robustness of our conclusions. In Appendix Figure A1, we present event studies of teacher effort as measured by student residuals, this time excluding pre-trend controls. The results align with our baseline findings. While we observe a slight declining trend in residualized math scores leading up to the threshold, this trend continues unaltered at the threshold. Trends in reading VA, behavioral VA, and teacher absences remain flat, consistent with our main analysis.

To further validate our findings, we conduct event studies controlling for teacher-specific pre-trends, as shown in Appendix Figure A2. These results mirror our baseline findings, with the primary difference being reduced precision in the post-eligibility period due to fewer degrees of freedom. We also present event studies using teacher value-added rather than student residuals in Online Appendix Figure A3. These analyses corroborate our main conclusions, providing additional support for the robustness of our results across different measures of teacher effectiveness.

In Appendix Figure A3, we replicate our finding of no productivity effects from crossing the retirement threshold using yearly value-added measures of productivity rather than student residuals. This exercise reveals only more precise null effects on productivity.

In light of the recent literature uncovering shortcomings of standard fixed effects estimators, we implement Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) difference-in-differences estimator, which addresses these potential concerns. Appendix Figure A4 shows the estimates from this exercise, which again reveal no decline in effort or output.

Our main DID estimates pool observations from three thresholds to improve precision. To ensure that this pooling does not mask heterogeneous effects across different retirement eligibility thresholds, we present disaggregated estimates in Appendix Table A2. Here, we compare the esti-

[20]We might not expect the deferred compensation mechanism to operate if job loss is not a risk. Data from the Current Population Survey (2010–2024) shows job-loss rates of 2.3 percent in the private sector, 1.0 percent for public school teachers, and 1.0 percent for the public sector more broadly. This context implies a few things about how what we learn about the deferred-compensation channel generalizes to other relevant settings. First, because public school teachers do face dismissal risk, the deferred compensation channel affecting effort is theoretically live. Second, because teachers have the same dismissal risk as other government employers, the results in this study likely generalize to other government employment, where pensions are relatively common (Zook, 2023). Third, while the private and public sectors have different average dismissal rates, they are of the same order of magnitude, suggesting similar motivational dynamics may be at play.

mates for the 30-year threshold with those for the two less densely populated thresholds (requiring five and 25 years of experience). The results are consistent across thresholds, with none showing increases in effort or productivity at the retirement threshold. This consistency further supports our main findings.

Our DID estimates in Table 2 show a range of specifications, including the baseline specification, one controlling for general pre-trends, and another controlling for individual pre-trends. Each tells the same story.

One potential concern with our analysis is that teachers who continue working after reaching retirement eligibility may be a selected sample. Selection into continued teaching after retirement eligibility is unlikely to explain our finding of smooth evolution in effort and productivity through the eligibility threshold. The event study design purges out selection effects with individual fixed effects, allowing us to observe individual teachers' productivity both before and after they reach eligibility. Even if teachers who continue working are systematically different, the lack of a discontinuous change at the eligibility threshold suggests that reaching pension eligibility does not affect their effort provision.

Collectively, these robustness checks—including our examination of teacher value-added in addition to raw student residuals, teacher-specific pre-trends, behavioral and academic value-added measures, modern difference-in-differences estimators, and separate threshold analyses—reinforce our primary conclusion, that generous pension payments do not increase teacher effort or productivity

5.2 Selection Effects of Pensions

The second rationale for pensions is to foster positive selection in the workplace. The logic is that pensions may be more attractive to conscientious and committed employees and differentially attract and retain them (Gustman et al., 1994). The pension eligibility threshold provides an opportunity to empirically observe whether pensions have a positive effect on selection. If pension incentives differentially retain high-caliber teachers, we would expect to see a larger spike in their attrition at the threshold when these incentives cease.

Pensions are structured to provide workers incentives to remain with an employer until the worker is eligible for retirement. Recalling Figure 1, pensions reward those who stay, with especially large accruals in the years leading up to retirement eligibility. Consequently, attrition odds are relatively low before workers reach the threshold and especially high after. If pensions do indeed foster positive selection, we would expect to see a more pronounced spike in departures among high-performing teachers at the threshold.

To see whether pensions foster positive selection, we test whether high-value-added teachers are more likely to be retained through the pension incentive than low-value-added ones. To operationalize this approach, we separate teachers into three bins based on the predictable part of teacher value-added, calculated as described above. We use yearly VA up to the year prior to eligibility to predict the teacher's durable value-added and use that measure to categorize teachers into three bins: a high-performing bin (the top third), a middle-performing bin (the middle third), and a low-performing bin (the bottom third). Within each of those groups, we plot the departure hazard over time around the retirement eligibility threshold.

For a typical teacher, attrition rates are steady at 2 percent per year in the decade leading up to retirement eligibility with attrition rising somewhat just before full eligibility. At the threshold, attrition rates vault by an order of magnitude to almost 20 percent, where the change in retention at eligibility describes the retentive effect of the pension. What is important for our purposes is that the attrition patterns of the three groups are very similar around the threshold. This is true regardless of which measure of value-added we employ (value-added for math, for reading, or for behavioral skills). This similarity implies that the retentive effect of the pension is similar for low-value-added and high-value-added teachers. If pensions were differentially retaining high-value-added teachers, their attrition would increase by more when those incentives cease. The similarity of the retention patterns for the three groups suggests that they have similar preferences for pensions. Therefore, pensions engender no selection advantage, with similar effects on their labor supply decisions across teacher quality levels.

We gauge the retentive effect of pensions to compare the attrition rate pre- and post-retirement eligibility in a specification to test statistically what we observe visually. We estimate the following equation:

$$Ret_{jt} = \alpha_k + \tau_t + eligible_{jt}\beta + \mathbf{1}[\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{k}] \times eligible_{jt}\boldsymbol{\delta}_k + f(TTE_{jt}) + \epsilon_{jt}, \tag{5}$$

Here, $K = k$ indicates teacher type, α_k is a fixed effect for being a high- or low-value-added teacher and τ_t is a year fixed-effect. The term $f(TTE_{jt})$ represents a local-linear function of time-to-eligibility for retirement. We allow this relationship to differ by teacher type. The coefficient β is the discontinuous effect of becoming retirement eligible for average-quality teachers, and $\boldsymbol{\delta}_k$ reflects the differential magnitude of the discontinuities for low- and high-value-added teachers. We estimate this specification at bandwidths of 5 and 10 years around the retirement eligibility threshold to assess robustness.

Like the figures, we find large impacts of the retirement thresholds on attrition. When teachers reach their retirement eligibility, they become about 17 (2.26) percentage points more likely to retire.[21] We find statistically identical retentive effects for the three groups, regardless of how value-added is constructed. This suggests that pension preferences do not differ by teacher quality and therefore pensions do not shape selection. Though our analysis does not directly test early career selection, the implied similarity of preferences makes this possibility unlikely. In a converging literature, Johnston (2024) similarly finds no difference in pension preferences by teacher quality.

Some models suggest that financial incentives of pensions may be second order. Goldhaber et al. (2024), for instance, find that retention patterns are similar across pension plans with different retention incentives in Washington state. This suggests that eligibility thresholds form what amounts to a behavioral anchor or social norm that guides workers selecting their retirement date.[22] The basic results of our paper have a similar takeaway under this model of behavior. If the incentive effects are social or psychological rather than financial, what matters to the employer is whether those intangible incentives operate more powerfully on high-quality workers than low-quality ones, and we find they do not.

5.2.1 Robustness

We conduct several variations to test the robustness of our conclusions regarding the selection effects of pensions. In Appendix Figure A5, we present an alternative version of our graphical attrition-rate analysis that uses counts rather than rates. This approach yields results consistent with our baseline findings: highly effective teachers do not exhibit a larger attrition increase at the threshold, suggesting they have similar preferences and therefore no positive selection. This pattern holds true across various measures of teacher quality, including math value-added (VA), reading VA,

[21] Consistent with Mahler (2018) in some specifications we find that highly effective teachers have lower attrition rates

[22] This may be particularly powerful if most individual workers do not carefully optimize their retirement date but instead rely on what others tend to do.

and different versions of behavioral VA.

To ensure our results are not sensitive to the choice of analytic sample, we vary the bandwidth around the threshold in our regression analyses (Table 3). We find no significant differences in the results when using narrower or broader bandwidths, further supporting the robustness of our main findings.

We also examine whether our results are sensitive to the specific measure of teacher effectiveness. Our analyses employ various value-added measures (math, reading, and behavioral skills), and the consistency of results across these strengthens confidence in the findings.

Lastly, while our primary regression estimates pool observations from three thresholds to improve precision, we recognize the potential for this approach to obscure heterogeneous effects across different retirement eligibility thresholds. We present disaggregated estimates in Appendix Tables A3 and A4, separately analyzing the 30-year threshold and the two less densely populated thresholds (requiring five and 25 years of experience). The results again remain consistent across these different thresholds, with none showing enhanced retention for more effective teachers.

Collectively, these robustness checks reinforce our primary conclusion that generous pension payments do not significantly alter the composition of the teacher workforce through differential retention of more effective teachers. The consistency of our results across various specifications, measures of teacher effectiveness, and retirement eligibility thresholds provides strong support for the validity of our findings.

6 Conclusion

Theoretical rationales for employer-provided pensions often highlight their potential to enhance employee effort and foster positive workforce selection. This paper empirically tests these claims within the public school system, using rich administrative data to examine how pension incentives around retirement eligibility influence teacher productivity and late-career selective retention.

Our findings indicate that a substantial decline in effective compensation at the retirement-eligibility threshold does not lead to a corresponding decrease in teacher productivity or attendance. This suggests that, for these teachers, pension accruals near retirement do not elicit additional effort. Similarly, we find no evidence that these pension structures selectively retain higher-performing teachers in late career; pensions appear to exert a comparable retentive influence regardless of teacher performance.

The impact of pensions on initial selection into the teaching profession, rather than the late-career retention patterns we study, remains a key area for future inquiry. As our analysis is focused on experienced teachers, subsequent research could, for example, use choice experiments with prospective teachers to assess if preferences for pension benefits correlate with productive attributes prior to labor market entry. Such work would complement our findings by providing a more complete picture of how pensions shape the teacher workforce across different career stages.

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Table 1: Summary statistics

	Full Sample	Within 10 years	Within 5 years
Math VA (mean)	0.00	0.01	0.01
Math VA (sd)	0.147	0.156	0.157
Math VA (N)	22,028	6,705	3,808
Reading VA (mean)	0.00	0.01	0.01
Reading VA (sd)	0.070	0.074	0.075
Reading VA (N)	23,181	7,143	4,068
Behavioral VA (mean)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Behavioral VA (sd)	0.070	0.078	0.080
Behavioral VA (N)	21,975	6,693	3,800
Behavioral VA (t+1) (mean)	-0.00	0.00	0.00
Behavioral VA (t+1) (sd)	0.108	0.119	0.121
Behavioral VA (t+1) (N)	21,994	6,690	3,797
Math student resid. (mean)	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
Math student resid. (sd)	0.253	0.252	0.252
Math student resid. (N)	22,028	6,705	3,808
Reading student resid. (mean)	-0.00	0.00	0.00
Reading student resid. (sd)	0.190	0.193	0.192
Reading student resid. (N)	23,181	7,143	4,068
Behavioral student resid. (mean)	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
Behavioral student resid. (sd)	0.290	0.288	0.291
Behavioral student resid. (N)	21,975	6,693	3,800
Behavioral student resid. (t+1) (mean)	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
Behavioral student resid. (t+1) (sd)	0.526	0.525	0.522
Behavioral student resid. (t+1) (N)	21,994	6,690	3,797
Days absent (mean)	23.12	22.86	22.43
Days absent (sd)	12.027	10.228	9.834
Days absent (N)	17,016	3,866	2,199
Notch at experience=28 (mean)	0.44	0.43	0.48
Notch at experience=29 (mean)	0.32	0.23	0.22
Notch at experience=25 (mean)	0.09	0.12	0.11
Notch at age=60 (mean)	0.07	0.09	0.09
Notch at age=65 (mean)	0.08	0.13	0.10
Attrition(mean)	0.03	0.05	0.08
Number of teachers	25,798	9,010	5,591

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for various samples including the full sample of teachers as well as analytic samples of teachers observed within five or ten years of the retirement threshold. Math VA is the forecast-unbiased predicted VA based on yearly residuals for each teacher. Current behavioral VA is calculated by principal component analysis using student truancy and disciplinary actions (in-school suspensions and out-of-school suspensions) using the outcomes in the year the student is assigned the teacher of measurement. Persistent behavioral VA is the same but uses as the outcome the behavior of the students in the future, specifically in the year after they have left the teacher of measurement. We show which threshold is relevant for the sample with an indicator for being at the threshold at different experience and age profiles. Finally, we show the average attrition rate for each sample. Number of teachers is provided several times to explain the sample available for different measures.

Table 2: Teacher effort across the retirement threshold

	(1) Math VA	(2) Reading VA	(3) Behavioral VA	(4) Behavioral (t+1) VA	(5) Teacher Absences
Eligible	0.00206	-0.00475	-0.000336	0.00476	-1.044***
	(0.00672)	(0.00566)	(0.00910)	(0.0136)	(0.323)
Dependent var. SD	0.280	0.189	0.284	0.521	10.33
Control for pre-trends	No	No	No	No	No
Teacher pre-trends	No	No	No	No	No

(a) Baseline specification

	(1) Math VA	(2) Reading VA	(3) Behavioral VA	(4) Behavioral (t+1) VA	(5) Teacher Absences
Eligible	0.00611	-0.00351	0.000831	0.00465	-0.753**
	(0.00683)	(0.00583)	(0.00955)	(0.0142)	(0.344)
Control for pre-trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Teacher pre-trends	No	No	No	No	No

(b) Controlling for pre-trends

	(1) Math VA	(2) Reading VA	(3) Behavioral VA	(4) Behavioral (t+1) VA	(5) Teacher Absences
Eligible	0.00561	-0.00848	0.0145	0.00864	-1.491*
	(0.0135)	(0.0111)	(0.0205)	(0.0293)	(0.787)
Control for pre-trends	No	No	No	No	No
Teacher pre-trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	41476	43203	41339	37055	33806

(c) Including teacher-specific pre-trends

Notes: In this table, we present estimates of how much the pension eligibility threshold corresponds to changes in teacher productivity and effort, using equation 4. In short, we regress measures of teacher output on an indicator for pension eligibility with controls for teacher fixed-effects and time fixed-effects. The design compares the effort of retirement-eligible teachers to their own effort before they were eligible. In general, we find that eligibility has little to no impact on productivity. While theory predicts teachers will exert less effort after the threshold, we find that teacher attendance increases without a corresponding increase in productivity. All regressions include teacher and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the teacher level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Differential attrition by teacher value-add at retirement threshold

	Quality by Math VA		Quality by Reading VA		Quality by Behavioral VA		Quality by Behavioral VA (t+1)	
	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition
Eligible	0.163***	0.171***	0.145***	0.141***	0.148***	0.120***	0.126***	0.151***
	(0.0183)	(0.0226)	(0.0183)	(0.0233)	(0.0181)	(0.0229)	(0.0196)	(0.0238)
Low-quality	0.0135	0.0224	-0.00607	-0.0114	0.000566	-0.0147	-0.00489	0.00995
	(0.0101)	(0.0188)	(0.00994)	(0.0188)	(0.00968)	(0.0182)	(0.0117)	(0.0199)
Low × eligible	-0.0249	-0.0286	0.00807	0.0123	-0.0126	0.0280	-0.00107	-0.0119
	(0.0266)	(0.0331)	(0.0260)	(0.0326)	(0.0258)	(0.0321)	(0.0272)	(0.0334)
High-quality	-0.00716	0.0159	-0.0203**	-0.0168	-0.00988	-0.0194	-0.0217**	-0.0147
	(0.00891)	(0.0168)	(0.00901)	(0.0173)	(0.00941)	(0.0179)	(0.0110)	(0.0187)
High × eligible	-0.00103	-0.0434	0.0160	0.000752	0.0272	0.0465	0.0337	0.0197
	(0.0246)	(0.0306)	(0.0241)	(0.0304)	(0.0250)	(0.0315)	(0.0264)	(0.0325)
Bandwidth	10	5	10	5	10	5	10	5
Depvar mean	0.0515	0.0948	0.0513	0.0940	0.0515	0.0947	0.0743	0.109
N	26444	11548	27917	12183	26330	11491	18252	10036

Notes: This table presents estimates of how much pension eligibility corresponds to increases in attrition for teachers of different output, using equation 5. Intuitively, we measure whether the change in retention at the threshold differs for highly productive teachers when compared to less productive teachers. If attrition increases more for highly productive teachers, it implies that the pension incentives for retention acted more powerfully on high value-add teachers and improved *selection*. We do not find that pensions are more likely to retain high-performing teachers, suggesting that pensions do not promote positive selection. Robust standard error are in parentheses with * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 1: Pension Returns from Experience as Teachers Approach a Retirement threshold



Notes: The figure shows the pension-wealth returns to experience for an archetypal teacher. The archetypal teacher begins her career at age 24 and is therefore not eligible for retirement until she reaches 30 years of service credit. The vertical scale measures how large the return is for an additional year of experience, where the y-axis is a measure of what percent of her final average salary (FAS) she accrues by an additional year of experience in terms of the present-discounted value of her lifetime pension income. In years 22–30, she receives a large present-discounted return, up to 100 percent of her FAS, from each additional year of service. This return falls precipitously when she crosses the retirement eligibility threshold at 30 years of experience.

Figure 2: Effort and output across the retirement threshold

(a) Math



(b) Reading



(c) Behavioral



(d) Behavioral (t+1)



(e) Teachers' days absent



Notes: The figures are plots of the coefficients from equation 3, showing teachers-associated student achievement gains (residuals) and teachers' absences as they cross the retirement-eligibility threshold. Because the estimates are conditioned on teacher fixed-effects, the estimates compare a teacher's output to her own output in other years. We calculate student residuals in each year so that they can change from one year to the next as incentives change. We plot the coefficients on event-study dummies here to show transparently how teacher performance changes in the run-up to eligibility, as teachers become eligible, and their dynamics while teachers are eligible to retire but remain working. The y-axis is scaled to approximately reflect 1 SD of the mean student residuals.

Figure 3: Attrition rates around pension threshold, by teacher quality



Notes: This figure presents how attrition evolves around the threshold for different VA groups (the top third, the middle third, and the bottom third of value-added). We find that attrition increases significantly at the threshold. We find no meaningful differences in attrition rates by teacher-effectiveness, meaning that high-VA teachers were not more likely to be retained by the pension than low-VA teachers. This suggests that pensions do not promote positive selection.

A Appendix: Supporting Figures

Figure A1: Effort and output across the retirement threshold, excluding pre-trend controls

(a) Math



(b) Reading



(c) Behavioral



(d) Behavioral (t+1)



(e) Days absent



Notes: These figures show teachers' average student residuals as teachers cross the retirement-eligibility threshold excluding controls for pre-threshold trends. We calculate average student residuals in each year we observe her. We plot the coefficients on event-study dummies here to show transparently how teacher value-added changes in the run-up to eligibility, as teachers become eligible, and their dynamics while teachers are eligible to retire but remain working. The y-axis is scaled to approximately reflect 1 SD of the outcome measure.

Figure A2: Effort and output across the retirement threshold, controlling for teacher-specific pre-trends

(a) Math



(b) Reading



(c) Behavioral



(d) Behavioral (t+1)



(e) Days absent



Notes: These figures show teachers' average student residuals as teachers cross the retirement-eligibility threshold with teacher-specific detrended data. While the estimates in the post-period are noisier, they still do not show a drop in teacher productivity following the threshold. The y-axis is scaled to approximately reflect 1 SD of the outcome measure.

Figure A3: Productivity across the retirement threshold, as measured by teachers' VA

(a) Math



(b) Reading



(c) Behavioral



(d) Behavioral (t+1)



Notes: These figures show teachers' value-added as teachers cross the retirement-eligibility threshold. We calculate teacher value-added in each year we observe her. We plot the coefficients on event-study dummies here to show transparently how teacher value-added changes in the run-up to eligibility, as teachers become eligible, and their dynamics while teachers are eligible to retire but remain working. The y-axis is scaled to approximately reflect 1 SD of the value-added measure.

Figure A4: Productivity and effort across the retirement threshold using Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021)

(a) Math



(b) Reading



(c) Behavioral



(d) Behavioral (t+1)



(e) Days absent



Notes: These figures show teachers' value-added and days absent as teachers cross the retirement-eligibility threshold. We calculate teacher value-added in each year we observe her. We plot the coefficients on event-study dummies here from Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) estimation to show transparently how teacher value-added changes in the run-up to eligibility, as teachers become eligible, and their dynamics while teachers are eligible to retire but remain working. The pretend is abridged with this estimator because unlike with the TWFE estimator, teachers who do not teach past the year of eligibility are designated as never treated and do not inform the magnitude of pre-eligibility coefficients.

Figure A5: Attrition counts around pension threshold, by teacher quality

(a) Math



(b) Reading



(c) Behavioral



(d) Behavioral (t+1)



Notes: This figure shows how much pension eligibility corresponds to increases in attrition separately for teachers in the lowest, middle, and highest tertile of teacher effectiveness. In general, we find that eligibility increases attrition significantly. Of interest in this study is whether low-performing teachers are less likely to be retained by pension incentives, but we find no meaningful differences by teacher quality in the number of teachers who leave once eligible for retirement. This suggests that pensions do not promote positive selection.

B Appendix: Supporting Tables

Table A1: Teacher effort across retirement threshold, measuring productivity by teachers' VA

	(1) Math VA	(2) Reading VA	(3) Behavioral VA	(4) Persistent Behav. VA	(5) Teacher Absences
eligible	0.000525	-0.000747	0.000781	0.000979	-1.044***
	(0.00263)	(0.00168)	(0.00176)	(0.00266)	(0.323)
Fixed effects	Teacher, year	Teacher, year	Teacher, year	Teacher, year	Teacher, year
Depvar mean	0.00707	0.00592	0.000121	0.000744	23.17
Depvar sd	0.154	0.0728	0.0762	0.116	10.33
N	42930	44674	42898	38372	33806

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: This table presents estimates of how much pension eligibility corresponds to productivity and effort. In general, we find that effort remains strikingly constant across the threshold. As measures of effort here, we include teacher value-added on math tests, reading tests, current student behavior, future student behavior, and teacher attendance. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A2: Teacher effort across the retirement threshold, separating thresholds

	(1) Math VA	(2) Reading VA	(3) Behavioral VA	(4) Behavioral (t+1) VA	(5) Teacher Absences
Eligible	0.000308	-0.00741	-0.0000552	0.0136	-0.748**
	(0.00562)	(0.00511)	(0.00973)	(0.0139)	(0.352)
Observations	42553	43934	33257	30353	22713

(a) 30-year threshold

	(1) Math VA	(2) Reading VA	(3) Behavioral VA	(4) Behavioral (t+1) VA	(5) Teacher Absences
Eligible	-0.0104	-0.0140*	0.00680	0.00335	-1.013
	(0.0104)	(0.00849)	(0.0147)	(0.0214)	(1.001)
Observations	22111	23027	18026	16618	10975

(b) lower-experience thresholds

Notes: This table presents estimates of how much pension eligibility corresponds to changes in teacher productivity and effort. In general, we find that eligibility has little impact on productivity. While the incentive structure might induce teachers to exert less effort after the retirement threshold, we find that teacher attendance increases after the threshold without a corresponding increase in productivity. All regressions include teacher and year fixed-effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the teacher level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A3: Differential attrition by teacher value-add at 30-year retirement threshold

	Quality by Math VA		Quality by Reading VA		Quality by Behavioral VA		Quality by Behavioral VA (t+1)	
	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition
Eligible	0.149***	0.163***	0.145***	0.145***	0.137***	0.120***	0.128***	0.148***
	(0.0198)	(0.0252)	(0.0196)	(0.0258)	(0.0189)	(0.0244)	(0.0214)	(0.0264)
Low-quality	0.0128	0.0181	-0.0123	-0.0187	-0.0131	-0.0218	-0.0119	0.00000280
	(0.0107)	(0.0206)	(0.0100)	(0.0193)	(0.00960)	(0.0182)	(0.0123)	(0.0206)
Low × eligible	-0.0100	-0.0176	-0.00450	-0.00191	-0.00620	0.0212	0.0110	-0.00682
	(0.0289)	(0.0370)	(0.0270)	(0.0347)	(0.0264)	(0.0333)	(0.0284)	(0.0354)
High-quality	-0.0108	-0.00724	-0.0150	-0.0173	-0.00540	-0.0177	-0.0200*	-0.0241
	(0.00886)	(0.0171)	(0.00917)	(0.0182)	(0.00972)	(0.0189)	(0.0117)	(0.0197)
High × eligible	0.0122	-0.0204	0.0123	0.00425	0.0448*	0.0634*	0.0403	0.0297
	(0.0254)	(0.0323)	(0.0254)	(0.0329)	(0.0264)	(0.0340)	(0.0282)	(0.0352)
Bandwidth	10	5	10	5	10	5	10	5
Depvar mean	0.0402	0.0725	0.0397	0.0718	0.0402	0.0726	0.0587	0.0832
N	17558	7875	18507	8329	17543	7869	12016	6867

Notes: This table presents estimates of how much pension eligibility at 30 years of experience corresponds to increases in attrition using equation 5. The logic is that we measure whether the change in retention at the threshold differs for highly productive teachers when compared to less productive teachers. If attrition increases more for highly productive teachers than less productive teachers, it implies that the pension incentives acted more powerfully on high value-add teachers and pensions improve *selection*. In general, we find little evidence of differential selection at the 30-year pension eligibility, though teachers with few behavioral infractions and good student attendance are marginally statistically significantly more likely to attrit when looking only at this threshold. We note that this finding may be an artifact of the number of hypotheses that are tested here. Robust standard error are in parentheses with * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4: Differential attrition by teacher value-add, at lower experience thresholds

	Quality by Math VA		Quality by Reading VA		Quality by Behavioral VA		Quality by Behavioral VA (t+1)	
	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition	Attrition
Eligible	0.182***	0.165***	0.150***	0.129***	0.172***	0.120***	0.135***	0.162***
	(0.0336)	(0.0412)	(0.0327)	(0.0413)	(0.0363)	(0.0461)	(0.0355)	(0.0432)
Low-quality	0.0104	0.0211	0.0132	0.00442	0.00308	-0.0232	0.0117	0.0303
	(0.0186)	(0.0348)	(0.0193)	(0.0367)	(0.0191)	(0.0368)	(0.0223)	(0.0389)
Low × eligible	-0.0365	-0.0173	0.0432	0.0632	0.000287	0.0476	-0.0118	-0.0222
	(0.0496)	(0.0604)	(0.0507)	(0.0628)	(0.0506)	(0.0629)	(0.0530)	(0.0644)
High-quality	0.0162	0.0635*	-0.0122	0.00329	-0.0196	-0.0383	-0.00581	0.0175
	(0.0181)	(0.0349)	(0.0174)	(0.0333)	(0.0188)	(0.0362)	(0.0208)	(0.0364)
High × eligible	-0.0127	-0.0531	-0.00373	-0.0163	-0.0171	0.0160	0.000892	-0.0128
	(0.0486)	(0.0607)	(0.0466)	(0.0567)	(0.0503)	(0.0617)	(0.0498)	(0.0613)
Bandwidth	10	5	10	5	10	5	10	5
Depvar mean	0.0690	0.129	0.0681	0.128	0.0690	0.129	0.0970	0.148
N	10331	4321	10897	4533	10331	4321	7322	3754

Notes: This table presents estimates of how much pension eligibility at 25 and 5 years of experience at ages above 60 and 65 corresponds to increases in attrition. In general, we find that eligibility increases attrition significantly, but does not appear to do so differentially by tertiles of teacher quality. Robust standard error are in parentheses with * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C A Model of Deferred Compensation without Dismissals

In this section, we show that pensions can increase effort by deferring compensation, even in the absence of a dismissal threat. In this framework, reputation throughout the length of a worker's career offers an incentive to induce effort, and career longevity may be manipulated through pension generosity. This basic result is clear when comparing pension schemes to none as is common in deferred compensation models. More nuance is required to tailor the model to our environment where there may be incremental changes to pension generosity. We take this latter approach. To formalize the hypothesis, we present a simple model of worker behavior.

Consider a worker who makes two key decisions: the level of his effort in each period and the duration of his employment with his current firm. That is the worker chooses an effort level in each period, E_t, and also chooses the total number of periods he will work for the firm, T.

Let W_t represent the real wage in period t, which grows at the rate of γ.[23] At the end of his career, the worker will be eligible to draw a pension benefit of $\delta T \cdot W_T$ each period, where a policy parameter δ and his terminal tenure determine the share of his final salary the worker receives for the rest of his life, L.

Workers face a trade-off when deciding how much effort to exert at work. The trade-off is central to our model and can be understood through two key components: the cost of effort and its benefits to the worker.

On one hand, exertion is costly for workers. It reduces their immediate utility by αE_t^β with $\beta > 2$ and $\alpha > 1$ such that the cost to workers is convex. This cost function reflects the increasing marginal disutility of effort.

On the other hand, greater effort yields important benefits by improving the worker's reputation within the firm. Enhanced reputation, in turn, improves the worker's own subjective utility derived from employment at the firm. "Reputation" can be understood broadly. It captures all the ways that effort improves the worker's subjective utility arising from his own effort. In addition to actual reputation, it includes fostering better relationships with managers and colleagues, contributing to a more pleasant work environment, and increasing overall job satisfaction.

Conversely, shirking carries its own cost. When workers exert less effort, it reduces the worker's reputation and degrades the work setting for the shirking worker. This degraded work environment can manifest in strained relationships with colleagues or weaker standing when requesting assignments, all of which decrease the worker's utility.

To capture these dynamics in our model, we introduce function E(t). This represents the cumulative reputation benefit as a share of the base wage, measuring the utility a worker receives in period t based on his history of effort up to that point.

The worker's objective is to choose a duration, T, and an effort sequence E_t that maximizes

[23] These real wages may be thought of as net of workers discounting.

his lifetime utility. Total lifetime utility is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} U(T,u) \equiv \int_0^T W(1+\gamma t)dt + \int_T^L \delta T W(1+\gamma T)dt \\ + \int_0^T \int_0^t E(s)dsdt - \alpha \int_0^T E^\beta(t)dt. \end{aligned} \tag{C.1}$$

The first term, the integral over $W(1+\gamma t)$, captures lifetime utility coming from the sequence of yearly real wages. The second term describes the utility arising from pension accruals. The third represents utility from reputation derived from the worker's own effort in current and past periods. The final term describes the cost of effort from exertion.

To find the optimal effort path, E_t, effort must be that which sets the derivative equal to zero. The optimal effort must satisfy:

$$\lim_{u\to 0} \frac{U(T,E+u\phi) - U(T,E)}{u} = 0 \text{ for all test functions } \phi. \tag{C.2}$$

Using (C.1), this is

$$\int_0^T \int_0^t \phi(s)dsdt - \beta\alpha \int_0^T E(t)\phi(t)dt = 0 \text{ for all test functions } \phi. \tag{C.3}$$

To simplify this expression, we integrate the first term by parts. This technique allows us to reduce the double integral to a single integral:

$$t\int_0^t \phi(s)ds|_0^T - \int_0^T t\phi(t)dt - \beta\alpha \int_0^T E(t)\phi(t)dt = 0$$

Rearranging terms, we obtain:

$$\int_0^T [(T-t) - \beta\alpha E(t)]\phi(t)dt = 0 \text{ for all test functions } \phi.$$

This expression implies that the bracketed factor must integrate to zero on the interval $[0,T]$, yielding the Euler-Lagrange equation

$$(T-t) - \beta\alpha E(t)^{\beta-1} = 0 \tag{C.4}$$

Solving this equation, we can express the optimal effort at time t as:

$$E^*(t) \equiv \left(\frac{T-t}{\beta\alpha}\right)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}}. \tag{C.5}$$

The result shows that the optimal effort choice increases with terminal tenure T. This implies that workers who anticipate longer careers with the firm will exert more effort at work. Therefore, if pensions effectively extend a worker's expected tenure, they also increase his optimal effort. This provides a mechanism by which pensions can motivate higher effort levels even in the absence of dismissal threats.

The solution also shows that effort decreases as the worker approaches his expected departure date. This suggests that worker productivity may naturally decline toward the end of a career, not because of physical or mental deterioration, but as a rational response to diminishing returns on reputation building.

Inserting this into (C.1), we seek to maximize

$$\begin{aligned}&\int_0^T W(1+\gamma t)dt + (L-T)\delta T W(1+\gamma T)\\ &+\int_0^T\int_0^t \Big(\frac{T-s}{\beta\alpha}\Big)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}} ds dt - \alpha\int_0^T \Big(\frac{T-t}{\beta\alpha}\Big)^{\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}} dt.\end{aligned} \tag{C.6}$$

over all choices of T. Making the substitution $z = T - s$ in the integral with respect to s and $z = T - t$ in the last integral, the previous expression may be written

$$\begin{aligned}&\int_0^T W(1+\gamma t)dt + (L-T)\delta T W(1+\gamma T)\\ &+\int_0^T\int_{T-t}^T \Big(\frac{z}{\beta\alpha}\Big)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}} dz dt - \alpha\int_0^T \Big(\frac{z}{\beta\alpha}\Big)^{\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}} dz.\end{aligned} \tag{C.7}$$

So, the first order condition for optimality is

$$\begin{aligned}&W(1+\gamma T) + \delta W[L(1+2\gamma T) - 2T - (1+2\gamma)T^2]\\ &+\int_0^T \Big(\frac{z}{\beta\alpha}\Big) dz + \int_0^T [\Big(\frac{T}{\alpha\beta}\Big)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}} - \Big(\frac{T-t}{\alpha\beta}\Big)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}}]dt - \alpha\Big(\frac{T}{\alpha\beta}\Big)^{\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}} = 0.\end{aligned} \tag{C.8}$$

The second integrand in the brackets, using the substitution $z = T - t$ again, cancels the first integral, leaving

$$\begin{aligned}&W(1+\gamma T) + \delta W[L(1+2\gamma T) - 2T - (1+2\gamma)T^2] + T\Big(\frac{T}{\alpha\beta}\Big)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}} - \alpha\Big(\frac{T}{\alpha\beta}\Big)^{\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}}\\ &= W(1+\gamma T) + \delta W[L(1+2\gamma T) - 2T - (1+2\gamma)T^2] + \frac{1}{(\alpha\beta)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}}}[1-\frac{1}{\beta}]T^{\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}} = 0.\end{aligned} \tag{C.9}$$

The solution, we call T^* and rewrite equation (C.9) as follows.

$$\frac{1}{(\alpha\beta)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}}}[1-\frac{1}{\beta}]T^{*\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}} = \delta W[2T^* + (1+2\gamma)T^{*2} - L(1+2\gamma T^*)] - W(1+\gamma T^*). \tag{C.10}$$

A unique solution for T^* exists in the range of $(0, L)$ for a wide range of reasonable parameter values.[24]

We would like to know how optimal effort responds to changes in δ, the rate at which an additional year of service accrues pension income as a fraction of the wage at the last year of service.

[24] When $T = 0$, $0 < W + \delta L$ and when $T = L$, $0 > (\alpha\beta)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}}(W(1+\gamma L - \delta(L+\gamma L^2)) + (1-\frac{1}{\beta})L^{\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}}$, which is dominated by the term $-(\alpha\beta)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}}\delta\gamma L^2 < 0$ with $\alpha > 1, \beta > 2$, and W and L being large. $\delta > \gamma$, $\delta\gamma L^2 > 1$, $\delta\gamma W > 1$ are sufficient conditions and each is plausible.

This will tell us if pension generosity impacts effort even without the threat of displacement.

We will calculate the derivative of E^* with respect to δ by using the chain rule

$$\frac{dE^*}{d\delta} = \frac{dE^*}{dT}\frac{T^*}{d\delta}.$$

We have already established that $\frac{dE^*}{dT} > 0$ above, as increases in the time to retirement magnifies the reputational benefits (or costs) of expending effort (or shirking). Therefore, the relationship between effort and pension generosity hinges on the power of pension generosity to impact tenure duration. This relationship is not monotonic in our model, and pensions can either increase or decrease T^* depending on parameter values. Since (C.9) defines T^* as a function of δ, we take the derivative with respect to δ.

$$\frac{\partial T^*}{\partial \delta} = \frac{(\beta\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}} W[2T^* + 3\gamma T^{*2} - L - 2LT^*]}{(\beta\alpha)^{\frac{1}{\beta-1}} W[\gamma + \delta(2\gamma L - 2 - 6\gamma T^*)] + T^{*\frac{1}{\beta-1}}} \tag{C.11}$$

A wide range of parameter values lead to $\frac{\partial T^*}{\partial \delta} > 0$. For instance, with $\alpha > 1$, $\beta > 2$, and W large, the sign is determined by the terms between the brackets. Let $bT^* = L$. One sufficient condition is that as long as $\frac{3\gamma T^*+2}{2\gamma T^*+1} < b < 3 - \frac{1}{2\delta T^*} + \frac{1}{\gamma T^*}$, additional pension generosity will increase years of service and thereby increase effort throughout a worker's career. Note that the minimum b may be as low as 1.5 depending on the rate of wage growth, γ, and the upper limit may take any value depending on γ and δ. Employers determine both parameters, giving them the latitude to tailor salary schedules and pension generosity to values that allow them to extract effort. In our context, we study a change in δ that occurs at 30 years of experience with an expected 18 more years of life such that $1.6\bar{3}T = L$, falling at the lower end but within the range above.[25] Thus, for teachers at the retirement notch and earlier in their careers, the model may predict the pension to increase the years of service and effort within the classroom. This is because a marginal increase in generosity induces workers to extend their years of service to bid up their wages and, ultimately, the pension income that they receive once they retire. Likewise, the precipitous fall in the rate of pension accrual is predicted to shorten the time to retirement and lead to a commensurate reduction in teacher effort.

This is a stylized model of deferred compensation in the absence of a threat of dismissal, adding incentives for costly effort from workers' reputations. In it, employers may induce workers to expend effort through marginal manipulation of pension generosity. Pension generosity may increase workers' years of service with the employer, thereby increasing the future benefits of expending effort today.

[25] With fewer years of life to collect potential pension income, more generous rates of accrual induce the worker to shorten years of service and increase years of higher pension income and no work.