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WELFARE EFFECTS OF A PERMANENT UNCONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM: EVIDENCE FROM MARICÁ, BRAZIL

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Welfare Effects of a Permanent Unconditional Cash Transfer Program: Evidence from Maricá, Brazil

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ABSTRACT

We investigate the impact of a permanent unconditional cash transfer called "Citizen's Basic Income" in the city of Maricá, Brazil. At the time of the study, the program made monthly household-level transfers of USD 180 PPP on average to about a fourth of the city's residents. The program is unique in that it is both unconditional and permanent, while existing programs typically only have one of these features. Between September 2021 and April 2022, we surveyed 5,182 individuals, about half of whom received the RBC. We use propensity score matching with inverse probability weights to create a matched comparison group and estimate the effect of the program on economic, social, and psychological outcomes. Our results reveal several positive welfare effects. Household income including transfers increased by 9%; consumption at the per capita level did not change significantly, but the household as a whole experienced a consumption increase of 5%. We also observe improvements in an index of children's health and education, although the effect does not survive multiple inference correction and bounding. There was a notable displacement of other income sources, particularly labor income, which decreased by 17% among recipients, suggesting shifts to lower-paying but potentially more desirable jobs during the pandemic. The program also led to increased access to financial services, but decreased the propensity to save. These findings paint a nuanced picture of the socioeconomic benefits of unconditional cash transfers and established cash transfer administrative systems.

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1 Introduction

The past few decades have seen a substantial increase in the prevalence of unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programs in low- and middle-income countries. A common feature of many of these programs is that they deliver one-time transfers, rather than a permanent increase in income (Baird et al., 2013; Blattman et al., 2014; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Egger et al., 2022). How households respond to permanent increases in income is of significant academic and policy interest, both to test economic theories (Friedman, 1957) and to improve the design of social protection programs. Existing evidence on permanent income increases comes mostly from conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, which makes it difficult to disentangle the effect of the transfers from possible effects of the conditionalities (Baird et al., 2011).

In this paper, we investigate the economic, social, and psychological effects of an unconditional, permanent, guaranteed income program in Maricá, a city in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, called *Renda Básica de Cidadania* (RBC, or Citizens' Basic Income). The RBC is a large-scale policy created in 2015 and scaled by local leadership in 2019, and combines several previous municipal cash transfer programs. As a part of the restructuring, the RBC benefits are paid to each individual in eligible households, instead of at the household level. To be eligible, in addition to a three-year residency requirement, potential recipients have to be registered in the *Cadastro Único*, the federal government's unified social benefit registry. The *Cadastro Único* is restricted to households with total monthly income less than or equal to three times the monthly minimum wage (Prefeitura de Maricá, 2019).[1] At the time of our study, the program benefited around 42,000 people, roughly one fourth of Maricá residents. Beneficiaries received a monthly payment equivalent to approximately USD 57 PPP per person at the start of the transfers, paid in *mumbucas*, a local digital currency.[2] In April 2020, as a response to the COVID-19 crisis, the transfer was temporarily increased to approximately USD 127 per person. Between December 2021 and March 2022 the benefit value was reduced to roughly USD 67 per person, and in April 2022, it was increased to USD 79 per person. Finally, in December 2023, it was increased to its current value of USD 84 per person.

To estimate the impacts of the program, we use a matching approach compare RBC recipients to other members of the *Cadastro Único* who are not recipients. To obtain a treatment and comparison sample, we combined the *Cadastro Único* database for Maricá with a dataset of RBC recipients obtained from the city government. After some general data cleaning, we had a pool of 29,995 households. We performed a matching exercise based on head of household characteristics to select households for surveying. After a few weeks of survey activity, we additionally implemented a door-to-door recruitment strategy due to inaccurate addresses in the originally selected sample. Between September 2021 and April 2022, we surveyed 5,182 individuals, including 2,756 RBC recipients (the treatment group) and 2,426 non-recipients (the comparison group).

Following Özler et al. (2021), we use a matching approach with inverse probability weighting to estimate the impact of the RBC program. Matching variables include age, sex, race, and proxies for program eligibility [3]. We also use pre-program variables: household income, education level, household size, household head working status, unemployment insurance, and a household Socioeconomic Status (SES) index. Our pre-specified primary outcomes included income, labor supply, non-housing assets, consumption, depression, an intimate partner violence index, and a children's education and health index. The analysis follows a pre-analysis plan published prior to data analysis (Balakrishnan et al., 2022)[4].

[1] The minimum monthly wage in Brazil, for the relevant years in this paper, was BRL 1,100 (USD 431) in 2021, BRL 1,212 (USD 475) in 2022, and BRL 1,320 (USD 517) in 2023.

[2] Brazil's national currency is called *reais*, hereafter BRL. All USD values are calculated at purchasing power parity, using the World Bank PPP conversion factor for BRL/USD in December 2021: 2.553.

[3] For more details, see subsection 3.3

[4] The pre-analysis plan is available at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/DMG9F

We report three main findings. First, we find a few positive welfare effects for transfer recipients. Recipient households experience an increase in income including transfers of USD 104 per month, corresponding to a 9% increase relative to matched non-recipients. Per capita consumption does not increase significantly, but at the household level, consumption rises by USD 43, or 5% relative to matched comparison households. The index of the health and education of the oldest child improves by 0.18 SD, although this effect does not survive multiple inference correction and conservative bounding. We find no significant effects on depression (+0.02 SD) and an intimate partner violence index (−0.02 SD). The value of non-housing assets in the treatment group is USD 116 (6%) lower than in the comparison group, but this effect is not significant.

Second, we observe some displacement of other income through the transfers. The average transfer per household at the time of the survey was USD 180. The overall USD 104 increase in household income thus actually reflects a statistically significant USD 77 (after rounding) reduction of household income when the transfer is not taken into account. Indeed, labor income, which makes up about 48% of households' total income, is reduced by USD 96 (17%), more than accounting for the reduction in income without the transfer.

The reduction in labor income could be partly driven by reductions in labor supply. Indeed, hours worked decrease by 7% for the respondent and 13% for other household members; however, neither effect is significant. At the extensive margin, we find a 5% reduction in the number of working household members, but again this is not significant. One possible mechanism that reconciles the decrease in labor income with the lack of strong labor supply effects is that household members changed to more desirable but lower-paying jobs.

Relatedly, the number of non-working household members among recipients increases relative to matched comparison non-recipients (by 0.10 persons or 12%). This may reflect individuals moving into recipient households to maximize transfer magnitude (which increases in the number of non-working household members).

Third, the positive effects of the transfers are stronger among disadvantaged households. Specifically, the transfers have a larger positive effect on income in households headed by women (53% of the sample) compared to households headed by men. Similarly, both household income and consumption increase more in households with minors (45% of the sample) compared to households without such members. These results suggest that the transfers are successful in protecting particularly vulnerable households.

Among our other outcomes, we find a significant increase in access to financial services for RBC households by 0.16 SD relative to the comparison group. This effect is explained by access to the Mumbuca Bank, which manages the mumbuca currency in which the transfers are delivered. We also find a significant decline in the economic security index (−0.14 SD). This unexpected finding is driven by a reduction in savings behavior (e.g. saving money at the end of the month) among RBC households. A potential explanation is that recipients may not think of the RBC transfer as income that can be saved because it is delivered in a local currency which cannot be invested in assets or placed in interest-bearing savings accounts. We also find that the program improves recipients' assessment of the Mayor who spearheaded the RBC program (+0.16 SD). We do not see significant effects on other outcomes.

Our paper contributes to the literature on cash transfers in low- and middle-income countries. The program we study is unique in that it is both unconditional and permanent, whereas other programs typically have one of these features, but not both. Specifically, most existing unconditional cash transfer programs deliver one-time or time-limited benefits, making it difficult to study the effects of increases in permanent income; and most programs that do deliver permanent income increases are conditional (e.g. on school attendance or vaccination), which complicates the interpretation of their impacts.

Similar to our results, beneficiaries of both CCTs and UCTs commonly experience an increase in consumption (Kabeer and Waddington, 2015). For example, monthly household expenditures have been shown to increase in several conditional cash transfer programs, including *Oportunidades* in Mexico (Angelucci et al., 2012), *Familias en Acción* in Colombia (Attanasio and Mesnard, 2006), and *Bolsa Família* in Brazil (Maciel and Duarte, 2023; Silvani et al., 2018). Unconditional cash transfers also typically generate increases in expenditure (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Baird et al., 2019; Egger et al., 2022).

Our findings on labor supply are ambiguous, with a reduction in household labor income, but null effects on labor supply at the intensive and extensive margins. The existing literature is similarly ambiguous. For example, Alzúa et al. (2013) find no significant effect on labor market participation or labor supply in hours for three CCTs programs: *Programa de Asignación Familiar* (Honduras), *Red de Protección Social* (Nicaragua), and PROGRESA (Mexico). Similarly, the labor supply impacts of the *Bolsa Família* program are very small (Barrientos et al., 2016; De Brauw et al., 2015). In contrast, Barrientos and Villa (2013) and Canavire-Bacarreza and Vasquez-Ruiz (2013) report an increase in labor market participation in two other CCTs (*Familias en Acción* and *Solidaridad* (Dominican Republic)), and Gerard et al. (2021) report a similar result for *Bolsa Família*. The evidence on the impact of UCTs on labor supply points towards null or small negative effects (Banerjee et al., 2017).

The positive impact we find on children's education and health index is in line with the literature, as studies on both CCTs and UCTs typically find positive effects on these outcomes (Saavedra et al., 2012; Bastagli, Hagen-Zanker, and Sturge, Bastagli et al.). The most common result in the literature is improved school attendance and enrollment (Schady et al., 2008; Barham et al., 2024; Baird et al., 2013), including for *Bolsa Família* (Barrientos et al., 2016; Araujo and Macours, 2021), and increased use of health services (Lagarde et al., 2009).

Prior studies have either found a positive or null impact of cash transfer programs on savings. For instance, Angelucci et al. (2012) find an increase in the probability of saving for households enrolled in the *Oportunidades* program, and Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) observe an increase in the value of savings in the *GiveDirectly* program. However, these programs are disbursed in the countries' national currencies. Our results suggest a decrease in savings behavior, possibly due to the transfer being paid in a local currency, as discussed above.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed review of the RBC program. Section 3 describes our data collection and econometric approach. Section 4 presents our results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.

2 The Citizens' Basic Income program

The discovery of large volumes of oil in the *Tupi* field and peculiar rules for sharing oil revenues in Brazil provided Maricá with an unprecedented increase in its municipal budget. Former mayor Washington Quaquá and his successor, Fabiano Horta, implemented a set of innovative policies and expanded existing ones that together constitute a local development strategy based on the economic and political inclusion of the most vulnerable people, which the city government calls a "solidarity economy" approach (Katz and Ferreira, 2020).

A conventional conditional cash transfer program was created in 2013. It was meant to be a household level income supplement with conditionalities[5] that emulated those of the *Bolsa Família*

[5]Conditionalities included evidence of compulsory vaccination for dependents aged 0 to 6 years, proof of minors being enrolled and with a 75% attendance rate in the state or municipal education system in Maricá, and legal

Program. But the program had one particularity: benefits were paid in a local digital currency, the *mumbuca*, which has a one-to-one parity with the BRL. The mumbuca can only be spent with accredited vendors within the boundaries of the municipality. This was an attempt to avoid the spillover of the benefits from Maricá, which is a commuter city to nearby municipalities that are economically dynamic and where many Maricá residents work, such as Niterói and Rio de Janeiro. Over the years, the cash transfer program expanded and evolved, including progressive increases to the benefit. The first notable change came in 2015 with the expansion of eligibility criteria and the abolition of the previous conditionalities. Enrollment was conducted in waves, with families being enrolled in 2014 and then in 2017.

In May 2019 the city government announced major changes to the program. The program was renamed *Renda Básica de Cidadania*, and the benefits would be paid to each individual in eligible households, instead of a household level benefit. Enrollments started with previous recipients (around 14,000 families), with registration updates to include individuals in the households. The city government had a city-wide enrollment drive in November and December to enroll as many people as possible. By the end of December, they enrolled 42,000 individuals, roughly one fourth of the estimated population of Maricá at the time. The January 2020 benefit was paid on December 31st 2019. No large enrollment efforts were made between 2020 and October 2023, a period that included the implementation of our study.

To be eligible for the RBC program, in addition to a three-year residency requirement, potential recipients should be registered in the *Cadastro Único*. The RBC benefit is disbursed using a debit card for each household, but the transfer can also be spent through a mobile application (Britto et al., 2022; Santana, 2023). There are no restrictions on how recipients can spend the benefit, with the mumbuca being widely accepted around the city.

Different from conventional programs in Latin America and from previous versions of the program in Maricá itself, the RBC is an unconditional, permanent, guaranteed income program. Initially, beneficiaries received a monthly payment equivalent to approximately USD 57 per person. In April 2020, with the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic, the transfer was temporarily increased to the equivalent of approximately USD 127, and reduced in December 2021 to approximately USD 67, a level at which it remained until March 2022, when it was increased again to USD 79. In December 2023, it was increased to its current value of USD 84.

The RBC program meets most requirements of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) policy, as defined by Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017), namely: (i) payment is regular and is sent monthly in a predetermined and fixed amount; (ii) it is delivered in cash (in the local currency), not in-kind; (iii) the value of the benefit is the same for every beneficiary; (iv) the benefit is granted individually; (v) no conditionality is imposed on the beneficiaries; (vi) the amount can be accumulated with income of any nature and from any other source, e.g., labor income or social assistance benefits such as *Bolsa Família*; (vii) its value is reasonable by national standards: until October 2023 it was the equivalent of 200 BRL per person. Annualized, that represents around 6% of Brazilian GDP per capita.

However, the RBC is not a UBI for two reasons. First, because it is not universal. The second unmet requirement is that its individualization is incomplete—the number of benefits granted does follow a per capita criterion, but: (a) eligibility is determined according to family income (as it involves registration in the *Cadastro Único*), and (b) the benefits are actually distributed in the form of family cards, not individual ones. So while the RBC is not a full-fledged UBI program, it comes relatively close, and is one of the largest permanent unconditional cash transfer programs, possibly only rivaled by the dividend paid annually to every Alaskan citizen by the Alaska Permanent Fund in the United States. The program is constantly evolving and expanding,

guardians being required to attend parent and student meetings at schools.

with plans for expansion to the entire city's population. As of the writing of this paper, the RBC program has 91,487 recipients.

3 Data and methods

Data collection for our overall evaluation of the RBC program was conducted between November 2020 and September 2022. Our data collection consisted of three approaches. First, we administered a large in-person quantitative survey with 5,182 participants, with 2,756 in the treatment group (RBC recipients) and 2,426 in a comparison group (non-RBC recipients). Second, we conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews with 27 street- and mid-level bureaucrats who have roles in the implementation of the program. Finally, we led qualitative semi-structured interviews with 72 recipients and non-recipients of the RBC. This paper focuses on the first component: the quantitative survey which was conducted between September 2021 and April 2022.

3.1 Sample selection and data collection

We used two datasets to identify treatment and comparison households. First, Maricá's Secretariat of Solidarity Economy provided us with a list of all 19,437 RBC cardholders, up to date as of July 2021. This list contains no comparison households and only RBC recipients, including their names, individual tax-payer identification numbers (CPF), addresses, and dates of enrolment in the program.[6]

Second, the federal government of Brazil provided us with a list of families enrolled in the *Cadastro Único* dataset. We requested and received access to the identified data from *Cadastro Único* for each month in 2019 and 2021, and for September, October, November, and December 2020. At the time of the sample selection, the most updated data we had was from September 2020, which contained 30,093 families (66,454 individuals) enrolled in *Cadastro Único*. This data contains names, addresses, contact information, and extensive information on household demographics and finances. The data contains both RBC recipient households and non-recipient households.

The two datasets were merged using a personal identifier (CPF). After excluding 1,507 households from this merged list due to incomplete data,[7] we obtained a sample of 17,424 potential treatment households and 12,571 potential comparison households (total 29,995).

We initially selected a random subset of 5,494 of these households for surveying, with an equal split between treatment and comparison groups, based on a pre-survey matching exercise using five variables: age, sex, race, and birthplace of the household head, and whether they had updated their *Cadastro Único* data in the two years prior to September 30, 2019. However, we abandoned this approach after a few weeks of survey activity due to slow pace and difficulty in finding households because of inaccurate address information.

[6] Our pre-analysis plan stated that we would use this data to calculate the amount of transfers received by recipient households (Balakrishnan et al., 2022), but we chose to use the data collected in our survey due to possible changes in household composition between July 2021 and the month the interview took place.

[7] We excluded 1,454 RBC recipients from the RBC cardholders list (7.5%) whom we could not identify in the *Cadastro Único* data. There are a number of possible explanations: a) it might be that these households weren't registered in the *Cadastro Único* in September, 2020; b) there could be typos or errors in one of the datasets; c) some individuals do not have their CPF listed in the *Cadastro Único*, but 90% of these were minors. We also excluded 47 households, 19 of them did not have information on race and 28 did not have information on birthplace of the household head in the *Cadastro Único*. Finally, we excluded 6 households with household heads aged above 100 (0.2%).

Instead, we began to target a larger subset of 6,756 households for which we had a *verified* address (hereafter called "list of addresses").[8] We were able to interview 3,060 of these households. In addition, we adopted a door-to-door recruitment strategy. This procedure began with a field officer knocking on the doors of households from the list of addresses. After that, whether or not an interview was conducted, the enumerator knocked on every third door to the right of the first one, up to the end of the street. We interviewed 2,363 household in the door-to-door recruitment strategy.

Thus, we surveyed 5,423 households in total. During data cleaning, we determined that 241 were not suited to be used in analysis for the following reasons: a) 176 interviews were duplicates, in which case we kept the first conducted interview; b) 59 interviews were erroneously conducted with households not in our sample; c) six interviews were interrupted. This resulted in a final sample of 5,182 interviews. Panel A in Table 1 shows their distribution across treatment status (2,756 treatment, 2,426 comparison) and recruitment strategy (2,902 list-of-addresses, 2,280 door-to-door).

Data collection started on September 22, 2021, and finished on April 18, 2022. The questionnaire was answered by one individual 18 years of age or older and capable of responding on behalf of all the residents of the household. Preference was given to the person identified in the *Cadastro Único* dataset as the household head. The individual received BRL 10 in cellphone credit as compensation. Participants provided informed consent at the beginning of the survey, which lasted around 60 minutes. Data were collected digitally.

3.2 Response rates

To assess whether response rates were balanced across treatment and comparison groups, we proceed as follows. First, for 6,756 households which we targeted in the list-of-addresses approach, we can conduct a standard analysis in which completion of a valid survey is the outcome variable, and treatment status the independent variable. Table Table A1 shows that the survey rates were not different between the treatment and comparison groups in this analysis.

For the door-to-door approach, this analysis cannot be performed because we do not know treatment status for unanswered doors. However, we can check whether the share of interviews conducted with treatment households using this strategy (55.3%) is similar to the share of treatment households in the city; 53.0% of households enrolled in the Cadastro Único received the RBC at the time of the study. We conduct a t-test of proportions against this null hypothesis. The results, shown in Panel B of Table 1 (second row), show that the slight overrepresentation of treatment households in the door-to-door sample is in fact statistically significant ($p = 0.025$). When we conduct the same analysis for the list-of-addresses approach (row 1 of Panel B in Table 1), we confirm that the sample share of treatment households amongst the surveyed households (51.5%) is not significantly different from the targeted share (50%). However, combining both recruitment strategies, the sample as a whole is again slightly imbalanced, with 53.2% treatment households instead of the targeted 51% ($p = 0.007$). In our main analysis, we therefore use Lee bounds to address the differential response rates (Lee, 2009).

[8] In this new approach, all addresses were first screened and validated, and survey visits were only attempted to addresses that had enough information to find an individual that needed to be interviewed, that is, addresses with neighborhood, street name and a house number.

3.3 Matching and estimation

We perform a matching exercise to ensure that households in the treatment and comparison groups are as similar as possible, closely following the approach used by Özler et al. (2021). We calculate a propensity score using a logit regression with our matching variables:

$$T_i = F(\sum_{j}^{J} \beta_j \mathbf{X}_j) \tag{1}$$

where $F(\cdot)$ is the cumulative logistic distribution and T is the treatment indicator that takes value 1 for recipient households. i is our unit of analysis and $\mathbf{X}$ is the vector of the j variables used in the matching. The basic set of matching variables is the following: age, sex, race, a dummy variable indicating if the household was found through the door-to-door strategy, and a dummy variable indicating if the interview was conducted with a household in the list of addresses but found through the door-to-door strategy.

In addition to these variables, we match on a number of variables drawn from the *Cadastro Único*: whether the head of household was born in Maricá; whether the household updated its *Cadastro Único* information in the two years preceding September 30, 2019;[9] and the following variables measured in May 2019: household income, work remuneration, education level and illiteracy, household size, household head working status, unemployment insurance enrollment, and a household SES index including variables measuring house and neighbourhood quality (defined in Appendix B: Outcomes and variable definitions).Table 2 reports the balance before and after weighting and shows that the matching approach was successful in creating comparable samples.

Closely following Özler et al. (2021), our specification to capture the treatment effect is:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_i + \beta_3 T_i \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where y_i is the outcome of interest for individual or household i and $\mathbf{X}_i$ is a vector of propensity scores and covariates.[10] ϵ_i is the error term. Observations are weighted with the inverse propensity score. Specifically, each treatment unit has weight $\frac{1}{\hat{p}(\mathbf{X}_i)}$, and each comparison unit has weight $\frac{1}{1-\hat{p}(\mathbf{X}_i)}$, where $\hat{p}(\mathbf{X}_i)$ is the propensity score, i.e. the likelihood that a unit with the given set of characteristics listed above receives treatment, regardless of its actual treatment status. As suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2006), the sample is trimmed if the propensity score is less than 0.05 or higher than 0.95. We lose 1,519 observations due to this trimming (29% of the 5,182 interviews), 708 at the bottom and 811 at the top of the distribution, resulting in an analysis sample of 3,663 observations.

The covariates in Equation 2 include the three variables that were not balanced after weighting: one missing dummy and two indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month. In addition, they include indicators for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (as determined by later checks); whether the interview was conducted by four enumerators who had cases of duplicate or erroneous interviews; and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, i.e. before the expansion; whether the household received

[9] This date was supposed to be a cut-off point such that only households with updated information would be considered eligible for the RBC. Although the requirement was not enforced, it could have affected the propensity of the eligible population to enroll in the program.

[10] Our pre-analysis plan stated that "$\mathbf{X}_i$ is a vector of propensity scores *of* covariates" (Balakrishnan et al., 2022), but this was a typo.

a monthly food and household goods basket (worth approximately USD 151), provided by the municipal government to all households with children enrolled in primary school.[11]. Under the conditional independence assumption, the coefficient β_1 in this approach identifies the average treatment effect.

Because we had a good number of missing observations in outcome variables, we impute missing outcomes; this was not pre-specified because we did not foresee it. For continuous outcome variables, we impute the mean by treatment status; for labor market outcomes we additionally impute separately by gender. For binary variables, we impute the "positive" outcome, depending on the survey question. For example, for cases in which there was a missing value in the component "Whether no household member was infected with COVID-19 since March 2020," we impute value one.[12] We control for these imputations in Equation 2. Our pre-analysis plan stated that right-hand side missing variables would be replaced by a 0 and a dummy would be added for observations where this replacement was made. However, there were no missing observation in the right-hand side variables of Equation 2. Considering the data was collected over eight months, we deflate all monetary values to December 2021. We employ the National Consumer Price Index (*Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor*, INPC) using the Brazilian Central Bank Calculator. Next, all monetary values are converted to USD using the World Bank PPP conversion factor for BRL/USD in December 2021, 2.553 (OECD iLibrary, 2023).

Figure A1 shows the common support of the treatment and comparison groups in the propensity score, with the comparison group concentrated in the lower tail of the propensity score distribution, and the treatment group in the upper tail.

We perform several robustness checks, including two matching exercises: nearest neighbor covariate matching Abadie and Imbens (2006) and coarsened exact matching Iacus et al. (2012). These will be discussed in subsection 4.4.

3.4 Heterogeneous treatment effects

We test whether the impact of the RBC varies with household and individual characteristics. The econometric specification for heterogeneous treatment effects is:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta_2 \mathbf{X}_i + \beta_3 T_i \mathbf{X}_i + \beta_4 T_i H_i + \beta_5 H_i + \epsilon_i \tag{3}$$

Here, H_i is an indicator variable for the dimension of heterogeneity. We pre-specified three primary dimensions of heterogeneity: household head race, household head sex, and household head age (median split). In addition, we had pre-specified a number of other dimensions we would investigate if data were available. This turned out to be the case, and we therefore also estimate heterogeneous treatment effects along the following dimensions: household head education level (less than a high school degree),[13] whether the household has any minors (below age 18), any seniors (over age 65), any dependents (either minors or seniors), household size (median split), and the household SES Index (median split, defined in Appendix B: Outcomes and variable definitions). We estimate Equation 3 for each of the heterogeneity dimensions.

[11] We add this covariate to the estimation because there is differential take-up between the treatment and the comparison group.

[12] The only exception is for the dummy components of the intimate partner violence index, "whether respondents experienced physical violence by the partner" and "whether respondents experienced sexual violence", because only 30% of our sample answered these questions. No imputations were made for these questions.

[13] Our pre-analysis plan stated that we would use the education level of adult members of the household (Balakrishnan et al., 2022), but we decided to use the household head education level to be consistent with other dimensions.

3.5 Outcome variables

3.5.1 Primary outcomes

Our primary outcomes are income, labor supply, non-housing assets, consumption, depression, intimate partner violence index, and children's education and health index. Appendix B: Outcomes and variable definitions explains in detail how each outcome is created.

Income is the sum of labor market earnings of all household members above 14 years old, income from rent payments, estimated value of in-kind benefits, benefits (from retirement, pensions, unemployment insurance, and other social programs), and other sources of income (excluding gifts from relatives).

Consumption includes household expenditures on groceries, food and drinks outside the home, clothing, transportation, medical and health care, education, entertainment and culture, housing (rent, utilities, internet, phone bills, and renovations), durable goods, insurance, child care, alcohol, cigarettes, and estimated value of in-kind benefits. We count in-kind benefits both as part of income and consumption, as they solely consist of food and household goods baskets delivered by the city government during the pandemic.

Labor supply in hours is a single variable measuring labor market participation in formal, informal and self-employment positions in the last week. This is measured separately for each household member.

Non-housing assets is calculated as the sum of durable goods, vehicles, farming equipment, and livestock.

Depression (only measured for the survey respondent) is measured using the PHQ-8 index (Kroenke et al., 2009), which is a version of the PHQ-9 without the question on suicide.

Index variables are constructed with simple standardization (subtraction of the mean and division by the standard deviation of the comparison group). The intimate partner violence index (only measured for the survey respondent) combines four variables: two dummy variables that indicate whether the respondent was physically abused or forced into physical intimacy by a partner, and two continuous variables indicating the frequency of such acts. Finally, an index for the health and education of the oldest child combines variables measuring their time devoted to school work, whether they attended classes with private tutors, whether their guardian assisted with school work or attended a school meeting, participation in paid work, and whether the child had a routine health exam.

3.5.2 Other outcomes

Outcomes that were not pre-registered as primary outcomes include labor market participation, participation in and time devoted to unpaid work, whether the respondent lost a job due to the pandemic, income from sales of goods and withdrawals from savings, the value of unpaid credit card bills and outstanding loans, self-assessed quality of health (five-point Likert scale), perception of the income distribution in Brazil (four-point Likert scale), evaluation of the mayor and of the president (five-point Likert scale), and indices for economic and food security, access to financial services, health security, and COVID-19 outcomes.

Participation and hours in unpaid work encompasses time spent on child or eldercare and domestic

tasks. Economic security index consists of whether the household could securely pay for a BRL 1,000 emergency bill, whether there were no unpaid bills, how often the household is able to save money (five-point Likert scale), and whether the household is above the poverty line. Food Security index combines two binary items: whether the household never ran out of food and whether the household was able to buy healthy food.

Access to financial services index comprises of the following variables: possession of a bank account, savings account or credit card, and access to loans. The health security index combines four variables: whether a household member skipped a drug dose due to its cost, whether a household member took a reduced dose of a drug due to its cost, whether the respondent asked the doctor to prescribe a less costly drug, and whether the respondent used alternative therapies in order to save money. The COVID-19 impact index combines two variables: whether a household member was infected with COVID-19 and whether a relative died due to COVID-19.

3.6 Multiple comparisons and corrections

Income, consumption, assets, labor supply, hours devoted to unpaid work, gifts given and received, value of unpaid credit card bills, and value of outstanding loans variables are top-coded at 95% and bottom-coded at 5%.[14] To adjust for multiple comparisons during analysis, we define an index or focal variable for several outcome families. The outcome families for our primary outcomes include income, labor market variables, non-housing assets, consumption, depression, intimate partner violence, and children's education and health. We then apply the false discovery rate (FDR) across these summary variables (Anderson, 2008). We do not adjust for multiple inference within outcome families.

4 Results

As discussed in subsection 3.2, we use Lee bounds to address the differential response rate in the door-to-door interviews (Lee, 2009). For all results below, we report both unbounded and bounded estimates(see subsection 3.2. The estimates discussed in text are the unbounded point estimates unless stated otherwise.

4.1 Impact on primary and related outcomes

Table 3 shows the propensity score matching estimates and response rates bounds for our primary outcomes — income, consumption, labor supply, non-housing assets, and indices for depression, intimate partner violence index, and children's education and health — and a set of related outcomes, including the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, and the number of household members. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the comparison group. Column (2) shows the treatment estimate of the RBC program using Equation 2. Columns (4) and (6) report lower and upper Lee bounds, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, and the bootstrapped FDR-corrected p-values for primary outcomes (1,000 iterations) in brackets.

We observe an increase in income: Household income with the RBC goes up by USD 104 (9% of comparison group household income), significant at the 1% level using both conventional and

[14] Our pre-analysis plan stated that we would only top-code monetary outcomes at 95% (Balakrishnan et al., 2022), but we chose to follow most of the literature on cash transfers and bottom-coded at 5% as well.

FDR-adjusted p-values; the lower and upper Lee bounds are also significant, both with and without FDR adjustment. Per capita income with the RBC increases by USD 37 (8%). However, when excluding the RBC transfer from the total income calculation, the impact is negative: Household income decreases by USD 77 (8%), and per capita income by USD 36 (8%); these reductions are significant, both bounded and unbounded. The income reductions are mainly driven by a decrease in household labor income, as shown in the detailed breakdown of income components presented in Table A3 and Table A4.

There are three possible mechanisms for this finding. First, the income decrease may be due to decreased labor supply. Indeed, we observe a roughly one-hour-per-week reduction in labor supply in both the respondent and other household members. This could be a reflection of beneficiaries working less during the pandemic under the stay-at-home restrictions instituted by Maricá's city government. However, the reductions in labor supply are not statistically significant. Second, another possible explanation for the reduced income is that recipients have switched to preferable but lower-paying jobs, but we have no direct evidence of this. Finally, there is suggestive evidence for a change in household composition: while the total number of household members does not change significantly (Table 3), we observe an increase of 0.10 non-working adult members ($p < 0.05$), although this effect does not survive bounding. These changes in household composition may underlie the reduction in per capita income, although note that they cannot explain the reduction in household income.

The increase in the number of non-working household members may be strategic: the RBC is paid to each individual in a recipient household, and so households may crowd in non-working members to receive more benefits. Indeed, while the population of Brazil grew by 6.5% from 2010 to 2022, the population of Maricá grew by 54.8%, largely due to migration from other Brazilian municipalities.[15] There seems to be no change in fertility preferences: the number of household members less than 14 years old does not change.

The increase in household income when the transfer is included does not translate into an increase in per capita consumption: the impact is positive (USD 3), but statistically insignificant. However, at the household level, we observe an increase of USD 43 (5%, significant at the 10% level), consistent again with the possibility that new household members have moved in. However, as shown in Table A5, a significant share (USD 27) of this increase reflects receipt of the in-kind benefits described above (food and household goods baskets). We observe no significant increase in temptation good consumption, consistent with the literature (Evans and Popova, 2017). Table A6 shows that the consumption effect is larger for households with more members, with the largest effects observed for three-person households. The RBC program has no significant effects on one-person households in terms of income, consumption, and household size.

Moving on to the last monetary outcome of Table 3, we observe a qualitative decrease in the value of non-housing assets (USD 116, 6%), but the effect is not significant. When housing is included, however, the RBC program decreases total value of assets by USD 4,572 (18%). The overall effect is again imprecisely estimated, but Table A7 shows a decrease of USD 4,491 (19%) in the value of real estate owned, significant at the 1% level and accounting for 98% of the overall reduction in total asset value. One possible explanation for this finding is that the RBC allows recipients to buy houses, but because they are marginal home buyers, these houses have lower value than those of non-recipients. Indeed, Table A8 shows that recipients move from rentals to houses they own. Alternatively or in addition, RBC recipients may wish to avoid being seen as "wealthy" home owners, and report lower numbers as a result. More broadly, caution is warranted when interpreting these findings as we do not have a baseline measure for the value of assets.

Our final three primary outcomes are indices for depression, intimate partner violence, and chil-

[15] Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (*Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*, IBGE)

dren's education and health. There is no statistically significant impact on depression (measured using the PHQ-8) or intimate partner violence. The RBC has a positive impact on the index of education and health outcomes of the oldest child in the household (0.18 SD); however, the effect does not survive FDR correction or bounding. As shown in Table A9, the effect is driven by an increase in hours devoted to schoolwork (0.12 SD) and doctor visits (0.04 SD). Together, these results provide weak suggestive evidence that unconditional cash transfers can accelerate child development, even without conditionalities, as discussed in section 1.

4.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects

Table 4 shows the results on our pre-registered dimensions of heterogeneity: household head gender, race, and age. Column (1) reports the means and standard deviation for the comparison group. Columns (2)–(6) present the interaction terms from Equation 3, showing the differential treatment effects for each dimension of heterogeneity: Column (2) shows the differential impact for white recipients, column (3) for Black recipients, column (4) for mixed race recipients, column (5) for female recipients, and column (6) for below median age recipients.[16]

We first explore the differential effects by race. There are no discernible heterogeneous treatment effects at conventional significance levels for respondents of mixed race, who represent the majority in our sample relative to other races, nor for those who identify as Black. For white respondents, who constitute 38% of our sample, there is only one significant estimate: the effect on the number of non-working household members above 18, which is positive in the main analysis, is significantly smaller in this subgroup. This could be explained by the fact that households headed by white persons tend to have higher socioeconomic status: if their relatives are also better off, these relatives may be less inclined to move into a recipient household to access the benefit income.

On the dimension of gender, we observe significant differential impacts on income for female respondents, who comprise 53% of the sample. Specifically, treatment increases household income including the RBC by an additional USD 148 (13% of the comparison mean, USD 1097; significant at the 1% level) for households headed by women relative to the treatment effect for others. When the transfers are not included in the total income calculation, the differential positive treatment effect is USD 155 (14%). In addition, we see a larger change in depression levels among female recipients (−0.15 SD, significant at the 10% level) compared to others as a result of the RBC program. Finally, we observe a larger increase in the number of household members in female-headed compared to other households (+0.25, significant at the 5% level), mirrored also in a differential effect on the per capita number of bedrooms and bathrooms (−0.12). In sum, as a result of the RBC, women appear to have been able to increase their income and improve their mental health, while bringing in more people to live with them.

We see no heterogeneous treatment effects by median age. In Table A10, we examine secondary dimensions of heterogeneity: household head education level (less than a high school degree); whether the household has any minors (below age 18), any seniors (over age 65), and any dependents (either minors or seniors); household size (median split); and the household SES Index (median split, defined in Appendix B: Outcomes and variable definitions). We observe some positive differential effects for households with minors/dependents (increased income and assets, and reduced intimate partner violence compared to households without minors/dependents); large households (increased income and consumption, reduced intimate partner violence, and increased child education and health index relative to small households); and low-SES households (increased assets and number of bedrooms/toilets relative to high-SES households).

Taken together, the heterogeneous treatment effects suggest that, even without deliberately in-

[16]The median age in our study sample is 49.

tending it, the transfers effectively safeguarded households that typically are more susceptible to adverse economic circumstances, such as those led by women and those with children.

4.3 Impact on other outcomes

Table 5 displays the estimates and Lee bounds for our other outcomes: labor market outcomes, income from sales of goods and withdrawals from savings, value of unpaid credit card bills and outstanding loans, value of gifts sent and received, self-assessed quality of health and health security, COVID-19 outcomes, perception of the income distribution in Brazil, evaluation of the mayor and the president, and indices measuring economic security, food security, and access to financial services. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation for the comparison group and column (2) reports the treatment estimate of the RBC program using Equation 2. Columns (4) and (6) report lower and upper Lee bounds, respectively. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.

We observe four statistically significant treatment estimates across the outcomes when considering unbounded estimates. First, the index of access to financial services shows a positive treatment effect (+0.16 SD), significant at the 1% level and robust to bounding. Table A11 shows that this is due to an increase in the number of household members with a Mumbuca bank account, indicative of greater financial inclusion within the recipient households.

Second, beneficiary households are less likely to save than comparison households. We find a negative impact on the economic security index (−0.14 SD, significant at the 1% level and robust to bounding), which is driven by a decreased propensity to save and more unpaid credit card bills (Table A12). This result is reinforced by the fact that recipient households report that they would not use their savings to cope with an emergency. We suspect that households in the RBC program save less because the RBC benefit is paid in a local currency that cannot be used for investment in assets or put into a savings account to earn interest. Hence, it is possible that the households may not consider the RBC transfer as a form of income that can be saved for future use.

Finally, we also see a small reduction in the value of gifts received vs. sent (USD 0.90, significant at the 10% level and not robust to bounding), and a moderately sized positive impact on recipients' opinion of Mayor Horta, who spearheaded the expansion of the RBC program in December 2019 (+0.16 SD, significant at the 1% level and robust to bounding).

4.4 Robustness checks

We implement several robustness checks. In all of them, we only report the unbounded estimates. First, we relax our imputation rules. As explained in section 3, we impute the mean for missing continuous outcome variables, and either one or zero for binary variables, depending on the survey question. We control for these imputations by adding a dummy variable on the right-hand side in all analyses discussed so far.

We begin by estimating Equation 2 without adding the imputation flags as controls. As Table A 13 shows, aside from some minor changes in magnitude, the estimates remain qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to Table 3.

In Table A14, we omit the imputations altogether. We observe a few changes in statistical significance (household consumption, the oldest child education and health index, and the number of non-working household members), but the coefficients are mostly similar in magnitude. Household consumption is an exception; it shows a USD 43 increase with imputations, and a non-significant

USD 11 increase without.

Second, we estimate our main model with two additional matching methods. First, following Abadie and Imbens (2006), we employ nearest neighbor covariate matching (Table A 15). This methodology finds comparison units (potentially more than one per treated unit) with comparable propensity scores within a radius of one from the treated unit's propensity score. Qualitatively, we again find similar results. However, the statistical significance of some coefficients changes: the negative impact on household income without the RBC and the positive impact on the children's education and health index are no longer significant; the reductions in the respondent's labor supply and non-housing assets are now statistically significant. Some of the household composition impacts also show changes in statistical significance, but again the direction and magnitude of the effects remains similar.

Next, we set out to compare our results with estimates from coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus et al., 2012). Under this methodology, we create categorical variables (strata) for our vector of covariates X_j to find exact matches. After finding the matches, we calculate weights for each stratum and use a weighted regression to obtain the treatment estimates. Unfortunately, however, it turns out that this method dramatically reduces the sample size (a well-known problem with this method; Black et al. 2020): we lose 99.7% of the sample due to our large number of matching variables (43). We present the results in Table A16 for completeness, but we do not interpret them because the number of observations is too small.

5 Conclusion

In this study, we analyzed the effects of the RBC in Maricá, Brazil, a permanent guaranteed income program disbursed using a local currency. At the time of the survey, the program provided monthly household-level transfers of USD 180 PPP on average to approximately 42,000 individuals from the *Cadastro Único*, the federal government's unified social benefit registry, earning at most three times the federal minimum wage. Our study period was during the COVID-19 pandemic, which likely had an impact on both the city's decision to increase or decrease the RBC benefit, and subsequently its effects on the recipients. We conducted 5,182 in-person surveys covering 2,756 RBC recipients and 2,426 non-recipients, and compare them using a matching approach with inverse probability weights.

Recipient households experience a 9% increase in income (including the RBC benefit); consumption does not rise significantly in per capita terms, but at the household level, we observe a significant 5% increase in consumption relative to comparison households. From a policy perspective, these results illustrate the benefit of a robust infrastructure for distributing benefits (De Wispelaere et al., 2024): because the RBC program had already established before the pandemic, it was straightforward for policy-makers to "dial up" and "dial down" the magnitude of the benefit during the pandemic. The city's ability to increase the value of the benefit between April 2020 and January 2022 may have protected recipients from financial hardship and enabled them to maintain or even increase their consumption levels.

We also observe a positive impact on an index of children's education and health, suggesting that the RBC benefits children even without the conditionalities of CCTs that are common in Latin America. Similarly, we observe larger increases in income in households with minors, and households headed by women, compared to others. Thus, a policy that is broadly targeted and does not take family composition into account may nevertheless be of more benefit to more disadvantaged groups.

At the same time, we observe a 17% decrease of labor income, and a small and non-significant reduction in hours worked. An index of economic security also shows a significant negative impact. It is not uncommon to find disincentive effects on labor supply of recipients at the microeconomic level as a consequence of income transfer policies, whether CCTs such as *Bolsa Família* (Gerard et al., 2021) or UCTs such as the Alaska program (Jones and Marinescu, 2022). Reductions in labor supply and income are not necessarily undesirable effects: Cash transfer beneficiaries are usually on the lower end of the income distribution and under-qualified for a changing labor market, which makes them more willing to accept subpar jobs. Cash transfers may allow recipients to move to lower-paying but overall more desirable jobs. This mechanism would reconcile the decrease in labor income with the lack of strong labor supply effects. Alternatively or in addition, the small reduction in labor supply suggests that the RBC may have supported the city's objective of keeping people home as much as possible during the pandemic, and thus (perhaps unintentionally) contributed to positive public health outcomes (Leal and Araújo, ming).

In sum, our results paint a nuanced picture of the impacts of the RBC on welfare outcomes, with some unambiguous benefits, and some impacts that may reflect tradeoffs made by households between e.g. consumption and work quality. Our study leaves open a number of questions:

First, granting benefits through a community bank, which requires the opening of an account, directly produces yet a further benefit, namely banking inclusion. Services such as micro-credit, previously inaccessible to the target audience, could facilitate inter-temporal planning and decision-making for RBC recipients. The separate impact of such services and the RBC itself is an important topic for future research.

Second, it is unknown how the impacts of the program depend on the magnitude of the benefits. Recently there has been a major expansion of the RBC program. Many of the advantages already observed for the families of the 42,000 beneficiaries of the 2019 expansion might be extended to the program's approximately 50,000 new beneficiaries. However, as the value of the benefit was "dialed down" in the post-pandemic scenario, the disincentive effects on labor supply identified for the pandemic period may have now been mitigated. Future work could systematically vary benefit magnitude to shed light on these questions.

Third, an intriguing and unexpected finding is that the number of non-working adult household members increased in recipient households relative to the comparison group. It is likely that recipient households added household members to maximize the RBC benefit. Understanding how such strategic behavior depends on design features of the program — e.g. allocation of benefits at the individual level — is an important ingredient into sound policy, and therefore another important topic for future work.

Finally, the macroeconomic and general equilibrium effects of the RBC program remain unknown. For instance, the program expansion discussed above will more than double the volume of mumbucas in circulation. This could have resulted in employment expansion effects through macroeconomic channels. Indeed, there is suggestive evidence that this may have occurred in Maricá (Lima et al., 2022). A more systematic understanding of such effects would allow policy-makers to make more informed decisions about program design and scope.

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Tables

Table 1: Completed interviews and test of differential response rates by data collection strategy

Panel A: Number of completed interviews			
Strategy	Comparison	Treatment	N
List of addresses	1,407	1,495	2,902
Door to door	1,019	1,261	2,280
Full sample	2,426	2,756	5,182

Panel B: Proportion tests of differential response rates				
Strategy	H_0	Treatment share of sample	p-value	N
List of addresses	0.50	0.515	0.102	2,902
Door to door	0.53	0.553	0.025	2,280
Full sample	0.51	0.532	0.007	5,182

Notes: Panel A shows the number of completed interviews in the two different recruitment strategies. Panel B presents proportion tests of differential response rates, to assess whether the shares of treatment and comparison households in the sample correspond to the theoretically targeted shares (50% for the list-of-addresses strategy and 53% for the door-to-door strategy).

Table 2: Summary statistics and balance before and after inverse probability weighting (IPW)

	Before IPW					After IPW				
Variable	Comparison Mean [SD]	*N*	Treatment Mean [SD]	*N*	Difference (1)-(2)	Comparison Mean [SD]	*N*	Treatment Mean [SD]	*N*	Difference (1)-(2)
Survey variables										
Age	47.00 [15.69]	1,577	47.40 [15.85]	2,086	−0.39	46.72 [21.16]	1,577	47.28 [21.79]	2,086	−0.56
Female (77.91% of the sample)	0.74 [0.44]	1,577	0.81 [0.40]	2,086	−0.06***	0.78 [0.52]	1,577	0.77 [0.63]	2,086	0.01
White (38.36% of the sample)	0.41 [0.49]	1,577	0.37 [0.48]	2,086	0.04***	0.41 [0.68]	1,577	0.39 [0.66]	2,086	0.02
Black (21.02% of the sample)	0.20 [0.40]	1,577	0.22 [0.41]	2,086	−0.02	0.20 [0.55]	1,577	0.21 [0.53]	2,086	−0.01
Asian (0.33% of the sample)	0.00 [0.06]	1,577	0.00 [0.05]	2,086	0.00	0.00 [0.05]	1,577	0.00 [0.07]	2,086	0.00
Mixed (39.86% of the sample)	0.39 [0.49]	1,577	0.41 [0.49]	2,086	−0.02	0.39 [0.67]	1,577	0.39 [0.65]	2,086	−0.01
Indigenous (0.44% of the sample)	0.00 [0.04]	1,577	0.01 [0.08]	2,086	0.00**	0.00 [0.07]	1,577	0.00 [0.06]	2,086	0.00
Month of data collection†	-	-	-	-	24.862	-	-	-	-	0.327
	-	-	-	-	(0.000)	-	-	-	-	(0.942)
Recruitment techniques										
Random door to door visits	0.33 [0.47]	1,577	0.37 [0.48]	2,086	−0.04**	0.37 [0.69]	1,577	0.36 [0.63]	2,086	0.01
List of addresses identified through *Cadastro Único*	0.15 [0.36]	1,577	0.24 [0.42]	2,086	−0.09***	0.22 [0.65]	1,577	0.22 [0.52]	2,086	0.00
Cadastro Único variables										
Head of household was born in Maricá‡	0.21 [0.40]	1,577	0.30 [0.46]	2,086	−0.10***	0.25 [0.64]	1,577	0.27 [0.52]	2,086	−0.01
Household *Cadastro Único* information updated by Sep 30 2019∓	0.58 [0.49]	1,577	0.79 [0.41]	2,086	−0.21***	0.70 [0.57]	1,577	0.72 [0.67]	2,086	−0.02
Cadastro Único enrollment month†‡	-	-	-	-	24.862	-	-	-	-	0.327
Cadastro Único variables before program launch (Jan - May 2019)										
Household SES Index	0.09 [1.19]	1,577	0.13 [1.38]	2,086	−0.04	0.09 [2.02]	1,577	0.11 [1.69]	2,086	−0.02
Average family income value (per capita)	184.71 [144.45]	1,577	180.52 [166.83]	2,086	4.20	175.30 [224.98]	1,577	183.42 [226.42]	2,086	−8.12
Number of people in the household	2.16 [1.01]	1,577	2.30 [1.19]	2,086	−0.14***	2.21 [1.59]	1,577	2.24 [1.40]	2,086	−0.03
Knows how to read and write	0.97 [0.16]	1,577	0.95 [0.22]	2,086	0.03***	0.96 [0.33]	1,577	0.96 [0.20]	2,086	0.00
Household head with paid work for the last 12 months	0.73 [0.44]	1,577	0.60 [0.49]	2,086	0.13***	0.66 [0.68]	1,577	0.64 [0.62]	2,086	0.03
Total remuneration of work in the last month	104.27 [164.93]	1,577	120.31 [190.91]	2,086	−16.04***	113.60 [255.72]	1,577	116.71 [259.32]	2,086	−3.11
Amount received from unemployment insurance	0.00 [0.00]	1,577	0.00 [0.00]	2,086	N/A	0.00 [0.00]	1,577	0.00 [0.00]	2,086	N/A
Worker class†	-	-	-	-	5.843	-	-	-	-	0.083
	-	-	-	-	(0.000)	-	-	-	-	(0.995)
Highest Education Level†	-	-	-	-	10.171	-	-	-	-	0.374
	-	-	-	-	(0.000)	-	-	-	-	(0.935)
Missing Dummies†	-	-	-	-	27.352	-	-	-	-	1.471
	-	-	-	-	(0.000)	-	-	-	-	(0.127)
Test of joint orthogonality (*F*-stat / *p*-value)					15.945					0.648
					0.000					0.971

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. The values displayed in the "Difference (1)–(2)" column are the differences in the means across the groups. Average family income value (per capita), total remuneration of work in the last month and amount received from unemployment insurance are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles.

† For convenience, we report the *F*-statistic from the *F*-test of joint orthogonality for variables with multiple categories with *p*-value in parenthesis. For individual parameters, see Table A2 in Appendix A: Tables and figures.

∓ This variable comes from *Cadastro Único* November 2019.

‡ This variable comes from the earliest entry found in *Cadastro Único* between January 2019 and December 2021.

"Random door to door visits" is a dummy indicating if the household was found through the door-to-door strategy. "List of addresses identified through *Cadastro Único*" is a dummy indicating if the interview was conducted with a household on the list of addresses, but found through the door-to-door strategy.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Estimation results for primary and related outcomes

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Unbounded treatment estimate	(3) N	(4) Lower Bound	(5) N (lower bound)	(6) Upper Bound	(7) N (upper bound)
Household income (USD, monthly)	1,096.95	−76.60**	3,663	−119.91***	3,587	−64.46**	3,594
	(732.91)	(31.45)		(31.00)		(31.17)	
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	1,096.95	103.82***	3,663	58.81*	3,587	118.55***	3,596
	(732.91)	(32.49)		(32.09)		(31.91)	
		[0.00]***		[0.00]***		[0.00]***	
Household consumption (USD, past month)	800.79	43.42*	3,663	14.81	3,582	60.95***	3,588
	(583.23)	(23.37)		(23.24)		(23.61)	
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	444.59	−35.95***	3,663	−53.62***	3,592	−30.03**	3,596
	(306.55)	(12.97)		(12.68)		(12.81)	
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	444.59	36.82***	3,663	19.91	3,596	46.29***	3,597
	(306.55)	(13.15)		(12.92)		(12.83)	
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)[a]	332.40	3.38	3,663	−11.59	3,595	13.13	3,596
	(236.31)	(10.39)		(9.71)		(10.39)	
		[0.83]		[0.11]		[0.55]	
Labor supply (hours, weekly)							
Respondent[a]	17.53	−1.21	3,663	−2.99***	3,578	−0.65	3,591
	(19.78)	(1.04)		(1.03)		(1.06)	
		[0.06]*		[0.00]***		[0.20]	
Other household members	9.61	−1.23	3,663	−2.47***	3,588	−0.96	3,591
	(17.83)	(0.92)		(0.91)		(0.94)	
Total value of assets (USD, non-housing)[a]	1,856.62	−116.19	3,663	−302.72***	3,589	−62.06	3,594
	(2,284.52)	(98.65)		(95.51)		(99.55)	
		[0.00]***		[0.00]***		[0.00]***	
Total value of assets (USD)	25,261.80	−4,572.06***	3,663	−6,455.11***	3,599	−3,875.08***	3,593
	(30,576.54)	(1,369.09)		(1,344.45)		(1,367.58)	
Depression (PHQ-8, SD)[a]	0.00	0.02	3,630	0.00	3,106	0.02	3,630
	(1.00)	(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.05)	
		[0.34]		[0.51]		[0.34]	
Intimate partner violence index[a]	0.00	−0.02	1,190	−0.04	1,001	−0.02	1,190
	(1.00)	(0.05)		(0.08)		(0.05)	
		[0.35]		[0.43]		[0.34]	
Oldest child education and health index[a]	0.00	0.18**	1,452	0.11	1,383	0.27***	1,395
	(1.00)	(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)	
		[0.54]		[0.55]		[0.04]**	
Per capita # of bedrooms plus toilets	1.38	−0.02	3,663	−0.07**	3,597	0.01	3,595
	(0.79)	(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.04)	
Number of household members							
Number of household members	2.69	0.01	3,663	−0.12**	3,585	0.05	3,602
	(1.37)	(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.07)	
Number of working household members	1.16	−0.06	3,663	−0.12***	3,589	−0.04	3,601
	(0.91)	(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)	
Number of non-working household members	1.54	0.08	3,663	−0.03	3,590	0.13**	3,604
	(1.20)	(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.06)	
Number of household members 14 years-old or younger	0.60	0.00	3,663	−0.06*	3,592	0.02	3,604
	(0.87)	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Number of non-working household members between 14 and 18 years-old	0.10	−0.03*	3,663	−0.05***	3,589	−0.02	3,604
	(0.32)	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.02)	
Number of non-working household members 18 years-old or older	0.83	0.10**	3,663	0.02	3,587	0.14***	3,604
	(0.81)	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, and FDR p-values for primary outcomes in brackets. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. Columns (4) and (6) report the upper and lower treatment estimate bounds using Lee (2009) bounds. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values suing dummy variables, separately for each outcome. Depression is measured using the PHQ-8 (Kroenke et al., 2009). Income, consumption, assets and labor supply variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor supply, depression, and the IPV index, where it is the respondent; and for the oldest child's education and health indeed, where it is that child.
a. Pre-registered primary outcome.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Heterogeneous treatment effects for primary and related outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Comparison mean (SD)	White × Treatment	Black × Treatment	Mixed Race × Treatment	Female × Treatment	Below-Median Age × Treatment
Household income (USD, monthly)	1,096.95	−38.32	88.01	−27.35	154.92***	16.80
	(732.91)	(48.73)	(63.81)	(50.29)	(48.15)	(50.11)
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	1,096.95	−46.47	99.10	−27.14	148.44***	62.40
	(732.91)	(49.61)	(65.65)	(51.14)	(49.17)	(51.13)
Household consumption (USD, past month)	800.79	−2.72	49.98	−29.74	42.67	24.42
	(583.23)	(39.73)	(50.80)	(39.41)	(39.01)	(40.83)
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	444.59	−18.35	36.97	−9.34	15.48	−26.95
	(306.55)	(22.26)	(26.10)	(20.48)	(21.18)	(21.42)
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	444.59	−14.07	36.58	−13.45	23.79	−31.03
	(306.55)	(22.54)	(26.42)	(20.69)	(21.50)	(21.71)
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)[a]	332.40	−3.59	24.19	−14.09	−29.44	2.96
	(236.31)	(22.71)	(23.06)	(19.25)	(19.51)	(20.74)
Labor supply (hours, weekly)						
Respondent[a]	17.53	3.00	−0.55	−2.72	−1.36	−1.10
	(19.78)	(1.82)	(2.19)	(1.88)	(1.79)	(1.80)
Other household members	9.61	−0.30	−2.19	1.77	2.36	−0.28
	(17.83)	(1.60)	(2.18)	(1.62)	(1.58)	(1.65)
Total value of assets (USD, non-housing)[a]	1,856.62	131.94	58.87	−150.74	291.62	47.02
	(2,284.52)	(185.66)	(213.54)	(173.81)	(178.09)	(178.31)
Total value of assets (USD)	25,261.80	−3,659.50	3,445.46	1,175.13	−2,177.41	3,072.95
	(30,576.54)	(2,428.79)	(2,803.91)	(2,417.94)	(2,420.56)	(2,312.87)
Depression (PHQ-8, SD)[a]	0.00	0.01	−0.03	0.01	−0.15*	0.06
	(1.00)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Intimate partner violence index[a]	0.00	0.02	−0.03	0.00	0.03	−0.11
	(1.00)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Oldest child education and health index[a]	0.00	0.03	−0.26	0.18	0.10	−0.20
	(1.00)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Per capita # of bedrooms plus toilets	1.38	−0.08	0.10	0.01	−0.12*	0.03
	(0.79)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Number of household members						
Number of household members	2.69	−0.07	0.04	0.04	0.25**	−0.04
	(1.37)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Number of working household members	1.16	0.03	−0.12	0.06	0.13	−0.06
	(0.91)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Number of non-working household members	1.54	−0.10	0.16	−0.01	0.12	0.03
	(1.20)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Number of household members 14 years-old or younger	0.60	0.08	−0.01	−0.08	0.07	−0.06
	(0.87)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Number of non-working household members between 14 and 18 years-old	0.10	0.02	0.03	−0.04	0.03	−0.01
	(0.32)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Number of non-working household members 18 years-old or older	0.83	−0.20***	0.14	0.10	0.02	0.10
	(0.81)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Sample composition	—	37.71% White	21.47% Black	40.26% Mixed Race	53.03% Female	42.53% Below-Median Age

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group. Columns (2) - (6) reports the heterogeneous treatment estimates for each subsample stated in the column names for the outcome variables listed on the left, following the regression model given by Equation 3 in section 3. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (which is later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. Depression is measured using the PHQ-8 (Kroenke et al., 2009). Income, consumption, assets and labor supply variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor supply, depression, and the IPV index, where it is the respondent; and for the oldest child's education and health indeed, where it is that child. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Estimation results for other outcomes

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Unbounded treatment estimate	(3) N	(4) Lower Bound	(5) N (lower bound)	(6) Upper Bound	(7) N (upper bound)
Labor market outcomes							
Labor market participation (dummy, past week)	0.64	−0.01	3,663	−0.03	3,585	0.00	3,596
	(0.48)	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Participation in unpaid work (dummy, past week)	0.85	0.00	3,663	0.00	3,590	0.03	3,591
	(0.36)	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Time devoted to unpaid work (hours, past week)	28.84	−1.90	3,663	−3.44**	3,590	−1.07	3,591
	(29.90)	(1.54)		(1.54)		(1.53)	
Lost a job because of the pandemic (dummy, past 12 months)	0.25	−0.02	3,663	−0.04**	3,594	−0.01	3,589
	(0.43)	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)	
Income from sales of goods and withdrawals from savings (USD)	0.00	0.00	3,663	0.00	3,587	0.00	3,604
	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Value of unpaid credit card bills (USD, past 12 months)	25.59	2.79	3,663	−2.32	3,595	3.51	3,599
	(70.51)	(3.12)		(2.88)		(3.19)	
Value of outstanding loans (USD)	0.00	0.00	3,663	0.00	3,590	0.00	3,601
	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)		(0.00)	
Value of gifts received in the past 2 months	2.57	−0.57	3,663	−1.27***	3,599	−0.51	3,598
	(8.14)	(0.42)		(0.39)		(0.42)	
Value of gifts sent in the past 2 months	2.30	0.47	3,663	−0.16	3,590	0.54	3,601
	(7.35)	(0.35)		(0.33)		(0.36)	
Net value of gifts in the past 2 months	0.50	−0.91*	3,663	−1.61***	3,596	−0.44	3,590
	(10.31)	(0.52)		(0.50)		(0.51)	
Self-assessed quality of health past 12 months (1 = worst, 5 = best)	3.51	−0.06	3,663	−0.13**	3,596	0.00	3,598
	(0.99)	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Perception of income distribution (1 = worst, 4 = best)	1.51	0.01	3,663	−0.03	3,598	0.02	3,600
	(0.64)	(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)	
Evaluation of the mayor (1 = worst, 5 = best)	4.31	0.16***	3,663	0.14***	3,596	0.20***	3,602
	(0.81)	(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Evaluation of the president (1 = worst, 5 = best)	2.23	−0.08	3,663	−0.15**	3,589	−0.04	3,601
	(1.27)	(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)	
Indices							
Economic security index	0.00	−0.14***	3,663	−0.21***	3,587	−0.09*	3,600
	(1.00)	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Food security index	0.00	0.05	3,663	0.02	3,596	0.09*	3,606
	(1.00)	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Access to financial services index	0.00	0.16***	3,663	0.13***	3,593	0.19***	3,601
	(1.00)	(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)	
Health security index	0.00	−0.04	3,663	−0.07	3,595	0.05	3,594
	(1.00)	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
COVID-19 impact index	0.00	0.05	3,663	0.01	3,588	0.10*	3,598
	(1.00)	(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. Columns (4) and (6) report the upper and lower treatment estimate bounds using Lee (2009) bounds. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor market variables, self-assessed health, COVID-19 impact index and political opinions, where it is the respondent.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix A: Tables and figures

Tables

Table A1: Response rates by treatment status (list-of-addresses strategy)

	Complete interview
Treatment	−0.009
	(0.012)
N	6,756
p-value	0.440
Comparison mean	0.434
Comparison SD	0.496

Notes: We treat door-to-door interviews done with list-of-addresses strategy as door-to-door households. The coefficient shows the difference in the likelihood of completing an interview for households found using the list-of-addresses strategy.
Standard errors in parentheses.
The independent variable is 1 if the household is in the treatment group and 0 if it is in the comparison group.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A2: Summary statistics and balance before and after inverse probability weighting (IPW)

	Before IPW					After IPW				
Variable	Comparison Mean [SD]	*N*	Treatment Mean [SD]	*N*	Difference (1)-(2)	Comparison Mean [SD]	*N*	Treatment Mean [SD]	*N*	Difference (1)-(2)
Survey variables										
Age	47.00 [15.69]	1,577	47.40 [15.85]	2,086	−0.39	46.72 [21.16]	1,577	47.28 [21.79]	2,086	−0.56
Female	0.74 [0.44]	1,577	0.81 [0.40]	2,086	−0.06***	0.78 [0.52]	1,577	0.77 [0.63]	2,086	0.01
White	0.41 [0.49]	1,577	0.37 [0.48]	2,086	0.04***	0.41 [0.68]	1,577	0.39 [0.66]	2,086	0.02
Black	0.20 [0.40]	1,577	0.22 [0.41]	2,086	−0.02	0.20 [0.55]	1,577	0.21 [0.53]	2,086	−0.01
Asian	0.00 [0.06]	1,577	0.00 [0.05]	2,086	0.00	0.00 [0.05]	1,577	0.00 [0.07]	2,086	0.00
Mixed	0.39 [0.49]	1,577	0.41 [0.49]	2,086	−0.02	0.39 [0.67]	1,577	0.39 [0.65]	2,086	−0.01
Indigenous	0.00 [0.04]	1,577	0.01 [0.08]	2,086	0.00**	0.00 [0.07]	1,577	0.00 [0.06]	2,086	0.00
Month of data collection										
Sep2021	0.07 [0.25]	1,577	0.08 [0.27]	2,086	−0.01	0.08 [0.40]	1,577	0.08 [0.35]	2,086	0.00
Oct2021	0.08 [0.28]	1,577	0.10 [0.30]	2,086	−0.01	0.10 [0.41]	1,577	0.09 [0.33]	2,086	0.00
Nov2021	0.20 [0.40]	1,577	0.26 [0.44]	2,086	−0.07***	0.23 [0.62]	1,577	0.23 [0.50]	2,086	0.00
Dec2021	0.24 [0.42]	1,577	0.28 [0.45]	2,086	−0.05***	0.26 [0.63]	1,577	0.24 [0.51]	2,086	0.01
Jan2022	0.12 [0.33]	1,577	0.15 [0.35]	2,086	−0.02*	0.14 [0.49]	1,577	0.14 [0.43]	2,086	0.00
Feb2022	0.20 [0.40]	1,577	0.11 [0.31]	2,086	0.09***	0.13 [0.33]	1,577	0.15 [0.57]	2,086	−0.02
Mar2022	0.07 [0.26]	1,577	0.02 [0.12]	2,086	0.06***	0.05 [0.24]	1,577	0.05 [0.52]	2,086	0.00
Apr2022	0.02 [0.13]	1,577	0.01 [0.08]	2,086	0.01***	0.01 [0.10]	1,577	0.01 [0.14]	2,086	0.00
Recruitment techniques										
Random door to door visits	0.33 [0.47]	1,577	0.37 [0.48]	2,086	−0.04**	0.37 [0.69]	1,577	0.36 [0.63]	2,086	0.01
List of addresses identified through *Cadastro Único*	0.15 [0.36]	1,577	0.24 [0.42]	2,086	−0.09***	0.22 [0.65]	1,577	0.22 [0.52]	2,086	0.00
Cadastro Único variables										
Head of household was born in Maricá	0.21 [0.40]	1,577	0.30 [0.46]	2,086	−0.10***	0.25 [0.64]	1,577	0.27 [0.52]	2,086	−0.01
Household *Cadastro Único* information updated by Sep 30 2019‡	0.58 [0.49]	1,577	0.79 [0.41]	2,086	−0.21***	0.70 [0.57]	1,577	0.72 [0.67]	2,086	−0.02
Cadastro Único enrollment month	-	-	-	-	24.862	-	-	-	-	0.327
Cadastro Único variables before program launch										
Household SES Index	0.09 [1.19]	1,577	0.13 [1.38]	2,086	−0.04	0.09 [2.02]	1,577	0.11 [1.69]	2,086	−0.02
Average family income value (per capita)	184.71 [144.45]	1,577	180.52 [166.83]	2,086	4.20	175.30 [224.98]	1,577	183.42 [226.42]	2,086	−8.12
Number of people in the household	2.16 [1.01]	1,577	2.30 [1.19]	2,086	−0.14***	2.21 [1.59]	1,577	2.24 [1.40]	2,086	−0.03
Knows how to read and write	0.97 [0.16]	1,577	0.95 [0.22]	2,086	0.03***	0.96 [0.33]	1,577	0.96 [0.20]	2,086	0.00
Household head with paid work for the last 12 months	0.73 [0.44]	1,577	0.60 [0.49]	2,086	0.13***	0.66 [0.68]	1,577	0.64 [0.62]	2,086	0.03
Total remuneration of work in the last month	104.27 [164.93]	1,577	120.31 [190.91]	2,086	−16.04***	113.60 [255.72]	1,577	116.71 [259.32]	2,086	−3.11
Amount received from unemployment insurance	0.00 [0.00]	1,577	0.00 [0.00]	2,086	N/A	0.00 [0.00]	1,577	0.00 [0.00]	2,086	N/A
Worker class										
Self-employed worker	0.93 [0.25]	1,577	0.89 [0.32]	2,086	0.05***	0.91 [0.47]	1,577	0.90 [0.35]	2,086	0.00
Employees without a formal contract	0.00 [0.00]	1,577	0.00 [0.00]	2,086	N/A	0.00 [0.00]	1,577	0.00 [0.00]	2,086	N/A
Employees with a formal contract	0.01 [0.10]	1,577	0.02 [0.12]	2,086	−0.01	0.02 [0.22]	1,577	0.01 [0.13]	2,086	0.00
Domestic worker without a formal contract	0.05 [0.21]	1,577	0.08 [0.28]	2,086	−0.04***	0.07 [0.41]	1,577	0.07 [0.29]	2,086	0.00
Domestic worker with a formal contract	0.00 [0.04]	1,577	0.00 [0.07]	2,086	0.00	0.00 [0.07]	1,577	0.00 [0.06]	2,086	0.00
Military or government servant	0.00 [0.07]	1,577	0.00 [0.04]	2,086	0.00*	0.00 [0.04]	1,577	0.00 [0.12]	2,086	0.00
Highest Education Level										
Pre-school	0.00 [0.03]	1,577	0.00 [0.03]	2,086	0.00	0.00 [0.02]	1,577	0.00 [0.02]	2,086	0.00
Literacy Class	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00

	[0.05]		[0.06]			[0.05]		[0.05]		
1st to 4th Grades	0.09	1,577	0.16	2,086	−0.07***	0.12	1,577	0.14	2,086	−0.02
	[0.29]		[0.37]			[0.50]		[0.43]		
5th to 8th Grades	0.67	1,577	0.53	2,086	0.14***	0.58	1,577	0.56	2,086	0.02
	[0.47]		[0.50]			[0.71]		[0.65]		
Basic School (9yr)	0.01	1,577	0.01	2,086	0.00	0.01	1,577	0.01	2,086	0.00
	[0.10]		[0.12]			[0.14]		[0.13]		
Special Regular Basic Education (Disabilities)	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00
	[0.04]		[0.06]			[0.11]		[0.05]		
Regular Secondary School	0.21	1,577	0.27	2,086	−0.06***	0.26	1,577	0.26	2,086	0.00
	[0.41]		[0.44]			[0.66]		[0.58]		
Basic Education for Adults	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	N/A	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	N/A
	[0.00]		[0.00]			[0.00]		[0.00]		
Secondary School for Adults	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	N/A	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	N/A
	[0.00]		[0.00]			[0.00]		[0.00]		
Higher Education	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00
	[0.03]		[0.02]			[0.03]		[0.03]		
Missing Dummies										
Age	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00*	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00
	[0.06]		[0.03]			[0.04]		[0.07]		
Female	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00
	[0.03]		[0.02]			[0.01]		[0.01]		
Race	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	0.00
	[0.05]		[0.04]			[0.03]		[0.04]		
Head of household was born in Maricá$^{\mp}$	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	N/A	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	N/A
	[0.00]		[0.00]			[0.00]		[0.00]		
SES index	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	N/A	0.00	1,577	0.00	2,086	N/A
	[0.00]		[0.00]			[0.00]		[0.00]		
Average family income (per capita)	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Number of people in the household	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Highest education level	0.53	1,577	0.31	2,086	0.22***	0.39	1,577	0.36	2,086	0.03
	[0.50]		[0.46]			[0.62]		[0.66]		
Knows how to read and write	0.50	1,577	0.26	2,086	0.24***	0.35	1,577	0.32	2,086	0.03
	[0.50]		[0.44]			[0.59]		[0.66]		
Class of worker	0.72	1,577	0.62	2,086	0.10***	0.65	1,577	0.65	2,086	0.00
	[0.45]		[0.49]			[0.69]		[0.60]		
Total remuneration of work in the last month	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.02
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Person with paid work for the last 12 months	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.02
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Amount received from unemployment insurance	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.02
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Enrollment Month	0.10	1,577	0.04	2,086	0.06***	0.04	1,577	0.03	2,086	0.02***
	[0.29]		[0.19]			[0.15]		[0.14]		
Floor material	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Outer walls material	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Running water	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Number of rooms	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Number of rooms used for sleeping	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Existence of bathroom	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Sanitary disposal	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.26	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.02
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.67]		
Garbage collection	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Lighting type	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Paved sidewalk	0.41	1,577	0.16	2,086	0.25***	0.25	1,577	0.23	2,086	0.03
	[0.49]		[0.37]			[0.47]		[0.66]		
Test of joint-orthogonality (F-stat / p-value)					15.945					0.648
					0.000					0.971

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. The values displayed in the "Difference (1)–(2)" column are the differences in the means across the groups.

Average family income value (per capita), total remuneration of work in the last month and amount received from unemployment insurance are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles.

$^{\mp}$ This variable comes from *Cadastro Único* November 2019.

‡ This variable comes from the earliest entry found in *Cadastro Único* between January 2019 and December 2021.

"Random door to door visits" is a dummy indicating if the household was found through the door-to-door strategy. "List of addresses identified through *Cadastro Único*" is a dummy indicating if the interview was conducted with a household on the list of addresses, but found through the door-to-door strategy.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A3: Estimation results for components of household income

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)	1,096.95	103.82***	3,663
	(732.91)	(32.49)	
Public retirement	70.14	−7.26	3,663
	(160.80)	(8.63)	
Other type of retirement	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Public pension	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Other type of pension	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Unemployment insurance	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
BPC-LOAS†	25.56	−1.49	3,663
	(101.28)	(4.72)	
Bolsa Família program	21.31	0.02	3,663
	(46.49)	(2.47)	
Federal Government's Emergency Assistance	33.91	−2.42	3,663
	(52.50)	(2.55)	
Workers' Aids Program	59.56	0.61	3,663
	(122.12)	(5.50)	
Other government social programs	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Household labor income	576.58	−95.72***	3,663
	(504.47)	(22.95)	
Rent income	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Other income	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
In-kind benefits (food and household goods baskets)	265.95	27.34	3,663
	(454.17)	(16.95)	
RBC	0.00	180.34***	3,663
	(0.00)	(3.81)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing valuesusing dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
†BPC-LOAS is a non-contributory benefit for old people (65+) and for households with people with disabilities with a per capita income of up to 25% of the minimum wage.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Estimation results for components of per capita income

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	444.59	36.82***	3,663
	(306.55)	(13.15)	
Public retirement	38.12	1.99	3,663
	(99.17)	(4.87)	
Other type of retirement	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Public pension	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Other type of pension	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Unemployment insurance	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
BPC-LOAS†	16.14	−2.12	3,663
	(71.95)	(3.83)	
Bolsa Família program	7.71	−0.18	3,663
	(19.29)	(1.03)	
Federal Government's Emergency Assistance	33.91	−2.42	3,663
	(52.50)	(2.55)	
Workers' Aids Program	24.92	1.81	3,663
	(61.76)	(2.72)	
Other government social programs	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Household labor income	238.16	−42.69***	3,663
	(265.38)	(10.24)	
Rent income	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Other income	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
In-kind benefits (food and household goods baskets)	265.95	27.34	3,663
	(454.17)	(16.95)	
RBC	0.00	72.30***	3,663
	(0.00)	(1.35)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations using dummy variables, done for missing values, separately for each outcome. All variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
†BPC-LOAS is a non-contributory benefit for old people (65+) and for households with people with disabilities with a per capita income of up to 25% of the minimum wage.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Estimation results for components of household consumption

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Household consumption (USD, past month)	800.79	43.42*	3,663
	(583.23)	(23.37)	
Food own production	140.08	5.40	3,663
	(94.67)	(4.38)	
Food bought	103.12	7.86	3,663
	(112.56)	(6.10)	
Food and drinks outside	22.34	6.19*	3,663
	(60.06)	(3.48)	
Housing (including reforms)	163.63	−6.46	3,663
	(118.05)	(5.83)	
Clothing	3.74	0.03	3,663
	(7.53)	(0.37)	
Transportation	24.21	0.24	3,663
	(52.79)	(2.44)	
Hygiene and personal care	20.21	−0.40	3,663
	(22.28)	(1.02)	
Medical and health care	26.72	1.21	3,663
	(48.69)	(2.22)	
Education	0.51	−0.05	3,663
	(1.58)	(0.06)	
Entertainment and culture	4.58	−0.48	3,663
	(10.70)	(0.40)	
Smoking	3.31	0.17	3,663
	(10.34)	(0.50)	
Personal services	1.12	−0.18	3,663
	(3.89)	(0.15)	
Internet and phone expenditure	14.43	2.69***	3,663
	(19.13)	(0.91)	
Temptation goods	3.65	0.42	3,663
	(13.47)	(0.57)	
Donations to religious institutions or charitable organizations	0.20	−0.03	3,663
	(0.73)	(0.02)	
Child care	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Insurance	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Durables	3.02	−0.67*	3,663
	(8.94)	(0.34)	
In-kind benefits (food and household goods baskets)	265.95	27.49*	3,663
	(454.17)	(16.71)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies forwhether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Estimation results for income and consumption, by household size

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Household size = 1			
Household income (USD, monthly)	558.03	−31.39	738
	(460.01)	(36.27)	
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	558.03	56.32	738
	(460.01)	(36.60)	
Household consumption (USD, past month)	465.80	−50.90	738
	(320.89)	(31.78)	
Number of working household members	0.48	−0.04	738
	(0.50)	(0.06)	
Number of non-working household members	0.52	0.04	738
	(0.50)	(0.06)	
	Comparison mean (std. dev)	Treatment estimate	N
Household size = 2			
Household income (USD, monthly)	918.40	−137.24***	1,073
	(575.75)	(40.92)	
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	918.40	11.21	1,073
	(575.75)	(40.46)	
Household consumption (USD, past month)	665.37	−7.37	1,073
	(425.11)	(32.44)	
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	459.20	−68.62***	1,073
	(287.87)	(20.46)	
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	459.20	5.60	1,073
	(287.87)	(20.23)	
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)[a]	332.69	−3.68	1,073
	(212.55)	(16.22)	
Number of working household members	0.91	0.00	1,073
	(0.76)	(0.07)	
Number of non-working household members	1.09	0.00	1,073
	(0.76)	(0.07)	
	Comparison mean (std. dev)	Treatment estimate	N
Household size = 3			
Household income (USD, monthly)	1,280.94	47.61	889
	(667.60)	(49.88)	
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	1,280.94	269.37***	889
	(667.60)	(51.04)	
Household consumption (USD, past month)	894.78	126.96**	889
	(587.26)	(53.16)	
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	426.98	15.87	889
	(222.53)	(16.63)	
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	426.98	89.79***	889
	(222.53)	(17.01)	
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)[a]	298.26	42.32**	889
	(195.75)	(17.72)	
Number of working household members	1.43	−0.05	889
	(0.81)	(0.08)	
Number of non-working household members	1.57	0.05	889
	(0.81)	(0.08)	
	Comparison mean (std. dev)	Treatment estimate	N
Household size = 4 or more			
Household income (USD, monthly)	1,569.15	−160.05***	963
	(771.82)	(61.57)	
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	1,569.15	100.68	963
	(771.82)	(63.01)	
Household consumption (USD, past month)	1,141.62	47.05	963
	(688.76)	(54.66)	
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	350.23	−31.78**	963
	(176.57)	(15.26)	
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	350.23	27.07*	963
	(176.57)	(15.78)	
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)[a]	253.48	14.16	963
	(152.38)	(12.45)	
Number of working household members	1.73	−0.13	963
	(0.95)	(0.09)	
Number of non-working household members	2.86	0.22*	963
	(1.13)	(0.12)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. Income and consumption variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
a. Pre-registered primary outcome.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Estimation results for individual assets

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Total value of assets (USD, non-housing)	1,856.62	−116.19	3,663
	(2,284.52)	(98.65)	
Value of television	295.28	−25.44**	3,663
	(210.04)	(9.93)	
Value of phone #1	63.55	2.72	3,663
	(126.01)	(6.09)	
Value of phone #2	125.14	11.35	3,663
	(177.42)	(8.79)	
Value of tablet	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Value of internet	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Value of washer	98.06	−7.36	3,663
	(113.21)	(5.05)	
Value of refrigerator	210.42	−6.60	3,663
	(122.93)	(6.04)	
Value of basin	13.02	1.66	3,663
	(30.49)	(1.44)	
Value of filter	3.76	0.37	3,663
	(8.66)	(0.46)	
Value of stove	4.15	−0.48	3,663
	(14.46)	(0.70)	
Value of oven	92.01	−4.52	3,663
	(69.36)	(3.15)	
Value of computer	25.84	2.58	3,663
	(74.60)	(3.04)	
Value of livestocks	0.08	0.00	3,663
	(0.29)	(0.01)	
Value of vehicles	925.30	−54.87	3,663
	(2,058.46)	(87.38)	
Value of real estate owned	23,405.18	−4,491.48***	3,663
	(29,859.97)	(1,339.59)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Estimation results for housing situation

	(1) Control mean (SD)	(2) Treatment effect	(3) N
Homeowners	0.61	0.06***	3663
	(0.49)	(0.02)	
Renters	0.24	-0.07***	3663
	(0.43)	(0.02)	
Others	0.15	0.01	3663
	(0.35)	(0.02)	

Notes: "Homeowner" is a dummy reflecting whether the respondent owns their home; "Renter" is a dummy reflecting whether they rent their home; and "Other" is a dummy for another housing situation Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. For each outcome variable, we report the coefficients of interest and their standard errors in parentheses. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Estimation results for components of the oldest child's education and health index

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Oldest child education and health index	0.00	0.18**	1,452
	(1.00)	(0.08)	
Type of schooling (face-to-face or remote)	0.83	−0.01	1,452
	(0.37)	(0.02)	
Hours per week devoted to school work	2.14	0.12***	1,452
	(0.33)	(0.03)	
Parent or guardian assisted with school work	4.10	0.01	1,452
	(1.20)	(0.10)	
Parent or guardian attended school meeting	0.68	0.04	1,452
	(0.45)	(0.04)	
Child has classes with private tutors	1.32	−0.02	1,452
	(0.90)	(0.06)	
Child has done paid work past 12 months	4.95	0.01	1,452
	(0.35)	(0.02)	
Child visited doctor for routine visit past 12 months	0.83	0.04*	1,452
	(0.38)	(0.03)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. The unit of observation is the oldest child for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Heterogeneous treatment effects along additional dimensions — primary and related outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Comparison mean (SD)	Less than High School x Treatment	HHs with Minors x Treatment	HHs with Seniors x Treatment	HHs with any Dependents x Treatment	Below-Median Household Size x Treatment	Below-Median SES Index x Treatment
Household income (USD, monthly)	1,096.95	31.45	55.11	−2.09	47.30	−99.88*	29.49
	(732.91)	(57.38)	(60.20)	(72.51)	(58.50)	(55.13)	(52.07)
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	1,096.95	26.51	131.65**	−33.06	104.67*	−186.44***	12.88
	(732.91)	(58.82)	(61.14)	(75.40)	(59.65)	(56.00)	(52.95)
Household consumption (USD, past month)	800.79	7.51	102.26**	3.26	100.18**	−120.58***	13.05
	(583.23)	(45.97)	(47.67)	(51.43)	(43.19)	(40.41)	(41.34)
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	444.59	3.14	20.17	−13.07	13.79	−32.15	18.92
	(306.55)	(25.19)	(24.00)	(30.23)	(24.65)	(25.71)	(22.01)
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	444.59	−2.23	13.97	−2.06	14.48	−33.78	15.91
	(306.55)	(25.68)	(24.28)	(30.69)	(25.02)	(26.18)	(22.27)
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)[a]	332.40	14.48	25.96	−15.49	18.61	−38.24	13.92
	(236.31)	(27.05)	(24.27)	(27.14)	(23.40)	(24.51)	(21.49)
Respondent[a]	17.53	0.06	−0.16	−0.40	−0.35	−6.65***	−0.96
	(19.78)	(2.07)	(2.15)	(2.65)	(2.12)	(2.11)	(1.88)
Other household members	9.61	−0.11	−0.01	−0.50	−0.29	−3.12*	−0.46
	(17.83)	(1.87)	(1.90)	(2.40)	(1.84)	(1.69)	(1.66)
Total value of assets (USD, non-housing)[a]	1,856.62	1.20	214.16	−187.97	94.75	−22.39	−53.56
	(2,284.52)	(219.46)	(208.79)	(259.73)	(217.11)	(204.76)	(183.17)
Total value of assets (USD)	25,261.80	−1,702.32	4,842.23*	37.22	4,772.79	−1,620.62	5,437.68**
	(30,576.54)	(2,773.72)	(2,888.42)	(3,841.46)	(3,267.66)	(3,070.24)	(2,429.52)
Depression (PHQ-8, SD)[a]	0.04	−0.09	−0.01	−0.07	−0.04	0.00	−0.06
	(1.02)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Intimate partner violence index[a]	0.01	−0.08	−0.32**	0.06	−0.32**	0.21*	0.11
	(1.02)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Oldest child education and health index[a]	−0.05	0.19	0.18	−0.27	0.18	−0.39*	−0.24
	(1.04)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.15)
Per capita # of bedrooms plus toilets	1.38	0.10	0.05	−0.09	0.00	0.02	0.14**
	(0.79)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Number of household members	2.69	0.02	−0.08	0.22	0.03	0.04	0.03
	(1.37)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Sample composition	—	74.04% with Less than High School Degree	43.94% Living with Minors	18.23% Living with Seniors	61.50% Living with Dependents	24.46% Below-Median Household Size	49.36% Below-Median SES Index

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group. Columns (2) - (7) reports the heterogeneous treatment estimates for each subsample stated in the column names for the outcome variables listed on the left, following the regression model given by Equation 3 in section 3. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. Depression is measured using the PHQ-8 (Kroenke et al., 2009). Income, consumption, assets and labor supply variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor supply, depression, and the IPV index, where it is the respondent; and for the oldest child's education and health indeed, where it is that child. a. Pre-registered primary outcome.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Estimation results for components of the financial access index

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Access to financial services index	0.00	0.16***	3,663
	(1.00)	(0.04)	
Whether a household member has a bank account	0.77	0.19***	3,663
	(0.42)	(0.01)	
Whether a household member has a bank account — Mumbuca Bank	0.06	0.81***	3,438
	(0.23)	(0.02)	
Whether a household member has a bank account — Other Banks	0.75	−0.05**	3,482
	(0.44)	(0.02)	
Whether a household member has a savings account	0.61	0.01	3,663
	(0.49)	(0.03)	
Whether a household member has a credit card	0.55	−0.03	3,663
	(0.50)	(0.03)	
Whether a household member has access to loans	0.14	−0.01	3,663
	(0.35)	(0.01)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was is later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. The index is winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles and standardized. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Estimation results for components of the economic security index

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Economic security index	0.00	-0.14^{***}	3,663
	(1.00)	(0.05)	
Household ability to cope with emergency in a secure way	0.37	-0.05^{*}	3,663
	(0.48)	(0.03)	
Pay with a credit card	0.18	−0.02	3,663
	(0.39)	(0.02)	
With financial reserves or savings	0.11	-0.04^{**}	3,663
	(0.32)	(0.02)	
A loan from friends or family	0.14	0.04^{**}	3,663
	(0.35)	(0.02)	
Bank overdraft	0.02	0.00	3,663
	(0.13)	(0.01)	
Bank loan	0.04	−0.01	3,663
	(0.18)	(0.01)	
Consigned credit [deducted directly from paycheck]	0.01	0.00	3,663
	(0.07)	(0.00)	
By selling a possession	0.02	0.00	3,663
	(0.14)	(0.00)	
Another form of payment	0.03	−0.01	3,663
	(0.16)	(0.01)	
I would not be able to pay this expense	0.49	0.01	3,663
	(0.50)	(0.03)	
DK/NA	0.02	0.00	3,663
	(0.14)	(0.00)	
No unpaid bills in the past month	0.56	0.03	3,663
	(0.50)	(0.02)	
No unpaid credit card bills in the past 12 months	0.91	-0.03^{*}	3,663
	(0.29)	(0.02)	
Frequency with which household was able to save at end of month	1.90	-0.15^{***}	3,663
	(1.05)	(0.05)	
Not in Poverty (without RBC)	0.84	-0.04^{*}	3,663
	(0.37)	(0.02)	
Not in Poverty (with RBC)	0.84	0.04^{*}	3,663

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. The index is winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles and standardized. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
The household is considered not able to cope with emergency in a secure way if they explicitly stated they would not be able to pay this expense or they do not know how they could along with being able to pay only through a loan from friends or family.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A13: Estimation results for primary and related outcomes — no flags for imputations

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Household income (USD, monthly)	1,096.95	−77.71**	3,663
	(732.91)	(33.26)	
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	1,096.95	104.41***	3,663
	(732.91)	(33.97)	
Household consumption (USD, past month)	800.79	28.84	3,663
	(583.23)	(23.94)	
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	444.59	−40.59***	3,663
	(306.55)	(13.31)	
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	444.59	31.68**	3,663
	(306.55)	(13.40)	
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)[a]	332.40	−0.01	3,663
	(236.31)	(10.19)	
Labor supply (hours, weekly)			
Respondent[a]	17.53	−1.19	3,663
	(19.78)	(1.04)	
Other household members	9.61	−1.23	3,663
	(17.83)	(0.92)	
Total value of assets (USD, non-housing)[a]	1,856.62	−166.51*	3,663
	(2,284.52)	(101.05)	
Total value of assets (USD)	25,261.80	−4,560.77***	3,663
	(30,576.54)	(1,386.35)	
Depression (PHQ-8, SD)[a]	0.04	0.02	3,630
	(1.02)	(0.05)	
Intimate partner violence index[a]	0.01	−0.02	1,190
	(1.02)	(0.05)	
Oldest child education and health index[a]	−0.05	0.16**	1,452
	(1.04)	(0.08)	
Per capita # of bedrooms plus toilets	1.38	−0.02	3,663
	(0.79)	(0.04)	
Number of household members			
Number of household members	2.69	0.01	3,663
	(1.37)	(0.07)	
Number of working household members	1.16	−0.06	3,663
	(0.91)	(0.05)	
Number of non-working household members	1.54	0.08	3,663
	(1.20)	(0.06)	
Number of household members 14 years-old or younger	0.60	0.00	3,663
	(0.87)	(0.04)	
Number of non-working household members between 14 and 18 years-old	0.10	−0.03*	3,663
	(0.32)	(0.02)	
Number of non-working household members 18 years-old or older	0.83	0.10**	3,663
	(0.81)	(0.04)	

Notes: In contrast to Table 3, we do not control for the imputations done for missing values for each outcome. Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. Depression is measured using the PHQ-8 (Kroenke et al., 2009). Income, consumption, assets and labor supply variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor supply, depression, and the IPV index, where it is the respondent; and for the oldest child's education and health indeed, where it is that child.
a. Pre-registered primary outcome.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A14: Estimation results for primary and related outcomes — no imputations

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Household income (USD, monthly)	1,041.15	−84.84**	3,663
	(754.20)	(35.37)	
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	1,041.15	90.43**	3,663
	(754.20)	(36.04)	
Household consumption (USD, past month)	748.89	10.58	3,663
	(599.22)	(26.59)	
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	423.62	−43.74***	3,663
	(314.36)	(13.90)	
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	423.62	26.02*	3,663
	(314.36)	(14.00)	
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)[a]	311.67	−9.04	3,663
	(239.55)	(10.61)	
Labor supply (hours, weekly)			
Respondent[a]	17.44	−1.05	3,454
	(20.25)	(1.07)	
Other household members	9.61	−1.10	3,663
	(17.83)	(0.90)	
Total value of assets (USD, non-housing)[a]	1,548.88	−156.04	3,663
	(2,518.94)	(112.72)	
Total value of assets (USD)	17,938.40	−6,032.49***	3,663
	(35,659.30)	(1,715.22)	
Depression (PHQ-8, SD)[a]	0.04	0.01	3,630
	(1.02)	(0.05)	
Intimate partner violence index[a]	0.01	−0.02	1,190
	(1.02)	(0.05)	
Oldest child education and health index[a]	−0.06	0.08	1,452
	(1.04)	(0.08)	
Per capita # of bedrooms plus toilets	1.38	−0.02	3,658
	(0.79)	(0.04)	
Number of household members			
Number of household members	2.69	0.02	3,663
	(1.37)	(0.07)	
Number of working household members	1.16	−0.06	3,661
	(0.91)	(0.05)	
Number of non-working household members	1.54	0.08	3,661
	(1.20)	(0.06)	
Number of household members 14 years-old or younger	0.60	0.00	3,663
	(0.87)	(0.04)	
Number of non-working household members between 14 and 18 years-old	0.10	−0.02	3,663
	(0.32)	(0.01)	
Number of non-working household members 18 years-old or older	0.83	0.10**	3,661
	(0.82)	(0.04)	

Notes: In contrast to Table 3, we do not perform any imputation for missing values for each outcome. Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. Depression is measured using the PHQ-8 (Kroenke et al., 2009). Income, consumption, assets and labor supply variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor supply, depression, and the IPV index, where it is the respondent; and for the oldest child's education and health indeed, where it is that child.
a. Pre-registered primary outcome.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A15: Estimation results for primary and related outcomes — nearest neighbor matching

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Household income (USD, monthly)	1,121.03	−35.50	3,663
	(738.45)	(33.43)	
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	1,121.03	153.05***	3,663
	(738.45)	(34.02)	
Household consumption (USD, past month)	794.82	68.86***	3,663
	(578.30)	(25.80)	
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	468.57	−37.81***	3,663
	(332.90)	(13.61)	
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	468.57	36.65***	3,663
	(332.90)	(13.83)	
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)[a]	330.60	4.92	3,663
	(224.37)	(10.15)	
Labor supply (hours, weekly)			
Respondent[a]	18.25	−2.67***	3,663
	(19.95)	(0.92)	
Other household members	9.93	−0.73	5,182
	(18.12)	(0.93)	
Total value of assets (USD, non-housing)[a]	1,938.87	−404.35***	3,663
	(2,370.91)	(106.28)	
Total value of assets (USD)	25,548.47	−3,937.30***	3,663
	(30,750.69)	(1,397.12)	
Depression (PHQ-8, SD)[a]	0.02	0.04	3,630
	(1.00)	(0.05)	
Intimate partner violence index[a]	0.03	−0.03	1,190
	(1.15)	(0.05)	
Oldest child education and health index[a]	0.00	−0.07	1,452
	(1.03)	(0.08)	
Per capita # bedrooms plus toilets	1.39	−0.09**	3,663
	(0.76)	(0.03)	
Number of household members			
Number of household members	2.66	0.09	3,663
	(1.38)	(0.06)	
Number of working household members	1.17	−0.04	3,663
	(0.91)	(0.04)	
Number of non-working household members	1.49	0.13**	3,663
	(1.23)	(0.05)	
Number of household members 14 years-old or younger	0.56	0.06	3,663
	(0.88)	(0.04)	
Number of non-working household members between 14 and 18 years-old	0.09	0.01	3,663
	(0.30)	(0.01)	
Number of non-working household members 18 years-old or older	0.83	0.06	3,663
	(0.84)	(0.04)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. Depression is measured using the PHQ-8 (Kroenke et al., 2009). Income, consumption, assets and labor supply variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.

Following Abadie Imbens (2006), we use nearest neighbor covariate matching, where we find control units (potentially more than one per treated unit) with comparable propensity scores within a defined radius from the treated unit's propensity score.

The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor supply, depression, and the IPV index, where it is the respondent; and for the oldest child's education and health indeed, where it is that child.

a. Pre-registered primary outcome.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A16: Estimation results for primary and related outcomes — coarsened exact matching

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Household income (USD, monthly)	1,121.03	−713.68	12
	(738.45)	(410.67)	
Household income with RBC (USD, monthly)[a]	1,121.03	−407.91	12
	(738.45)	(421.15)	
Household consumption (USD, past month)	794.82	−153.84	12
	(578.30)	(1,540.07)	
Per capita income (USD, monthly)	468.57	441.19	12
	(332.90)	(321.41)	
Per capita income with RBC (USD, monthly)	468.57	592.38	12
	(332.90)	(333.61)	
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)	330.60	166.74	12
	(224.37)	(535.42)	
Respondent[a]	18.25	28.82*	12
	(19.95)	(14.00)	
Other household members	9.69	−16.91	12
	(17.93)	(19.54)	
Total value of assets (USD, non-housing)[a]	1,938.87	−600.07	12
	(2,370.91)	(698.09)	
Total value of assets (USD)	25,548.47	77,141.12	12
	(30,750.69)	(0.00)	
Depression (PHQ-8, SD)[a]	0.02	−0.63***	12
	(1.00)	(0.00)	
Intimate partner violence index[a]	0.03	0.00	5
	(1.15)	(0.00)	
Oldest child education and health index[a]	0.00	0.64	6
	(1.03)	(1.09)	
Per capita # of bedrooms plus toilets	1.39	1.86***	12
	(0.76)	(0.17)	
Number of household members	2.66	−2.82***	12
	(1.38)	(0.55)	
Number of working household members	1.17	−0.55	12
	(0.91)	(0.66)	
Number of non-working household members	1.49	−2.27*	12
	(1.23)	(0.92)	
Number of household members 14 years-old or younger	0.56	−0.09	12
	(0.88)	(0.38)	
Number of non-working household members between 14 and 18 years-old	0.09	0.00	12
	(0.30)	(0.00)	
Number of non-working household members 18 years-old or older	0.83	−2.18*	12
	(0.84)	(0.97)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. Depression is measured using the PHQ-8 (Kroenke et al., 2009). Income, consumption, assets and labor supply variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
We use coarsened exact matching, following Iacus et al. (2012). Under this methodology, we create categorical variables (strata) to find exact matches and calculate weights for each stratum. All regressions are weighted using these weights.
†The trimmed analysis sample based on the propensity scores–3,663 individuals–is used in the matching procedure. The average household income and earnings, which could not be coarsened in a way to find exact matches, are included in the matching variables instead of having them as control variables in the estimating equation which explains the more unmatched units and reduced sample size.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor supply, depression, and the IPV index, where it is the respondent; and for the oldest child's education and health indeed, where it is that child.
a. Pre-registered primary outcome.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figures



Figure A1: Kernel density smoothing plot of propensity scores across treatment and comparison samples



Figure A2: Distribution of propensity scores across treatment and comparison samples

Appendix B: Outcomes and variable definitions

In creating all indices, we first standardize the components, generate the index, top-code it at 95% and bottom-code at 5%, and then standardize the index. We do not top- and bottom-code the intimate partner violence index because most of the components are equal to zero.

Income

1. **Focal variable: Total income as defined by the income variables listed below:**[17]
   (a) Monthly income usually earned in the labor market
   (b) Contributory and non-contributory cash benefits in the past month
   (c) Income from rents (real estate and others)
   (d) Other income in the past month (interest from a savings account or from other stocks, dividends, income in lieu of retirement, etc.)[18]
   (e) Estimated value of in-kind benefits (not including donations/remittances) received by the household
2. Income from assets: includes sales of goods and possessions and withdrawals of savings.[19]

Labor market variables

1. **Focal variable: Labor supply in hours in a typical week**
2. Current labor market participation status (formal, informal, and self-employment jobs)
3. Participation in unpaid work (including care work) in the past week (dummy)
4. Hours devoted to unpaid work (care and domestic work) in the past week
5. Whether the respondent lost his or her job because of the COVID-19 pandemic in the past 12 months (dummy)

Economic security

1. **Index: Standardized average of (a)–(e):**
   (a) How would the household cope with a BRL 1,000 emergency bill? Dummy variable taking value 1 for naming a secure method, and 0 for not naming a non-secure method (see below):

[17] Our pre-analysis plan stated this focal variable would be "Total income *in the past month...*" (Balakrishnan et al., 2022), but this is not true for all components of income because we decided to measure some of them differently: Specifically, income earned in the labor market, income from rents, and estimated value of in-kind benefits are measured in terms of monthly monetary values *usually* earned/received. We collected these variables in this fashion to account for fluctuations in informal markets and the delivery of in-kind benefits.

[18] Our pre-analysis plan erroneously listed this component as "Cash benefits received by the household (not including donations/remittances) in the past month" (Balakrishnan et al., 2022). This was a copy-and-paste mistake from item b. above.

[19] In our pre-analysis plan, the component listed here was "Income from assets: includes sales of real estate, cars and other goods, inheritances and the positive balance of financial transactions (deposits and withdrawals of financial investments, for example, savings and investment fund quotas)" (Balakrishnan et al., 2022), but we were not able to collect all of these variables for time reasons and therefore used an abridged list.

i. Secure
   A. Pay with a credit card
   B. Financial reserves or savings
   C. Bank loan
   D. Bank overdraft
   E. Consigned credit
   F. Selling a possession
ii. Not Secure
   A. Loan from friends or family
   B. Another form of payment
   C. I won't be able to pay this expense

(b) Whether there were no unpaid bills in the past month (dummy)[20]

(c) Whether there were no unpaid credit card bills in the past 12 months (dummy)[21]

(d) How often the household is able to save at the end of the month (1–5 scale, from "Never" to "Always")

(e) Poverty incidence (whether in poverty or not)[22]

2. Value of unpaid credit card bills in the past 12 months[23]

Assets/Wealth

1. **Focal variable: Total value of movable assets (b)–(d):**[24]

   (a) Value of real estate owned

   (b) Value of furniture, electronic devices, and other domestic possessions

   (c) Value of vehicles and farming equipment

   (d) Value of livestock

2. Per capita number of bedrooms plus bathrooms in the household

Consumption

Index: Total per capita expenditure in the past month, (1)–(18):

1. Food[25]

[20] In our pre-analysis plan, this component was listed as "whether there were unpaid bills in the past month (dummy)" (Balakrishnan et al., 2022), but we reverse-code the item to let higher values denote "better" outcomes.

[21] Reverse-coded as described above.

[22] Since there is no official poverty line in Brazil, we used the one from *Bolsa Família* at the beginning of data collection, September 2022, with a monthly per capita income of up to 178BRL. We deflate this value to December 2021 using the Brazilian Central Bank Calculator.

[23] In our pre-analysis plan, "Value of unpaid credit card bills in the past 12 months" was listed as being a part of the index instead of a separate outcome. We decided to use it as standalone outcome because this is a continuous variable and all the other index components are categorical variables.

[24] In our pre-analysis plan, the index was erroneously defined to include real estate and the per capita number of bedrooms and bathrooms; this has been corrected here. The pre-analysis plan also included savings, but due to an error it was not included in the survey.

[25] In our pre-analysis plan, there were three more items listed here: "meat, fish and eggs", "fruit and vegetables" and "other categories of food", but these are already covered in items a and b and were therefore omitted from the survey.

   (a) Food (own production)
   (b) Food bought
2. Food and drinks outside
3. Housing (including reforms)
4. Clothing
5. Transportation
6. Hygiene and personal care
7. Medical and health care
8. Education
9. Entertainment and culture
10. Smoking
11. Personal services
12. Internet and phone expenditure
13. Temptation goods
14. Donations to religious institutions or charitable organizations
15. Child care
16. Insurance
17. Durable good
18. Estimated value of in-kind benefits (not including donations/remittances) received by the household[26]

Food security

Index: Standardized index of (1)–(2)[27]

1. Whether the household never ran out of food in the past three months (dummy)
2. Whether the household was able to buy healthy food in the past three months (dummy)

[26] This component was not listed under consumption in our pre-analysis plan (Balakrishnan et al., 2022). We decided to include it in consumption because in-kind benefits were almost exclusively food baskets delivered by the city government during the pandemic.

[27] Both items are reverse-coded as described above.

Financial inclusion and loans/remittances

1. **Index: Standardized index for access to financial services of (a)–(d)**
   (a) Whether a household member has a bank account (dummy)
   (b) Whether a household member has a savings account (dummy)
   (c) Whether a household member has a credit card (dummy)
   (d) Whether a household member has access to loans (dummy)
2. Value of outstanding loans
3. Value of donations/remittances sent from the past two months
4. Value of donations/remittances received from the past two months
5. Net donations/remittances from the past two months

Psychological and physical well-being

1. **Focal variable: Depression (PHQ-9 without the suicide question)**
2. **Index: Standardized index for health security of (a)–(d)**[28]
   (a) Whether a household member never skipped a drug dose due to its cost in the previous 12 months (dummy)
   (b) Whether a household member never took a reduced dose of a drug due to its cost in the previous 12 months (dummy)
   (c) Whether the respondent never asked the doctor to prescribe a less costly drug in the past 12 months (dummy)
   (d) Whether the respondent never used alternative therapies in order to save money in the past 12 months (dummy)
3. Self-assessed quality of health in the past 12 months
4. Standardized index of COVID-related questions (a)–(b):[29]
   (a) Whether no household member was infected with COVID-19 since March 2020 (dummy)
   (b) Whether no relative died due to COVID-19 since March 2020 (dummy)

Children's education and health

Index: Standardized index of (1)–(7):[30]

1. Type of schooling (face-to-face or remote) (dummy)
2. Time in hours per week devoted to school work in the past week
3. Whether parent or guardian assisted with school work in the past 12 months (1–5 scale, from "Never" to "Always")

[28] All items reverse-coded as described above.
[29] Both items reverse-coded as described above.
[30] Items (3) and (5) reverse-coded as described above.

4. Whether parent or guardian attended a school meeting (face-to-face or remote) in the past 12 months (dummy)
5. Whether the child has classes with private tutors in the past 12 months (1–5 scale, from "Everyday" to "Never")
6. Whether the child has done paid work in the past 12 months (1–5 scale, "Never" to "Everyday")
7. Whether the child visited a doctor or a clinic for a routine exam or to be vaccinated in the past 12 months or not (dummy)

Intimate partner violence

Index: Standardized index of (1)–(4):[31]

1. Whether respondents experienced physical violence by the partner (dummy)
2. Frequency of physical violence the respondents experienced in the past 12 months
3. Whether respondents experienced sexual violence (dummy)
4. Frequency of sexual violence the respondents experienced in the past 12 months

Political preferences [32]

1. How fair is income distribution in the country (1–4 scale, from "Very Unfair" to "Very Fair")
2. Evaluation of the mayor (1–5 scale if the mayor of the city is doing a good job, from "Very Bad" to "Very Good")
3. Evaluation of the president (1–5 scale if the mayor of the city is doing a good job, from "Very Bad" to "Very Good")

Household SES index used in matching and for heterogeneous treatment effects

Index: Standard index of (1)–(11):

1. Quality of the house floor
2. Quality of predominant material on the external walls of the home
3. Whether the household has running water
4. Quantity of rooms in the household

[31] In our pre-analysis plan, we listed all components as being measured in the past 12 months (Balakrishnan et al., 2022), but during piloting it turned out that components (1) and (3) were much more acceptable to respondents without the timeframe, and we therefore omitted it.

[32] All items reverse-coded as described above. In our pre-analysis plan, we stated that we would calculate a standardized index of these three variables (Balakrishnan et al., 2022), but we decided against it because the variables are so different that it seems problematic to average them.

5. Quantity of bedrooms in the household
6. Whether there is a bathroom in the household
7. Whether the household has running water
8. Type of sanitary drainage
9. Garbage collection method
10. Type of lighting
11. Street totally, partially, or not at all paved

Appendix C: Additional analysis

Table C1: Estimation results for components of per capita consumption

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Per capita consumption (USD, past month)	332.40	3.38	3,663
	(236.31)	(10.39)	
Food own production	63.35	1.20	3,663
	(53.54)	(2.20)	
Food bought	46.47	−0.05	3,663
	(57.70)	(2.85)	
Food and drinks outside	11.19	2.06	3,663
	(35.93)	(1.77)	
Housing (including reforms)	76.96	−5.15	3,663
	(75.19)	(3.31)	
Clothing	1.64	−0.10	3,663
	(3.98)	(0.16)	
Transportation	10.79	−0.14	3,663
	(27.62)	(1.23)	
Hygiene and personal care	9.14	−0.24	3,663
	(12.54)	(0.56)	
Medical and health care	13.00	−0.42	3,663
	(29.17)	(1.20)	
Education	0.18	−0.01	3,663
	(0.64)	(0.02)	
Entertainment and culture	2.11	−0.30	3,663
	(6.11)	(0.20)	
Smoking	1.59	−0.01	3,663
	(5.94)	(0.24)	
Personal services	0.55	−0.19**	3,663
	(2.16)	(0.08)	
Internet and phone expenditure	6.50	0.69	3,663
	(10.03)	(0.45)	
Temptation goods	1.87	0.01	3,663
	(8.11)	(0.30)	
Donations to religious institutions or charitable organizations	0.09	−0.02	3,663
	(0.41)	(0.01)	
Child care	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Insurance	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Durables	1.35	−0.37**	3,663
	(4.68)	(0.18)	
In-kind benefits (food and household goods baskets)	265.95	27.49*	3,663
	(454.17)	(16.71)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP. The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C2: Estimation results for components of the depression questionnaire (PHQ-8)

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Depression (PHQ-8, SD)	0.00	0.02	3,630
	(1.00)	(0.05)	
Little interest or pleasure in doing things	0.88	0.08	3,630
	(1.08)	(0.06)	
Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless	0.93	−0.06	3,630
	(1.09)	(0.05)	
Trouble falling or staying asleep, or sleeping too much	1.07	0.06	3,630
	(1.23)	(0.07)	
Feeling tired or having little energy	1.23	0.08	3,630
	(1.20)	(0.06)	
Poor appetite or overeating	0.81	−0.01	3,630
	(1.14)	(0.06)	
Feeling bad about yourself, or that you are a failure, or have let y	0.60	−0.02	3,630
	(0.99)	(0.05)	
Trouble concentrating on things, such as reading the newspaper or wa	0.65	−0.01	3,630
	(1.02)	(0.05)	
Moving or speaking so slowly that other people could have noticed. O	0.60	−0.01	3,630
	(1.03)	(0.05)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (which is later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values unsing dummie variables, separately for each outcome. Depression is measured using the PHQ-8 (Kroenke et al., 2009). All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. The unit of observation is the respondent for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C3: Estimation results for other outcomes — no flags for imputations

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Labor market outcomes			
Labor market participation (dummy, past week)	0.64	−0.01	3,663
	(0.48)	(0.03)	
Participation in unpaid work (dummy, past week)	0.85	0.01	3,663
	(0.36)	(0.02)	
Time devoted to unpaid work (hours, past week)	28.84	−1.87	3,663
	(29.90)	(1.54)	
Lost a job because of the pandemic (dummy, past 12 months)	0.25	−0.02	3,663
	(0.43)	(0.02)	
Income from sales of goods and withdrawals from savings (USD)	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Value of unpaid credit card bills (USD, past 12 months)	25.59	3.99	3,663
	(70.51)	(3.37)	
Value of outstanding loans (USD)	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Value of gifts received in the past 2 months	2.57	−0.57	3,663
	(8.14)	(0.42)	
Value of gifts sent in the past 2 months	2.30	0.47	3,663
	(7.35)	(0.35)	
Net value of gifts in the past 2 months	0.50	−0.91*	3,663
	(10.31)	(0.52)	
Self-assessed quality of health past 12 months (1 = worst, 5 = best)	3.51	−0.06	3,663
	(0.99)	(0.05)	
Perception of income distribution (1 = worst, 4 = best)	1.51	0.01	3,663
	(0.64)	(0.03)	
Evaluation of the mayor (1 = worst, 5 = best)	4.31	0.16***	3,663
	(0.81)	(0.04)	
Evaluation of the president (1 = worst, 5 = best)	2.23	−0.08	3,663
	(1.27)	(0.06)	
Indices			
Economic security index	−0.03	−0.13**	3,663
	(1.01)	(0.05)	
Food security index	−0.09	0.05	3,663
	(1.01)	(0.05)	
Access to financial services index	−0.01	0.14***	3,663
	(1.03)	(0.05)	
Health security index	−0.02	−0.05	3,663
	(1.00)	(0.05)	
COVID-19 impact index	0.06	0.05	3,663
	(0.99)	(0.06)	

Notes: In contrast to Table 5, we do not control for the imputations done for missing values for each outcome. Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor market variables, self-assessed health, COVID-19 impact index and political opinions, where it is the respondent.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C4: Estimation results for other outcomes — no imputations

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Labor market outcomes			
Labor market participation (dummy, past week)	0.64	−0.01	3,661
	(0.48)	(0.03)	
Participation in unpaid work (dummy, past week)	0.89	0.00	3,526
	(0.32)	(0.02)	
Time devoted to unpaid work (hours, past week)	35.91	−2.83	2,778
	(34.56)	(1.87)	
Lost a job because of the pandemic (dummy, past 12 months)	0.25	−0.02	3,642
	(0.43)	(0.02)	
Income from sales of goods and withdrawals from savings (USD)	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Value of unpaid credit card bills (USD, past 12 months)	21.29	4.31	3,218
	(82.16)	(4.18)	
Value of outstanding loans (USD)	0.00	0.00	3,663
	(0.00)	(0.00)	
Value of gifts received in the past 2 months	2.54	−0.55	3,417
	(8.07)	(0.44)	
Value of gifts sent in the past 2 months	1.95	0.38	3,378
	(6.23)	(0.29)	
Net value of gifts in the past 2 months	0.54	−0.94*	3,197
	(10.34)	(0.54)	
Self-assessed quality of health past 12 months (1 = worst, 5 = best)	3.51	−0.06	3,653
	(0.99)	(0.05)	
Perception of income distribution (1 = worst, 4 = best)	1.51	0.01	3,550
	(0.65)	(0.03)	
Evaluation of the mayor (1 = worst, 5 = best)	4.31	0.16***	3,626
	(0.81)	(0.04)	
Evaluation of the president (1 = worst, 5 = best)	2.23	−0.07	3,499
	(1.30)	(0.06)	
Indices			
Economic security index	−0.04	−0.14***	3,663
	(1.01)	(0.05)	
Food security index	−0.09	0.05	3,651
	(1.01)	(0.05)	
Access to financial services index	−0.04	0.18***	3,655
	(1.01)	(0.05)	
Health security index	−0.02	−0.04	3,657
	(1.00)	(0.05)	
COVID-19 impact index	0.06	0.03	3,657
	(0.99)	(0.06)	

Notes: In contrast to Table 5, we do not perform any imputation for missing values for each outcome. Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables except for labor market variables, self-assessed health, COVID-19 impact index and political opinions, where it is the respondent.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C5: Estimation results for components of the health security index

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Health security index	0.00	−0.04	3,663
	(1.00)	(0.05)	
Household member skipped a drug dose due to its cost in past 12 months	0.84	−0.02	3,663
	(0.37)	(0.02)	
Household member took a reduced dose of a drug due to its cost in past 12 months	0.82	0.00	3,663
	(0.39)	(0.02)	
Respondent asked the doctor to prescribe a less costly drug in past 12 months	0.64	−0.01	3,663
	(0.48)	(0.02)	
Respondent used alternative therapies in order to save money in past 12 months	0.84	−0.02	3,663
	(0.37)	(0.02)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. The index is winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles and standardized. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the household for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C6: Estimation results for COVID-19 outcomes

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
COVID-19 impact index	0.00	0.05	3,663
	(1.00)	(0.06)	
Household member infected with COVID-19 since March 2020	0.72	−0.01	3,663
	(0.45)	(0.02)	
Whether a relative died due to COVID-19 since March 2020	0.74	0.03	3,663
	(0.44)	(0.02)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. The index is winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles and standardized. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the respondent for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C7: Estimation results for participation in unpaid work

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Comparison mean (SD)	Treatment estimate	N
Participation in unpaid work (dummy, past week)	0.85	0.00	3,663
	(0.36)	(0.02)	
Participation in domestic work in the past week	0.84	0.00	3,663
	(0.37)	(0.02)	
Participation in care work in the past week	0.33	−0.01	3,663
	(0.47)	(0.02)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection –(this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the respondent for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table C8: Estimation results for time spent on unpaid work

	(1) Comparison mean (SD)	(2) Treatment estimate	(3) N
Time devoted to unpaid work (hours, past week)	28.84	−1.90	3,663
	(29.90)	(1.54)	
Hours devoted to care work in the past week	29.50	−0.50	1,535
	(41.10)	(2.94)	
Hours devoted to domestic work in the past week	20.03	−1.50	3,215
	(24.65)	(1.38)	

Notes: Variable definitions follow the Pre-Analysis Plan. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group and Column (2) reports the basic treatment estimate, i.e. comparing treatment households to comparison households for the outcome variables listed on the left. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The regression model in Column (2) is given by Equation 2 in section 3. All regressions control for the three variables that were not balanced after weighting (1 missing dummy, 2 indicators for the *Cadastro Único* enrollment month), and dummies for whether the household identification was entered incorrectly during data collection (this was later fixed in the data cleaning process), whether the interview was conducted by one of the four enumerators who had cases of fraudulent interviews, and whether a household received the RBC benefit in October 2019, before the expansion. We also control for the imputations done for missing values using dummy variables, separately for each outcome. All variables are winsorized at the 5^{th} and 95^{th} percentiles. All regressions are weighted using inverse probability weights. The propensity score variable is centered by subtracting the sample mean. USD values are calculated at December 2021 PPP.
The unit of observation is the respondent for all outcome variables.
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$