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ABSTRACT

By regulating how firms collect, store, and use data, privacy laws may change the role of data in production and alter firm demand for information technology inputs. We study how firms respond to privacy laws in the context of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) by using seven years of data from a large global cloud-computing provider. Our difference-in-difference estimates indicate that, in response to the GDPR, EU firms decreased data storage by 26% and data processing by 15% relative to comparable US firms, becoming less “data-intensive.” To estimate the costs of the GDPR for firms, we propose and estimate a production function where data and computation serve as inputs to the production of “information.” We find that data and computation are strong complements in production and that firm responses are consistent with the GDPR, representing a 20% increase in the cost of data on average. Variation in the firm-level effects of the GDPR and industry-level exposure to data, however, drives significant heterogeneity in our estimates of the impact of the GDPR on production costs.

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A data appendix is available at http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w32146
1 Introduction

In the information age, the production of goods and services increasingly relies on the processing of data (Agrawal et al., 2018; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2019). Since some of the most valuable data concerns personal information on human subjects, its growing use has led to new policy attention and regulation. One of the most influential privacy policies is the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which was enacted in 2016 and affects more than 20 million firms across dozens of countries (GDPR.eu, 2019). Many countries have since followed this example: as of early 2022, 157 countries had enacted legislation to secure data and privacy (Greenleaf, 2022).

While these privacy laws help harmonize and improve data collection practices, they can also be costly for firms (Johnson et al., 2022; Aridor et al., 2022; Goldberg et al., 2023; Peukert et al., 2022). For example, privacy laws may generate a wedge between the marginal product of data and its (perceived) marginal cost, leading firms to substitute data with other inputs. Variations in these wedges across firms can result in misallocation of inputs in the economy (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Given the increasing role of data in firm production, understanding how privacy regulations affect firms’ input decisions is of the utmost importance.

However, large-scale empirical evidence of how privacy laws affect firm data decisions, the key margin targeted by privacy laws, is scant. Studying this question is complicated for a number of reasons (Johnson, 2022). First, firms’ data and computation usage are inherently difficult to observe, as standard firm datasets do not provide information on these measures. Second, there is no unified framework for analyzing the role of data in firm production (Veldkamp and Chung, 2023). Any such framework needs to be parsimonious while having enough flexibility to allow the impact of privacy laws to depend on the importance of data and computation for firms.

In this paper, we make progress on these fronts by studying how the GDPR affected firms’ computation and data choices using confidential data from one of the largest global cloud-computing providers. The cloud is an ideal setting for our study because it enables us to observe high-frequency firm decisions about data and computation usage over a seven-year period from 2015 to 2021. Our data contains detailed information on the monthly cloud usage of over a hundred thousand firms and comprises hundreds of zettabytes (i.e., hundreds of millions of terabytes) of data and billions of core-hours.1 This data spans most major industries, from manufacturing to finance, allowing us to analyze the impacts of privacy regulations beyond the digital economy.

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1We omit precise numbers to avoid disclosing potentially business-sensitive information.
We first apply this data toward studying the direct impact of the GDPR on firm data and computation choices. In our first set of analyses, we compare domestic firms in the European Union (EU) subject to the GDPR to similar, non-treated firms from the same industry in the US using a difference-in-differences approach. In our second set of analyses, we develop and estimate a production function framework with data and computation. We use this framework both to study how firms combine data and computation, and to infer the wedges generated by the GDPR.

We begin by summarizing the key features of the GDPR that affect firm input decisions. The GDPR is a landmark privacy policy that was enacted in 2016 and implemented in 2018. Notably, its regulations apply to all firms in the EU, as well as non-EU firms offering goods or services to “data subjects” within the EU. This law increased the cost of collecting and storing data for firms by requiring firms to enhance data protection, increasing penalties in case of data breaches, and giving consumers more information about firms’ tracking behavior. Survey evidence suggests that GDPR compliance is costly, ranging from $1.7 million for small to medium-sized businesses to $70 million for large ones (Accenture, 2018; Hughes and Saverice-Rohan, 2018).

Next, we discuss the specific context in which we observe firm data decisions: the cloud. Cloud computing is a widely adopted information technology (IT) that enables firms to store and process data remotely over the internet (Byrne et al., 2018; Greenstein and Fang, 2020; DeStefano et al., 2023). Using data from our cloud computing provider, we observe firm-level monthly usage of “storage”—the amount of data stored in gigabytes—and “compute”—the number of core-hours of computation. We also observe other information, such as prices and the location of the data centers where firms source services. We match our cloud usage data to other data sources that provide information on firm characteristics.

Our first set of results comes from an event study design comparing data and computation use among comparable firms in the EU to the US after the GDPR. We find that EU firms store on average 26% less data than US firms two years after the GDPR. The direction of this relative decline in storage is perhaps unsurprising, given that the GDPR primarily regulates data usage, but the magnitude is noteworthy. Interestingly, we also find that EU firms decreased their computation relative to US firms by 15%—implying that firms became less data-intensive after the GDPR. Furthermore, we observe substantial heterogeneity in the effects of the GDPR across industries. Finally, we look at how

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2It is ex-ante unclear how the GDPR would affect computation; this effect theoretically depends on the substitutability between data and computation (Acemoglu, 2002). For example, if data and computation were strong substitutes, firms could replace data with computation to minimize the effects of the GDPR.
the effects vary with the regulatory stringency across EU countries, as enforcement of the GDPR is delegated to individual countries. Although the differences are not statistically significant at the 5% level, our estimates suggest that firms in countries with stricter enforcement decrease storage and computation more than those in countries with more lenient enforcement.

While our event study findings provide direct evidence of the impact of GDPR on firms, they only offer a partial understanding of the associated economic costs. Motivated by this, we propose and estimate a production function model where firms use data and computation to produce “information” through a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. This production function includes two key parameters: (i) the firm-level compute (augmenting) productivity, which determines relative factor intensities of computation and data (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2018; Raval, 2019; Demirer, 2020) and (ii) the elasticity of substitution between computation and data, which determines how firms respond to changes in factor prices (Hicks, 1932). Our model can accommodate many of the uses of data proposed in the literature, such as being an intermediate input in the production function and augmenting firm productivity (e.g., Jones and Tonetti, 2020; Farboodi and Veldkamp, 2022), and emphasizes the role of computation in firm production.

Our information-production model provides an input demand function that links firms’ optimal data and computation choices to input prices and model parameters. We estimate this input demand function industry-by-industry to recover changes in the elasticity of substitution and input demand wedges due to the GDPR. We estimate that data and computation are strong complements in production, with our estimates of the elasticity of substitution ranging from 0.44 (non-software services) to 0.34 (manufacturing). This strong complementarity suggests that firms cannot easily substitute toward computation when faced with increased data costs. To our knowledge, this is the first estimate of the elasticity of substitution between different IT inputs.

To recover the distortion generated by the GDPR, we model it as an unobserved wedge (to the econometrician) between the marginal cost of storing data in the cloud and the total marginal cost that includes GDPR compliance costs. This wedge arises from various sources, including penalties in case of breaches, higher data security requirements, and the need for detailed data records. We estimate firm-specific wedges by attributing them to the changes in post-GDPR input choices unexplained by changes in input prices in the EU (relative to the US), or by changes in the elasticity of substitution.

Our production function analysis suggests that the GDPR made data storage 20%

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3We also account for potential sources of endogeneity in prices by using a shift-share instrument, which we describe in further detail in Section 5.3.1.
more costly for firms on average. Firms in data-intensive industries face higher costs: the effect is the largest in the software sector (24%), followed by manufacturing (18%), and services (18%). What determines the increase in costs? To provide suggestive evidence for this question, we correlate firm-level characteristics with our estimated firm-specific wedges. We consider two firm characteristics: (i) firm size, measured by the number of employees, and (ii) pre-GDPR compute productivity, estimated from the production function specification. We find that larger and more compute-intensive firms experienced smaller wedges from the GDPR.

In the last part of the paper, we use the model to estimate the change in the cost of “information production” due to the increase in the cost of data storage. For this, we calculate the cost of information with and without the GDPR wedge holding the price of data and computation fixed. We find that the GDPR resulted in a 4% increase in the cost of producing information, a significantly smaller impact than the increase in the cost of data. This is primarily because data is significantly cheaper than computation and therefore accounts for only a small share of the information cost. In other words, the GDPR targets the less costly IT input, which limits its impact on the cost of information. Finally, we conduct a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation assuming a CES production technology in information and non-information inputs (e.g., capital, labor), which we calibrate using estimates from Lashkari et al. (2023), to estimate the impact of GDPR on the production cost. We find that production costs increase on the order of 0.5% for software firms, with smaller effects in the less data-intensive industries.

We conduct additional analyses to show that our results are robust to many concerns. First, we show that our results are similar when we exclude multi-cloud firms, suggesting that results are not driven by EU firms substituting toward other cloud providers. Second, we find similar results when estimating our empirical strategy using only start-ups, which tend to use cloud computing as their only IT—suggesting that substitution to traditional IT is not a large concern. Third, we show that our results are not driven by differential trends in cloud prices in the EU and the US. Finally, we estimate our specification while excluding firms using web services or with listed websites, showing that the results do not only come from websites, which experienced cookie consent changes under the GDPR.

Nevertheless, we acknowledge some relevant limitations of our study. Unlike many previous GDPR studies, our paper is based on a large sample of firms. While this allows us to draw more generalizable conclusions about firms’ data uses, the trade-off is that we observe less detailed information than an in-depth single-firm study. For example, although we observe detailed measures of the quantity of information stored in our data, we cannot be as precise about the role of data for the firm as more focused studies can be.
We conclude the introduction by highlighting that our results do not provide a definitive answer on the overall welfare impact of privacy laws. Privacy laws benefit consumers by protecting their data and privacy (Arrieta-Ibarra et al., 2018). Despite their benefits, compliance with them is costly for firms, and providing large-scale estimates of the associated compliance costs is of first order importance. However, further evidence is needed to fully understand the benefits of these laws and how they compare with any potential harm to firms.  

**Contribution to the Literature** The first body of literature we contribute to is the research on the impact of the GDPR on firms. These papers find that the GDPR decreased the investment in technology ventures (Jia et al., 2021) while encouraging app exit and discouraging app development (Kircher and Foerderer, 2020; Janßen et al., 2021). Several papers studying the GDPR document adverse impacts on digital tracking and advertising: the GDPR decreased the usage of tracking technology tools, such as cookies, in the immediate months after implementation (Aridor et al., 2022; Lefrere et al., 2022; Lukic et al., 2023), decreased page views and e-commerce revenue (Goldberg et al., 2023), decreased the number of website visits (Schmitt et al., 2022), increased market concentration in the advertising sector (Peukert et al., 2022; Johnson et al., 2022) and increased search frictions (Zhao et al., 2021). On the benefits side, some papers argue that GDPR requirements may have differentially filtered out low-value customers for firms, increasing the average value of remaining consumers to advertisers (Aridor et al., 2022) and increasing effective targeted advertising (Godinho de Matos and Adjerid, 2022).

A subset of the GDPR papers study outcomes outside the digital economy. These papers find that the GDPR may have decreased profits, sales, and profit margins (Koski and Valmari, 2020; Chen et al., 2022). Some papers were concerned about the effect of privacy regulation on the competitive structure of data-intensive industries, with smaller firms being the most affected (Campbell et al., 2015; Koski and Valmari, 2020). We note that although most evidence suggests that the GDPR has significantly impacted data-driven economic activity, Zhuo et al. (2021) find a null effect for short-term extensive margin changes in the formation and termination of internet infrastructures between GDPR and non-GDPR countries.  

While our paper builds on an identification strategy similar to some of these GDPR papers, it is different in two main aspects. First, because of the richness of our data, we directly study firms’ data and computation decisions, margins which are directly targeted

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4 As shown in the literature, estimating the benefits of privacy is challenging (Acquisti et al., 2016; Lin and Strulov-Shlain, 2023).

5 More recent literature has studied California Consumer Privacy Act (Canayaz et al., 2022; Doerr et al., 2023).

6 Johnson (2022) provides a comprehensive survey of this literature.
by the regulation. In particular, our data is well-suited for studying firm adjustments on the intensive margin, and the heterogeneity across industries. Second, we take a production function approach. Crucially, this approach allows us to structurally estimate the role of data and computation in production and to calculate the cost of the GDPR for firms.

Second, we contribute to the literature that incorporates data in firm production. This literature has proposed different ways of how firms use data. Jones and Tonetti (2020) model data as a non-rival input that is generated as a byproduct of production from all firms in the economy. Farboodi and Veldkamp (2022) model data as a productivity-enhancing input that helps firms accurately predict future outcomes. We complement this literature by developing and estimating a firm production framework with data, providing empirical estimates on how firms combine data and computation.

Third, our paper is related to the literature on misallocation, which documents large differences in the efficiency of factor allocations resulting from various frictions (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). We employ a similar identification strategy by modeling distortion as a wedge between the marginal revenue product of an input and its price. Most of this literature abstracts from the origin of frictions, treating them as model primitives. In contrast, we study an important regulatory change as the source of firms’ input distortion.

Our paper also relates to the growing body of literature on the use of personal data by firms (e.g., Bergemann and Bonatti, 2015; Arrieta-Ibarra et al., 2018; Bergemann et al., 2018; Acemoglu et al., 2022; Bergemann and Bonatti, 2022; Bimpikis et al., 2023) by providing empirical evidence on the value of data in firm production. We also directly contribute to the economics of privacy literature (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011, 2012; Acquisti et al., 2016; Athey et al., 2017; Choi et al., 2019; Montes et al., 2019; Ichihashi, 2020; Loertscher and Marx, 2020; Chen et al., 2021; Krähmer and Strausz, 2023) by evaluating the effects of the largest privacy regulation on important firm outcomes.

2 Institutional Setting

This section first discusses the relevant details of the GDPR. We then describe cloud computing technology, the setting for our primary data source in this paper.

2.1 The European General Data Protection Regulation

There is perhaps no policy more important in the modern privacy landscape than the GDPR. As Johnson (2022) notes, "In many ways, the GDPR set the privacy regulation agenda globally.” As such, understanding the consequences of the GDPR is vital not only
because of its direct impacts on firms but because of its crucial role in shaping privacy laws. In this section, we describe the key features of this policy and how they affect firms.

The GDPR is a set of rules that govern the collection, use, and storage of personal data belonging to individuals within the EU. It was enacted in April 2016 and came into force in May 2018. By consolidating and enhancing existing privacy provisions, the GDPR introduced a harmonized approach to privacy regulations across the EU.\(^7\) We provide a detailed description of the changes required for firms after GDPR in Appendix B.1 and summarize its most important characteristics below.

Two aspects of the GDPR are particularly important for our paper. First, the GDPR takes a data protection approach rather than a consumer protection approach as in the US (Jones and Kaminski, 2020).\(^8\) A data protection approach imposes a set of costly responsibilities on firms to protect data, in addition to a substantive system of individual rights. Second, the GDPR takes a risk-based approach to data protection without clarity on the specific measures firms must take to protect data, making implementation firm-dependent (Hustinx, 2013; Gellert, 2018). For example, Article 25 (Data Protection by Design and by Default) uses phrases such as "taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation [...] as well as the risks" and requires that controllers “implement appropriate technical and organizational measures [...] in an effective manner.” This risk-based approach makes costs heterogeneous across firms based on the sensitivity of data and firms’ risk preferences.

The GDPR applies whenever the firm that controls the data (“data controller”) is established in the EU or whenever the individuals (“data subjects”) whose data is collected are located in the EU, regardless of their citizenship or residence (Article 3). Under the GDPR, personal data is defined broadly to include any information that can be used to identify an individual either directly or indirectly (Article 4). This includes information such as name, address, email address, internet protocol (IP) address, and other identifying characteristics. It applies to all personal data, regardless of whether it is in a client or employee context. Therefore, even business-to-business firms are subject to GDPR.

From the firm perspective, the GDPR primarily increased the cost of collecting and storing data by imposing costly responsibilities on firms. These include keeping a record of processing activities (Article 30), designating a data protection officer (Article 37), preparing data protection impact assessments (Article 35), implementing appropriate technical and organizational measures for data security (Article 32), providing timely notifications

\(^7\)Unlike the GDPR, which is directly binding and applicable across the European Union, the preceding Directive 95/46/EC had to be incorporated into each member state’s national laws to take effect, leading to variation in its implementation across different jurisdictions.

\(^8\)For more information on the US approach to privacy and how it compares to the GDPR, see Boyne (2018).
in case of data breaches (Article 33), executing consumers’ requests for data transfer, erasure, or rectification (Article 14-21), and paying hefty penalties in case of data breaches (Article 83). Firms also must have a legal basis for processing personal data.9

The cost of complying with the GDPR can vary significantly depending on the size and complexity of an organization. There are no official statistics, but most survey evidence suggests that complying with the GDPR is costly. The estimates range from an average of $3 million (Hughes and Saverice-Rohan, 2018) and $5.5 million (Ponemon Institute, 2017) to $13.2 million (Ponemon Institute, 2019) depending on the composition of surveyed firms. The survey evidence indicates that a large percentage of the costs (between one-fifth and one-half) are labor costs, followed by technology, outside consulting, and internal training (Ponemon Institute, 2019; Hughes and Saverice-Rohan, 2019).

The changes mandated by the GDPR entail both fixed and marginal costs. For example, the cost of having a data protection officer may not scale with data size, so the latter could be considered mostly a fixed cost. On the other hand, the costs of handling customers’ access or deletion requests, the liability in case of a data breach, and keeping data in a more secure environment would increase with data and firm size. As such, it may be more sensible to interpret these kinds of costs as changes to the marginal costs. We provide a detailed classification of GDPR costs into these fixed and variable cost categories and present corresponding survey evidence in Appendix B.2.

In addition to these direct costs, organizations may also incur indirect costs such as cybersecurity insurance or penalties if they are found to be non-compliant or in the case of data leaks.10 Non-compliant firms may face fines of up to 4% of an organization’s annual global revenue or €20 million (whichever is greater). We scraped publicly available GDPR fine data (which we describe in detail in Appendix B.3) from a database maintained by CMS, an international law firm.11 In Figure 1, we provide the size distribution of these GDPR fines.12 We note two key features of these fines. First, the distribution of fine sizes implies that enforcement is not limited to large violations: 25% of the fines have been under €2,000. Many of these have been levied on small businesses. Second, the GDPR applies to

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9Contrary to popular belief, consent is not the only appropriate legal basis that firms may use to process personal data—consent, contractual necessity, legal obligation, vital interests, public task, and legitimate business interest may all serve as a basis for processing data (Article 6). However, firms are required to identify which legal basis they are using to process personal data.
10There are likely additional costs beyond the direct financial costs of compliance, including opportunity costs associated with diverting existing employees towards GDPR compliance and expenses related to the disruption caused by operational changes.
12The total cumulative fines imposed under the GDPR in this dataset have amounted to over €3 billion, and over 1,700 firms have been fined. This figure is likely to be an underestimate because not all GDPR fines are made publicly available.
Figure 1: Publicly Reported GDPR Fines

Notes: The figure presents the distribution of 1,730 publicly available GDPR fines, noting that not all GDPR fines are made public. The data collection process is described in Section 3 and we provide greater detail for the data in Appendix B.3. Fines are presented in undeflated nominal terms (€), and five examples from the data have been highlighted: a restaurant, a jewelry manufacturer, Google, Amazon, and Meta.

a much broader set of businesses and industries than just software and technology firms. Figure 1 highlights some of these non-software cases, and restaurants and manufacturers appear not infrequently in the GDPR fine data.

2.2 Our Setting: Cloud Technology

One of the primary challenges of studying firms’ responses to privacy policies has been the fundamental difficulty of observing how firms use data. Measuring data usage for firms with traditional IT requires both access to their servers and an accounting of usage statistics that firms may not even keep themselves. The advent of cloud computing, however, presents a unique opportunity to study the impact of policy changes on firm data usage due to well-tracked measures of storage and processing.

Cloud computing provides scalable IT resources on demand over the internet. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (Mell et al., 2011), cloud computing is defined as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” Cloud computing has ex-

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13Cloud computing resources can be categorized into three forms: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS).
experienced extremely rapid growth since its introduction.\textsuperscript{14} According to a 2020 survey by Magoulas and Swoyer (2020), 88% of respondents used cloud computing in some form.

We focus on the two primary cloud services: storage and computation. Storage services allow users to store data and applications in a data center, which can be accessed over the internet. Computation services allow users to run applications and perform computations in a virtual machine (VM). Cloud providers offer a variety of VM types with different specifications in terms of CPU, memory, and upload and download speed. Users choose the VM type that best meets the needs of their workload (Kilcioglu et al., 2017).

Firms use storage and computing services in multiple parts of their production process. For example, a manufacturing company that produces goods in multiple locations may use VMs to ensure that all of its information is available everywhere. Firms may also decide to use storage without using computing services, e.g., a newspaper may decide to host all of the photographs that will be displayed on its website online and provision them directly without the need for computing. However, it is rare to observe firms using computation without also using storage, although non-data simulations might serve as instances in which this might occur. Firms may also add other cloud services (e.g., analytics, security) in conjunction with their computing and storage needs.\textsuperscript{15}

From the researchers’ point of view, the existence and ubiquity of the cloud provides important advantages over traditional IT. It is possible to aggregate data from tens of thousands of firms because cloud computing is typically provided by large third-party firms. Moreover, cloud providers keep detailed records of their users’ activity for billing purposes, allowing for usage to be tracked consistently over time. Despite these advantages, there are important limitations to using data from cloud computing. First, many firms use a mix of cloud computing and traditional IT, especially during the transition to the cloud. In such cases, we can only observe firm data in the cloud and not from their on-site hardware, which may limit our analysis if the GDPR changes the composition of cloud and on-site data. Second, it is common for firms to use cloud services from multiple providers, known as multi-cloud (Accenture, 2022). For these firms, a reduction in cloud technology usage from one provider could indicate substitution to another provider. We take these concerns seriously and provide several robustness checks in our empirical strategy.

\textsuperscript{14}See Jin and McElheran (2017); Jin (2022); DeStefano et al. (2023) for recent studies on firm’s cloud adoption and the impacts of cloud technology on firms.

3 Data

This section describes the main datasets used in the paper and presents basic summary statistics. We leave the exact data construction details to Appendix C.

3.1 Cloud Computing Data (2015-2021)

We obtain information through one of the largest cloud technology providers. Using this data, we observe monthly-level usage information of the universe of their customers for all cloud services between 2015 and 2021. These services include hardware services, such as storage, computation, and networking, as well as some software services. For each service, we observe the number of units purchased, the location of the data center, the date, and the price paid. Therefore, we have both the physical unit of usage and expenditures.\(^\text{16}\)

We focus on storage and computation, as they are the main IT services firms use in cloud computing, which we describe in greater detail in Appendix C.1. We measure storage in gigabytes and computing in core-hours (number of cores \(\times\) number of hours). Core-hours are a commonly used metric to quantify the amount of computational work done in cloud computing environments.\(^\text{17}\) We use this data to construct monthly-level usage at the firm-location (data center) level for storage and computation from July 2015 to December 2021. As a result, we can observe data stored in the US and EU separately by the same firm.\(^\text{18}\) Through this data, we also observe SIC industry codes, firm headquarters location, and whether a firm is a start-up or not.\(^\text{19}\)

One limitation of our dataset is that it does not allow us to see which specific data firms are collecting nor the exact ways in which they use the data. This limits our ability to speak to some important questions about how firms specifically use data.

3.2 Cloud Computing Usage from Other Providers (2016-2021)

To address the concern of observing data from single provider, we use an establishment-level IT data panel produced by a marketing and information company called Aberdeen (previously known as “Harte Hanks”). Using web crawling, surveys and publicly available data, Aberdeen provides the adoption of cloud technology on the extensive margin from each of the service providers (e.g., AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud) between 2016 and

\(^\text{16}\)This is in contrast with most input information in production datasets, which generally include input expenditures rather than measures of direct usage.

\(^\text{17}\)To illustrate the concept, consider the example of a software engineer in a startup who runs a virtual machine with 8 cores for 5 hours. In this case, the usage is recorded as 40 units of compute.

\(^\text{18}\)It is important to note that our sample is comprised of firms rather than establishments.

\(^\text{19}\)The “start-up” classification is defined internally by the cloud technology provider.
2021 at the yearly level. The Aberdeen dataset comprises around 3.1 million establishments from 1.9 million companies worldwide. Previous versions of this data have been widely used by researchers to construct measures of IT adoption, both in Europe and in the United States.\textsuperscript{20} We use this data to identify single cloud firms and examine differential changes in market shares in the EU and US around the GDPR for cloud providers.

### 3.3 Other Datasets: Firm Characteristics

Aberdeen also provides information on other firm characteristics, such as employment and revenue from Duns & Bradstreet. We match our cloud computing data to Aberdeen firms using a matching procedure described in Appendix C.3 based on name, location, domain, and other information. We are able to match close to 60\% of our cloud firms to the Aberdeen dataset. We use the employment information in 2018 to define firm size. We further augment our data by merging our primary dataset with employment data from the Orbis firm database from Bureau van Dijk through firm name and domain name matching. We augment these merges with manual linking for the small share of remaining firms. With this procedure, we link cross-sectional employment data to approximately 80\% of the European firms.

### 3.4 Sample Construction and Summary Statistics

We begin by presenting a framework that will allow us to classify firms by their exposure to the GDPR. Following Section 2, Table 1 presents information on whether the GDPR applies to firms depending on the location of the firm and data subjects (using the language from Peukert et al., 2022). Now, while we cannot directly observe the location of each firm’s employees and consumers, we use the fact that we can observe firm server locations to approximate the locations of their consumers and employees. We view this as a reasonable approximation because firms tend to choose data centers close to them to reduce latency (Greenstein and Fang, 2020). We argue that firms based solely in one geographic region are unlikely to use servers across the Atlantic unless they have consumers or employees located in the other location.\textsuperscript{21}

By combining information on the locations of firm server choices before the GDPR with the locations of firm headquarters, we attempt to categorize firms into the four cases

\textsuperscript{20}See e.g., Bloom et al. (2012). Note that Aberdeen’s data has undergone changes in recent years, relying more on web scraping and extrapolation than on surveys. We conduct cross-checks with our internal data to assess the quality of Aberdeen’s accuracy for cloud adoption. See Appendix C.3 for more details.

\textsuperscript{21}One piece of evidence that supports server location choice being predictive of firm location is that when we construct EU vs US firms classifications using only server locations, the regions assigned to 98\% of the firms coincide with the headquarter locations in our data.
Table 1: Matrix of Firms from Peukert et al. (2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Consumer / Employee</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data Used</td>
<td>Case 1</td>
<td>Case 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>GDPR applies</td>
<td>GDPR applies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 3(1) GDPR</td>
<td>Art. 3(2) GDPR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Case 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>GDPR applies</td>
<td>GDPR does not apply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art. 3(1) GDPR</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table is taken from Table 1 of Peukert et al. (2022). The matrix shows whether the GDPR is applicable to firms located within and outside the EU.

described in Table 1. We consider a firm multi-national (Cases 2 and 3) if they use data centers both in Europe and in the US. We consider a firm to be a domestic EU or US firm (Cases 1 and 4) if they use data centers only in Europe or in the US.22 As we explain later in the paper, our empirical strategy focuses on comparing domestic EU and US firms, and therefore, these domestic firms constitute our main sample throughout the paper.23

As we discuss in Appendix C.2, we restrict our attention to firms that continuously used our cloud provider’s services for the full year beginning exactly two years prior to the introduction of the GDPR. This restriction affects only a small share of pre-GDPR storage or computation in our sample: excluded firms are only responsible for about 10% of storage and computation. We use this sample restriction to intentionally focus our analysis on the effects of the GDPR on relatively stable users of cloud computing. Our sample is therefore comprised of firms that are both responsible for the vast majority of storage and computation in the pre-GDPR period and that have been continuously attached to our cloud computing provider.

Table 2 presents summary statistics for our baseline sample of nearly forty thousand firms. We categorize the industry of each firm by simply taking the industry division that corresponds to the firm’s SIC code, and we intentionally split software firms from other firms in the services division due to their large share in our sample.24 The majority of firms belong to the services (43%) and software (25%) industries, but firms from manufacturing and various other industries are also represented in our sample. While there is variation in

22 We also include UK firms in our EU sample. The UK was part of the EU when the GDPR came into effect on May 25, 2018. After the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the GDPR was incorporated into UK law as the UK GDPR, which largely mirrors the provisions of the GDPR, with some minor changes.
23 While multinational firms are important, their exposure and responses to GDPR are more complex than those of domestic firms, which required us to focus on domestic firms.
24 We define software firms as those with SIC codes between 7370 and 7377.
Table 2: Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Number of Firms</th>
<th>Share Compute</th>
<th>Share Storage</th>
<th>Mean Storage</th>
<th>Mean Compute</th>
<th>Mean Data Intensity</th>
<th>Share EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>15,886</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Software</td>
<td>9,480</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>3,095</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Trade</td>
<td>2,152</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>1,101</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance &amp; Insurance</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale Trade</td>
<td>1,945</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,689</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>37,304</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table presents summary statistics from our matched sample of firms. A description of the sample’s construction can be found in Section 3.1 and a more detailed description of the sample construction can be found in Appendix C. Industries are defined as the ten divisions classified by SIC codes, with the exception of software firms, which are carved out of the services division and represent SIC codes 7370 - 7377. For confidentiality purposes, mean storage and compute have both been normalized such that mean storage is denoted by 1,000 units. We calculate mean data intensity at the firm level while restricting to firms that use both storage and computing services.

usage across industries—likely driven in part by the difference in the average size of firms using cloud computing—we observe significant storage and computation in all industries. We also note some slight variation in the share of firms in the US versus the EU by industry, although each region always accounts for at least 40% of the share of firms observed.

Lastly, Column 7 of Table 2 presents the mean data intensity for each industry, which is defined as the ratio of storage to computation. We find that the average data intensity does not vary significantly across industries, ranging from 1.69 to 2.23. However, these averages mask significant within-industry firm-level heterogeneity, as shown in Figure 2, which plots the distribution of data intensity for the three largest industries in our sample. Even within an industry, there is significant firm-level variation in data intensity across all industries, suggesting that the role of data and computation likely vary across firms.25 This result is consistent with the large evidence of within-industry heterogeneity in other firm outcomes, such as productivity (Syverson, 2011), labor shares (Kehrig and Vincent, 2021), markups (Autor et al., 2020; De Loecker et al., 2020), and management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). As we will see in Sections 5, taking into account this heterogeneity will be important when modeling a production framework with data and computation.

25This result remains even if we focus on more narrowly defined 4-digit SIC industries.
Figure 2: Histogram of Data Intensity by Industry

Notes: Figure presents a histogram of data intensity at the firm level, defined as the ratio of data stored to computation (the ratio of gigabytes to core hours) for each industry. Industries are defined through SIC codes (with the exception of software firms, which are carved out of the services division). We limit to the sample of firms who have ever used both storage and computation ($N = 11,858$).

4 Event Study Evidence

In this section, we apply an event study design to study the effect of the GDPR on firms’ data storage and computing decisions. We begin by defining our empirical strategy and providing intuition for our identifying assumptions. Next, we turn toward our baseline estimates of the GDPR’s impact on data and computation. We also discuss the robustness of our strategy across various alternative samples and specifications.

4.1 Empirical Strategy

Our empirical strategy aims to identify the causal effect of the GDPR on firms’ computation and data choices. In order to identify a relevant treatment and control group for our strategy, we turn to our classifications of firm locations from Section 3. Following Table 1, we define “Case 1” as our treatment group and “Case 4” as our control group.

Notably, these two definitions exclude multi-national firms (i.e., those with branches and/or consumers across countries). We choose to do so for two reasons. First, we may
think of multi-national firms as being partially treated: only some of their data may be subject to the GDPR. Thus, we might want to separate the estimation of the treatment effects of these groups of firms from the firms which we consider fully treated (Case 1). Second, multi-national firms may systematically differ from the control firms that we define (Case 4). Thus, they may potentially respond to the GDPR along different margins than our control group, choosing to shift data storage, computation, and even business operations into or out of the European Union.

We focus on three separate outcomes: data storage, computation, and “data intensity” (the ratio of storage to computation). These outcomes reflect the multiple dimensions of firm data usage that might be affected by the GDPR. Our empirical specification uses a difference-in-differences design and estimates the following regression:

$$\log(Y_{it}) = \sum_{q \neq 1} \beta_q \cdot \mathbb{I}_{(EU)} + \alpha_i + \tau_{kqs} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where $Y_{it}$ is the outcome of interest for firm $i$, in month $t$. We use $q$ to denote quarter, $k$ to denote industry, and $s$ to pre-GDPR cloud usage decile. In this specification, $\alpha_i$ is a firm-level fixed effect that captures time-invariant firm unobservables while $\tau_{kqs}$ are industry-by-quarter-by-size-decile fixed effects which allow for time trends to differ flexibly in each quarter for an industry-size decile combination.\(^{26}\) We define industries using the ten mutually exclusive and exhaustive divisions defined by one-digit SIC codes.

We restrict our analysis to the sample period from July 2015 to March 2020.\(^{27}\) The coefficients of interest, $\beta_q$, represents the difference in outcomes relative to the quarter before the GDPR came into force. Now, because our sample conditions only on usage a full year before the enactment of the GDPR, we allow for potential anticipation effects. The identifying assumption of our empirical strategy is a conditional parallel trends assumption. We take advantage of our large sample and allow time trends in our outcomes to vary flexibly by industry and initial cloud usage levels in our baseline specification, with 110 distinct bins for each quarter (11 defined industries $\times$ 10 pre-GDPR cloud usage deciles).

To discuss the short- and long-run estimates of the effect of the GDPR, we also present

\(^{26}\)We measure cloud usage deciles for storage and computation outcomes by using a firm’s computation or storage, respectively, as measured one year before the GDPR. For data intensity, we use terciles of firm storage interacted with terciles of firm compute to increase power.

\(^{27}\)Even though we have data for later periods, we end the sample in March 2020 to rule out the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This sample restriction also limits the potential effects of another privacy law, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCCA), on the US firms in our sample. The CCCA came into effect on January 1, 2020, and applies to businesses that collect the personal data of California residents.
results in a table format using an alternative regression specification given by:

\[
\log(Y_{it}) = \delta_1 \cdot 1_{\{EU\}} \cdot 1_{\{t\in Jun/18-May/19\}} + \delta_2 \cdot 1_{\{EU\}} \cdot 1_{\{t\in Jun/19-May/20\}} + \alpha_i + \tau_{kqs} + \epsilon_{it},
\]

where the notation of \(\alpha_i\) and \(\tau_{kqs}\) is the same as in Equation (1). Our estimates are relative to the excluded group, which is the pre-GDPR period. Thus, the short-run coefficient (\(\delta_1\)) and long-run coefficient (\(\delta_2\)) estimates the average difference in \(Y_{it}\) between treated and untreated firms in the first and second year after the GDPR came into force (relative to the pre-period difference).

4.2 Results

Our main event study results are shown in Figure 3, which plots the estimated coefficients \(\beta_q\) from Equation (1) for our three key outcomes. We discuss each of these outcomes separately, and we present the corresponding short- and long-run estimates from Equation (2) in Table 3.

Results on Data Storage Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the results for data storage. First, we find no evidence of significant differential pre-GDPR trends in the US and EU, as all pre-GDPR coefficients are close to zero. We also find limited evidence for anticipation effects, which is consistent with the survey evidence that only 10% of firms expected to be compliant with the GDPR before May 2018 (Ponemon Institute, 2018). After the implementation of the GDPR, however, firms in the EU, relative to US firms, started to decrease their relative amount of data stored gradually, with cumulative effects growing steadily over the two years after the GDPR. The fact that the decrease is gradual rather than sudden may be due to the fact that it took time for firms to implement necessary changes, as noted by Aridor et al. (2022) in the case of a large website.

The decline in data storage is perhaps not surprising, as the GDPR increased the cost of storing data. What is perhaps more surprising, however, is the magnitude of the effect. Table 3 shows that the short-run effect is around a 13% decrease in storage while the long-run effect doubles to around 26%. This table also shows that our results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the flexible time trends by industry and size-decile fixed effects.

Results on Computation Turning towards computation, we first note that there is no clear theoretical prediction for how the GDPR should affect firm computation decisions. GDPR’s primary goal is to protect individual data, with limited direct impact on computing.

\[\text{Importantly, firms are not necessarily deleting data, as our identification strategy relies on comparing EU and US firms. Data storage for EU and US firms could be increasing but at different rates.}\]
Figure 3: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of GDPR on Cloud Inputs

(a) Effect on Storage

(b) Effect on Compute

(c) Effect on Data Intensity

Notes: Figure presents estimates of equation (1) of $\beta_q$, the coefficient on the quarter of the move interacted with our treatment indicator. The coefficient in the quarter before the GDPR’s implementation is normalized to zero. Dotted bars represent the 95% confidence intervals, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Sample sizes are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Short- and Long-Run Effects of GDPR  
(Storage, Computing, and Data Intensity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panel A. Dependent variable: Log of Storage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td>-0.260</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,143,149</td>
<td>1,143,149</td>
<td>1,143,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Firms</td>
<td>16,409</td>
<td>16,409</td>
<td>16,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Firms</td>
<td>16,281</td>
<td>16,281</td>
<td>16,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel B. Dependent variable: Log of Computation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>-0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>672,942</td>
<td>672,942</td>
<td>672,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Firms</td>
<td>10,294</td>
<td>10,294</td>
<td>10,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Firms</td>
<td>8,927</td>
<td>8,927</td>
<td>8,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel C. Dependent variable: Log of Data Intensity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>418,803</td>
<td>418,803</td>
<td>418,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Firms</td>
<td>5,487</td>
<td>5,487</td>
<td>5,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Firms</td>
<td>5,872</td>
<td>5,872</td>
<td>5,872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table presents estimates of Equation (2) of the short-run ($\delta_1$) and long-run ($\delta_2$) coefficients, which estimate the impact of the GDPR in the first and second year after the GDPR came into force. Column (1) presents our baseline specification, where we allow for time trends to vary flexibly across industry and pre-GDPR size decile interactions. Column (2) restricts these time trends so that they only vary by pre-GDPR size decile, while Column (3) only allows for variation at the industry level. Column (4) shows estimates when we include no time-trend interactions. Industries are defined as the ten divisions classified by SIC codes. Pre-GDPR size deciles are measured thirteen months before the GDPR. For data intensity, we define “size decile” as the interaction between storage and compute terciles when measured in the period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Therefore, the effect of the GDPR on computation likely depends on the elasticity of substitution between compute and data and the intensity of these inputs in the production function. If storage and computation are strong substitutes, firms can respond to increases in data costs by substituting away from data toward computation. This would increase total computation. On the other hand, if data and compute are strong complements, then an increase in data cost would lead to a decrease in computation. Thus, the direction and magnitude of firm computation responses is ultimately an empirical question.

Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows that EU firms gradually decrease their computation relative to US firms after the introduction of GDPR. However, the effect on computation is smaller than what we observe for data storage, with only a 15% decline two years after GDPR. Similar to the results on data, we find no evidence of significant differential pre-GDPR trends in the US and EU.

The results on computation are also important because they indicate that firms do not simply eliminate (or stop accumulating) data they do not use. One potential explanation for our data results could be that, before GDPR, firms stored data that they never utilized and deleted it to comply with GDPR. Our findings suggest that this hypothesis is unlikely to hold because of the substantial reduction in computation, which we conjecture would not have happened if data that was not being used was simply eliminated.29

**Results on Data Intensity** Comparisons of the magnitudes between our data storage and computation results suggest that firms became less data-intensive after the GDPR. However, in order to account for potential compositional effects, we investigate the effects of the GDPR on data intensity by using the natural logarithm of the ratio of computing to storage as an outcome. We estimate our specification on firms that used both types of inputs for the full year beginning exactly two years before the GDPR came into force.

Panel (c) of Figure 3 shows that firm data intensity decreases immediately after the GDPR. Panel (c) of Table 3 estimates a decrease of around 7% in the short run and 13% in the long run. The fact that firms in the EU become less data-intensive post-GDPR (relative to comparable US firms) suggests that storage and computing are likely complements in production, which we revisit using a production framework in Section 5.

**Robustness of Results** There are several potential threats to our identification strategy. In Appendix D, we go through the most critical threats to identification and show evidence suggesting that these threats are not driving our results. We summarize the main exercises below, and we leave the additional exercises (such as alternative sample definitions and

29This hypothesis appears unlikely also because cloud computing incurs a marginal cost for storing data, even if it remains unused. Additionally, in Section 5, we find that firms are responsive to changes in cloud prices.
alternative empirical specifications) and details in Appendix D.

The most salient identification threat is that we observe only one cloud service provider (Appendix D.1). What we observe as declines in cloud usage could simply be firms substituting usage towards other providers. We first show that our results are similar when we restrict our sample to firms that only use our cloud provider (Table OA-2 and Figure OA-7). Therefore, it is unlikely that the declines we observe are simply driven by substitution in usage to other providers. Second, we show that results are unlikely to be driven by firms shifting to traditional (i.e., in-house) IT services. To do so, we show that our empirical exercise yields similar results for the start-up firms in our sample, which are unlikely to have or use traditional IT (Table OA-4 and Figure OA-9).

Another natural explanation for our results is the possibility of differential price trends in the EU and the US (Appendix D.2). If cloud computing providers increased their prices in the EU relative to the US around the time of the GDPR (perhaps to cover GDPR compliance costs, for example), we could see a decline in storage and computation even without the GDPR having any effects on firms. To check this hypothesis, we use the paid prices for cloud storage as a dependent variable. Appendix Figure OA-10 shows that prices did not change differentially in the EU and the US. Cloud prices have been generally trending downwards, but not in a differential manner between the EU and the US.

We also consider whether our results are particularly being driven by websites’ cookie consent notices and the clauses governing the collection and storage of data from websites (Appendix D.3). We might expect firms with active website use—which we proxy for through the usage of cloud-based web services in our cloud provider—to be more affected by the policy than those without. Table OA-5 shows larger treatment effects among firms that used web services in storage and computation. However, we find that the storage and computing adjustments of web users and non-web users are proportional and that their reductions in data intensity are similar.

4.3 Heterogeneity

By Industry The relationship between storage and computation may vary by industry, depending on how each industry incorporates data inputs into its production processes. For this reason, we investigate whether the effects of GDPR on data and computation vary across four mutually exclusive and exhaustive industry groups: software firms, non-software service firms, manufacturing firms, and all other industries. Table 4 shows our estimates of the short- and long-run impacts of the GDPR when we estimate Equation (2)
across different industry groups.\textsuperscript{30} One striking result is that the direction of our primary findings—declines in storage, computation, and data intensity—are the same across all industry groups. Furthermore, there are detectable effects in storage and computation across all industries. This immediately suggests that our results are not being driven by a single industry and that the effects of the GDPR are not simply limited to software firms, but instead affect firms across all industries.

Furthermore, we find substantial heterogeneity between industries in the magnitudes of the effects. Panel A shows that the most significant decreases in storage in response to the GDPR come from manufacturing firms (40\% in the long run), followed by software firms (25\%), and non-software service firms (18\%). Similarly, Panel B shows that for computation, the fall is largest in magnitude for manufacturing (32\% in the long run), followed by service firms (15\% for software and 10\% for non-software services in the long run).

While it may seem surprising that IT-intensive industries like software and non-software service firms seem to have more muted responses to the GDPR, this may reflect differences in the ability of firms in a given industry to shift away from data in their production functions or compliance cost. For example, manufacturing firms might simply be able to substitute from data to capital and labor more efficiently than other industries or they might have higher compliance costs. Similarly, service firms may be less responsive to the GDPR simply because storage and computation are essential parts of their production processes.

Finally, Panel C of Table 4 shows results for data intensity. We find that data intensity decreases in all industries, however the standard errors are wide for some estimates. The point estimates suggest that long-run data intensity decreases the most in the industries with the smallest declines in storage and computation.

\textbf{By Enforcement Stringency} Although the GDPR harmonized the regulation surrounding data protection, enforcement was delegated to each country’s data protection authority. Thus, enforcement stringency can vary across countries in practice, in part because of the resource availability to each data protection authority (Johnson, 2022). Because of these differences, we might expect firms in countries with more lenient regulators to respond less to the GDPR. To test this hypothesis, we use a measure of strictness created by Johnson et al. (2022) using data from European Commission (2008) that varies at the country level.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30}We show the quarterly dynamics in Figures OA-1 and OA-2, and the (lack of) pretrends at the industry level. 
\textsuperscript{31}This measure assigns a z-score to each country based on the perception of firms within that country about the regulators’ strictness. For more information, see Johnson et al. (2022).
Table 4: Short- and Long-Run Effects of GDPR (Heterogeneous Effects by Industry Classification)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Software Services</th>
<th>Non-Software Services</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Other Industries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A. Dependent variable: Log of Storage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.259</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.257</td>
<td>-0.253</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
<td>-0.404</td>
<td>-0.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,143,149</td>
<td>291,781</td>
<td>486,457</td>
<td>94,612</td>
<td>270,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Firms</td>
<td>16,409</td>
<td>3,196</td>
<td>8,141</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>3,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Firms</td>
<td>16,281</td>
<td>5,150</td>
<td>5,912</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>3,711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Panel B. Dependent variable: Log of Compute** |          |                   |                       |               |                 |
| Short-Run Effect         | -0.078   | -0.078            | -0.048                | -0.171        | -0.077          |
|                          | (0.016)  | (0.032)           | (0.024)               | (0.051)       | (0.033)         |
| Long-Run Effect          | -0.154   | -0.150            | -0.100                | -0.322        | -0.163          |
|                          | (0.024)  | (0.050)           | (0.037)               | (0.073)       | (0.049)         |
| Observations             | 672,942  | 165,752           | 270,846               | 65,532        | 170,812         |
| US Firms                 | 10,294   | 2,050             | 4,623                 | 900           | 2,721           |
| EU Firms                 | 8,927    | 2,747             | 3,204                 | 914           | 2,062           |

| **Panel C. Dependent variable: Log of Data Intensity** |          |                   |                       |               |                 |
| Short-Run Effect         | -0.072   | -0.084            | -0.084                | -0.078        | -0.043          |
|                          | (0.020)  | (0.042)           | (0.031)               | (0.066)       | (0.039)         |
| Long-Run Effect          | -0.131   | -0.196            | -0.161                | -0.043        | -0.069          |
|                          | (0.029)  | (0.064)           | (0.045)               | (0.097)       | (0.055)         |
| Observations             | 418,804  | 103,606           | 168,020               | 41,449        | 105,729         |
| US Firms                 | 5,487    | 1,054             | 2,473                 | 496           | 1,464           |
| EU Firms                 | 5,872    | 1,755             | 2,123                 | 610           | 1,384           |

Notes: Table presents estimates of equation (2) of $\delta_1$ and $\delta_2$, re-estimated across for various industry divisions. For comparison, Column (1) presents our baseline estimates across all industry divisions. Column (2) restricts our sample to software firms, which are defined through SIC codes 7370 - 7377. Column (3) restricts the sample to non-software service firms, Column (4) restricts the sample to firms in the manufacturing division, and column (5) presents estimates on the remaining firms in the sample (non-software, non-services, and non-manufacturing industry divisions). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
Table 5: Effect of Strictness on Short- and Long-Run Effects of GDPR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Storage (1)</th>
<th>Compute (2)</th>
<th>Intensity (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-Run Effect</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,143,149</td>
<td>672,942</td>
<td>418,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Firms</td>
<td>16,281</td>
<td>8,927</td>
<td>5,872</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table presents estimates of equation 2 with an additional term to measure the effect of above-median GDPR strictness. The short-run term captures the triple interaction of the short-run post-GDPR coefficient, the EU categorical variable, and a categorical variable indicating firms in above-median enforcement countries. The long-run term repeats the same procedure but uses the long-run post-GDPR period instead. Strictness is measured according to Johnson et al. (2022) using data from European Commission (2008). We continue to define industries as the ten divisions classified by SIC codes. Pre-GDPR size deciles are measured thirteen months before the GDPR. For data intensity, we define “size decile” as the interaction between storage and compute terciles when measured in the period. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.

We collapse this measure above and below the normalized median strictness in the survey and assign each firm their country’s regulator’s strictness.

We modify Equation (2) by adding two additional coefficients to capture potential heterogeneity by enforcement stringency. We create a categorical variable indicating firms in above-median enforcement countries, and we interact this variable with the EU categorical variable and our long-run and short-run post-GDPR indicators. Our main coefficients of interest (the triple interactions) measure the short- and long-run differences in $Y_{it}$ for EU firms with above-median strictness relative to those with below-median strictness post-GDPR.

Table 5 summarizes these results. The interaction coefficients—although many are not statistically significant—suggest that firms in above-median strictness countries face larger declines in storage, computation, and data intensity. In the short run, storage goes down by 2.8 pp. more in above-median strictness countries than in below-median ones, while computation goes down by 6.1 pp. In the long run, storage and computation go down by 4 pp. and 4.7 pp. more in above-median strictness countries, respectively. Similarly, data intensity decreases are larger for firms in the above-median strictness countries. Overall, these findings suggest a non-negligible role for enforcement stringency beyond the simple presence of privacy regulation itself.
4.4 Discussion

Our results so far suggest that EU firms responded to the GDPR by storing less, computing less, and becoming less data-intensive relative to US firms. These results are important for several reasons. First, we provide direct and large-scale evidence that firms comply with the GDPR by significantly reducing their data and computation. Second, we show that the GDPR affects firms’ input choices by changing the composition of data and computation used in firm production. Third, the results are not driven by a single industry, by a single country, or exclusively by website firms that are affected by cookie consent policy, indicating the far-reaching implications of the GDPR across many industries.

Although these findings provide insights into the impact of privacy laws on firm behavior, they do not offer a comprehensive understanding of firm-specific economic costs. Such an analysis requires understanding how firms use data in production and the different adjustment margins of firms. For this reason, we take a more structural approach in the next section.

5 A Model of Production with Data

This section introduces a production function framework with data and estimates its structural parameters. We use our framework to consider both how firms use data and computation in production and how privacy regulations might affect these decisions. Since data serves as an input in production, any regulatory-induced increase in input costs will inevitably impact firms’ input choices. Therefore, we model the GDPR as a gap between the actual cost of data and the perceived cost of data that include regulatory costs. We focus on estimating the size of this wedge and its implications for firms.

Our framework is designed to be flexible in terms of how data and computation are integrated into firm production. There currently is no standardized framework for how data enters the production function, and there is likely considerable heterogeneity in how firms use data. For this reason, we model only the relationship between data and computation in firm production rather than modeling a full production function with standard inputs such as labor and capital. We introduce the model below.

5.1 Production Function with Data

Firms produce information by processing data, which requires two inputs: data and computation. We assume the following constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form for
the information production function:

\[ I_{it} = \left( \omega^c_{it} (C_{it})^\rho + \alpha D_{it}^\rho \right)^{1/\rho}, \]

where \( C_{it} \) represents the amount of computation performed by firm \( i \) in month \( t \), \( D_{it} \) is the amount of data stored by firm \( i \) in month \( t \), and \( \omega^c_{it} \) is compute productivity. The parameter \( \sigma = (1/(1 - \rho)) \) is the elasticity of substitution between data and computing. The parameters of the production function are industry-specific as we estimate the model separately by each industry.

Our model includes a firm-specific compute productivity term, \( \omega^c_{it} \), to capture heterogeneity in computing productivity.\(^{32}\) This choice is motivated by the substantial variation in the firms’ data intensity, as reported in Figure 2 of Section 3. This heterogeneity can arise for two reasons. First, there could be inherent production technology differences between firms on how they could use data, making the information production more data-intensive for some firms than others. Second, even if the production technology is the same, some firms may have higher-quality computation resources (e.g., higher-quality software tools and more skilled engineers) to generate the same amount of information with less data. Our paper is agnostic about the source of \( \omega^c_{it} \). However, we believe it is essential to account for such heterogeneity.

We also intentionally refrain from specifying how information is integrated into the production function, as firms can use information in different ways.\(^{33}\) As a result, our model remains general enough to capture several of the common ways that data has been modeled as using information, including augmenting overall firm productivity (Jones and Tonetti, 2020), serving as an input in production (Bessen et al., 2022), enhancing labor productivity (Agrawal et al., 2019), and enabling firms to target customers better or forecast demand (Eeckhout and Veldkamp, 2022). These include all of the following cases (omitting subscripts for ease of notation):

- \( Y = f(K, L)\omega(I) \) (productivity increasing)
- \( Y = f(K, L, I)\omega \) (input in production)
- \( Y = f(K, \omega^c(I) \cdot L)\omega \) (labor-augmenting)
- \( R = p(I) \cdot (f(K, L)\omega) \) (price discrimination)

\(^{32}\)The literature typically calls this term “factor-augmenting productivity.” We use the term “compute productivity” instead of “compute-augmenting productivity” for the sake of brevity.

\(^{33}\)Even though this limits some counterfactual analysis we could conduct, we consider it a reasonable trade-off given the large-scale nature of our study, which covers many firms and industries.
In these examples, $K$, $L$, $Y$, and $R$ are capital, labor, output, and revenue: $\omega$ is Hicks-neutral productivity, $\omega^h$ is labor-augmenting productivity, and $p$ is the output price. In each specification, information affects a different part of the production function.

Our approach relies on estimating input demand functions under the assumption that firms choose inputs to minimize information production costs. In particular, we assume that $C_{it}$ and $D_{it}$ are variable inputs that firms optimize every period. We view this assumption as reasonable for cloud computing, where providers typically follow a pay-as-you-go model and firms can easily adjust their usage of storage and computation on-demand. We also assume that firms are price-takers in the input markets for computation and storage. We again view this assumption as reasonable for cloud computing because cloud providers typically post list prices and firms pay by the hour.

We use $p^c_{it}$ and $p^d_{it}$ to denote the input prices for computation and storage, which may vary across firms. We observe both the list prices and the actual prices paid by firms. In theory, all firms should face uniform cloud computing prices since they can access all data centers. However, latency effects and switching costs between data centers may restrict firms’ ability to use all data centers, leading to different consideration sets for different firms (and thus differential prices). In addition, potential negotiated discounts may also result in heterogeneous prices. Based on the assumptions of cost minimization, we derive the following first-order condition for firms’ data and computing choices from the CES production function:

$$\log\left(\frac{C_{it}}{D_{it}}\right) = \gamma + \sigma \log\left(\frac{p^d_{it}}{p^c_{it}}\right) + \sigma \log(\omega^c_{it}),$$

(3)

where $\gamma = -\sigma \log(\alpha)$. We provide the complete derivations in Appendix E.1. We also show that we get the same first-order condition if we were to include labor (e.g., software engineers) in the information production function in Appendix E.2.

According to this first-order condition, the relationship between input ratios and input prices is governed by the elasticity of substitution between these two inputs. When the price of data (relative to compute) is higher, firms substitute towards computation, with an intensity of $\sigma$. A notable feature of this equation is that the elasticity of substitution

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34 All cloud providers offer discounts if firms commit to using cloud resources over a specific period of time. These discounts are called “reserved instance” or “committed use” discounts, depending on the provider. These discounts are typically applied to the list price. A survey of 750 large companies conducted in 2023 suggests that only one-third of companies use these discounts (Flexera, 2023). This number is most likely lower during our sample period and among small firms. Moreover, firms that receive quantity discounts can resell or refund their commitments for a small fee for most major cloud providers. Therefore, we believe that linear prices are good approximations even for these firms.
between computation and data can be estimated from firms’ input demand alone, without observing other inputs or outputs. This property arises from the homotheticity property of the CES production function, commonly used in the literature for estimating the elasticity of substitution (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2018; Raval, 2019; Demirer, 2020).

Although our framework expands upon the production function literature by considering computation and data, it does have some limitations. While we account for variations in data quality across firms using $\omega_{ij}$, we assume that data is homogenous within a single firm. This assumption might be strong since, in reality, firms may have different types of data with varying quality. This limitation would become particularly relevant if, for example, the GDPR affected the data composition of firms. To relax this assumption, we would need to include different data types in production, which we do not observe. It is worth noting, however, that the assumption of homogenous inputs within a firm is a common practice in production function research, primarily due to data limitations.

One important way our approach differs from previous literature is that we recognize that data must be processed to generate useful information, and we therefore include computation as an additional input along with data. As the modeling of data in firm production is an active area of research, we view our framework as complementary to the existing literature (e.g., Jones and Tonetti, 2020; Farboodi and Veldkamp, 2022).

5.2 The GDPR as a Cost Shock to Data

This section incorporates the effects of the GDPR into our production framework. We model the GDPR as a firm-level cost shock to data inputs—as we have extensively argued they are the main focus of GDPR regulations. While some aspects of the GDPR do pertain to computation, the impacts of the regulation on data are significantly larger, and computation is less salient to regulators than data.\footnote{See Veldkamp and Chung (2023) for an excellent review of this literature.}

As mentioned before in Section 2 and in Appendix B.2, the GDPR increased the fixed and variable costs of data storage. For example, variable costs of storing data increase because of the customer “delete requests,” whose number and difficulty may increase with the amount of data a firm stores. Similarly, the probability of a data breach and of penalties in case of non-compliance likely increase with the amount of data that firms collect.\footnote{If the GDPR’s impact on computation costs is non-negligible, our wedge estimate will identify the ratio of data to compute wedges. In this case, our estimate of the wedge will be conservative.} By contrast, fixed costs increase because of one-time expenses that do not vary with the amount of data a firm has—e.g., hiring data protection officers, developing a data protection management system, or implementing organization measures. Since fixed costs

\footnote{This observation aligns with the fact that larger firms tend to receive more substantial fines.}
should not affect input demand, we focus on modeling the variable cost. We make the following assumptions about data costs before and after the GDPR:

**Pre-GDPR:** \( \tilde{p}_{it}^d = p_{it}^d \)  
**Post-GDPR:** \( \tilde{p}_{it}^d = (1 + \lambda_i)p_{it}^d \).

Here, \( p_{it}^d \) represents the marginal cost of data without the GDPR (i.e., the cost of storing data paid to the cloud provider), and \( \tilde{p}_{it}^d \) is the marginal cost of data after accounting for the costs introduced by the GDPR. Therefore, \( \lambda_i \) denotes the wedge between the actual cost of data and the total cost that includes complying with GDPR. We follow the literature and model \( \lambda_i \) as a multiplicative wedge (e.g., Chari et al., 2007; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). This wedge is firm-specific because compliance costs will likely be heterogeneous across firms, depending on their size and the types of data they collect. Alternatively, we can also interpret \( \lambda_i \) as each firm’s perceived cost of the GDPR, as they may hold different beliefs about enforcement or have varying levels of risk aversion that affect the expected cost of liability in the event of a data breach.

### 5.3 Identification of Parameters

Our end goal is to estimate two parameters: the firm-level wedges introduced by the GDPR (\( \lambda_i \)) and the elasticity of substitution between computation and data (\( \sigma \)). To illustrate the potential identification problems when estimating \( \lambda_i \) and \( \sigma \), consider the first-order condition in Equation (3) after the GDPR for EU firms:

\[
\log \left( \frac{C_{it}}{D_{it}} \right) = \gamma + \sigma \log \left( \frac{p_{it}^d}{p_{it}^c} \right) + \sigma \log(1 + \lambda_i) + \sigma \log(\omega_{it}^c). \tag{4}
\]

This first-order condition reveals a fundamental challenge for identification: the cost of the GDPR, \( \log(1 + \lambda_i) \), cannot be separately identified from the mean of firm-specific compute productivity post-GDPR (\( \omega_{it}^C \)). Intuitively, firms may decrease their data intensity either because their compute productivity has increased or because the GDPR has imposed additional data costs. Without additional information, we cannot distinguish these two cases. Therefore, to identify the GDPR wedge, we need to control for changes in firm-specific computing technology. To this end, we impose the assumption that compute productivity can be decomposed as follows:

\[
\log(\omega_{it}^C) = \log(\omega_i^C) + \log(\phi_i^C) + \log(\eta_{it}). \tag{5}
\]
Equation (5) specifies that the compute productivity term can be decomposed into a firm-specific component ($\omega^c_i$), an industry-specific time trend ($\phi^c_i$), and an idiosyncratic component ($\eta^c_{it}$). This decomposition suggests that we need to control for (i) $\log(\omega^c_i)$ to identify firm-specific wedges and (ii) $\log(\phi^c_i)$ to identify the industry-specific level of wedges by the GDPR.

Our identification strategy therefore involves two steps. In the first step, we recover $\omega^c_i$ and $\phi^c_i$ using data from EU firms in the pre-GDPR period and data from US firms. In particular, we assume that firm-specific compute technology does not change after the GDPR and that each EU industry follow the same compute-technology time-trend as the same industry in the US. These assumptions allow us to control for firm-specific computing technology in the second step, where we estimate the cost of the GDPR as a percentage of the observed data input cost. We explain each of these steps below and provide more detail in Appendix F.4.

5.3.1 First Step: Identification of Compute Productivity and Elasticity of Substitution

To estimate the elasticity of substitution and firm-level compute productivity, we use pre-GDPR data and estimate the following equation:

$$
\log \left( \frac{C_{it}}{D_{it}} \right) = \gamma + \sigma_1 \log \left( \frac{p^d_{it}}{p^c_{it}} \right) + \sigma_1 \log(\omega^c_i) + \sigma_1 \log(\phi^c_i) + \sigma_1 \log(\eta^c_{it}),
$$

(6)

where $\sigma_1$ is the pre-GDPR elasticity of substitution. There are two important considerations when estimating this equation. First, the estimation requires variation in the data-to-compute price ratio across firms over time. Second, these prices might be correlated with unobservable and time-varying compute productivity shocks ($\eta^c_{it}$). To address this endogeneity, it is important to understand the factors contributing to the heterogeneity and price changes in cloud computing.

Cloud computing providers display their prices for various cloud computing products on their websites, which typically vary depending on the region where the data center is located. These posted prices can be considered orthogonal to the firm-level idiosyncratic compute productivity shocks ($\eta^c_{it}$) because it is unlikely that any firm is large enough to affect them. In addition, cost improvements and increased competition were the main drivers of price changes in the last decade (Byrne et al., 2018). However, the prices that firms pay may differ from these list prices for two reasons. First, firms may have differential preferences over data center locations. Second, firms may receive a percentage discount.
from the listed price based on long-term commitments or bargaining power, as discussed earlier.

These two sources of price heterogeneity can create endogeneity. For instance, firms that experience a high compute productivity shock may be more willing to switch between data centers to take advantage of lower prices, resulting in a correlation between the firm’s compute productivity and the prices it faces. In addition, firms with high compute productivity may negotiate higher discounts. We address these potential sources of endogeneity by developing a shift-share design (Bartik, 1991; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020; Borusyak et al., 2022).

We first introduce the broad intuition behind our instrument. Our shift-share design addresses these two potential sources of endogeneity in prices by leveraging two features of our data. First, because we observe both list prices and negotiated prices, we can use changes in list prices to instrument for the changes in negotiated prices. These changes, however, are still predictive of the prices that firms face because discounts are applied to list prices.39

Second, we construct a measure of exposure to specific data centers for each firm and period. We use historical exposure shares rather than contemporary ones because previous data center choices are sunk. However, previous data center choices remain predictive of current data centers firms use because of the switching costs associated with moving data between data center locations. Transferring data from one location to another can be time-consuming and expensive, especially for large or complex datasets. As a result, firms’ location choices are highly persistent over time.

More formally, the shift-share design combines list prices with variation in firms’ pre-existing data center location choices. We construct instruments $z_{it}^{d}$ and $z_{it}^{c}$ for the data storage and computation prices each firm $i$ faces at time $t$. The exposure shares for each service in a given period are calculated as the share of firm $i$’s usage in a given data center relative to the firm’s total demand. This differential exposure gives us the following equation for the instrument:

$$z_{it}^{\{c,d\}} = \sum_{l \in \mathcal{L}} s_{it(t-12)}^{\{c,d\}} p_{lt}^{\{c,d\}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

where $s_{it(t-12)}^{\{c,d\}}$ denotes firm $i$’s usage share for data center location $l$ as measured 12 months before $t$, $p_{lt}^{\{c,d\}}$ is the price index for each service in location $l$ at time $t$, and $\mathcal{L}$ denotes the set of data center locations.40 Our exposure shares are lagged by 12 months because contemporaneous exposure shares are susceptible to reverse causality. While shift-

39We provide more information about cloud computing pricing in Appendix F.1.
40We provide more detail on our price index construction in Appendix F.2.
share instruments can be driven by assumptions about either the exogeneity of “shares” or the independence and exogeneity of “shocks” (Borusyak et al., 2022), the identifying assumption underlying our exposure shares is most similar to the “shares” assumption discussed in Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020). In particular, the exclusion restriction behind our shift-share design is that contemporary shocks to the compute productivity of each firm are exogenous to the changes in the ratio of list prices of cloud computing in the firm’s historical data center choices, controlling for industry-specific trends.41

We use $z_{it}^c / z_{it}^d$ as an instrument for price ratio $p_{it}^d / p_{it}^c$ and estimate Equation (6) for three EU industries (software, non-software services, and manufacturing) separately using pre-GDPR data, as the pre-GDPR data does not include a regulatory wedge. This allows us to estimate firm-specific compute productivity ($\omega_i^c$) and elasticity of substitution parameter before the GDPR. We also estimate Equation (6) for US industries over the entire sample period, as US firms do not experience regulatory distortion either before or after the GDPR. This allows us to recover the industry-specific compute productivity trends, $\phi_i^c$ for US industries.

5.3.2 Second Step: Identification of the Cost of the GDPR

In the second step, we use the EU post-GDPR data to estimate the wedge generated by the GDPR ($\lambda_i$) and the EU post-GDPR elasticity of substitution between compute and storage. Incorporating this into the firm’s input demand, we obtain the following equation:

\[
\log \left( \frac{C_{it}}{D_{it}} \right) = \gamma + \sigma_2 \log \left( \frac{p_{it}^d}{p_{it}^c} \right) + \sigma_2 \log (1 + \lambda_i) + \sigma_2 \log (\omega_i^c) + \sigma_2 \log (\phi_i) + \sigma_2 \log (\eta_{ii}), \tag{8}
\]

where $\sigma_2$ is the post-GDPR elasticity of substitution. Here, unlike the pre-GDPR input demand equation, the additional term $\lambda_i$ affects the ratio of computing to storage. The higher the cost of the GDPR, $\lambda_i$, the more likely firms are to substitute away from data toward computation. In order to use this equation for identifying $\lambda_i$, we make the following assumptions:

**Assumption 1.** Firm-specific compute productivity remains the same after the GDPR.

We note that this assumption still allows for industry-specific trends in computation due to $\log(\phi_i)$, as we can see from Equation (5). The assumption also does not restrict

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41 One example of a potential threat to identification would be if idiosyncratic compute productivity shocks are strongly correlated over time after accounting for aggregate industry time trends, and this caused firms to select data centers with specific trends in the ratio of prices. However, given that our model is estimated with the ratio of prices rather than direct price levels and considering that forecasting data center-specific trends in these price ratios is difficult, we view our identification assumption as reasonable for the setting. We provide further details for the instrumental variable construction in Appendix F.3.
firms’ abilities to respond to the GDPR by changing their compute-to-storage ratio. Rather, it implies that the firm-specific component of the underlying information production technology remains the same.

At this point, it is worth discussing our approach and comparing it to the approaches taken in the literature that estimates wedges. The large literature on misallocation identifies distortions as the difference between the marginal product of an input and its price (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). The typical approach in that literature assumes that firms have the same production technology. This assumption is needed because otherwise the firm-specific wedges cannot be distinguished from arbitrary firm-level heterogeneity in production technology. We face the same identification problem but take a different approach. Instead of assuming homogeneous production technology, we allow for heterogeneity through compute productivity but assume that this heterogeneity is time-invariant within a window of a few years. We note that both approaches have strengths and weaknesses, but we believe that in our context, it is essential to allow for heterogeneous production technology.

We also differ from the misallocation literature by using input demand functions for two variable inputs—one distorted and one not—instead of estimating a full production function. The underlying idea is that we can net out the sources of distortions that are common to both inputs, such as market power and adjustment costs, and recover the distortion specific to data input. This identification strategy is similar to the approach used in the literature to identify input market power from the ratio between two variable inputs (Morlacco, 2020; Kirov and Traina, 2023).

**Assumption 2.** EU and US industries follow the same time trends in aggregate compute technology post-GDPR.

This is the second critical assumption necessary for identifying the cost of the GDPR. The identification of wedges requires controlling for aggregate changes in compute productivity. Otherwise, the changes in the computation-to-data ratio of EU firms due to GDPR may be attributed to differential aggregate trends in compute productivity in the EU. Therefore, we use the estimated post-GDPR industry trend from the US firms to control for industry trends in the EU. In particular, the parallel trends we find within industries before the GDPR in our reduced-form results are consistent with this assumption.

With these two assumptions, we can estimate the following equation:

\[
\log \left( \frac{C_{it}}{D_{it}} \right) = \gamma_2 + \sigma_2 \left( \log \left( \frac{P_{it}^{d}}{P_{it}^{c}} \right) + \log(\phi_i) \right) + \sigma_2 \left( \log(1 + \lambda_i) + \log(\phi_{i}^c) \right) + \log(\eta_{it}), \quad (9)
\]
Table 6: Elasticity of Substitution Results by Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Software</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OLS</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>OLS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of Substitution ($\sigma$)</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Stage (Instrument)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Stat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,637</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>130,560</td>
<td>130,560</td>
<td>106,594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table presents our estimation results of the elasticity of substitution between storage and computing ($\sigma$) across industries. Estimates are presented for pre-GDPR elasticities for EU firms ($\sigma_{EU}^{*}$). Standard errors are calculated using 100 bootstrap repetitions at the firm level.

where $\hat{\phi}_i^c$ denotes estimates of compute productivity using pre-GDPR data and $\hat{\phi}_i$ denotes the estimates of compute productivity trend of the US firms. This equation allows us to estimate our main object of interest ($\lambda_i$) along with the post-GDPR elasticity of substitution between computing and data.\textsuperscript{42} Our specification is therefore flexible enough to allow for and to measure changes in firm production technology post-GDPR.

We estimate this equation using post-GDPR data of EU firms to obtain firm-specific wedges. For standard errors, we use a bootstrap procedure to account for generated regressors. The bootstrap procedure treats firms as independent observations and re-samples firms with replacement within an industry in 100 bootstrap repetitions. We provide the details of the estimation procedure in Appendix F.

6 Production Function Estimation Results

This section provides results on the elasticity of substitution between data and computation, the wedges introduced by the GDPR, and how these wedges translate into production costs.

\textsuperscript{42}Appendix F.5 provides useful intuition behind the identification of $\lambda_i$. Roughly speaking, the estimated wedges capture the variation in data intensity (the ratio between inputs) among comparable EU and US firms that is not explained by changes in prices, changes (over time or across regions) in the elasticity of substitution, or differences in compute productivity.
Figure 4: Elasticity of Substitution Between Storage and Computing for EU firms

Notes: Figure presents our estimation results of the elasticity of substitution between storage and computing \((\sigma)\) across industries, and we present separate estimates for the pre- and post-GDPR \((\sigma_1 \text{ and } \sigma_2, \text{ respectively})\). Solid lines denote the 95% confidence intervals, and standard errors are calculated using 100 bootstrap repetitions at the firm level.

6.1 The Elasticity of Substitution Between Data and Computation

We begin by presenting estimates for the elasticity of substitution using pre-GDPR data. Table 6 presents these elasticities for three industries separately—services, software, and manufacturing—using both OLS and IV estimates. We also present the first-stage estimates for each industry and their associated \(F\)-statistics. The first-stage coefficients are positive, indicating a positive relationship between our shift-share instruments and the contemporaneous prices faced by firms. Our results also indicate \(F\)-statistics in the thousands, suggesting that our instruments strongly correlate with the endogenous variables.

Our estimated elasticities suggest that data and computation are strong complements in all industries, which is consistent with our event study results in Section 4. The estimated elasticities range from 0.34 to 0.44, and the larger magnitudes in the software industry suggest that software firms can more easily substitute between data and computation. Furthermore, our IV estimates are smaller than the OLS ones. This bias is consistent with our intuition that firms with higher computing productivity may be more likely to search for lower relative computation prices and to negotiate higher relative discounts on computation.

We also assess whether the GDPR led to a meaningful change in production technology by allowing for the elasticity of substitution to differ before and after GDPR. Figure 4 separately reports the elasticity of substitution estimates before and after the GDPR for...
Figure 5: Wedge Estimates

(a) Average Wedge by Industry

(b) Wedge Distribution

Notes: This figure presents our estimation results for the wedge induced by the GDPR ($\lambda_i$). Panel (a) presents the average estimated wedge for firms within each industry. Panel (b) presents the full distribution of estimated wedges. Solid lines denote the 95% confidence intervals, and standard errors are calculated using 100 bootstrap repetitions at the firm level.

EU firms. While the results suggest a slight decline in the elasticity of substitution in all industries, the magnitudes are not large enough to be economically meaningful. We therefore conclude that EU firms did not significantly alter their information production process after the GDPR.43

Finally, although we are not aware of any previous estimates of the elasticity of substitution between data and computation, it is still informative to compare these estimates with the estimated substitutability between other inputs. While the estimates vary, they range from 0.3 to 0.7 for capital and labor (Caballero et al., 1995; Chirinko, 2008; Raval, 2019) and from 1.5 to 3 for labor and intermediate inputs such as materials (Chan, 2023; Peter and Ruane, 2023). This indicates that data and computation are more complementary than traditional inputs. We view these elasticity of substitution estimates as a contribution to the production function literature, as there is very little empirical evidence on how firms use data despite its growing importance. The strong complementarity also highlights the crucial role that computational resources play in processing data and the growing role of computation in the modern firm production function.

43In Appendix Figure OA-3, we repeat this exercise for US firms for comparison. We find comparable elasticities of substitution for firms in the US and similarly cannot reject the null that there are no changes in the elasticity of substitution for US firms.
Figure 6: Wedge Heterogeneity by Firm Size, Compute Productivity and IT Intensity

(a) Average Wedge by Firm Size
(b) Average Wedge by Compute Productivity

Notes: Figure presents our estimation results for the wedge induced by the GDPR ($\lambda_i$), averaging across firms within each of the given groups. Panel (a) shows these estimates across the five firm-size quintiles, while Panel (b) shows these estimates across the five compute productivity ($\omega_{it}^C$) quintiles computed using pre-GDPR estimates. Solid lines denote the 95% confidence intervals, and standard errors are calculated using 100 bootstrap repetitions at the firm level.

6.2 The Regulatory Wedge Induced by the GDPR

Next, we examine our estimates of the wedges introduced by the GDPR ($\lambda_i$). Panel (a) of Figure 5 displays the average wedge for EU firms across industries together with the 95% confidence intervals. The findings indicate that the average wedge in all industries is statistically significantly different from zero, implying that the GDPR has raised the cost of data for businesses. The wedge is the highest for software firms at 24%, and these larger magnitudes may reflect higher average exposure to the costs of the GDPR among software firms. These average estimates, however, hide substantial firm-level heterogeneity. As shown in Panel (b) of Figure 5, there is considerable heterogeneity in the wedge generated by the GDPR. For some firms, the wedge is close to zero, while for others, it can be as large as one.44

To better understand this heterogeneity and to study the determinants of these regulatory wedges, we look at how firm-level variables are correlated with this wedge. We consider two firm characteristics: (i) firm size, as measured by the number of employees, and (ii) compute productivity, as measured by pre-GDPR $\omega_{it}^C$ estimates. The results are reported in Figure 6. Panel (a) shows the average wedge estimates across the five firm-size quintiles, where the quintiles are calculated within each industry. The results suggest that the distortionary effects of the GDPR are highest for the smallest firms, with a wedge equivalent to a 25% tax, and with monotonically decreasing effects as the firm size gets

44A small fraction of our wedge estimates are negative, which we attribute to noise in the estimation.
bigger. This finding is consistent with other evidence on the effects of the GPPR in the literature (Campbell et al., 2015; Koski and Valmari, 2020; Goldberg et al., 2023) and may reflect the fact that larger firms have more resources to comply with the GDPR. In panel (b), we report the wedge distribution across quantiles of the compute productivity distribution. There is a strong inverse monotonic relationship between compute productivity and the data cost of the GDPR. As firms become more compute-intensive, the magnitude of the wedge decreases from 26% in the first quantile to 15% in the last quantile.

6.3 The Effect of the GDPR on the Cost of Information

How do the additional data costs resulting from the GDPR affect firms’ production costs and input decisions? To answer this, we begin by deriving how our estimated wedges affect the cost of producing a given level of information or the “cost of information.” Given data and computation prices, the cost of information is given by:

\[ CI^*(I_{it}, p_{it}, \lambda_i) = I_{it} \left( (\omega^c_{it})^\sigma (p^c_{it})^{1-\sigma} + \alpha^\sigma \left( (1 + \lambda_i) p^d_{it} \right)^{1-\sigma} \right)^{1/(\sigma - 1)}, \]

(10)

with the full derivation provided in Appendix E.3.

We use Equation (10) to estimate the increase in the cost of information post-GDPR by considering two scenarios: (i) a case in which there was no wedge \( \lambda_i = 0 \) and the cost of data was simply the cloud cost \( p^d_{it} \), and (ii) the realized case in which the cost for firms included the costs of regulations: \( (1 + \lambda_i) p^d_{it} \). To implement this calculation, we use our estimates of key model parameters, such as each firm’s compute technology, input prices, and the elasticity of substitution. These parameters allow us to estimate the counterfactual information cost with and without the privacy regulation for each firm at a monthly level.

The results for the percentage increases in information costs are reported in Figure 7. Panel (a) shows the average change in the cost of information by industry, plotting the mean along with standard errors. These results suggest that changes in the cost of information were significantly lower than changes in the cost of data. The average increase in the cost of information in the manufacturing industry is 2.5%, while it is 4.2% in software and 2.6% in the services industry. Once again, however, these average estimates hide considerable firm-level heterogeneity in information cost changes, which we document in Panel (b).

The increase in the cost of information is considerably smaller than that the increase in the cost of data. To further understand why, we decompose in Appendix E.4 the increase


**Figure 7: Results on Information Cost**

(a) Avg. Change in Info. Cost by Industry

(b) Distribution of Change in Information Cost

**Notes:** Figure presents our estimation results for the change in the cost of information induced by the GDPR. As discussed in the text, we calculate the increase in the cost of information by using Equation (10) to compare the cost of information with our estimated wedge \( \hat{\lambda}_i \) to the cost of information in the counterfactual with no wedge \( \lambda_i = 0 \). Panel (a) presents the average estimated increase in the cost of information for firms within each industry. Solid lines denote the 95% confidence intervals, and standard errors are calculated using 100 bootstrap repetitions at the firm level. Panel (b) presents the full distribution of the estimated increase in the cost of information.

in the information cost as:

\[
\frac{dC_i^*}{d\lambda_i} \frac{\lambda_i}{C_i^*} = s_i^d \lambda_i + \left[ s_i^d \left( \frac{\partial D_i^*}{\partial \lambda_i} \frac{\lambda_i}{D_i^*} \right) + \left( 1 - s_i^d \right) \left( \frac{\partial C_i^*}{\partial \lambda_i} \frac{\lambda_i}{C_i^*} \right) \right]
\]

where the first term—the direct effect—represents the increase in costs if firms do not re-optimize their input mix, while the second term—the firm re-adjustment margin—is the extent to which firms can mitigate the increase in costs by substituting data for computation while holding production fixed. Conceptually, if firms do not re-optimize their inputs, the increase in the cost of information would be determined by the expenditure share of data \( s_i^d \) multiplied by the wedge (hence the positive direct effect). However, firms’ input re-optimization would reduce this effect depending on the elasticity of substitution, \( \sigma \) (hence the negative re-adjustment margin).

Both channels explain why the (average) cost of information increase is about a fifth of the size of the (average) wedge. First, we find that the direct effect is small (3.9%, as shown
by Figure OA-4(a)) because data is significantly cheaper than computation and accounts for an average expenditure share of only 19% in information production costs. Second, given the strong complementarity of data and computation, firms are limited in their ability to mitigate the increase in the information cost by substituting data storage for computation. Therefore, the average firm re-adjustment margin is only −0.2% (see Figure OA-4(b)).

To summarize, our production framework suggests that the GDPR lead to a 3.7% average increase in the cost of information despite the 20% average increase in the cost of data because data accounts for a small share of the information cost in firm production relative to compute.

6.4 The Effect of the GDPR on Firm Production Costs

Finally, we estimate the impact of the wedges imposed by GDPR on firm production costs. Up until now, we limited the scope of our analysis to the firm’s production of information. This allowed our framework to accommodate multiple specifications for how information might be integrated into the production function. In this subsection, however, we sacrifice some generality to analyze how changes in the cost of information translate into changes in production costs for firms under additional assumptions.

We follow Lashkari et al. (2023) by using a nested and homothetic CES production technology, where information $I$ is combined with a constant returns to scale aggregator of non-information inputs such as capital and labor, $M(L, K, \cdot)$. We denote the production function by:

$$Y_i = v_i \left[ \alpha_i I_i^{\hat{p} - 1} + (1 - \alpha_i) M_i^{\hat{p} - 1} \right]^{\frac{\hat{p}}{\hat{p} - 1}},$$

(11)

where $v_i$ denotes firm-specific productivity, $\alpha_i$ denotes firm-specific information intensity in production, and $\hat{p}$ is a key parameter that represents the elasticity of substitution between information and non-information inputs.

Rather than expressing the unit cost function as in Equation (10), which required data on prices and other firm-level parameters, we show in Appendix G.1 that under some simplifying assumptions—that all inputs are flexible, inputs have common prices, and that firms do not have market power—we can use aggregate industry-level data and cost shares to derive how information cost changes translate into production costs. More explicitly, we can provide a benchmark for the effect of the GDPR on production costs using only the cost share of information ($s_i^i$) and elasticity of substitution between information and
Table 7: Effects of GDPR on Production Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Software (1)</th>
<th>Services (2)</th>
<th>Manufacturing (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key Parameter Estimates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in Information Costs ($\theta_i$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean increase</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th - 95th percentile increase</td>
<td>[0.03 - 0.05]</td>
<td>[0.02 - 0.04]</td>
<td>[0.01 - 0.03]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elasticity of Substitution ($\bar{\rho}$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashkari et al. (2023)</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Expenditure Share ($s_i^I$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median share</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of estimates</td>
<td>8.7% - 16.7%</td>
<td>2.9% - 5.0%</td>
<td>2.3% - 3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in Production Costs ($\zeta_i$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean increase</td>
<td>0.47%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of estimates</td>
<td>[0.26% - 0.82%]</td>
<td>[0.06% - 0.20%]</td>
<td>[0.02% - 0.10%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table presents estimates of Equation (12) calibrated with increases in the cost of information estimated in Section 6.3 and information expenditure shares estimated from Aberdeen and other industry surveys for each industry. The mean increase in production costs is calculated with the mean increase in information costs and the median information expenditure share. The contribution to the GDP is calculated using OECD National Accounts using the output approach. The range of estimates is calculated by combining the 5th - 95th percentile increases in information costs with the lower and upper range of information expenditure share estimates, respectively. The cost attributed to the GDPR is the multiplication of the increase in production costs, the contribution to the GDP, and the 2018 EU GDP at 2018 current prices. Column (1) presents these estimates for software firms, which are defined through SIC codes 7370 - 7377 in our data. Column (2) presents estimates for non-software service firms. Column (3) presents estimates for manufacturing firms. Appendix G provides more detail about the information expenditure share estimates, the point estimates of $\bar{\rho}$ taken from Lashkari et al. (2023), and our calculation of the contribution to the GDP by industry.

non-information inputs ($\bar{\rho}$) as sufficient statistics:

$$\zeta_i = \left( (1 + \theta_i)^{1-\bar{\rho}} \cdot s_i^I + 1 - s_i^I \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\bar{\rho}}} - 1,$$

where $\zeta_i$ represents the increase in production costs that arise from $\theta_i$, the increase in the information cost. Equation (12) reveals intuitive comparative statics: a given increase in the cost of information translates into larger increases in production costs for larger information shares ($s_i^I$) and lower elasticities ($\bar{\rho}$).

Now, we turn towards estimating $\zeta_i$. First, we note that we previously calculated $\theta_i$ in Section 6.3. Next, we need the elasticity of substitution between information and non-
information inputs. As estimating requires information on non-data inputs (e.g., capital and labor), we rely on the estimates by Lashkari et al. (2023).

Finally, we turn towards the last remaining estimates needed to calculate $\zeta_i$: the information expenditure shares $s_i$. We cannot calculate these directly from our data. In fact, estimates are difficult to calculate directly at the firm level more generally, as most production datasets do not provide information on “information-related inputs.” Instead, we proxy for information costs by using IT-related expenditures to estimate a range of information cost shares at the industry level.

For this purpose, we turn to the Aberdeen data set and various industry-level surveys, which we discuss in detail in Appendix G.2. While we might expect each source to suffer from distinct drawbacks, we find that the sources generate remarkably consistent estimates for the information share of expenditure across industries. Appendix Table OA-10 provides the estimates from each source separately, and we both use the median estimate and interquartile range of estimates for our calculations.

We present our parameter estimates and the estimated ranges for $\zeta_i$ from Equation (12) in Table 7. We estimate that production costs increase 0.47% on average for software firms. These average increases are significantly larger than the mean increases which we calculate for services and manufacturing firms, which are 0.15% and 0.06%, respectively. This difference is primarily driven by the larger information expenditure shares of software firms: the median expenditure share estimate for software firms is 11.8% compared to 3.1% for manufacturing firms. This difference is compounded by the fact that software firms also face the largest average wedges and resulting increases in the cost of information.

To provide a sense of the quantitative magnitudes associated with our estimated increases in production costs, we multiply our estimates ($\zeta_i$) by the amount of GDP accounted for by each industry in the Euro Area in 2018. This exercise implies an annual variable production cost increase for the software industry on the order of €3 billion. Furthermore, although service and manufacturing industries experienced smaller relative increases in production costs, the importance of these industries implies associated annual GDPR costs

$Lashkari et al. (2023)$ study France from 1995 - 2007. Although their setting predates ours, their comprehensive data on firm-level information technology investment and industry-level estimates are useful in considering how the wedges introduced by privacy laws might translate into production costs for firms.

While some researchers have leveraged data from the U.S. Census to track spending on digital technologies (e.g., Zolas et al., 2021; McElheran et al., 2023), they do not provide relevant industry-level estimates of this statistic that we could use for our estimation.

While these sources only partially capture the information expenditure share and capture different samples of firms, we aim to provide a range of plausible values by combining estimates across surveys and years.

Our estimates of the GDP accounted by each industry (and their share of the GDP) are €639 billion (5.53%), €7.84 trillion (67.86%), and €1.95 trillion (16.88%) for software, services, and manufacturing, respectively. We discuss how we attribute GDP to industries in greater detail in Appendix G.2.
on the order of €11.8 and €1.2 billion, respectively.49

We view these results as providing evidence that the direct impacts of the GDPR that we estimated translated into highly heterogeneous effects on production costs, with substantial increases in production costs for data and information-intensive industries.

7 Conclusions

In this paper, we examine the impact of the GDPR on firm data input choices. Comparing EU firms affected by the GDPR to similar firms in the US, we document that the GDPR decreased the amount of data used by firms. Firms subject to the GDPR decrease the amount of data stored by 26% and the amount of computation by 15% by the second year after the GDPR, becoming less data-intensive. Our results contribute to the literature documenting the costs of GDPR, complementing the existing literature by focusing on data outcomes that have been rarely studied.

We also map the observed shift in input choices to the production cost of the GDPR using a production function model that we develop and estimate. Our data allows us to estimate “data usage” as a multi-dimensional object composed of both storage and computation units. We propose a framework in which firms produce “information,” an intermediate good, using storage and computation as inputs. We show that data storage and computation are complements in production. To our knowledge, these are the first estimates of such a trade-off. Having estimated these results, we then use our model to measure the cost of the GDPR, and we find that the measures that firms had to adopt are equivalent to an increase in the cost of data storage of around 20%, with substantial variation both within and across industries. Software industries, whose firms may be more exposed to the GDPR than manufacturing firms, and small firms, which may find compliance more costly, experience more significant distortions in their demand for storage and computation.

Using our estimates of key model parameters, such as firm-level compute technology, input prices, and the elasticity of substitution between data storage and computation, we find that these increases in the costs of data for firms translate into significant increases in “information” production costs, with average increases on the order of 3%. Finally, by using information as an input in a flexible nested-CES framework, we show that under standard assumptions, our estimated wedges translate into extremely heterogeneous increases in production costs across industries. These effects range from smaller 0.06%

49These numbers are in the same ballpark as some of the available estimates from surveys. For example, Ernst & Young consultants argued that in 2018, the largest 500 corporations in the world were on track to spend a total of $7.8 billion to comply with GDPR (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2018).
increases in production costs for manufacturing firms to substantially larger estimates of 0.47% increases in production costs for data and information-intensive industries such as software.

Our results reinforce the importance of studying the impact of privacy regulation on firm production, and they emphasize the importance of considering “data usage” as a multi-dimensional object and studying how firms combine data and computation. We reiterate, however, that this paper is only a partial analysis of the welfare effects of the GDPR. This paper is completely agnostic to the benefits that consumers derive from the information disclosures provided by the GDPR or the surplus derived from the increased privacy protections that such a law entails. A full welfare analysis must incorporate these benefits into a single estimation framework.
References


