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### **ABSTRACT**

The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) has been active for 30 years, and the interest in this theory grew with the recent global surges in inflation and government spending. A related idea from Lucas and Stokey is that inflation during wartime (or an analogous global emergency such as the COVID pandemic) can be an efficient form of state-contingent public finance. This study applies these ideas to the recent inflation in 37 OECD countries. The theory's centerpiece is the government's intertemporal budget constraint, which relates a country's inflation rate in 2020-2023 to a composite government-spending variable. This variable equals the increases in ratios of government expenditure to GDP in 2020 and 2021, divided by the ratio of public debt to GDP in 2019 and the duration of the debt in 2019. The estimated coefficients of this variable are significantly positive, implying that about 80% of effective government financing came from the inverse effect of unexpected inflation on the real value of public debt, whereas only around 20% reflected conventional public finance (increases in current or future taxes or cuts in future spending). Within the Euro area, inflation reacts mostly to the area-wide composite government-spending variable, not to individual values.

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# 1 Introduction

The fiscal theory of the price level, FTPL, has been around since the early 1990s. Major contributions include Leeper (1991), Woodford (1995, 2001), Sims (1994), Dupor (2000), Cochrane (2001), and Bassetto (2002). This research was summarized and extended in the recent book by Cochrane (2023). However, despite its theoretical elegance, the FTPL was not taken seriously by mainstream macroeconomists as an empirical model of the price level and inflation until recently. This neglect arose partly because inflation has been associated much more with monetary policy and partly because the inflation rate in many countries has been low and stable from the mid-1980s until 2020. The global expansion of government spending and the accompanying surge of inflation after 2019 in the wake of the COVID crisis changed the picture. There is now broader receptivity toward the idea that, at least in extreme circumstances such as the COVID crisis, fiscal expansion can be a key driver of inflation and that the FTPL offers a coherent framework for understanding these effects.

The link between fiscal expansion and inflation in the COVID period is reminiscent of the connection that Lucas and Stokey (1983) emphasized for wartime. They noted that inflation during wars meant that nominally-denominated public debt was a contingent claim that paid off well in real terms during peacetime but badly during wars. They also observed that this kind of state-contingent public finance might approximate optimal taxation when wars were uncertain in timing and magnitude: “... this centuries-old practice may be interpreted as a crude approximation to the kind of debt policies we have found to be optimal. Verifying this would involve going beyond the observation that war debts tend to be inflated away, in part, to establishing that the size of the inflation-induced ‘default’ on war debt bears some relation to the unanticipated size of the war.”

Our study combines the Lucas-Stokey insight with ideas from the FTPL to understand inflation during the COVID period. A key ingredient is that, analogous to world wars, the COVID pandemic was an unanticipated global emergency.<sup>1</sup> Undergoing substantial infla-

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<sup>1</sup>This application of Lucas and Stokey (1983) relates to Hall and Sargent (2024), who also noticed the

tion—through cooperation between monetary and fiscal authorities—amounts to engineering a partial default on the public debt and, thereby, providing a form of government “revenue” that may be efficient in a state-contingent sense. Going further, we argue empirically that, across 37 OECD countries, the amount of the inflation-induced revenue relates closely to the size of the appropriately scaled expansion of government spending during the COVID period.

More specifically, we examine the role of fiscal expansion as a determinant of inflation rates across the OECD countries for 2020-2023. We first use the key ingredients of the FTPL to work out a simple relation between inflation rates and government spending. Then we apply this specification empirically, using measures of CPI headline and core inflation rates along with information on general government primary expenditure, public-debt levels, and debt duration. Our conclusion is that estimation of a well-specified equation supports the idea that the recent fiscal expansion has been a key driver of inflation rates in the OECD countries.

The framework that we apply empirically relies on a frictionless setting with no nominal rigidities, in the spirit of Cochrane (2001). In this respect, we depart from empirical work that integrates the insights of the FTPL into models with nominal rigidities to explain the evolution of inflation (such as Bianchi and Ilut (2017), Bianchi and Melosi (2017, 2022), and Caramp and Silva (2023)). Further, while most of the existing empirical evidence regarding the FTPL is based on U.S. data, we work instead with a panel of OECD countries.

We base our conceptual framework on the fiscal theory of the price level, while relying on minimal assumptions. However, the key element of the FTPL that we use—the effective revenue generated from surprise inflation in the context of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint—applies also in models of fiscal dominance and optimal taxation such as Lucas and Stokey (1983). In recent years, researchers have developed models incorporating non-Ricardian elements that arise in micro-founded models. For example, in Angeletos et al.

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parallel between the COVID pandemic and major wars. A key difference in our work is the application to the broad set of OECD countries, whereas Hall and Sargent focus on the United States.

(2024), a fiscal stimulus leads to inflation through a wealth effect that boosts aggregate demand in a model with boundedly rational or financially constrained agents. In this setting, the extent to which debt is stabilized through inflation depends on the behavior of the central bank. In Angeletos et al. (2023), the desire to smooth inflation over time arises if government debt provides liquidity services. Future research might incorporate these elements into our framework to test the empirical implications for inflation from the additional features stressed in these micro-founded models.

## 2 Conceptual Framework

The centerpiece of the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) is the government’s intertemporal budget constraint, which equates the market value of the initial real public debt to the present value of expected real primary surpluses:

$$\frac{B_t}{P_t} = \sum_{h=0}^{\infty} \frac{T_{t+h} - G_{t+h}}{(1+r)^h} \quad (1)$$

where  $B_t$  is the nominal market value of (short-term and long-term) public debt outstanding at the beginning of period  $t$ ,  $P_t$  is the price level at the start of period  $t$ ,  $T_{t+h}$  and  $G_{t+h}$  are the government’s real taxes and primary real spending,<sup>2</sup> respectively, in period  $t+h$ , and  $r$  is a constant real discount rate. (In our analysis, the length of the period plays no economic role and is assumed to be very short.) The assumption is that, as of the start of period  $t$ , the full path of  $T_{t+h}$  and  $G_{t+h}$  is known, so that the realized values can be used instead of the expected values.

As is well-known, the validity of Eq. (1) depends on a no-Ponzi condition, which precludes the government financing itself in the long run through perpetual rolling-over of principal and interest on its bonds. We assume throughout that this no-Ponzi condition holds. Note

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<sup>2</sup>We do not deal here with seigniorage associated with governmental issue of paper money. This seigniorage, associated primarily with anticipated inflation, can be viewed as part of the government’s tax revenue.

that  $G_{t+h}$  is the sum of real government purchases and transfers and excludes interest payments. Equation (1) says that the outstanding stock of public debt has to be financed by a corresponding present value of expected real primary surpluses, although the timing of these surpluses is flexible.

For the application to the recent surge of inflation in OECD countries, the idea is that a rise in government spending stimulated by the COVID recession lowered the right side of Eq. (1) for most countries. In particular, the expectation was that the large, unexpected increase in spending would not be matched fully by rises in current or future revenue or reductions in future spending. Instead, the government's intertemporal budget constraint would have to be satisfied through a cut in the real market value of public debt on the left side of Eq. (1). If the public debt is denominated in domestic currency, this depreciation of the real value of debt could be accomplished—in the absence of formal default—by increases in current or future price levels; that is, by a sustained period of inflation that was unexpected prior to period  $t$ . To make these ideas applicable to empirical estimation across countries, the analysis uses a series of simplifications that leads to a tractable functional form that can be readily implemented empirically.

Suppose that a crisis, such as the COVID pandemic, begins at the start of period  $t$  and features an unexpected surge in government spending that raises  $G_{t+h}$  for  $h = 0, \dots, M$ . The assumption is that, after period  $t+M$ , real spending returns to its previous path—that is, the higher real spending is temporary.<sup>3</sup> Let  $\Delta G_{t+h} = G_{t+h} - \mathbb{E}_{t-1}G_{t+h}$  be the real spending in period  $t+h$ , relative to that expected from the perspective of period  $t-1$ . The present

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<sup>3</sup>For the 37 OECD countries in the empirical analysis, the mean ratio to GDP of general government spending exclusive of interest payments is 0.385 in 2019, 0.444 in 2020, 0.423 in 2021, 0.399 in 2022, and 0.404 in 2023. Hence, the average spending ratio rose by 0.019 from 2019 to 2023. The mean ratio of general government revenue to GDP is 0.394 in 2019, 0.393 in 2020, 0.401 in 2021, 0.402 in 2022, and 0.399 in 2023. Therefore, this average ratio rose by 0.005 from 2019 to 2023. The average ratio of the primary deficit to GDP rose by 0.014 from 2019 to 2023, going from -0.009 to 0.005. Therefore, it is plausible that the permanent change in the ratio of the primary deficit to GDP was small.

value of these changes is

$$\text{Real Present Value of Spending Surge} = \sum_{h=0}^M \frac{\Delta G_{t+h}}{(1+r)^h} \quad (2)$$

Suppose that real GDP,  $Y_{t+h}$ , grows at the constant rate  $g$  and that  $g = r$  applies from period  $t$  to period  $t + M$ . Assume further that  $G_{t+h}$  has the same trend growth rate,  $g = r$ , as real GDP, so that  $\mathbb{E}_{t-1}G_{t+h} = G_{t-1}(1+r)^{h+1}$ . Define  $\Delta\left(\frac{G_{t+h}}{Y_{t+h}}\right) \equiv \frac{G_{t+h}}{Y_{t+h}} - \frac{G_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}}$ ; that is, the spending-GDP ratio expressed relative to the pre-crisis ratio. In that case, the expression in Eq. (2) can be written as

$$\text{Real Present Value of Spending Surge} = Y_t \cdot \sum_{h=0}^M \Delta\left(\frac{G_{t+h}}{Y_{t+h}}\right) \quad (3)$$

That is, given the assumptions about trend growth rates, the spending surge depends on the sum of spending-GDP ratios expressed relative to the pre-crisis ratio. These changes in real spending ratios are assumed to be unknown before period  $t$  but fully known at the start of period  $t$ .

A general analysis would include changes in real government revenue in the form of the present value:

$$\text{real present value of revenue surge} = \sum_{h=0}^M \frac{\Delta T_{t+h}}{(1+r)^h}. \quad (4)$$

Again, the changes after date  $t + M$  are assumed to be zero. In practice, especially for the years 2020 and 2021 that featured the main fiscal expansion in OECD countries, the government spending surge dominated the changes in government revenue. For example, for general government for the 37 OECD countries considered in the empirical analysis, the sum of the rise in ratios to GDP for 2020 and 2021, compared to the ratio in 2019, averaged 0.097 for primary government spending and only 0.006 for government revenue. Our main analysis omits the revenue side, shown in Eq. (4), and focuses on the contribution to real primary deficits from the spending surge, shown in Eq. (3).

The analysis is carried out within the frictionless (flexible-price) version of the FTPL described by Cochrane (2001; 2023, Chs. 1–3). In particular, the paths of real GDP,  $Y_t$ , and the real interest rate,  $r_t = r$ , are assumed to be invariant with the fiscal/monetary shocks. More broadly, the assumption is that the path of inflation rates is not substantially influenced by changes that occur in real variables (which effectively enter into the error term in our analysis).

At time  $t$ , the aggregate amounts of nominal payouts due on government bonds at the start of each period—for coupons and principal payments—are  $B_t^0, B_t^1, \dots, B_t^T$ , where  $T$  is the maximum debt maturity. The key idea is that these nominal obligations are effectively hostage to choices that the government makes that determine the price level at the corresponding dates. By raising the price level in the various periods in a manner not anticipated before period  $t$ , the government reduces the real value of its payouts. We can study these effects by examining the total nominal market value of government bonds outstanding at the start of period  $t$ :

$$B_t = B_t^0 + \frac{B_t^1}{(1+r)(1+\pi_{t+1})} + \frac{B_t^2}{(1+r)^2(1+\pi_{t+1})(1+\pi_{t+2})} + \dots + \frac{B_t^T}{(1+r)^T(1+\pi_{t+1}) \cdots (1+\pi_{t+T})} \quad (5)$$

where  $\pi_{t+h}$  is the inflation rate for period  $t+h$ . The assumption is that these inflation rates were unknown before period  $t$  but fully anticipated as of the start of period  $t$ , when the path of real primary deficits also becomes known. Therefore, if  $R_{t+h}$  is the nominal interest rate for period  $t+h$ , this rate moves along with the inflation rate,  $\pi_{t+h}$ , so that  $(1+R_{t+h}) = (1+r)(1+\pi_{t+h})$ .

To simplify the algebra, the aggregate nominal payments due on bonds are assumed to rise over time in accordance with a baseline (past) inflation rate,  $\pi^*$ , and the growth rate of real GDP,  $g = r$ . That is, before period  $t$ , the government is assumed to have arranged its debt composition so that the total nominal payments due rise from date  $t$  to date  $t+T$



along with the anticipated path of nominal GDP. In that case, Eq. (5) becomes

$$B_t = B_t^0 \left[ 1 + \frac{1 + \pi^*}{1 + \pi_{t+1}} + \frac{(1 + \pi^*)^2}{(1 + \pi_{t+1})(1 + \pi_{t+2})} + \cdots + \frac{(1 + \pi^*)^T}{(1 + \pi_{t+1}) \cdots (1 + \pi_{t+T})} \right] \quad (6)$$

When all (actual and expected) inflation rates equal the baseline rate,  $\pi^*$ , the relation between the total nominal market value of debt and the amount of short-term debt paid off in period  $t$  is

$$B_t^* = B_t^0 \cdot (1 + T), \quad (7)$$

where  $B_t^*$  is the baseline nominal value of public debt; that is, the value prior to the deviation of inflation rates from the baseline rate.

The reaction to the surge in spending from Eq. (3) is assumed to be a surge in the sequence of inflation rates,  $\pi_{t+1}, \dots, \pi_{t+T}$ , above the baseline rate,  $\pi^*$ . The assumption is that  $\pi^*$  is fixed (and, thereby, pins down the long-term future inflation rate). The shifts in inflation rates, when anticipated, lower the nominal market value of bonds outstanding in accordance with Eq. (6). (This analysis rules out a jump in the price level at the start of period  $t$ , though that change could be introduced.) The idea is that lowering the real value of public debt effectively pays for part of the increase in the present value of real primary deficits in Eq. (3).<sup>4</sup> The change in the nominal market value of debt generated by a shift in (actual and expected) inflation rates from  $\pi^*$  to the sequence  $\pi_{t+1}, \dots, \pi_{t+T}$  is given from Eqs. (6) and (7) by

$$\Delta B = \frac{B_t^*}{1 + T} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^T \left( \frac{(1 + \pi^*)^j}{\prod_{k=1}^j (1 + \pi_{t+k})} - 1 \right) \right] \quad (8)$$

Note that a boost to the inflation rates,  $\pi_{t+h} > \pi^*$ , implies a negative value of  $\Delta B$ .

As stressed by Cochrane (2001), there is a multiplicity of future inflation rates corresponding to a given  $\Delta B$  on the left side of Eq. (8). In particular, if the debt maturity,  $T$ ,

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<sup>4</sup>More generally, changes in current and future price levels could also affect the real values of governmental liabilities and assets beyond those represented by formal public debt. For example, the real value of depreciation allowances might be affected. Our present empirical analysis is limited to the gross public debt of general government, as defined by the IMF.

is long, part of the inflation surge can occur in the distant future. Cochrane argues that it may be optimal to smooth out the boost to inflation rates and that monetary policy can be used to achieve the desired path of inflation, while generating a given value of  $\Delta B$  in Eq. (8). In the present analysis, we work directly with the time path of inflation rates and not with the changes in monetary instruments, including short-term nominal interest rates, that support this path. That is, we assume that the monetary authority cooperates with the fiscal authority to generate the chosen time path of inflation rates (and that the underlying monetary actions do not impact the time paths of real variables). Viewed alternatively, our application to the COVID crisis assumes that fiscal dominance applies.

We focus on the extreme case of smoothing in which the higher inflation rate,  $\pi_{t+h}$ , is constant at a value  $\pi > \pi^*$  for  $h = 1, \dots, T$ .<sup>5</sup> In that case, Eq. (8) can be shown to simplify to

$$\Delta B = \left( \frac{B_t^*}{1+T} \right) \left\{ \left( \frac{1+\pi^*}{\pi-\pi^*} \right) \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{1+\pi^*}{1+\pi} \right)^T \right] - T \right\} \quad (9)$$

The expression on the right side of Eq. (9) includes the maximum debt maturity,  $T$ . We approximate the term  $\left( \frac{1+\pi^*}{1+\pi} \right)^T$  with a second-order expansion around one, assuming  $(\pi - \pi^*) \cdot T \ll 1$ . If we also assume  $T \gg 1$  (with  $T$  measured in numbers of periods), then Eq. (9) simplifies to

$$\Delta B \approx -B_t^* \cdot \frac{1}{2} T \cdot (\pi - \pi^*). \quad (10)$$

Note again that a negative value of  $\Delta B$  corresponds to a boost in the inflation rate,  $\pi > \pi^*$ . Moreover, as is important later, for a given value of  $\Delta B$ , larger values of  $B_t^*$  or  $T$  are associated with smaller values of  $\pi - \pi^*$ .

If the surge in inflation “financed” 100% of the increase in government expenditure, the magnitude of the real value  $\Delta B/P_t$ , where  $\Delta B$  is given in Eq. (10), would equal the present

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<sup>5</sup>An alternative assumption is that the government chooses a path of inflation rates to minimize a term that represents the costs of inflation—modeled as the sum of squared deviations of  $\pi_{t+h}$  from  $\pi^*$ —for a given amount of effective revenue,  $\Delta B$ , from Eq. (8). The resulting values of  $\pi_{t+h}$  are positive and monotonically decreasing from period  $t$  to period  $t+T$ . However, for reasonable parameters, the decreases in  $\pi_{t+h}$  are “small,” so that a constant value may be a reasonable approximation.

value of the increase in real primary deficits from Eq. (3).<sup>6</sup> We can readily generalize to the case where the surge in inflation pays for the fraction  $\eta$  of the spending surge, where  $0 \leq \eta \leq 1$ , so that the fraction  $1 - \eta$  is paid for by cuts in spending beyond date  $t + M$  or by increases in current or future government revenue.<sup>7</sup> The resulting expression for the inflation rate,  $\pi$ , is

$$\pi \approx \pi^* + \eta \cdot \frac{\sum_{h=0}^M \Delta \left( \frac{G_{t+h}}{Y_{t+h}} \right)}{\left( \frac{B_t^*}{P_t Y_t} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{T}{2} \right)} \quad (11)$$

The object  $T/2$  represents the “average maturity” of the outstanding stock of public debt at the start of period  $t$ . Note that Eq. (11) implies a non-negative slope coefficient,  $\eta$ , with  $0 \leq \eta \leq 1$ . Moreover,  $\pi = \pi^*$  when the increments to ratios of government spending to GDP add to zero.

The rescaled change in spending that appears on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) will play a central role in our empirical analysis. In what follows, we refer to this variable as “composite government spending”:

$$(\text{composite govt spending})_t \equiv \frac{\sum_{h=0}^M \Delta \left( \frac{G_{t+h}}{Y_{t+h}} \right)}{\left( \frac{B_t^*}{P_t Y_t} \right) \cdot \left( \frac{T}{2} \right)} \quad (12)$$

The case  $\eta = 0$  applies in Eq. (11) when the surge in primary government spending up to date  $t + M$  in Eq. (3) is matched by an expectation of offsetting cuts in spending further in the future or increases in current and future government revenue. This case can be regarded as standard intertemporal public finance in the sense of the government always respecting the constraint that an increase in today’s real primary deficit must be balanced by corresponding reductions in future real primary deficits (all measured as real present values). Therefore, we

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<sup>6</sup>The assumption is that the initial debt-GDP ratio,  $\frac{B_t^*}{P_t Y_t}$ , is large enough so that driving its value to zero is sufficient to cover the surge in the  $G/Y$  terms shown in the brackets in Eq. (3). This condition would be satisfied for the OECD countries in our empirical application to the COVID crisis.

<sup>7</sup>Bianchi et al. (2023) argue that the extent to which fiscal shocks are unfunded—that is, not balanced by corresponding changes in future primary real deficits—is the key to the connection between fiscal expansion and inflation. Learning about the path of primary real deficits is central to the analysis of Bassetto and Miller (2025).

would expect  $\eta = 0$  to hold in most circumstances, with  $\eta > 0$  applying only during economic emergencies, such as the COVID crisis or a large war. Hence, the discussion fits with the state-contingent fiscal-deficit policies described by Lucas and Stokey (1983) in the context of wartime, notably World War II.<sup>8</sup> The upshot of this perspective is that fiscal deficits and inflation might not be much related during “normal” economic times but could be closely connected during unusual events.<sup>9</sup> This perspective fits with our empirical application to inflation in the OECD countries in the context of the COVID crisis.

Equation (11) provides the functional form used in the main empirical work. Note that this form implies, not surprisingly, that the rise in the inflation rate is higher the larger the cumulative rise in  $G_{t+h}/Y_{t+h}$  for  $h = 1, \dots, M$ . Less intuitively, the rise in the inflation rate is larger the smaller the baseline debt-GDP ratio,  $B_t^*/(P_t Y_t)$ . This result follows because a smaller debt-GDP ratio implies that a higher inflation rate is required to get the decline in the real market value of public debt needed to balance the specified fraction of the surge in real primary deficits. A higher average debt maturity,  $T/2$ , also implies a smaller increase in the inflation rate. The reason is that, with the size of the cumulative increase in  $G/Y$  held fixed and the inflation rate equalized over  $T$  periods, a higher  $T$  implies that a smaller inflation rate is required each period to generate the requisite reduction in the real value of public debt. This decrease in the real market value of debt results from revaluation effects generated by increases in expected inflation rates and, correspondingly, nominal interest rates. Overall, the model says that the inflation rate reacts to a composite government-spending variable, which equals the cumulative surge in ratios of government spending to GDP divided by the initial debt-GDP ratio and the average debt maturity.

Given the value of the composite government-spending variable from Eq. (12), Eq. (11) says that the deviation of the inflation rate,  $\pi$ , from the baseline  $\pi^*$  depends on the parameter

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<sup>8</sup>However, price controls are often important in assessing wartime data.

<sup>9</sup>This result accords with Bassetto and Miller (2025), who argue “This setting explains why there can be long stretches of time during which government surpluses have large movements with little inflation response; yet, at some point, something snaps, and a sudden inflation takes off that is strongly responsive to fiscal news.”

$\eta$ , which specifies the share of financing from inflation. We think of  $\eta$  as a governmental choice that can vary across countries. However, in the regression analysis, we estimate  $\eta$  as a single coefficient to test whether the pandemic might have triggered a similar policy response across countries.

Another margin of choice that could be introduced concerns the smoothing of inflation rates—these were taken to be equalized over the interval of  $T$  years, which likely exceeds the interval  $M$  associated with the surge in government spending. Governments could instead choose to react faster or slower in terms of the response of near-term inflation.

In the empirical application of Eq. (11), we think of adding an error term that “explains” why the  $R^2$  of the regressions is not one. This residual can arise because of measurement error in the left- and right-side variables, other country-specific shocks, differences in expectations about future government spending or current and future taxes, and variations in the coefficient  $\eta$ , which represent differences in how much of extra government spending is financed via inflation. Some of these variations across countries would reflect governmental choices derived from differences in political structure and in the nature and extent of COVID infections.

We apply Eq. (11) to inflation rates across OECD countries from 2020 to 2023. The main explanatory variable in this application is the composite government-spending variable. The analysis allows in addition for an effect from the Ukraine-Russia War in 2022 and 2023. Countries that share a common border with Ukraine or Russia are found to have higher inflation rates than would otherwise be predicted.

### 3 Data

This section contains a description of the variables used in the regressions. The tables below contain more details.

### 3.1 CPI Inflation Rates

The left side of Eq. (11) requires data on each country’s inflation rate over various periods. The analysis calculates inflation rates from information on consumer price indexes (CPI) values, as reported in `OECD.STAT`. The numbers for 37 OECD countries (all except Turkey) for the period 2010–2023 are summarized in Table 1. Part I applies to headline CPI inflation and Part II to core CPI inflation, which excludes energy and food.<sup>10</sup>

### 3.2 Government Spending

The composite government spending variable, defined in Eq. (12), involves changes in each country’s spending levels expressed as ratios to GDP. This variable comes from information for general government on primary expenditure, which includes government purchases and transfer payments but excludes interest payments. These data are from the IMF *World Economic Outlook* (WEO) Database, *Government Finance Statistics*, and *Article IV Staff Reports*. The WEO data is the primary source because its coverage extends to 2023. In practice, we argue that the main spending surge applies to 2020 and 2021, and we therefore focus on ratios of government spending to GDP for 2020 and 2021 expressed relative to a base ratio, taken to be that for 2019 (pre-crisis). These values are in Table 2, column 1. The analogous variable for general government revenue, which we do not use in our main analysis, is in Table 2, column 2.

### 3.3 Quantities of Public Debt

The composite government spending variable in Eq. (12) includes in the denominator the ratio of the stock of public debt to GDP in a base year, taken in the empirical analysis to be the end of 2019. The concept of public debt used in the main analysis is the gross debt

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<sup>10</sup>This approach does not deal with differences across countries in CPI construction outside of energy and food. For example, countries differ in their treatment of housing costs, notably in the inclusion or exclusion of implicit rentals on owner-occupied housing.

of general government, coming from the IMF sources (primarily the WEO database). These numbers are mostly at estimated market value but sometimes are at face value. Ratios of gross public debt to GDP for general government in 2019 are in Table 2, column 3.

An alternative procedure adjusts the gross public debt for amounts denominated in foreign currency or in inflation-indexed form. These parts of the debt would not be subject to direct reductions in real value due to unexpected domestic inflation. However, measurement issues may make the unadjusted data preferable, and our main analysis uses the unadjusted gross public debt.

The estimated shares of public debt denominated in foreign currency or in inflation-indexed form come mostly from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), *Central and General Government Debt Securities Markets*, Tables C4 and C2. These values are in Table 3, columns 3 and 4. The numbers for debt denominated in foreign currency apply to general government. The numbers for debt in inflation-indexed form apply to central government. We adjusted these numbers by ratios of central to general government expenditure (from the IMF’s GFS database) to estimate the values applicable to general government (assuming that only central governments issue inflation-indexed bonds). The ratios to GDP of adjusted gross public debt—with amounts denominated in foreign currency or in inflation-indexed form filtered out—are in Table 2, column 4.<sup>11</sup>

In principle, we would carry out the analysis for the consolidated government sector. The IMF’s concept of general government, described in *International Monetary Fund* (2014, Chapter 2), includes various layers of government (central, state, local, etc.) along with social security funds. This concept excludes public corporations, which include central banks. (The IMF includes public corporations in a broader measure called the public sector.) The

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<sup>11</sup>It may also be desirable to adjust for public debt issued in floating-rate form. Since these coupon payments adjust automatically for changes in expected inflation (given the values of real interest rates), the corresponding part of the value of outstanding bonds should be filtered out in the calculation of adjusted public debt. However, we have data (from the BIS) on the floating-rate share of gross public debt only for central governments and only for 14 countries. The average share of government bonds in floating-rate form for these countries in 2022 is only 9%, and only the coupon parts of the values of these bonds should be filtered out. Therefore, the neglect of an adjustment for floating-rate bonds may not have major consequences.

consolidation of central banks with general government would be desirable for the purposes of studying inflation. In this broader consolidation, the debts of central banks, including reserves held by financial institutions and others, would be added to the gross public debt. However, in a consolidated calculation, the assets held by central banks would be deducted.<sup>12</sup> If the assets and debts of central banks largely cancel, this broader consolidation would not have much impact on the public debt numbers but would likely lower the average maturity of the debt—because central bank liabilities tend to be shorter term than central bank assets. In any event, data are not available for this broader consolidation.

The IMF also provides information on “net debt,” which subtracts out holdings by general government of assets comparable to government bonds (see IMF (2014, pp. 207–208)). However, the net-debt measures (shown in Table 2, column 5) were not used because they filter out unknown quantities of assets denominated in foreign currency.<sup>13</sup> As extreme examples, using the IMF reported data for 2019 shown in Table 2, columns 3 and 5, the ratios to GDP of gross and net public debt are, respectively, 41% and –74% for Norway, 90% and 9% for Canada, 236% and 152% for Japan, 32% and 7% for New Zealand, 36% and 5% for Sweden, 65% and 27% for Finland, and 22% and –14% for Luxembourg. Although netting out asset holdings by various parts of government is attractive in principle, we think at this point that the data on gross public debt are better for our purposes than the data on net public debt.

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<sup>12</sup>As an example, the gross public debt of Japan is the largest in relation to GDP—257% in 2022—but slightly over half of this debt in 2023 is held by the central bank (as reported by *Japan Times*, May 2023). In addition, unlike other countries, Japan’s gross debt for general government is reported without the consolidation of social-insurance funds.

<sup>13</sup>For example, sovereign wealth funds hold large amounts of U.S. Treasury bonds. Using Wikipedia for data for 2020 on the U.S. dollar value of sovereign-wealth funds, the largest of these funds among the OECD countries when measured in relation to the U.S. dollar value of GDP (taken from World Bank, *World Development Indicators*) are for Norway (237% of GDP), France (51%), Turkey (31%), Canada (16%), New Zealand (15%), South Korea (12%), Australia (8%), Austria (8%), and Chile (8%). The parts of sovereign-wealth holdings denominated in foreign currency should not be netted out from gross public debt for the purpose of analyzing inflation.



### 3.4 Duration of Public Debt

We began with data from the OECD on a standard measure, the “average remaining maturity” of the public debt, a concept that considers only the timing of the principal payouts due on each bond. The values for general government of average remaining debt maturity in 2019 (coming mostly from OECD, *Sovereign Outlook for OECD Countries, Survey on Central Government Marketable Debt and Borrowing*) are in Table 3, column 1.

A more appropriate concept is the duration of a bond, which considers also the amounts and timings of coupon payments. We define the duration in the usual (Macaulay (1938, Chapter II)) sense as the weighted average of due dates for each coupon and principal payout, where the weights are the market values corresponding to each payout expressed relative to the total market value of bonds. Although the duration of the public debt can be calculated from detailed knowledge of all government bonds outstanding at a given point in time, this calculation would be challenging for the set of 37 OECD countries used in the empirical analysis. We have also found little in direct reporting on the duration of the public debt.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, it is useful to be able to approximate the debt duration given the typically available data, which include the average remaining maturity based only on principal payments and the nominal interest rates paid on government bonds.

Part A2 of the appendix derives a formula for the duration of a standard bond that pays a constant stream of nominal coupons and a nominal principal in year  $T$ . We assume for date  $t$  (taken to be 2019 in the empirical analysis) that bonds were “trading at par” in the past when the nominal interest rate was  $R_{t-L}$  (measured empirically by averages of long-term nominal interest rates on government bonds going back from 2018 the number of years corresponding to the estimated duration). At date  $t$  (2019), the nominal interest rate on government bonds is observed to be  $R_t$ , which can differ from  $R_{t-L}$ .<sup>15</sup> For this case, the

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<sup>14</sup>In the past, OECD.STAT, *Central Government Debt, Average Term to Maturity and Duration*, reported the Macaulay duration or, alternatively, the modified duration of the central government’s debt for many OECD countries (although some of the reported numbers for duration appear to be inaccurate). The relevant table was terminated as of 2010.

<sup>15</sup>The data on interest rates on long-term government bonds for 37 OECD countries are from OECD.Stat

formula in the appendix relates the duration,  $D_t$ , to the reported average maturity and to the interest rates  $R_t$  and  $R_{t-L}$ . The resulting estimates of the duration of the public debt in 2019 are in Table 3, column 2.

It would be desirable to estimate the duration applying only to the public debt denominated in domestic currency and not indexed for inflation. However, we lack the breakdown of debt maturity needed to make that calculation for most countries.

### 3.5 Euro-Area Data

In our main specification, we consider the Euro area as a single economic entity. There are 17 OECD countries that use the Euro.<sup>16</sup> Except for duration and some other debt-related variables (average debt maturity and shares of gross public debt denominated in foreign currency or in inflation-linked form), we weight all country-level variables by the relative values of GDP in current prices from the IMF. For duration and the other debt-related variables, we weight by the size of outstanding gross public debt (using the IMF data on the ratio of gross debt to GDP, along with the GDP weight).

### 3.6 Proximity to War in Ukraine

We constructed measures for 37 OECD countries on distance to Ukraine and Russia, based on country capitals and on an array of major cities. We also constructed shares of each country’s trade with Ukraine and Russia. However, we found in the analysis of inflation rates that the main explanatory power (for inflation rates in 2022 and 2023) came from a dummy variable for whether a country shared a common border with Ukraine or Russia (of which 3 had a border with Ukraine and 6 had one with Russia, with Poland having a border with both).

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and IMF, *International Financial Statistics*. Data for Costa Rica are for 2014–2019. Data for Estonia begin in 2015 and are approximated by 6-month Euribor interest rates reported by the Central Bank of Estonia.

<sup>16</sup>The countries are Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Three non-OECD countries also use the Euro: Malta, Croatia, and Cyprus.

## 4 Empirical Results

### 4.1 Setup for Regressions

The form of the regressions reflects the model's result from Eq. (11):

$$\pi_{it} = \pi_i^* + \eta \cdot (\text{composite govt spending})_{it} + X_t + \beta Z_{it} + u_{it}, \quad (13)$$

where  $i$  is the country (for example, the 21-country sample comprising 20 non-Euro OECD countries and a Euro-area aggregate) and  $t$  runs from 2010 to 2023. The term  $\pi_i^*$  is country  $i$ 's inflation-rate target and is assumed to be constant over time. This target is estimated as a country fixed effect.

The key variable on the right side of Eq. (13) is composite government spending, as defined in Eq. (12). The first part of composite government spending is the sum of current and future deviations of ratios of primary government spending to GDP,  $\Delta \left( \frac{G_{it}}{Y_{it}} \right) + \Delta \left( \frac{G_{i,t+1}}{Y_{i,t+1}} \right) + \dots + \Delta \left( \frac{G_{i,t+M}}{Y_{i,t+M}} \right)$ . We assume that this sum was zero from 2010 to 2019 but became non-zero with the advent of the COVID crisis as of 2020. For the 21-economy sample, the means of  $G_{i,t+h}/Y_{i,t+h}$  are 0.360 for 2019, 0.414 for 2020, 0.391 for 2021, 0.364 for 2022, and 0.370 for 2023. This pattern suggests that the rise in spending ratios may be temporary and, after two years (corresponding to the interval  $M$ ), the spending ratios reverted to their pre-crisis levels from 2019. Hence, we measure the spending surge as the sum of the primary spending ratios for 2020 and 2021, each expressed relative to the ratio for 2019. To construct the composite government-spending variable from Eq. (12), we divide the measured spending surge by the ratio of public debt to GDP in 2019 and by the duration of the debt in 2019. We then use this construct to measure the composite government-spending variable in Eq. (13) for country  $i$  for each year  $t = 2020, \dots, 2023$ . This spending variable equals zero for each year  $t = 2010, \dots, 2019$ .

The variable  $X_t$  on the right side of Eq. (13) represents global influences on inflation

rates for year  $t$ . This variable could include disruptions in the global supply chain due to COVID or the effects of lockdowns that were largely synchronized across countries. This variable is captured by year fixed effects in the regressions.

The variable  $Z_{it}$  represents country-specific effects on inflation aside from those reflected in composite government spending. In practice, the only additional variable that we include concerns the influence of the Ukraine-Russia war in 2022 and 2023. We gauge this effect by the dummy variable for whether a country shares a common border with Ukraine or Russia. Eight of the 37 OECD countries in the full sample share a common border with Ukraine or Russia, but only three of these are outside of the Euro zone: Hungary, Norway, and Poland.<sup>17</sup> The border dummy has significant explanatory power for inflation in 2022 and 2023, but the results concerning composite government spending are similar when this dummy variable is excluded.

The term  $u_{it}$  in Eq. (13) is a usual error term. The key identifying assumption is that this term is independent of the composite government-spending variable. A rationale for this independence is that government-spending decisions after 2019, particularly on transfer payments in 2020 and 2021, depended on exogenous differences in political structure and in the perceived severity of the COVID crisis.<sup>18</sup>

The sample comprises 37 OECD countries, 20 outside of the Euro zone and 17 in this zone. Within the Euro zone, the constraint of a common currency and high mobility of goods and factors may preclude much independent variation in inflation rates, which would have to represent changes in relative prices across these countries. Therefore, we start with a setting in which the 17 Euro-zone countries are combined into single aggregate observations. That is, the initial regression sample consists of 21 economies: 20 outside the Euro zone and an aggregated version of the Euro zone.

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<sup>17</sup>OECD countries having a common border with Ukraine are Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. Those sharing a border with Russia are Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Poland.

<sup>18</sup>We had hoped to use measures of COVID mortality and infection from the World Health Organization, *WHO Coronavirus Dashboard*, as instruments for government spending. Although the estimated relationships were positive, they were not significant at usual levels. Therefore, these instruments were too weak to be useful.

## 4.2 Regressions

### 4.2.1 Baseline Results

Table 4 provides statistics for the variables used in the regressions. Table 5 contains baseline regressions for headline and core CPI inflation rates. The estimation framework applies to annual data from 2010 to 2023 for 21 economies in the form of Eq. (13). The estimation method is panel least-squares with country and year fixed effects.

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 consider headline CPI inflation, and columns 3 and 4 consider core CPI inflation, computed without energy and food. Columns 1 and 3 allow for individual coefficients on the composite government-spending variable for each year from 2020 to 2023 and for the border dummy for 2022 and 2023. Columns 2 and 4 impose a common coefficient on composite government spending for each year 2020–2023 and for the border dummy for 2022–2023.<sup>19</sup>

For headline inflation (Table 5, column 1), the estimated coefficient of composite government spending is significantly positive for each year from 2020 to 2023. The estimated values rise from around 0.5 for 2020 and 2021 to around 1 for 2022 and 2023. The results for core inflation (column 3) are similar, though there is a clearer pattern of the coefficient peaking in 2022 (at a value of 1.3) and then falling to around 0.7 in 2023, similar to that for 2021. The estimated coefficients suggest a hump shape in the response of inflation to the composite government-spending variable. This pattern could reflect agents learning about the policy response (size of fiscal stimulus, accommodation from monetary policy, absence of a credible plan for future fiscal adjustment, etc.), sluggishness in price adjustments, or subsequent waves of fiscal spending.

If the coefficient on the composite government-spending variable is constrained to be

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<sup>19</sup>The regressions in Table 5 use unadjusted gross public debt in the construction of the composite government-spending variable. The results are broadly similar if the gross public debt is adjusted to eliminate the parts estimated to be denominated in foreign currency or in inflation-indexed form. The fits of the regressions also change negligibly if the reported average debt maturity (Table 3, column 1) is used instead of the estimated duration (Table 3, column 2). This finding is not surprising because the correlation for the 21 economies in 2019 between the average debt maturity and the estimated duration is 0.95.

the same for each year 2020–2023 (Table 5, columns 2 and 4), the estimated coefficient for headline inflation is 0.78 (s.e. = 0.11) and that for core inflation is 0.84 (0.09). These coefficient estimates—corresponding closely to the average of the coefficients estimated for individual years—are significantly positive with a  $p$ -value less than 0.01. The first coefficient is significantly less than one with a  $p$ -value of 0.040, and the second is significantly less than one with a  $p$ -value of 0.065.

The results in Table 5, columns 1–4, include the border dummy variable associated with Ukraine or Russia. The estimated coefficients of this variable are significantly positive for most cases. Most importantly, the elimination of this variable has little impact on the estimated coefficients of the composite government-spending variable. For headline inflation, the single coefficient estimate (corresponding to column 2) becomes 0.85 (s.e. = 0.12). For core inflation, the estimate (corresponding to column 4) becomes 0.88 (0.09).<sup>20</sup>

As noted before, the coefficient of the composite government-spending variable, denoted by  $\eta$  in Eq. (11), corresponds to the share of excess government spending in 2020 and 2021 that is “paid for” by the inverse effect of inflation on the real market value of the initial public debt (in 2019). In Table 5, these estimated coefficients are significantly positive and marginally significantly below one. The point estimates in columns 2 and 4 suggest that roughly 80% of the required financing for the excess spending came from the negative effect of inflation on the real market value of the public debt, whereas only about 20% came from the more standard method of intertemporal public finance, involving cuts in future spending or raises in future revenue. The fact that the estimated coefficients are only marginally statistically different from one means that the surge in inflation may have financed nearly the entirety of the fiscal surge.

The cross-country relationships between the dependent variable (the headline or core CPI inflation rate) and the composite government-spending variable are depicted for the 21

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<sup>20</sup>We have also added the composite revenue variable (the revenue-GDP ratio for 2020 and 2021 relative to that in 2019, divided by the ratio of gross public debt to GDP in 2019 and by the estimated duration of the debt in 2019) to the regressions for headline and core inflation. The estimated coefficients of this variable differ insignificantly from zero, and the estimated coefficients of the other variables change little.

economies for headline inflation in Figure 1 and core inflation in Figure 2. In these figures, the horizontal axis has the composite government-spending variable (based on the surge in spending for 2020 and 2021) and the vertical axis has the average inflation rate for 2020–2023.<sup>21</sup> Each country is marked by its standard acronym. Note that the points for the United States are not outliers—they lie moderately above the middle of the sample with respect to the composite government-spending variable and the headline or core inflation rate. The points for the Euro area are below those for the United States with respect to the inflation rates and the composite government-spending variable. Overall, the figures show clear positive slopes that are not driven by extreme observations.

#### 4.2.2 Three Components of Composite Government-Spending Variable

The regressions in Table 5 include the composite government-spending variable, as defined in Eq. (12). This variable equals  $\Delta(G/Y)$ , the cumulation for 2020 and 2021 of ratios of general government spending to GDP gauged relative to ratios for 2019, divided by the ratio of gross public debt to GDP in 2019 and by the debt duration in 2019. As already noted, the estimated coefficients of this variable are positive and highly statistically significant.

We can assess how the statistical significance of the composite government-spending variable relates to the individual contributions from its three components:  $\Delta(G/Y)$ , the debt-GDP ratio, and the debt duration. We consider in the main text the cases in columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 that estimate a single coefficient on composite government spending for each year 2020–2023. The appendix has results when the coefficients vary across years.

Table 6 reports regressions in which each component of the composite government-spending variable is set, one at a time, at its sample mean. That is, each designated variable is restricted not to contribute to the explanation of the variations in inflation rates. For example, in column 1,  $\Delta(G/Y)$  for each country for 2020–2023 is constrained to equal the sample mean of 0.084 and, therefore, no longer helps to explain the variations in the headline

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<sup>21</sup>The average inflation rate shown for each country filters out the estimated effects from the border dummy variable and the country and year fixed effects.

CPI inflation rate for 2020–2023. In comparison with Table 5, column 2, the  $\log(\text{likelihood})$  falls by 22.0.

In one approach, we think of constraining each variable to equal its sample mean as amounting to one coefficient restriction imposed on the estimation. Then we test for the validity of this restriction by using the condition that  $-2 \times \log(\text{likelihood ratio})$  is distributed asymptotically as a Chi-squared variable with one degree of freedom. For example, in Table 6, column 1, the resulting  $p$ -value for  $\Delta(G/Y)$  is 0.000. This result also applies for core inflation (column 4). Hence,  $\Delta(G/Y)$  is individually statistically significant for explaining headline and core inflation rates.

The same conclusion applies to the initial ratio of gross public debt to GDP and the initial debt duration. The  $p$ -values associated with these variables are 0.000 in all cases. Therefore, the initial debt-GDP ratio and the initial debt duration are individually statistically significant for explaining inflation rates.<sup>22</sup>

An issue with this approach is that the model in which all three components of the composite government-spending variable enter (Table 5, columns 2 or 4) and the models where one of the components is restricted to equal its sample mean (Table 6, columns 1–3 or 4–6) are not nested. In fact, it is possible that imposing the condition that a variable enter only at its sample-mean value would raise the likelihood, although that outcome does not materialize in any of our cases. As an alternative, we compare the models using the Akaike information criterion (AIC), which amounts to another procedure for assessing the likelihood ratios for the various models.<sup>23</sup> According to the AIC, the weight attached to the restricted model is 0.000 for all cases considered. Thus, the conclusions are similar to those found before—there is strong support for combining the influences from  $\Delta(G/Y)$ , the initial

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<sup>22</sup>Table A1 in the appendix shows that this conclusion for the AIC is the same if we allow for individual coefficients on the composite government-spending variable for each year from 2020 to 2023.

<sup>23</sup>The AIC equals  $2k - 2 \cdot \log(\mathcal{L})$ , where  $k$  is the number of free parameters and  $\mathcal{L}$  is the likelihood. In our case,  $k$  is the same for all of the alternative models and does not affect the calculations. The models can be compared using the relative likelihood,  $RL = \exp[(\text{AIC}_1 - \text{AIC}_2)/2]$ , where  $\text{AIC}_1$  is the value from Table 5, columns 2 or 4, and  $\text{AIC}_2$  is the value from Table 6, columns 1–3 or 4–6. The weights on the two models are then  $1/(1 + RL)$  and  $RL/(1 + RL)$ . See, for example, Anderson and Burnham (2002, Section 2.2).



debt-GDP ratio, and the initial debt duration in the manner prescribed by the model in Eq. (11).<sup>24</sup>

Possibly, a more transparent way to assess the three components of the composite government-spending variable is to enter them individually into the regressions using a linear approximation.<sup>25</sup> Specifically, we linearize the composite government-spending variable around its cross-sectional “mean,”  $\bar{\Omega}$ , defined as  $\bar{G}/(\bar{B} \cdot \bar{D})$ , where  $\bar{G}$ ,  $\bar{B}$ , and  $\bar{D}$  are the respective cross-sectional means of  $\Delta(G/Y)$ , the initial debt-GDP ratio, and the initial debt duration. We then use the approximate relation between the inflation rate and the three components:

$$\pi \approx \pi^* + \left[ \beta_G \cdot \left( \frac{G - \bar{G}}{\bar{G}} \bar{\Omega} \right) + \beta_B \cdot \left( \frac{B - \bar{B}}{\bar{B}} \bar{\Omega} \right) + \beta_D \cdot \left( \frac{D - \bar{D}}{\bar{D}} \bar{\Omega} \right) \right] + \dots \quad (14)$$

We ran regressions of the inflation rate on the three linearized components (including country and year fixed effects and the border dummy variable). The results for headline and core inflation when we estimate single coefficients on the components of composite government spending for each year 2020–2023 are in Table 7. The coefficients enter as predicted by the model, with  $\beta_G$  positive and  $\beta_B$  and  $\beta_D$  negative. As an example, for headline inflation in column 1, the estimated coefficients are 0.75 (s.e. = 0.17) for  $\Delta(G/Y)$ ,  $-0.52$  (0.14) for the initial debt-GDP ratio, and  $-0.72$  (0.31) for the initial debt duration. We then test whether the coefficients on these three variables accord with the model in the sense that they are the same in absolute value; that is,  $\beta_G + \beta_B = 0$  and  $\beta_B = \beta_D$ . The  $p$ -values for these restrictions, shown in Table 7 for headline and core inflation, are well above 10%; that is, we do not reject the model’s restrictions at usual critical values.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Table A1 in the appendix shows that this conclusion for the AIC is the same if we allow for individual coefficients on the composite government-spending variable for each year from 2020 to 2023.

<sup>25</sup>It does not work to take logs of the left and right sides of the regression equation because each side may be negative and there are constant terms on the right side.

<sup>26</sup>Table A2 in the appendix shows that this conclusion also holds when we estimate separate coefficients on the components of the composite government-spending variable for each year from 2020 to 2023.

### 4.2.3 Results using only the spending surge

A positive connection between the change in the inflation rate and incremental government spending,  $\Delta(G/Y)$ , would not be surprising from a Keynesian perspective that stresses the effect of government spending on aggregate demand. A distinguishing feature of the present model is the two scaling variables—the initial values of the debt-GDP ratio and the debt duration. In particular, the effect of the debt-GDP ratio on the inflation rate is negative for given  $\Delta(G/Y)$ , whereas an aggregate-demand model might predict the opposite sign.

If we enter the fiscal variable into the regressions just as the spending surge,  $\Delta(G/Y)$ , we get estimated coefficients that are significantly positive but with much less explanatory power than that for the composite government-spending variable (in Table 5). The results with the fiscal variable entered as  $\Delta(G/Y)$  look as shown in Figure 3 (for headline CPI) and Figure 4 (core CPI). There is a significantly positive relationship between excess government spending and the inflation rates, but the fits are much poorer than those shown in Figures 1 and 2. With respect to the baseline results reported in Table 5, the  $R$ -squared declines from 0.80 to 0.76 in the case of headline inflation and from 0.80 to 0.73 for core inflation. More revealingly, we can consider partial  $R$ -squared values, which compare the sum of squared residuals with the sum that corresponds to already having in the system the country and year fixed effects and the Ukraine-Russia war dummy variable. For headline inflation, the partial  $R$ -squared for composite government spending (Figure 1) is 0.20, whereas that for the spending surge alone (Figure 3) is 0.03. For core inflation, the partial  $R$ -squared for composite government spending (Figure 2) is 0.31, whereas that for the spending surge alone (Figure 4) is 0.05. Hence, the partial  $R$ -squared is substantial for composite government spending but not much above zero for the spending surge alone. This result confirms the contribution of the size and duration of public debt to the explanation of the cross-sectional variations in post-COVID inflation. The role of these variables can be understood in light of the conceptual framework presented in this paper, while it is hard to reconcile the results with a traditional fiscal-multiplier view of the link between spending and inflation.

#### 4.2.4 Border dummy variable

We interpret the border dummy variable as a proxy for effects on inflation in 2022 and 2023 from the Ukraine-Russia War, for given values of the composite government-spending variable. Since the estimated coefficients on the border dummy for headline inflation (Table 5, columns 1 and 2) are higher than those for core inflation (columns 3 and 4), part of the effect likely involves energy prices.<sup>27</sup> However, the results could also reflect broad negative influences of wartime on productivity, including adverse effects on transportation and supply chains. Another possible interpretation of the border dummy is that it signals an increase in future government spending for countries that are directly exposed to Russian aggression.

#### 4.2.5 The Euro zone as a single economy

We now compare the baseline results from Table 5, which treated the Euro zone as a single economy, to those with each Euro-zone country entered individually. Table 8 shows regressions for 37 countries—20 non-Euro and 17 Euro. These regressions contain two composite government-spending variables. For the 20 non-Euro countries, the first variable equals the individual country value as entered in Table 5, and the second variable equals zero. For the 17 Euro-zone countries, the first variable equals the weighted average of the values for these countries, and the second variable equals the individual value less the weighted-average value. A coefficient of zero on the second variable means that inflation in a Euro-zone country depends on composite government spending only through the weighted-average value, not the individual one. A coefficient on the second variable equal to that on the first variable means that inflation in each Euro-zone country depends on that country’s own composite government spending, in the same way as for each non-Euro country.

The results when we estimate single coefficients for the two composite government-spending variables for each year 2020–2023 are in Table 8. The estimated coefficients of

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<sup>27</sup>However, Minton and Wheaton (2023) show that oil-price changes impact an array of other price changes through network effects. Therefore, changes in energy prices can affect core inflation.

the second variable are much smaller than those of the first variable, and the estimated coefficient of the second variable differs significantly from zero at the 5% level only for headline CPI. Therefore, for a Euro-zone country, the main impact of composite government spending on inflation comes from the Euro-wide value, rather than the country’s own value. However, the results suggest that inflation in a Euro-zone country responds positively to a small extent to its own composite government spending.<sup>28</sup>

The results do not mean that the Euro-zone countries are effectively in a fiscal union in the sense of choosing similar values of government spending in relation to GDP. For the  $\Delta(G/Y)$  variable (ratios of government expenditure to GDP for 2020 and 2021 compared to that in 2019), the standard deviation across the 17 Euro countries, 0.048, is similar to that for the 20 non-Euro countries, 0.054. Our finding is that inflation in each Euro-zone country is mainly a response to Euro-zone fiscal aggregates, rather than individual country values, not that the choices of the individual values are themselves similar.

## 5 Conclusions

In response to the COVID pandemic, many countries implemented large increases in deficit-financed government spending especially in 2020 and 2021. To the extent that these fiscal interventions were perceived as not backed by current and future tax increases or future spending cuts, the fiscal theory of the price level predicts that countries should experience a rise in their inflation rates. The predicted increases in inflation rates are proportional to the size of the fiscal stimulus, measured by the cumulative increases in ratios of spending to GDP. However, for a given fiscal stimulus, a country’s surge in inflation should be lower if it starts with a larger ratio of public debt to GDP or has a longer duration of this debt.

We find support for these theoretical predictions. Specifically, we show for a sample of 21 economies—20 non-Euro-zone OECD countries and an aggregated version of 17 Euro-

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<sup>28</sup>Table A3 in the appendix shows regressions when separate coefficients on the two composite government-spending variables are estimated for each year 2020-2023. These results show that the appearance of a positive coefficient on the second variable derives from the behavior of inflation in 2022.

zone countries—that headline and core inflation rates in 2020–2023 responded positively to a theory-motivated composite government-spending variable. This variable includes cumulated increases in spending-GDP ratios for 2020 and 2021 divided by the ratio of public debt to GDP in 2019 and by the average duration of the public debt in 2019. In contrast, for 17 Euro-zone countries, the main link between composite government spending and inflation derives from overall Euro-zone spending and only to a small extent from a country’s own spending.

We find in the sample of 21 economies that the coefficient that gauges the response of the inflation rate to the composite government-spending variable is significantly positive. The point estimates of coefficients around 0.8 suggest that about 80% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, whereas the remaining 20% was paid for through the more orthodox method of intertemporal public finance that involves increases in current or prospective government revenue or cuts in prospective future spending.

Figure 5 summarizes some of the results through the lens of time paths from 2010 to 2023 for ratios of gross public debt (at estimated market value) to GDP. The upper curve is for the United States and the lower curve is for the GDP-weighted average of the 21 economies considered in our main analysis. Because of the large fiscal deficits in 2020 and 2021, following the onset of the COVID crisis, we would expect to see large runups in ratios of public debt to GDP. This expectation is borne out for 2020, when the U.S. debt-GDP ratio rose from 1.08 to 1.32 and the 21-economy ratio rose from 1.03 to 1.21. Subsequently, however, the debt-GDP ratios fell or stayed roughly constant, as the U.S. ratio went from 1.32 in 2020 to 1.20 in 2022 and 1.22 in 2023, and the 21-economy ratio went from 1.21 in 2020 to 1.10 in 2022 and 1.09 in 2023. The declining parts of these time paths reflect, first, effects from rising price levels and, hence, levels of nominal GDP and, second, effects from rising nominal interest rates, which depressed market values of government bonds. That is, these negative effects on debt-GDP ratios—which offset the impacts from continuing fiscal deficits especially in 2021—reflected partly realized inflation and partly increases in

expected inflation, as embodied in increases in nominal interest rates. These last two effects correspond to the effective revenue from unexpected inflation that we emphasized in our analysis. Absent this “revenue,” debt-GDP ratios would have been substantially higher in 2022 and 2023.

Table 1: Inflation Variables for 37 OECD Countries.

<b>Part I: Headline Consumer Price Indexes</b>			
Country	Change in inflation rate	Inflation rate 2010–19	Inflation rate 2020–23
Australia	0.0186	0.0212	0.0398
Canada	0.0196	0.0174	0.0370
Chile	0.0374	0.0296	0.0670
Colombia	0.0325	0.0374	0.0698
Costa Rica	-0.0034	0.0315	0.0281
Czech Republic	0.0650	0.0169	0.0819
Denmark	0.0209	0.0122	0.0332
Hungary	0.0756	0.0248	0.1004
Iceland	0.0296	0.0313	0.0608
Israel	0.0131	0.0107	0.0238
Japan	0.0091	0.0047	0.0137
Korea, South	0.0121	0.0172	0.0293
Mexico	0.0167	0.0396	0.0563
New Zealand	0.0306	0.0158	0.0464
Norway	0.0190	0.0211	0.0401
Poland	0.0701	0.0159	0.0859
Sweden	0.0377	0.0113	0.0489
Switzerland	0.0118	0.0003	0.0121
United Kingdom	0.0248	0.0207	0.0455
United States	0.0274	0.0177	0.0451
Euro zone (weighted avg)	0.0260	0.0129	0.0389
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.0283</b>	<b>0.0195</b>	<b>0.0478</b>
<i>Euro-zone countries:</i>			
Austria	0.0327	0.0186	0.0513
Belgium	0.0239	0.0182	0.0421
Estonia	0.0586	0.0233	0.0819
Finland	0.0267	0.0129	0.0396
France	0.0194	0.0112	0.0305
Germany	0.0268	0.0133	0.0401
Greece	0.0260	0.0067	0.0327
Ireland	0.0349	0.0055	0.0404
Italy	0.0272	0.0117	0.0389
Latvia	0.0596	0.0147	0.0744
Lithuania	0.0683	0.0185	0.0868
Luxembourg	0.0171	0.0165	0.0336
Netherlands	0.0283	0.0162	0.0445
Portugal	0.0219	0.0116	0.0335
Slovak Republic	0.0555	0.0155	0.0710
Slovenia	0.0330	0.0124	0.0454
Spain	0.0244	0.0123	0.0367
<b>Mean Euro zone</b>	<b>0.0344</b>	<b>0.0141</b>	<b>0.0484</b>

Table 1: Inflation Variables for 37 OECD Countries (continued)

<b>Part II: Core Consumer Price Indexes</b>			
Country	Change in inflation rate	Inflation rate 2010–19	Inflation rate 2020–23
Australia	0.0158	0.0211	0.0369
Canada	0.0151	0.0169	0.0320
Chile	0.0301	0.0243	0.0543
Colombia	0.0160	0.0360	0.0519
Costa Rica	-0.0150	0.0336	0.0186
Czech Republic	0.0588	0.0124	0.0712
Denmark	0.0143	0.0119	0.0262
Hungary	0.0534	0.0262	0.0796
Iceland	0.0278	0.0309	0.0587
Israel	0.0126	0.0105	0.0231
Japan	0.0048	0.0013	0.0060
Korea, South	0.0050	0.0169	0.0219
Mexico	0.0140	0.0329	0.0468
New Zealand	0.0287	0.0152	0.0439
Norway	0.0146	0.0198	0.0344
Poland	0.0566	0.0115	0.0680
Sweden	0.0368	0.0090	0.0458
Switzerland	0.0087	-0.0005	0.0081
United Kingdom	0.0181	0.0192	0.0373
United States	0.0225	0.0187	0.0412
Euro zone (weighted avg)	0.0161	0.0111	0.0272
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.0216</b>	<b>0.0180</b>	<b>0.0397</b>
<i>Euro-zone countries:</i>			
Austria	0.0245	0.0187	0.0432
Belgium	0.0195	0.0162	0.0357
Estonia	0.0357	0.0170	0.0527
Finland	0.0209	0.0116	0.0326
France	0.0116	0.0084	0.0200
Germany	0.0169	0.0121	0.0290
Greece	0.0156	0.0019	0.0175
Ireland	0.0255	0.0061	0.0316
Italy	0.0106	0.0103	0.0209
Latvia	0.0372	0.0090	0.0462
Lithuania	0.0495	0.0174	0.0670
Luxembourg	0.0104	0.0160	0.0264
Netherlands	0.0189	0.0159	0.0348
Portugal	0.0192	0.0092	0.0284
Slovak Republic	0.0476	0.0144	0.0621
Slovenia	0.0296	0.0075	0.0371
Spain	0.0146	0.0085	0.0231
<b>Mean Euro zone</b>	<b>0.0240</b>	<b>0.0118</b>	<b>0.0358</b>



**Notes on Table 1:** Inflation rates are averages over periods indicated, based on annual averages of CPI values. Data are mostly from OECD.STAT. Information for core CPI in Costa Rica came from the Central Bank of Costa Rica. Change in inflation rate in columns 1 and 4 is the value for 2020-2023 less that for 2010-2019. Observations for the Euro zone are GDP-weighted averages of data for the 17 individual countries. Turkey was excluded from the sample because of missing data and also because its extreme inflation rate in 2022—72% for headline CPI inflation and 59% for core CPI inflation—is unlikely to be well explained by the fiscal model. Countries currently under consideration for accession to the OECD include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Indonesia, Peru, Romania, and Ukraine.

Table 2: Fiscal Variables for General Government of 37 OECD Countries (IMF Data).

Country	Excess Govt Spending to GDP 2020–21	Excess Govt Revenue to GDP 2020–21	Gross Debt to GDP 2019	Adjusted Gross Debt to GDP 2019	Net Debt to GDP 2019
Australia	0.086	0.021	0.467	0.443	0.278
Canada	0.169	0.028	0.902	0.772	0.087
Chile	0.097	0.005	0.283	0.125	0.080
Colombia	0.014	-0.050	0.524	0.310	0.431
Costa Rica	-0.016	-0.004	0.564	0.322	0.550
Czech Republic	0.115	0.002	0.300	0.266	0.181
Denmark	0.043	0.001	0.337	0.324	0.123
Hungary	0.076	-0.030	0.653	0.485	0.575
Iceland	0.142	-0.007	0.665	0.358	0.544
Israel	0.070	0.009	0.592	0.299	0.568
Japan	0.125	0.033	2.364	2.350	1.517
Korea, South	0.057	0.027	0.421	0.412	0.117
Mexico	0.036	0.005	0.519	0.314	0.433
New Zealand	0.066	0.037	0.318	0.281	0.069
Norway	0.029	-0.027	0.406	0.406	-0.742
Poland	0.089	0.013	0.457	0.355	0.385
Sweden	0.032	-0.009	0.356	0.225	0.049
Switzerland	0.077	0.016	0.396	0.396	0.173
United Kingdom	0.180	0.023	0.857	0.626	0.758
United States	0.164	0.023	1.081	1.038	0.832
Euro zone	0.121	0.008	0.861	0.828	0.692
<b>Mean</b>	<b>0.084</b>	<b>0.006</b>	<b>0.634</b>	<b>0.521</b>	<b>0.367</b>
<i>Euro-zone countries:</i>					
Austria	0.160	0.007	0.706	0.699	0.479
Belgium	0.101	-0.005	0.976	0.968	0.848
Estonia	0.084	0.004	0.085	0.085	-0.022
Finland	0.068	-0.002	0.649	0.632	0.270
France	0.100	0.004	0.974	0.917	0.889
Germany	0.118	0.004	0.596	0.569	0.403
Greece	0.221	0.038	1.855	1.855	1.639
Ireland	0.038	-0.045	0.571	0.571	0.489
Italy	0.158	0.010	1.342	1.282	1.217
Latvia	0.094	0.007	0.367	0.329	0.282
Lithuania	0.122	0.027	0.358	0.261	0.303
Luxembourg	0.038	-0.037	0.224	0.224	-0.141
Netherlands	0.100	0.001	0.485	0.484	0.398
Portugal	0.124	0.029	1.166	1.133	1.099
Slovak Republic	0.095	0.009	0.480	0.455	0.431
Slovenia	0.146	0.004	0.654	0.618	0.495
Spain	0.175	0.066	0.982	0.957	0.837
<b>Mean Euro zone</b>	<b>0.114</b>	<b>0.007</b>	<b>0.733</b>	<b>0.708</b>	<b>0.583</b>

**Notes on Table 2:** In column 1, excess government spending is calculated from general government expenditure exclusive of interest payments. Values are sums of ratios to GDP for 2020 and 2021, expressed relative to the ratio for 2019. In column 2, excess government revenue is calculated from general government revenue. Values are sums of ratios to GDP for 2020 and 2021, relative to the ratio for 2019. In column 3, gross public debt is observed at the end of 2019 for general government. In column 4, the adjusted gross public debt is net of shares denominated in foreign currency or in inflation-indexed form. In column 5, net public debt for general government at the end of 2019 is based on IMF criteria for netting. Data are from IMF, World Economic Outlook Data Base, Government Finance Statistics, and Article IV Staff Reports. Column 4 uses information on shares of public debt denominated in foreign currency or in inflation-indexed form from Table 3, columns 3 and 4.

Table 3: Characteristics of Public Debt for 37 OECD Countries

Country	Avg. Maturity 2019	Duration 2019	Share FX 2019	Share Indexed 2019	Composite Spending
Australia	7.7	6.8	0.001	0.049	0.0269
Canada	6.3	5.9	0.112	0.033	0.0319
Chile	11.9	8.9	0.206	0.353	0.0384
Colombia	8.6	6.2	0.227	0.181	0.0043
Costa Rica	6.4	4.5	0.376	0.054	-0.0061
Czech Republic	6.1	5.8	0.115	0.000	0.0657
Denmark	8.0	7.6	0.001	0.039	0.0168
Hungary	4.6	4.2	0.210	0.047	0.0274
Iceland	5.4	4.6	0.165	0.296	0.0459
Israel	6.5	6.0	0.145	0.351	0.0198
Japan	9.3	9.1	0.001	0.005	0.0058
Korea, South	10.4	8.9	0.010	0.011	0.0153
Mexico	9.9	6.9	0.169	0.225	0.0100
New Zealand	7.7	6.7	0.007	0.111	0.0310
Norway	4.0	3.8	0.000	0.000	0.0185
Poland	4.6	4.2	0.220	0.004	0.0462
Sweden	5.0	4.9	0.214	0.152	0.0184
Switzerland	10.4	10.0	0.000	0.000	0.0193
United Kingdom	15.3	12.5	0.000	0.269	0.0168
United States	5.7	5.3	0.000	0.039	0.0289
Euro (weighted avg)	7.7	7.1	0.014	0.025	0.0198
<b>Mean</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>0.104</b>	<b>0.107</b>	<b>0.0238</b>
<i>Euro-zone countries:</i>					
Austria	9.9	9.1	0.010	0.000	0.0248
Belgium	9.8	8.9	0.008	0.000	0.0116
Estonia	7.2	7.2	0.000	0.000	0.1375
Finland	6.3	6.1	0.026	0.000	0.0172
France	8.2	7.7	0.015	0.044	0.0134
Germany	6.9	6.7	0.028	0.018	0.0295
Greece	9.6	6.8	0.000	0.000	0.0176
Ireland	10.3	8.7	0.000	0.000	0.0076
Italy	7.0	6.3	0.007	0.037	0.0186
Latvia	9.9	8.5	0.103	0.000	0.0302
Lithuania	7.4	6.8	0.270	0.000	0.0497
Luxembourg	4.9	4.8	0.000	0.000	0.0357
Netherlands	8.0	7.6	0.003	0.000	0.0271
Portugal	6.2	5.6	0.028	0.000	0.0192
Slovak Republic	8.8	8.0	0.051	0.000	0.0247
Slovenia	9.0	7.9	0.054	0.000	0.0283
Spain	7.7	6.9	0.001	0.024	0.0258
<b>Mean Euro zone</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>7.3</b>	<b>0.036</b>	<b>0.007</b>	<b>0.0305</b>

**Notes on Table 3:** In column 1, average years of remaining maturity (applying only to principal payments) come in most cases from OECD, *Sovereign Outlook for OECD Countries, Survey on Central Government Marketable Debt and Borrowing*, 2023, Figure 1.14 for 2022; 2022, Figure 1.15 for 2020 and 2021; and 2021, Figure 1.14 for 2019. These values are for central government debt and were assumed to apply also to general government. Value for Estonia is for 2020. Value for Chile for 2022 is from *Ministerio de Hacienda Chile, Composición de la Deuda Chile by Currency*, March 2023. Value for Costa Rica for 2022 is from *Ministerio de Hacienda, Costa Rica, Profile of the Public Debt*, July 2023. Value for Iceland for 2022 is from *Office of Debt Management Newsletter, Iceland*, July 2023.

In column 2, the average duration of the public debt is calculated from the reported average maturity (column 1) using the formula in part A2 of the appendix, with data on nominal interest rates on long-term government bonds from 2007 to 2019 from OECD.Stat and IMF, *International Financial Statistics*. Data on interest rates begin in 2014 for Costa Rica and in 2015 for Estonia (approximated by 6-month Euribor interest rates reported by the Central Bank of Estonia). In the formula, the lagged interest rate,  $R_{t-L}$ , corresponds to the average going back from 2018 the number of years of duration. The current interest rate,  $R_t$ , corresponds to the rate for 2019. Since we lack separate data in most cases on maturity for bonds denominated in foreign currency or in inflation-indexed form, we made no adjustments to estimated duration because of these compositional differences.

In column 3, the share denominated in foreign currency is mostly from BIS, *Central and General Government Debt Securities Markets*, Table C4, 2020–2023. These values apply to long-term debt (maturity of one year or more) for general government. Sources for Costa Rica and Iceland are as above. Source for New Zealand is *Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Holdings of Central Government Debt Securities*, July 2023. For Costa Rica, Iceland, and New Zealand, the values of foreign-currency-denominated share for 2022 are assumed to apply also for 2019.

In column 4, the share inflation-indexed is mostly from BIS, Table C2, 2020–2023. These values are for central-government debt. Sources for Chile, Costa Rica, Iceland, and New Zealand are as above. Value for Japan for 2023 came from communication with the Bank of Japan. This value was assumed to apply also in 2019. Value for France for 2020 is from World Bank, *What Is the Role of Inflation-Linked Bonds for Sovereigns?*, 2022, Figure 2.5. Value for Sweden for 2022 is from CEICdata.com. Values of zero were confirmed by central banks of Norway and Switzerland. Reported inflation-indexed shares, which apply to central government, were multiplied by the ratio for 2019 of central to general government expenditure from IMF, *Government Finance Statistics*. The resulting values for inflation-indexed shares are estimated values for general government, assuming that only central governments issue inflation-linked bonds. For some countries, the values of inflation-indexed share for 2022 are assumed to apply for 2019.

In column 5, the composite government-spending variable is excess government spending from Table 2, column 1, divided by the ratio of gross public debt to GDP from Table 2, column 3, and divided by the estimated duration from Table 3, column 2.

Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables

Variable	Mean	s.d.	Max	Min
Headline CPI inflation rate, 2010–2019	0.0195	0.0101	0.0396	0.0003
Headline CPI inflation rate, 2020–2023	0.0478	0.0232	0.1004	0.0121
Change in headline CPI inflation rate	0.0283	0.0202	0.0756	-0.0034
Core CPI inflation rate, 2010–2019	0.0180	0.0100	0.0360	-0.0005
Core CPI inflation rate, 2020–2023	0.0397	0.0198	0.0796	0.0060
Change in core CPI inflation rate	0.0216	0.0180	0.0588	-0.0150
Energy CPI inflation rate, 2010–2019	0.0268	0.0153	0.0676	0.0002
Energy CPI inflation rate, 2020–2023	0.0790	0.0353	0.1366	0.0270
Change in energy CPI inflation rate	0.0522	0.0393	0.1164	-0.0368
Food CPI inflation rate, 2010–2019	0.0216	0.0130	0.0503	-0.0018
Food CPI inflation rate, 2020–2023	0.0680	0.0341	0.1555	0.0123
Change in food CPI inflation rate	0.0465	0.0264	0.1251	0.0129
$\Delta(G/Y)$ (primary govt spending to GDP, cum. 2020–21 vs 2019)	0.0844	0.0531	0.1796	-0.0156
$\Delta(\text{REV}/Y)$ (govt revenue to GDP, cum. 2020–21 vs 2019)	0.0060	0.0219	0.0368	-0.0499
Gross public debt/GDP (2019)	0.6345	0.4534	2.3638	0.2833
Gross public debt adjusted/GDP (2019)	0.5208	0.4725	2.3502	0.1250
Estimated public-debt duration (2019)	6.6682	2.2114	12.4739	3.8427
Composite govt-spending variable	0.0238	0.0161	0.0657	-0.0061
Composite govt-spending variable adjusted	0.0322	0.0254	0.0870	-0.0108
Composite govt-revenue variable	0.0005	0.0077	0.0172	-0.0172
Dummy for border with Ukraine or Russia	0.1447	0.3579	1.0000	0.0000

**Notes on Table 4:** Statistics refer to the 21 economies considered in Table 5 (20 non-Euro-zone countries and the weighted average of the 17 countries in the Euro zone). The headline and core CPI inflation rates are in Table 1.  $\Delta(G/Y)$  is the sum of the ratio of primary general government expenditure to GDP for 2020 and 2021 expressed relative to the ratio for 2019 (Table 2, column 1).  $\Delta(\text{REV}/Y)$  is the sum of the ratio of general government revenue to GDP for 2020 and 2021 expressed relative to the ratio for 2019 (Table 2, column 2). The estimated duration of the gross public debt in 2019 is from Table 3, column 2. The adjusted gross public debt (adjusted for amounts denominated in foreign currency or in inflation-linked form) is from Table 2, column 4. The composite government-spending variable from Table 3, column 5, equals  $\Delta(G/Y)$  divided by the ratio of gross public debt to GDP in 2019 and by the estimated debt duration in 2019. The composite government-spending variable adjusted uses instead the ratio of adjusted gross public debt to GDP. The composite government-revenue variable equals  $\Delta(\text{REV}/Y)$  divided by the ratio of gross public debt to GDP in 2019 and by the estimated debt duration in 2019.

Table 5: Regressions for Inflation Rate: Euro zone treated as one economy

	Headline CPI		Core CPI	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b>Coefficients of composite government spending</b>				
2020	0.472** (0.189)	–	0.507*** (0.150)	–
2021	0.533*** (0.189)	–	0.804*** (0.150)	–
2022	1.156*** (0.191)	–	1.320*** (0.152)	–
2023	0.969*** (0.191)	–	0.737*** (0.152)	–
2020–2023	–	0.777*** (0.109)	–	0.838*** (0.088)
p-value equal coefficients	0.019	–	0.001	–
<b>Coefficients of border dummy</b>				
2022	0.028*** (0.009)	–	0.009 (0.007)	–
2023	0.047*** (0.009)	–	0.037*** (0.007)	–
2022–2023	–	0.040*** (0.006)	–	0.025*** (0.005)
p-value equal coefficients	0.096	–	0.003	–
<b>Statistics</b>				
R-squared	0.80	0.79	0.80	0.78
s.e. of regression	0.013	0.013	0.010	0.011
log(likelihood)	882.281	875.184	949.292	936.249
p-value 6 equal coefficients	0.015	–	0.000	–

**Notes on Table 5:** The sample is 2010–2023 for 21 economies (20 non-Euro zone and the Euro zone considered as an aggregate). For the Euro zone, each variable is a weighted average of the values for the 17 Euro-zone countries. The regressions are by panel OLS, with standard errors of estimated coefficients in parentheses. Each regression includes country and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the headline CPI inflation rate in columns 1 and 2 and the core CPI inflation rate in columns 3 and 4. The composite government-spending variable for 2020–2023 equals the cumulation of ratios of general government primary spending to GDP from 2020 to 2021 expressed relative to the ratio for 2019 (Table 2, column 1), divided by the ratio of gross public debt to GDP in 2019 (Table 2, column 3) and by the estimated duration of the debt in 2019 (Table 3, column 2). This variable equals zero for 2010–2019. The border dummy for 2022–2023 equals one for countries with a common border with Ukraine or Russia and equals zero otherwise. This variable equals zero for 2010–2021. Columns 1 and 3 allow for separate coefficients on the composite government-spending variable for each year 2020–2023 and for the border dummy for each year 2022–2023. Columns 2 and 4 estimate common coefficients for the two variables for 2020–2023 and 2022–2023, respectively.

\*\*\*significant at 1%.

\*\*significant at 5%.

\*significant at 10%.

Table 6: Regressions for Inflation Rate: Euro zone treated as one economy, selected variables set at sample means

	Headline CPI			Core CPI		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variable at sample mean:	Spending	Gross debt	Duration	Spending	Gross debt	Duration
Composite govt spending	0.415*** (0.146)	0.487*** (0.128)	0.722*** (0.125)	0.498*** (0.124)	0.537*** (0.108)	0.776*** (0.104)
Border dummy	0.0394*** (0.0071)	0.0435*** (0.0067)	0.0479*** (0.0065)	0.0235*** (0.0060)	0.0285*** (0.0057)	0.0333*** (0.0054)
Number of Observations	294	294	294	294	294	294
R-squared	0.761	0.766	0.781	0.724	0.732	0.759
s.e. of regression	0.0142	0.0140	0.0136	0.0120	0.0119	0.0113
log(likelihood)	853.151	856.684	866.552	901.164	905.687	921.138
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Relative likelihood (AIC)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

**Notes on Table 6:** See the notes to Table 5. The regressions for the headline CPI inflation rate correspond to Table 5, column 2. The ones for the core CPI inflation rate correspond to Table 5, column 4. Each column in Table 6 sets the indicated part of the composite government-spending variable for each country to its sample mean. These parts are excess government spending for 2020 and 2021, gross public debt as a ratio to GDP in 2019, and duration of the public debt in 2019. The p-values come from treating  $2 \cdot \log(\text{likelihood ratio})$  as distributed asymptotically as a chi-squared variable with one degree of freedom. For headline CPI inflation, the calculations use the difference between the  $\log(\text{likelihood})$  shown in Table 5, column 2, from those shown in Table 6, columns 1–3. For core CPI inflation, the difference is between the  $\log(\text{likelihood})$  shown in Table 5, column 4, from those shown in Table 6, columns 4–6. The relative likelihood, based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and using the same likelihood values, is the weight attached to the model in which the indicated variable is set at its sample mean and, therefore, does not contribute to the explanation of the cross-sectional variations in the inflation rates. One minus these relative likelihoods is the weight attached to the model shown in Table 5, column 2 or 4. See n.23 on the AIC.

\*\*\*significant at 1%.

\*\*significant at 5%.

\*significant at 10%.



Table 7: Regressions for Inflation in Linearized Form: Euro zone treated as one economy

	Headline CPI (1)	Core CPI (2)
$(G - \bar{G}) \cdot \bar{\Omega} / \bar{G}$	0.749*** (0.169)	0.825*** (0.141)
$(B - \bar{B}) \cdot \bar{\Omega} / \bar{B}$	-0.520*** (0.144)	-0.554*** (0.120)
$(D - \bar{D}) \cdot \bar{\Omega} / \bar{D}$	-0.721** (0.306)	-0.781*** (0.255)
Border with Ukraine/Russia	0.0412*** (0.0069)	0.0262*** (0.0058)
Number of Observations	294	294
R-squared	0.776	0.750
s.e. of regression	0.0138	0.0115
log(likelihood)	863.079	915.942
p-value	0.406	0.166

**Notes on Table 7:** The regressions are the linearized counterpart of the ones reported in Table 5. The framework is based on Eq. (14) in the text:

$$\pi \approx \pi^* + \left[ \beta_G \cdot \left( \frac{G - \bar{G}}{\bar{G}} \bar{\Omega} \right) + \beta_B \cdot \left( \frac{B - \bar{B}}{\bar{B}} \bar{\Omega} \right) + \beta_D \cdot \left( \frac{D - \bar{D}}{\bar{D}} \bar{\Omega} \right) \right] + \dots$$

The p-values apply to the hypothesis  $\beta_G = -\beta_B = -\beta_D$ .

\*\*\*significant at 1%.

\*\*significant at 5%.

\*significant at 10%.

Table 8: Regressions for Inflation Rate: Euro-zone countries considered individually

	Headline CPI	Core CPI
Composite government spending I	0.737*** (0.104)	0.810*** (0.080)
Composite government spending II	0.143** (0.065)	0.071 (0.050)
Border with Ukraine/Russia	0.0457*** (0.0041)	0.0283*** (0.0031)
Number of Observations	518	518
R-squared	0.823	0.805
s.e. of regression	0.0129	0.0099
log(likelihood)	1548	1684

**Notes on Table 8:** The regressions correspond to Table 5, except that the Euro-zone countries are considered individually. For the 20 non-Euro countries, the first government-spending variable equals the value entered in Table 5 and the second government-spending variable equals zero. For the 17 Euro zone countries, the first government-spending variable equals the weighted average of the values for these countries and the second variable equals the individual value less this weighted-average value.




Figure 1: Headline CPI Inflation Rate versus Composite Government-Spending Variable

**Notes on Figure 1:** The sample is 2010–2023 for 21 economies (20 non-Euro zone and the Euro zone considered as an aggregate). The vertical axis has the average headline CPI inflation rate from 2020 to 2023, net of the estimated effects from the border dummy and the fixed effects for country and year. The horizontal axis has the composite government-spending variable: the ratio of general government primary spending to GDP (cumulation for 2020 and 2021 relative to that for 2019) divided by the ratio of gross public debt to GDP in 2019 and by the estimated duration of the public debt in 2019. The slope of the orange line equals the arithmetic average of the estimated coefficients on composite government spending from 2020 to 2023 (from Table 5, column 1).




Figure 2: Core CPI Inflation Rate versus Composite Government-Spending Variable

**Notes on Figure 2:** See the notes to Figure 1. The difference is that the inflation rates are based on core CPI. The slope of the orange line equals the arithmetic average of the estimated coefficients on composite government spending from 2020 to 2023 (from Table 5, column 3).




Figure 3: Headline CPI Inflation Rate versus Excess Government-Spending Variable

**Notes on Figure 3:** The difference from Figure 1 is that the horizontal axis has the ratio of general government primary spending to GDP (cumulation for 2020–2021 relative to the ratio for 2019).




Figure 4: Core CPI Inflation Rate versus Excess Government-Spending Variable

**Notes on Figure 4:** The difference from Figure 2 is that the horizontal axis has the ratio of general government primary spending to GDP (cumulation for 2020–2021 relative to the ratio for 2019).




Figure 5: Debt-GDP Ratios

**Notes on Figure 5:** The upper curve is the ratio of gross public debt to GDP for the United States. The lower curve is the GDP-weighted average of gross public debt to GDP for the 21 economies considered in Table 5. Note that the data on public debt, from the International Monetary Fund, are mostly at estimated market value.

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## A Derivation of Equation (10)

Equation (9) contains the term  $((1 + \pi^*)/(1 + \pi))^T$ . This term can be written as

$$((1 + \pi^*)/(1 + \pi))^T = \exp \{T \cdot [\log(1 + \pi^*) - \log(1 + \pi)]\} \quad (15)$$

Taking a second-order expansion of the log terms leads to:

$$((1 + \pi^*)/(1 + \pi))^T \approx \exp \{T \cdot [(\pi^* - \pi) \cdot (1 - (\pi + \pi^*)/2)]\} \quad (16)$$

Taking a second-order expansion of the exponential leads, after simplification, to:

$$((1 + \pi^*)/(1 + \pi))^T \approx 1 + (\pi^* - \pi)(1 - (\pi + \pi^*)/2)T + \frac{1}{2}(\pi^* - \pi)^2(1 - (\pi + \pi^*)/2)^2T^2 \quad (17)$$

Plugging this result into Eq (9) leads, after simplification, to:

$$\Delta B \approx B_t^*(1 + \pi^*) \left\{ -\frac{1}{2}(\pi - \pi^*)T + \frac{1}{2}(\pi - \pi^*)(\pi + \pi^*) \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{4}(\pi + \pi^*) \right] \frac{T^2}{1 + T} \right\} \quad (18)$$

If  $T \gg 1$ ,  $\pi^* \ll 1$ , and  $\pi \ll 1$ , the result simplifies to that in Eq.(10):

$$\Delta B \approx -B_t^* \frac{T}{2} (\pi - \pi^*) \quad (19)$$

## B Formula for Estimated Duration of Bonds

At time  $t$ , the outstanding nominal coupons and principal payment on a bond are  $B_t^0, B_t^1, \dots, B_t^T$ .

Unlike in the main text, these amounts now apply to a single bond, not to the coupons and principal payments for the aggregates of bonds outstanding. Consider a “standard” bond that has constant nominal coupons followed by a single nominal principal payment at  $T$ , so that  $B_t^0 = B_t^1 = \dots = B_t^{T-1} = B_t^i$ . In that case, the standard data would report  $T$  to be the

remaining maturity of the bond.

If the nominal discount rate at time  $t$  is  $R_t$  (assumed to apply to all future periods), the value of the bond is

$$B_t = B_t^i \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{1 + R_t} + \cdots + \frac{1}{(1 + R_t)^{T-1}} \right] + \frac{B_t^T}{(1 + R_t)^T} \quad (20)$$

This result assumes that each coupon or principal payment occurs at the beginning of each period (where a period corresponds here to the time between payments of coupons or principal). Evaluating the sum leads to

$$B_t = \frac{B_t^i}{R_t} \left[ 1 + R_t - \left( \frac{1}{1 + R_t} \right)^{T-1} \right] + \frac{B_t^T}{(1 + R_t)^T} \quad (21)$$

The Macaulay (1938, Chapter II) duration of the bond is

$$D_t = \frac{B_t^i}{B_t} \left[ \frac{1}{1 + R_t} + \frac{2}{(1 + R_t)^2} + \cdots + \frac{T - 1}{(1 + R_t)^{T-1}} \right] + \frac{B_t^T}{B_t(1 + R_t)^T} \cdot T \quad (22)$$

Evaluating the sum inside the brackets (using Jolley, 1961, series 5) and simplifying leads to:

$$D_t = \frac{B_t^i}{B_t} \cdot \frac{1}{R_t^2} \left[ 1 + R_t - \frac{1 + R_t T}{(1 + R_t)^{T-1}} \right] + \frac{B_t^T}{B_t(1 + R_t)^T} \cdot T \quad (23)$$

The ratio  $\frac{B_t^i}{B_t^T}$  is the coupon yield of the bond. For a bond issued currently at par—which we take to be the typical case for bonds—this yield would equal  $R_t$ . However, the coupon yields of long-term bonds outstanding at the start of period  $t$  would reflect past issues. We assume that the coupon yield on each of these bonds equals the discount rate that applied when the bonds were issued. In that case,  $\frac{B_t^i}{B_t^T}$  would correspond to an average of past discount rates, which we denote by  $R_{t-L}$ . Making this substitution into Eqs. (23) and (21) leads to:

$$D_t = \frac{B_t^T}{B_t} \left\{ \frac{R_{t-L}}{R_t^2} \left[ 1 + R_t - \frac{1 + R_t T}{(1 + R_t)^{T-1}} \right] + \frac{T}{(1 + R_t)^T} \right\} \quad (24)$$

$$B_t = B_t^T \left\{ \frac{R_{t-L}}{R_t} \left[ 1 + R_t - \frac{1}{(1+R_t)^{T-1}} \right] + \frac{1}{(1+R_t)^T} \right\} \quad (25)$$

Substitution for  $B_t$  from Eq. (25) into Eq. (24) leads to the formula for duration:

$$D_t = \frac{\frac{R_{t-L}}{R_t^2} \left[ 1 + R_t - \frac{1+R_t T}{(1+R_t)^{T-1}} \right] + \frac{T}{(1+R_t)^T}}{\frac{R_{t-L}}{R_t} \left[ 1 + R_t - \frac{1}{(1+R_t)^{T-1}} \right] + \frac{1}{(1+R_t)^T}} \quad (26)$$

Note that  $D_t$  in Eq. (26) can be computed from the reported average remaining time to maturity, which corresponds to  $T$  in the formula, the current interest rate on long-term government bonds,  $R_t$ , and the lagged value of this interest rate,  $R_{t-L}$ . In the empirical analysis,  $R_t$  is the long-term interest rate on government bonds in 2019 and  $R_{t-L}$  is the average of long-term interest rates on government bonds covering the period up to 2018 and going back  $D_t$  years. (The estimation involves a recursion, but only two steps were required in practice.) The important properties of the formula are that  $D_t$  is less than the reported average maturity,  $T$ , increasing in  $T$ , and decreasing in  $R_{t-L}$ , which determines the coupon yield. The estimated value of  $D_t$  for each country in 2019 is in Table 3, column 2.

Table A1: Regressions for Inflation Rate:  
Euro zone treated as one economy, selected variables set at sample means

	Headline CPI			Core CPI		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Variable at sample mean	Govt spending	Gross debt	Duration	Govt spending	Gross debt debt	Duration
Comp. govt spending 2020	0.295 (0.247)	0.298 (0.226)	0.405* (0.218)	0.424** (0.209)	0.310 (0.190)	0.400** (0.177)
Comp. govt spending 2021	0.290 (0.247)	0.492** (0.226)	0.428* (0.218)	0.327 (0.209)	0.610*** (0.190)	0.777*** (0.177)
Comp. govt spending 2022	0.844*** (0.277)	0.534** (0.228)	1.156*** (0.219)	0.848*** (0.234)	0.736*** (0.191)	1.319*** (0.178)
Comp. govt spending 2023	0.303 (0.277)	0.627*** (0.228)	0.908*** (0.219)	0.466** (0.234)	0.494** (0.191)	0.612*** (0.178)
Border dummy 2022	0.0229*** (0.0103)	0.0343*** (0.0092)	0.0410*** (0.0087)	0.0054 (0.0087)	0.0158** (0.0077)	0.0240*** (0.0071)
Border dummy 2023	0.0499*** (0.0103)	0.0518*** (0.0092)	0.0579*** (0.0087)	0.0354*** (0.0087)	0.0404*** (0.0077)	0.0445*** (0.0071)
Number of Observations	294	294	294	294	294	294
R-squared	0.766	0.769	0.791	0.733	0.741	0.778
s.e. of regression	0.0141	0.0140	0.0134	0.0119	0.0118	0.0109
log(likelihood)	856.235	858.594	873.212	905.887	910.312	933.381
p-values	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Relative likelihood (AIC)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

**Notes on Table A1:** See the notes to Table 6. The difference is that the coefficients on the composite government-spending variable differ for each year 2020–2023 and those for the border dummy differ for each year 2022–2023.

\*\*\* significant at 1%.

\*\* significant at 5%.

\* significant at 10%.

Table A2: Regressions for Inflation Rate in Linearized Form  
Euro zone treated as one economy

	Headline CPI	Core CPI
$(G - \bar{G}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{G}, 2020$	0.371 (0.299)	0.402 (0.246)
$(B - \bar{B}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{B}, 2020$	-0.182 (0.255)	-0.187 (0.210)
$(D - \bar{D}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{D}, 2020$	-0.452 (0.518)	-0.615 (0.425)
$(G - \bar{G}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{G}, 2021$	0.681** (0.299)	0.922*** (0.246)
$(B - \bar{B}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{B}, 2021$	-0.421 (0.255)	-0.547*** (0.210)
$(D - \bar{D}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{D}, 2021$	-0.841 (0.518)	-0.655 (0.425)
$(G - \bar{G}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{G}, 2022$	1.028*** (0.299)	1.280*** (0.246)
$(B - \bar{B}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{B}, 2022$	-0.943*** (0.255)	-1.037*** (0.210)
$(D - \bar{D}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{D}, 2022$	-1.119* (0.584)	-1.179** (0.479)
$(G - \bar{G}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{G}, 2023$	0.915*** (0.299)	0.695*** (0.246)
$(B - \bar{B}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{B}, 2023$	-0.534** (0.255)	-0.449** (0.210)
$(D - \bar{D}) \cdot \bar{\Omega}/\bar{D}, 2023$	-0.514 (0.584)	-0.781 (0.479)
Border dummy, 2022	0.0281*** (0.0103)	0.0108 (0.0084)
Border dummy, 2023	0.0528*** (0.0103)	0.0375*** (0.0084)
Number of Observations	294	294
R-squared	0.785	0.768
s.e. of regression	0.0138	0.0113
log(likelihood)	868.688	927.666
p-value, G variable 2020	0.81	0.59
p-value, G variable 2021	0.65	0.28
p-value, G variable 2022	0.95	0.61
p-value, G variable 2023	0.37	0.60
p-value, G variable, 4 years	0.93	0.78

**Notes on Table A2:** See the notes to Table 7. The difference is that the coefficients for the three components of the composite government-spending variable differ for each year 2020–2023 (and different coefficients are allowed for the border dummy for 2022 and 2023). The regressions use the linearized formula based on Eq. (14) in the text:

$$\pi \approx \pi^* + \left[ \beta_G \cdot \left( \frac{G - \bar{G}}{\bar{G}} \bar{\Omega} \right) + \beta_B \cdot \left( \frac{B - \bar{B}}{\bar{B}} \bar{\Omega} \right) + \beta_D \cdot \left( \frac{D - \bar{D}}{\bar{D}} \bar{\Omega} \right) \right] + \dots$$

The p-values apply to the hypothesis  $\beta_G = -\beta_B = -\beta_D$ , either individually for each year 2020–2023 or jointly for the four years.

Table A3: Regressions for Inflation Rate:  
Euro-zone countries considered individually

	Headline CPI	Core CPI
Composite government spending I, 2020	0.483*** (0.177)	0.496*** (0.139)
Composite government spending I, 2021	0.526*** (0.177)	0.795*** (0.139)
Composite government spending I, 2022	0.981*** (0.178)	1.259*** (0.140)
Composite government spending I, 2023	0.988*** (0.178)	0.705*** (0.140)
Composite government spending II, 2020	-0.145 (0.106)	-0.062 (0.084)
Composite government spending II, 2021	0.144 (0.106)	0.088 (0.084)
Composite government spending II, 2022	0.712*** (0.116)	0.294*** (0.091)
Composite government spending II, 2023	-0.061 (0.116)	-0.001 (0.091)
Border dummy, 2022	0.0422*** (0.0056)	0.0195*** (0.0044)
Border dummy, 2023	0.0400*** (0.0056)	0.0328*** (0.0044)
Number of Observations	518	518
R-squared	0.841	0.816
s.e. of regression	0.0123	0.0097
log(likelihood)	1575	1699

**Notes on Table A3:** See the notes to Table 8. The difference is that the coefficients for the two composite government-spending variables differ for each year 2020–2023 (and different coefficients are allowed for the border dummy for 2022 and 2023).

\*\*\* significant at 1%.

\*\* significant at 5%.

\* significant at 10%.