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The Confederate Diaspora

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ABSTRACT

This paper shows how white migration out of the postbellum South diffused and entrenched Confederate culture across the United States at a critical juncture of westward expansion and postwar reconciliation. These migrants laid the groundwork for Confederate symbols and racial norms to become pervasive nationally in the early 20th century. Occupying positions of authority, former slaveholders played an outsized role in this process. Beyond memorializing the Confederacy, migrants exacerbated racial violence, boosted novel forms of exclusion, and compounded Black disadvantage outside the South. Moving West, former Confederates had larger effects in frontier communities lacking established culture and institutions. Over time, they continued to transmit norms to their children and non-Southern neighbors. The diaspora legacy persists over the long run, shaping racial inequities in labor, housing, and policing. Together, our findings offer a new perspective on migration, elite influence, and the interplay between culture and institutions in the nation-building process.

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1 Introduction

The history of the United States is marked by racial division and conflict. The Civil War (1861–65) brought about the end of slavery, while the civil rights movement of the 1960s dismantled most explicit forms of racial discrimination. Despite this overall trend of racially-progressive reform, stark disparities persist in critical areas such as education, housing, labor markets, and policing. Moreover, monuments and iconography venerating the pro-slavery Confederacy, which became widespread across the nation in the 20th century, still dot the American cultural landscape. These symbols of past injustice, coupled with persistent inequities, raise recurring questions about the legacy of slavery and the extent of racial animus entrenched within local institutions, civil society organizations, and norms.¹

The enduring influence of the Confederacy, despite its resounding military defeat, owes in part to the “Lost Cause of the Confederacy,” a revisionist narrative that emerged in the postbellum U.S. South (Domby, 2020). Seeking to redeem the image of the South, Lost Cause ideologues offered noble rationalizations for Southern secession and the war, downplaying slavery while emphasizing Northern aggression and the defense of states’ rights (Cox, 2003). White supremacist tropes were central to this retelling, touting the supposed contentment of enslaved people and Black inferiority as just cause for slavery (Blight, 2001; Cowa, 2013). Advocates, such as the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC), propagated this narrative across the country, through various forms of Confederate memorialization (Chamberlain and Yanus, 2021; Cox, 2021; Waite, 2020). At the same time, more overt and violent expressions of racial animus gained momentum as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and lynchings spread. Together, these actions coalesced into a budding “Confederate culture,” which characterized the postbellum South and, in the early 20th century, transformed America’s collective memory of the Confederacy.²

This paper investigates the role of Southern white migration after the Civil War in diffusing Confederate culture throughout the country at a critical juncture of nation building. Estimates based on linked Census records suggest that nearly one million whites—including more than 61,000 former enslavers and 127,000 of their household kin—left the former Confederacy for the rest of the U.S. in the three decades after the war. These migrants and their descendants retained strong attachments to Confederate culture; e.g., like their brethren in the South, they gave their newborn children the names of prominent Confederate leaders long after the war. We explore how this “Confederate diaspora” influenced the cultural landscape and, in the process, changed the trajectory of racial inequity across America.³

We begin by characterizing the formation of the Confederate diaspora, tracking migrants, including former slaveholders, and their occupational choices outside the South from 1870 to 1900. We show that these migrants often went west, settling in nascent communities throughout the frontier where institutions were relatively weak and cultural norms not yet deeply ingrained. At destination, Southern migrants sorted into positions of authority—judges, lawyers, public administration, police, and clergy—much more so than other residents, including migrants from elsewhere. Such choices went beyond a

¹Recent polling from [Morning Consult \(2021\)](#) found that 51% of respondents and 60% of whites favored keeping Confederate leader statues while 30% and 25% favored removing them, respectively. Similarly, 47% of respondents and 54% of whites viewed the Confederate battle flag as a symbol of Southern pride, versus 36% and 30% seeing it as a symbol of racism.

²Historian Karen L. Cox (2003, p. 1) defines “Confederate culture” as “those ideas and symbols that Lost Cause devotees associated with the former Confederacy.” Historian Kevin Waite (2020), meanwhile, uses “Confederate culture” to describe an affinity for Confederate memorialization in many places outside of the South during the 20th century.

³We describe early postbellum migrants as the “Confederate diaspora,” distinguishing it from the later “Southern diaspora,” comprised of those who left the South during the Great Migration of the 20th century. We use the latter term, inspired by [Gregory \(2005\)](#), in a complementary study detailed below ([Bazzi et al., forthcoming](#)).

broader sorting into high-status occupations and was especially strong for migrants from slaveholding households in the antebellum South, who often assumed leadership roles in newly incorporated areas.

Next, we show how the diaspora brought symbolic and material expressions of Confederate culture throughout the country by the early 20th century. We focus on four outcomes: (i) Confederate memorialization (e.g., monuments, place names), (ii) UDC chapters, (iii) KKK chapters, and (iv) lynchings of Black people. Together, these measures capture a process, described by historians of the postbellum U.S., in which Southern whites mobilized grievances and engaged in racial terror in order to recreate the social and economic hierarchies of the old South. We aim to identify a causal impact of the diaspora in catalyzing this process beyond the South. We develop a shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) framework to isolate exogenous county-level variation in exposure to postbellum Southern white migration through 1900. Our SSIV combines historical migrant networks outside the South as of 1870, at the dawn of the postbellum period (shares), with predicted migration flows out of the South from 1870 to 1900 (shifts). Conditional on the population share of Southern-born whites in 1870, our SSIV estimates identify the distinct influence of the Confederate diaspora forged between 1870 and 1900.

We find significant cultural impacts of the Confederate diaspora in destination counties. These migrants helped build the physical infrastructure (memorials) and organizational foundations (UDC) for keeping the memory of the Confederacy alive. By hastening the diffusion of the KKK and Black lynchings, they helped lay the groundwork for deep racial injustice in public life. Our findings are robust to (i) a large set of flexible controls capturing migrant sorting correlates, (ii) inference corrections for SSIVs and spatial regressions, (iii) omitting individual origin and destination states, (iv) excluding border states outside the Confederacy where enslavement was also legal before the war, and (v) restricting to newly incorporated counties with little to no population in 1860. The latter provides a strong check against biases due to endogenous sorting towards places with a longstanding, ideologically-aligned antebellum population. Together, these results, and other SSIV diagnostics, point to a causal interpretation.

Our IV estimates are consistent with sizable impacts of a relatively small Confederate diaspora. On average, migrants from the former Confederacy comprised 2.2% of the population in destination counties by 1900. Yet, their influence appears outsized. For example, moving from zero to the mean Confederate diaspora implies an 8 percentage point (p.p.) increase in the likelihood of KKK activity relative to a mean prevalence in 35% of counties outside the South. The effects on post-1900s lynching events were even larger, growing in likelihood by 4 p.p. relative to a mean of 5%. These large effect sizes suggest that the reach of these migrants may have extended well beyond the diaspora itself.

Beyond their immediate impacts on the diffusion of Confederate culture, the diaspora also contributed to novel forms of racial exclusion outside the South, namely, the “sundown town.” Distinct from de jure exclusionary institutions associated with the Confederacy and Jim Crow, sundown towns spread throughout the non-South from 1890–1960. Historical research by [Loewen \(2005\)](#) describes the process by which Blacks and other minorities were excluded from residing in these all-white towns after sunset. We link Southern white migrants to the prevalence of sundown towns and show, at the town level, that a 1 p.p. increase in the size of the Confederate diaspora in 1900 led to a 2.4 p.p. increase in the likelihood of Black depopulation, i.e., towns with ≥ 25 Black residents in 1870 having *zero* Blacks after 1900. This sort of racial cleansing changed the geography of Black settlement throughout the 20th century and, by limiting intergroup contact, may have made it easier for Confederate norms to persist.

These early impacts of the Confederate diaspora are not a mere artifact of history but rather continue

to cast a long shadow over the socioeconomic well-being of Black Americans. Using our county-level SSIV strategy, we find that a larger diaspora in 1900 is associated with larger racial wage gaps, greater residential segregation, and higher rates of Black incarceration and police-induced mortality through the 21st century. Such disparities are mirrored in more conservative racial attitudes among whites in these counties, which we identify using modern survey data. Together, our findings suggest that, despite racially progressive national policy reform since the 1960s, inequity persists locally through institutionalized mechanisms reinforced by a culture of racial animus.

We provide rich and varied evidence on the process by which the diaspora shaped these institutional and cultural foundations of racial inequity. First, we show that migrants more effectively diffused Confederate culture in communities with more malleable social and political infrastructure. In particular, the diaspora impacts were significantly larger in counties along the frontier (as measured in [Bazzi et al., 2020](#)), where state institutions were weak and where culture was incipient. At the same time, the diaspora transmitted Confederate culture more effectively in counties with fewer Union Army enlistees whose families after the war might oppose such resurgent ideology in public life.

Second, we find that former slaveholders, despite being a minority of Southern white migrants from 1870 to 1900, became pivotal to the diffusion and entrenchment of Confederate culture. We identify their sizable influence using an analogous SSIV for enslavers, which, conditional on the instrumented overall diaspora, relies on distinct identifying variation. These former elites from the South not only imported Confederate norms but plausibly helped to embed them in nascent institutions. From their outsized presence in local public administration and religious leadership, they amplified memorialization and facilitated racial terror. Such influence was not merely symbolic: the likelihood of incarceration in 1920 was twice as large for Black men who, in 1900, lived in counties with migrants from slaveholding backgrounds working in policing, judicial, or administrative occupations.

Third, we identify overrepresentation of first- *and* second-generation migrants in the KKK. Established in the South in 1915, the second KKK helped to rejuvenate and mainstream Confederate culture. Using newly digitized membership records, we show that, relative to men with no Southern heritage, those born in the South were 11% more likely to belong to the KKK in the Denver metropolitan area, a major hub of Klan activity outside the South in the 1920s. We find a similar differential for second-generation migrants born in the diaspora, and these patterns hold within Census enumeration blocks. This suggests that vertical cultural transmission within families may have been an important vehicle for sustaining diaspora influence long after the initial Confederate migrants had passed.

Fourth, we provide suggestive evidence of cultural spillovers as migrants interacted with their non-Southern neighbors. White men without Southern heritage living next door to either first- or second-generation Southern whites were significantly more likely to join the KKK in Denver. Together with the higher rates of KKK membership among Southern whites, these patterns are consistent with cultural transmission from Southern to non-Southern whites. We offer further evidence on the direction of transmission using another measure of Confederate culture—whether a child is given a name associated with prominent Confederate leaders—available for the entire non-South. After moving to counties with a larger Confederate diaspora, non-Southern white parents gave their later-born children names that are more evocative of Confederate heroes than those given to their children born prior to moving.

Finally, we highlight occupational choices as another potentially important channel for sustaining the early influence of the diaspora across successive generations. Much like their parents born in the South,

those in the second generation born outside the South are significantly more likely than those without Southern heritage to work in authority positions in the criminal justice system and religious leadership. Moreover, unlike the initial movers, these second-generation migrants are overrepresented in the education sector where they could have cultivated ideology during students' impressionable years. Overall, this intergenerational transmission of authority roles may have helped Confederate norms endure.

This paper offers new insights on the interplay between culture and institutions. A large and influential literature characterizes the origins and consequences of institutions (e.g., [Acemoglu et al., 2005](#); [North et al., 2009](#)) and culture (e.g., [Tabellini, 2010](#)). The links between these two key forces in comparative development, until recently under-explored, are the focus of an emerging body of research (see [Tabellini, 2008](#); [Alesina and Giuliano, 2015](#); [Bisin and Verdier, 2023](#)). Understanding how culture and institutions influence each other can be challenging empirically. Using granular data on migration, occupational choices, and local governance, we shed unique light on the historical process by which Confederate cultural entrepreneurs captured early institutions across America. These deep roots may explain some of the limited progress towards racial justice in the U.S.: laws to reduce racial discrimination may have limited impact where a culture of racial animus is ingrained in local institutions.

While we emphasize an institutional interpretation, our findings are also consistent with prestige-biased cultural transmission wherein the non-elite masses seek to emulate former slaveowners in positions of power, perhaps confounding the latter's white supremacist ideology with their socioeconomic success. [Henrich and Gil-White \(2001\)](#) formalize this type of evolutionary transmission process in which cultural change effectively follows salient leaders. Along these lines, [Dippel and Hebllich \(2021\)](#) show that a small but politically active German immigrant population formed a vanguard of anti-slavery mobilization in the mid-20th century: they swayed white Americans to join the Union army during the Civil War and changed the trajectory of local support for racial progressivism over the long run. The centrality of former slaveowners in the Confederate diaspora legacy points to analogous influence.⁴

Our paper illuminates a hidden element in the history of nation building in the early 20th century United States. This was a time of national reconciliation between former Confederate and Union territories as Southerners, Northerners, and Westerners began to forge new shared identities in the postbellum country. The bridging of the North–South divide during this period is well documented in the seminal history by [Blight \(2001\)](#). Our findings establish the critical and understudied role of the Confederate diaspora in this process. These migrants brought distinctive cultural norms and experience with slaveholding to new areas of the country. Their location and occupational choices sowed the seeds of Confederate affinity and racial chauvinism that later erupted across white America after the wildly popular 1915 film, *The Birth of a Nation* ([Ang, 2023](#); [Esposito et al., 2023](#)).

More specifically, we offer a new perspective on the deep roots of racial animus across the U.S.⁵ A burgeoning literature in economics explores the consequences of racial bias and discrimination across numerous domains, including labor markets (e.g., [Bayer and Charles, 2018](#)), media (e.g., [Moreno-Medina et al., 2022](#)), credit (e.g., [Bayer et al., 2018](#)), education (e.g., [Billings et al., 2014](#)), housing

⁴Our findings on the sociopolitical influence of slaveowners outside the South resonate with research on the recovery of slaveholder power within the postbellum South (see, among others, [Foner \(2002\)](#) on the undermining of racial progress during the Reconstruction era and [Ager et al. \(2021\)](#) on intergenerational mobility within former slaveholding families). Beyond our setting, these findings mirror elite influence observed among migrating Nazis after WWII ([Ochsner and Roesel, 2020](#)) and Luther-adjacent local leaders during the Protestant Reformation ([Becker et al., 2020](#)).

⁵Such work spans economics (e.g., [Aaronson et al., 2021](#); [Fryer Jr. and Levitt, 2012](#); [Shertzer and Walsh, 2019](#)), history (e.g., [Campney, 2019](#)), political science (e.g., [Acharya et al., 2016](#)), and sociology (e.g., [O'Connell, 2019](#)), among others.

(e.g. Logan and Parman, 2017), public accommodations (e.g., Cook et al., 2022), policing (e.g., Knox et al., 2020), and the criminal justice system (e.g., Arnold et al., 2022). Our research provides fresh evidence on the cultural foundations of institutionalized animus that underlie some of these proximate causes of racial inequity. Much progress has been made in uncovering such foundations within the South, including work connecting (post-)Confederate institutions to adverse outcomes for Black Americans.⁶ Our paper is among the first to show how these institutions echoed across the country through internal migration in the decades after the Civil War.

Together with Bazzi et al. (forthcoming), we break new ground in the study of Southern migration and its influence on cultural and political change. Bazzi et al. (forthcoming) show how mass Southern white migration in the 20th century changed the trajectory of partisan politics by creating new possibilities for a broad-based national coalition of religious, racial, and economic conservatives. By contrast, the present study provides a micro lens on the distinct influence of the smaller Confederate diaspora, and especially the slaveholder class, as it brought extreme ideologies to new parts of America at a critical juncture of westward expansion in the late 19th century. These early migrants mobilized postwar grievances, captured local institutions, and built some of the networks that would shape the legacy of the Great Migration of whites and Blacks in the decades to come. Our empirical evidence complements a rich historical literature on Southern emigration (Berry, 2000; Dippel, 2005; Dochuk, 2010; Gregory, 2005; Waite, 2021), while offering a new angle on the evolution of racial hierarchies. The enduring legacy of the early postbellum diaspora is a testament to the cultural influence of small numbers of immigrants in the early stages of development, a common theme across the American landscape with important political implications today (Bazzi et al., 2020; Grosjean, 2014; Zelinsky, 1973).

Before proceeding, we offer a note on interpretation. Our findings show that Confederate migrants influenced the cultural and institutional foundations of racial animus outside the South. We do not rule out the influence of non-Southern whites and, in fact, establish relevant evidence of such in the paper. Nor do our results imply that all migrants were equally attached to Confederate culture. Although the diaspora was *on average* characterized by cultural expressions and activities tied to the history of the South, its members varied in influence, with former slaveholders playing an especially important role.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the Confederate diaspora and describes some of our data contributions. Section 3 characterizes the location and occupation choices of migrants. Section 4 presents our main county-level estimates, showing how postbellum Southern white migration diffused Confederate culture and racial norms throughout America. Section 5 looks beyond initial migrants, to identify channels through which they catalyzed cultural and institutional change. Section 6 studies the long-run legacy of the diaspora on racial inequity. Section 7 concludes.

2 Historical Background and Data

This section details the history of Southern white outmigration from the antebellum era through the postbellum era up to 1900. We also trace the configuration of “Confederate culture,” from Lost Cause

⁶See, among others, O’Connell (2020) and Williams (2021) on memorialization and wage inequality, Henderson et al. (2021) on memorialization and lynching, Rahnama (2022) on de-memorialization and attitude change, Jones et al. (2017) and Williams (forthcoming) on lynching and voting, and Cook (2014) on lynching and patenting. There is also a much broader literature tackling the various legacies of slavery (see, e.g., Althoff and Reichardt, 2022; Bertocchi and Dimico, 2012, 2014; Buttrick and Mazon, 2022; Cook et al., 2018; Jung, 2019; McVeigh et al., 2014; Nunn, 2008; O’Connell, 2012; Reece and O’Connell, 2016; Suryanarayan and White, 2021).

narratives and public memorialization to expressions of white supremacy in the South and, later, across America. Besides providing background, we describe the rich primary and secondary data that we use to track the diaspora and to measure its cultural and institutional impacts outside the South.

2.1 The Confederate Diaspora

In the mid-19th century, the Gold Rush ushered in the first major waves of Southern white outmigration. Poor settlers pushed westward in pursuit of cheap land in places where slavery—and the labor competition it entailed—had not yet been established. At the same time, many wealthy slaveholders were keen to expand plantation agriculture and to bring slavery to fertile areas of the West (Waite, 2021). Despite their differences, early Southern white migrants were rather unified in their commitment to preserving racial hierarchies and white supremacy (Dippel, 2005).

One such early migrant was Cameron E. Thom, whose story, retold by Waite (2021), illustrates the journey of slaveholding elites in the Confederate diaspora, their sorting into authority positions, and their role in mobilizing influential organizations like the KKK and the UDC. A Virginia-born lawyer, Thom first went west in 1849 with several slaves in pursuit of gold. He settled in Sacramento, where he opened a law office, but left to serve as a Confederate captain in the Civil War. Returning to California after the war, he oversaw, as the district attorney of Los Angeles, a sham trial that freed white defendants in the Chinatown massacre of 1871. He later became mayor of Los Angeles in 1882 and went on to co-found the town of Glendale in 1889, which emerged as a regional and national hub for white supremacy. An early “sundown town,” Glendale hosted one of the first chapters of the UDC outside of the South—co-founded by Thom’s wife, Belle, in 1899—and later retained an active KKK presence.

After the Civil War, enslaved people were freed, and plantation agriculture collapsed throughout the South. Combined with wartime destruction, ensuing losses of labor, capital, and credit devastated the Southern economy, including its now-former slaveholder class (Aldrich, 1973; Baker and Hahn, 2016). The sudden emancipation and enfranchisement of Black people threatened to undermine the white monopoly on economic and political power in the region (Acharya et al., 2016). These changes, alongside frustration with Union Army occupation and the advent of Reconstruction, set the stage for new waves of Southern white migration. From 1870–1900, nearly 18% of Southern whites left the region for other non-Southern states and territories.⁷ Migrants hailed primarily from the upper South, including Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina, and, later, from parts of Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma.

These migrants often sorted into places where they might reproduce the socioeconomic hierarchies of the old South. For some, this meant seeking out all-white destinations, where Blacks could pose no economic or political threat (Dippel, 2005; Waite, 2021). Among the former slaveholding elite, the West offered a chance to replicate the “oligarchic principles of the Confederacy” and hierarchical structures of the antebellum South in new locations and industries (Cox Richardson, 2020, p. 85). Many struck off “in search of land on which to begin rebuilding family estates lost during the Civil War” (Dochuk, 2010, p. 7). Some Southern whites tended to migrate to places like the South politically and agroclimatically, as we show empirically in Section 3. At a broad level, this explains the strong pull West, which boasted large-scale farming opportunities and by the end of the 19th century had more in common ideologically with the South than the North (see Cox Richardson, 2020).

⁷As described in Appendix C, we estimate that 921,119 whites left Southern sending states between 1870 and 1900, relative to the 5,163,445 whites of Southern origin living in these states as of the complete-count 1870 U.S. Census.

Their lived experience under the Confederacy, its crushing defeat, and post-war occupation by the Union Army distinguished early postbellum migrants both from their antebellum forerunners and from those leaving the South during the later, Great Migrations of the 1900s. Their direct experience with slavery, antebellum nostalgia, and animosity towards federal intervention would play an important role in the Confederate diaspora as it put down roots across America at a critical juncture of nation building and post-war reconciliation. Southern slaveholding families may have held especially strong grievances, as they were more likely to join the Confederate Army (Hall et al., 2019) and experienced larger losses in wealth after the war (Ager et al., 2021).

Tracking Migrants. We track Southern white migrants using the complete-count U.S. Censuses of Population from 1870–1900. Our main county-level measure of the Confederate diaspora includes those born in former Confederate states plus Oklahoma who lived outside the South in 1900. We also make extensive use of linked records from the Census Linking Project (Abramitzky et al., 2020) to track individuals over time and to construct an instrumental variable for the local diaspora in 1900.

Within the overall diaspora, we track the subset of migrants hailing from former slaveholding households. In particular, we link white male slaveholders in the 1860 U.S. Census Slave Schedule to the 1860 U.S. Census of Population.⁸ We then onward link both listed slaveholders and their male co-resident kin in 1860 to future Censuses through 1900. This procedure delivers the first comprehensive measure of former slaveholder migration across postbellum America (see Section 3.1 for further details).

2.2 Confederate Culture

Since America’s early history, a cultural divide has separated North and South. The South had an agroclimatic comparative advantage in crops conducive to large-scale plantation labor, while the North did not. More so than other places, the Southern colonies came to be situated institutionally and economically around the plantation (Coclanis, 2000; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002). Historical settlement patterns also shaped the cultural divide. Grosjean (2014), for instance, shows how Scots-Irish migrants to the Deep South brought a “culture of honor” favoring a higher prevalence of violence. Moreover, whiteness as an identity may have solidified much earlier in the South, which, unlike the North, did not experience the mass arrival of ethnically diverse European immigrants in the 19th century (Roediger, 2006). Religion further deepened the divide, as a Protestant revival movement known as the Second Great Awakening catalyzed abolitionism across the North through the mid-1800s, and two major denominations, the Baptists and Methodists, split over the issue of slavery in the 1840s (McKivigan, 1999).

The fault lines grew deeper around the Civil War. In 1861, seven Southern states declared secession from the United States and formed the Confederate States of America, soon joined by four other states once the war began.⁹ In addition, most of the Indian Territory (later Oklahoma) was aligned with the Confederacy through formal treaties.¹⁰ Together, these states and territories organized an army and

⁸We match on first and last name as well as county, using the ABE algorithm (Abramitzky et al., 2019) with NYSIIS-standardized names. We match nearly 64% of name–county combinations to the 1860 Census, corresponding to over 250,000 former slaveholders in 1860. This compares favorably to linking rates in Ager et al. (2021) and Hall et al. (2019).

⁹The first seven included Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Southern Carolina followed by Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Kentucky and Missouri declared membership but were never under Confederate control, and West Virginia became a state in 1863 when it separated from Virginia and joined the Union states.

¹⁰Confederate-Native American alliances in the Indian Territory included “treaties of friendship and alliance” with the “Five Civilized Tribes” of the Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole, as well as with the Comanche, Osage, Quapaw,

government seeking to maintain legal slavery. Upon their military defeat, the white residents of the former Confederacy sought to rationalize their loss and to redeem the image of the South. They forged a novel set of symbols and cultural norms as well as new organizations in service of their advancement.

These symbols and norms clustered around the “Lost Cause of the Confederacy,” a mythology that emerged in the war’s immediate aftermath, drawing from a publication by the director of a prominent Virginia newspaper (Pollard, 1866). Lost Cause narratives glorified Confederate military figures and offered rationalizations for Southern secession and the war that painted the South in a positive light. A key revisionist maneuver was to call into question the very nature of the war, highlighting Northern aggression against “states rights” as the main motive, rather than slavery itself. Racist tropes of Black inferiority and white supremacy permeated these narratives, which portrayed slaveowners as generously paternalistic (Blight, 2001; Cowa, 2013; Cox, 2003).

Prominent advocates, such as the UDC, actively sought to disseminate Lost Cause ideology and to transmit it to the next generation. The UDC hastened the spread of Confederate memorialization across the South in the form of monuments, art, and place names commemorating military heroes and the battle flag. Cox (2003, p. 2) notes how the UDC ensured that monuments “were placed in public settings such as courthouse lawns or town squares, where . . . they could be observed by children,” and “successfully placed Confederate flags in nearly every white public school in the South”; these flags “accompanied portraits of Confederate heroes” and “were significant in transmitting Confederate ideals.”

While many memorials did not reference race, the signaling of white supremacist ideology was well understood by observers, and, moreover, these memorials tended to go hand-in-hand with violent expressions of racial animus, such as public lynchings (Williams, 2021). The Ku Klux Klan helped spread such violence, beginning as an insurgent, white supremacist movement immediately after the war. Suppressed by the federal government during Reconstruction, the group re-emerged in Georgia in 1915 (McVeigh, 2009). Together, these ideals and associated iconography coalesced into a novel Confederate cultural form, giving expression to a revitalized regional identity in the postbellum South.

By the early 20th century, Confederate memorialization and Lost Cause narratives had spread across America, perhaps helping to foster support for national reconciliation among non-Southerners (Cox, 2003; Gallagher et al., 2000; Cox Richardson, 2004). Such efforts, alongside battles against a common enemy (the late Indian Wars, the Spanish-American War, and WWI), may have hastened integration across the North–South divide. Later, popular films like *The Birth of a Nation* in 1915, *Gone With the Wind* in 1939, and *Song of the South* in 1946 helped to further solidify a Confederate cultural influence within the national consciousness (Gallagher, 2008).

Measurement. We build four measures of Confederate culture at the county level: memorialization, UDC chapters, lynching, and KKK chapters. Together, these measures trace a process in which women in the UDC organized symbolic expressions that bolstered Confederate ideology, while men in the KKK unleashed material expressions of racial terror. Public memorials and lynchings provided technologies to transmit Confederate memory and racial norms long after slavery and the Civil War had ended.

We draw on several primary and secondary sources to track these measures of Confederate culture across time and space. First, we build a new, omnibus measure of memorialization, which first includes

Seneca, and Shawnee (Bernholz et al., 2022). Separately, the territory of Confederate Arizona, which consisted of parts of modern-day Arizona and New Mexico, was aligned with but not controlled by the Confederacy.

monuments from the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC)’s “Whose Heritage?” database.¹¹ We also identify prominent Confederate leaders appearing on multiple monuments and look for those leaders’ names in (i) places listed in the U.S. Geographic Names Information System (GNIS), (ii) streets enumerated in the U.S. Census Bureau’s TIGER/Line Shapefiles, and (iii) schools listed in the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey Data. Second, we geolocate chapters of the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) from 1900–20 based on a novel digitization of the organization’s “Minutes of the Annual Meeting.” Third, we use data on local chapters of the Second KKK from 1915–40 from the Virginia Commonwealth Library’s Klan Map Project. Fourth, we track lynchings of Black people (and other minorities) from 1882–1941 using data from [Seguin and Rigby \(2019\)](#) and the Historic American Lynching (HAL) Project.

Migrants in the diaspora often retained Confederate culture. The UDC and the KKK originated in the South and spread outward. Membership in the former was restricted to those with Southern heritage, and hence provides clear evidence of cultural attachments in the diaspora. Memorials arguably do as well. At the individual level, such attachments are evident in KKK membership (see [Section 5.3](#)) and in children’s name choices. [Figure 2](#) plots the evolution of Confederate leaders’ names across birth cohorts for three white populations: (i) Southerners in former Confederate states and territories (the South), (ii) Southerners outside the South, and (iii) non-Southerners outside the South.¹² We take a conservative approach and consider a child’s first name as belonging to a Confederate leader when containing distinctive constituent parts. For example, some report a given name of “Robert Lee” while others report “Beauregard” or “Stonewall”, the surname and nickname of two prominent generals. Although rare, such names offer a unique signal of attachment to Confederate culture in the historical era.

[Figure 2](#) shows that, during the Civil War, Confederate leader names surged in popularity among Southern-heritage whites living within and outside the South. Within the diaspora, this surge was even more pronounced among children born to former slaveholders than to non-slaveholders (see [Appendix Figure C.1](#)), which further validates the strong signal of Confederate affinity in such name choices. In contrast, these names gained less traction among whites without Southern heritage (light red), consistent with more pervasive opposition to the Confederacy outside the South. Confederate leader names universally declined after the war, only to rise again in the early 20th century, this time among Southern and non-Southern whites alike. Strikingly, this resurgence among non-Southerners holds for those without second-generation heritage, i.e., those whose parents were not born in the South (see [Appendix Figure D.1](#)). This points to cultural spillovers beyond the diaspora, a possibility we explore later in the paper.

3 The South Goes West: Migration and Occupational Choices

In this section, we use complete-count Census records and linked samples to characterize migrants’ selection, sorting, and occupational choices in the late 19th century. These results serve two purposes. First, they corroborate the historical background in [Section 2](#). Second, they inform our causal identification strategy developed in [Section 4](#).

¹¹The majority of these monuments, especially outside the South, were built in the early 1900s.

¹²We define prominent Confederate leaders as those linked to multiple monuments by the Southern Poverty Law Center.

3.1 Outmigration

Using the intercensal linked records, we track migrants from each Southern origin county o to any incorporated county in the conterminous non-Southern states. For each origin county o , we total the number of white out-migrants in a given Census period through $\tau \in \{1880, 1900\}$ (1890 records were lost in a fire).¹³ We then estimate the following equation to characterize county-level push factors:

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{o\tau} = \alpha + \mathbf{push}'_{o,\tau-1}\boldsymbol{\beta}_\tau + \phi_\tau \text{population}_{o,\tau-1} + \varepsilon_{o\tau}, \quad (1)$$

where $\mathbf{push}_{o,\tau-1}$ is a vector of predetermined economic factors, related to industrial and agricultural activity, and ideological factors, related to slavery and the Civil War. The former include measures of manufacturing wages and output from the Census as well as cotton, tobacco, and overall agricultural potential from the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database. The latter include the enslaved population share, slaveholding population share, Confederate Army enlistment rate, Civil War battle locations from [Arnold \(2015\)](#), and the vote share for John C. Breckinridge, the pro-slavery Southern Democratic candidate for president in 1860 (see Appendix Table [A.2](#) for summary statistics).¹⁴ Note that the τ index on the parameters allows the push factors to differ across periods.

Appendix Table [A.1](#) highlights several economic and ideological forces driving postbellum migration. Counties with stronger support for slavery before the war—proxied by the Breckinridge vote share in 1860—exhibit less outmigration afterwards. Urban manufacturing centers also saw greater outmigration, consistent with positive individual-level selection (as shown, for instance, in Appendix Table [C.3](#)). Yet, outmigration was often triggered by economic devastation following the war, compounded by its destructive battles and the collapse of Southern agriculture. Many migrants came from agriculturally-rich areas of the Carolinas and Virginia, which were highly populated and had been major origins of poorer white migrants even prior to the war ([Dippel, 2005](#)). After emancipation, labor-intensive plantations saw their workforces freed ([Prince, 2000](#)), but many formerly enslaved people stayed on at relatively low wages, which allowed many white-owned farms to remain viable. This may explain why counties with more slaveholder families and larger Black populations saw less white outmigration. Hardship nonetheless pushed out those whites with less viable economic options but who could afford to leave.

Outmigration among Former Slaveholders. We also estimate an analogous equation for former slaveholding migrants.¹⁵ Appendix Table [B.1](#) suggests there were distinctive push factors among those

¹³Concretely, we use the linked Census records together with the complete-count Census to estimate:

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{o,\tau} = \sum_{d=1}^D \left(\frac{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to } d \text{ in } \tau}{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to Census } \tau} \right) \times \text{Southern whites}_{o,\tau-1},$$

where o indicates Southern origin counties, d indicates non-Southern destination counties, and $\text{Southern whites}_{o,\tau-1}$, is based on the complete-count Census in the previous period. This allows us to approximate, for each Census period, total Southern white outmigration from o to all non-Southern counties, which we then put on the left-hand-side of equation (1). See Appendix Figure [B.1](#) for validating evidence that the approximation works well.

¹⁴We link Confederate Army rosters from the National Archive (via [Hall et al., 2019](#)) to the 1860 U.S. Census.

¹⁵We use the linked Census records together with the 1860 Slave Schedule and the complete-count Census to estimate the number of former slaveholder migrants from origin county o and Census period τ :

$$\sum_{d=1}^D \left(\frac{\# \text{ slaveholders in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to } d \text{ in } \tau}{\# \text{ slaveholders in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to } \tau} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{\# \text{ slaveholders in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to 1860 Census}}{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to 1860 Census}} \right) \cdot \text{Southern whites}_{o,\tau-1},$$

where d indicates non-Southern destination counties, and $\text{Southern whites}_{o,\tau-1}$ is based on the complete-count Census.

with ties to slavery. While several factors were common predictors of outmigration across all Southern white migrants (e.g., fewer Blacks, fewer Confederate Army households during the war, and tobacco abundance as characteristic of the Atlantic Southeast), others were distinct. Most notably, cotton abundance becomes negatively associated with former slaveholder outmigration once the cotton sector rebounds after the 1870s. Given its intensive use of slaves, cotton production severely contracted after emancipation, only to fully recover and then expand by the 1880s (Ager et al., 2021; Aldrich, 1973).

3.2 Sorting: Locations and Occupations

Migrant sorting reflects a combination of economic and ideological pull factors. Here, we characterize migrants’ destinations and their occupational choices once settled.

Destination Characteristics. We measure migration flows from all origin counties to all destination counties for each Census period τ . We compare sorting behavior between Southern-origin and non-Southern-origin migrants, limiting destination counties to those outside the South and restricting the sample to individuals that moved across states. For each county pair, we use linked Census records to define an indicator for whether there were any white migrants from origin county o in $\tau - 1$ and in destination county d in τ . We then estimate the following to describe the extensive margin of migration:

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{migrants}_{ord\tau} > 0) = \mathbf{pull}'_{od,\tau-1}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_{o\tau} + \kappa_{r\tau} + \varepsilon_{ord\tau}, \quad (2)$$

where $\mathbf{pull}'_{od,\tau-1}$ is a vector of predetermined destination pull factors. In addition to the economic and ideological measures from equation (1), this vector also includes geographic distance from the origin county, the preexisting share of migrants from origin county o ’s state in the South, and Union Army enlistment and mortality rates in the Civil War from Dupraz and Ferrara (2021) (see Appendix Table D.1 for summary statistics). We include fixed effects for Census period separately interacted with origin county o and destination Census Division r , $\alpha_{o\tau}$ and $\kappa_{r\tau}$, respectively. Standard errors are two-way clustered by origin and destination county.

The estimates in Appendix Table A.3 again highlight the importance of economic and ideological pull factors. Certain drivers of migrant sorting were common, regardless of migrant origin. For instance, destination counties tended to be more urban, less agricultural, and relatively closer to the home county. Movers also exhibit chain migration, going to counties with relatively more previous migrants from their home states. In other ways, Southern and non-Southern migrants chose distinct locations. Southerners tended to settle places relatively early in the process of community formation. Disproportionately western, Southern white destinations tended to be more geographically distant from their origins, and density was less of a pull factor than for non-Southerners. The nascent but familiar extractive industry of the West proved attractive to many whites seeking new opportunities outside the South. Southern whites were also more likely to choose destinations sympathetic to the culture and institutions of the South (see, also, Eli et al., 2018, on postbellum ideological sorting among veterans from Kentucky). While Southern migrants gravitated towards counties with greater support for Breckinridge in 1860, non-Southern migrants generally avoided counties with legal slavery before the war.¹⁶

¹⁶Even prior to the Civil War, “Western free states attracted non-slaveholders and pioneer families who preferred to live where slavery was not present . . . with nearly as many natives of New York living [by 1860] in Iowa as persons born in all of the slave states east of the Mississippi combined” (Dippel, 2005, p. 220).

Occupational Sorting into Positions of Authority. Migrants in the Confederate diaspora not only chose distinctive destinations but also entered distinctive occupations once settled. We use the complete-count U.S. Census of Population to construct a dataset comprising all working-age white males living outside the South in 1900. At the time, many destination counties were still in the early stages of development, which may have created unique opportunities for entering occupations and institutions with public-facing authority, including lawyers and judges, law enforcement, public administrators, religious workers, and educators. Although few in number, these positions hold significant sway over public life. We show here that Southern white migrants strongly sorted into such occupations.

Table 1 tests for differential sorting by comparing occupational choices across white male workers within the same non-Southern county. Panel (a) compares Southern migrants to all working-age, non-Southern-born men including non-migrant natives, and panel (b) restricts the comparison group to other out-of-state migrants from non-Southern origins. The latter helps disentangle a general occupational sorting tendency among migrants from one specific to Southern migrants. Panels (c) and (d) then restrict the analysis to counties in the West and non-West Census regions, respectively, with the goal of distinguishing sorting in places with more versus less well-established institutions (see Section 5.1).

Several results in Table 1 point to an outsized presence of the Confederate diaspora in local authority positions. On average, across panels (a)–(d), Southern white migrants are 35–48% more likely to work in such positions (column 1). Moreover, such sorting holds conditional on the income category of the individual’s chosen occupation (column 2). Among occupations with a similar occupational income score (*occscore*, a proxy for historical income), Southern white migrants are overrepresented in ones with public authority; for example, they are more likely to be religious officials than weavers or machinists. This suggests that sorting into positions of authority is unlikely to be driven solely by earnings potential or broader elite status (for additional evidence, see Appendix Figure C.2 and discussion thereof).

Looking at specific occupations, we see first that migrants sort into the legal profession (column 3): they are 68% more likely to work as *lawyer or judge* than non-Southern-born (panel a) and 118% more likely than other migrants from non-Southern origins (panel b). This pattern holds across Western and non-Western counties. Second, Southern whites are 28% more likely to work in *law enforcement* compared to other migrants (column 4, panel b) and nearly 62% more likely than all other men in Western counties (panel c). Third, Southern white migrants exhibit strong sorting into *religious* occupations, with implied differentials ranging from 52–123% across panels (column 6). Like those in the justice system, jobs in the religious sector—and especially the clergy—often entail considerable scope for shaping public attitudes and social norms. We see more limited evidence of sorting into *public administration* (column 5) or *education* (column 7) especially in non-Western counties, perhaps due to barriers faced by Southerners residing in former Union territory. These patterns hold not only for first-generation Southern white migrants but also for their children born outside of the South (see Section 5.4).

Together, the results suggest that Southern white migrants may have had a comparative advantage in or taste for authority positions. Lawyers, judges, law enforcement, and religious officials can exert considerable influence in a community, particularly at early stages of development when culture and institutions are most malleable. This may have been attractive to some whites leaving the South, drawn to opportunities for rebuilding the type of society lost during the war and threatened by Reconstruction era reforms thereafter. This may have been especially true for slaveholding elites, who had particularly strong affinity for the Confederacy (recall Appendix Figure C.1).

Sorting Among Former Slaveholder Migrants. For slaveholders, ideology and economics were deeply entwined; they had benefitted the most from slavery and thus lost the most from emancipation. The West presented opportunities for former slaveholders to preserve the antebellum hierarchies of the South in a new region rife with extractive potential. Many of these migrants likely fit the stereotype of the aggrieved Southern white “who hated that racial equality could be enforced by the government [and] saw the West as the only free place left in America” (Cox Richardson, 2020, p. 9).

We show here that indeed, relative to the broader Confederate diaspora, former slaveholders chose a distinctive set of destinations and occupations consistent with their quest to gain hold of these malleable spaces. Our analysis relies on the linked sample described in Section 2.1, and we restrict attention to men living in the South in 1860 and outside the South in the decades thereafter. Former slaveholders comprise just over 6% of this linked sample of Confederate migrants. We compare slaveholders’ choices to those of non-slaveholders from the same origin county in the South.

We find that slaveholders gravitated towards Western counties that looked more economically and politically similar to the South. The coefficients in Appendix Table C.1 identify the differential likelihood of choosing a particular type of destination county across slaveholder and non-slaveholder migrants leaving the same origin county in the same Census period. The counties chosen by former slaveholders were 20% more likely to be in the West (column 1), had 11% lower population density (column 2), were 16% more likely to be cotton-suitable (column 3), had 7% higher Breckinridge vote shares in 1860 (column 4), had 6% fewer Union Army soldiers per capita during the war (column 5), and nearly 42% more slaves on average just prior to the war (column 6). These patterns hold, in panel (a), for the original slaveholder (typically the household head) and, in panel (b), for a broader group that includes other white men living as of 1860 in slaveholding households (typically the children of slaveholders).

Former enslavers also differentially sorted into positions of authority outside the South. Appendix Table C.2 shows that, compared to the average Southern white migrant from the same origin county, former slaveholders were about 50% more likely to work in any occupation of public-facing authority (column 1). As with the general diaspora, such sorting does not appear to be solely driven by earnings opportunities in these positions of power (column 2; also see Appendix Figure C.2). Some of these former slaveholders may simply be continuing the same line of work they had in the South prior to the war: Appendix Table C.3 shows that among former slaveholders, those who left the South were more likely to have worked in positions of authority prior to the war.

Breaking out specific occupations, former slaveholder migrants were more than twice as likely to work as lawyers or judges (column 3) and nearly three times as likely to work in public administration (column 5) as the average non-slaveholding Southern white migrant. They were no more likely to work in the law enforcement, religious, or education sectors (columns 4, 6, and 7, respectively). All patterns are similar for slaveholders alone (panel a) and inclusive of their male kin (panel b).

In sum, we find overrepresentation of former slaveholders in underdeveloped counties and in positions of authority outside the South. Many of these erstwhile Southern elites may have played a leadership role in the Confederate diaspora. When one accounts for the small size of these governance sectors, combined with the strong occupational sorting by former slaveholders therein, it becomes clear that slaveholder migrants could play in a large role in local institutions in many places outside the South (see Appendix Figure C.3 for maps with back-of-the-envelope estimates of occupational shares by county). In the following section, we explore the early impacts of the entire Confederate diaspora and then, in

Section 5, explore the distinct impacts of former slaveholders. The sorting patterns described above will later help clarify how a small number of postbellum migrants from the South could shape the geography of cultural change across America by the early 20th century.

4 Diffusion of Confederate Memory and Racial Norms

This section explores how white migrants from the U.S. South after the Civil War helped spread Confederate memory and norms across the westward-expanding country. Our results suggest that this diaspora laid the groundwork for a resurgent Confederate culture to gain traction across America in the early 20th century. We show that besides their role in the national expansion of Southern-born organizations like the UDC and the KKK (and associated expressions of racial animus), these migrants also helped boost a novel form of racial exclusion that was not as prevalent in the South—the sundown town.

4.1 Identification Strategy

We identify county-level effects of the Confederate diaspora using a shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) framework developed in this section. Our primary second-stage estimating equation is:

$$y_c = \alpha_s + \beta \cdot \% \text{ Southern Whites}_{c,1900} + \mathbf{X}'_c \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_c, \quad (3)$$

where the outcomes y_c span four measures of Confederate culture in non-Southern county c in the early 1900s: any Confederate memorials, UDC chapters, 2nd KKK chapters, and lynchings of Blacks. We also consider a composite Confederate Culture Index (CCI), which sums these indicators. Figure 3 shows CCI scores (from 0 to 4) by county, and Appendix Figure D.2 shows maps for each outcome along with available time variation for the KKK and lynchings, which we use in secondary analyses.

Our primary regressor, $\% \text{ Southern Whites}_{c,1900}$, measures the Southern-born white population share in county c in 1900 observed in the complete-count Census. This variable captures the postbellum Confederate diaspora, while predating the larger white outflows during the Great Migration after 1900.¹⁷ In some specifications, we also include a distinct measure for the population share of Southern-born former slaveholders in county c in 1900 based on various linked Censuses from 1860–1900. We cluster standard errors across counties within 60×60 mile grid cells along the lines of Bester et al. (2011) and show robustness to other forms of spatial autocorrelation (Adao et al., 2019; Conley, 1999).

There are two interrelated threats to causal identification of β in equation (3). First, place-specific factors, such as factor endowments conducive to plantation labor, may confound interpretation. Second, endogenous location choices based on previous settlement patterns may bias OLS estimates. Depending on the relative importance of ideological and economic sorting—both of which were salient, as we showed in Section 3—the bias could go in either direction. Economic sorting would imply downward bias of OLS estimates, insofar as economically-vibrant locales would have attracted a broad array of migrants beyond Southerners with an affinity for Confederate culture. Ideological sorting, on the other hand, would have favored culturally-proximate destinations, implying an upward bias.

¹⁷This time horizon focuses our analysis on the group of interest: those who experienced slavery, the Confederacy, and its loss and then moved in the years after the war. In our baseline, we consider migrants from the former Confederate states and territories to the conterminous non-Southern U.S.; we then vary the set of origin and destination states for robustness.

We address these concerns in three ways. First, equation (3) includes state fixed effects, α_s , and many controls, \mathbf{X}_c , to absorb confounders. Our baseline includes log population in 1870, as well as log county area in contemporary boundaries. We also include additional sorting correlates, motivated by the relevant pull and push factors discussed above: cotton, tobacco, and overall agricultural potential, Black population shares in 1870, enslaved population shares in 1860, Breckinridge vote share in 1860, Union Army enlistment and mortality rates in the Civil War, and indicators for frontier status in 1860 and from 1860–89. Continuous controls are entered flexibly, using quadratic terms. Further robustness checks adopt a Belloni et al. (2014) double LASSO procedure to select optimal controls among this set.

Second, we adopt a shift-share IV strategy that combines two sources of variation: shares and shifts. The shares are based on the cross-sectional distribution of white migrants from Southern origin state j living in non-Southern county c in 1870, which we denote $\pi_{jc,1870}$. The shifts are based on the change in the number of whites from Southern state j living outside the South between 1870 and 1900, which we denote $\Delta M_{j,1870-1900}$. Following Bazzi et al. (forthcoming) and building on Boustan (2010) and Derenoncourt (2022), we use predicted shifts, $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1870-1900}$, based on origin-county push factors over the 1870–1900 period. Together, these predict the stock of Southern white migrants in 1900 as:

$$Z_{c,1900} = \sum_{j=1}^J \pi_{jc,1870} \widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1870-1900}. \quad (4)$$

Scaling $Z_{c,1900}$ by the 1870 county population yields our SSIV for % *Southern Whites* $_{c,1900}$ in equation (3). This IV isolates the contribution of the Confederate diaspora that is due to changes in Southern white inflows during the postbellum period from 1870 to 1900. The SSIV is relevant to the extent that postbellum whites tended to follow the migratory pathways introduced by their antebellum predecessors, as discussed in the previous section. The share component, $\pi_{jc,1870}$, reflects these historical networks at the dawn of the postbellum period for all counties c incorporated in the U.S. by 1870.

Because the shares alone may be endogenous, our SSIV combines them with predicted shifts, based on origin-county push factors. This “push factor” version of the standard SSIV can satisfy the exclusion restriction even when the share component is endogenous, to the extent that the shift is based on exogenous shocks (see Borusyak et al., 2022). We construct our predicted shift, $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1870-1900}$, by summing predicted Southern white outmigration, $\overline{\text{Southern white migrants}}_{o\tau}$, for each origin county o for Census periods 1870–1880 and 1880–1900 based on equation (1). Specifically, we use a flexible LASSO algorithm, which shrinks the set of origin-county predictors as well as their square and cross-term interactions into an optimal subset, to predict Southern outflows for each origin-county-period. These are then aggregated to the sending state j level to produce $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1870-1900}$ in equation (4):

$$\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1870-1900} = \sum_{o \in j} \sum_{\tau=1880}^{1900} \overline{\text{Southern white migrants}}_{o\tau}, \quad (5)$$

Later, we use a variant of equation (1) to predict a distinct set of shifts for Southern former slaveholders.

Third, we deploy several additional checks that address residual concerns. We include in \mathbf{X}_c the Southern white population share in 1870 to rule out a confounding influence of antebellum migrants. Controlling for % *Southern Whites* $_{c,1870}$ in equation (3) renders the IV specification equivalent to one with the *change* in Southern white shares between 1870 and 1900 as the regressor of interest, thus

absorbing time-invariant heterogeneity. Later, alongside this control, we also implement the [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#) random-shifts placebo exercise to clarify the identifying variation in the SSIV. Finally, we re-estimate equation (3) on a restricted sample of counties with < 2 people per square mile in the 1860 Census. Such places had more limited scope for antebellum populations to influence culture and institutions independent of the postbellum Confederate diaspora. Together, these checks help ensure that early migrant shares are not confounding our causal interpretation.

4.2 Confederate Diaspora Impacts in the Early 20th Century

We now report our main county-level findings on the cultural influence of the Confederate diaspora. We begin by identifying the impacts of these early postbellum migrants on the reinvigoration of Confederate narratives in public life and then turn to more overt forms of racial animus and white supremacy.

Confederate Memorialization and Lost Cause Advocacy. After the Civil War, memorialization efforts spread throughout the former Confederacy and, before long, into the former border states and large swathes of the “Old West,” too. [Table 2](#) shows that white migrants from the postbellum South hastened the diffusion of Confederate nostalgia throughout the country. We examine two indicators for any (i) Confederate memorials (i.e., monuments, location names), and (ii) UDC chapters after 1900.¹⁸ For memorials, OLS estimates, with state FE and flexible controls for county population and area, suggest that a 1 p.p. increase in the share of Southern whites in 1900 (relative to a mean of 2.2%) is associated with a 0.8 p.p. increase in the likelihood of Confederate memorialization (relative to a mean of 25% outside the South). The corresponding IV estimate is over twice as large (column 2), and when controlling for the 1870 share of Southern whites, this coefficient increases further to 3.4 p.p. (column 3). In other words, after accounting for the influence of pre-1870 migrants, the implied imprint of the postbellum diaspora, namely those arriving between 1870–1900, grows.¹⁹ Estimates for UDC chapters, in columns 4–6, are similar but imply larger effect sizes given the relatively limited presence of the organization outside the South (only 10% of counties). The estimates in [Table 2](#) corroborate the insights of historians who note an “outsized cultural influence” of migrants from the South, particularly in the West, because of organizations like the UDC ([Waite, 2020](#), p. 34). All estimates are significant at conventional levels, with evidence of a strong first stage and robustness to potential instrument weakness.

Expressions of White Supremacy. The late 19th and early 20th centuries also saw the spread of more overt expressions of racial animus that had historically been associated with the South. Most prominently, the KKK reemerged in 1915, following *The Birth of a Nation*’s commercial success in propagating Lost Cause narratives and a rosy image of the original KKK. Although the 2nd KKK had been founded in Georgia, the organization quickly spread throughout the West and Midwest during the 1920s ([McVeigh, 2009](#)). Lynchings of Black people also spread after the war ([Blocker et al., 2013](#)).

¹⁸We identify likely Confederate location names (i.e., place, street, school) using the more restrictive set of “distinguishing names” as in panel (b) of [Figure 2](#), so as to minimize the potential for false positives in our county-level analysis. In [Appendix Table B.2](#), we go even further by restricting to those names with at least two (columns 1–3) and at least three (columns 4–6) words. These reduce outcome variation but produce similar estimates. In [Appendix Table B.3](#), we show that the IV estimates hold across distinct memorial types in (i) monuments, (ii) place names, and (iii) street names.

¹⁹This is consistent with the logic of [Jaeger et al. \(2018\)](#). To the extent that later migrant flows tend to be correlated with earlier ones, controlling for the latter will change both the estimates and the interpretation of coefficients.

Such killings often took on a symbolic role: to the extent that they were perpetrated publicly, lynchings signaled local commitment to white supremacy (Henderson et al., 2021).

Table 3 shows that the postbellum Confederate diaspora played an important role in helping to spread such expressions of racial animus beyond the South. We examine two binary outcomes for any (i) KKK chapters, and (ii) lynchings of Black people after 1900. For KKK chapters, which could be found in 37% of non-Southern counties from 1915–40, OLS estimates suggest that a 1 p.p. increase in the share of Southern whites in 1900 is associated with a 0.8 p.p. increase in the likelihood of a KKK chapter (column 1). The corresponding IV estimate is roughly twice as large (column 2), and controlling for the 1870 share of Southern whites increases the estimate to 3.5 p.p. (column 3). Coefficients for lynchings are similar yet even more striking, given the rarity of lynchings outside the South after 1900 (5% of counties). As before, IV estimates (1.5 p.p., column 5) are larger than OLS (0.8 p.p., column 4), and controlling for earlier migration in the 1870 shares increases the estimated impacts of the postbellum Confederate diaspora (column 6). This may be due, in part, to the greater cultural attachments, or deeper racial grievances, of those who directly experienced Confederate secession and defeat. Moreover, these results are unique to Black lynchings as we find no diaspora effect on white lynchings (see Appendix Table B.4). This helps distinguish racially-motivated attacks from a generalized culture of violence associated with the South (Grosjean, 2014; Tan, 2023).

Together, the findings in Tables 2 and 3 shed new light on the co-location of Confederate memorialization and more overt and violent forms of racial animus. Our findings complement Ang (2023), who links exposure to *The Birth of a Nation* showings during its early roadshow to increased lynchings and KKK activity. Our findings together suggest a close relationship between Confederate iconography in its advent and the entrenchment of white supremacy in communities across America.

Interpreting Magnitudes. The estimates in Tables 2 and 3 suggest a large diaspora impact consistent with direct influence over important public-facing institutions as well as cultural transmission to non-Southern populations. We explore these channels of influence in Section 5, and below we provide further robustness checks towards a causal interpretation.

Before proceeding, however, it is worth dwelling briefly on why the IV is consistently larger than the OLS, even though they are not always significantly different. Although noise in historical data attenuates OLS estimates, it is unlikely to fully explain the differences. Two other factors seem plausible. First, economic sorting may have been relevant. To the extent that Southern whites chose more productive locales, which were also likely to have attracted a culturally-diverse array of migrants *besides* Southern whites, the impact of Southern white migrants would be diluted and OLS estimates biased downward. Indeed, Section 3 points to significant economic sorting, but also to ideological sorting, which would imply upward bias. Our SSIV addresses both types of endogeneity.

Moreover, our SSIV identifies a particular local average treatment effect (LATE): counties with the strongest chain migration from the South, and hence those underpinning the SSIV, are perhaps most likely to have migrants attached to Confederate culture. Such a pattern is consistent with other recent SSIV applications (Calderon et al., 2019; Derenoncourt, 2022). Following Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020), a LATE interpretation for SSIVs rests on positive “Rotemberg weights,” which capture the relative contribution of different origin states to the second-stage identifying variation. In our case, the vast majority (97%) are positive. To further ensure that no state is driving our effects nor undermining a

LATE-based interpretation, Appendix Figure B.3 drops sending and receiving states one-by-one, using the composite Confederate cultural index (CCI) as the outcome. While effect sizes vary in sensible ways (e.g., California is an important destination), all remain significant at conventional levels.

Additional Checks. This section bolsters the case for causal identification. We summarize several key checks and report most in Table 4, for the four core outcomes and the composite CCI.

Alternative Standard Errors. First, we show that inference is robust to alternative forms of spatial correlation, across nearby counties (Conley, 1999) or counties with similar initial shares in the SSIV (Adao et al., 2019). These deliver similar takeaways as our baseline (see row 1 of Table 4).

Varying Controls. Subsequent rows of Table 4 examine robustness to alternative controls, \mathbf{X}_c , in equation (3). Estimates remain sizable, statistically significant, and stable across the following specifications: controlling for 1870 Southern white shares only (row 2); controlling for sorting correlates, including cotton, tobacco, and overall agricultural potential, Black shares in 1870, slave shares in 1860, Breckinridge vote in 1860, Union Army enlistment and mortality, and frontier status (row 3); and using a double LASSO control selection on rows 1 and 3 (rows 4 and 5, respectively). We further clarify robustness to differential spatial structures, including no state FE (row 6) and reweighting by population size (row 7).

Varying SSIV Shifts. Although we use LASSO to select the push factors that predict the shifts in our SSIV, the algorithm ultimately selects from those that we initially provide. To ensure that effects are not an artifact of our choice of push factors, we replace our predicted shifts, $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1870-1900}$, with the actual shifts, $\Delta M_{j,1870-1900}$, in equation (4). Again, estimates are relatively unchanged (row 8). We also implement the Adao et al. (2019) diagnostic, in which we replace predicted shifts with randomly-generated ones. Doing so yields $< 5\%$ of coefficients statistically significant at that level.²⁰ This ensures that the (potentially endogenous) shares are not the sole identifying variation in our SSIV.

Early Migrants and Critical Junctures. We further address concerns about confounding effects of early, antebellum Southern white migrants, as well as exclusion restriction violations via their influence on initial culture and institutions. Here, we focus on a restricted sample of relatively “unsettled” counties, with < 2 residents in the 1860 U.S. Census. These estimates, in row 9 of Table 4, are somewhat larger than baseline ones, which suggests that sorting towards counties on the frontier—at a critical early juncture in their histories—may have helped solidify the cultural influence of postbellum diaspora whites. Below, we provide further evidence supporting this interpretation.

(Re-)Defining Sending and Receiving States. Our findings suggest that early postbellum migrants brought a distinctive set of Confederate cultural attachments to their destinations outside the South. It is thus important to ask whether our results are contingent on the particular demarcation of the South. We want to clarify, for example, whether results depend on cultural complementarities with residents of border states, or if those border states themselves had deep antebellum Confederate cultural proclivities.

Importantly, our core estimates are not particularly sensitive to our choice of origin states. Among the 12, only Oklahoma was not part of the Confederacy; we include it in our baseline measure, as the state (and namely the Indian Territories before it) had maintained legal slavery and formal treaties of

²⁰In equation (4), we interact the origin-state shares from 1870 with shifts drawn from a random normal distribution of mean 0 and variance 5. We then re-estimate the baseline 1,000 times. See Appendix Figure B.4 for a coefficient plot.

alliance with the Confederacy during the Civil War.²¹ Given Oklahoma's unique history, row 10 of Table 4 excludes it from the set of sending states with little change to our estimates. Besides Oklahoma, Missouri and Kentucky also had close ties to the Confederacy; beyond a shared history of slavery, both states had shadow governments declaring their allegiances to the Confederate Army during the war. In row 11, we include Missouri and Kentucky among sending states rather than destination states. Using this re-defined set of Southern white migrants decreases estimates somewhat, consistent with weaker affinity for Confederate culture among migrants from non-Confederate-controlled states.

To ensure that our findings are not simply driven by places with antebellum slavery outside the South, row 12 of Table 4 excludes the five border states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia. Slavery was legal in these states before the war, and they were popular destinations for Confederate migrants thereafter (see Figure 1). Although this restriction reduces the variation in some outcomes, particularly lynchings, our estimates uniformly increase, with large diaspora effects even in places with no ties to slavery and with significant cultural distance from the Confederacy.

Northern Migration. The West was settled not only by white migrants not only from the South but also from former Union states. This raises the question as to whether Confederate memorialization and anti-Black sentiment were driven by white migrants in general or whether Southern whites had a distinctive and outsized impact. Table 5 provides evidence consistent with the latter, focusing on Western states to which migrants from former Union and Confederate territories flocked after the war. KKK activity is the only outcome from Tables 2 and 3 that responded significantly to migration from the North. As noted earlier, some of the northern affinity for the Klan concentrated around negative sentiment towards Catholic Irish and Italian immigrants, as well as Jews (Fouka et al., 2022; McVeigh, 2009). Consistent with this history, we find little impact of migrants from former Union states on Confederate memorialization or on lynchings of Black people.

4.3 A New Form of Racial Exclusion: Diaspora Impacts on Sundown Towns

While the diaspora effectively transmitted Confederate norms, they also helped to build new racial norms without roots in the South. This section shows how postbellum migrants contributed to novel modes of racial exclusion in their destination communities, in the form of “sundown towns.” Distinct from the de jure exclusionary institutions associated with the antebellum South and later Jim Crow era, sundown towns emerged and proliferated mainly *outside* the South. Named after bans on Black and other minority populations' presence within town limits after sunset, this informal institution diffused widely from 1890 to 1960 (Crowe, 2012; Loewen, 2005; O'Connell, 2019). Prior to the Civil War, states like Ohio and Oregon tried to preclude Blacks from settling there, but the federal government blocked such large-scale exclusion efforts. Sundown towns could be seen as a postbellum innovation that facilitated exclusion at a scale small enough to evade federal attention or control.

Although concentrated outside of the South, sundown towns were more likely to form in places where large numbers of Southern white migrants settled. Diaspora whites often perceived Black people as potential sources of economic and political competition where they lived, prompting new forms of de facto exclusion outside of the South (Cook et al., 2022; Waite, 2021). At the same time, sundown towns often went hand-in-hand with Klan and lynching activity, as we show in Bazzi et al. (2022)

²¹Figure 3 illustrates the cultural similarities of Oklahoma to the Confederate states in the postbellum period.

and consistent with graphic accounts of incipient sundown towns in [Loewen \(2005\)](#). These activities facilitated exclusion of Blacks on a town-wide basis by both Southern and non-Southern whites.

Table 7 explores the influence of the Confederate diaspora on sundown towns using two measures.²² The first relies on a measure from [Loewen \(2005\)](#) (via [Taylor, 2020](#)), based on the centroids of documented sundown towns, aggregated to the county level. The second is based on town-level data from the Census Place Project ([Berkes et al., 2022](#)), with which we build a more granular measure of what [Loewen](#) calls the “Great Retreat” of Blacks from towns and counties across America (see Figure D.3 on the pervasive Black depopulation of towns in the early 1900s). Together, these two measures provide a rich and more complete picture of Black exclusion and depopulation across time and space.

The estimates in Table 7 point to a sizable diaspora imprint on the geography of sundown towns. SSIV estimates suggest that a 1 p.p. increase in the diaspora share in 1900 is associated with a 22% increase in the number of sundown towns in the county (column 1). We find similar results using our second, town-level regression. Relative to the sample mean, a 1 p.p. increase in the town-level diaspora in 1900 leads to a 2.6 p.p. increase in the likelihood that a non-Southern town with ≥ 25 Black residents as of 1870 had *zero* Black residents after 1900 (column 4). Effects are smaller and insignificant among non-Southern towns that already had few Black people as of 1870. These findings are robust to using county-level measures of Southern white migrant shares (column 5–6). And while some of the depopulation episodes in this town-level sample may stem from voluntary exodus, rather than forced exclusion, it is reassuring that our town-level results mirror column 2, which adapts the town-level specification to the county-level [Loewen \(2005\)](#) sample of confirmed sundown towns.

In sum, many whites leaving the postbellum South chose destinations with few Black people, while others helped build new means of removing and excluding non-white populations. This contributed to the widespread “Great Retreat” of Blacks during the early-to-mid 20th century, while also ensuring little minority opposition to white supremacy in the decades to come.

5 Channels: Institutions, Organizations, and Culture

The early 20th century ushered in a wave of national reconciliation as organizations like the KKK bridged the North–South divide and Lost Cause ideology gained traction in new arenas beyond the South. This section digs deeper into this process to understand, at a micro level, how the Confederate diaspora changed the trajectory of postbellum nation building. First, we show that migrants more effectively diffused Confederate culture in places lacking established culture and institutions on the eve of the Civil War. Second, we find that, within the diaspora, those with personal ties to slavery played an outsized role in propagating Confederate memory and entrenching white supremacy in nascent institutions. Third, we use individual-level data to show that first-generation migrants from the South transmitted Confederate culture not only to their children born outside the South but also to their non-Southern neighbors. Fourth, we show that the second-generation followed in their parents’ footsteps within the halls of power, maintaining the diaspora’s overrepresentation in positions of authority and even entering new domains like education where their parents had not gained a foothold. Together, these results further clarify how white migrants from the postbellum South not only transplanted Confederate norms but also captured early institutions ensuring the perpetuation of those norms over the long run.

²²These results build upon and extend initial findings in our *AEA Papers & Proceedings* article ([Bazzi et al., 2022](#)).

5.1 Early Settlement in Malleable Places

The influence of the Confederate diaspora may have varied across destinations depending on the support or opposition of incumbent residents and local institutions. It could have been easier for a small group of Southern migrants to stoke cultural change in counties without well-developed institutions, with small populations, or with residents favorably predisposed to Confederate ideology. By contrast, these migrants could have faced greater resistance in counties with deeply ingrained norms and strong institutions, especially when those norms and institutions were built by those with antipathy towards the former Confederacy. Table 6 provides evidence along these lines by exploring two key sources of place-based heterogeneity in the impact of the diaspora. In each case, we augment equation (3) to include the given heterogeneity measure, call it het_c , and its interaction with $\% Southern Whites_{c,1900}$, instrumenting that interaction with $SSIV \times het_c$.²³

Panel (a) shows that the Confederate diaspora exerted greater influence in frontier communities where both culture and institutions had not yet taken deep root on the eve of the Civil War. Concretely, we see that the postbellum diaspora was more effective at transmitting Confederate memory and building white supremacist organizations in counties that were still on the frontier in 1860. The estimate for the composite CCI outcome in column 5 suggests that such efforts were three times more effective on the frontier than in more densely settled counties where the diaspora imprint nevertheless also materialized (as seen from the estimates in row 1). This is consistent with the Confederate diaspora having greater scope for ideological transmission in places without well-established institutions or culturally-dominant groups. We find very similar estimates using another proxy for undeveloped social infrastructure: an indicator for whether the county was not yet incorporated into the U.S. by 1850.²⁴

Panel (b) shows that the Confederate diaspora exerted weaker influence in communities where a greater share of residents enlisted in the Union Army during the prior years of the Civil War. Many in these communities would have lost family members in the fight against the Confederate Army. It is not surprising, then, that the Confederate diaspora was less effective at transmitting its norms in these places. The summary estimate for the CCI in column 5 suggests a nearly exact countervailing effect of Union enlistment: going from zero to 100% Union Army enlistment rate wholly nullifies the impact of the Confederate diaspora. At the same time, the estimates in row 1 suggest that the Confederate diaspora had its largest impact in communities with zero participation in the Union Army, some of which would have been in frontier areas of the country.

Together, the results in Table 6 provide empirical support for an overarching narrative in the paper: the Confederate diaspora was most effective at shaping norms in areas of the country still early in the process of nation- and state-building or that lacked strong oppositional (i.e., pro-Union) cultural forces. It was places like these where key social institutions could be contested by early settlers and where a diaspora with strong cultural entrepreneurs might have unique pathways to public influence. Postbellum migrants from the South indeed gravitated towards some of these places (see Section 3.2), and the estimates in Table 6 suggest that their diaspora communities causally transmitted a strong Confederate legacy just as these areas became part of a now-larger United States.

²³Both measures of heterogeneity are included among the additional controls used in row 3 of Table 4.

²⁴By 1850, 604 counties outside the South were not yet incorporated into the U.S., and 553 of these were on the frontier.

5.2 Former Slaveholders and the Foundations of Local Institutions

Just as the diaspora was more influential in certain places, so too were certain elite members of the diaspora across destinations. Of the nearly one million white migrants who left the South in the three decades following the Civil War, only about 6.7% had personally held slaves in 1860, with another 13.9% coming from slaveholding households. In this section, we show that this minority former slaveholding elite in the Confederate diaspora had a distinctive influence on culture and institutions at destination. We develop a variant of the SSIV for former slaveholder migrants, using shifts based on former slaveholder migration from the South and distinct push factor variation over Census periods from 1870 through 1900. We then re-run key regressions from Tables 2 and 3, as well as regressions with the composite CCI outcome, in each case distinguishing former slaveholders from the general diaspora.

In columns 1–2 of Table 8, we regress outcomes separately on the total shares in 1900 of Southern white migrants (mean of 2.2%) and linked former slaveholder migrants (mean of 0.3%), respectively. Both columns include baseline controls as well as the corresponding 1870 shares. Once scaled by their sample means, these effects are of comparable size to each other: an increase from zero to the sample mean of either is associated with about a 0.3 point increase in a non-Southern county’s CCI (relative to a sample mean of 0.76, on a scale from 0 to 4).

When these regressors are included and instrumented jointly, the former slaveholder migrant effect dominates the overall migrant effect. Column 4 reports small and imprecise associations with Southern whites in general, but large and precise effects associated with former slaveholder migrants: an increase from zero to the latter’s sample mean is associated with a 0.8 point increase in the CCI. This pattern holds across all four outcomes from Tables 2 and 3, with varying precision. Importantly, there is sufficiently distinct identifying variation in the overall diaspora and slaveholder SSIVs to generate individually and jointly strong first stages (see the Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) and Kleibergen and Paap (2006) diagnostics in Table 8). This distinct variation stems from the differences in selective outmigration and sorting across slaveholder and non-slaveholder migrants from the South, as described in Section 3.2.

Additional columns of Table 8 address measurement and endogeneity concerns. One concern is that the slaveholder-migrant effects are confounded by antebellum slavery institutions in the places to which those migrants gravitated.²⁵ We address this in columns 3 and 5 by controlling for the share non-Southern slaveholders in 1860. Estimates are generally robust, consistent with a distinct influence of slaveholders hailing from Confederate-controlled areas. Column 6 addresses a measurement concern: we measure postbellum Southern white migration with linked Census records, mirroring the measurement of slaveholder migration. Column 7 addresses residual concerns about place-based confounders, given the endogenous sorting patterns we document in Section 3, by including the sorting correlates outlined in Section 4. Results are robust to these alternative specifications.

Overall, these findings suggest that those in the diaspora with personal ties to slavery were instrumental to the diffusion of Confederate culture. This resonates with historical accounts of slaveholder influence in society. Dippel (2005, p. 218), for instance, notes that although “they were a small minority, large slaveholders invariably came to control the political and economic systems” in the places they settled. This influence extended to the postbellum period, in which former slaveholder elites who left the South explain much of the impacts of the Confederate diaspora. While this does not preclude

²⁵In some non-Southern counties (e.g., those in border states), native former slaveholders would have outnumbered migrant ones. As an additional check, we drop border states from our receiving states in Table 4, which increases effect sizes.

the importance of the average migrant in this process, it does suggest that former slaveholders played an essential leadership role within the diaspora, ensuring its cultural imprint. We turn now to understanding how such an elite imprint materialized and its implications for Blacks living outside the South.

Occupational Sorting and Institutional Influence. Despite being a minority, former slaveholder migrants had a sizable influence in the postbellum diaspora, according to estimates in Table 8. This is consistent with their sorting patterns, which favored destinations in the country’s underdeveloped West, as well as public-facing positions of authority therein (see Sections 3 and 5.1). Whereas Southern white migrants generally displayed such tendencies, former slaveholder migrants displayed even starker sorting into certain governance positions, such as in public administration. These results earlier in the paper set the stage for our analysis here.

Table 9 reveals a large and distinct imprint from former slaveholding migrants working in positions of power.²⁶ We augment the specification from Table 8 with binary indicators for whether any former slaveholding migrants are working in one of the occupations considered in Table 1. Columns 1–7 use our composite Confederate cultural index (CCI, scored 0–4) as the outcome. We find that the CCI is significantly higher in counties with at least one former slaveholding migrant working in public administration or a religious occupation. When breaking out the CCI components in columns 8–11, we find patterns of heterogeneity that resonate with the historical record on institutional support for Confederate culture and racial norms. Memorials are more likely in counties with former slaveholders working in law enforcement; UDC chapters are more likely where former slaveholders are working in public administration; and KKK chapters are more likely where former slaveholders are working in public administration and especially in religious institutions, the latter being a core element of Klan life and its overt Protestant chauvinism (Goldberg, 1981). With the exception of education occupations, coefficients are positive across all public-facing authority occupations and all outcomes.²⁷

Importantly, such impacts go above and beyond the general contribution of Southern white and former slaveholder migrants, both of which are accounted for, and instrumented, in the regression. These results are also not an artifact of occupational sorting by all diaspora whites. While we find similar patterns for any Southern whites working in these occupations, these largely disappear once we control for, and instrument, former slaveholder shares (see Appendix Tables C.4 and C.5).

To further corroborate the distinctive role of former slaveholders in authority positions, we consider several placebo occupations where one would not expect much influence on public institutions or visibility in public life more generally. Appendix Table C.6 includes, alongside each authority occupation, a placebo one with similar earnings potential and overall employment shares but with no such component of power or influence. None of these placebo occupations prove to be as important, with estimates that are small and insignificant across specifications.

Despite such reassurances, the findings in Table 9 should ultimately be seen as descriptive, insofar as the causal effects of occupational sorting would be difficult to convincingly identify. Yet, in conjunction with our slaveholder SSIV strategy and estimates in Table 8 above, these results strongly suggest that

²⁶Given the dearth of former slaveholder migrants who can be successfully linked across Census periods to specific occupational categories within specific destination counties as of 1900, for this exercise we define migrants with ties to slavery as those white men who lived in Southern slaveholder *households* in 1860. One caveat is that this also includes family members who may be less sympathetic to slavery even though they exhibit similar sorting patterns (see Section 3).

²⁷The null for education is perhaps because such occupations were dominated by women, whereas linked individuals are men.

Southern white migrants—and former slaveholders in particular—not only imported Confederate culture directly but also shaped institutions in their destinations, thus solidifying their posthumous legacy.

Micro Effects of Former Slaveholder Governance. The results thus far suggest that occupational sorting by the Southern former slaveholding class may have helped to entrench Confederate culture throughout the country by the early 20th century. What remains to be seen is whether such influence matters for the well-being of non-white minorities. Here, we explore how former slaveholder involvement in local governance affected individual outcomes among Black residents.

We explore this question by constructing a dataset of young Black and (non-Southern) white men in 1900, along with their exposure to Southern white migrants from slaveholding backgrounds working in governance (i.e., policing, legal, or administrative occupations). We then link these men to the 1920 Census, which contains information on incarceration status. We restrict the sample to men through the age of 25 in 1900, who were at peak probability of being incarcerated in the intervening period (Eriksson, 2019, 2020). We regress incarceration status on an individual race indicator ($\text{Black}_{ic} = 1$), which we interact with an indicator for whether an individual’s county, as of 1900, had any former slaveholding migrants working in local governance positions. In addition to basic individual-level controls, specifications variously include fixed effects for state or county of residence in 1900, with the latter fully absorbing the overall effects of the Confederate diaspora and former slaveholders therein.²⁸

Table 10 estimates these probabilities of incarceration, which always depend strongly on race. Black males living in 1900 in a non-Southern county without former slaveholding migrants working in governance were nearly 5 times more likely than the average white male to be incarcerated from 1900–20. That probability roughly *doubles* for Black men living in counties with such migrants. These suggestive estimates illustrate an important micro-level consequence of local “institutional capture” by the former slaveholding class of the diaspora.

5.3 Cultural Transmission: Families, Neighbors, and KKK Mobilization

Beyond its entrenchment within local institutions, Confederate culture was also transmitted directly throughout the country by individuals and, especially, new organizations. The latter most prominently included the UDC in the 1900s–20s and the 2nd KKK in the 1910s–30s. Whereas the former was composed primarily of Confederate whites and their direct descendants (Cox, 2003), the latter had a largely non-Southern member base. The 2nd KKK was first organized in Georgia, before finding popularity throughout the Midwest and West, where “as many as six million Americans heeded its call to resist Catholics, Jews, lawbreakers, Blacks, and immigrants” at its peak in the 1920s (Goldberg, 1981, p. 8). At the same time, the group relied heavily on “rituals and symbols designed to memorialize the Confederacy, Southern-style chivalry, and white Protestant supremacy,” helping to bring those ideals and iconography to new audiences across the country (Gregory, 2005, p. 294). Table 3 provided evidence consistent with a causal effect of the diaspora on KKK chapter formation. In this section, we go deeper to show, at the individual level, how the diaspora mobilized white Americans to join this organization.

We explore this mobilization process using the complete membership data from the Denver, Col-

²⁸Individuals are often incarcerated in counties far from their county of residence-cum-arrest. This is one reason why we allow for a lag between time of exposure to Southern whites and time of observed incarceration. Another is that it may take time for the cumulative adverse effects of exposure to Confederate culture and institutions to materialize in incarceration.

orado chapter of the KKK in the 1920s.²⁹ Colorado had been at the epicenter of the 1920s Klan, with tens of thousands of members, including the Denver city attorney and chief of police (Goldberg, 1981). To identify diaspora connections, we construct a dataset of all white men in the 1920 Census living in the Denver metropolitan area. We then match these men to the membership records from the mid-1920s. Using the ABE algorithm from Abramitzky et al. (2019) with NYSIIS standardized names, we find 21.3% percent of all white men—about 51,000 individuals—in these records. We then explore this matched-KKK-membership outcome for different white sub-populations in the Denver area.

Table 11 provides a uniquely rich window into the transmission of KKK activity within and beyond the diaspora. First, in panel (a), we find that the first- and second-generation diaspora was overrepresented in the Denver KKK. We begin by focusing on Denver county where 24% of white men without Southern heritage belong to the KKK. By comparison, Southern-born men are 3.2 p.p. more likely to be KKK members, and second-generation men (i.e., those with at least one Southern-born parent) are 3.7 p.p. more likely (column 1). The latter arises for both Southern-born mothers and fathers (column 2), and all of these estimates are significant at the 1 percent level, while clustering standard errors by neighborhood or enumeration district, of which there are 313 in the county. Columns 3–6 expand the sample to include individuals in all 14 Denver metro area counties, which nearly doubles the sample size. We also consider more granular levels of analysis, using fixed effects for county (columns 3–4) and enumeration-district (columns 5–6). Despite these changes, estimates are largely unaffected. Together, the results in panel (a) suggest that first-generation migrants not only transplant Confederate affinity for the KKK but also transmit that affinity to their sons in the next generation.

Second, in panel (b), we find evidence consistent with horizontal transmission of KKK affinity from the Confederate diaspora to their neighbors without Southern heritage. In this case, we restrict the analysis to white men born outside the South and whose parents were also born outside the South. We then regress these men's KKK membership indicator on measures of physical proximity to the Confederate diaspora. We find highly localized associations suggestive of neighborhood exposure effects. Non-Southern whites with next-door neighbors from the first- or second-generation Confederate diaspora are nearly 2 p.p., or 8%, more likely to be KKK members than those whose next-door neighbors have no Southern heritage (columns 1 and 3).³⁰ We find similar estimates for Denver county and the broader metro area (columns 1–2 and 3–4, respectively), and for neighbors from the first- and second-generation (columns 2 and 4). Finally, we see, in columns 5–6, that the transmission of KKK activity extends beyond the family and next-door neighbors to others within the broader neighborhood: a 1 p.p. increase in the diaspora size in the enumeration district is associated with a 0.5–0.8 p.p. increase in KKK membership among non-Southern-heritage whites.

Together, the results in panels (a) and (b) of Table 11 are consistent with cultural transmission from the Confederate diaspora to their neighbors without Southern heritage. However, they are not dispositive of one-way transmission. It is possible that the two groups are simultaneously joining the KKK for correlated reasons unrelated to cultural transmission. It is also possible that the transmission flows from non-Southern to Southern whites. The results in panel (a) perhaps go against the latter inasmuch as diaspora whites are significantly more likely to be KKK members, making it more plausible that they are the ones leading the early mobilization and diffusion efforts in their communities. Such an interpretation

²⁹We follow Fryer Jr. and Levitt (2012) in using these data, although we expand record matching to the complete-count Census.

³⁰We identify next-door neighbors based on the zigzag enumeration procedure, following Logan and Parman (2017).

is also consistent with the causal SSIV estimates at the county level in Table 3. Moreover, in Appendix E, we present complementary evidence of one-way transmission: among non-Southern white migrants, those exposed to a larger Confederate diaspora in their new communities are more likely to name their children after Confederate leaders. By comparing name choices across children born before and after their household migrated, these mover-based strategies can effectively isolate causal spillover effects of exposure to a given place or population therein (see Bazzi et al., *forthcoming*, for a related application).

Overall, these results suggest that migrants transmitted Confederate culture to non-Southern populations during a period of resurgent Confederate pride in the early 20th century. The patterns of KKK membership in Table 11 resonate with Gregory (2005, p. 294), who writes that “[t]he 1920s Klan had not been dominated by diaspora Southerners, but it had depended upon them for early expansion and some of its leadership.” Our analysis above, and in Appendix E, provides a granular perspective on the sort of localized, contact-based transmission of culture underlying our broader county-level findings throughout the paper. Such transmission was essential to the persistence of Confederate memory and norms supporting racial inequity over the long run. In the next, and final, section, we explore another institutional pathway for persistence that would have reinforced the cultural legacy of the initial postbellum migrants out of the South.

5.4 Intergenerational Occupational Persistence and Institutional Capture

This section presents an important additional insight into the mechanisms for persistence of the Confederate legacy outside the South. We saw in Section 3.2 that Southern white migrants were much more likely than other groups to occupy positions of authority in the late 1800s. And the foregoing results in Section 5.2 showed how those occupational choices may have helped to entrench Confederate norms in nascent institutions outside the South. In Table 12, we show that the second-generation born in the diaspora reinforced the institutional capture by their parents in the first generation, thus helping to sustain those norms over the long run, as we showed in Section 6.

In particular, we revisit the occupational sorting analysis from Table 1 and add an additional term distinguishing the second generation migrants, i.e., those born outside the South to Southern-born parents. The patterns are consistent across all subsamples, comparing to other out-of-state migrants (panel b) and restricting to Western (panel c) and non-Western counties (panel d). Much like their parents who left the South, those born in the diaspora are significantly overrepresented in positions of public authority (column 1), and plausibly for reasons that went beyond the income opportunities in such positions (column 2). They entered the legal system and policing at rates on par with or greater than their parents (columns 3–4). And although they were relatively less likely to become religious leaders (column 6), these second-generation migrants realized even greater entry into positions in public administration (column 5) and education (column 6) than their parents were no more likely to occupy than other residents. These results complement our previous findings on the sorting by former slaveholders and their kin into authority positions (see Appendix Table C.2 and the discussion in Section 3.2).

Through these positions of governance and persuasion, the Confederate diaspora was able to grow its influence over time. As the first generation of migrants aged out of the workforce, their children filled their shoes in important roles in public life. From these authority positions, they could shape subsequent generations and ultimately ensure that the roots of Confederate ideology continued to run deep in many communities across America over the long run. We turn now to evidence of this enduring legacy.

6 The Long Shadow of the Confederate Diaspora

The results thus far have established how the Confederate diaspora shaped the cultural and institutional foundations of racial inequity in the early 20th century. In this brief and final section, we show that the early influence of these migrants propagated over the long run with adverse consequences for the socioeconomic well-being of Blacks outside the South. Despite the racially progressive reforms of the Civil Rights era in the 1960s, racial disparities persist across many domains of social and economic life. Our findings below suggest that the Confederate diaspora contributed to some of these lasting disparities in the 21st century. Long after early migrants—both slaveholders and non-slaveholders—had passed, their influence persisted as culture and institutions mutually reinforced racial animus across generations.

6.1 Employment, Segregation, and Policing

We use our county-level SSIV framework to identify the long-run impact of the Confederate diaspora on three important dimensions of structural racial inequality. We measure racial wage gaps using the complete-count Census in 1940. We capture Black residential segregation in 1940 and 2000 using the indices from [Logan and Parman \(2017\)](#) and [Escarce et al. \(2011\)](#), respectively. We also collect data on jail occupants by race for 2010–18 from the Vera Institute of Justice and police killings by race for 2013–20 from the Mapping Police Violence Database.

Table 13 reveals persistent patterns of racial inequity in large-diaspora counties: reduced relative earnings for Blacks as of 1940 (columns 1–2), increased Black residential segregation in 1940 and 2000 (columns 3–6), and increased probabilities of Black incarceration and police-induced mortality in the 2000s (columns 7–10). These effect sizes are large throughout, consistent with a roughly 4–5% decrease in relative Black earnings, 8–13% increase in Black segregation, a 5% increase in Black incarceration, and a 24–26% increase in the probability of police killing, all relative to sample means. Note that some of the segregation impacts, both in 1940 and in 2000, may be an outcome of sundown towns changing the geography of race across towns within counties.

To what extent are these findings, like those in the early 20th century, driven by the outsized influence of the former slaveholding elites within the Confederate diaspora, as seen in Section 5.2? In Appendix Table C.7, we replicate, to striking effect, the double SSIV from Table 8, with the five outcomes in Table 13. Much like the short-run influence of the diaspora, its enduring legacy is largely explained by former slaveholder migrants.

Overall, these findings are consistent with recent work connecting Confederate memorialization to adverse racial outcomes ([O’Connell et al., 2020](#); [Rahnama, 2022](#); [Williams, 2021](#)). As debates over the removal of Confederate monuments and battle flag have raged in recent years, some have defended such symbols and memorials as celebrations of Southern pride and national heritage. Our findings are consistent with the view that this memorabilia may have acted as harbingers of more overt and harmful racial animus, insofar as their dissemination was often part of a sustained effort to preserve white supremacy and promote racial exclusion.

6.2 Racial Animus

Black disadvantage in counties with a large Confederate diaspora may be reinforced, over the long run, by racial animosity among white residents. Using the General Social Survey (GSS) from 1993–2014

and the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) from 2010–16, we track whites’ views on prominent racial issues. These surveys are rich in detail but limited in geographic representativeness, which hinders use of the SSIV strategy. Nevertheless, we find suggestive evidence that a larger Confederate diaspora of postbellum is associated, at the turn of the 21st century, with stronger preferences for racial separatism, white supremacist beliefs, and racially conservative political ideology.

Appendix Table D.2 reports these estimates. A 1 p.p. increase in the migrant share in 1900 is associated with a 5.5% increase in mean preferences for white residential segregation, a 7.7% increase in pro-segregation beliefs, and an 11% increase in opposition to interracial marriage. Respondents are 0.5% more likely to believe Blacks must work their way up without government help, 0.6% more likely to state that systemic racism does not exist, and 1.4% more likely to express fear of other races.³¹

These patterns are consistent with a feedback loop between cultural, organizational, and institutional mechanisms identified earlier. As Confederate norms deepened and former slaveholders captured important institutions, Black populations fled from and later avoided many towns and communities across America. KKK mobilization, differential incarceration, and forced exclusion through sundown towns changed the geography of race. Together, these limited the scope for local interracial contact that might have otherwise ameliorated biases and animus among white Americans over the long run.

7 Discussion

A debate has raged in recent years among the general American public as to the significance of Confederate memorials and iconography. Some claim that these serve merely as innocuous symbols of Southern pride and are part of America’s past and heritage. Others argue that they are harbingers of overt racial hate. These debates have generated intense public emotion, at times spilling over into violence. History and memory are at the heart of these debates, and as such require continued research to elucidate the origins and consequences of the Confederate legacy.

This paper offers a new perspective. We showed how Confederate memorialization, together with more explicit expressions of white supremacy associated with the postbellum South, spread across the country in the early 20th century. Nearly one million Southern whites left the South in the few decades after the war and transmitted Confederate culture within non-Southern communities and through local institutions, over which they had an outsized influence. Such influence arose in part through sorting decisions among migrants—and especially former slaveholders—which favored destinations in the country’s developing West, as well as occupations with outward-facing public authority. Our empirical approach reinforces the work of historians on the Confederate legacy and provides novel insights on how the postbellum diaspora helped ensure, by the early 20th century, that “national reconciliation had been achieved on the South’s terms” (Cox, 2003).

The diaspora’s early influence remained salient over the long run. We linked the historical presence of postbellum Southern white migrants to persistent racial inequities in labor and housing markets and in policing practice. The visible legacy of this “Confederate diaspora” offers an important lesson for policymakers weighing the costs and benefits of Confederate cultural preservation. Ultimately, to advance racial progress in the U.S. means first understanding racism, something to which many Confederate cultural artifacts are incontrovertibly tied. We hope this paper stimulates future work on the deep roots of

³¹See Chinoy et al. (2023) for more on the intergenerational implications of Confederate culture, based on our CCI measure.

racial animus and, especially, the role of migration in both exacerbating and dampening such animus.

The Confederate diaspora studied in this paper set the stage for a larger exodus of Southern whites during the Great Migration. Dwarfing the million or so migrants that left the South in the three decades after the Civil War, upwards of 20 million whites migrated North and West in the 20th century. This mass migration followed pathways paved by the postbellum movers on which this present study focuses. Yet as we show separately in [Bazzi et al. \(forthcoming\)](#), their scale and geographic scope meant that the later migrants had a profound impact on the trajectory of mainstream conservative politics across America. Importantly, these impacts of the “other Great Migration” are distinct from the earlier impact of the Confederate diaspora and the comparatively extreme ideology of former enslavers.

Ultimately, to understand how migration affected cultural and political change in the U.S., it is important to understand the effects—both distinct and combined—of the many, inevitably interconnected migratory episodes in the country’s history. These include not only the postbellum Southern white migration in this paper and the later diaspora in [Bazzi et al. \(forthcoming\)](#), but also the European migration that shaped the South well before both emigration episodes ([Grosjean, 2014](#)), the more general process of frontier settlement during the 19th century ([Bazzi et al., 2020](#)), and the Great Migration of Blacks during the 20th century ([Calderon et al., 2019](#); [Fouka et al., 2022](#)). Together, the grand story of migration has colored and can be expected to continue to color the cultural and political geography of the U.S.

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
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
Figures

Figure 1: Mapping Southern-born Whites Outside the South in 1900




Notes: This figure maps the county-level population share of white individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1900 according to the complete-count Census (see also Appendix Figure G.2 in [Bazzi et al., forthcoming](#)). The legend shows the identical intervals considered for each split. Also see Appendix Figure A.1 for a version of (b) based on counts, which better illustrates sorting into large population centers.

Figure 2: Confederate Leader Names among Children Born 1850–1940



Notes: Three-year moving average in Confederate leader name frequencies across birth years among different subsets of Southern and non-Southern white populations (ages 0–9) in the U.S. Census: those born in the South living in the South (dark red), those born in the South living outside the South (bright red), and those born outside the South living outside the South (light red). An individual’s name match equals one if their given, first name is highly likely to have been given in reference to a Confederate leader. This includes individuals whose first name includes a leader’s full name (e.g., “Robert Lee”), as well as distinctive nicknames like Stonewall and last names like Beauregard. The list of Confederate leader names includes those with multiple public symbols in the Confederacy in the Southern Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) “Whose Heritage?” Project.

Figure 3: Confederate Culture Index, Post-1900



Notes: Map shows Confederate cultural index (CCI) scores for counties across the conterminous United States. This score is based on the sum of county-level indicators for (i) any matched Confederate memorials (i.e., monuments, location names), (ii) any United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) chapters, (iii) any 2nd Ku Klux Klan (KKK) chapters, and (iv) any recorded lynchings of Black people. With the exception of memorials, for which data feature limited information on the time dimension, we restrict these outcomes to those observed after 1900, thus following the migratory period of study. Note that these scores are highest in the formerly Confederate-controlled states and territories (outlined in black) but also tend to be higher in former border states, the West, and some major population centers (e.g., Chicago, the Northeast megalopolis).

Tables

Table 1: Occupational Sorting by Southern White Migrants, 1900

Dependent Variable: Individual Works as...	Any Authority Position		Lawyer or Judge	Law Enforcement	Public Administrator	Religious Worker	Educator
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(a) Full Sample (<i>N</i> = 16, 187, 176)							
Southern	0.595*** (0.063)	0.388*** (0.041)	0.269*** (0.053)	0.004 (0.019)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.394*** (0.039)	-0.061*** (0.017)
Non-Southern mean	1.58	1.58	0.39	0.26	0.09	0.36	0.49
(b) Out-of-State Migrants Only (<i>N</i> = 8, 207, 851)							
Southern	0.726*** (0.082)	0.550*** (0.048)	0.389*** (0.064)	0.068*** (0.017)	0.013* (0.007)	0.239*** (0.040)	0.016 (0.019)
Non-Southern mean	1.47	1.47	0.33	0.24	0.08	0.48	0.35
(c) Western Counties Only (<i>N</i> = 1, 348, 860)							
Southern	0.802*** (0.098)	0.503*** (0.059)	0.463*** (0.066)	0.135*** (0.024)	0.002 (0.018)	0.183*** (0.042)	0.020 (0.035)
Non-Southern mean	1.71	1.71	0.54	0.22	0.14	0.35	0.47
(d) Non-Western Counties Only (<i>N</i> = 14, 838, 316)							
Southern	0.546*** (0.072)	0.360*** (0.049)	0.224*** (0.064)	-0.026 (0.023)	-0.014* (0.007)	0.442*** (0.047)	-0.079*** (0.020)
Non-Southern mean	1.57	1.57	0.37	0.26	0.08	0.36	0.50
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occup. Income Category FE	No	Yes	–	–	–	–	–

Notes: Regressions of occupation indicators ($\times 100$) on Southern origin among various subsamples of white male individuals outside of the South between the ages of 18 and 64 in the 1900 U.S. Census. The “any authority” occupation indicator is based on any of the five positions of authority in columns 3–7. Sample derived from the complete-count Census, with Southern origin determined using state of birth. Southern states are those of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Panel (b) restricts the sample to include only migrants born in a different state from the given county. Panel (c) restricts to counties in the West Census region, and panel (d) to the non-West Census region. All regressions include destination county fixed effects. Individual controls include a cubic in age, marital status, and number of children. Column 2 additionally controls for occupational income category fixed effects, based on bins of *occscore* width 2. These fixed effects capture the historical income score for the average worker in the chosen occupation (e.g., *occscore* = 32 for law enforcement and = 30 for mechanics). Occupational classifications follow those laid out by the Census Bureau’s 1950 (“occ1950”) definitions. Standard errors are clustered by county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: The Confederate Diaspora in 1900 and Confederate Memorialization

Dependent Variable:	Any Confederate Memorials?			Any United Daughters of the Confederacy Chapters?		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.008* (0.004)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.018** (0.008)	0.042*** (0.013)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701
Outcome mean	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.09	0.09	0.09
Adj. R ²	0.22			0.24		
F-statistic		30.6	15.0		30.6	15.0
Anderson-Rubin, p-val		0.00	0.00		0.02	0.00
KP Underident., p-val		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00

Notes: Regressions of (i) Confederate memorials (coded as any Confederacy leader-inspired monuments as well as matched place names, street names or school names) and (ii) any United Daughters of the Confederacy chapters after 1900 on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in non-Southern counties (sample mean of 2.2%). Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Columns 2–3 and 5–6 instrument the share of Southern whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted change in the Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation 1). Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles), entered as quadratic terms. Columns 3 and 6 also control for the share of Southern whites in 1870. All regressions include state fixed effects. The Anderson-Rubin p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the coefficient on % *Southern Whites*, 1900 is statistically significant and that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. Standard errors are clustered at the 60×60 square-mile grid cell level, following the approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: The Confederate Diaspora in 1900 and Expressions of White Supremacy

Dependent Variable:	Any Ku Klux Klan Chapters?			Any Lynchings of Black People?		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.008** (0.004)	0.018* (0.010)	0.035** (0.016)	0.008** (0.004)	0.015** (0.006)	0.018** (0.009)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701
Outcome mean	0.37	0.37	0.37	0.05	0.05	0.05
Adj. R ²	0.23			0.09		
F-statistic		30.6	15.0		30.6	15.0
Anderson-Rubin, p-val		0.05	0.00		0.01	0.01
KP Underident., p-val		0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00

Notes: Regressions of (i) any 2nd Ku Klux Klan chapters and (ii) any recorded lynchings of Black people after 1900 on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in non-Southern counties (sample mean of 2.2%). Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Columns 2–3 and 5–6 instrument the share of Southern whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted change in the Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation 1). Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles), entered flexibly using quadratic terms. Columns 3 and 6 also control for the share of Southern whites in 1870. All regressions include state fixed effects. The Anderson-Rubin p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the coefficient on % *Southern Whites*, 1900 is statistically significant and that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. Standard errors are clustered at the 60×60 square-mile grid cell level, following the approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Identification and Robustness Checks on IV Estimates in Tables 2 and 3

	Dependent Variable:				CCI Score (from 0–4) (5)
	Any Confederate Memorials? (1)	Any UDC Chapters? (2)	Any KKK Chapters? (3)	Any Lynchings of Blacks? (4)	
<i>Alternative Standard Errors</i>					
1. Baseline (columns 3 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.042*** (0.013)	0.035** (0.016)	0.018** (0.009)	0.130*** (0.039)
Bester et al. (2011) 60 mi ² grid-cell	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.057)
Conley (1999) 200 km spatial HAC	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.010)	(0.066)
Conley (1999) 500 km spatial HAC	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.030)
Adao et al. (2019) SSIV adjustment					
<i>Varying Control Sets</i>					
2. Initial 1870 Share Control Only	0.030*** (0.009)	0.039*** (0.013)	0.028* (0.016)	0.019** (0.009)	0.115*** (0.039)
3. Baseline Controls + 1870 Shares Control + Additional Sorting Correlates	0.032*** (0.008)	0.044*** (0.012)	0.044** (0.017)	0.021** (0.010)	0.141*** (0.038)
4. Post-LASSO from Baseline Controls (columns 3 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3)	0.032*** (0.010)	0.042*** (0.012)	0.029* (0.016)	0.018** (0.008)	0.122*** (0.035)
5. Post-LASSO from All Controls	0.034*** (0.010)	0.050*** (0.013)	0.041** (0.018)	0.019** (0.009)	0.146*** (0.038)
<i>Other Alternative Specifications</i>					
6. No Fixed Effects	0.024*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.011)	0.020 (0.014)	0.018** (0.007)	0.096*** (0.035)
7. Weighting by 1900 Population	0.048* (0.029)	0.077*** (0.026)	0.042* (0.024)	0.049** (0.025)	0.217*** (0.081)
8. SSIV Using Actual Shifts	0.031*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.012)	0.035** (0.016)	0.016* (0.008)	0.121*** (0.036)
9. Restricting to Counties “Unsettled” in 1860	0.039*** (0.013)	0.039** (0.018)	0.062** (0.031)	0.021 (0.015)	0.161** (0.067)
<i>Alternative Diaspora Variation</i>					
10. Excluding Oklahoma from Sending States	0.036*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.036** (0.017)	0.019* (0.010)	0.135*** (0.041)
11. Including Missouri and Kentucky in Sending States	0.018** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.026** (0.013)	0.014** (0.007)	0.088*** (0.025)
12. Excluding Border States from Receiving States	0.054*** (0.018)	0.058** (0.026)	0.069* (0.036)	0.025 (0.017)	0.205** (0.088)

Notes: This table re-estimates Tables 2 and 3 using a variety of robustness specifications. See the notes to those tables for the list of baseline controls. Additional sorting controls include cotton, tobacco, and overall agricultural potential, Black shares in 1870, slave shares in 1860, Union Army enlistment and mortality rates, Breckinridge vote shares in 1860, and dummies for on the frontier in 1860 and never on the frontier, based on Bazzi et al. (2020). All continuous baseline and sorting controls are entered flexibly using quadratic terms. All regressions include state fixed effects, except for row 6. All rows instrument the share of Southern whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation 1). Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011), with the first row also reporting standard errors based on the Conley (1999) spatial HAC with very wide bandwidths of 200 km and 500 km as well as the Adao et al. (2019) adjustment for SSIV estimators. Rows 4–5 choose optimal controls from these sets using the Belloni et al. (2014) double LASSO procedure. This procedure first runs a LASSO regression of the Southern white share on the set of controls. It then does the same using the given outcome. Lastly, it runs the IV regression using all of the controls that were selected in the first two steps. Row 7 weights regressions by county population in 1900. Row 8 uses a shift-share IV based on actual rather than predicted shifts. Row 9 uses only the subsample of 626 non-Southern counties classified by the Census Bureau as “unsettled” by non-natives as of 1860 (i.e., using the Census definition of < 2 persons per square mile). Rows 10–12 consider alternative sending and/or receiving state definitions for the endogenous and instrumental variables. Column 5 considers as an additional outcome the composite Confederate Culture Index, which sums the outcomes in columns 1–4. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Comparing Southern versus Northern White Migrant Impacts in Western States

Dependent Variable:	Any Confederate Memorials? (1)	Any UDC Chapters? (2)	Any KKK Chapters? (3)	Any Lynchings of Blacks? (4)	CCI Score (from 0–4) (5)
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.033*** (0.009)	0.044*** (0.012)	0.019* (0.011)	0.021** (0.009)	0.117*** (0.032)
% Northern Whites, 1900	0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.024*** (0.006)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.029** (0.012)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	823	823	823	823	823
Outcome mean	0.29	0.17	0.31	0.08	0.86
KP Joint F-statistic	12.16	12.16	12.16	12.16	12.16
KP Underident., p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
% S. Whites, SW F-statistic	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06	27.06
% S. Whites, Underid. p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
% N. Whites, SW F-statistic	27.89	27.89	27.89	27.89	27.89
% N. Whites, Underid. p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: This table makes two changes to the specification in columns 3 and 6 from Tables 2 and 3: (i) it adds the share of Northern white migrants as an additional endogenous variable, and (ii) it restricts the sample to Western states outside the North and South where we define the “North” as the territories of the Union during the Civil War, excluding the western states (California, Oregon, Nevada). The share of Southern and Northern whites are each instrumented using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of whites of each group and the predicted change in the white population living outside the South (or North) from 1870 to 1900. The shift part is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation 1). Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles), entered flexibly using quadratic terms. Column 5 considers as an additional outcome the composite Confederate Culture Index, which sums the outcomes in columns 1–4. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. The SW F-statistics and Underidentification test p-values are based on Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F statistics and LM tests, respectively, for the individual endogenous regressors. Standard errors are clustered at the 60×60 square-mile grid cell level, following the approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects of the Confederate Diaspora in Malleable and Oppositional Places

Dependent Variable:	Any Confederate Memorials? (1)	Any UDC Chapters? (2)	Any KKK Chapters? (3)	Any Lynchings of Blacks? (4)	CCI Score (from 0–4) (5)
(a) Interacting with a County's Frontier Status (as of 1860)					
β_1 : % Southern Whites, 1900	0.013 (0.009)	0.022* (0.012)	0.006 (0.012)	0.015* (0.008)	0.056** (0.027)
β_2 : % Southern Whites \times On Frontier, 1860	0.035** (0.014)	0.032 (0.021)	0.047* (0.026)	0.006 (0.015)	0.119* (0.064)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2$: % Southern Whites in Frontier Counties	0.047*** (0.013)	0.054*** (0.020)	0.053** (0.026)	0.020 (0.014)	0.175*** (0.064)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701
Outcome mean	0.25	0.09	0.37	0.05	0.76
KP Joint F-statistic	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
KP Underident., p-val	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
β_1 , SW F-statistic	65.6	65.6	65.6	65.6	65.6
β_1 , Underid. p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
β_2 , SW F-statistic	91.1	91.1	91.1	91.1	91.1
β_2 , Underid. p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(b) Interacting with a County's Union Army Enlistment Rate					
β_1 : % Southern Whites, 1900	0.041*** (0.011)	0.046*** (0.015)	0.046** (0.020)	0.014* (0.008)	0.148*** (0.042)
β_2 : % Southern Whites \times % Union Enlistment	-0.045*** (0.016)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.062*** (0.020)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.147*** (0.042)
$\beta_1 + \beta_2^{90th}$: % Southern Whites at 90th percentile of Union Enlistment	0.001 (0.001)	0.023** (0.010)	0.003 (0.013)	0.010 (0.007)	0.044 (0.027)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701
Outcome mean	0.25	0.09	0.37	0.05	0.76
KP Joint F-statistic	14.5	14.5	14.5	14.5	14.5
KP Underident., p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
β_1 , SW F-statistic	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3	18.3
β_1 , Underid. p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
β_2 , SW F-statistic	49.1	49.1	49.1	49.1	49.1
β_2 , Underid. p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: This table augments the specification in columns 3 and 6 from Tables 2 and 3 to include interactions of the Southern white share with pre-migration characteristics of the destination counties: an indicator for frontier status in 1860 from [Bazzi et al. \(2020\)](#) (panel a), and Union Army enlistment rates during the Civil War (panel b). The own-term in the interaction is also included as an additional regressor in both stages. All columns instrument the share of Southern whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted change in the Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation (1)). The interaction terms are instrumented separately by the interaction of the SSIV and the given variable. The specifications are otherwise identical to those in Tables 2 and 3; see the notes therein for additional details. Column 5 considers as an additional outcome the composite Confederate Culture Index, which sums the outcomes in columns 1–4. In panel (b), the first coefficient, β_1 , captures the effect in incorporated counties with zero Union enlistment rate, and the bottom row coefficient reports the effect evaluated at the 90th percentile of Union enlistment rates, which is 70.2%. We include a separate interaction and own-term indicator for counties, mostly unincorporated, with missing Union enlistment rate; the interaction term is instrumented by the SSIV times the missing indicator. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the [Kleibergen and Paap \(2006\)](#) LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. The SW F-statistics and Underidentification test p-values are based on [Sanderson and Windmeijer \(2016\)](#) first-stage F statistics and LM tests, respectively, for the individual endogenous regressors. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: The Confederate Diaspora, Sundown Towns, and the “Great Retreat”

Dependent Variable:	Number of Sundown Towns in County		No Blacks in Town After 1900 = 1			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.102*	0.106*				
	(0.058)	(0.061)				
$\beta_{<25}$: % Southern Whites, 1900 \times < 25 Blacks, 1870			1.096	1.501	0.599	0.868
			(1.293)	(2.182)	(0.733)	(1.314)
$\beta_{\geq 25}$: % Southern Whites, 1900 \times \geq 25 Blacks, 1870			2.355***	2.603**	2.060***	2.329*
			(0.854)	(1.277)	(0.771)	(1.254)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Town controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control	Yes	Yes		Yes		Yes
Unit of analysis	County	County	Town	Town	Town	Town
Diaspora regressor at ... level	County	County	Town	Town	County	County
Observations	1,701	1,701	33,904	33,904	33,904	33,904
Outcome mean	0.47	0.47	65.57	65.57	65.57	65.57
(KP Joint) F-statistic	15.0	12.1	12.8	6.1	15.4	6.9
KP Underident., p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
$\beta_{<25}$, SW F-statistic			25.6	12.3	31.6	14.5
$\beta_{<25}$, Underid. p -val			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
$\beta_{\geq 25}$, SW F-statistic			80.9	51.6	85.0	53.5
$\beta_{\geq 25}$, Underid. p -val			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Columns 1–2 show SSIV regressions of the number of sundown towns in a county c on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in all non-Southern counties. Columns 3–6 alternatively show SSIV regressions of an indicator ($\times 100$) of whether a given non-Southern town had no Black residents at some point after 1900 (through 1940) on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in all non-Southern towns (columns 3–4) or counties (columns 5–6). Columns 3–6 include an interaction term for whether a town had over 25 Blacks in 1870 and report the coefficient estimates for those two subsamples. All columns instrument the share of Southern whites (and their interactions in columns 3–6) using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution across counties of Southern whites and the predicted change in Southern white (or Southern former slaveholder) population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation 1). Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles), entered flexibly using quadratic terms. Columns 3–6 also control for town longitude, latitude, a dummy for whether it had over 25 Blacks in 1870, and a dummy for whether it had over 1,000 residents in 1870, while column 2 controls for the county-level aggregates for these factors. All regressions include state fixed effects. The sample of confirmed sundown towns used to construct the numerator in columns 1–2 is originally from [Loewen \(2005\)](#) (who coined the term “Great Retreat” to capture the Black exodus from towns across America in the early 1900s) and taken from [Taylor \(2020\)](#) via its complementary GIS resource. The sample of towns used in columns 3–6 is based on [Berkes et al. \(2022\)](#). The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the [Kleibergen and Paap \(2006\)](#) LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. The SW F-statistics and Underidentification test p-values are based on [Sanderson and Windmeijer \(2016\)](#) first-stage F statistics and LM tests, respectively, for the individual endogenous regressors. Standard errors are clustered at the 60×60 square-mile grid cell level, following the approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: The Distinctive Influence of Former Slaveholders in the Confederate Diaspora

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(a) Dep. Var.: All Confederate Cultural Activity (CCI Score, from 0–4)							
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.130*** (0.039)			-0.042 (0.063)	-0.036 (0.064)	-0.028 (0.047)	-0.010 (0.063)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		1.055*** (0.402)	1.140*** (0.402)	2.694** (1.099)	2.609** (1.120)	2.497*** (0.931)	2.386** (1.122)
(b) Dep. Var.: Any Confederate Memorials?							
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.034*** (0.009)			-0.015 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.021)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		0.291*** (0.108)	0.318*** (0.106)	0.769** (0.345)	0.739** (0.351)	0.698** (0.279)	0.574* (0.321)
(c) Dep. Var.: Any United Daughters of the Confederacy Chapters?							
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.042*** (0.013)			-0.013 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.014)	0.004 (0.018)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		0.250* (0.131)	0.304** (0.130)	0.869** (0.350)	0.785** (0.338)	0.762*** (0.291)	0.631** (0.311)
(d) Dep. Var.: Any Ku Klux Klan Chapters?							
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.035** (0.016)			0.002 (0.023)	-0.003 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.019)	0.002 (0.028)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		0.304* (0.181)	0.284 (0.177)	0.557 (0.395)	0.624 (0.427)	0.614 (0.373)	0.687 (0.488)
(e) Dep. Var.: Any Lynchings of Blacks?							
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.018** (0.009)			-0.015 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.016)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		0.209** (0.101)	0.233** (0.100)	0.499** (0.240)	0.461* (0.246)	0.423** (0.204)	0.494* (0.279)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control(s)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
% Non-Southern slaveholders control			Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Linked Census measures only?						Yes	
Sorting controls							Yes
Observations	1,701	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,677
KP Joint F-statistic	15.0	19.8	20.2	2.5	2.4	3.9	2.6
KP Joint Underident., p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01
% S. Whites, SW F-statistic				7.1	6.5	6.5	6.8
% S. Whites, Underident., p-val				0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
% Slaveholders, SW F-statistic				5.1	4.8	4.8	5.2
% Slaveholders, Underident., p-val				0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02

Notes: This table re-estimates Tables 2 and 3 using an alternative explanatory variable, based on migrating Southern white *former slaveholders* as of 1900, as well as alternative shift-share instrument, based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted aggregate change in the Southern former slaveholder population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation 1). Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles). Columns 3, 5, and 6 also control for the share of non-Southern former slaveholders in a county, defined as a share of all individual linked to non-Southern states as of the 1860 Slave Schedule. All regressions control for the share of Southern whites and/or the share of Southern former slaveholders in 1870 as well as state fixed effects. Column 6 uses an alternative endogenous variable for Southern whites in 1900 based on the same linked Census dataset as the slaveholder measure. Column 7 includes additional sorting controls for cotton, tobacco, and overall agricultural potential, Black shares in 1870, slave shares in 1860, Union Army enlistment and mortality rates, Breckinridge vote shares in 1860, and dummies for on the frontier in 1860 and never on the frontier, based on [Bazzi et al. \(2020\)](#). All continuous baseline and sorting controls are entered flexibly using quadratic terms. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the [Kleibergen and Paap \(2006\)](#) LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. The SW F-statistics and Underidentification test p-values are based on [Sanderson and Windmeijer \(2016\)](#) first-stage F statistics and LM tests, respectively, for the individual endogenous regressors. Standard errors are clustered at the 60×60 square-mile grid cell level, following the approach of [Bestler et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Institutional Foundations of Confederate Diaspora Influence

Dependent Variable:	Confederate Cultural Activity (CCI Score, from 0–4)						Any Confederate Memorials?	Any UDC Chapters?	Any KKK Chapters?	Any Lynchings of Blacks?
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
% Southern Whites, 1900	-0.048 (0.064)	-0.042 (0.063)	-0.041 (0.062)	-0.042 (0.062)	-0.041 (0.063)	-0.047 (0.062)	-0.014 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.022)	-0.016 (0.015)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900	2.731** (1.105)	2.705** (1.102)	2.675** (1.092)	2.648** (1.116)	2.729** (1.160)	2.724** (1.250)	0.764** (1.357)	0.872** (0.409)	0.578 (0.422)	0.510* (0.470)
<i>Any Linked . . . from Southern Slaveholder Households?</i>										
Public Administrators	0.735*** (0.227)					0.727*** (0.237)	0.060 (0.130)	0.223** (0.094)	0.340*** (0.109)	0.103 (0.111)
Religious Workers		1.140*** (0.182)				1.141*** (0.182)	0.049 (0.055)	0.043 (0.061)	1.010*** (0.066)	0.039 (0.036)
Law Enforcement			0.192 (0.329)			0.270 (0.354)	0.248* (0.127)	0.088 (0.134)	-0.069 (0.113)	0.002 (0.092)
Lawyers or Judges				0.222 (0.212)		0.227 (0.214)	0.026 (0.076)	0.087 (0.075)	0.073 (0.075)	0.041 (0.056)
Educators					-0.160 (0.341)	-0.258 (0.345)	-0.097 (0.113)	-0.082 (0.112)	-0.014 (0.119)	-0.065 (0.077)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679
Outcome mean	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.25	0.09	0.38	0.05
KP Joint F-statistic	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
KP Underident., p-val	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 8 alongside county-level indicators of whether any Southern white (male) migrants linked to former slaveholder households (as of 1860) work in a given occupation in that non-Southern county (as of 1900). See the notes to Table 8 for all other details on instruments and controls. Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Standard errors are clustered at the 60×60 square-mile grid cell level, following the approach of [Bestler et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Black Incarceration in the Southern (Former) Slaveholder Diaspora

	Dependent Variable: Person is Incarcerated in 1920					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Black	0.289*** (0.029)	0.291*** (0.030)	0.284*** (0.028)	0.283*** (0.028)	0.331*** (0.042)	0.334*** (0.045)
<i>Any . . . from Southern Slaveholder Households in 1900 County of Residence?</i>						
Law Enforcement	0.001 (0.005)					
Law Enforcement × Black	0.340** (0.142)	0.338** (0.139)				
Lawyers or Judges			0.000 (0.003)			
Lawyers or Judges × Black			0.200* (0.113)	0.209* (0.113)		
Public Administrators					0.003 (0.011)	
Public Administrators × Black					0.383*** (0.098)	0.376*** (0.101)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Initial state FE	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Initial county FE		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	4,228,050	4,228,050	4,228,050	4,228,050	4,228,050	4,228,050
Outcome mean (whites)	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06

Notes: OLS regressions of an indicator of incarceration status among Black and white men between the ages of 20 and 45 in the 1920 U.S. Census on an individual being Black, interacted with an indicator for whether they lived in a non-Southern county in 1900 with any Southern white (male) migrants linked to former slaveholder households (as of 1860) working in a given governance occupation or agriculture in that non-Southern county (as of 1900). Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. We also exclude white men born in any of these states. Individual controls include a cubic in age, marital status, and number of children. Odd columns include fixed effects for state of residence in 1900, while even columns include fixed effects for county of residence in 1900. Note that these county FE absorb the effects of Southern white and slaveholder migrant population shares in the individuals' counties as of 1900. Standard errors are clustered by initial county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11: The Confederate Diaspora and Klan Membership in the Early 20th Century

	Dependent Variable: Matched to KKK Member Records?					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(a) All White Men						
Southern-Born	0.032*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.005)
<i>Second-Generation</i>						
Non-Southern-Born w/ Southern Parent	0.037*** (0.007)		0.035*** (0.005)		0.026*** (0.004)	
Non-Southern-Born w/ Southern Father		0.031*** (0.009)		0.033*** (0.006)		0.026*** (0.006)
Non-Southern-Born w/ Southern Mother		0.021** (0.009)		0.019*** (0.006)		0.014** (0.006)
Fixed Effects	–	–	County	County	District	District
Observations	129,248	129,248	241,298	241,298	241,297	241,297
Outcome mean (control)	0.24	0.24	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.21
(b) Only White Men with no Southern Heritage/Parentage						
<i>Neighbors in Houses Next Door</i>						
1st or 2nd Gen. Southern White Neighbor	0.019*** (0.006)		0.018*** (0.004)		0.008** (0.003)	
1st Gen. Southern White Neighbor		0.018** (0.007)		0.015*** (0.005)		0.006 (0.004)
2nd Gen. Southern White Neighbor		0.021*** (0.008)		0.021*** (0.005)		0.010** (0.004)
<i>Neighbors in Enumeration District</i>						
% 1st Gen. Southern Whites in District					0.008*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.001)
% 2st Gen. Southern Whites in District					0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Fixed Effects	–	–	County	County	County	County
Observations	93,654	93,654	189,263	189,263	189,263	189,263
Outcome mean (control)	0.25	0.25	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Sample Counties	Denver only	Denver only	All metro	All metro	All metro	All metro

Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether a white male in the Denver, CO metropolitan area as of the 1920 U.S. Census can be found in Denver KKK membership records from the 1920s. Linking based on first and last names, using the ABE algorithm from Abramitzky et al. (2019) with NYSIS standardized names. In panel (a), the sample includes all white men in the given area, and the regressors include indicators for whether they were born in the South and whether they were born outside the South but their parents were born in the South. In panel (b), the sample includes only those born outside the South to parents who were also born outside the South, and the regressors include an indicator for whether one's next-door neighbors have first- and/or second-generation Southern white migrants and the share of first- and/or second-generation Southern white migrants in one's enumeration district. The latter is leave-out, excluding one's next-door neighbors from the district total. There are 313 enumeration districts in Denver county and 527 in the greater metro area, which spans 14 counties. All regressions include controls for a cubic polynomial in age, marital status, and number of children. Standard errors are clustered by enumeration district. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12: Occupational Sorting by 2nd Generation Southern White Migrants, 1900

Dependent Variable: Individual Works as...	Any Authority Position		Lawyer or Judge	Law Enforce.	Public Admin.	Religious Worker	Educator
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(a) Full Sample (<i>N</i> = 16, 187, 176)							
Southern-Born (First-Generation)	0.669*** (0.065)	0.451*** (0.042)	0.307*** (0.055)	0.009 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.007)	0.407*** (0.040)	-0.046*** (0.017)
Non-Southern-Born w/ Southern Parent (Second-Generation)	0.471*** (0.040)	0.397*** (0.023)	0.241*** (0.030)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.080*** (0.012)	0.093*** (0.015)
Non-Southern mean	1.58	1.58	0.39	0.26	0.09	0.36	0.49
(b) Out-of-State Migrants Only (<i>N</i> = 8, 207, 851)							
First-Generation	0.785*** (0.082)	0.592*** (0.049)	0.417*** (0.065)	0.072*** (0.017)	0.016** (0.007)	0.254*** (0.040)	0.026 (0.019)
Second Generation	0.773*** (0.059)	0.544*** (0.031)	0.363*** (0.044)	0.054*** (0.011)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.196*** (0.021)	0.125*** (0.018)
Non-Southern mean	1.47	1.47	0.33	0.24	0.08	0.48	0.35
(c) Western Counties Only (<i>N</i> = 1, 348, 860)							
First-Generation	0.865*** (0.099)	0.541*** (0.060)	0.496*** (0.068)	0.143*** (0.024)	0.005 (0.018)	0.188*** (0.042)	0.033 (0.035)
Second-Generation	0.932*** (0.098)	0.565*** (0.051)	0.499*** (0.069)	0.121*** (0.025)	0.040** (0.016)	0.074*** (0.026)	0.199*** (0.034)
Non-Southern mean	1.71	1.71	0.54	0.22	0.14	0.35	0.47
(d) Non-Western Counties Only (<i>N</i> = 14, 838, 316)							
First-Generation	0.619*** (0.077)	0.426*** (0.049)	0.260*** (0.067)	-0.023 (0.024)	-0.010 (0.007)	0.456*** (0.049)	-0.065*** (0.020)
Second-Generation	0.406*** (0.043)	0.370*** (0.025)	0.204*** (0.033)	0.020*** (0.007)	0.020*** (0.005)	0.083*** (0.013)	0.079*** (0.017)
Non-Southern mean	1.57	1.57	0.37	0.26	0.08	0.36	0.50
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occup. Income Category FE	No	Yes	-	-	-	-	-

Notes: This table re-estimates the specifications in Table 1 with an additional binary regressor indicating those individuals in the second-generation Confederate diaspora, i.e., men with at least one parent born in the South but who are themselves born outside the South. See the notes to Table 1 for details on the specification. Standard errors are clustered by county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 13: An Enduring Legacy of the Confederate Diaspora

Dependent Variable:	Economic		Residential				Penal			
	Black to Non-Black Earnings Ratio, 1940		Black Residential Segregation, 1940		Black Residential Segregation, 2000		Black County Jail Shares, 2010–18		Any Police Killings of Blacks, 2013–20	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
% Southern Whites, 1900	-0.039*** (0.014)	-0.030** (0.012)	0.007** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.757** (0.313)	0.735*** (0.276)	0.034** (0.013)	0.037*** (0.013)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sorting controls		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
1870 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,045	1,043	1,695	1,693	1,697	1,695	1,604	1,603	1,701	1,699
Outcome mean	0.77	0.77	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	13.78	13.78	0.14	0.14
F-statistic	12.0	14.8	15.8	16.3	14.9	15.3	14.9	15.6	15.0	15.3
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
KP Underident., p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: SSIV regressions of various Black-related socioeconomic outcomes between 1940 and 2020 on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. All columns instrument the share of Southern whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted change in the Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation 1). Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles). Additional sorting controls include cotton, tobacco, and overall agricultural potential, Black shares in 1870, slave shares in 1860, Union Army enlistment and mortality rates, Breckinridge vote shares in 1860, and dummies for on the frontier in 1860 and never on the frontier, based on [Bazzi et al. \(2020\)](#). All continuous baseline and sorting controls are entered flexibly using quadratic terms. All regressions control for the share of Southern whites in 1870 and include state fixed effects. The Anderson-Rubin p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the coefficient on % *Southern Whites*, 1900 is statistically significant and that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the [Kleibergen and Paap \(2006\)](#) LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. Standard errors are clustered at the 60×60 square-mile grid cell level, following the approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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A The Geography of the Confederate Diaspora

In this Appendix, we document the economic and ideological factors underlying Southern white outmigration between 1870 and 1900, as well as the destination choices of these migrants. Together, these factors shaped the geography of the Confederate diaspora that we study in this paper.

A.1 Selection into Migration: Origin County Push Factors

Table A.1: Push Factors for Postbellum Southern White Migrants, 1870–1900

Dependent Variable:	Southern White Migrants Outflows		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
% Black population	-10.825*** (1.073)	-16.256*** (0.732)	-13.875*** (0.752)
Average manufacturing wages	5.981** (2.857)	2.906 (4.779)	5.263* (3.088)
% from slaveholding households (1860)	-2.244** (1.129)		-0.681 (0.954)
% from Confederate Army households (1860)	-13.051*** (1.101)	-14.521*** (1.175)	-14.375*** (0.984)
Any Civil War battles in county?	120.155*** (33.764)	231.493*** (52.953)	174.079*** (31.634)
Tobacco county	-17.268 (22.874)	97.080*** (27.592)	35.096* (19.767)
Cotton county	21.026 (27.951)		
Agricultural potential	211.072* (115.285)		181.099** (91.031)
% Vote share for Breckinridge (1860)	-1.382*** (0.457)	-2.239*** (0.609)	-1.938*** (0.402)
Population size in sending counties	0.064*** (0.005)	0.061*** (0.002)	0.061*** (0.002)
Manufacturing output per capita		1.049 (1.290)	0.445 (0.778)
Period	1870–1880	1880–1900	1870–1900
Year FE			Yes
Observations	1,078	1,136	2,214
Outcome mean	330.5	497.2	416.0
Adj. R ²	0.794	0.749	0.761

Notes: Estimates of equation (1), which regresses a measure of Southern white migrant outflows from Southern counties on various observable origin county characteristics. These outflow measures from each origin county to non-Southern counties are based on linked Census records, which track (white male) migrants across Census periods for decades following the Civil War from 1870–1900. All columns use a linear LASSO specification to select optimal sets of covariates for each Census period. Column 3 pools data across years and estimates a version with year fixed effects. Sample counties include those in the twelve former Confederate states plus Oklahoma. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.2: Summary Statistics, Southern County-Level Push Factor Data

	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Push factors					
% Black population	2,795	24.84	20.89	0.00	88.03
Manufacturing output per capita	2,795	16.37	28.53	0.00	456.74
Manufacturing wage per capita	2,795	2.33	4.89	0.00	68.96
% Individuals from slaveholding households (1860)	2,688	28.84	13.58	0.00	100.00
% Individuals from Confederate Army households (1860)	2,688	58.70	28.50	0.00	100.00
Any Civil War battles?	2,910	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00
Tobacco county (above-median potential)	2,910	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Cotton county (above-median potential)	2,910	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Agricultural potential	2,910	0.65	0.18	0.00	0.90
% Votes for Breckindidge (1860)	2,910	35.50	27.02	0.00	100.00
% Slaves (1860)	2,910	26.39	22.49	0.00	92.43

Notes: Summary statistics for counties in the South in the period 1870–80 and 1880–1900 as used in the descriptive analysis of push factors and corresponding construction of the migration shifts in the SSIV. See Section 3 for data sources. The variables in the first three rows are time-varying. The others are time-invariant, but we report the overall sample size allowing for the entry of new counties (in Texas and Oklahoma) in the later period.

A.2 Migrant Sorting: Destination County Pull Factors


Table A.3: Pull Factors for White Migrants, 1870–1900

Dependent Variable:	Any Southern White Migrants from Counties o to d		Any Non-Southern White Migrants from Counties o to d	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log distance $_{o-d}$	-2.909*** (0.052)	-4.246*** (0.073)	-8.577*** (0.068)	-10.180*** (0.122)
Origin state network in d	12.089*** (0.235)	10.656*** (0.291)	10.107*** (0.436)	11.186*** (0.812)
Agricultural potential	-5.555*** (0.181)	-14.756*** (0.370)	-18.704*** (0.339)	-51.416*** (0.669)
Cotton county	0.690*** (0.033)	0.714*** (0.043)	0.539*** (0.052)	0.207*** (0.065)
Tobacco county	-0.210*** (0.030)	-0.187*** (0.036)	0.127** (0.051)	0.684*** (0.060)
Log population density	0.634*** (0.011)	1.749*** (0.032)	3.291*** (0.021)	7.485*** (0.057)
% Vote share for Breckinridge (1860)		0.007*** (0.001)		-0.012*** (0.002)
% Union Army enlistment		0.005*** (0.001)		0.026*** (0.001)
% Slaves in d (1860)		0.008*** (0.003)		-0.102*** (0.003)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Origin county \times year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination census division \times year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,909,978	2,060,712	4,530,763	3,191,940
Outcome mean	2.51	2.87	16.10	16.74
Adj. R ²	0.09	0.10	0.17	0.20


Notes: Estimates of equation (2), which regresses the probability ($\times 100$) that an origin county-destination county pair saw at least one migrant in a given Census window on a set of observable destination county characteristics. The set of destination counties excludes Southern counties belonging to states of the former Confederacy or Oklahoma and is limited to the same counties across all columns to best ensure comparability of migrant groups' chosen destination characteristics. The sample of migrants is based on linked Census records, which track (white male) migrants across Census periods for decades following the Civil War from 1870–1900. Migrants in columns 1–2 are those tracked from Southern origin counties to non-Southern destination counties. Migrants in columns 3–4 are those tracked from non-Southern origin counties to non-Southern destination counties outside of the origin state. All regressions include origin county \times year fixed effects and destination census division \times year fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered by origin and destination county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A.1: Mapping Southern White Migrants Outside the South in 1900

(a) Southern White Migrant Counts as of 1900



(b) Southern White Migrant Shares as of 1900



Notes: This figure maps county-level population (a) counts and (b) shares of white individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1900, according to the complete-count Census.

B SSIV Construction and Robustness Checks

B.1 Leveraging Push and Pull Factors for Identification

The sorting patterns in Appendix Table A.3 highlight the importance of strategies for addressing threats to causal identification in our county-level analyses in Section 4 and elsewhere. To address residual sorting biases, we control directly for the potential confounders in that table. Insofar as these confounders are leading to bias, our estimates should be sensitive to their inclusion in Table 4, and they are not. This suggests that our SSIV provides robust and excludable sources of identifying variation through the combination of push-factor-based shifts from Appendix Table A.1 with the predetermined shares underlying chain migration pathways from Appendix Table A.3. This Appendix provides additional details and results related to this SSIV strategy.

Shift-Share IV with Push Factors. Following Bazzi et al. (forthcoming) and building on Boustan (2010) and Derenoncourt (2022), we construct a SSIV for Southern white migrants outside the South in the early postbellum era. To do this, we use the linked Census records from Abramitzky et al. (2020) to approximate Southern white outmigration from Southern counties for Census periods 1870–1880 and 1880–1900. We then calculate for each Census period through $\tau \in \{1880, 1900\}$:

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{o,\tau} = \sum_{d=1}^D \left(\frac{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to } d \text{ in } \tau}{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to Census } \tau} \right) \times \text{Southern whites}_{o,\tau-1}, \quad (\text{B.1})$$

where o indicates Southern origin county, d indicates non-Southern destination county, and where the rightmost term, $\text{Southern whites}_{o,\tau-1}$, is based on the complete-count Census. In Bazzi et al. (forthcoming), we validate the accuracy of this approach for the mass Southern outflows during the Great Migration of the 20th century. Taking a similar approach here for the late 19th century, we see, in Appendix Figure B.1, that the estimated stocks of Southern white migrants from the linked Census closely approximate those based on the complete-count Census.

We then predict decade-specific shifts using zero-stage regressions of equation (1) in the paper, which relates the outcome from equation (B.1) to origin-county push factors discussed in Appendix A:

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{o\tau} = \alpha + \mathbf{push}'_{o,\tau-1} \boldsymbol{\beta}_\tau + \phi \text{population}_{o,\tau-1} + \varepsilon_{o\tau},$$


where $\mathbf{push}_{o,\tau-1}$ is the vector of Southern county push factors. Columns 1–2 of Appendix Table A.1 shows estimates for the set of push factors selected by a LASSO algorithm from a set of linear predictors. As in Bazzi et al. (forthcoming), we also include square terms and cross-term interactions of each predictor for the purposes of constructing our predicted shifts.

We then sum these decade- and county-specific predictions, $\widehat{\text{Southern white migrants}}_{o\tau}$, within Southern sending states to construct the aggregate predicted shifts, $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1870-1900}$, which denote the predicted change in the number of whites from Southern state j living outside the South between 1870 and 1900. These shifts are interacted with the cross-sectional shares of white migrants from Southern origin state j living in non-Southern county c in the 1870 complete-count Census, which we denote $\pi_{jc,1870}$. Appendix Figure B.2 maps the overall population share of Southern-born whites in each


county outside the South. Together, these predict the stock of Southern white migrants in 1900 as $Z_{c,1900} = \sum_{j=1}^J \pi_{jc,1870} \widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1870-1900}$, which we scale by the 1870 county population to generate the SSIV for % *Southern Whites* $_{c,1900}$.

Figure B.1: Validating the Linked-Sample Estimates of Southern White Migration

(a) Migration from 1870–80



(b) Migration from 1880–1900



Notes: Panel (a) plots the number of white men ages 10 and older from a Southern state (based on the BPL variable) in a non-Southern county using the 1880 full count Census against the number of white men from the same Southern state in the same non-Southern county who were successfully linked from 1870 to 1880 using the linked Census. Panel (b) plots the number of white men ages 20 and older from a Southern state (based on the BPL variable) in a non-Southern county using the 1900 full count Census against the number of white men from the same Southern state in the same non-Southern county who were successfully linked from 1880 to 1900 using the linked Census.

Table B.1: Push Factors for Southern Former Slaveholder Migrants, 1870–1900

Dependent Variable:	Southern Former Slaveholder Migrant Outflows		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
% Black population	-0.682*** (0.074)	-1.067*** (0.131)	-1.095*** (0.147)
Manufacturing output per capita	0.008 (0.054)	0.109 (0.130)	0.128 (0.095)
% from slaveholding households (1860)	0.791*** (0.135)	1.022*** (0.238)	0.815*** (0.136)
% from Confederate Army households (1860)	-1.000*** (0.119)	-1.456*** (0.214)	-1.221*** (0.125)
Any Civil War battles in county?	4.823 (3.892)	6.803 (6.131)	5.635 (3.595)
Tobacco county	4.591** (2.254)	13.511*** (4.408)	9.176*** (2.645)
Agricultural potential	-48.735*** (8.555)	-17.640 (22.373)	-33.621** (13.385)
Population size in sending counties	0.004*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
Cotton county		-11.775** (4.835)	-4.981* (2.714)
Average manufacturing wages			-0.351 (0.292)
% Vote share for Breckinridge (1860)			-0.019 (0.053)
% Slaves (1860)			0.253* (0.149)
Period	1870–1880	1880–1900	1870–1900
Year FE			Yes
Observations	1,019	1,017	2,036
Outcome mean	25.23	35.12	30.17
Adj. R ²	0.561	0.366	0.423


Notes: Estimates of a version of equation (1), which regresses a measure of Southern white former slaveholder migrant outflows from Southern counties on various observable origin county characteristics. These outflow measures from each origin county to non-Southern counties are based on linked Census records, which track (white male) migrants across Census periods for decades following the Civil War from 1870–1900. All columns use a linear LASSO specification to select optimal sets of covariates for each Census period. Column 3 pools data across years and estimates a version with year fixed effects. Sample counties include those in the twelve former Confederate states plus Oklahoma. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

To ensure sufficient orthogonal variation for identifying the distinct effects of (i) Southern white migrants overall and of (ii) former slaveholder migrants (e.g., as in Table 8), we construct a separate SSIV for the latter, using an alternative version of equation (B.1) above based on linked Southern former slaveholders in Southern counties, combined with linked outmigration flows of former slaveholders from each Southern county o to all non-Southern counties:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{slaveholder migrants}_{o,\tau} = & \sum_{d=1}^D \left(\frac{\# \text{ slaveholders in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to } d \text{ in } \tau}{\# \text{ slaveholders in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to } \tau} \right) \\
& \times \left(\frac{\# \text{ slaveholders in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to } 1860}{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } \tau-1 \text{ linked to } 1860} \right) \\
& \times \text{Southern whites}_{o,\tau-1},
\end{aligned} \tag{B.2}$$

where d indicates non-Southern destination counties and the last term, $Southern\ whites_{o,\tau-1}$, is based on the complete-count Census in the previous Census period. As above, we predict decade-specific shifts using zeroth stage regressions, which relate the measure produced from equation (B.2) to the origin-county push factors discussed in Appendix A, again using a LASSO algorithm selecting from all linear, square, and cross-term interactions of those push factors (see columns 1–2 of Appendix Table B.1 for zeroth-stage estimates from a simple linear approach). The output from these flexible LASSO regressions are then summed within Southern sending states to construct aggregate predicted shifts for 1870–1900. Finally, these shifts are interacted with cross-sectional shares of migrants, from Southern origin state j linked to non-Southern county c in the 1870 complete-count Census, and then scaled by 1870 county population to yield an SSIV for former slaveholder migrants in 1900.

Figure B.2: Mapping Southern White Migrants Outside the South in 1870



Notes: This figure maps county-level population shares of white individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1870, according to the complete-count Census.

B.2 SSIV Robustness Checks

Table B.2: Further Restricting Confederate Leader Name Inputs in Table 2

Dependent Variable: Leader Name Inputs:	Any Confederate Memorials?					
	≥ 2 Word Name Inputs			≥ 3 Word Name Inputs		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.015*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.011* (0.006)	0.027*** (0.009)	0.022*** (0.008)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Sorting controls			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,701	1,701	1,699	1,701	1,701	1,699
Outcome mean	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.10	0.10	0.10
F-statistic	30.6	15.0	15.3	30.6	15.0	15.3
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.01
KP Underident., p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Regressions of Confederate memorials (coded as any Confederacy leader-inspired monuments as well as matched place names, street names or school names) on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in non-Southern counties (sample mean of 2.2%). Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Columns 1–3 identify Confederate location names using only the subset of Confederate leader name inputs with at least two words, while columns 4–6 restrict further to those with at least three words (including initials). All columns instrument the share of Southern whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted change in the Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation (1)). Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles). Additional sorting controls include cotton, tobacco, and overall agricultural potential, Black shares in 1870, slave shares in 1860, Union Army enlistment and mortality rates, Breckinridge vote shares in 1860, and dummies for on the frontier in 1860 and never on the frontier, based on [Bazzi et al. \(2020\)](#). All continuous baseline and sorting controls are entered flexibly using quadratic terms. All regressions control for the share of Southern whites in 1870 and include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.3: Breaking Out Confederate Memorialization in Table 2

Dependent Variable:	Any Confederate Monuments?		Any Confederate Place Names?		Any Confederate Street Names?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	% Southern Whites, 1900	0.023*** (0.008)	0.021*** (0.008)	0.014** (0.007)	0.012* (0.007)	0.025** (0.010)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sorting controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,701	1,699	1,701	1,699	1,701	1,699
Outcome mean	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.16
F-statistic	15.0	15.3	15.0	15.3	15.0	15.3
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.00	0.01	0.10	0.15	0.00	0.01
KP Underident., p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00


Notes: Regressions of (i) Confederate monuments, (ii) Confederate leader-inspired place names, and (iii) Confederate leader-inspired street names on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in non-Southern counties (sample mean of 2.2%). Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. All columns instrument the share of Southern whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted change in the Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation (1)). Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles). Additional sorting controls include cotton, tobacco, and overall agricultural potential, Black shares in 1870, slave shares in 1860, Union Army enlistment and mortality rates, Breckinridge vote shares in 1860, and dummies for on the frontier in 1860 and never on the frontier, based on [Bazzi et al. \(2020\)](#). All continuous baseline and sorting controls are entered flexibly using quadratic terms. All regressions control for the share of Southern whites in 1870 and include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.4: Placebo: Using White Lynchings in Table 3

Dependent Variable:	Any Lynchings of Whites?			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control			Yes	Yes
Sorting controls				Yes
Observations	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,699
Outcome mean	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R ²	0.00			
F-statistic		30.6	15.0	15.3
Anderson-Rubin, p-val		0.78	0.80	0.85
KP Underident., p-val		0.00	0.00	0.00


Notes: Regressions of any recorded lynchings of whites on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in non-Southern counties (sample mean of 2.2%). Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Columns 2–4 instrument the share of Southern whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted change in the Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions (see equation (1)). Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles). Additional sorting controls in column 4 include cotton, tobacco, and overall agricultural potential, Black shares in 1870, slave shares in 1860, Union Army enlistment and mortality rates, Breckinridge vote shares in 1860, and dummies for on the frontier in 1860 and never on the frontier, based on [Bazzi et al. \(2020\)](#). All continuous baseline and sorting controls are entered flexibly using quadratic terms. Columns 3–4 control for the share of Southern whites in 1870, and all regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure B.3: Sensitivity to Sample Changes



Notes: Coefficients from IV regressions of Confederate cultural activity after 1900 (score 0–4) on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in non-Southern counties. All regressions include the set of controls from columns 3 and 6 in Tables 2 and 3. Estimates are compared to one with all states included, which is reported in the solid vertical red line in the respective graphs. Panel a excludes Southern sending states one-by-one when constructing the 1900 share of Southern whites living outside the South in a given non-Southern county c as well as the instrumental variable, with the excluded sending state reported on the vertical axis. The instrumental variables regressions instrument the share of Southern whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and the predicted change in the Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. Panel b excludes receiving states one-by-one where the excluded state is reported on the vertical axis. The dashed red line marks zero. Error bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#).

Figure B.4: SSIV Using Random Placebo Shifts



Notes: Coefficients from IV regressions of Confederate cultural activity after 1900 (score 0–4) on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in all non-Southern counties. The share of Southern whites in 1900 is instrumented using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern whites and a **randomly generated shift**. The random shift was generated based on a normal distribution with mean zero and variance five as in [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#). The figure shows the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from instrumental variables regressions where the instrument was generated with 1,000 random shifts. All regressions include the set of controls from columns 3 and 6 in [Tables 2 and 3](#). Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#).


C Further Exploring the Southern Slaveholder Diaspora

In this Appendix, we further explore the subset of the Confederate diaspora that was made up of former slaveholders within the antebellum South, as well as their direct kin. We begin by comparing their spatial and occupational sorting patterns to others in the Confederate diaspora without such ties to the institution of slavery. We then consider how their occupation choices influenced the diffusion of Confederate culture and other outcomes, using several additional robustness exercises. We conclude this Appendix by contextualizing these sorting patterns, and the implications thereof, through several back-of-the-envelope estimates of the former slaveholder diaspora’s size and geographic scope.

C.1 Characterizing the Southern Slaveholder Diaspora

Our analysis in Section 5 highlights the role of former slaveholders within the Confederate diaspora to driving its overall influence. Who were these slaveholder migrants? We begin by showing, in Appendix Figure C.1, that former slaveholders were more strongly attached to Confederate culture than were other Southern white migrants without slaveholding experience in the South as of 1860. The graph provides further validation of the hypothesis that former slaveholders maintained stronger affinity with the Confederacy even after they left its erstwhile border into the rest of the U.S. The remainder of this appendix then expands upon our sorting analyses in Section 3 and Appendix A in an effort to further characterize former slaveholder migrants within the diaspora.

Figure C.1: Confederate Leader Names among Children of Southern Former Slaveholders



Notes: Confederate leader name frequencies across five-year birth year intervals from 1801 to 1880 for children (ages 0–9) in the U.S. complete-count 1860, 1870, and 1880 Censuses among different subsets of Southern white fathers in the U.S. Census: those born to Southern white fathers who were matched to the 1860 Slave Schedule (i.e., former slaveholders) and those born to Southern white fathers who were not matched to the 1860 Slave Schedule and who were not matched to the same household as someone matched to the 1860 Slave Schedule (i.e., were not slaveholders or kin). The latter group of fathers (non-slaveholders) thus also includes Southern whites who were not successfully linked to the 1860 Census. An individual’s Confederate name match equals one if their given, first name is highly likely to have been given in reference to a Confederate leader. This includes individuals whose first name includes a leader’s full name (e.g., “Robert Lee”), as well as distinctive nicknames like Stonewall and last names like Beauregard. The list of Confederate leader names includes those with multiple public symbols in the Confederacy in the Southern Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) “Whose Heritage?” Project.

Destination Characteristics of Former Slaveholder Migrants. We examine former slaveholders’ typical destination choices, relative to the average postbellum Southern white migrant. To do this, we use linked Census records from the Census Linking Project (Abramitzky et al., 2020), which allow us to study sorting behavior among a subsample of Southern white migrants that can be linked back to the 1860 Census—and therefore potentially to the 1860 Slave Schedule. These linked Census records provide information on migrants’ county of origin and decade of migration. With this tracking ability, we can estimate the following equation, using a stacked sample of Southern white migrants for the Census periods through $\tau \in \{1880, 1900\}$:

$$y_{idor\tau} = \alpha \text{slaveholder}_{idor\tau} + \mathbf{x}'_{idor\tau}\beta + \eta_{o\tau} + \varepsilon_{idor\tau},$$

where $y_{idor\tau}$ denotes some characteristic of destination county d of Southern white migrant i from origin county o in the Census period through τ . Using our baseline definition of former slaveholders based on listed slaveholders (panel a) and another that also includes their direct kin (panel b), Appendix Table C.1 shows that Southern slaveholder migrants, relative to non-slaveholders, gravitated towards more remote Western counties that looked more economically, agroclimatically, and politically similar to the South. These patterns speak to the possibility, raised in historical accounts, that former slaveholder migrants may have sought out areas where the socioeconomic hierarchies of the South might be replicated. We discuss these estimates in Section 3.

Table C.1: Destination Characteristics of Former Slaveholder Migrants

Dependent Variable:	West (1)	Log Population Density (2)	Cotton County (3)	% Vote Share for Breckinridge, 1860 (4)	% Union Army Enlistment (5)	% Slaves, 1860 (6)
(a) Based on Listed Slaveholders Only						
Former Slaveholder	0.022*** (0.008)	-0.115* (0.059)	0.082*** (0.012)	1.223** (0.504)	-2.213** (0.877)	1.754*** (0.294)
Observations	27,878	27,370	27,878	23,533	25,721	26,436
Non-slaveholder mean	0.11	3.81	0.51	17.84	34.36	4.22
(b) Also Based on Slaveholder Household Members						
Former Slaveholder	0.031*** (0.005)	-0.117*** (0.038)	0.080*** (0.008)	1.673*** (0.309)	-1.856*** (0.525)	2.246*** (0.177)
Observations	27,878	27,370	27,878	23,533	25,721	26,436
Non-slaveholder mean	0.11	3.83	0.50	17.41	34.63	3.84

Notes: Regressions of observable destination county characteristics among white male migrants tracked from Southern to non-Southern counties between 1870–1880 or 1880–1900 on a dummy for a migrant’s former slaveholding status as of 1860 (equal to one for about 6% of sample individuals in row i). The set of destination counties excludes Southern counties belonging to states of the former Confederacy or Oklahoma. The sample of former slaveholders is constructed from the 1860 U.S. Census Slave Schedule, which we match to the 1860 U.S. Census of Population. We then use linked Census records to track white male migrants from Southern to non-Southern counties across Census periods for decades following the Civil War from 1870–1900. For comparability, all individuals in the sample must be able to be matched to the 1860 Census. All regressions include origin county \times year fixed effects. Individual controls include a cubic in age, marital status, and number of children. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Former Slaveholder Sorting into Positions of Authority. Occupational sorting patterns at destination likewise speak to the incentives and preferences of these former slaveholder migrants. For context, we begin by briefly reviewing the occupational sorting patterns of postbellum Southern white migrants more generally, before highlighting the distinct choices of former slaveholder migrants therein. Recall that Table 1 uses the 1900 complete-count U.S. Census to characterize occupational sorting patterns

of white working-age men in the postbellum Southern white diaspora, relative to non-Southern whites. Panel (b) of Table 1 further limits the sample to out-of-state migrants, estimating the following equation:

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{occupation}_{id} = \text{occ}) = \alpha \text{southern}_i + \mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\beta} + \theta_d + \varepsilon_{id},$$

where “occ” denotes various occupational choices. These include the following positions of authority:

- *Law enforcement*: includes policemen and detectives (occ1950=773, occscore=32), marshals and constables (occ1950=771, occscore=24), and sheriffs and bailiffs (occ1950=782, occscore=30). In 1900, 37,811 men outside of the South were working as policemen or detectives, 6,570 as marshals or constables, and 5,827 as sheriffs or bailiffs, for a total of 50,208 men with an average occscore of 30.7.
- *Legal occupations*: includes lawyers and judges (occ1950=55, occscore=62). In 1900, 83,301 men outside of the South were working as a lawyer or judge.
- *Public administration*: includes officials and administrators (n.e.c.), public administration (occ1950=250, occscore=36). In 1900, 20,530 men outside of the South were working as a public official or administrator.
- *Education*: includes teachers (n.e.c.) (occ1950=93, occscore=27), college presidents and deans (occ1950=10, occscore=41), and professors and instructors (occ1950=12-29, occscore=41). In 1900, 106,208 men outside of the South were working as teachers, 197 as college presidents or deans, and 3,259 as college professors and instructors, for a total of 109,664 men with an average occscore of 27.4.
- *Religious occupations*: includes clergyman (occ1950=9, occscore=24) and other religious workers (occ1950=78, occscore=15). In 1900, 90,987 men outside of the South were working as a clergyman and another 2,108 as religious workers, for a total of 93,095 men with an average occscore of 23.8.

These specifications (columns 3–7) control for relevant individual characteristics (\mathbf{x}_i : age, age², age³, marital status, and number of children) and destination county fixed effects, θ_d . We document substantial occupational sorting toward positions of authority throughout Table 1 by postbellum Southern white migrants—for instance, into occupations of governance as well as religion—which we discuss at length in Section 3. We find similar patterns among migrants’ (non-Southern) children in Table 12.

To understand the distinct role played by former slaveholder migrants (and kin) in driving these patterns, we must again turn to the subsample of migrants available through the linked Census records. We then estimate the following equation, using a stacked sample of Southern white migrants for the Census periods through $\tau \in \{1880, 1900\}$:

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{occupation}_{id\tau} = \text{occ} \mid \text{southern white migrant}) = \alpha \text{slaveholder}_{id\tau} + \mathbf{x}'_{id\tau} \boldsymbol{\beta} + \theta_{d\tau} + \eta_{o\tau} + \varepsilon_{id\tau}.$$

Appendix Table C.2 shows that the former slaveholders were even more likely than non-slaveholders in the diaspora to sort into certain public-facing positions of authority, especially in law enforcement and public administration.

Table C.2: Occupational Sorting by Former Slaveholders in the Confederate Diaspora

Dependent Variable:	Any Authority Position		Lawyers or Judges	Law Enforcement	Public Administrators	Religious Workers	Educators
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(a) Based on Listed Slaveholders Only							
Former Slaveholder	1.488** (0.663)	0.972** (0.457)	0.626* (0.361)	0.127 (0.153)	0.423* (0.254)	0.114 (0.324)	0.198 (0.252)
Observations	23,362	23,362	23,362	23,362	23,362	23,362	23,362
Non-slaveholder mean	2.50	2.50	0.76	0.26	0.15	0.91	0.43
(b) Also Based on Slaveholder Household Members							
Former Slaveholder	1.084*** (0.346)	0.441* (0.228)	0.774*** (0.218)	-0.016 (0.071)	0.177** (0.085)	0.052 (0.175)	0.097 (0.127)
Observations	23,362	23,362	23,362	23,362	23,362	23,362	23,362
Non-slaveholder mean	2.33	2.33	0.62	0.27	0.15	0.87	0.42
Occup. Income Category FE	No	Yes	–	–	–	–	–
Origin County×Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination County×Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Regressions of various occupation indicators ($\times 100$) among white working-aged male migrants tracked from Southern to non-Southern counties between 1870–1880 or 1880–1900 on a dummy for a migrant’s former slaveholding status as of 1860 (equal to one for about 6% of sample individuals in row i). The “any authority” occupation indicator is based on any of the five positions of authority in columns 3–7. The set of destination counties excludes Southern counties belonging to states of the former Confederacy or Oklahoma. The sample of former slaveholders is constructed from the 1860 U.S. Census Slave Schedule, which we match to the 1860 U.S. Census of Population. We then use linked Census records to track white male migrants from Southern to non-Southern counties across Census periods for decades following the Civil War from 1870–1900. For comparability, all individuals in the sample must be able to be matched to the 1860 Census. All regressions include origin county \times year and destination county \times year fixed effects. Individual controls include a cubic in age, marital status, and number of children. Column 2 additionally controls for occupational income category fixed effects, based on bins of *occscore* width = 2. Occupational classifications follow those laid out by the Census Bureau’s 1950 (“occ1950”) definitions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Beyond showing that Southern white migrants and especially former slaveholder migrants sorted strongly into positions of authority, we can also comment on whether this reflects a comparative advantage and/or taste for working in positions of authority, or is simply a byproduct of migrants’ elite socioeconomic status that traveled with them as they left the South (see Appendix Table C.3). Of course, many of these positions of authority happen to be characterized by high income. Given former slaveholders’ elite backgrounds in particular, it is possible that these sorting patterns simply reflect sorting into high-income occupations.

Table C.3: Individual Characteristics of Migrants Versus Stayers

Characteristic:	All Linked Southern Whites				Former Slaveholders Only			
	Occ. Income Score (1)	Working in Position of Authority (2)	Working in Agriculture (3)	Slaveholder in 1860 (4)	Occ. Income Score (5)	Working in Position of Authority (6)	Working in Agriculture (7)	Number of Slaves in 1860 (8)
Outmigrant	0.961*** (0.146)	0.363*** (0.109)	-8.410*** (0.477)	-0.045*** (0.003)	1.199*** (0.390)	0.969* (0.496)	-6.257*** (1.203)	0.080 (0.455)
Observations	285,138	344,988	344,988	344,988	31,917	36,240	36,240	36,240
Outcome mean (non-migrant)	16.32	1.68	64.68	0.11	18.08	2.83	12.04	6.27

Notes: Regressions of various individual characteristics among white men living in the South in 1860 (columns 1–4) and among slaveholders living in the South in 1860 (columns 5–8) on whether they subsequently migrated to the non-South between 1870–1880 or 1880–1900. The sample of former slaveholders is constructed from the 1860 U.S. Census Slave Schedule, which we match to the 1860 U.S. Census of Population. We then use linked Census records to track which white male migrants moved from Southern to non-Southern counties across Census periods for decades following the Civil War from 1870–1900. For comparability, all individuals in the sample must be able to be matched to the 1860 Census. All regressions include origin county×year fixed effects. Individual controls include a cubic in age, marital status, and number of children. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.



We examine this possibility in two ways. First, columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 and Appendix Table C.2 group the five authority occupations into a single indicator. Column 2 additionally uses information on occupational income scores to compare occupational sorting patterns *within* occupational income categories. These estimates show sorting by Southern white migrants, and even more so by former slaveholder migrants, into positions of authority—even after controlling for income.

Second, we run a large set of regressions using the specifications from panels (a) and (b) of each of these tables and then plot, in Appendix Figure C.2, the main regression coefficients against the occupational income score of the regressions' given occupation. Across all of these, we fail to estimate a statistically significant correlation between differential sorting and occupational income (see the dashed regression line and corresponding estimates in bottom right of each graph panel). This further suggests that earnings potential alone is not driving sorting. For instance, sorting into the legal and religious sector is significantly stronger than sorting into a number of occupations of comparable earnings potential. Put differently, among occupations at similar levels of income, those with public-facing authority are more likely to attract Southern white migrants in the Confederate diaspora, and especially the former slaveholders therein. These migrants in the Confederate diaspora are differentially more likely to work in these authority positions than are non-Southerners, including migrants from elsewhere in the country.

Figure C.2: Occupational Sorting: Authority Versus Income



(a) Southern White Sorting (panel a of Table 1)

(b) Southern White Sorting (panel b of Table 1)



(c) Slaveholder Sorting (panel a of App. Table C.2)

(d) Slaveholder Sorting (panel b of App. Table C.2)



Notes: Triangles denote coefficients from regressions of occupations on a Southern-origin indicator among working-age males outside the South (panels a and b) and a former slaveholder indicator among Southern white migrants outside the South (panels c and d). Details for all specifications correspond to those for columns 3–7 in panels (a and b) of Table 1 and panels (a and b) of Appendix Table C.2, respectively. See the notes to those tables for all details. Triangle darkness denotes significance level (i.e., light grey = $p < 0.10$, grey = $p < 0.05$, black = $p < 0.01$).

C.2 The Distinct Influence of Former Slaveholder Migrants

This section further illustrates the distinct influence of former slaveholders within the Confederate diaspora, through a series of robustness and placebo checks on Tables 9, 10, and 13.

First, Appendix Tables C.4 and C.5 extend Table 9 to consider the relative importance of sorting into occupations of authority by postbellum Southern white migrants more generally. Appendix Table C.5 extends Appendix Table C.4 by controlling for (instrumented) slaveholder migrant shares. These results together further suggest the central role of former slaveholders in driving our county-level effects.

Second, Appendix Table C.6 extends Table 9 through a set of placebo regressions, which consider the relative importance of sorting by these migrants into occupations of similar income and sector size to our positions of authority, but with no de jure component of power or influence. Of course, some of these more private-facing positions, like medical doctors (the placebo for lawyer/judge), may still entail considerable scope for public influence. As such, we interpret these placebos with a measure of caution.

In what follows, we describe placebo occupation(s) for each authority occupation:

- For *law enforcement* occupations: mechanics and repairmen (n.e.c.) (occ1950=554, occscore=30), funeral directors and embalmers (occ1950=54, occscore=31), and sports instructors and officials (occ1950=91, occscore=32). In 1900, 31,119 men outside of the South were working as mechanics or repairmen, 13,528 as funeral directors or embalmers, and 6,185 as sports instructors or sports officials, for a total of 50,832 men with an average occscore of 30.5.
- For *legal* occupations: physicians and surgeons (occ1950=75, occscore=80). In 1900, 113,070 men outside of the South were working as physicians and surgeons.
- For *public administrative* occupations: railroad switchmen (occ1950=681, occscore=36) and advertising agents and salesmen (occ1950=400, occscore=35). In 1900, 17,644 men outside of the South were working as switchmen and 3,021 working as advertising agents or salesman, for a total of 20,665 men with an average occscore of 35.9.
- For *education* occupations: metal molders (occ1950=561, occscore=28), photographers (occ1950=74, occscore=27); Glaziers (occ1950=530, occscore=28), and surveyors (occ1950=92, occscore=28). In 1900, 82,468 men outside of the South were working as metal molders, 21,587 as photographers, 2,407 as glaziers, and 3,745 as surveyors, for a total of 110,207 men with an average occscore of 27.8.
- For *religious* occupations: textile weavers (occ1950=684, occscore=23), apprentice machinists and toolmakers (occ1950=604, occscore=24), and metalworking trades apprentices (n.e.c.) (occ1950=612, occscore=23). In 1900, 77,079 men outside of the South were working as textile weavers, 9,579 as apprentice machinists or toolmakers, and 5,037 as metalworking trades apprentices, for a total of 92,325 men with an average occscore of 23.1.

The first set of estimates in Appendix Tables C.6 reiterate those in Table 9 above, wherein local public officials and religious leaders with ties to slavery played a uniquely important role in diffusing Confederate culture and white supremacy, even beyond the baseline effect of former slaveholder migrants. In contrast, placebo occupations of comparable income but less public authority exhibit little such importance, with estimates that are smaller and statistically insignificant across specifications. This again suggests that occupational pathways to public influence were key to former slaveholder migrants' outsized influence.

Finally, Appendix Table C.7 augments the specifications in in Table 13 to explore the long shadow of former slaveholders in shaping Black opportunities outside the South. SSIV estimates show that, as with the short-run influence of the Confederate diaspora, its enduring legacy is largely explained by former slaveholder migrants.

Table C.4: Using All Linked Southern White Migrants for Table 9

Dependent Variable:	Confederate Cultural Activity (CCI Score, from 0–4)						Any Confederate Memorials?	Any UDC Chapters?	Any KKK Chapters?	Any Lynchings of Blacks?
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.129*** (0.039)	0.130*** (0.039)	0.129*** (0.040)	0.120*** (0.040)	0.124*** (0.038)	0.116*** (0.040)	0.032*** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.013)	0.031* (0.016)	0.017* (0.010)
<i>Any Linked White ... from South?</i>										
Public Administrators	0.192 (0.179)					0.157 (0.172)	-0.019 (0.061)	0.046 (0.062)	0.122* (0.072)	0.008 (0.050)
Religious Workers		0.361 (0.260)				0.099 (0.186)	0.186 (0.134)	-0.014 (0.158)	0.056 (0.234)	-0.130** (0.053)
Law Enforcement			0.408** (0.159)			0.334** (0.149)	0.098 (0.068)	0.140** (0.063)	0.067 (0.063)	0.030 (0.047)
Lawyers or Judges				0.393*** (0.090)		0.336*** (0.091)	0.076* (0.040)	0.080** (0.031)	0.104** (0.043)	0.076** (0.031)
Educators					0.289*** (0.103)	0.175* (0.100)	0.031 (0.051)	0.112*** (0.040)	0.051 (0.047)	-0.019 (0.027)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701	1,701
Outcome mean	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.25	0.09	0.37	0.05
F-statistic	15.0	14.9	15.4	14.7	14.7	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03
KP Underident., p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: This table re-estimates Tables 9 excluding former slaveholder migrant shares and including county-level indicators for whether any Southern white male migrants (linked to a Southern household in 1860) is working in a given occupation in that non-Southern county in 1900. See the notes of Tables 8 for all other details on the specification. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.5: Controlling for Former Slaveholder Migrants in Table C.4

Dependent Variable:	Confederate Cultural Activity (CCI Score, from 0–4)						Any Confederate Memorials?	Any UDC Chapters?	Any KKK Chapters?	Any Lynchings of Blacks?
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
% Southern Whites, 1900	-0.043 (0.063)	-0.042 (0.063)	-0.043 (0.063)	-0.048 (0.062)	-0.042 (0.063)	-0.049 (0.063)	-0.016 (0.020)	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.023)	-0.016 (0.015)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900	2.703** (1.095)	2.690** (1.101)	2.704** (1.095)	2.708** (1.100)	2.691** (1.127)	2.742** (1.129)	0.777** (0.351)	0.871** (0.353)	0.570 (0.402)	0.524** (0.248)
<i>Any Linked White ... from South?</i>										
Public Administrators	0.145 (0.261)					0.120 (0.259)	-0.029 (0.082)	0.034 (0.082)	0.113 (0.089)	0.002 (0.060)
Religious Workers		0.148 (0.309)				-0.036 (0.285)	0.149 (0.140)	-0.056 (0.165)	0.025 (0.243)	-0.155** (0.073)
Law Enforcement			0.375* (0.223)			0.352 (0.220)	0.103 (0.074)	0.146* (0.086)	0.067 (0.075)	0.036 (0.057)
Lawyers or Judges				0.227 (0.138)		0.209 (0.141)	0.040 (0.050)	0.039 (0.045)	0.079 (0.054)	0.051 (0.037)
Educators					0.014 (0.202)	-0.073 (0.203)	-0.040 (0.070)	0.033 (0.072)	-0.001 (0.069)	-0.066 (0.042)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679
Outcome mean	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.25	0.09	0.38	0.05
KP Joint F-statistic	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
KP Underident., p-val	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02

Notes: This table re-estimates Tables 9 alongside county-level indicators, based on any Southern white (male) migrants linked to any Southern household (as of 1860) working in a given occupation in that non-Southern county (as of 1900). See the notes of Tables 8 for all other details on instruments and controls. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.6: Placebo Exercise: Using Non-Authority Positions of Similar Income in Table 9

Dependent Variable:	Confederate Cultural Activity (CCI Score, from 0–4)												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
% Southern Whites, 1900	-0.048 (0.064)	-0.040 (0.062)	-0.042 (0.063)	-0.042 (0.063)	-0.041 (0.062)	-0.042 (0.063)	-0.042 (0.062)	-0.044 (0.062)	-0.041 (0.063)	-0.041 (0.063)	-0.047 (0.062)	-0.042 (0.060)	-0.046 (0.060)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900	2.731** (1.105)	2.670** (1.087)	2.705** (1.102)	2.691** (1.097)	2.675** (1.092)	2.690** (1.108)	2.648** (1.116)	2.719** (1.089)	2.729** (1.160)	2.674** (1.097)	2.724** (1.176)	2.676** (1.080)	2.720** (1.146)
<i>Any Linked ... from Southern Slaveholder Households?</i>													
Public Administrators	0.735*** (0.227)										0.727*** (0.237)		0.705*** (0.249)
Public Administrators (Placebo)		0.598 (0.505)										0.537 (0.544)	0.531 (0.571)
Religious Workers			1.140*** (0.182)								1.141*** (0.182)		1.128*** (0.181)
Religious Workers (Placebo)				0.130 (0.364)								0.110 (0.373)	0.096 (0.392)
Law Enforcement					0.192 (0.329)						0.270 (0.354)		0.189 (0.374)
Law Enforcement (Placebo)						0.086 (0.448)						0.018 (0.436)	0.034 (0.424)
Lawyers or Judges							0.222 (0.212)				0.227 (0.214)		0.184 (0.206)
Lawyers or Judges (Placebo)								0.166 (0.237)				0.144 (0.243)	0.095 (0.247)
Educators									-0.160 (0.341)		-0.258 (0.345)		-0.265 (0.333)
Educators (Placebo)										0.227 (0.250)		0.168 (0.246)	0.121 (0.245)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679
Outcome mean	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77
KP Joint F-statistic	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.6	2.4
KP Underident., p-val	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02

Notes: This table re-estimates Tables 9 alongside county-level indicators, based on any Southern white (male) migrants linked to former slaveholder households (as of 1860) working in a given occupation in that non-Southern county (as of 1900). Placebo categories are constructed to be of similar size and occupational income score (occscore) to their comparison category, while lacking the authority component. See the notes of Tables 8 for all other details on instruments and controls. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.7: Using Southern Former Slaveholders for Table 13

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(a) Dep. Var.: Black to Non-Black Earnings Ratio, 1940							
% Southern Whites, 1900	-0.039*** (0.014)			0.028 (0.042)	0.024 (0.042)	0.020 (0.031)	0.038 (0.059)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		-0.393** (0.189)	-0.423** (0.191)	-0.978 (0.663)	-0.932 (0.673)	-0.834* (0.461)	-1.040 (0.954)
(b) Dep. Var.: Black Residential Segregation, 1940							
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.007** (0.003)			-0.008 (0.006)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.007)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		0.079** (0.037)	0.081** (0.036)	0.234** (0.118)	0.241* (0.126)	0.214** (0.097)	0.204* (0.118)
(c) Dep. Var.: Black Residential Segregation, 2000							
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.009*** (0.003)			-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		0.105*** (0.030)	0.110*** (0.031)	0.223** (0.091)	0.219** (0.095)	0.204*** (0.076)	0.154* (0.080)
(d) Dep. Var.: Black County Jail Shares, 2010–18							
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.757** (0.313)			-1.404 (0.997)	-1.316 (1.020)	-1.054 (0.699)	-1.415 (1.131)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		6.643* (3.763)	8.054** (3.809)	34.501** (16.806)	33.249* (17.183)	29.190** (12.473)	33.843* (18.152)
(e) Dep. Var.: Any Police Killings of Blacks, 2013–20							
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.034** (0.013)			0.010 (0.013)	0.010 (0.014)	0.008 (0.012)	0.023* (0.013)
% Southern Former Slaveholders, 1900		0.299** (0.127)	0.298** (0.125)	0.413 (0.257)	0.424 (0.274)	0.454* (0.268)	0.255 (0.269)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1870 share control(s)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
% Non-Southern slaveholders control			Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Linked Census measures only?						Yes	
Sorting controls							Yes
Observations	1,701	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,679	1,677
KP Joint F-statistic	15.0	19.8	20.2	2.5	2.4	3.9	2.6
KP Joint Underident., p-val	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01
% S. Whites, SW F-statistic				7.1	6.5	6.5	6.8
% S. Whites, Underident., p-val				0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
% Slaveholders, SW F-statistic				5.1	4.8	4.8	5.2
% Slaveholders, Underident., p-val				0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 13 using the same set of specifications, across columns, as Table 8. See the notes therein for details. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C.3 The Size and Scope of the Southern Slaveholder Diaspora

In this section, we use the linked Census data—in combination with complete-count Census data and estimates from this Appendix—to further characterize the size and geographic spread of the former slaveholder diaspora. We develop several back-of-the-envelope estimates, both of the number of former slaveholder migrants from the South between 1870 and 1900 and of their entry into key positions of authority outside the South. These estimates help clarify the magnitude of sorting among former slaveholders. They also illustrate just how pervasive former slaveholders were among the Confederate diaspora, and how overrepresented they were in positions of influence within their new communities. Together, these results provide useful context for the effects observed, for instance, in Tables 8 and 9.

How Many Southern (Slaveholder) Migrants Were There? Although it is difficult to quantify precisely how many Southern whites, and former slaveholders in particular, left the former Confederacy for the rest of the country in the three decades after the Civil War, we aim to impute these flows using data from the complete-count and linked Census records from the Census Linking Project (Abramitzky et al., 2020). Based on these, we estimate at least 921,119 Southern white migrants from 1870–1900, including 61,430 former slaveholders and an additional 127,696 of their household kin. These counts are constructed as follows: for each of these three groups, we calculate an outmigration rate between 0 and 1 for each Census period through $\tau \in \{1880, 1900\}$ from each Southern county. We then multiply these by a measure of the relevant origin county population from the previous Census period $\tau - 1$.

Concretely, to estimate total Southern white migrant flows, we first use the linked Census records together with the complete-count Census to approximate the number of Southern white migrants from each origin county to all non-Southern counties for each Census period, based on equation (B.1). Aggregating across all Southern origin county-years, this gives us an estimate of the *total Southern white migrant population* from all Southern counties to all non-Southern counties, of 921,119 individuals.

We repeat the same process for former slaveholder migrants, using the share of linked former slaveholders in a given Southern county in a given Census year to impute the initial former slaveholder population from which migrants were sourced. Concretely, we use the linked Census records together with the complete-count Census to approximate, for each Census period, total Southern former slaveholder outmigration flows from o to all non-Southern counties, based on equation (B.2). Aggregating across all Southern origin county-years, this gives us a count estimate of the *total former slaveholder migrant population* from all Southern counties to all non-Southern counties, of 61,430 individuals.

Note that while the first two terms in equation (B.2) are constructed using only the available data on linked men, our final approximation is gender inclusive. This is based on the fact that (i) some slaveholders in the 1860 Slave Schedule were women, and (ii) slaves were implicitly the property of both a listed slaveholder and their spouse. This choice is supported by the fact that the share of all male Southern white migrants that were slaveholders in our linked samples, as used for Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2, is about 6%, which is similar to the share implied by the counts here. We also construct an even broader measure of former slaveholders that also includes direct household kin. In this measure, the first two terms in equation (B.2) further include male household members of a listed slaveholder, e.g., sons. This imputation produces a count estimate of the *total migrant population from former slaveholder households* from all Southern counties to all non-Southern counties, of 189,126 individuals.

Note that because Census linking is imperfect and generally limited to men, actual counts are likely

to differ from these. At the same time, use of linked Census records for the purposes of constructing aggregate data is shown to be accurate, for a slightly later period, in the parallel work of [Bazzi et al. \(forthcoming\)](#). Insofar as these estimates are accurate, it would imply that former slaveholders made up about 6.7% of the Confederate diaspora formed over 1870–1900, with their household kin making up an additional 13.9% of the diaspora.

How Pervasive were Former Slaveholder Migrants in Positions of Authority? Although former slaveholders were somewhat rare within the Confederate diaspora—and even more so overall—our analyses throughout Section 3 and in the Appendix thus far suggest that former slaveholder migrants especially sorted into nascent communities in the West and, once there, sorted strongly into positions of authority and influence. As a result of their overrepresentation in positions of authority, especially where culture and institutions were incipient, former slaveholder migrants were able to play a distinct and outsized role in spreading Confederate culture and in entrenching it in local institutions.

We now put these occupational sorting patterns into more concrete perspective, in order to further illustrate how the slaveholder diaspora could have had such large effects despite its small scale. We construct an additional set of back-of-the-envelope estimates for the purposes of examining the extent of local entry into key occupations, relative to local occupational sector size.

We construct these estimates as follows. First, because use of the linked Census is limited when it comes to linking migrant individuals within narrow occupational categories across Censuses, we instead use our estimates from Appendix Table C.2 to back out shares of all former slaveholder migrants working in a given occupation. We do this for all sectors estimated as relevant in Tables 9 and/or 10, which includes our various governance (law enforcement, lawyers and judges, and public administration) and religious occupations—all of which demonstrated disproportionate sorting by Southern former slaveholders relative to non-Southern whites (see Table 1 and Appendix Table C.2 together).

Second, we calculate for each non-Southern county d the total number of former slaveholder migrants in a given occupation. As occupations of authority were generally dominated by white men in 1900, we estimate former slaveholder migrants counts conservatively using total white male populations in 1900 from the complete-count Census, multiplied by former slaveholder migrant shares calculated from the linked Census records:


$$\text{former slaveholder}_{d,1900} = \left(\frac{\# \text{ slaveholders in } d \text{ in 1900 linked to South in 1860}}{\# \text{ white men in } d \text{ in 1900 linked to 1860}} \right) \times \text{white men}_{d,1900},$$

which we then multiply by the conditional means implied by the estimates in Appendix Table C.2 to generate counts for both governance occupations and religious occupations.

Lastly, we divide these counts by the total number of workers in a given sector in each non-Southern county d , again from the 1900 complete-count U.S. Census. These shares, calculated for all counties in the conterminous non-Southern U.S., are plotted across the four panels of Appendix Figure C.3, which illustrates the relative prevalence and spatial reach of these former slaveholder migrants.

This visual clarifies why we observe such large effects associated with former slaveholder migrants throughout Tables 8–10. Even in 1900, over three decades after the Civil War had ended, several non-Southern counties are estimated as having had over half of their governance sector staffed by those with personal slaveholding backgrounds in the antebellum South. When we also include household kin of said slaveholders (e.g., sons), a nontrivial share of counties throughout the West and former border

Figure C.3: The Spatial Distribution of Southern Slaveholders in Positions of Authority, 1900



Notes: Maps show estimated spatial diffusion across counties of former slaveholder migrants (excluding and including their direct kin) in occupations of governance (law enforcement, legal occupations, and public administration) and religion (religious clergy and other workers).

states show a majority of their public employees as coming from slaveholding backgrounds. Although we do not use such imputations in our actual analysis, these back-of-the-envelope estimates nonetheless help to illustrate the likely reach of former slaveholders, given the sorting patterns we observe. Indeed, Southern white migrants are about twice as likely to have worked as a lawyer or judge as non-Southern white migrants in Table 1, and former slaveholder migrants are about twice as likely to have worked as a lawyer or judge as a non-slaveholding Southern white migrant in Table C.2. Such extreme sorting into such small sectors has the potential to generate significant overrepresentation, as seen here.

D Additional County-level Results

D.1 Additional Tables

Table D.1: Summary Statistics, Non-Southern County-Level Data

	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Outcome variables					
Any Confederate memorials (e.g., monuments, place names)?	1,702	0.25	0.43	0.00	1.00
Any United Daughters of the Confederacy chapters (1900–20)?	1,702	0.09	0.29	0.00	1.00
Any 2nd Ku Klux Klan chapters (1915–40)?	1,702	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
Any lynchings of Blacks occurred (post-1900)?	1,702	0.05	0.22	0.00	1.00
Confederate cultural index (i.e., the sum of the above)	1,702	0.76	0.89	0.00	4.00
Black to non-Black earnings ratio (1940)	1,047	0.77	0.36	0.03	4.27
Black residential isolation index (1940)	1,696	0.08	0.14	0.00	1.00
Black residential isolation index (2000)	1,698	0.07	0.13	0.00	0.86
Black county jail shares (2010–18)	1,605	13.83	15.23	0.00	91.34
Any police killings of Blacks (2013–20)	1,702	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
Explanatory variables					
% Southern-born whites (1900)	1,702	2.19	3.68	0.00	49.69
Predicted % Southern-born whites (for 1870–1900)	1,702	6.72	11.24	0.00	91.40
% Southern former slaveholders (1900)	1,702	0.26	0.52	0.00	6.15
Predicted % Southern former slaveholders (for 1870–1900)	1,702	0.47	0.76	0.00	6.11
Controls					
Log population (1870)	1,702	8.39	2.18	0.00	13.74
Log county area	1,702	6.59	0.86	3.14	9.91
% Black population (1870)	1,702	2.13	5.93	0.00	68.75
On frontier in 1860	1,702	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00
Never on frontier (settled by 1790)	1,702	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Male Union Army enlistment rate during Civil War	1,702	25.64	27.88	0.00	100.00
Male Union Army mortality rate during Civil War	1,702	3.21	4.91	0.00	87.50
% Votes for Breckinridge (1860)	1,702	8.53	15.59	0.00	79.81
% Slaves (1860)	1,702	2.13	6.75	0.00	58.44
Cotton potential	1,700	0.20	0.27	0.00	0.74
Tobacco potential	1,700	0.58	0.35	0.00	0.97
Agricultural potential	1,700	0.45	0.21	0.00	0.68
% Southern-born whites (1870)	1,702	5.70	11.18	0.00	91.40
% Southern former slaveholders (1870)	1,680	0.28	0.58	0.00	10.00

Appendix Table D.1 shows summary statistics for outcome, explanatory, and control variables used in our county-level analysis. Boundaries for county-level variables are standardized to 2010 boundaries using ArcGIS, based on the procedure described in Ferrara et al. (2021). This lets us consistently match counties across time with historical Census data and prevents issues associated with the merging and splitting of counties across Census periods. This process involves creating unique units (henceforth county parts), based on where historical and 2010 counties intersect. We then calculate areas for each county part. We divide these by total (2010) county area to generate an area share-based weight. We then interpolate values of historical count variables for county parts based on these shares. Finally, these approximated counts are aggregated within each 2010 county. Counties get dropped from the analysis if any county part was not yet incorporated in the base year (e.g., as of 1870) and as such had no count data from which to derive harmonized values.


Table D.2: The Legacy of the Confederate Diaspora for Racial Attitudes

Dependent Variable:	Want Only Whites in Neighborhood (1)	Whites Have Right to Segregate (2)	Against Interracial Marriage (3)	Fear Other Races (4)	Blacks Must Work Their Way Up (5)	No Systemic Racism Exists (6)
% Southern Whites, 1900	0.020*** (0.007)	0.010* (0.005)	0.011** (0.004)	0.002* (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Survey	GSS	GSS	GSS	CCES	CCES	CCES
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	13,109	1,803	4,653	27,882	82,695	82,676
Outcome mean	0.37	0.13	0.10	0.14	0.63	0.50
Adj. R ²	0.12	0.05	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.03

Notes: Regressions of six survey indicators of racial sentiment from the GSS (column 1–3) and CCES (4–6) on the share of Southern whites in 1900 in non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Baseline controls include log county population in 1870 and log county area (in square miles), entered flexibly using quadratic terms. Respondent controls include sex and age, the latter entered flexibly using a quadratic term. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


D.2 Additional Figures

Figure D.1: Confederate Leader Names among 2nd Generation Southern and Non-Southern Whites




Notes: Three-year moving average in Confederate leader name frequencies across birth years among different subsets of second-generation Southern migrant (i.e., at least one parent born in the South) and non-Southern white populations (ages 0–9) in the complete-count U.S. Census by birth cohort year. See the notes to Figure 2 for details on the name measures.

Figure D.2: Confederate Cultural Activity In and Outside the South



Notes: Maps show the diffusion of our four main county-level outcomes out of the South. The map for UDC chapters (panel a) is based on confirmed chapters during the 1900–20 period. The map for Confederate memorials (panel b) combines information on Confederate monuments as well as Confederate-inspired location names (i.e., places, streets, schools) matched from a restrictive set of name inputs, as previously used in panel b of Figure 2. The map for Black lynchings (panel c) is based on confirmed lynchings of Black people during the specified periods in the legend and features time variation. The map for KKK chapters (panel d) is based on the diffusion of chapters with time information.

Figure D.3: Visualizing the “Great Retreat”, Black Depopulation in [...] Outside the South



Notes: This figure shows the share of non-Southern towns with all-white populations (left y-axis), and shares of non-Southern towns that had more than 25 Black residents as of 1870 with (i) no Blacks or (ii) with one Black family or less (right y-axis). The sample in (a) consists of all towns outside the former Confederacy and Oklahoma and in (b) is further limited to towns with populations of over 1,000 as of 1870. A version of this figure was previously featured in an earlier version of [Bazzi et al. \(forthcoming\)](#) and is based on a similar figure featured in [Bazzi et al. \(2022\)](#).

E Further Evidence of Cultural Transmission: Confederate Leader Names

In this Appendix, we explore whether postbellum migrants contributed to the steady expansion in Confederate affinity among non-Southern whites in the early 1900s, as measured using children’s names (see Figure 2). To ensure sufficient variation on the right-hand side, we construct and use for this analysis a less restrictive measure of “Confederate names” among children, based on first names that exactly match a Confederate leader’s legal or adopted first name, last name, or entire full name (e.g., enumerated first name of “Robert Lee”).¹

For identification, we examine how non-Southern white parents named their children before and after moving, as a function of the share of Southern whites in their destination counties as of 1900.² We pool all children born to white non-Southern parents in the first two Census rounds of the 20th century when Confederate culture became widespread nationally and many first-generation postbellum migrants remained alive. We consider households with ≥ 2 children: ≥ 1 born in the state of residence at time τ and ≥ 1 born in a different state by $\tau + 10$. To avoid double counting children across Census periods, we restrict sample ages to 0–9. We then estimate the time of household move, $\tilde{\tau}$, as the midpoint between the birth years of the children born in different states, where child year of birth is given by $\tilde{\tau} + j$ for $j = -9, \dots, 9$. Overall, this yields 1,404,641 white children in 467,040 households.

We proceed to estimate the following equation, which relates the given name of child i to whether their household h had yet moved to non-Southern county c at their time of birth $\tilde{\tau} + j$:

$$\text{Confederate name}_{ihc\tau} = \theta_h + \beta \cdot \% \text{ Southern Whites}_{c,1900} \times \text{Born After Move}_i + \mathbf{X}'_{i\tau} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_{ihc\tau}, \quad (\text{E.1})$$

where Confederate name $_{ihc\tau}$ is multiplied by 100 for interpretive ease. Household fixed effects, θ_h , absorb various characteristics of h including its cultural attitudes, its place of origin, and factors affecting its destination choice.³ The $\mathbf{X}_{i\tau}$ vector includes dummies for child gender, birth order, birth period, and birth year relative to move in j . Standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county.

Our first set of results in Appendix Table E.1 uses a pooled sample of male and female children in multi-children mover households. The estimates in columns 1–2 suggest that a 1 p.p. increase in Southern white migrant shares in 1900 is associated with roughly a 0.09 p.p. increase in the likelihood that parents give their child a Confederate name, relative to a child born prior to the move. Though somewhat small, these estimates are statistically significant at conventional levels.

In the remaining columns of Appendix Table E.1, we show that these results are, reassuringly, driven by boys. Most Confederate heroes whose names had become popular in the postbellum South—generals, politicians, and veterans—were men. Narratives also often focused on men. Historian David W. Blight

¹This of course entails a tradeoff between including names that are almost certain to reference Confederate leaders but are rarely given (e.g., “Stonewall”) and those shared by Confederate leaders but also commonly given otherwise (e.g., “Lee”). This broad measure ensures sufficient variation in the outcome, at the possible expense of attenuation bias in estimates. As a validation check, men from former slaveowning households (both fathers and sons) in the South are significantly more likely to name their children after Confederate leaders. Using the 1900 Census, we find that conditional on father’s birthplace, current county FE, and cohort FE, children aged 0–20 with fathers from former slaveowning households are (i) nearly 1 p.p. more likely to have a loosely defined Confederate leader’s name (as used in this Appendix section) relative to a mean of 22% among children without slaveowning fathers, and (ii) nearly 0.04 p.p. more likely to have a strictly defined Confederate leader’s name (as in Figure 2) relative to a mean of 0.2% among children without slaveowning fathers.

²Bazzi et al. (2020) develop this strategy to identify effects of frontier exposure on individualism, and Bazzi et al. (forthcoming) adapt it to identify effects of exposure to Southern whites during the Great Migration on religious conservatism.

³As there may be positive correlations between Southern white shares across origins and destinations, household fixed effects are important insofar as they control for households’ origin county Southern white shares.

(2001, p. 266) argues that “by the sheer virtue of losing heroically, the Confederate soldier provided a model of masculine devotion and courage” to Southern whites. Thus, it is likely that boys’ names would contain a relatively stronger signal of exposure-based transmission of Confederate culture, if such transmission is indeed taking place. Columns 3–4 establish as much: a 1 p.p. increase in Southern white migrant shares in 1900 is associated with a statistically significant 0.15 p.p. increase in the likelihood that parents give their male child a Confederate leader name, relative to a male child born prior to the move. In contrast, estimates for girls, in columns 5–6, are small and insignificant at conventional levels.

A causal interpretation implies that greater exposure to Southern white migrants induced a shift towards Confederate naming among other white migrants without Southern heritage. The parallel trends assumption here holds that, within a household, the likelihood of Confederate name-giving should not have changed across children had that household not moved to a county with a large Confederate diaspora. Appendix Figure E.1 provides event-study estimates in support of this assumption, showing limited evidence of pre-trends and gradual increases in post-move coefficients. This pattern is consistent with an exposure-based mechanism, in which it takes time for Southerners and non-Southerners to make contact and for cultural transmission to occur.


Overall, these results suggest that migrants transmitted Confederate culture to non-Southern populations during a period of resurgent Confederate pride in the early 20th century. This analysis above provides an additional, granular perspective on the sort of localized, contact-based transmission of culture underlying our broader county-level findings throughout the paper. Together with our analysis of the Denver-area KKK in Section 5.3, our findings reveal an important role for non-Southern whites in helping grow the Confederate *cultural* diaspora, including both Confederate memorialization and racial norms, throughout the country.

Table E.1: Cultural Transmission and Exposure Effects on Non-Southern White Names

	Dependent Variable: Child has Confederate Name					
	Full Sample		Non-Southern Boys		Non-Southern Girls	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1900 × Born After Move	0.087*** (0.027)	0.091*** (0.027)	0.144** (0.059)	0.154*** (0.059)	0.008 (0.031)	0.008 (0.031)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Year - Move Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Order FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Period FE	Decade	5-Year	Decade	5-Year	Decade	5-Year
Observations	1,404,641	1,404,641	536,052	536,052	514,282	514,282
Households	467,040	467,040	222,686	222,686	214,091	214,091
Outcome mean (pre-move)	20.14	20.14	34.56	34.56	5.06	5.06

Notes: OLS regressions of an indicator for whether the non-Southern-ancestry child has a Confederate name ($\times 100$) on a dummy for whether that child in mover household h was born in its post-move county c \times the share of Southern-born whites in county c in 1900. The full sample in columns 1–2 includes mover households from non-Southern origin states with at least 1 child born before moving and 1 child born after. Columns 3–4 and 5–6 further limit to mover households with at least 2 boys and 2 girls, respectively. Excluded Southern areas are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. All regressions include fixed effects for child gender, birth order, birth period (decade or 5-year), and birth year minus household year of move. In odd columns, the birth period FE are decadal and in even columns five-yearly. Standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure E.1: Cultural Transmission: Exposure to Southern Whites and Confederate Child Names



Notes: This figure isolates within-household, cross-child variation in parental exposure to Southern white migrants in the destination county based on the following equation:

$$\text{Confederate name}_{iht\tau} = \theta_h + \sum_{j=-9}^9 \beta_j [\% \text{ Southern Whites}_{c,1900} \times 1(\text{Born in } \tilde{\tau} + j)] + \mathbf{X}'_{it\tau} \gamma + \varepsilon_{iht\tau}, \quad (\text{E.2})$$

which allows β in equation (E.1) to vary with birth year relative to the household move, $j = -9, \dots, 9$. Each graph reports estimates of β_j and 95% confidence intervals for the relatively balanced event years $j = -4, \dots, 4$. Each β_j can be interpreted as the differential effect of exposure to postbellum Southern white migrants on the likelihood of a Confederate name given to a child born j years before/after their non-Southern-born parents moved to the county, relative to a child born one year prior to the household move. Estimates control for household fixed effects as well as birth order, birth decade fixed effects, and child gender. Standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county.