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SUBJECTING THE 'AVERAGE JOE' TO WAR THEATRE TRIGGERS INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

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ABSTRACT

This research is the first to identify the impact of armed conflict exposure for the average male randomly drawn from the population on subsequent intimate partner violence (IPV). We exploit a population-level natural experiment in service location assignment of draftees under Turkey's universal conscription system, inducting 90% of all draft-age men for 15-to-18 months, with nearly a quarter of them being deployed to the conflict zone during our analysis period, 1984-to-2011, in the southeast of the country to curb the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) insurgency. Purging any confounding influence of civilian exposure, the innovative design of our survey captures isolated exposure during military service. Results show that conflict zone deployment increases physical and psychological IPV perpetration from husband to wife. Probing the mechanisms, our analysis first renders the use of violence as an instrumental behavior in intrahousehold bargaining as an unlikely mechanism by eliminating labor market outcomes and economic- and social-controlling behaviors from the list of usual suspects. Moreover, we rule out the possibility of risky health habits exacerbating the unfavorable effects of combat. Then, we show compelling evidence that normalizing violence in everyday life, likely emerging as an expressive behavior when arguments escalate, is the primary mediating pathway.

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I. Introduction

Intimate partner violence (IPV) against women is a major global public health issue and a human rights violation, with profound consequences that extend beyond the health and happiness of individuals, affecting the well-being of entire communities (World Health Organization, 2017; Duvvury et al., 2013).^{2,3} Concurrently, causing more than 16 million deaths since World War II, and substantial reductions in productive resources and per capita incomes of societies, driving them to poverty and misery, civil conflicts have been another primary obstacle to human well-being (Arbath et al., 2020). It is, therefore, not surprising that the elimination of all forms of violence against women and the cessation of armed conflicts around the world constitute two of the major goals adopted by the UN as part of its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.⁴

This study is the first to examine how armed conflict exposure of the average male randomly picked from the population translates into subsequent intimate partner violence (IPV) perpetration against women. We exploit a population-level natural experiment engendered by Turkey's strict universal conscription system in determining the service location of conscripts via a deployment assignment lottery after the basic military training to estimate the impact of conflict zone service. Therefore, we identify the population average treatment effect (PATE) of armed combat exposure. We find compelling evidence that the conflict zone assignment of the *average Joe* increases his subsequent domestic violence against his female partner, recommending that the two development goals set by the UN are causally linked and that the

² Living in a violent relationship affects a woman's sense of self-esteem and her ability to participate in the world, rendering her unable to look after herself and her children properly or to pursue a job or a career (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006). Women who suffer from IPV are more likely to have physical and psychological health problems and to engage in risky behaviors (Campbell, 2002). In those cases, where the abused women have children or are pregnant, the negative effects spillover from mother to the offspring (Currie et al., 2022; Aizer, 2011).

³ Still dismissed as a private family matter in many societies, IPV against women continues to be frighteningly common. In a review of 48 population-based surveys from around the world, between 10 and 69 percent of women were found to have reported being physical assault by an intimate male partner at some point in their lives (Heise and Garcia-Moreno, 2002).

⁴ https://sdgs.un.org/goals.

establishment of peace in the public space has substantial positive spillover effects in enhancing women's well-being in the private space.

Theories of domestic violence suggest that intra-partner violence may be used as a tool to gain an advantage in household bargaining (Dobash and Dobash, 1979), or it may emerge as an expressive behavior, either providing positive utility to the aggressor (Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991; Aizer, 2010) or arising spontaneously when heated discussions get out of control (Straus et al. 1980; Card and Dahl, 2011). It stands to reason that conflict zone deployment may feed these motivations through several potential mechanisms, operating via psychological effects of direct trauma, military socialization under elevated conflict, and their secondary effects emerging later in civilian life (Cesur and Sabia, 2016). To begin, conflict environment socialization and direct exposure to armed combat can lead to the normalization of violence, rendering the use of physical force and aggression to address social and private issues justifiable (Dodge et al., 1990). Second, conflict environments can also exacerbate existing gender-based inequalities or challenge traditional gender roles in a society, which may, in turn, lead men to resort to violence and aggression against their partners to reassert their position of power in the family (Clark et al. 2010). Third, persistent psychological effects of war caused by the direct trauma of armed combat can evoke violent behavior as a coping device in stressful situations, such as when arguments get heated (Card and Dahl, 2011). Moreover, conflict exposure can impact domestic violence through its secondary effects on labor market outcomes, assortative mating, and risky health behaviors, such as alcohol abuse and drug use (Cesur et al., 2016).

While a number of studies examine the relationship between conflict exposure and domestic violence, these findings are limited in their capacity to inform us about the causal links that run from armed conflict exposure to IPV, the underlying mechanisms, and their generalizability. Therefore, major questions await compelling answers. First, due to the unavailability of suitable natural experiments, identifying the causal impact of conflict exposure

remains an empirical challenge.⁵ Second, in an overwhelming majority of cases, the results only hold among a specific sub-population; hence, the generalizability of the findings in the extant literature remains limited, if not impossible (Cesur and Sabia, 2016).⁶ Third, an overwhelming majority of the conflict literature studying the domestic violence effects of a civil conflict struggles to separate the impact of conflict exposure of the perpetrator from that of the IPV victims because both partners were exposed to the consequences of war either directly or indirectly through the macroenvironmental effects of conflict, including economic growth and community-level paradigm shifts (La Mattina, 2017; Stojetz and Brück, 2023).⁷ Moreover, even when such natural experiments are available, the lack of comprehensive data incorporating accurate information on the IPV experiences of women, the conflict exposure of their male partners, and potential mechanisms constitute another challenge (Clark et al., 2010).

Our study overcomes these difficulties by employing arguably the most powerful empirical framework utilized up to date. First, Turkey's universal military draft system mandates every male citizen to serve in the Armed Forces when he reaches the age of induction. Strikingly, between 1984 and 2011, this strict conscription system drafted 97 percent of all men reaching the age of induction, with 93 percent of them serving 15 to 18 months, and after a short training (up to three months), about one-fourth being deployed to the conflict zone amid a deadly armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) insurgency; hence, our findings apply to large segments of the population. Second, we exploit

⁵ A number of studies show that, compared to the general population, IPV perpetration rates are higher for veterans and active-duty servicemen (for reviews of the empirical literature see Galovski and Lyons, 2004; Taft et al., 2011; Jones, 2012). Survey studies from Palestine (Clark et al., 2010); Colombia (Svallfors, 2023); East Timor (Hynes et al., 2004); Peru (Gutierrez and Gallegos, 2016); Afghanistan (Catani et al., 2009); and Sub-Saharan Africa (Østby, 2016) indicate a positive association between armed conflict exposure and various forms of domestic violence in civilian populations.

⁶ For instance, while Cesur and Sabia (2016) identify professional US service members, these effects only apply to those who are deployed overseas and cannot be generalizable to the average Joe.

⁷ Identifying the causal the impact of exposure to 1994 genocide in Rwanda, La Mattina (2017) shows that exposed women faced higher IPV victimization and could had lower discretion in household decision making, with effects driven in part by the distortion of sex ratios against women in the marriage market.

variation in the deployment assignment of the drafted young men into military bases nationwide via a deployment lottery to identify the causal impact.

Third, we employ new and rich data from two representative field surveys conducted outside of the conflict zone, in western Turkey, in 2019 as part of a broader project, the Exposure to Political Violence and Individual Behavior (EXPOVIBE) (Kibris, 2019), to investigate the effects of armed conflict exposure. We perform our main analysis using the EXPOVIBE-Intimate Partner Violence (EXPOVIBE-IPV) survey, interviewing married women between the ages 25 and 50, representative of wives of conscript veterans who served between 1984 and 2011, to collect information on their IPV experiences, personal and family characteristics, and their husbands' military service location and dates. We supplement our analysis by tapping into the EXPOVIBE-Conscript Veterans (EXPOVIBE-CV), a representative sample of men conscripted between 1984 and 2011, providing information on their personal and family characteristics and their military service history in detail. Notably, the EXPOVIBE-CV provides the information available to the military before the deployment assignment lottery and prior to the induction, when the branch of service and military occupation assignment took place. In addition to testing the validity and strength of our natural experiment, we employ the EXPOVIBE-CV to test the credibility of accuracy, adequacy, and representativeness of the EXPOVIBE-IPV and, therefore, the generalizability of our findings.

Armed by the combined power of the natural experiment at hand, the innovative design of the EXPOVIBE surveys, and the strict universal conscript system in Turkey, this study fills major voids in the literature. First, to our knowledge, we are the first to identify the impact of armed conflict exposure on the outcomes of interest for the *average Joe*. Second, the geographical concentration of the conflict makes it possible to construct clean treatment and control groups. That is, by sampling from western provinces away and with little in-migration from the conflict areas, we avoid the conflation of exposure during service from that of civilian experiences and other possible conflict-induced changes in the socioeconomic environment, thereby capturing isolated exposure to conflict during military service as conscripts returned to their peaceful hometowns upon discharge. The same sampling strategy also rules out the potential conflating effects of conflict-induced community-level socioeconomic changes and women's exposure to violence as civilians.

We start our analyses by performing balance tests in the EXPOVIBE-CV sample. The military rule states that conditional on the branch of service, military occupation classification, and the province of registration, service location assignment is orthogonal to draftees' predeployment characteristics (Official Gazette, 1927; 2019; Mater, 1999 pp. 42,114).⁸ We test whether this conjecture holds because the EXPOVIBE-CV data provide the information available to the Armed Forces at the time of induction and right before the deployment of conscripts upon the competition of up to three months of military training. Our analysis documents that conflict zone assignment is orthogonal to the pre-deployment on direct combat experiences. These estimates document that those who serve in the conflict zone face a substantially higher likelihood of engaging the enemy in firefight, suffering injury, and witnessing casualties, with effect sizes as high as 50 percentage points. This 'first-stage' analysis demonstrates the severity of the effect of conflict zone assignment on exposure to war trauma.

Next, we use the EXPOVIBE-CV to test if the EXPOVIBE-IPV sample (i) is representative of the wives of those conscripted between 1984 and 2011, (ii) provides accurate information on husband's characteristics, including conflict zone deployment statistics, and (iii) has adequate information to ensure the conditional unconfoundedness property of our natural

⁸ These rules are stated in the Conscription Law (Law Number: 1111), which was originally legislated in 1927. Mater interviews 42 ex-conscripts who had been deployed to intense conflict areas during their service. The interviews contain frequent references to the "lottery."

experiment. Our analysis confirms the adequacy of the EXPOVIBE-IPV data with regard to all these points and recommends that it is an ideal data set for our purposes.

Upon showing evidence supporting the validity and potency of our identification strategy and data, we investigate the impact of husbands' armed conflict exposure on IPV perpetration. The results indicate that women whose husbands had been deployed to the *Conflict Zone* as conscripts become significantly more likely to suffer from psychological and physical IPV. Moreover, further analysis regarding the dynamics of the documented relationship suggests that these effects materialize early in the marriage and persist long after discharge. While our natural experiment holds among both college-educated and less-than-college-educated individuals in identifying the impact of conflict zone deployment, our findings are driven by those with at most high school education, representing roughly 85 percent of all males reaching conscription age between 1984 and 2011. Besides the protective role of education against adverse shocks (Di Novi et al., 2021), this finding is consistent with the expectation for younger individuals to be more impressionable by their environment (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989).

We undertake an exhaustive set of robustness checks to scrutinize the resiliency of our estimates. We begin these tests with a placebo analysis in which we use the information on the timing of IPV to show that husbands' conflict exposure is not associated with wives' IPV experiences before induction, recommending that conflict zone deployment is orthogonal to the IPV perpetration tendency of draftees. We then explore whether parent and in-law domestic violence histories indicate any assortative mating. This exercise indicates that accounting for parent and in-law domestic violence histories does not indicate any selection bias that could threaten the validity of our findings.

We continue our specification checks by estimating our model using 'cleaner' subsamples, including husbands with at most high school education, those who served at least

15 months in the military, those who were inducted before their 22nd birthday, those with Turkish ethnicity, those whose husbands served in the east, and those who had never lived elsewhere. These exercises produce remarkably similar estimates, recommending that our natural experiment identifies the causal impact of conflict zone deployment.

Next, we investigate the possible mechanisms transmitting the impacts we observe on IPV. For this purpose, we first separate the role of exposure to intense armed combat from military socialization by accounting for the intensity of exposure via the number of combatant casualties within the base province during service. Results indicate that while military socialization in the conflict environment plays a significant role, those exposed to more intense conflict exhibit more pronounced effects.

Next, we explore whether and to what extent our findings align with instrumental theories of IPV, defining domestic violence as a tool to gain an advantage in intra-household bargaining and show that this set of mechanisms does not explain our results. In doing so, we first analyze the impact of conflict exposure on husbands' financial- and social-controlling behaviors to investigate whether changes in preferences about gender roles and using violence as a negotiation tool in household bargaining are among the likely explanations. The results do not show any evidence that conflict zone deployment increases the husband's propensity to impose restrictions on his wife's social and economic life. These findings recommend that war theatre exposure does not impact the husband's likelihood of resorting to violence to gain an advantage in household bargaining. Moreover, we do not find any sizable effect of the husband's conflict zone deployment on labor market outcomes and family income, which again recommends that financial hardship is not a driver of the husband's IPV perpetration, recommending that potential marital discord due to financial problems or family issues do not explain our findings, either. Furthermore, our explorations reveal that conflict-induced risky health habits, shown to be a primary mechanism in explaining the effect of combat deployment on IPV among professional enlisted combat veterans in the USA (Cesur et al., 2019), do not play any role in explaining our findings.

Finally, we control for the potentially endogenous family, wife, and husband characteristics, including family income, and husband's and wife's employment, in addition to their parental IPV histories, husband's risky health habits, and controlling behaviors, in our main model. This exercise does not appreciably influence our estimates. Therefore, we conclude that household bargaining is not a significant channel linking conflict exposure to subsequent IPV perpetration.

Next, we turn our attention to investigating if the impact of war theater exposure operates through normalizing violence and potential anger management issues triggering the use of violence when disputes get out of control (Card and Dahl, 2010). In doing so, using data from the EXPOVIBE-CV, we show that exposed men exhibit higher rates of aggression, report an increased tendency to resort to violence if provoked, and have trouble controlling their anger. These results recommend that conflict zone deployment causes the normalization of violence to solve personal and social problems. Moreover, the documented findings on the likelihood of resorting to violence if provoked and having trouble controlling anger indicate that conflict zone deployment inhibits the ability to handle stressful situations without resorting to violence.

The article continues as follows. In the next section, we discuss our identification strategy. In section III, we introduce our data and measures. Section IV presents our statistical models, followed by presenting evidence on the validity of our empirical design in section V. Results are presented in section VI. We test the robustness of our findings in Section VII. Mechanisms are studied in Section VIII. Finally, we conclude in Section IX.

II. Identifying the Impact of Conflict Zone Service

We exploit variation in the service location of Turkish conscripts, enabled by a deployment lottery, during the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) insurgency since 1984 to identify the impact of armed conflict exposure. The PKK was first founded with the goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. However, later in the 1990s, the PKK appeared to have changed its goal to a federational structure to gain more autonomy in the region (Stanton, 2016).

Leading to deadly armed combat, the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK has so far claimed about 25,000 combatant casualties among Turkish military members (about 7,500) and PKK recruits (nearly 17,500) (Kibris, 2021). In response to ever-increasing violence, the Turkish authorities declared a *state of emergency* (OHAL) in the epicenter of the conflict under military rule (Official Gazette, 1987). The OHAL region spans the 13 provinces in southeast Turkey, including Adıyaman, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van, shown in Figure I. The declaration of the state of emergency boosted the power of the military in the region, allowing it to undertake extensive measures which would not be possible otherwise, thereby rendering the OHAL area the 'official' conflict zone (Official Gazette, 1983, 1987; Agamben, 2005; Öztan and Bezci, 2015).

The strict military conscription system in Turkey mandates each male resident citizen to serve in the Armed Forces. In particular, a young man becomes draft eligible when he turns 20 and typically gets inducted into the military before he turns 22, depending on the current induction term in his registered location (Official Gazette, 1927; 2019). During our analysis period, between 1984 and 2011, the service duration of draftees ranged from 15 to 18 months.

The conscription procedure starts with the draft call, inviting those eligible in the associated induction period to surrender to the Armed Forces. Following the confirmation of enlistment but before induction, the military assigns the conscripts to branches, military

occupation classifications, and training centers. Detailed information on this classification, mainly based on educational qualifications and conducted on anonymized records, can be found on the official instruction brochures for prospective draftees.⁹ We present a flowchart of these instructions in Data Appendix II.

Upon induction, the draftees first go through a basic training program that lasts up to 3 months and then are sent to military bases all over the country, but their home provinces, to serve their terms. Our natural experiment rests on the military's service location assignment system, leaving draftees no discretion over where they get deployed. Instead, considering the needs of the military, the Turkish Armed Forces determines the staffing allocation of different bases across the country (Official Gazette, 2019). Then, accounting for the branch of service, military occupation, and home provinces of conscripts, the deployment assignment is done via a 'base lottery' (Turkish Ministry of Defence, 2015; Mater, 1999 pp.13,42,114,131,136). As they were conducted in public ceremonies to ensure the transparency of the assignment process, recordings of base lotteries can be found on popular social media outlets (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3w4i07_Wj4 as an example). Therefore, this deployment regime implies that conditional on the branch of service, military occupation, and home provinces of service, military occupation, and home provinces to ensure the transparency of the assignment process, recordings of base lotteries can be found on popular social media outlets (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3w4i07_Wj4 as an example). Therefore, this deployment regime implies that conditional on the branch of service, military occupation, and home provinces of service members, our natural experiment achieves conditional unconfoundedness; therefore, it identifies the causal impact of conflict zone service.

Between 1984 and 2011, Turkey's strictly enforced universal conscription system drafted nearly every male (97 percent, i.e., roughly 14 million) born between 1962 and 1991. We focus on this period because the nature of mandatory military service changed with new legislation enacted in 2011. Accordingly, after 2011, the Turkish military started recruiting professional soldiers on fixed-term contracts to replace conscripts, especially in conflict zones, as part of a move towards a professional army (Official Gazette, 2011). With professional

⁹ <u>https://www.msb.gov.tr/Askeralma/icerik/siniflandirma-islemleri.</u> Last visited on February 7, 2023.

soldiers in place, civilians were granted the option to pay to reduce their service to basic training only. Therefore, because our interest is in identifying the PATE of armed conflict exposure of the average person randomly picked from the population, we limit our analysis to the period between 1984 and 2011.

Our estimates using the EXPOVIBE-CV data indicate that, within this period, 93 percent of these men served at least 15 months, and about one-fourth (i.e., nearly 3.5 million) were randomly deployed to the conflict zone. To the best of our knowledge, this renders the current study the first to reveal the causal impact of armed violence exposure of the *average Joe* on subsequent male-to-female domestic violence perpetration, with results applicable to nearly the entire population. It is worth mentioning that locating a natural experiment relevant to around 90% of the population is almost impossible. The closest examples we can think of are early compulsory schooling reforms, such as the one that went into effect in England in 1944, affecting about half the population (Clark and Royer, 2013). Importantly, we are unaware of any natural experiments in the literature where the likelihood of exposure to war theatre applies to the entire population of males. For example, over half the draft-eligible men evaded the famous Vietnam Era draft lottery in the USA.¹⁰

While the regulatory narrative of the Armed Forces dictates that conditional on the branch of service, military occupation, and the residential origin of conscripts, deployment assignment is orthogonal to draftee pre-deployment background characteristics, one may still ask if the official statements of the Turkish military on deployment assignments of conscripts is accurate. To address this concern, we undertake formal balance tests below and confirm our identifying assumptions.

There also exists other evidence supporting the regulatory narrative of the military. Because mandatory military service imposes severe morbidity and mortality risks to those

¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Draft_evasion_in_the_Vietnam_War.

serving in the conflict zone, the assignment system and its fairness have always been on the radar of the general public and the media, especially during periods of intensified conflict as a significant number of conscripts lost their lives or got seriously injured in clashes (Kıbrıs, 2011). Consequently, the Turkish Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces emphasize in all their communications with the public that the system does not discriminate (Yıldırımkaya, 2010; Turkish Ministry of Defence, 2015).

Anecdotal evidence also supports the arguments regarding the non-discriminatory nature of the system. For example, as in the 2007 incident in which the first cousin of the then Secretary of Turkey was killed on duty in a PKK attack on the Çeltikli outpost in Bitlis, a southeastern province, it is not uncommon to observe close relatives of high-level politicians among the fallen soldiers.¹¹ Furthermore, the fact that the military has long been the most trusted institution in Turkey attests to the fairness perception of the public with regard to military practices (Esmer, 1999; Adaman et al., 2005).

A relevant question regarding the credibility of our identification strategy is whether citizens can avoid deployment to conflict zones by dodging the draft, manipulating their service location, or influencing the timing of induction, rendering our natural experiment fail in identifying the causal impact of ACE. Unlike other nations with universal conscription, such as Israel and South Korea, where a significant share of eligible men can avoid active duty service, young Turkish men have negligibly limited options to circumvent the strict draft system, and escaping induction is not a practical alternative for them.¹² Evaders face legal consequences and are shunned by society via social rejection and emotional distancing (Altinay and Bora,

¹¹ https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni.net/archive/turkish-fms-cousin-killed-in-pkk-attack-h10956.html

¹² In the Israeli case, exemptions are made on religious, physical, psychological, or lawful grounds. Also, one can refuse to serve on the grounds of pacifism, antimilitarism, religious philosophy, or political disagreement with Israeli policies. The Israeli High Court of Justice ruled in 2002 that refusal to serve was legal (<u>https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Refusal to serve in the IDF</u>). While the South Korean case allows less evasion, it nonetheless has a broader definition of compulsory service that includes social work, research, full-time reserve enlistment, and industrial technical service.

2002; Altmay, 2012). Consequently, for an overwhelming majority of the population, evading the draft is not an attractive alternative. The legal consequences include forfeiting paid formal employment as a civilian because the law prohibits firms from hiring draft evaders and penalizes those violating the law with imprisonment.¹³ In addition, draft evaders and those who help them face legal charges, including arrest and imprisonment of up to three years if found guilty by the military court.¹⁴ Finally, the likelihood of obtaining a fraudulent health-ailment exemption is slim because it is subject to close scrutiny and requires several steps and approvals from multiple entities.¹⁵ Consistent with these arguments, as discussed earlier, nearly all men born between 1962 and 1991 were drafted, with 93 percent of those serving 15 months or longer. Moreover, a substantial 23 percent of draftees were deployed to the conflict zone. Therefore, the conscription system in Turkey constitutes a rare exception as all Turkish men, except a small fraction who were pardoned due to incapacitating health ailments and those that illegally avoid induction, get drafted and complete their service (Akyürek, 2010).

One feature of the military service system in Turkey that we need to note here is that it incorporates some differentiation based on education level. While everyone gets the draft call at the age of 20, those who continue their schooling in higher education are allowed to postpone enlistment until graduation (or until they are 29, whichever comes first). Under this system, all draftees with less than a college degree serve full-term as rank-and-file soldiers. College graduates serve either as full-term sub-lieutenants or half-term as rank-and-file, depending on the needs of the military in the associated draft period. Having said that, these half-termers

¹³ https://turkishlaborlaw.com/news/business-in-turkey/is-there-a-penalty-for-hiring-a-deserter/

¹⁴ The Military Penal Code enacted by the law number 1632 states that evading service is punishable by up to three years in prison, and employing a fugitive is punishable by up to two years in prison. https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.3.1632.pdf.

¹⁵ Those with serious health problems are given exemption if the diagnosis is approved by a panel of military doctors. What constitutes "a serious health problem" is defined in regulations (Turkish Armed Forces, Health Capability Regulation, Official Gazette 29530, 12 November 2015).

constitute a small share of the relevant population, as our estimates in the EXPOVIBE-CV show that 93 percent of conscripted men served between 15 and 18 months.

Nevertheless, an exceptional feature of this system is that, even though extended schooling beyond high school enables those with more education to receive differential treatment, they still remain subject to the lottery-based assignment system regardless of their rank and duration of service. Furthermore, because one becomes draft eligible at the age of 20 and is allowed to postpone enlistment until graduation from formal high education, induction largely takes place after the completion of formal schooling (Akyürek, 2010; Yıldırım and Erdinç, 2007). However, because the branch of service and occupation classifications are determined by the Armed Forces according to technical specializations, service duration, and induction age, college graduates have slightly lower odds of assignment to bases in the conflict zone. Consequently, educational attainment must be included among the conditional random assignment covariates to ensure that our identifying assumptions hold.

III. Data and Measures

Our data come from the EXPOVIBE-Intimate Partner Violence (EXPOVIBE-IPV) and the EXPOVIBE-Conscript Veterans (EXPOVIBE-CV) surveys conducted in 2019 as face-toface interviews at randomly selected residential addresses in 29 provinces in western Turkey. The sampling of both surveys mimics each other and was performed by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) in 29 western provinces, outside of and with negligible in-migration from the conflict zone, to separate exposure during military service from that of civilian experiences.¹⁶

¹⁶ TurkStat maintains the national address-based electronic census registry system in Turkey. From this registry, residential addresses were randomly drawn from the 29 provinces in proportion to population distribution across these provinces to finalize the EXPOVIBE-CV and EXPOVIBE-IPV survey samples.

III.I. The EXPOVIBE Intimate Partner Violence (EXPOVIBE-IPV) Survey

We conduct our main analysis using data from the EXPOVIBE-IPV survey. It is designed to elicit information from married women on their IPV experiences, personal and family characteristics, and the factual basics of husbands' military service, including the year of induction, deployment province, and service duration. While a household survey in which their husbands were also interviewed would have been a more straightforward way to track the spousal conflict exposure histories, this approach comes with significant shortcomings, including ethical concerns due to potential threat to the well-being of the participant women and severe data accuracy limitations (World Health Organization, 2001).¹⁷ Accordingly, consistent with the standards promoted by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the recommendations of the scientific ethics board of the project, the EXPOVIBE-IPV interviews were conducted with women in Turkish by female interviewers in their homes in privacy and without any interaction with anyone else from their households. In other words, the possibility of reaching women through their husbands was eliminated as a design option for these apparent concerns. Instead, the EXPOVIBE project surveyed a sample of women expected to be representative of the wives of men who were conscripted between 1984 and 2011. With privacy and anonymity established through careful study design, the EXPOVIBE-IPV survey, therefore, elicits accurate, reliable, and detailed measures of these variables while minimizing nonresponse, recall, and reporting biases without raising ethical concerns.¹⁸

The fieldwork was conducted in western Turkey in early 2019 with a representative sample of 6,384 married women. At each randomly selected address, the eligible participant

¹⁷ Moreover, the pilot surveys for the EXPOVIBE-CV among conscript veterans produced implausibly low IPV perpetration rates against their spouses, demonstrating the inadequacy of male surveys in studying husband-to-wife IPV perpetration.

¹⁸ Informed consent was obtained from all participants. A pilot study was conducted to test the questionnaire and field organization before embarking on the main field study. The scientific ethics protocols followed in this survey are discussed in detail in the Data Appendix I.

was "the lady of the house" between the ages of 25 and 50, excluding those whose husbands were exempt or served an irregularly short period of time due to special circumstances such as health problems.^{19,20, 21} The age restriction was introduced based on the average age differential in married couples in Turkey to maximize the likelihood of reaching out to women whose husbands were of draft age, and therefore were conscripted in the 1984-2011 period.²²

To measure their husbands' exposure to the armed conflict environment, respondents were asked about the location, induction year, and duration of their husbands' service in the Armed Forces. Conscription service is culturally highly revered and considered an essential part of male gender identity and patriotism in Turkish culture (Altınay, 2012). Moreover, as a significant and challenging experience for nearly every male, memories from compulsory military service are extensively discussed in family and friend circles. Therefore, wives are typically well-informed about their husbands' service history. Confirming this argument, 97.5% of respondents answered the questions regarding their husbands' conscription basics. About 89% of IPV respondents had husbands enlisted between 1984 and 2011.²³ We conduct our analysis with these 5,495 EXPOVIBE-IPV respondents whose husbands were conscripted

¹⁹ Interviewers were trained and equipped to use a Kish grid in households with more than one eligible participant to select one randomly. However, the age and status restrictions coupled with the very high percentage of nuclear family households in the sampling provinces (according to 2019 census data by TurkStat, more than 90% of families in these provinces are nuclear) eliminated any such need.

²⁰ The survey only interviewed married women because cohabitation is rare as it is highly stigmatized in Turkish culture. The interview, however, did not specify any definition of being married and simply relied on the respondent's declaration of her marital status.

²¹ As advised by the WHO (World Health Organization, 2001, p.12), the survey was framed as a study on women's health and life experiences. Relatedly, participation was only constrained by women's age without any reference to husbands' characteristics.

²² The age restriction was placed to obtain a representative sample of the women husbands served between 1984 and 2011, corresponding to those men born between 1964 and 1991, as the EXPOVIBE-IVP survey focuses on the IPV experiences of these women. It should be noted that because nearly every male born in the relevant period was drafted (Kibris and Cesur, 2022), it stands to reason that a representative survey of married women is also representative of the wives of men served in the military. Accordingly, men conscripted in this period should be roughly between 28 and 55 at the time of the survey in 2019. Based on the TurkStat national statistics on marriage and divorce (https://data.tuik.gov.tr), the average age difference within couples was about 3 to 4 years in favor of the husband in our target population; therefore, the wives of those who were inducted between 1984 and 2011 are expected to be between 25 and 50 years old, the age group interviewed by the EXPOVIBE-IPV, considering that the age gap is larger among older cohorts and vice versa.

²³ As presented later, including women whose husbands were conscripted before 1984 or after 2011 has no bearing on our estimates.

between 1984 and 2011, with non-missing information on their marriage timing and husbands' basic conscription history.

Most important for our purposes, respondents were surveyed about their IPV experiences. The questions used in the EXPOVIBE-IPV are very similar to those used by the 2006 WHO cross-country study (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006) and are built on the tradition of the Conflict Tactics Scale (Straus et al., 1996).

To capture psychological IPV experiences, respondents were asked whether they had ever experienced the following acts of violence by their current intimate male partner:

Has your husband ever sworn at you? Has your husband ever belittled or humiliated you in front of other people? Has your husband ever scared or threatened you? (ex. with his looks, by shouting or breaking things, or by threatening to hurt those you love) Has your husband ever thrown you out of the house?

Those who responded affirmatively to any of the above questions were asked:

How old were you when this first happened? Did such a thing happen in the past year?

If the participant responded that any of the above behavior by their husbands happened

after the induction, we coded *Psychological IPV Initiation* as 1, and it is set equal to 0 otherwise.

Then, we set the binary Psychological IPV Past Year equal to 1 for respondents who responded

affirmatively to experiencing any of the listed behaviors within the past 12 months, and it is

coded as 0 otherwise.

To capture physical IPV experiences, the respondents were asked whether they had ever

experienced the following physical acts of violence by their current intimate male partner:

Has your husband ever slapped you in the face? Has your husband ever pushed or scratched you or pulled your hair? Has your husband ever punched, kicked, or beat you? Has your husband ever used or threatened to use a knife or gun against you?

Those who responded affirmatively to any of the above questions were also asked:

How old were you when this first happened?

Did such a thing happen in the past year?

Using the answers to these questions, *Physical IPV Post Discharge* indicates an affirmative response to at least one of the questions above and if it took place after the timing of induction. Then, we set the binary *Physical IPV Past Year* indicator equal to 1 for respondents who were physically victimized by their husbands in the past 12 months, and 0 otherwise.

Using the above covariates, we create *Any IPV Post Discharge* and *Any IPV Past Year* to capture whether either physical or psychological violence materialized after discharge and within the past year, respectively.

Finally, by relaxing the after-discharge constraint, we also construct *Ever-Physical IPV*, *Ever-Psychological IPV*, and *Ever-Any IPV* indicators.

Appendix Table 1 presents the IPV variables by various subsamples, including educational attainment, age, marriage duration, employment, marriage age, marriage type, husband's schooling, and family income. The estimates show that 18% of the respondents reported having experienced physical violence, and 23% reported having experienced psychological violence from their husbands. The IPV prevalence among different subgroups follows an intuitive pattern. We find husband-to-wife domestic maltreatment decreases in women's education, marriage age, husbands' schooling, and family income. Moreover, IPV rates are higher in non-autonomous marriages. While physical IPV prevalence is slightly lower among working women, the opposite holds for psychological violence.

These estimates are comparable to existing surveys that capture IPV prevalence among Turkish women considering differences in survey questions and sampling.²⁴ Moreover, as long as IPV reporting in our data is unrelated to the husbands' service location assignment, our

²⁴ See Yüksel-Kaptanoğlu et al. (2015) for a detailed study of the prevalence of IPV among Turkish women.

estimates of the impact of the husband's conflict zone deployment should correspond to causal parameters.

Our main conflict exposure indicator, *Conflict Zone*, is a binary variable identifying whether the respondent's husband served in the state of the emergency area. Moreover, to explore the mechanisms and to account for potential differential effects of military socialization from that of direct armed combat exposure, we also construct measures of the intensity of armed combat the husband was exposed to during his service in the conflict zone, using geotemporal data on combatant casualties from the Turkish Stata-PKK Conflict Event Dataset TPCONED (Kibris, 2021) to characterize the military service experience and its armed violence content for each conscript in an individual-specific, relevant, and precise way.²⁵ Specifically, exploiting cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in armed violence intensity, we construct the dichotomous *Conflict Zone with Moderate Combat* and *Conflict Zone with Intense Combat* measures, which indicate below and above median combatant casualties in the deployment province of the husband during his service there.

III.II. The EXPOVIBE Conscription Veterans (EXPOVIBE-CV) Survey

To scrutinize the potential shortcomings of our main data source, the EXPOVIBE-IPV, due to reliance on wives' recollections of their husbands' military experience, we supplement our analysis using data from our second data source, the EXPOVIBE-CV survey. Specifically, by performing appropriate comparisons between these data sources, we check whether the EXPOVIBE-IPV (i) is representative of the wives of those conscripted between 1984 and 2011, (ii) provides accurate information on husband's characteristics, including conflict zone deployment statistics, and (iii) has adequate information to ensure the conditional unconfoundedness property of our natural experiment.

²⁵ The TPCONED provides the most comprehensive and accurate coverage of the Turkish State-PKK conflict at high geo-temporal precision (Kibris and Cesur, 2022; Kibris, 2021).

The EXPOVIBE-CV interviewed 5,024 draft veterans, all male by definition, in the summer and fall of 2019.²⁶ The survey questionnaire was designed to collect information on a wide range of personal and family characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors besides military experiences, including the branch of service, military occupation, rank, training duration and location, and service location and length. At each randomly selected address, the eligible participant was the "man of the house" who completed military duty between 1984 and 2011.²⁷

Using the information on induction year, service location, and the duration of service, respondent's conflict zone assignment variables, including *Conflict Zone, Conflict Zone with Moderate Combat*, and *Conflict Zone with Intense Combat*, are constructed analogously to those in the EXPOVIBE-IPV survey.

We also construct direct armed combat exposure indicators to capture conflict zone experiences of conscriptions, using the following survey questions:

Were you ever wounded in armed combat during your regular service? (Possible Answers: Yes/No) Was anyone around you ever injured or killed in armed combat during your regular service? (Possible Answers: Yes/No) Were you ever involved in armed combat during your regular service? (Possible Answers: Yes/No)

Injured is a binary variable measuring if the respondent was wounded in combat during conscription. *Witnessed Casualties* captures if the survey participant witnessed killing or wounding in combat during service. *Armed Combat* is coded as 1 if the respondent engaged the enemy in a firefight, and 0 otherwise. Finally, *Any Direct Combat* is set equal to 1 if the survey participant responded affirmatively to any of the direct combat experience questions, and it is equated to 0 otherwise.

²⁶ Interviews were conducted in Turkish by trained interviewers. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. A pilot study was conducted to test the questionnaire and field organization before embarking on the main field study.

²⁷ The EXPOVIBE surveys excluded those who were exempt or served an irregularly short period of time due to exceptional circumstances such as health problems.

IV. Estimating Equations

Using data from the EXPOVIBE-CV, we begin our analysis by testing whether our natural experiment achieves conditional random assignment using the following equation:

(1)
$$(Conflict Zone)_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{E}_d + \beta_2 \mathbf{R}_d + \varepsilon_d$$

where *Conflict Zone* represents deployment to a province in the state of emergency region. **E** is a vector of exogenous pre-deployment covariates, including birth quarter, Kurdish ethnicity and non-Muslim minority indicators, landownership, having a relative who suffered injury or died in combat during service, conscription age, military rank identifiers, training length, and service duration for draftee *d*. Note that military rank, bootcamp training length, and service duration are included among the pre-deployment characteristics because they are, as declared by the Armed Forces, determined prior to deployment and unrelated to the deployment decisions. If the military deploys draftees to their service locations consistent with its declared method, exogenous pre-deployment covariates should be orthogonal to the exogenous pre-deployment characteristics, controlling for conditional random assignment covariates upon which our identifying assumptions rest.

The vector **R** includes conditional unconfounded covariates, including height in centimeters, the branch of service, military occupation, dichotomous birth province identifiers, half-term service indicator, and educational attainment by the year of induction. As discussed above and elsewhere, induction takes place after formal education is completed (Kibris and Cesur, 2022; Akyürek, 2010). Moreover, educational attainment is arguably the most critical input the military uses in deciding the branch of service and military occupation of draftees right before the induction occurs (Yıldırım and Erdinç, 2007; Yıldırımkaya, 2010). For this reason, we control years of schooling differentiated by the year of the draft to account for both the level of education and the distribution of educational attainment by cohort. In addition,

because regulations include minimum and/or maximum height for certain military occupation classifications, we also control for height (Official Gazette, 2015). Finally, ε_c is the white noise. We cluster the standard errors at the service province level.

Given that we conduct our main analysis in the IPV survey, it is incumbent upon us to test whether our identifying assumptions hold using the available control variables in the IPV survey. Consequently, we reproduce our balance tests using the following econometric model:

(2)
$$(Conflict Zone)_d = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathbf{E}_d + \beta_2 \mathbf{R}_{-} \mathbf{IPV}_d + \varepsilon$$

where **R_IPV** includes the years of schooling fixed effects by the year of induction, half-term indicator, and residence province fixed effects, the conditional random assignment variables available in the IPV survey. If equation (2) achieves conditional random assignment, we can infer that our estimates in the IPV reflect the causal impact of *Conflict Zone* on the associated outcomes of interest.

Upon establishing evidence on the plausibility of our identifying assumptions, we estimate the impact of the husband's conflict zone deployment on domestic violence using the following econometric specification:

(3) IPV_w =
$$\mu_0 + \mu_1$$
(Conflict Zone)_w + $\mu_2 \mathbf{E}_{IPV_w} + \mu_2 \mathbf{R}_{IPV_w} + \mathbf{\xi}_w$

where IPV denotes physical or psychological husband-to-wife intimate partner violence victimization for women *w*; *Conflict Zone* represents the husband's deployment to a province in the state of emergency region; the vector \mathbf{E} _IPV includes the husband's pre-deployment characteristics available in the EXPOVIBE-IPV survey; and the rest of the covariates are analogous to those shown in equation (2).

V. Evidence on the Validity of Our Empirical Design

V.I. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Deployment Assignment

We perform our balance tests using the pre-enlistment variables, summarized in Appendix Table 2, in the EXPOVIBE-CV sample for the married men conscripted between 1984 and 2011 by conflict zone deployment status. Column (1) pertains to the whole sample. Columns (2) and (3) show the descriptive statistics in the full sample based on deployment to non-conflict areas and the conflict zone status. Then, we split those deployed to the conflict zone based on the intensity of armed combat during service measured via the number of combatant casualties in their deployment province within their service dates, with moderate combat in column (4) and intense combat in column (5), respectively. Columns (6) to (10) and Columns (11) to (15) repeat this exercise for the at most high school- and college-educated samples. A glance over these estimates does not suggest any systematic differences in exogenous pre-deployment characteristics, suggesting that deployment assignment is orthogonal to the background characteristics of draftees.

In Table 1, we perform our formal balance tests by estimating equation (1). First, in column (1), we compare the background covariates of those deployed to the conflict zone versus draftees who served outside the conflict zone. Next, columns (2) and (3) compare conflict zone service with moderate combat and intense combat to non-conflict zone service. Then, in columns (4) to (6) and (7) to (9), we repeat this exercise for individuals with less than twelve years of formal schooling and those with more than high school education, respectively. Balance tests reveal that deployment location is orthogonal to pre-enlistment characteristics; therefore, they imply that our natural experiment identifies the causal impact of conflict zone service on subsequent male-to-female domestic violence. Moreover, balance tests show that our natural experiment, i.e., the deployment lottery, satisfies the conditional unconfoundedness property in the entire sample, among men with at most 11 years of formal schooling and those who continued their education beyond high school. Therefore, given that our results apply to 97 percent of all men born reaching conscription age between 1984 and 2011, we conclude that

our natural experiment estimates the population average treatment effect of conflict zone deployment during conscription.

A slight (up to 0.06 months) but statistically significant increase in the duration of bootcamp aligns with the military providing internal safety training to those randomly selected for deployment to conflict zone (Mater, 1999, pp. 42). This safety training is undertaken by the Armed Forces to minimize the likelihood of victimization of conscripts by the PKK during their travel to their service bases.²⁸

Upon showing evidence supporting the credibility of our natural experiment, we next estimate the impact of Conflict Zone assignment on direct combat experiences in Table 2. In the entire sample, columns (1) to (4) of Panel A show that *Conflict Zone* increases the likelihood of getting injured, witnessing casualties, engaging in armed combat, and experiencing any of the direct combat experiences by 4.9, 30, 36. and 41 percentage points, respectively. Then, the corresponding estimates in Panel B show that the intensity of armed violence during service increases the likelihood of experiencing direct armed combat. That is, moderate and intense armed conflict in the location of deployment during service increases the chances of injury by 2.2 and 7.7, witnessing casualties by 2.5 and 35.1, and involvement in armed combat by 2.6 and 45.3, and any armed combat involvement by 32 and 50 percentage points, respectively.

Among those with at most a high-school education (columns 5 to 8) and those with a college education (columns 9 to 12), we document a similar pattern of estimates. These results show that regardless of the level of educational attainment, the impact of conflict zone assignment during conscription substantially increases the likelihood of direct combat exposure, bolstering the argument that our natural experiment applies nearly to the entire population of men born in the period of interest.

²⁸ After finishing the training, draftees are provided generally about 10 days of a break prior to joining their service bases. After the bootcamp, draftees typically visit their families before heading to their service locations.

V.II. Evidence on the Adequacy of the EXPOVIBE-IPV

In this subsection, we test the validity of the *EXPOVIBE-IPV* data for our purposes. First, in Appendix Table 3, we repeat the balance tests in the EXPOVIBE-CV sample by estimating equation (2) which restricts conditional random assignment variables to those available in the IPV survey. These results produce a similar pattern of estimates to those shown in Table 1, recommending that the available control variables in the IPV sample achieve the conditional random assignment property demanded by our natural experiment.

Then, we compare the wife and husband characteristics obtained from the EXPOVIBE-IPV to those obtained in the EXPOVIBE-CV. As shown in Appendix Table 4, summary statistics from these two samples produce remarkably similar estimates, recommending that the EXPOVIBE-IPV is representative of the wives of men drafted between 1984 and 2011. In particular, columns (1) and (2) display the summary statistics for the sample of married men and those with wives between 25 and 50, in the EXPOVIBE-CV survey. Column (3) presents the summary statistics obtained from the EXPOVIBE-IPV. Our first observation is that women carry precise knowledge about their husband's military service location. That is, the percentage of husbands deployed to the conflict zone and experienced moderate and high levels of combat intensity within the conflict zone are nearly identical across these two samples.

Note that the observed small differences in age and age-derived characteristics are due to the timing of interviews in these two samples. Because the EXPOVIBE-IPV was conducted 6 to 8 months before the EXPOVIBE-CV and, unlike the latter, which had no age restrictions on participants or their wives, constrained participating women's age to between 25 and 50, it is expected for EXPOVIBE-IPV respondents, as well as their husbands, to be roughly half-a-year older than the ones in the EXPOVIBE-CV, by construction. Aligning with the same logic, this small difference in husbands' age can be observed in the comparison between the average time passed since induction. The difference in family income may be attributed to the

differential reporting of household finances by couples, where husbands tend to report higher household incomes (Haberman and Elinson, 1967). Moreover, given the high inflation rates in Turkey²⁹, the timing of the two surveys can be held responsible for some of the observed differences in household incomes. Finally, the higher rate of consent marriages we observe in the EXPOVIBE-CV survey is consistent with the argument that women's acquiescence to their parents' decisions is interpreted by others as consent.

Next, to further scrutinize the potency of the IPV data in satisfying the requirements of our natural experiment, we examine the impact of conflict zone assignment on the husband and family outcomes in the EXPOVIBE-IPV and EXPOVIBE-CV samples and compare these outcomes. Understandably, because of the potential within-family reporting differences in marriage and spousal outcomes between the husband and wife, this analysis may not always produce identical results. Nonetheless, if the sample design and the control variables we employ in the EXPOVIBE-IPV survey are sufficient to achieve conditional random assignment, the results obtained from the EXPOVIBE-CV and EXPOVIBE-IPV samples should be statistically indistinguishable.

As we demonstrate in Panel A and B of Appendix Table 5, the estimates obtained from these two surveys produce a similar pattern of findings. In both samples, we observe similar results on nearly all of these outcomes. The estimates in both samples show that conflict zone deployment leads to a higher likelihood of wives being younger than 18 years old at the time of marriage, a lower probability of having both parties consenting before marriage, a higher probability of having a child, a slight decrease in the wife's schooling, and a small (and marginally statistically significant) negative effect on family income. We find in both EXPOVIBE-IPV and EXPOVIBE-CV samples that conflict zone assignment has no

²⁹ TurkStat reports the CPI as 15.2% in 2019 (https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Tuketici-Fiyat-Endeksi-Aralik-2019-33861).

measurable impact on whether the husband is in his first marriage, whether he drinks daily, and whether his wife is currently employed. The only difference we observe is that while in the EXPOVIBE-CV sample, we find a small negative and marginally statistically significant effect on the husband's employment status, we do not observe it in the IPV sample. This fairly small difference in estimates between the samples could be due to the seasonality in labor markets as we observed men and women in different parts of the years. For instance, if conflict zone service has a weak negative impact on male employment and the associated earnings, these differences may become more visible during different parts of the year. Moreover, this difference could also be because of the differential reporting of spouses.

Next, in Panel C, we reproduce the CV estimates using the control variables available in the IPV sample. We show that re-estimating these outcomes in the CV sample with conditional random assignment controls available in the IPV sample yields similar results suggesting that had we observed these outcomes for the husbands of our female respondents in the IPV survey, we would have reached the same conclusions.

Therefore, we conclude that the variables available in the IPV sample are sufficient to achieve conditional random assignment and that our estimates of the effect of the husband's war theatre exposure correspond to causal parameters.

VI. Main Results

We begin the main analysis by presenting the summary of the IPV data by conflict zone deployment. Table 3 reports the percentages of women who reported experiencing psychological and physical violence from their husbands after they had completed their military service, the percentages of women who experienced such behavior within the last year, and the

cumulative IPV perpetration rates since the start of the marriage. The table devotes columns (1) to (5) to the whole sample. The first column corresponds to all respondents. Columns (2) and (3) represent those deployed to non-conflict and conflict zones, in that order. In the final two columns, we present husband-to-wife domestic violence statistics by the intensity of armed conflict in the deployment province during service among those who served in the conflict zone. These summary statistics depict a clear pattern that both physical and psychological violence is greater among women whose husbands performed their service in conflict zones (column 3) compared to the ones with spouses completing their service outside the conflict zone (column 2). Then, columns (4) and (5) further show that IPV victimization by women increases with the intensity of the armed conflict their husbands face during their service in the conflict zone.

In (6) to (10), among women whose husbands carry at most high school education, the IPV perpetration rates exhibit a similar pattern to the entire sample with slightly larger mean values. However, among wives whose spouses attended college in columns (11) to (15), the IPV prevalence is significantly lower than it is among women with less educated husbands. Moreover, we do not observe an association between Conflict Zone and increased IPV perpetration rates among women with college-educated spouses.

Table 4 presents the estimates of the impact of the husband's conflict zone deployment on a woman's likelihood of IPV victimization. Columns (1) to (3) display the physical, psychological, and IPV results. In the first two columns of Panel I, showing unadjusted estimates in the entire sample, we find that women whose husbands served in the conflict zone are 5.8 percentage points more likely to be physically and psychologically abused by their husbands. Column (3) documents that conflict zone service causes a 6 percentage point increase in the probability of physical or psychological violence toward women by their husbands. These coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 5-percent level.

In Panel II, we include the conditional-unconfoundedness variables, namely years of schooling fixed effects by the year of induction, length of service indicator, and residence province fixed effects, upon which our identifying assumptions rest. We find that, from Panel I to II, while the magnitudes of the impact of conflict zone deployment remain nearly unchanged, the standard errors decline significantly by 35, 44, and 38 percent in columns (1) to (3), respectively, and the estimates become statistically significant at the 1-percent level, in all cases. In Panel III, we add the husband's service length, induction age, landownership status, and fixed effects for women's birth year and month of birth, respectively. These estimates are qualitatively and quantitatively indistinguishable from those presented in the previous panel. In columns (1) to (3) of Panel III, presenting estimates from our fully specified models, we find that the conflict zone deployment of the husband increases the likelihood of physical, psychological, and any IPV victimization by 5.7, 6.2, and 6.8 percentage points. These estimates are also large, with conflict zone deployment of the husband increasing the relative probability of a woman being the victim of physical, psychological, and any IPV by 36, 30, and 27 percent, respectively.

Notably, the pattern of estimates presented in Panels I to III display remarkable coefficient stability, suggesting our natural experiment identifies the causal impact of conflict zone service on subsequent IPV perpetration. Specifically, between Panel I to III, while the estimated effect on physical IPV in column (1) remains nearly unchanged, it increases by 7 and 13 percent for psychological and any IPV in columns (2) and (3), respectively. The fact that our coefficients remain either nearly identical or increase modestly while the coefficient of determination increase significantly further supports the argument that the potential unobservable determinants of IPV do not threaten our identification strategy (Oster, 2019).

Then, Panel IV reproduces our fully saturated specification among those whose husbands hold at most a high school degree. We find that the effect sizes in the high school sample are roughly 10 percent greater than those in the entire sample. Finally, in Panel V of Table 4, we estimate the impact of the Conflict Zone using the sample of women with more educated husbands and show that the conflict zone deployment of men with more than a high school education does not impact the likelihood of their subsequent IPV perpetration. The differential finding by educational attainment is consistent with the argument that individuals with lower levels of education are less resilient to adversity (Di Novi et al., 2021) and those inducted during their impressionable years, i.e., before 25, are more susceptible to external shocks (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989).

In light of the results presented Panels IV and V of Table 4, we restrict our analysis sample to women with at most high-school-educated husbands in the remaining part of the article.

Upon establishing our baseline estimates, we now focus on unearthing the dynamics of the impact of conflict zone service on IPV. In doing so, in Table 5, in the high school sample, we investigate whether these effects emerge in the first year of marriage and to what extent they mature by the third and fifth years. Panel I shows that conflict zone deployment increases the probability of physical and psychological IPV onset within the first year of marriage by 2.9 and 4.2 percentage points, corresponding to 51 and 68 percent of the cumulative effect shown in Panel II of Table 3, respectively. Then, these effect sizes increase to around 85 percent of the total effect by the third year and reach near maturity by the fifth year.

Next, we examine whether the estimated effects persist in the past year. Table 6 shows that conflict zone service increases the likelihood of physical and any IPV perpetration in the past year by 1.6 and 1.2 percentage points, corresponding to 64 and 25 percent increases relative to the comparison group. Results presented in Tables 4 and 5 recommend that conflict zone deployment leads to the initiation of husband-to-wife IPV perpetration soon after marriage,

with effects reaching near maturity by the fifth year, and its impact persists in the past 12 months, 8 to 35 years after discharge.

Before examining the robustness of our estimates, in Appendix Table 6, we explore subsample effect heterogeneity. Accordingly, we split our sample by women's age, the duration of the marriage, and the service timing of their husbands. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the physical and psychological IPV since the discharge specifications, and (3) to (4) present IPV in the past year models. Focusing on the first two panels, comparing younger versus older women, we find that the impact of conflict zone deployment on physical abuse is similar, with women below the median age experiencing slightly higher psychological abuse due to their husbands' conflict zone deployment. In Panels III and IV, our estimates in the above and below median marriage duration sample show that the impact of conflict zone assignment on both physical and psychological IPV is greater among those who had been married for a longer time at the time of the interview. This result is consistent with the view that longer marriage duration increases the likelihood of the occurrence of a cumulative event. Finally, in Panels V and VI, we present our estimate for those whose husbands were inducted prior to 2000 and in the third millennium and find qualitatively similar effects.

Regarding the estimates of the impact of *Conflict Zone* on IPV perpetration last year, column (3) shows that conflict zone assignment continues to positively impact physical IPV perpetration, with effect sizes being qualitatively similar across different subgroups. In column (4), however, we find, that conflict zone deployment does not impact psychological IPV perpetration in the past year.

In summary, conflict zone deployment substantially increases subsequent male-tofemale IPV initiation. These effects are observed in the first year of marriage and mature by the fifth year. Moreover, our analysis also documents that conflict exposure causes the persistence of husband-to-wife physical IPV perpetration in the past year, which is 8 to 35 years after discharge. Qualitatively similar magnitudes are observed among different subgroups.

VII. Robustness

In this section, we subject our findings to several robustness tests. We start by scrutinizing the resilience of our findings by dividing the estimation sample based on the timing of marriage with respect to the husband's induction. Panel I of Table 7 presents the estimates we obtain from the sample of women who got married after their husbands were discharged from the army. The estimated effect sizes are similar to our main findings.

In Panel II, where we restrict the estimation sample to women who got married before their husbands were drafted, we find IPV initiation likelihoods after discharge to be more than twice as high for physical violence and 32% higher for psychological violence. This finding is consistent with the argument that unexpected shocks tend to have a greater effect on the outcomes of married couples compared to the impact of expected ones (Negrusa et al., 2014).³⁰

Having said that, a similar pattern might emerge if there is any unobserved selection into combat deployment among those married prior to induction. We explore whether this should be a concern for us in Table 8. Specifically, we examine the impact of conflict zone assignment on the likelihood of IPV initiation prior to induction. As domestic violence prior to the draft should be theoretically unrelated to conflict zone assignment, we call this exercise a "placebo analysis" for ease of explanation. We find that men who got married before the draft are not more likely to resort to such behavior before they were inducted. Therefore, this exercise implies that the unobserved determinants of conflict zone deployment do not threaten our

³⁰ Negrusa et al. (2014) find that combat deployment has a much larger impact divorce likelihood of the U.S. military members who married prior to September 11 compared to those who married after 9/11.

estimates' credibility, further demonstrating that our natural experiment yields the causal impact of conflict zone service on subsequent male-to-female domestic violence.

Next, we explore the role of parental IPV history in explaining our results, following the findings in the IPV literature, which identifies growing up in a home or marrying a man who grew up with parental IPV as one of the major factors that put women at risk for IPV victimization (Capaldi et al., 2012). In the IPV survey, women were asked whether their father had committed IPV against their mother; whether they directly witnessed such behavior; and whether their mother-in-law had suffered from IPV. Table 9 shows that parental IPV experiences, which we measure with binary indicators of awareness of parental IPV, witnessing parental IPV, and IPV among husband's parents, respectively, are not associated with their husbands' conflict zone deployment. These results recommend that assortative mating, i.e., the tendency of draft veterans to match with women vulnerable to domestic violence, does not bias our estimates. Also, we do not observe any association between in-law IPV and husband's exposure, further validating our identification strategy by showing that men who grew up with parental IPV are no more likely to get deployed to conflict areas.

Next, in Table 10, we perform our estimates using more homogeneous groups among those with at most eleven years of schooling, providing us with cleaner subsamples in achieving conditional random assignment. If our effect sizes remain statistically unchanged in these "clean" samples, our confidence in our estimates will increase and vice-versa. Balance tests in Appendix Table 7 recommend that our identifying assumptions hold in each of these subsamples. In Panel 1 of Table 10, we restrict our sample to those whose husbands served at least 15 months in the military. If our results stem from the differences in the combat assignment and the associated exposure levels of those serving for full and shorter terms, our effect sizes should shrink and vice-versa. This exercise produces quantitatively and qualitatively identical estimates to our main findings. In Panel II, we limit our sample to those whose husbands were

inducted before their 22nd birthday, the natural conscription age, in the absence of extended schooling. While our estimated effect sizes increase slightly compared to the main results shown in the third panel of Table 4, this exercise produces very similar estimates. In Panel III, our findings are highly resilient to limiting the estimation sample to those with Turkish ethnicity. To further scrutinize the resilience of our findings, we restrict the analysis sample to those whose husbands served in eastern Turkey. Our results in Panel IV remain robust to this test. Finally, in the bottom Panel, we drop those who had ever lived elsewhere from the analysis sample to address the potential impact of the husband's conflict zone service on migration. Again, estimates remain remarkably similar, further validating the power of our natural experiment. All in all, the estimates shown in Table 10 increase our faith in the validity of our findings because the use of more conservative samples strongly confirms our baseline results.

In Appendix Table 8, we reproduce our results employing a logit model to explore our findings' sensitivity to a non-linear estimation method. These results are remarkably similar to our baseline findings.

Then, in Appendix Table 9, we explore the sensitivity of our estimates to correcting standard errors for clustering at alternative levels. In Panel I, we correct for clustering at husbands' education by draft year level. Then, in Panel II and III, we cluster standard errors at women's residence and birth provinces, respectively. Our estimates are resilient to these exercises.

In Appendix Table 10, we control for women's birth and residence province by draft year fixed effects to investigate whether such unobserved factors introduce any bias in our estimates. Again, we find that the estimated effects remain similar.

Finally, in Appendix Table 11, we test the robustness of our findings to including women whose spouses were conscripted before 1984 or after 2011 in the estimation sample. The results show that this exercise has no significant bearing on our conclusions.
Upon documenting that our findings are resilient to a battery of specification checks, we explore the underlying mechanisms in the following section.

VIII. Mechanisms

In this section, we explore the potential mechanisms articulating the links from the husband's conflict zone service to subsequent IPV initiation. The effects of conflict zone assignment can operate via two different types of exposure that may subsequently impact the outcomes of service members: (i) exposure to military culture during the war; and (ii) direct exposure to armed combat. Accordingly, the first channel implies that conflict zone deployment can immerse draftees in a military culture that emphasizes the role of physical power and boosts the dominant role of men as combatants and protectors, leading them to adopt patriarchal gender norms which may then lead to relationship problems upon returning home (Jewkes, 2002). The second channel may operate through the traumatic effects of direct combat involvement (Cesur and Sabia, 2016). Moreover, these two types of exposures can influence the behavior of draft veterans after discharge through several intermediaries, including risky health behaviors and labor market outcomes.

Therefore, we start the investigation of mechanisms by exploring the impact of conflict zone assignment based on the intensity of direct armed combat exposure during service. For this purpose, we use the intensity of armed combat exposure measures, for which balance tests were already performed in Table 1. The results in Table 11 show that while all husbands deployed to the conflict zone exhibit an elevated risk of IPV perpetration upon returning home, the intensity of their exposure matters, with women whose husbands had exposure to intense armed combat suffering the highest risk of victimization. In particular, conflict zone service with moderate and high-intensity armed combat exposure increases physical violence by 5.4 and 7.4 percentage points and psychological violence by 6.5 and 7.8 percentage points,

respectively. In that order, the associated coefficients for any violence are 6.8 and 8.6 percentage points.

These results recommend that IPV perpetration increases in the intensity of armed conflict during service. However, while these could be interpreted as direct combat exposure and the associated trauma having a greater effect on IPV, they do not necessarily rule out the influence of military socialization. This is because higher conflict intensity during service may also imply the intensification of military socialization. Moreover, theoretically speaking, in addition to their violence-enhancing properties, direct conflict-exposure-induced physical and mental health ailments can counterbalance subsequent violent tendencies (Friedman et al., 1994). Therefore, these results imply that both military socialization and direct armed combat exposure contribute to the subsequent IPV perpetration of conscription veterans. Given that the intensity of armed combat during service impacts matters in defining the relationship between conflict zone deployment and subsequent domestic violence, we continue the exploration of the impact of *Conflict Zone* on other potential mechanisms with the decomposed version of our exposure measure based on the likelihood of direct armed combat exposure during service.

Table 12 looks into the risky health behaviors of the husband in the EXPOVIBE-IVP sample by regressing husbands' drinking, gambling, and drug use on *Conflict Zone with Moderate Combat* and *Conflict Zone with Intense Combat*. These results show that, regardless of the intensity of armed combat, Conflict Zone service has no measurable effect on conscript veterans' substance use.

In Table 13, we estimate the impact of conflict zone deployment on the husband's controlling behaviors, including exhibiting jealousy, restricting contact with family and friends, and limiting women's economic freedoms. The questions, which require women to indicate whether they have ever been subjected by their husbands to each of the listed controlling

behaviors, are shown in Data Appendix III. The *Standardized Controlling Behavior Index* is constructed by utilizing the method of Anderson (2008), a weighted summation of answers to these questions by employing the inverse covariance matrix, lowering the weights of variables with higher correlation levels, with sub-indexes of *Jealousy; Social Contact Limitation;* and *Economic Control* similarly constructed with relevant subgroupings of questions. The results show no evidence that the husband's armed violence exposure ignites subsequent jealousy and socially and economically restrictive behaviors. These findings recommend that our results do not materialize through changes in the husband's preferences toward traditional gender roles or the husband's likelihood of resorting to violence to gain an advantage in intrahousehold bargaining.

In Appendix Table 12, we condition our models on the potentially endogenous covariates that we explored in Appendix Table 5 (husband, wife, and marriage characteristics), Table 9 (parent and in-law IPV history), Table 12 (risky health behaviors), Table 13 (husband's controlling behaviors), to descriptively check if and how much this exercise explains our findings. In columns (1) and (2), we show the physical IPV specifications without and with controlling for these covariates. Columns (3) and (4) and columns (5) and (6) repeat the same exercise for psychological and any IPV, respectively. Consistent with the results in the previous tables, controlling for these covariates does not have any meaningful bearing on how conflict zone service impacts subsequent IPV initiation.

It is worth emphasizing that the estimated coefficients confirm that these covariates are ideal precursors of IPV perpetration from husband to wife as they align with theoretical expectations and empirical regularities (Capaldi et al., 2012). Specifically, we find that domestic violence is positively correlated with the parental IPV histories of both the wife and the husband; increases in risky health behaviors of the husband; co-emerges with the husband's economic- and social-controlling behaviors; is less prevalent in consensual marriages; rises by parenting stress; and is more common among working wives. Remarkably, while adding these measures increases the R-squared by 62 to 79 percent, the coefficients on conflict exposure indicators exhibit considerably little variation, suggesting that unobservable determinants of conflict zone assignment do not pose a threat to the credibility of our findings.

Eliminating the likelihood of the instrumental use of violence as a bargaining device in household affairs, now, we turn our attention to the EXPOVIBE-CV to explore the potential psychological effects of conflict deployment in a representative sample of currently married draft veterans. Specifically, our final table explores whether those exposed to the conflict zone display aggressive tendencies and are more likely to resort to violent behavior in their everyday lives. Our first measure is an index we constructed based on a shortened version of the Buss-Perry Aggression Scale (Buss and Perry, 1992), capturing thoughts, emotions, and behaviors intended to harm others, using Anderson's methodology (2008). The 5-point Likert scale questions, with answers ranging from "completely false for me" to "completely true for me" regarding how each description represents their character, were used in constructing the abridged 12-item Aggression Index, developed by Webster et al. (2013), are shown in Data Appendix III. We also construct two binary indicators measuring the inclination to use violence in everyday life, and anger management problems, respectively. Ready to Use Violence if Provoked is a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 for the respondents who completely agreed that he could be depicted as a person who would hit someone if provoked enough; it is set equal to 0 otherwise. Finally, we equate the dummy variable *Trouble Controlling Anger* to 1 for those who completely agreed that " (they) sometimes fly off the handle for no good reason," and it is equal to 0 otherwise.

Table 13 shows that those who serve in intense combat environments display aggressive tendencies. In column (1), we find an increase in the overall aggression score. In columns (2) and (3), those with high exposure indicate a higher likelihood of violent response to

'provocation' and trouble controlling anger, indicative of resorting to violence as a psychological coping device to manage stressful life situations, consistent with the argument that the trauma of combat could lead to subsequent anger management problems (Galovski and Lyons, 2004; Taft, 2007).

IX. Conclusion

In this study, we examine the causal impact of armed conflict exposure on the IPV perpetration likelihood of the randomly picked adult male from the population. We exploit a population-level natural experiment delivered by the deployment lottery embedded in the Turkish conscription system predicting the service location of conscripts during the PKK's armed insurgency that has been going on in the southeastern parts of the country since 1984. We use data from two independent surveys conducted in Turkey in 2019. Our main data source is the EXPOVIBE-IPV survey providing detailed information on the IPV experiences of married women along with information on their husbands' military service. We supplement our analysis and findings with data from the EXPOVIBE-CV survey, which provides rich information on conscript veterans' personal characteristics and military service experiences.

Our results indicate that husband's conflict exposure puts women at a higher risk of domestic violence, captured by higher odds of psychological and physical IPV victimization, starting soon after marriage and continuing 8 to 35 years after discharge. Our back-of-theenvelope calculations based on our findings indicate that men's conflict exposure during service constitutes a major public health problem in Turkey with long-lasting effects. For instance, estimated coefficients indicate that the husband's conflict zone deployment is responsible for 12% percent of all the nationwide physical IPV cases in the previous year among married couples. Moreover, conflict zone deployment explains 35% of the variation in physical IPV in the past 12 months among women whose husbands were deployed to the conflict zone. Notably, these estimates are likely to correspond to the lower bound as our sample does not include women whose IPV experience had led to the dissolution of their marriages.

We show that these effects are driven by husbands with less than a college education, corresponding to roughly 85 percent of men reaching the age of induction between 1984 and 2011. These results align with the arguments that more impressionable (e.g., younger) and less resilient (e.g., less educated) individuals are more vulnerable to the adverse effects of external shocks (e.g., armed conflict exposure). Therefore, our results recommend that policy interventions to curb domestic violence due to armed conflict exposure may benefit from focusing on men who belong to such demographic groups.

We also isolate the mechanisms that transmit the effects. Our results nominate military socialization and the trauma of combat leading to the co-emergence of the normalization of violence and anger management issues among the exposed as the primary pathways, with important implications. First, our findings confirm the theoretical arguments that violence is a learned phenomenon and that people carry their learnings from one social context to another (Pollak, 2004). Second, in the absence of labor market channels and the husband's controlling behaviors, we find evidence supporting the notion that IPV is an expressive behavior fueled by anger management issues when discussions escalate out of control.

Most importantly, our research is the first to show that when a randomly picked male from the population goes through combat zone deployment, he becomes more likely to use violence to solve daily life problems upon his return while also experiencing anger management issues that potentially create and escalate such problems. Effect-heterogeneity analysis documents that these results apply to an overwhelming majority of the population within our study period, except about 15 % of men who continued their formal education beyond high school. These results apply to several other cases around the globe, where institutional setups allow forcing civilians into combatant roles. While the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of Russian conscripts in the invasion of Ukraine is the most timely example, there are also several other recent cases.³¹ For instance, Israel's conscripts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Colombian draftees during the civil conflict in the 1958-2013 period (Rodriguez, 2018), the mass conscription campaign in Eritrea as part of its involvement in neighboring Ethiopia's civil war,³² the universal draft in Iran amid ongoing armed conflict with the PJAK insurgents in the northwest of the country; and the Armenian and Azerbaijani military campaigns that deployed conscripts to combat in their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh constitute other contemporary examples in which military institutions expose young men to armed violence.³³ Our results predict that their experiences lead to adverse psychological transformations among these young men exposing their female partners to higher risks of IPV victimization.

Research on violence against women in conflict environments has so far mostly focused on sexual violence perpetrated by armed actors in conflict environments as part of conflict strategies (Wood, 2014; Cohen, 2013). Relatedly, humanitarian guidelines developed to address the issue of gender-based violence in armed conflicts may benefit from paying closer attention to this important source of danger that awaits women at home.

³¹ <u>https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/russia-mobilisation-ukraine-war-army-drive.</u>

³² https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-18/eritrea-goes-for-broke-in-ethiopian-civil-war-to-crush-old-foe

³³ https://eurasianet.org/armenians-and-azerbaijanis-are-called-to-war (last visited October 13, 2020).

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Figure I. Map of the Conflict Zone



Note: The dark highlighted Conflict Zone refers to the state of emergency (OHAL) region declared by the Turkish State. The OHAL region includes provinces Adıyaman, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, and Van.

Figure II. Sampling distributions



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Sample	All	All	All	High School	High School	High School	College	College	College
VARIABLES	Conflict vs	Moderate	Intense	Conflict vs	Moderate	Intense	Conflict vs	Moderate	Intense
	Non-Conflict	Combat vs	Combat vs	Non-Conflict	Combat vs	Combat vs	Non-Conflict	Combat vs	Combat vs
		Non-Conflict	Non-Conflict		Non-Conflict	Non-Conflict		Non-Conflict	Non-Conflict
Birth-Quarter: Second	0.0049	0.0166	-0.0028	0.0009	0.0181	-0.0102	-0.0005	0.0124	0.0157
	(0.0163)	(0.0126)	(0.0133)	(0.0192)	(0.0145)	(0.0146)	(0.0495)	(0.0444)	(0.0434)
Birth-Quarter: Third	0.0013	0.0171	-0.0149	0.0051	0.0238	-0.0195	-0.0464	-0.0299	-0.0093
	(0.0174)	(0.0161)	(0.0148)	(0.0196)	(0.0191)	(0.0161)	(0.0616)	(0.0606)	(0.0588)
Birth-Quarter: Fourth	-0.0165	-0.0062	-0.0095	-0.0215	-0.0043	-0.0175	0.0630	0.0124	0.0833
	(0.0224)	(0.0209)	(0.0183)	(0.0247)	(0.0212)	(0.0200)	(0.0786)	(0.0723)	(0.0683)
Landowner	-0.0063	0.0040	-0.0082	0.0020	0.0077	-0.0034	-0.0572	-0.0109	-0.0593
	(0.0190)	(0.0159)	(0.0168)	(0.0194)	(0.0159)	(0.0175)	(0.0532)	(0.0472)	(0.0494)
Martyr in the Family	0.0221	0.0240	0.0098	0.0220	0.0235	0.0132	0.0009	0.0030	0.0174
	(0.0261)	(0.0162)	(0.0216)	(0.0298)	(0.0195)	(0.0245)	(0.0623)	(0.0531)	(0.0541)
Kurdish	0.0400	0.0046	0.0612	0.0434	0.0101	0.0647	0.0503	0.0348	-0.0020
	(0.0365)	(0.0297)	(0.0398)	(0.0427)	(0.0330)	(0.0438)	(0.1222)	(0.0799)	(0.1038)
Non-Muslim Minority	0.1800	0.1635	0.0690	0.2131	0.2075	0.0812	-0.4133	-0.2922	-0.1318
	(0.1705)	(0.2125)	(0.0909)	(0.1852)	(0.2444)	(0.1031)	(0.2794)	(0.2441)	(0.1912)
Induction Age	-0.0030	-0.0053	0.0014	0.0005	-0.0025	0.0015	-0.0147	-0.0172	0.0004
	(0.0051)	(0.0038)	(0.0037)	(0.0060)	(0.0050)	(0.0048)	(0.0093)	(0.0106)	(0.0069)
Rank: Corporal	-0.0037	0.0154	-0.0292	-0.0071	0.0120	-0.0310	0.0489	0.0541	-0.0062
	(0.0307)	(0.0273)	(0.0233)	(0.0309)	(0.0290)	(0.0245)	(0.1001)	(0.0947)	(0.0913)
Rank: Sergeant	0.0095	-0.0112	0.0145	0.0189	0.0157	-0.0011	-0.0046	-0.1143	0.1145***
	(0.0249)	(0.0195)	(0.0219)	(0.0292)	(0.0249)	(0.0239)	(0.0730)	(0.0752)	(0.0408)
Sub-Lieutenant	-0.0868	-0.0420	-0.0357				-0.0845	-0.0924	-0.0036
	(0.0980)	(0.0848)	(0.0755)				(0.1457)	(0.1343)	(0.1257)
Training Duration	0.0445***	0.0310***	0.0269*	0.0419***	0.0306***	0.0229	0.0511	0.0337	0.0429
	(0.0147)	(0.0110)	(0.0148)	(0.0149)	(0.0111)	(0.0157)	(0.0374)	(0.0329)	(0.0320)
Service Duration	-0.0167**	-0.0086	-0.0129	-0.0164*	-0.0066	-0.0149	-0.0193	-0.0085	-0.0103
	(0.0080)	(0.0058)	(0.0089)	(0.0087)	(0.0089)	(0.0094)	(0.0254)	(0.0168)	(0.0182)
Observations	3,571	3,108	3,145	3,096	2,664	2,730	475	444	415
R-squared	0.260	0.265	0.302	0.267	0.274	0.307	0.560	0.606	0.680
F-test of joint significance	0.59	0.99	0.77	0.51	0.90	0.54	0.69	0.45	1.23
Joint F-test P-value	0.83	0.46	0.67	0.88	0.54	0.86	0.75	0.93	0.29

Table 1. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Zone Deployment, CV Sample

Notes: These estimates are obtained from the sample of married men in the EXPOVIBE-CV, using sampling weights. Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for conditional unconfoundedness covariates, including height, and fixed effects for military occupation, the branch of service, half-term service, the draft year by husband's education, birth province, and training province.

L												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Sample	All	All	All	All	High	High	High	High	College	College	College	College
					School	School	School	School		_	_	-
	Injured	Witnessed	Armed	Any	Injured	Witnessed	Armed	Any	Injured	Witnessed	Armed	Any
		Casualties	Combat	Direct		Casualties	Combat	Direct		Casualties	Combat	Direct
				Combat				Combat				Combat
Panel A:												
Conflict Zone	0.049***	0.302***	0.355***	0.407***	0.054***	0.306***	0.363***	0.415***	0.006	0.284***	0.335***	0.376***
	(0.008)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.083)
Observations	3,566	3,558	3,568	3,568	3,092	3,085	3,093	3,093	474	473	475	475
R-squared	0.128	0.343	0.405	0.397	0.133	0.342	0.408	0.396	0.362	0.599	0.594	0.624
Panel B:												
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	0.022**	0.254***	0.256***	0.318***	0.023**	0.251***	0.260***	0.323***	0.003	0.281***	0.278***	0.296***
	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.009)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.075)	(0.069)	(0.073)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	0.077***	0.351***	0.453***	0.497***	0.083***	0.356***	0.457***	0.500***	0.010	0.292	0.440***	0.526***
	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.011)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.178)	(0.133)	(0.125)
	3,566	3,558	3,568	3,568	3,092	3,085	3,093	3,093	474	473	475	475
	0.136	0.346	0.418	0.405	0.141	0.345	0.421	0.404	0.362	0.599	0.598	0.631

Table 2. The Impact of Conflict Zone Deployment on Direct Armed Combat Experiences

Notes: These estimates are obtained from the sample of married men in the EXPOVIBE-CV, using sampling weights. Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for conditional unconfoundedness and pre-deployment covariates, including height, training duration, service length, and fixed effects birth quarter, landownership status, having a martyr in the family or among friends, ethnicity, military rank, military occupation, the branch of service, half-term service, the draft year by husband's education, birth province and training province.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Variable	All	All	All	All	All	HS	HS	HS	HS	HS	College	College	College	College	College
		Non-	Conflict	Conflict	Conflict		Non-	Conflict	Conflict	Conflict		Non-	Conflict	Conflict	Conflict
		Conflict	Zone	Zone	Zone		Conflict	Zone	Zone	Zone		Conflict	Zone	Zone	Zone
		Zone		Moderate	Intense		Zone		Moderate	Intense		Zone		Moderate	Intense
Panel A Full Sample				Combat	Combat				Combat	Combat				Combat	Collidat
Physical IPV Post Discharge	0.175	0.162	0.219	0.192	0.247	0.189	0.174	0.238	0.214	0.262	0.093	0 000	0.063	0.041	0.095
Thysical II + Toss Discharge	(0.380)	(0.368)	(0.21)	(0.394)	(0.432)	(0.301)	(0.370)	(0.426)	(0.214)	(0.202)	(0.000)	(0.200)	(0.244)	(0.200)	(0.205)
Psychological IPV Post Discharge	0.220	0.207	(0.414) 0.265	(0.394)	0.288	0.232	0.216	0.283	0.263	0 303	0.152	0.159	0.116	0.100	0.139
i sychological il v i ost Discharge	(0.414)	(0.207)	(0.442)	(0.243)	(0.453)	(0.232)	(0.412)	(0.451)	(0.441)	(0.460)	(0.350)	(0.366)	(0.321)	(0.302)	(0.348)
Any IPV Post Discharge	(0.717)	0.251	0.311	0.286	0 3 3 7	0.270	(0.412) 0.264	0 3 3 0	0.308	0 352	0.178	0.183	0.140	0.129	0.178
	(0.441)	(0.422)	(0.462)	(0.452)	(0.337)	(0.279)	(0.441)	(0.330)	(0.462)	(0.352)	(0.282)	(0.287)	(0.257)	(0.227)	(0.285)
	(0.441)	(0.433)	(0.403)	(0.452)	(0.473)	(0.449)	(0.441)	(0.471)	(0.402)	(0.478)	(0.382)	(0.387)	(0.557)	(0.337)	(0.385)
Physical IPV Past Year	0.030	0.025	0.049	0.038	0.061	0.034	0.028	0.053	0.042	0.064	0.009	0.008	0.018	0.011	0.030
	(0.171)	(0.155)	(0.217)	(0.192)	(0.239)	(0.181)	(0.165)	(0.224)	(0.202)	(0.244)	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.135)	(0.102)	(0.172)
Psychological IPV Past Year	0.079	0.076	0.093	0.072	0.114	0.083	0.078	0.097	0.078	0.115	0.061	0.062	0.059	0.032	0.098
	(0.270)	(0.265)	(0.290)	(0.259)	(0.318)	(0.275)	(0.269)	(0.296)	(0.268)	(0.320)	(0.240)	(0.241)	(0.236)	(0.176)	(0.300)
Any IPV Past Year	0.089	0.084	0.105	0.086	0.124	0.093	0.088	0.110	0.094	0.125	0.063	0.063	0.064	0.031	0.112
	(0.284)	(0.277)	(0.307)	(0.281)	(0.330)	(0.290)	(0.283)	(0.313)	(0.293)	(0.331)	(0.243)	(0.242)	(0.245)	(0.174)	(0.317)
Ever Physical IPV	0.181	0.167	0.231	0.203	0.261	0.195	0.179	0.249	0.224	0.274	0.102	0.105	0.085	0.059	0.123
	(0.385)	(0.373)	(0.422)	(0.402)	(0.439)	(0.396)	(0.383)	(0.433)	(0.417)	(0.446)	(0.303)	(0.307)	(0.280)	(0.237)	(0.331)
Ever Psychological IPV	0.233	0.218	0.284	0.257	0.311	0.245	0.228	0.300	0.276	0.324	0.164	0.167	0.151	0.129	0.183
	(0.423)	(0.413)	(0.451)	(0.438)	(0.463)	(0.430)	(0.420)	(0.459)	(0.447)	(0.468)	(0.371)	(0.373)	(0.359)	(0.337)	(0.389)
Ever Any IPV	0.276	0.261	0.328	0.299	0.358	0.291	0.274	0.346	0.319	0.372	0.192	0.193	0.184	0.158	0.222
	(0.447)	(0.439)	(0.470)	(0.458)	(0.480)	(0.454)	(0.446)	(0.476)	(0.467)	(0.484)	(0.394)	(0.395)	(0.388)	(0.367)	(0.418)
Observations	5495	4246	1249	628	621	4585	3503	1082	529	553	910	743	167	99	68

Table 3. Summary Statistics for Intimate Partner Violence by Husband's Armed Conflict Zone Deployment

These summary statistics are obtained from the sample of married women in the EXPOVIBE-IPV, with husbands conscripted between 1984 and 2011, using sampling weights. Standard deviations are in parathesis.

8			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Post Discharge
Panel I. All, No Controls			
Conflict Zone	0.058**	0.058**	0.060**
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Observations	5,488	5,486	5,491
R-squared	0.004	0.003	0.003
Panel II. All, Conditional Unconfoundedness Controls			
Conflict Zone	0.057***	0.060***	0.064***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Observations	5,488	5,486	5,491
R-squared	0.222	0.174	0.183
Panel III. Full Controls			
Conflict Zone	0.057***	0.062***	0.068***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Observations	5,488	5,486	5,491
R-squared	0.242	0.195	0.205
Panel IV. Full Controls. High School			
Conflict Zone	0.063***	0.072***	0.078***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Observations	4,578	4,580	4,581
R-squared	0.237	0.195	0.203
Panel V. Full Controls. College			
Conflict Zone	-0.001	-0.023	-0.010
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.034)
Observations	910	906	910
R-squared	0.356	0.326	0.312

Table 4. The Impact of Husband's Conflict Zone Deployment on Intimate Partner Violence After Discharge

Notes: Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Conditional unconfoundedness controls include fixed effects for the draft year by husband's education, residence province, and an indicator variable for half-term service. Full controls add service duration, and fixed effects for draft age, women's ethnicity, birth year, and month of birth.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Discharge	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Post Discharge
Panel I. Within 1 Year of Marriage			
Conflict Zone	0.032**	0.051***	0.055***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Observations	4,567	4,564	4,560
R-squared	0.199	0.168	0.166
Panel II. Within 3 Years of Marriage			
Conflict Zone	0.053***	0.065***	0.076***
	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Observations	4,567	4,564	4,560
R-squared	0.193	0.187	0.177
Panel III. Within 5 Years of Marriage			
Conflict Zone	0.059***	0.074***	0.084***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Observations	4,567	4,564	4,560
R-squared	0.232	0.202	0.198

Table 5. The Impact of Husband's Conflict Zone Deployment on Intimate Partner Violence on the Onset of the Initiation of IPV Relative to Marriage Year

Notes: Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include conditional unconfoundedness variables, as well as pre-deployment and women's characteristics. Conditional unconfoundedness controls include fixed effects for the draft year by husband's education, residence province, and an indicator variable for half-term service. Pre-deployment and women's characteristics include service duration, and fixed effects for draft age, women's ethnicity, and birth year and month.

Table 6. The Impact of Husband's Conflict Zone Deployment on Intimate Partner Violence in the Past Year

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Past Year	Past Year	Past Year
Conflict Zone	0.017**	0.016*	0.024**
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Observations	4,579	4,580	4,580
R-squared	0.288	0.197	0.208

v			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Post Discharge
Panel I. Married After Discharge			
Conflict Zone	0.063***	0.075***	0.087***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Observations	3,563	3,565	3,564
R-squared	0.272	0.218	0.226
Panel II. Married Before Draft			
Conflict Zone	0.132***	0.097**	0.127***
	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Observations	641	641	643
R-squared	0.491	0.512	0.488

Table 7. The Impact of Husband's Conflict Zone Deployment on Intimate Partner Violence by Marriage Before and After Induction

Notes: Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include conditional unconfoundedness variables, as well as pre-deployment and women's characteristics. Conditional unconfoundedness controls include fixed effects for the draft year by husband's education, residence province, and an indicator variable for half-term service. Pre-deployment and women's characteristics include service duration, and fixed effects for draft age, women's ethnicity, and birth year and month.

Table 8. The Impact of Husband's Conflict Zone Deployment on Prior to Deployment Intimate Partner Violence ('Placebo IPV'), Married Before Draft Sample

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Before Draft	Before Draft	Before Draft
Conflict Zone	0.013	0.022	-0.005
	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Observations	641	644	645
R-squared	0.387	0.520	0.494

Notes: Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include conditional unconfoundedness variables, as well as pre-deployment and women's characteristics. Conditional unconfoundedness controls include fixed effects for the draft year by husband's education, residence province, and an indicator variable for half-term service. Pre-deployment and women's characteristics include service duration, and fixed effects for draft age, women's ethnicity, and birth year and month.

Table 9. The Impact of Conflict On Parents' and In-Laws' IPV History

	(1) Parental IPV	(2) Witnessed Parental IPV	(3) In-Laws IPV	(4) In-Laws IPV Missing
Conflict Zone	-0.017	0.003	0.021	-0.005
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.013)
Observations	4,576	4,576	4,017	4,585
R-squared	0.142	0.154	0.195	0.137

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Post Discharge
Panel I. Months Service >=15			
Conflict Zone	0.062***	0.076***	0.077***
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Observations	4,184	4,186	4,187
Panel II. Draft Age < 22			
Conflict Zone	0.064***	0.073***	0.077***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Observations	4,237	4,239	4,240
Panel III. Turkish Ethnicity Only			
Conflict Zone	0.067***	0.073***	0.079***
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Observations	4,240	4,240	4,242
Panel IV. Service in the Eastern Provinces Only			
Conflict Zone	0.043*	0.102***	0.086***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.026)
Observations	1,645	1,647	1,647
Panel V. Non-Movers			
Conflict Zone	0.065***	0.075***	0.071***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Observations	3,085	3,085	3,088

Table 10. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Intimate Partner Violence, Robustness to Employing "Cleaner" Subsamples

Table 11. Separating the Role of Exposure to Elevated Armed Combat from Conflict Zone Socialization

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Post Discharge
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	0.055**	0.067***	0.071***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	0.070**	0.076***	0.082***
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Observations	4,578	4,580	4,581
R-squared	0.237	0.194	0.201

¥	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Husband	Husband	Husband
	Drinks	Gambles	Uses
	Daily		Drugs
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	-0.003	0.022	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.006)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	0.004	0.008	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.004)
Observations	4,577	4,577	4,578
R-squared	0.072	0.122	0.119

Table 12. The Impact of Conflict Zone Deployment and Armed Combat Exposure on Husband's Risky Health Behaviors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Standardized	Standardized	Limiting	Economic
	Controlling	Jealousy	Social	Controlling
	Behavior	Index	Contact	Index
	Index		Index	
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	-0.006	-0.068	0.049	0.048
	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	-0.064	-0.016	-0.027	-0.069**
	(0.050)	(0.069)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Observations	4,585	4,583	4,584	4,585
R-squared	0.170	0.185	0.147	0.160

Table 13. The Impact of Conflict Zone Deployment and Armed Combat Exposure on the Husband's Controlling Behaviors

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Aggression	Ready to	Trouble
	Index	Use	Controlling
		Violence	Anger
		if Provoked	
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	-0.095*	0.012	-0.012
	(0.053)	(0.021)	(0.013)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	0.182**	0.095***	0.030**
	(0.084)	(0.022)	(0.012)
Observations	3,092	3,087	3,078
R-squared	0.205	0.251	0.242

Table 14. The Impact of Conflict Zone Deployment and Armed Combat Exposure on Normalization of Violence, CV Sample

Notes: These estimates are obtained from the sample of married men in the EXPOVIBE-CV, using sampling weights. Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for conditional unconfoundedness and pre-deployment covariates, including height, training duration, service length, and fixed effects birth quarter, landownership status, having a martyr in the family or among friends, ethnicity, military rank, military occupation, the branch of service, half-term service, the draft year by husband's education, birth province and training province.

<u> </u>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
		Ever		Physical	Psychological	Any		Psychological	Any	
	Ever	Psychological	Ever	ÎPV	IPV	IPV	Physical IPV	IPV	IPV	
	Physical	IPV	Any	Post	Post	Post	Past	Past	Last	
	ÍPV		IPV	Discharge	Discharge	Discharge	Year	Year	Year	Ν
All	0.18	0.23	0.28	0.17	0.22	0.26	0.03	0.08	0.09	5495
Education College	0.09	0.15	0.17	0.09	0.14	0.16	0.02	0.04	0.05	749
Education <= HS	0.19	0.24	0.29	0.19	0.23	0.28	0.03	0.08	0.09	4746
Age >37	0.22	0.26	0.32	0.21	0.24	0.30	0.03	0.08	0.09	2802
Age <38	0.14	0.20	0.23	0.14	0.20	0.23	0.03	0.08	0.09	2693
Marriage Duration >15	0.23	0.27	0.33	0.22	0.25	0.31	0.03	0.08	0.09	2782
Marriage Duration <16	0.12	0.19	0.22	0.12	0.19	0.21	0.03	0.08	0.09	2713
Work	0.17	0.27	0.30	0.16	0.25	0.28	0.05	0.10	0.10	1341
No Work	0.18	0.22	0.27	0.18	0.21	0.26	0.02	0.07	0.08	4106
Marriage Age >=18	0.17	0.22	0.26	0.16	0.21	0.26	0.03	0.08	0.09	4886
Marriage Age <18	0.28	0.31	0.37	0.26	0.26	0.33	0.03	0.09	0.09	609
Autonomous Marriage	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.11	0.17	0.20	0.02	0.06	0.07	2989
Non-Autonomous Marriage	0.25	0.30	0.35	0.24	0.28	0.34	0.04	0.10	0.11	2502
Husband > 11 Schooling	0.10	0.16	0.19	0.09	0.15	0.18	0.01	0.06	0.06	910
Husband <12 Schooling	0.20	0.24	0.29	0.19	0.23	0.28	0.03	0.08	0.09	4585
Family Income > 2500TL	0.14	0.19	0.24	0.13	0.17	0.22	0.01	0.06	0.06	2663
Family Income <=2500TL	0.22	0.27	0.31	0.21	0.26	0.30	0.05	0.10	0.11	2832

Appendix Table 1. Intimate Partner Violence and Armed Combat Exposure Statistics by Subsample

These summary statistics are obtained from the sample of married women in the EXPOVIBE-IPV, with husbands conscripted between 1984 and 2011, using sampling weights. Standard deviations are in parathesis.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Variable	All	All	All	All	All	HS	HS	HS	HS	HS	College	College	College	College	College
		Non-	Conflict	Conflict	Conflict		Non-	Conflict	Conflict	Conflict		Non-	Conflict	Conflict	Conflict
		Conflict	Zone	Zone	Zone		Conflict	Zone	Zone	Zone		Conflict	Zone	Zone	Zone
		Zone		Moderate	Intense		Zone		Moderate	Intense		Zone		Moderate	Intense
Dirth Oscartan Einst	0.24	0.24	0.22	Combat	Combat	0.24	0.24	0.22	Combat	Combat	0.25	0.26	0.20	Combat	Combat
Birth-Quarter: First	0.34	0.34	0.33	0.32	0.33	0.34	0.54	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.35	0.36	0.50	0.30	0.51
Dirth Origination Correct	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.47)
Birth-Quarter: Second	(0.27)	0.28	0.25	0.28	0.23	0.28	0.29	0.25	0.28	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.20	(0.27)	0.24
Digit Occurry Thind	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.45)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.43)
Birth-Quarter: Third	0.22	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.22	0.22	0.25	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.20	0.24	0.13
Dirth Ossertan Easynth	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.34)
Birth-Quarter: Fourth	(0.10)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.25)	0.20	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.27)	0.15	0.19	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.19	(0.32)
Londorran	(0.57)	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.37)	(0.34)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.48)
Landowner	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.42)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.27)	(0.42)	0.20	(0.21)	(0.20)	0.26	(0.23)	0.21	(0.20)
Montra in Fomily	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.41)	(0.43)
Martyr in Fainity	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Turkich	0.04	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.43)
TUIKISII	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.93)	(0.22)	(0.93)	(0.26)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.93)	(0.18)	(0.30)
Kurdich	0.06	0.05	0.06	(0.28)	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.20)	(0.29)	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	(0.18)	0.10
Kuluisii	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.03)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.23)	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.30)
Non Muslim Minority	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Non-Wushin Winofity	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.00)	(0.06)	(0.07)	0.00	0.00	0.00
Induction Age	20.66	20.71	20.48	20.58	20.39	20.36	20.39	20.27	20.28	20.26	22.89	23.00	22.30	22.47	22.25
induction Age	(1.69)	(1.76)	(1.42)	(1.48)	(1.37)	(1.16)	(1, 21)	(0.96)	(0.83)	(1.06)	(2.0)	(2.94)	(2.86)	(2,75)	(3.11)
Rank: Corporal	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.08	0.09	0.06
Runk: Corporat	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.25)
Rank: Sergeant	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.10	0.32	0.33	0.28	0.22	0.40
Runk: Sergeun	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.47)	(0.45)	(0.42)	(0.50)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07
Sub Eleatenant	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.06)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Training Duration	2.67	2.65	2.74	2.66	2.81	2.73	2.72	2.77	2.72	2.81	2.19	2.13	2.47	2.29	2.82
Training Daration	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.67)	(0.75)	(0.58)	(0.68)	(0.69)	(0.63)	(0.69)	(0.58)	(1.00)	(1.01)	(0.93)	(1.01)	(0.64)
Service Duration	16.69	16.67	16.75	16.26	17.19	17.11	17.14	16.99	16.70	17.23	13.61	13.42	14.48	13.44	16.51
	(2.47)	(2.55)	(2.18)	(2.56)	(1.67)	(1.52)	(1.48)	(1.61)	(1.64)	(1.55)	(4.85)	(4.93)	(4.41)	(4.71)	(2.86)
Observations	3571	2682	889	426	463	3096	2298	798	366	432	475	384	91	60	31

Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics by Conflict Zone Deployment, CV Sample

These summary statistics are obtained from the sample of married men in the EXPOVIBE-CV, using sampling weights. Standard deviations are in parathesis.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Sample	All	All	All	High School	High School	High School	College	College	College
VARIABLES	Conflict vs	Moderate	Intense	Conflict vs	Moderate	Intense	Conflict vs	Moderate	Intense
	Non-Conflict	Combat vs	Combat vs	Non-Conflict	Combat vs	Combat vs	Non-Conflict	Combat vs	Combat vs
		Non-Conflict	Non-Conflict		Non-Conflict	Non-Conflict		Non-Conflict	Non-Conflict
Birth-Quarter: Second	-0.0055	0.0147	-0.0149	-0.0095	0.0164	-0.0211*	0.0537	0.0349	0.0358
	(0.0154)	(0.0117)	(0.0125)	(0.0172)	(0.0137)	(0.0126)	(0.0487)	(0.0503)	(0.0334)
Birth-Quarter: Third	-0.0067	0.0063	-0.0151	-0.0056	0.0112	-0.0187	-0.0203	-0.0023	-0.0153
	(0.0167)	(0.0164)	(0.0152)	(0.0184)	(0.0175)	(0.0171)	(0.0380)	(0.0325)	(0.0350)
Birth-Quarter: Fourth	-0.0140	-0.0169	-0.0023	-0.0221	-0.0186	-0.0112	0.0885	0.0354	0.0835
	(0.0275)	(0.0200)	(0.0227)	(0.0316)	(0.0215)	(0.0256)	(0.0672)	(0.0559)	(0.0684)
Landowner	-0.0179	-0.0018	-0.0196	-0.0140	0.0031	-0.0196	-0.0285	-0.0341	-0.0094
	(0.0200)	(0.0141)	(0.0178)	(0.0216)	(0.0149)	(0.0190)	(0.0504)	(0.0481)	(0.0345)
Kurdish	0.0392	0.0300*	0.0208	0.0387	0.0301	0.0223	0.0520	0.0518	0.0009
	(0.0303)	(0.0177)	(0.0259)	(0.0324)	(0.0195)	(0.0280)	(0.0433)	(0.0369)	(0.0369)
Non-Muslim Minority	0.0093	0.0158	0.0014	0.0072	0.0239	-0.0108	0.0637	0.0002	0.0874
	(0.0293)	(0.0190)	(0.0288)	(0.0332)	(0.0213)	(0.0338)	(0.0856)	(0.0693)	(0.0791)
Induction Age	0.2440	0.1881	0.1312	0.2862	0.2181	0.1758	-0.1372	-0.0538	-0.0824
	(0.1767)	(0.2196)	(0.0997)	(0.1886)	(0.2481)	(0.1128)	(0.1266)	(0.0844)	(0.1157)
Rank: Corporal	-0.0052	-0.0071*	0.0007	-0.0037	-0.0048	-0.0004	-0.0077	-0.0105	0.0021
	(0.0054)	(0.0042)	(0.0041)	(0.0060)	(0.0045)	(0.0052)	(0.0084)	(0.0077)	(0.0067)
Rank: Sergeant	-0.0164	0.0186	-0.0483	-0.0301	0.0112	-0.0581*	0.1407	0.1102	0.0726
-	(0.0347)	(0.0261)	(0.0323)	(0.0332)	(0.0277)	(0.0335)	(0.0936)	(0.0972)	(0.0547)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.0140	0.0062	0.0091	0.0231	0.0296	-0.0025	0.0111	-0.0581	0.0721*
	(0.0278)	(0.0184)	(0.0264)	(0.0309)	(0.0263)	(0.0291)	(0.0445)	(0.0444)	(0.0380)
Training Duration	-0.0917	-0.0524	-0.0443				-0.0770	-0.0443	-0.0394
-	(0.0991)	(0.0906)	(0.0704)				(0.1081)	(0.1032)	(0.0852)
Service Duration	0.0613***	0.0382***	0.0344*	0.0608***	0.0373***	0.0334*	0.0549*	0.0310	0.0466**
	(0.0193)	(0.0119)	(0.0186)	(0.0199)	(0.0118)	(0.0198)	(0.0277)	(0.0252)	(0.0224)
Observations	3,571	3,108	3,145	3,096	2,664	2,730	475	444	415
R-squared	0.144	0.185	0.194	0.139	0.190	0.187	0.262	0.266	0.356
F-test of joint significance	0.89	1.09	0.62	0.63	1.24	0.82	1.46	0.75	0.94
Joint F-test P-value	0.55	0.38	0.81	0.79	0.28	0.61	0.17	0.69	0.51

Appendix Table 3. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Conflict Deployment, CV with IPV Conditional Random Assignment Controls

Notes: These estimates are obtained from the sample of married men in the EXPOVIBE-CV. Regressions are weighted using sampling weights. Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In addition to service length, draft age, and landownership status, all models control for conditional unconfoundedness controls available in the EXPOVIBE-IPV sample, including binary half-term service indicator and residence province fixed effects.

Appendix Fuble 1. Whe and Husband Characterist		and C v Sam	5105
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	CV-	CV- Men with	IPV
	Married	Wives	
	Men	25 to 50	
Conflict Zone	0.222	0.228	0.224
	(0.415)	(0.420)	(0.417)
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	0.110	0.107	0.114
	(0.313)	(0.310)	(0.318)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	0.112	0.121	0.110
	(0.315)	(0.326)	(0.313)
Wife Age	39.744	38.828	38.055
	(7.520)	(6.579)	(6.636)
Husband Age	43.382	42.622	41.648
	(7.143)	(6.631)	(6.998)
Wife Birth Year	1979.257	1980.173	1980.948
	(7.520)	(6.579)	(6.637)
Husband Birth Year	1975.602	1976.361	1977.330
	(7.150)	(6.645)	(6.996)
Wife < 18 at Marriage	0.116	0.116	0.127
	(0.321)	(0.321)	(0.333)
Husband Age at Marriage	25.605	25.792	25.375
	(4.585)	(4.481)	(4.643)
Wife's Years of Schooling	7.941	8.063	8.005
	(3.553)	(3.542)	(3.651)
Husband's Years of Schooling	8.848	8.918	9.016
	(3.238)	(3.216)	(3.416)
Service Duration	16.746	16.695	16.259
	(2.449)	(2.465)	(3.091)
Years Since Induction	22.781	22.047	21.025
	(7.202)	(6.762)	(7.092)
Wife Works for Money	0.279	0.288	0.227
	(0.448)	(0.453)	(0.419)
Family Income	3708.153	3701.568	3213.259
	(1976.106)	(1956.201)	(1613.310)
Consent Marriage	0.896	0.904	0.817
	(0.305)	(0.295)	(0.387)
Husband's First Marriage	0.965	0.966	0.957
	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.204)
Have Child(ren)	0.918	0.914	0.908
	(0.274)	(0.281)	(0.288)
Number of Children	2.043	2.016	1.942
	(1.120)	(1.115)	(1.058)
Observations	3922	3590	5495

Appendix Table 4. Wife and Husband Characteristics in the IPV and CV Samples

Notes: In columns (1) and (2), summary statistics are obtained from the sample of married men in the EXPOVIBE-CV using sampling weights. In column (3), mean values come from the sample of married women in the EXPOVIBE-IPV, with husbands conscripted between 1984 and 2011, using sampling weights. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Wife < 18	Consent	Husband's	Have	Number of	Daily	Wife	Wife's	Husband	Family
	At Marriage	Marriage	1st Marriage	Child(ren)	Children	Drinker	Works	Schooling	Works	Income
Panel A: EXPOVIE-IPV Sample										
Conflict Zone	0.042***	-0.036**	0.007	0.016*	0.033	0.000	-0.006	-0.072	-0.000	-73.798
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.103)	(0.006)	(54.698)
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	0.039*	-0.012	0.009	0.022*	0.044	-0.004	-0.010	-0.066	0.006	-52.126
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.044)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.140)	(0.007)	(73.291)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	0.045***	-0.062**	0.004	0.010	0.021	0.005	-0.003	-0.078	-0.007	-96.888
	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.049)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.115)	(0.011)	(73.694)
	5,495	5,491	5,491	5,495	5,495	5,487	5,447	5,490	5,257	5,164
Panel B: EXPOVIE-CV with Full Set of										
Controls										
Conflict Zone	0.015	-0.018	0.004	0.023**	0.049	-0.006	0.005	-0.197	-0.013	-152.504*
	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.129)	(0.008)	(87.483)
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	-0.017	-0.011	-0.003	0.008	0.062	-0.005	0.025	-0.078	-0.002	-126.441
	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.057)	(0.007)	(0.030)	(0.155)	(0.012)	(108.987)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	0.044**	-0.024	0.011	0.037***	0.037	-0.007	-0.014	-0.307**	-0.023*	-176.725
	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.040)	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.152)	(0.013)	(115.579)
	3,571	3,565	3,568	3,571	3,561	3,566	3,454	3,561	3,331	3,120
Panel C: EXPOVIE-C Sample with EXPOVIBE-IPV Controls										
Conflict Zone	0.017	-0.009	0.001	0.020	0.038	-0.003	-0.009	-0.218**	-0.016**	-123.236*
	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.038)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.106)	(0.007)	(70.882)
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	-0.023	-0.004	-0.007	0.005	0.086	-0.002	0.012	-0.162	-0.008	-103.257
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.054)	(0.006)	(0.032)	(0.147)	(0.013)	(113.523)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	0.054*	-0.013	0.007	0.033*	-0.004	-0.004	-0.027	-0.268**	-0.023*	-141.478
	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.043)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.116)	(0.013)	(102.399)
	3,571	3,565	3,568	3,571	3,561	3,566	3,454	3,561	3,331	3,120

Appendix Table 5. Testing the Effects of ACE on Husband and Family Outcomes in the IPV and Male Sample

Notes: Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Regressions are based on sampling weights. In Panel A, using data from the EXPOVIBE-IPV, models control for the available conditional unconfoundedness controls include fixed effects for the draft year by husband's education, residence province, and an indicator variable for half-term service, as well as service duration, and fixed effects for draft age. In Panel B, using the data from the EXPOVIBE-CV, models control for variables available in the EXPOVIBE-IPV sample. In Panel C, using the sample of married men in the EXPOVIBE-CV, all models control for conditional unconfoundedness covariates and pre-enlistment variables, including height, training duration, service length, and fixed effects birth quarter, landownership status, having a martyr in the family or among friends, ethnicity, military rank, military occupation, the branch of service, half-term service, the draft year by husband's education, birth province and training province.

/ 8)	0
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Last Year	Last Year
Panel I. Women > 37	0.054**	0.057**	0.010	0.007
	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Observations	2,380	2,382	2,382	2,383
Panel II. Women < 38	0.062**	0.075***	0.018	0.016
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Observations	2,198	2,198	2,197	2,197
Panel III. Married > 15	0.060**	0.078***	0.019***	0.012
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Observations	2,473	2,476	2,477	2,477
Panel IV. Married < 16 Years	0.043**	0.049*	0.009	0.021
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Observations	2,105	2,104	2,102	2,103
Panel V. Service Prior to 2000	0.056**	0.067***	0.014**	0.016
	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.011)
Observations	2,684	2,685	2,686	2,686
Panel VI. Service Since 2000	0.058***	0.060***	0.022*	-0.000
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Observations	1,894	1,895	1,893	1,894

Appendix Table 6. The Impact of Husband's Conflict Zone Deployment on Intimate Partner Violence, Heterogeneity by Age, Marriage Duration, and Service Timing

i	(1) Service Duration>=15	(2) Induction Age < 22	(3) Turkish	(4) Deployed to East	(5) Non-mover
		6			
Birth-Ouarter: Second	-0.0230	-0.0025	-0.0012	-0.0081	-0.0033
2	(0.0234)	(0.0197)	(0.0193)	(0.0411)	(0.0276)
Birth-Ouarter: Third	0.0066	0.0095	0.0052	0.0426	0.0137
	(0.0273)	(0.0208)	(0.0210)	(0.0420)	(0.0348)
Birth-Quarter: Fourth	-0.0421	-0.0110	-0.0207	0.0025	-0.0705
	(0.0303)	(0.0258)	(0.0281)	(0.0410)	(0.0496)
Landowner	0.0088	0.0032	-0.0019	0.0039	-0.0146
Lundowner	(0.0213)	(0.0196)	(0.0214)	(0.0383)	(0.0337)
Martyr in Family	-0.0000	0.0148	0.0191	-0.0128	-0.0167
	(0.0306)	(0.0271)	(0.0327)	(0.0402)	(0.0448)
Kurdish	0.0568	0.0446	(0.0527)	0 1999**	-0.0003
i cui dibii	(0.0468)	(0.0480)		(0.0729)	(0.0541)
Non-Muslim Minority	-0.0636	0.1785		0.2055	0 1420
iton itidshin tunionty	(0.1729)	(0.1932)		(0.2082)	(0.2788)
Induction Age	0.0046	0.0143	0.0028	0.0038	-0.0162
induction Age	(0.0109)	(0.0145)	(0.0020	(0.0186)	(0.0102)
Rank: Cornoral	0.0325	-0.0180	-0.0026	0.0031	-0.0260
Kank. Corporat	(0.0323)	(0.0297)	(0.0346)	(0.0601)	(0.0466)
Pank: Sergeant	0.0254	(0.02)7)	0.0284	0.0395	-0.0052
Kank. Sergeant	(0.0234)	(0.0318)	(0.0204)	(0.0575)	(0.0496)
Training Duration	0.0711***	0.0386**	0.0300***	0.0391	0.0520**
	(0.0100)	(0.0380)	(0.0147)	(0.0351)	(0.0320)
Service Duration	0.0602***	0.0100)	(0.0147) 0.0158*	(0.0437)	(0.0241)
Service Duration	(0.0248)	-0.0137	-0.0138°	-0.0108	(0.0032)
Observations	2.0248)	(0.0090)	2 886	1 255	(0.0198)
Deservations Deservations	2,026	2,744	2,880	1,233	960
K-squared	0.500	0.280	0.203	0.384	0.424
F-test of joint significance	0.4/3	0.4/6	0.433	1.534	0.690
Joint F-test P-value	0.903	0.901	0.898	0.190	0./15

Appendix Table 7. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Zone Deployment, CV "Cleaner Subsamples"

Notes: These estimates are obtained from the sample of married men in the EXPOVIBE-CV. Regressions are weighted using sampling weights. Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for conditional unconfoundedness controls, including height and fixed effects for military occupation, the branch of service, half-term service, the draft year by husband's education, birth province, and training province.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Post Discharge
Conflict Zone	0.057***	0.066***	0.073***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.013)
Observations	4,402	4,460	4,475

Appendix Table 8. The Impact of Husband's Conflict Zone Deployment on Intimate Partner Violence, Robustness to Logit

Notes: Standard errors, clustered on the province of military service, in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models include conditional unconfoundedness variables, as well as pre-deployment and women's characteristics. Conditional unconfoundedness controls include fixed effects for the draft year by husband's education, residence province, and an indicator variable for half-term service. Pre-deployment and women's characteristics include service duration, and fixed effects for draft age, women's ethnicity, and birth year and month.

Appendix Table 9. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Intimate Partner Violence, Robustness to Clustering at Different Levels

0			
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Post Discharge
Panel I. Husband's Education by Draft Year			
Conflict Zone	0.063***	0.071***	0.076***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Observations	4,578	4,580	4,581
Panel II. Residence Province			
Conflict Zone	0.063***	0.071***	0.076***
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Observations	4,578	4,580	4,581
Panel III. Women's Birth Province			
Conflict Zone	0.063***	0.071***	0.076***
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Observations	4,578	4,580	4,581

/ 8			
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Any IPV
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Post Discharge
Panel I. Controlling for Women's Birth Province			
instead of Residence Province Fixed Effects			
Conflict Zone	0.060***	0.067***	0.070***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Observations	4,578	4,580	4,581
Panel II. Controlling for Women's Birth Province			
and Residence Province Fixed Effects			
Conflict Zone	0.060***	0.067***	0.071***
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Observations	4,578	4,580	4,581
Panel III. Controlling for Residence Province by			
Husband's Induction Year			
Conflict Zone	0.059***	0.063***	0.072***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Observations	4,578	4,580	4,581

Appendix Table 10. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Intimate Partner Violence, Robustness to Controlling for Women's Birth Province Fixed Effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	Physical IPV	Psychological IPV	
	Post Discharge	Post Discharge	Last Year	Last Year	
Panel A. All					
Conflict Zone	0.055***	0.059***	0.013**	0.011	
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.008)	
Observations	6,172	6,170	6,172	6,170	
R-squared	0.254	0.205	0.268	0.198	
Panel B. High School					
Conflict Zone	0.062***	0.070***	0.013*	0.014*	
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.008)	
Observations	4,963	4,965	4,964	4,965	
R-squared	0.244	0.203	0.282	0.201	
Panel C. College					
Conflict Zone	-0.004	-0.025	0.009	-0.002	
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.019)	
Observations	1,209	1,205	1,208	1,205	
R-squared	0.351	0.295	0.167	0.297	

Appendix Table 11. The Impact of Husband's Conflict Zone Deployment on Intimate Partner Violence, Robustness to Including Women Whose Husbands Were Conscripted Before 1984 or After 2011

		8				-
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Physical	Physical	Psychological	Psychological	Any	Any
	IPV	IPV	IPV	IPV	IPV	IPV
	Post	Post	Post	Post	Post	Post
	Discharge	Discharge	Discharge	Discharge	Discharge	Discharge
Conflict Zone Moderate Combat	0.055**	0.035*	0.067***	0.050**	0.071***	0.050**
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)
Conflict Zone Intense Combat	0.070**	0.077***	0.076***	0.083***	0.082***	0.093***
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.023)
Parental IPV	(0.027)	-0.011	(0.020)	0.059	(0:020)	0.067*
		(0.025)		(0.038)		(0.037)
Witnessed Parental IPV		0.102***		0.032		0.066*
		(0.028)		(0.032)		(0.000)
Le Louve IDV		(0.028)		(0.039)		(0.039)
III-Laws IP v		(0.017)		(0.020)		0.141
		(0.017)		(0.020)		(0.019)
In-Laws IPV Missing		0.119		0.1/1		0.258
		(0.133)		(0.169)		(0.156)
Husband Daily Drinker		0.054		0.199***		0.166***
		(0.065)		(0.059)		(0.061)
Gambler		0.068***		0.082***		0.099***
		(0.018)		(0.019)		(0.017)
Drug Use		0.001		0.008		-0.010
		(0.036)		(0.039)		(0.047)
Jealousy Index		0.002		0.010		0.007
		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.007)
Limits Contact with Friends/Family Index		0.050***		0.052***		0.051***
		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Economic Controlling Index		0.088***		0.095***		0.096***
C		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.009)
Wife Age Marriage < 18		0.030		-0.017		0.004
		(0.020)		(0.019)		(0.021)
Consent Marriage		-0.063***		-0.057***		-0.040*
Consent Marriage		(0.003)		(0.027)		(0.022)
Wife Vears of Schooling		-0.002		0.000		-0.001
whe rears of benooning		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.001)
Kurdish		0.064**		0.039		0.085***
Kuluish		(0.004)		(0.039)		(0.035)
Non Muslim Minority		(0.028)		(0.030)		(0.031)
Non-mushin minority		-0.039		-0.014		-0.033
Hard an Har Flord Manifest		(0.032)		(0.033)		(0.042)
Husband's First Marriage		-0.033		-0.009		-0.012
		(0.026)		(0.023)		(0.026)
Have Child(ren)		0.05/***		0.0//9***		0.084***
		(0.018)		(0.022)		(0.022)
Wife Works for Money		0.031**		0.069***		0.071***
		(0.015)		(0.017)		(0.018)
Husband Has a Paying Job		-0.043		-0.061		-0.077
		(0.046)		(0.048)		(0.048)
Family Income		-0.000*		-0.000*		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Observations	4,578	4,578	4,580	4,580	4,581	4,581
R-squared	0.237	0.384	0.194	0.347	0.201	0.352

Appendix Table 12. The Impact of Husband's Conflict Zone Deployment on Intimate Partner Violence, Robustness to Controlling for Potentially Endogenous Characteristics

Data Appendix I: Scientific Ethics Protocols

Ethical approvals for the EXPOVIBE project were received from the European Research Council, the University of Warwick, and Sabanci University. The scientific ethics boards of these institutions examined and approved all survey materials, including the questionnaires, informed consent sheets, information pamphlets, interviewer training materials, as well as data protection measures before the fieldwork. The project also had an independent ethics advisory committee composed of five expert scholars overseeing the study design and implementation at every step.

Interviews for the EXPOVIBE-IPV were conducted in Turkish in private settings by female interviewers specially trained on interviewing techniques, survey documents, IPV, and ethical issues related to IPV research (World Health Organization, 2001). In addition, a clinical therapist specializing in domestic violence victims with extensive fieldwork experience joined the research team in the design and execution of the interviewer training program. She also monitored interviewers at regular intervals during the fieldwork and provided consulting to interviewers as needed.

Fieldwork was implemented in accordance with WHO recommendations on researching violence against women (World Health Organization, 2001). The PI (corresponding author) accompanied each interviewer on her first day on the field to ensure that all implementation rules and procedures were followed correctly. To guarantee the safety and well-being of participants, interviews were conducted one-on-one with respondents at their residential addresses, and interviewers did not interact with anyone else from the same household.

Collaborating with the Turkish Federation of Women's Associations (TKFD), support and counselling services were provided to all survey participants. TKFD is an umbrella organization for all women's associations in Turkey. They run a well-established emergency hotline service (Domestic Violence Emergency Help Hotline, https://www.tkdf.org.tr/hizmetler/acil-yardim-hatti-uygulamasi) that connects domestic violence victims with a network of legal and psychological support and counseling services and resources all around the country. The Federation, its hotline operators, and the members of their network were informed about the study in detail. A pamphlet, prepared in collaboration with the Federation, on domestic violence containing detailed information on what victims can do in case of domestic violence, their legal rights, and how to access this emergency hotline as well as other local counseling, support, and security services was given to each respondent unless she rejected receiving it. The pamphlet was tailored for each sampling province to include easily accessible local resources.

Interviews for the EXPOVIBE-CV survey were conducted in Turkish in private settings by interviewers specially trained on interviewing techniques, survey documents, and scientific ethics protocols related to fieldwork. In addition, the PI accompanied each interviewer on his/her first day on the field to make sure that all implementation rules and procedures were followed correctly.

In both surveys, informed consent was obtained from all respondents. The consent forms informed the participants about the content, purpose, and length of the study, how the data was going to be maintained and used, and participant rights, and included contact information of the PI as well as those of the scientific ethics officers of the host and partner universities.
Data Appendix II: Conscription Classification Procedure by the Turkish Ministry of Defense https://www.msb.gov.tr/Askeralma/icerik/siniflandirma-islemleri



Data Appendix III: Survey Questions on Controlling Behaviors and Aggression

EXPOVIBE-IPV Survey: Controlling Behaviors of the Husband

- 1. Does he want to know where you are at all times?
- 2. Does he get angry if you speak to other men?
- 3. Does he suspect that you cheat on him?
- 4. Does he interfere in your clothes and want you to dress as he likes?
- 5. Does he want you to give him access to your cell phone, email, and social media accounts?
- 6. Did your husband ever try to stop you from meeting your friends?
- 7. Did your husband ever try to restrict or stop you from meeting your own family or relatives?
- 8. Did your husband ever stop you from working when you wanted to or make you quit a *job*?
- 9. Did your husband ever refuse to give you enough money to meet the needs of the house even though he has money?
- 10. Did your husband ever take your income from you without your consent?

(Scale 1: "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)

Standardized Controlling Behavior Index: Weighted summation of answers to all questions by employing the inverse covariance matrix à la Anderson (2008).

Jealousy Index: Weighted summation of answers to questions 1 to 5.

Limiting Social Contact Index: Weighted summation of answers to questions 6 and 7. *Economic Control Index*: Weighted summation of answers to questions 8 to 10.

EXPOVIBE-CV Survey: The Brief Aggression Questionnaire (Webster et al., 2013)

Using the 5-point scale, indicate how much the following statement represents you (Scale 1 to 5: 1 = "I am not like this at all, " 5 = "I am completely like this; " 99 - Don't know/no answer)

- 1. "If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will."
- 2. "When people are especially nice to me, I wonder what they want."
- 3. "I tell my friends openly when I disagree with them."
- 4. "Given enough provocation, I may hit another person."
- 5. "Good things always seem to happen to others."
- 6. "I am an even-tempered person."
- 7. "When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them."
- 8. "There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows."
- 9. "Sometimes I fly off the handle for no good reason."
- 10. "I sometimes feel that people are laughing at me behind my back."
- 11. "I have trouble controlling my temper."
- 12. "My friends say I am somewhat argumentative."