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DOES WAR FOSTER COOPERATION OR PAROCHIALISM? EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT AMONG TURKISH CONSCRIPTS

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Does War Foster Cooperation or Parochialism? Evidence from a Natural Experiment among Turkish Conscripts

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ABSTRACT

Exploiting a natural experiment and an innovative survey design, we study the causal impact of armed conflict exposure (ACE) on the sociopolitical attitudes and behaviors of the average male randomly picked from the population. Contrary to the arguments that war fosters cooperation, we find little evidence of prosociality in exposed individuals. Instead, we document compelling evidence that ACE promotes parochialism, measured by opposition to peaceful means of conflict resolution, animosity towards minorities, and adherence to right-wing ideology. Further analyses show war-driven grievances, the normalization of violence in everyday life, and changes in parochial norms and preferences as the transmitting pathways.

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1. Introduction

What are the political and social legacies of armed conflict exposure? The extant literature so far offers compelling but conflicting answers. On the one hand, an emerging line of inquiry finds that exposure to war violence induces individuals to exhibit prosocial behaviors (Bauer et al., 2016). In particular, using different identification strategies, a number of studies show evidence that war exposure leads to increased civic engagement, political participation, collective action, trustworthiness, interpersonal trust, and generosity and inequality aversion towards in-group members (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan et al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2014, Bauer et al., 2016, Bauer et al., 2018; Jha and Wilkinson, 2012).[1] On the other hand, there is the observed persistence of conflicts and their tendency to recur, and the argument that this pattern can be explained by parochial responses to war exposure, such as increased nationalism, polarization, loss of trust, and reduced prosociality towards out-group members, likely triggered by psychological reactions to war trauma and the associated grievances (Henrich, 2020; Collier et al., 2003; Rohner et al., 2013a, b; Grossman et al., 2015; Hager et al., 2019; Conzo and Salustri, 2019; De Juan et al., 2022; Vlachos, 2022).[2]

This seeming contrast is attributed to the challenges in identifying and isolating the complex psychological, economic, and social mechanisms linking war exposure to subsequent political and societal attitudes and behaviors, and the effects they transmit (Blattman and Bauer, 2010; Bauer et al., 2016; Cederman and Vogt, 2017; Couttenier et al., 2019). Therefore, several vital questions on the political and social legacies of armed conflicts remain intact, inviting suitable natural experiments and creative research designs to address these gaps (Blattman and Bauer, 2010).

This study attempts to fill the void in the literature by exploiting a population-level natural experiment, enabled by the strict universal military conscription in Turkey, staffing the Turkish Armed Forces during a deadly civil conflict in the southeast of the country. Within this setting, between 1984 and 2011, 97 percent of all men reaching the age of induction were drafted, 93 percent of them served

[1] The role of wars in enabling and enhancing large-scale cooperation has also been discussed. For instance, wars have been held responsible for the formation of states from chiefdoms and strengthening existing ones (Carneiro, 1970; Flannery and Marcus, 2003; Tilly, 1985; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Morris, 2014). Moreover, it has also been argued that, potentially via influencing human psychology, wars have contributed to the emergence of complex social organizations (Bowles, 2008; Turchin, 2016).

[2] There is also work showing mixed findings on the impact of war exposure on trust (Cassar et al., 2013).

15 to 18 months, and about one-fourth were deployed to bases in conflict areas after a short training (up to three months) via a deployment lottery. We build on this natural experiment using an innovative survey providing detailed information on military experiences, and political and social outcomes to examine the causal impact of armed conflict exposure (ACE), measured by the intensity of armed conflict at deployment location during service, on social and political participation, attitudes towards conflict resolution and minorities, and general political inclination. We investigate the potential explanatory channels, as well.

Our study design provides us with unique capabilities. First, the draft system in Turkey mandates every healthy male citizen to serve in the Armed Forces and the random assignment of draftees to service locations all around the country via a deployment lottery right after the completion of a basic training program. The military rules state that conditional on the branch of service, military occupation, and the province of registration, service location assignment of conscripts is orthogonal to the pre-deployment characteristics of individuals (Official Gazette, 1927; 2019).[3] Therefore, we identify the impact of ACE for the randomly picked average male from the target population. Second, by sampling from provinces outside of and with negligible migration from the conflict areas, our empirical setup takes advantage of the geographical concentration of the conflict and eliminates (i) any potential bias that may stem from unobserved exposure in civilian roles and (ii) confounding macroenvironmental effects of war. Consequently, we capture the impact of isolated (i.e., away from home) and limited duration ACE during military service as conscripts return to their peaceful hometowns upon discharge. Third, the richness of our data allows us to track actual experiences of armed violence, which not only allows us to test the validity of our exposure measure but also enables us to investigate the role of personal grievances on the outcomes of interest.

Equipped with these capabilities, we tackle major questions in the literature for which the verdict is still out. To begin, we contribute to the discussion regarding whether and to what extent conflict exposure is conducive to prosocial behaviors when neoclassical explanations, including the need for social insurance, security concerns, community-level paradigm shifts, and labor market outcomes, which may be conducive to producing cohesion, are minimized. Second, we test whether getting

[3] The *Conscription Law* (Law Number: 1111) was originally legislated in 1927. The province of registration coincides with birthplace in an overwhelming majority of the cases.

exposed to war feeds the self-perpetuating dynamics of conflict. Third, we attempt to dissect war exposure into its military socialization and direct experiences of armed violence dimensions and explore the relative importance of these two main components of exposure in driving the outcomes. Finally, we explore the potential mechanisms, including labor market outcomes, psychological health, adoption of parochial norms and preferences, war-induced grievances, and the normalization of violence.

The outcome measures come from the Exposure to Political Violence and Individual Behavior-Conscript Veterans (EXPOVIBE-CV) survey (Kibris, 2020), conducted in 2019 in Turkey to explore the individual-level effects of armed conflict exposure. The survey interviewed 5,024 randomly selected adult males, conscripted in the 1984-2011 period, in 29 provinces outside of and with negligible in-migration from the conflict areas.

We start our analysis by showing evidence on the orthogonality of deployment location to pre-deployment characteristics. Then, examining the impact of ACE intensity on direct combat experiences, we document that conflict intensity at the time and place of service substantially increases the likelihood of involvement with at least one direct armed combat experience, i.e., enemy firefight, injury, and witnessing casualties. This 'first-stage' analysis demonstrates the severity of service in conflict areas.

Upon showing evidence supporting our identification strategy's credibility and its potency in predicting direct combat experiences, we estimate the impact of ACE on our primary outcomes of interest. We do not find any statistically significant favorable impact on the *Civic Participation Index*, a broad measure of prosociality constructed by using multiple indicators of participation in social and political life, including membership in various social and community organizations, voting in local and general elections, and political party membership. On the contrary, estimated coefficients indicate a decline in the civic participation of individuals exposed to low-intensity conflict during their time in the Armed Forces.

We continue our analysis by examining the effect of ACE on attitudes towards conflict resolution and minorities, as well as self-placement on the left-right political spectrum. We find that service in an intense conflict environment increases the likelihood of being against multilateral deliberations for a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict between the Turkish State and the PKK, supporting further

military intervention as the best way to resolve it, feeling distant to minorities, being averse to living with minority neighbors, and favoring an iron-fist rule that would not hesitate to employ "even the harshest measures to destroy traitors and restore order in the country." Specifically, we find that service under intense conflict leads to a 0.3 standard deviation increase in the *Standardized Animosity Index*, summarizing the aforementioned variables, and in the propensity to lean towards the right-hand side of the *Political Spectrum Index*.

These results largely persist years after discharge. We undertake an exhaustive set of robustness exercises to test the sensitivity of our estimates, which document the robustness of our findings, bolstering our confidence in the soundness of our conclusions.

Upon identifying the causal impact of ACE and establishing the robustness of our findings, we focus on tackling another significant void in this line of inquiry—unearthing the mediating pathways between ACE and prosociality. The findings provide strong evidence that the adverse effects of war exposure flow through grievances, the normalization of violence, and subscription to conservative norms, highlighting how conflict exposure may contribute to the observed persistence of civil conflicts (Collier et al., 2003).

Our findings, therefore, indicate that societies with a history of conflict can risk further armed violence unless resolution efforts and reconstruction policies acknowledge and address the institutionalization of parochialism and involve measures to re-establish and strengthen peaceful social and behavioral norms. These results also suggest that the employment of conscription armies and mass mobilization campaigns might add to the perpetuation risk by exposing civilians to the violence of armed conflicts, which then gets transmitted into social and political life through the deepening of social divides, accumulation of grievances, tightening of conservative social norms, and normalization of violence as an acceptable way of mediating social problems.

2. Conflict Between the Turkish State and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

The conflict between the Turkish state and the insurgent armed group Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has been raging since 1984. First founded as a separatist organization to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, the PKK shifted its political agenda during the 90s towards a federational structure that would grant more autonomy to the region (Kıbrıs, 2011).

Importantly, the conflict endured over the years with heavy casualties on both sides and remained geographically concentrated in the southeastern and eastern parts of the country.

The temporal evolution of armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK rebels is demonstrated in Figure I, with Panels A and B showing the trends in annual and cumulative combatant casualties over the 1984-2019 period. These figures also present the breakout of the deaths among the members of the Turkish security forces and PKK recruits. The intensity of armed conflict gradually increased until the mid-1990s. It peaked in 1994, reaching 3610 combat deaths, and declined afterward, consistent with the shift of the PKK's focus towards considering a less radical approach (Kıbrıs, 2011). As the Figures demonstrate, combatant fatalities exhibited a slowdown during the times of ceasefires: between 1999 and 2004, after the founding leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured and jailed in February 1999; in 2009, when PKK announced a one-sided ceasefire; and between 2013 and 2015 during the Peace Process (Köse, 2017). Notably, although the information on the death statistics for Turkish military members and PKK rebels comes from different sources, the two series exhibit a very high correlation, confirming the validity of the conflict event data we employ.

As we elaborate later, while draftees historically constituted around 85% of fallen soldiers, our analysis of the TPCONED indicates that this number has dramatically declined after the Turkish military started recruiting professional soldiers on fixed-term contracts in 2011 to replace conscripts, especially in conflict areas, as part of a move towards a professional army (Official Gazette, 2011). Therefore, we limit our analysis to the period between 1984 and 2011, given that our interest is in the effects of ACE among conscripts.

It is worth discussing the rhetoric of the Turkish state concerning the PKK insurgency and the related armed conflict because this discourse has been instrumental in shaping the public perception and determining the culturally relevant in- and out-groups. The official language has always been consistent with the assimilationist state tradition of the Republic, dating back to its inception in 1923 (Yeğen, 2009). Accordingly, the PKK uprising is coined as a problem of terrorism targeting the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of the Turkish nation, constitutionally established by the bond of citizenship to the country as opposed to ethnic ties. This terrorism frame, which is the mainstream nationalist discourse in the country, defines the conflict as one between the state and a violent terrorist organization that is supported and funded by outside powers (Çelebi et al., 2014).

Therefore, citizens with both Turkish and Kurdish ethnic backgrounds are depicted as the victims of terrorism, and the ethnic nature of the conflict is ignored to minimize ethnic polarization and out-group discrimination across the population that would target Kurds.[4] In official statements and especially in the military, a strong emphasis has thus been placed on disassociating "citizens with Kurdish ethnic backgrounds" from the enemies of the nation that perpetrate the problem of terrorism. As part of this narrative, while the in-group consists of all loyal citizens regardless of ethnic identity, the out-group is defined as anyone who poses a threat to the unity of the state with its nation, including not only the PKK but any person or entity opposing or not embracing the official identity (Yeğen, 1996; 1999; 2009). This rhetoric has been hugely successful in shaping public perceptions and adopted by an overwhelming majority of the nation, even among those with non-Turkish ethnic backgrounds (Çelebi et al., 2014). Therefore, taking this dominant discourse into account, rather than singling out and focusing on Kurds as an explicitly specified out-group, we examine the preferred policies to resolve the conflict and attitudes towards ethnic minorities.

3. Deployment Lottery as the Source of Identifying Variation

Turkey has a draft military system mandating that each Turkish male resident citizen serve in the Armed Forces. In particular, a young man becomes draft eligible when he turns 20 and typically gets inducted into the military before he turns 22, depending on the current induction term in his registered location (Official Gazette, 1927; 2019). The duration of service within the period we consider ranged between 15 to 18 months.[5] Therefore, service duration in our sample is considerably uniform, allowing us to make like-for-like comparisons without potential conflation of ACE with variation in service duration.

The conscription procedure starts with the draft call. Those called must surrender to the Military Enrolment Services of the Turkish Defence Ministry, which then assigns them to branches, military

[4] While the PKK was designated as a terrorist organization by Turkish state and other countries, including the USA, EU, Australia, and Japan among others, there also exists some controversy over this definition.
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/country_22_6088
https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/
https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/7/0705.html
https://www.aei.org/op-eds/us-should-follow-belgiums-lead-and-end-pkk-terror-designation/

[5] While the required service length for rank-and-file was 18 months in the 80s, it was taken down to 15 months in 1992, brought back up to 18 months in 1995, taken down to 15 months in 2003, and remained so up until 2014.

occupation classifications, and training centers. Detailed information on this classification step can be found on the official instruction brochures for prospective draftees.[6] These instructions emphasize that the classification is conducted electronically on anonymized records and is conditional on the educational qualifications of draftees to meet the needs of the Armed Forces across its branches and tasks. We present a flowchart of these instructions in Data Appendix F.

An important point to note here is that regulations allow one to postpone service until the completion of his formal education (Official Gazette, 1927; 2019). Therefore, induction largely takes place after the completion of formal schooling (Akyürek, 2010; Yıldırım and Erdinç, 2007). That is, although everyone gets the draft call at the age of 20, those who are in school (high school, college, or graduate studies) are allowed to postpone enlistment until they complete their formal education (or until they are 29, whichever comes first). The law also states that while draftees with less than a bachelor's degree serve full terms as rank-and-file soldiers, college graduates serve either as full-term sub-lieutenants or do half-term as rank-and-file depending on the needs of the Armed Forces in that draft period. However, even though the level of formal schooling impacts the timing and duration of service, rules pertaining to the assignment of the branch of service, military occupation, and service location apply to every male regardless of his background, including educational attainment.

Once inducted, conscripts first go through a short training of up to three months in training centers all of which, for security reasons, are outside of conflict areas. Upon completion of this basic training program, they then get sent to military bases all over the country, with the exception of those in their registered provinces, to serve their terms. Importantly, conditional on the branch of service and military occupation, the deployment assignment is done randomly via a lottery system. According to this system, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces determines the staffing needs at different bases across the country. A random matching is then conducted between the draftees and military bases.[7] The system is publicly known as the "base lottery" (Mater, 1999 pp.13,42,114,131, 136; Dündar and Anwar, 2021).[8] As they were conducted in public, the recordings of such base-lottery

[6] https://www.msb.gov.tr/Askeralma/icerik/siniflandirma-islemleri. Last visited on February 7, 2023.
[7] For a bilingual emphasis on the random nature of base assignments see, https://www.takvim.com.tr/guncel/2020/05/28/kutuge-gore-askerlik-nereye-cikar-kutuge-gore-askerlik-yeri-sorgulama/2
[8] Mater interviews 42 ex-conscripts who had been deployed to intense conflict areas during their service. The interviews contain frequent references to the "lottery". A recently published biography of the current president Erdogan mentions how relieved he felt when he had drawn a base in Istanbul in his base lottery (Dündar and Anwar, 2021, p. 98).

ceremonies can still be found on social media outlets (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3w4i07_Wj4 as an example). Over the years, this institutional setup randomly assigned a significant portion of the draftees to military bases in southeastern and eastern Turkey, and these young men got actively involved in the armed conflict against the PKK as combatants.

Consistent with the argument that conditional on the branch of service, military occupation, and registration province of draftees, service location is orthogonal to their individual pre-enlistment characteristics, the regulatory information provided by the Armed Forces states that deployments are based on the needs of the Armed Forces.[9] However, one may still ask if this official narrative reflects the actual practice. To address this concern, we perform formal balance tests to confirm our identifying assumptions.

Although one may be worried about whether differential treatment due to formal education can bias our estimates, this potential issue does not threaten our identification. Recall that induction mainly occurs upon the completion of formal schooling, a key input for the military in determining the branch and occupation classifications. Therefore, incorporating schooling level, an observable characteristic available in our data, among conditional random assignment covariates addresses such concerns.

There also exist plausible explanations supporting the regulatory narrative of the military on the exogeneity of service location to pre-deployment characteristics. Needless to mention, because mandatory military service imposes severe morbidity and mortality risks to those serving in the conflict zone, the assignment system and its fairness have always been under close scrutiny by the general public and the media, especially during periods of intensified conflict as a significant number of conscripts lost their lives or got seriously injured in clashes (Yıldırımkaya, 2010; Kıbrıs, 2011). Consequently, the Turkish Ministry of Defense and the General Staff emphasize in all their communications with the public that the system does not discriminate based on conscripts' socioeconomic status or on relatedness to high-level bureaucrats and military officials (Turkish Ministry of Defense, 2015).[10] Anecdotal evidence also supports the argument regarding the non-

[9] (https://static.turkiye.gov.tr/downloads/kurumlar/msb/ERBAS_VE_ERLERIN_YASAL_HAKLARI.pdf."

[10] It is worth noting that the relatives and children of high-rank bureaucrats and military officials are significantly more likely to extend their educational attainment beyond high school. Therefore, they are substantially more likely to serve half-term and, consequently, more likely to have lower exposure to the conflict. On the other hand, as they are more likely to

discriminatory nature of the system. For example, as in the 2007 incident in which the first cousin of the then Secretary of the State died on duty in a PKK attack on the Çeltikli outpost in Bitlis - a southeastern province, it is not uncommon to observe close relatives of high-level politicians among the fallen soldiers.[11,12] Furthermore, the fact that the military has long been the most trusted institution in Turkey attests to the fairness perception of the public with regard to military practices (Esmer, 1999; Adaman et al., 2005).

A relevant question regarding the credibility of our identification strategy is whether citizens can avoid deployment to conflict zones by dodging the draft, manipulating their service location, or influencing the timing of induction. Unlike other countries with universal conscription, like Israel or South Korea, where a significant share of eligible men can avoid active duty service, young Turkish men have negligibly limited options to circumvent the strict draft system, and escaping induction is not a practical alternative for them.[13] The likelihood of obtaining a fraudulent health-ailment exemption is slim because it is subject to close scrutiny and requires several approvals from multiple entities.[14] Moreover, for an overwhelming majority of the population, evading the draft is not an attractive alternative because evaders face legal consequences and are shunned by society via social rejection and emotional distancing (Altınay and Bora, 2002). The legal consequences include forfeiting paid employment because male employees are legally required to provide their employers with a military discharge certificate upon hiring.[15] Draft evaders and those who help them also risk potential arrest and imprisonment of up to three years if found guilty by the military court.[16] Therefore, the

follow in their fathers' footsteps, sons of military officials would be more likely to pursue professional military careers (and as such they would be excluded from the EXPOVIBE survey), which then would increase their likelihood of exposure as military officials are periodically relocated (Yıldırımkaya, 2010).

[11] https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni.net/archive/turkish-fms-cousin-killed-in-pkk-attack-h10956.html.

[12] In fact, one of the highly exposed ex-conscripts Mater interviews (1999, p.224) is the son of a high-level military official.

[13] In the Israeli case, exemptions are made on religious, physical, psychological, or lawful grounds. Also, one can refuse to serve on the grounds of pacifism, antimilitarism, religious philosophy, or political disagreement with Israeli policies. The Israeli High Court of Justice ruled in 2002 that refusal to serve was legal (https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Refusal_to_serve_in_the_IDF). While the South Korean case allows less evasion, it nonetheless has a broader definition of compulsory service that includes social work, research, full-time reserve enlistment, and industrial technical service.

[14] Those with serious health problems are given exemption if the diagnosis is approved by a panel of military doctors. What constitutes "a serious health problem" is defined in regulations (Turkish Armed Forces, Health Capability Regulation, Official Gazette 29530, 12 November 2015).

[15] https://www.haberturk.com/e-devlet-ten-askerlik-durum-belgesi-sorgulama-islemi-nasil-yapilir-hts-2378941.

[16] The Military Penal Code enacted by the law number 1632 states that evading service is punishable by up to three years in prison, and employing a fugitive is punishable by up to two years in prison.
https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.3.1632.pdf.

conscription system in Turkey constitutes a rare exception as all Turkish men, except a small fraction who were pardoned due to incapacitating health ailments and those who illegally avoid induction, get drafted and complete their service. In line with these explanations, among all males born between roughly 1964 and 1991, the induction rate is about 97 percent (Akyürek, 2010). And based on our data, conditional on being drafted, the likelihood of serving at least 15 months is 93 percent and the chances of participating in armed combat, getting injured, or witnessing casualties stand at 21 percent.

4. Data and Measures

We use data from two sources to conduct our analysis. First, information on military experiences, including service location, year of induction, and direct armed combat experiences, and on outcomes of interest was obtained from the Exposure to Political Violence and Individual Behavior (EXPOVIBE) survey (Kibris, 2020). Second, data on conflict intensity during service come from the Turkish State-PKK Conflict Event Dataset (TPCONED), providing longitudinal and cross-sectional information on combatant casualties since the conflict's inception in 1984 (Kibris, 2019).

4.1 The Exposure to Political Violence and Individual Behavior (EXPOVIBE) Data

The EXPOVIBE data are part of a larger project that builds on the Turkish case to explore the individual-level political, social, and economic effects of armed conflict exposure in a civil conflict context (Kibris, 2019). As part of the project, a field survey was conducted in Turkey in 2019 with 5,024 randomly selected adult males at their residential addresses. The sampling was performed by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) in 29 provinces outside of and with negligible in-migration from the conflict zone to separate exposure during military service from that of civilian experiences (Kibris, 2020).[17] TurkStat maintains the national address-based electronic census registry system in Turkey. From this registry, which constitutes our sampling frame, residential addresses were randomly drawn in proportion to province populations to finalize the EXPOVIBE-CV sample.

[17] Turkey is administratively composed of 81 provinces, which, according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) classification developed by the European Union and adopted by the TurkStat, constitute 26 NUTS2 regions. 19 of those regions are outside the conflict zone, however, 4 of them are composed of provinces with heavy in-migration from the conflict areas and therefore are not included in the EXPOVIBE surveys. From each of the remaining 15 regions, two provinces, that are, according to TurkStat definitions, representative of their regions, are included in the sampling frame (with the exception of the Ankara region which consists of only the province of Ankara itself).

At each randomly selected address, the eligible participant was the "man of the house" who completed his military service between 1984 and 2011.[18] The survey focused on this period because the Turkish military has been going through structural changes to reduce the involvement of conscripts in combat since 2012.[19]

Figure II maps the sample distribution alongside the distribution of combatant casualties to visualize the clear separation between the sampling and conflict areas isolating ACE during military service from that of civilian experiences. Moreover, separating respondents' living environments from the conflict zone by survey design eliminates any influence that conflict may have on potential macroenvironmental mechanisms, such as the physical destruction of war, post-conflict reconstruction, threats to personal security and property after discharge, and community-level paradigm shifts in political and social attitudes.

The survey questionnaire was designed to collect information on military service experiences and a wide array of economic, social, and political attitudes. Interviews were conducted in Turkish by trained interviewers. Apart from the time, duration, and location of deployment, the EXPOVIBE also collected detailed information on direct combat experiences, including engaging the enemy in firefight, witnessing deaths and injuries, and self-injury during service.

Our first batch of dependent variables, reflecting direct combat experiences, are created based on survey questions in Data Appendix A. In particular, *Armed Combat* and *Injured or Witnessed Casualties* are dichotomous variables indicating whether the respondent engaged in armed combat, was injured himself or witnessed others getting hurt or killed in armed combat during service. The binary variable *Any Direct Combat* reflects whether a respondent experienced at least one of the combat experiences described above.

Appendix Table 1 displays our calculations of the number of Turkish men exposed to direct armed combat during compulsory military service between 1984 and 2011, using exposure risk

[18] Those who were exempt or served an irregularly short period of time due to exceptional circumstances such as health problems were not interviewed. Of the 5,024 interviewed, 41 individuals served prior to 1984. We exclude them from our analyses. Their inclusion does not change our results and conclusions.

[19] With new legislation enacted in late 2011 (Official Gazette, 2011), the Armed Forces started recruiting professional soldiers on fixed-term contracts to replace conscripts especially in the conflict zone as part of a move towards a professional military. The TPCONED reflects this structural change as most security force casualties of the conflict after 2011 have been professional service members. Moreover, with enough professional soldiers in place, regulations were relaxed after 2018 to allow civilians to pay their way out of military service.

estimates from the EXPOVIBE[20] and information on the number of men conscripted during the period obtained from the TurkStat birth statistics. The estimates reveal the extent of direct armed combat involvement in the Turkish society, with more than 2 million directly engaged the enemy in firefight, and witnessed deaths and injuries, all together indicating that, within this period, roughly 3 million Turkish men were exposed to at least one direct armed combat incident. To the best of our knowledge, these statistics represent the highest war theatre exposure rates for the average male among middle- or higher-income nations worldwide.[21]

To examine the impact of ACE on cooperative behaviors, we employ variables reflecting engagement in various community and social organizations, political party membership, and voter turnout, using survey items shown in Data Appendix B. *The Social Participation Index* focuses on engagement in social organizations like alumni associations and social and sports clubs. *The Community Participation Index* provides the corresponding measure for engagement in community organizations including compatriot, local community, and school parents' associations, religious and secular charities, and trade and worker unions. *The Political Participation Index* represents the extent of voting in local and general elections and political party membership. These summary indexes are constructed by utilizing the method of Anderson (2008), a weighted summation of these measures by employing the inverse covariance matrix, lowering the weights of variables with higher correlation levels. In the analysis, we use values of the index measures normalized to mean zero and standard deviation of one. The *Civic Participation Index* summarizes the answers to all these 14 questions on social and political engagement and electoral turnout.

Next, we construct variables capturing political attitudes using the survey questions provided in Data Appendix C. *Against Peaceful Solution* is a binary indicator, coded as one for those who are somewhat or entirely against peaceful solutions and zero otherwise. *Pro-Military Solution* is a binary indicator set equal to one for respondents who consider intensified military operations and armed

[20] The exposure rates listed pertain to the EXPOVIBE data. As military rules prevent conscripts to be deployed to bases in their home provinces, the exposure rates are expected to be somewhat lower for those drafted from conflict regions. Accordingly, we use the population distribution statistics from TurkStat and the distribution of home locations of the casualties of the Armed Forces we obtain from the TPCONED to adjust these rates for the veterans from the conflict areas.

[21] While exposure rates among conscripts may also be high in cases like Israel, the risk for the average male remains much lower as it applies to at most half the male population because the other half can manage to avoid conscription (Jager, 2018).

combat as the best solutions to ending the ongoing armed conflict, and it is set equal to zero otherwise. *Feel Distant to Minorities* is a binary variable indicating feeling distant to minority identities, including Alevite, Circassian, Georgian, Kurdish, Laz, and others. The Dichotomous *Against Minority Neighbors* variable represents whether the respondent would be opposed to having a minority neighbor, including Kurdish, Alevite, Syrian, or those who speak other languages. *Tolerates Severe Measures* is coded as one for survey participants who do not (somewhat or entirely) indicate disagreement with using even the most severe measures to put the country on the right path and eradicate the traitors, and zero otherwise. The *Animosity Index* aggregates the answers to these five questions into a single indicator following the methodology of Anderson (2008), as described above. Finally, the *Political Spectrum Index* is the normalized value of respondents' self-reported positioning on a 10-point left-right political ideology scale, with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

4.2 Constructing the Armed Conflict Exposure (ACE) Variables

We measure ACE by combining the information on the dates and location of service from EXPOVIBE with data on the geotemporal evolution of the conflict from the Turkish State-PKK Conflict Event Dataset (TPCONED) (Kıbrıs, 2021) to characterize the conflict environment each respondent was exposed to during his time in the military. The TPCONED provides precise information on the timing and granular location of fatalities between the PKK and the Turkish state through conflict events on Turkish soil, where there was at least one combatant casualty. It contains detailed information on 7,196 conflict events, with 17,532 PKK and 7,572 state casualties, over the course of the conflict. Accordingly, for each respondent, ACE corresponds to the total number of combatant casualties at the base district within his dates of service.

Appendix Figure I displays the geographical distribution of combatant casualties and the military placements of survey respondents of the EXPOVIBE survey at the district level. In Appendix Figure II, we repeat the heat maps for the number of casualties and service location of respondents for the periods 1984 to 1990, 1991 to 1995, 1996 to 2000, 2001 to 2005, and 2006 to 2011. This exercise shows that while conflict intensity exhibits significant variation over time at the district level, military placements of respondents to different bases across the country are fairly stable; therefore, we conclude that there is a good deal of cross-sectional and longitudinal variation in conflict exposure.

To address the potential non-linearities in the effect of ACE on our outcomes of interest and achieve as well as facilitate the interpretation of coefficient estimates, we categorize those for whom ACE equals zero as having *Non-ACE Service*, and we rank those with positive ACE values into three equal categories: Low-*, Medium-*, and *High-Intensity ACE*. We also explored finer exposure categories, such as four quartiles and five quintiles, and used the number of combatant casualties as a linear measure of ACE. These exercises lead to two conclusions. First, as ACE non-linearly impacts our outcomes of interest, a linear specification is unlikely to articulate the true extent of the effects of conflict exposure. Second, as using three equal ACE categories fairly successfully captures the impact of conflict, there is no need to adopt a finer exposure category.

To explore the relative importance of military socialization and direct experiences of armed violence in explaining our findings, we also create binary indicators reflecting service with and without direct exposure for each ACE intensity level. *Low, Medium, and Intense Conflict with DAC* (direct armed combat) identify those with *Low-*, *Medium-*, and *High-Intensity ACE* and direct combat experiences during their service, respectively. Similarly, the variables *Low, Medium,* and *Intense Conflict no DAC* are created for respondents with *Low-*, *Medium-*, and *High-Intensity ACE* but no direct combat experience during their service, in that order.

5. Econometric Model

We estimate the impact of armed conflict exposure on our outcomes of interest using the following equation:

(1) $Y_{cp} = \alpha + \pounds_1(\textit{Low-Intensity ACE})_{cp} + \pounds_2(\textit{Medium-Intensity ACE})_{cp} + \pounds_3(\textit{High-Intensity ACE})_{cp} + \beta\Psi_{cp} + \Phi\Pi_{cp} + \delta\Omega_{cp} + \varepsilon_{cp}$

where Y_c denotes the outcome variables, including *Civic Participation Index*, *Animosity Index*, and *Political Spectrum Index* for conscript *c*, who served in province *p*. Coefficients $\pounds_1$, $\pounds_2$, and $\pounds_3$ capture the impact of our key independent variables, *Low-, Medium-, and High-Intensity ACE,* representing conflict intensity in the deployment district during military service.

Ψ is a vector of conditional random assignment (CRA) covariates, including fixed effects for draft year, birth province, training province, branch of service, military occupation, half-term service indicator, year of induction and years of schooling. The justification behind the choice of CRA variables deserves attention. Regarding the service location assignment of draftees, the Armed Forces

declare that conditional on the branch of service and military occupation, conscripts are randomly deployed to different military bases, excluding those in their province of registration, across the country. Hence, the CRA variables include the branch of service, military occupation, and birth province fixed effects. Educational attainment is included among the CRA covariates as education is the main determinant of military branch and occupation. Given that the staffing needs of the military, which is a function of real-life events and security needs in different parts of the nation, determine the number of deployments to each military base, the service timing fixed effects are included in vector Ψ. Moreover, we also include training location fixed effects among our CRA variables to guard against potential bias that may stem from the Armed Forces performing the bootcamp training in particular provinces to efficiently train the draftees for different tasks, including armed combat. Although no formal military rule suggests that training location determines armed conflict zone assignment, we include training province fixed effects in our specifications to address any bias that may stem from this type of practice, if there is any.

Π contains plausibly exogenous pre-deployment characteristics, including height, ethnicity, draft age, conscript rank, training duration and service length in months. Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Appendix Table 2. The military rules state conscript rank to be unrelated to deployment assignment. Moreover, as they are determined prior to induction by the regulations in place, training and service durations should also be exogenous. Accordingly, if deployment is done based on the method declared by the Armed Forces, controlling for CRA variables, training duration, service length, and military rank should not appreciably differ between service members who were deployed to armed conflict zones and those who were not; therefore, we include these variables among pre-deployment characteristics. Moreover, to capture the deployment-location-specific unobserved heterogeneity, we control for military service fixed effects, represented by vector **Ω**.

Finally, ε_{cp} is the idiosyncratic error term. We cluster the standard errors at the service province level.[22] In deciding the unit of clustering, we follow the rule of thumb of clustering at the 'coarsest feasible level' when the number of clusters is sufficiently large (Cameron and Miller, 2015; MacKinnon et al., 2023).[23]

[22] Clustering at the service province level yields 83 clusters with an average of 60 observations per cluster.
[23] As we demonstrate in the robustness section, our conclusions remain robust to adjusting standard errors for clustering at a number of different clustering levels.

6. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Deployment Assignment

The randomization of service location assignment implies that the pre-deployment characteristics of draftees should be unrelated to conflict intensity. We formally test this conjecture in Table 1 by conducting balance tests on pre-deployment covariates, including height, Turkish ethnicity, Kurdish ethnicity, other minority ethnicity, conscription age, military rank, training duration, and service length. Columns (1) to (4) present the means and standard deviations of pre-deployment variables by ACE intensity. Then, conditioning on exogenous random assignment covariates, columns (5) to (7) show the normalized differences and the associated p-values for Low-, Medium-, and High-Intensity ACE relative to Non-ACE Service.

The results support the orthogonality of ACE during service to pre-deployment characteristics. Moreover, the joint F-test p-values show that pre-deployment characteristics are jointly unrelated to ACE intensity. Appendix Table 3 presents balance tests based on detailed exposure indicators. Given that these balance tests produce similar results to those shown in the main analysis, we conclude that our natural experiment enables us to distinguish the impact of exposure, with individual involvement in armed violence from that of exposure to the conflict environment. Our estimates in Appendix Tables 4 and 5 document that service location lottery achieves conditional random assignment among both at most high school-educated men and those with college education.

All in all, these results recommend that our natural experiment identifies the causal impact of ACE for the randomly picked male from the target population, allowing us to approximate the impact of ACE applicable to large segments of the population.

6.2 The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Direct Armed Combat Experiences

We continue our analysis by estimating the impact of ACE on direct armed combat experiences. This exercise allows us to test the impact of our natural experiment on the 'first-stage' outcomes of service in a conflict area by gauging the strength of ACE in predicting an individual draftee's involvement in the war theatre.

In Appendix Figure III, we compare the annual combatant casualties obtained from the TPCONED to direct armed combat exposure rates by draft year in the EXPOVIBE. This exercise shows that the trends in the prevalence of self-reported armed combat experiences by induction year

closely track the temporal evolution of the conflict intensity in the TPCONED data; therefore, it provides evidence validating the accuracy and quality of both data sets.

Appendix Table 6 displays the descriptive statistics. We find that the likelihood of reporting direct combat experiences increases substantially in ACE intensity, with *Any Direct Combat* involvement likelihoods being 12.9, 44, 55.2, and 69.2 percent for those with *Non-ACE Service*, and *Low-, Medium-*, and *High-Intensity ACE*, respectively.

We formally examine the impact of ACE on direct armed combat experiences in Table 2. In column (1), we find that *Low-, Medium-* and *High-Intensity ACE* increase the likelihood of *Any Direct Combat* experience by 6.5, 11, and 17 percentage points, respectively. In column (2), we find that *Low-, Medium-* and *High-Intensity ACE* increases the likelihood of engaging the enemy in armed combat by 6.5, 13, and 20 percentage points, in that order. Similarly, column (3) shows that the likelihood of suffering or witnessing harm increases substantially with ACE intensity.

7. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Cooperation and Political and Social Attitudes

After documenting evidence on the exogeneity of ACE exposure and the strength of our natural experiment in predicting direct combat involvement, we continue with our main analysis. The correlation matrix for outcome variables in Appendix Table 7 shows that the outcome variables are weakly correlated.

In Table 3, we examine whether and to what extent ACE impacts our outcomes of interest, including the *Civic Participation Index* (Panel A), the *Animosity Index (Panel B),* and the *Political Spectrum Index* (Panel C), respectively. In each case, column (1) shows the unadjusted estimate. Then, in columns (2), (3), and (4), we sequentially add CRA covariates, pre-deployment variables, and service province fixed effects to our models, in that order.

In column (1) of Panel A, we do not find any positive impact of ACE on the *Civic Participation Index*. Instead, we find that conflict exposure with low- or medium-intensity lowers nearly all types of participation we measure. While the inclusion of CRA covariates (column 2) increases the precision of estimates, the addition of pre-deployment characteristics (column 3) does not have any influence on the estimated coefficients, compared to the results shown in the previous column. Finally, we control for service-province fixed effects to fully account for the potential influence of time-invariant characteristics of service location on civic participation. For instance, localities in conflict areas may

develop a specific military culture that may impact the social and political attitudes of conscripts, independent of the intensity of armed combat during service. However, it should be noted that as military culture and the associated socialization effects may be a function of the severity of the armed conflict during service, conditioning our estimates on province-fixed effects does not necessarily rule out the role of military socialization in defining our findings. As shown in column (4), purging the time-invariant influence of service locality on the outcomes of interest has no meaningful bearing on our estimates. These findings do not indicate any positive impact of ACE on civic participation. Instead, we find that low-intensity conflict exposure lowers civic participation. The 95 percent confidence interval for medium-intensity exposure ranges between -0.231 and 0.045 standard deviations, with the point estimate being equal to -0.093. The point estimate for high-intensity conflict exposure is almost zero, however, it is imprecisely estimated, with the 95 percent confidence interval ranging between -0.125 and 0.145. In Appendix Table 8, we examine the impact of ACE on the components of the *Civic Participation Index*, including the *Social Participation Index*, *Community Participation Index*, and *Political Participation Index,* and document a similar pattern of results to those shown in the top panel of Table 3.

Next, in Panel B, we explore whether and to what extent ACE impacts attitudes towards conflict resolution and minorities, captured by the *Animosity Index*. We find, in column (3), that *High-Intensity ACE* causes a 0.28 standard deviation increase in the index, and this estimate is statistically significant at the 1-percent level, and controlling for service-province fixed effects produces a similar effect size (0.3 standard deviations). Then in Appendix Table 9, we investigate the impact of ACE on the components of the *Animosity Index*, namely the likelihood of being against peace talks, supporting military measures for conflict resolution, feeling distant to ethnic minorities, being against having neighbors of minority ethnic origin, and not opposing the use of severe measures against traitors to put the country in the right path. Albeit less precisely estimated, these estimates are qualitatively similar to our findings shown in Panel B of Table 3.

Finally, in Panel C, we find that *High-Intensity ACE* causes a 0.3 standard deviation increase in the *Political Spectrum Index*, implying that conflict boosts the likelihood of support for right-wing politics, with specifying service province fixed effects producing a similar pattern of estimates. In Appendix

Table 10, we show that the results are qualitatively similar across the two educational groups, even though coefficients are less precisely estimated in the college-educated subsample.

In Table 4, we explore whether these effects dissipate or persist over time. Panels I, II, and III reproduce the impact of ACE by limiting the estimation sample to those discharged at least 10, 15, and 20 years ago, in that order. The results suggest that the observed impacts of ACE, especially on animosity and political orientation, are not transitory, as reflected by the stability of coefficient estimates across the panels.[24]

Note that service in a conflict environment exposes conscripts to the military socialization of a war environment and to the violence of direct armed combat, both of which can trigger a number of mechanisms that can influence social and political outcomes. For instance, it is conceivable for the effects of ACE on attitudes toward conflict resolution and animosity towards minorities to be driven by military socialization in combat environments, breeding hostility and ethnocentrism, and military indoctrination, framing the adversary as an enemy that should be defeated militarily (Grossman et al., 2015). These findings, however, may also be explained by war-induced traumatic experiences, such as physical injury and witnessing casualties, causing grief among veterans, boosting negative sentiments toward the out-group members (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2014; Wood, 2008), and leading to "repeated decisions to fight" (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Cederman and Vogt, 2017).[25]

To explore the relative weights of military socialization and direct experiences of armed violence as components of exposure, we dissect our exposure indicators into ACE with and without direct armed combat experiences. The findings in the first column of Table 5 show that the negative effects we observe on the *Civic Participation Index* largely pertain to those with direct armed combat experiences in low-intensity conflict environments and those who served in medium-intensity conflict environments without any direct armed combat experience.

[24] In unreported specifications, we also explored if these effects dissipate or persist over time by interacting the exposure measures with years passed since discharge. This exercise, from which the results are available upon request, produced similar conclusions.

[25] https://forgehealth.com/the-impact-of-grief-and-loss-in-a-veterans-life-and-recovery-may-be-greater-than-people-think/
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/globalhealth/2020/03/31/from-war-to-grief-themes-from-the-conflict-and-mental-health-event/
https://www.ocregister.com/2019/11/11/uci-study-examines-unseen-grief-of-soldiers-who-lost-friends-in-combat-or-by-suicide/

Similarly, in column (2), we find that those who served in a locality during intense conflict and personally experienced direct combat drive the effects we observe on animosity. However, as the coefficient on *Intense Conflict no DAC* is not statistically distinguishable from the one on *Intense Conflict with DAC*, the potential role of military socialization cannot be completely overruled.

Finally, we repeat the same exercise in column (3) and find that while direct armed combat exposure during intense conflict has the largest impact (0.30 standard deviations) on right-wing political orientation, serving in a high-intensity conflict area without any direct combat involvement also yields a similar effect, suggesting that both military socialization and direct armed combat experiences matter in determining the impact of ACE on relative standing on the left-right political spectrum.

8. Robustness

We start analyzing the robustness of our results by exploring whether a continuous measure of ACE or a quartile categorization of ACE performs a better fit of the impact of exposure to armed conflict during service. Comparing the estimates of the impact of using the continuous ACE measure in Appendix Table 12A and the quartile ACE categorization in Appendix Table 12B, we conclude that ACE rather non-linearly impacts our outcomes of interests as the effects usually emerge in the third and fourth quartiles of ACE intensity.[26] Therefore, we conclude that the use of the linear ACE measure fails to capture the true impact of conflict exposure. Moreover, the quartile estimates suggest that our main specifications capture the impact of ACE fairly well.

In Appendix Table 13, we employ conflict intensity in service location prior to deployment, which we measure via the standardized total number of combatant casualties in service district since the beginning of the conflict up until deployment date as a placebo exposure measure and confirm that our results are not biased by unobserved confoundment of ACE.

As previously discussed, educational attainment is instrumental in determining the military occupation and branch of service allocation which then condition deployment. Recall the discussion that school enrollment is the only practically viable option for the possible postponement of induction.

[26] Appendix Tables 11A and 11B display the associated balance tests for the linear and four-quartile ACE intensity specifications, respectively.

Accordingly, those who continue school and apply for deferral are granted a deferral until the completion of formal schooling, with the law stating that deferral requests should be renewed each year with proof of school enrolment. Therefore, induction largely takes place after the completion of formal schooling. Nonetheless, in this subsection, we investigate whether potential reverse causation from ACE to education can bias our estimates. We undertake two strategies to investigate whether this possibility biases our findings. First, we limit our sample to those who served the full term, i.e., at least 15 months, without postponement, i.e., inducted prior to their twenty-second birthday. We impose the service duration restriction because less than full-term service is only possible via continued schooling; hence, their educational attainment cannot be a function of ACE. Age restriction is imposed to exclude those who continued schooling to delay induction to circumvent any potential bias they may cause in estimating the impact of ACE on schooling. Therefore, these restrictions eliminate individuals who postponed induction to complete their schooling and leave us with those with the potential to continue their education after discharge. While it is possible that ACE may impact the subsequent schooling of individuals in this sample, results displayed in Appendix Table 14A do not show a significant impact, recommending the absence of reverse causation from ACE to schooling.

Second, while we do not have information on school completion age, we test the robustness of our estimates to employing the sample of respondents who are likely to have completed their schooling prior to induction. In doing so, we first create a predicted school completion age (PSCA) indicator based on the assumption that the attainment of a particular level of schooling takes place at a given age if there are no interruptions in school attendance.[27] Then, using the PSCA, we estimate our models by restricting our sample to those whose draft age and educational attainment are consistent with the assumption that their formal schooling ended prior to induction. In Appendix Table 14B, this exercise produces similar results to our main findings and suggests that potential reverse causation from ACE to educational attainment does not bias our findings.

[27] The PSCA is created by adding years of schooling to school start age, which is 7. Then, we add 1 to PSCA to account for rounding errors and a potential year gap in schooling, which relatively commonly takes places between high school and college due to prep for the centralized college admission test.

In Appendix Table 15, we control for the birth province by draft year fixed effects to further scrutinize the resilience of our findings. This practice relies on variation in conflict exposure by comparing the outcomes of conscripts with those of their contemporary draftees sharing the same pre-enlistment environment. This exercise has no bearing on our main findings.

If ACE influences the likelihood of responding to survey questions, our findings may be biased depending on the nature of that association. For instance, if ACE increases both non-response and animosity toward minorities, then our estimates should correspond to the lower-bound impact of ACE and vice-versa. To explore if this possibility constitutes a threat to our findings, in Appendix Table 16, we estimate the effect of ACE on the likelihood of non-response to survey questions pertaining to our outcome measures and show that our estimates do not suffer from any such non-response bias.

In Appendix Table 17, we limit the estimation sample to different and arguably more homogenous samples to test the robustness of our estimates. It is well known that soldiers and gendarmes shoulder the burden of armed conflict as they are more likely to serve in conflict areas and be exposed to direct combat. Hence, in Panel I, we reproduce our estimates by excluding sailors and airmen. These estimates are fairly similar to our baseline findings, suggesting that our results are not driven by the systemic differences between service in Land Forces and other branches.

Because of their shorter service duration, those who serve less than full-term may not be preferred to serve their duties in conflict zones. Therefore, to test whether the presence of less than full-termers biases our findings, we re-estimate our specifications by excluding them, corresponding to roughly seven percent of our sample, in Panel II. This exercise produces remarkably similar effect sizes to our baseline estimates, implying that our results are not dictated by the systemic differences between the full-term and less-than-full-term serving conscripts.

As discussed, a young man becomes liable for induction when he turns 20 and gets conscripted before his 22nd birthday. However, one could defer the timing of induction beyond age 21 via extended schooling. Therefore, we limit our estimation sample to those inducted before turning 22 to test whether our findings are resilient to dropping individuals who delayed their draft. As displayed in Panel III, this specification check produces estimates highly similar to the main findings.

In Panel IV, we exclude individuals with non-Turkish ethnicity, i.e., those who grew up in a household where a language other than Turkish was spoken. The reasoning behind this exercise is that the Kurdish uprising is considered a threat to the integrity of the Turkish state and its unification efforts around a national identity that rests on Turkish citizenship that shuns any emphasis on minority ethnic identities in the public space (Kadıoğlu, 2008). Hence, we investigate whether our findings are robust to excluding those who come from a non-Turkish ethnic background. Results show that this exercise has no bearing on our conclusions.

We also subject our findings to additional scrutiny by undertaking Oster's (2019) omitted variables bias test. Building on Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), this method estimates the relative significance of unobservables by tracking the changes in the value of R-squared and the coefficient of interest when additional observables are added to the estimated models. Following Oster (2019), we fix the R_{max} value to 130% of the R-squared statistic of the specification controlling for observable covariates and assume that observable and unobservable factors have equal weights in determining our outcomes, implying that Oster's δ is set equal to 1. As displayed in Appendix Table 18, Oster's beta values are nearly identical to our baseline estimates, suggesting that our natural experiment identifies unbiased estimates of the impact of ACE.

To test whether our results are driven by a small number of influential observations, in Appendix Figure IV columns (1) and (2), we drop one military-service province and one draft year at a time and plot the associated coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals. These exercises show that our coefficient estimates are highly resilient to dropping one military province at a time or one induction year at a time and re-estimating our models.

As we examine the impact of ACE on different outcomes, one potential concern is the problem of multiple inferences, which implies that statistically significant estimates may emerge by chance. Recall that, when possible, we already use summary indexes to circumvent this possibility. Moreover, we test the robustness of the standard errors to four different multiple-hypothesis-testing procedures including the Simes (1986) and Hochberg (1988) methods, and those accounting for the familywise error rate (FWER) (Westfall and Young, 1993) and for the false discovery rate (FDR) (Anderson,

2008), respectively.[28] In Appendix Table 19, we present the associated p-values using these approaches along with the baseline estimates and show that our results are robust to multiple inference testing.

As noted, standard errors in the main analysis are corrected for clustering on the military service province, which is arguably the 'coarsest feasible level' within which errors are correlated, as the conflict activity within the service province is likely to be correlated (Cameron and Miller, 2015; MacKinnon et al., 2023). In Appendix Table 20, we check the sensitivity of the precision of our estimates to clustering at different levels. Specifically, we adjust standard errors at training province; service province and induction year (i.e., two-way clustering); service district; service district and induction year (i.e., two-way clustering); birth province; branch by draft year; branch by occupation; and branch by occupation by draft year, respectively. The results show that inference based on adjusting for clustering at different levels produces identical conclusions to our main analysis.

Finally, to neutralize any potential interviewer influence on respondents' answers, in Appendix Table 21, we control for interviewer-fixed effects. These results, which are fairly similar to our baseline findings, recommend that interviewer-specific idiosyncrasies do not influence our findings.

9. Mechanisms

Theoretical reasoning based on economic, evolutionary, and psychological approaches suggests that ACE may impact the subsequent political and social attitudes and behaviors through several different channels, which may be broadly grouped under the macroenvironmental effects of conflict; the impact of conflict experiences on the accumulation of transferable skills; and the effects of exposure on preferences and psychological mechanisms (Galovski and Lyons, 2004; Grosjean, 2014; Bauer et al., 2016; Henrich, 2020; Blattman, 2009; Blattman and Annan, 2010).

The community-level effects of war concern the differential incentives and payoffs created by the conflict social ecology, such as demand for social insurance due to risks to personal security and property, and community-level paradigm shifts, among others (Bauer et al., 2016), are irrelevant in our setup by design. In particular, the EXPOVIBE survey was implemented outside the conflict zone, with survey participants whose exposure is limited to the duration of their mandatory service in the Armed Forces. As they did not live in areas where the conflict took place and caused any physical

[28] https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/impactevaluations/updated-overview-multiple-hypothesis-testing-commands-stata

destruction, they did not bear any risks to their personal security, property rights, or local social networks, nor did they take part in any form of post-conflict reconstruction. Importantly, this aspect of our empirical framework sets us apart from other well-known cases of conscription armies deployed in conflict, such as the case of Israel, where personal safety concerns have been offered among the explanatory pathways (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2014; Grossman et al., 2015). Moreover, because we study the impact of ACE among those whose communities and family members were unexposed as civilians, community-level paradigm shifts to a new equilibrium are unlikely. As further evidence that community-level effects of conflict are irrelevant in explaining our findings, we also show that our results are robust to exclusion from the sample of those who live in the provinces that experienced few casualties within their borders. If our results are driven by respondents from these places, our findings could be contaminated by possible unobserved civilian exposure. To explore the validity of this possibility, in Appendix Table 22, we estimate our models by excluding from our sample those respondents from provinces that are partially affected by the conflict.[29] As shown by these results, there exists no reason to believe that our findings are contaminated by the potential social-ecological effects of conflict, including civilian exposure.

Conflict experience can also influence cooperative attitudes and behavior via the accumulation of transferable skills through investments in prosocial skills and formal schooling. Those who fight in conflict may need to hone their prosocial skills and attitudes to maximize social support and their likelihood of survival under scarce resources (Kalyvas, 2006). Such incentives, however, are either not relevant or play a minimal role in our case. First, as conscripts are recruited by the Turkish military, which has a well-defined institutional structure to provide its staff with the social and technical support they need on the field as conflict actors, draftees may never feel the need to invest in their prosocial capital. Second, because induction takes place after formal schooling, conflict exposure is unlikely to significantly affect human capital formation via educational attainment, as shown by our analysis in Section 7 above.

As the potential human capital formation effects of ACE may be reflected in labor market outcomes and financial wellbeing, we explore the impact of ACE on such outcomes. We show in Table 6 that ACE has no sizable impact on the likelihood of being unemployed (column 1) or family

[29] The excluded provinces in this exercise are Kayseri and Sivas.

income (column 2). These results suggest that the impacts of ACE do not work through labor market success or family finances. Relatedly, it is worth noting that there is no significant financial compensation for service in conflict zones (excluding those who were disabled due to severe injury during service) or any favorable treatments directed to conscripts in their civilian lives upon discharge (Açiksöz, 2015).[30]

Conflict-induced migration could be another channel related to human capital. That is, although the EXPOVIBE survey was administered in provinces with low levels of in-migration from conflict areas, one may still be concerned if ACE causes subsequent migration and whether and to what extent such migration explains our findings. To address such concerns, we estimate the impact of ACE on the likelihood of being a migrant in Appendix Table 23A. These estimates do not suggest that ACE increases the likelihood of currently living in a province different from birthplace. Then, in Appendix Table 23B, we re-estimate our models by excluding migrants from the sample and find that none of our conclusions change because of this exercise. Thus, we infer that potential conflict-induced migration does not explain our findings.

Armed conflict exposure can also operate through its effects on general preferences and psychological channels. On the one hand, an emerging line of inquiry shows evidence that exposure to war may lead to post-traumatic growth, supporting the argument that experiencing traumatic events can incite positive change (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004; Blattman, 2009; Bauer et al., 2016). On the other hand, the psychological burden of war trauma, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and distress, can hinder a person's desire and ability to establish and maintain healthy social relationships and, therefore, lower prosociality (Ehlers and Clark 2000; Galovski and Lyons 2004). To gauge the role of mental health and risky health behaviors in explaining our findings, we explore depressive symptomology, smoking, and daily drinking. Our depression indicators come from a 6-question brief depression scale (Derogatis, 1975) included in the EXPOVIBE that required respondents to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 to 4 how frequently they had felt sadness, loneliness, hopelessness, withdrawn, worthless, and suicidal within the past week.

[30] Only a very small 0.5 per thousand of the conflict area veterans receive veteran's compensation. This is because gaining disability status is subject to close scrutiny and only provided to those with more than 40% impairment in accordance with Article 52 of the 5434 Law on the Pension Fund of the Turkish Republic due to injury during service (https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/2.3.41053.pdf). Unlike the veterans in the USA, psychological ailments, such as PTSD, do not usually quality a former conscript to receive disability status (Güloğlu, 2016).

In column (3) of Table 6, we examine the total score on these questions as a binary 90th percentile indicator, capturing the upper end of this scale, and we find little evidence that ACE triggers such symptoms. Relatedly, in column (4), we test if ACE leads to personal security concerns, a proxy measure of the potential psychological burden of war theatre exposure. Our measure, the *Standardized Personal Safety Index*, is derived from an 8-item insecurity scale (Vélez et al., 2016) included in the EXPOVIBE survey that questions participants' perceptions of risks to personal safety in daily life. We do not find a statistically significant impact of ACE on such perceptions.[31]

Note that as evidenced by the literature, mental health ailments are significant risk factors for substance abuse, and relatedly, they are also likely to hinder labor market prospects (Kulka et al., 1990; Zatzick et al., 1997). In columns (5) and (6) of Table 6, we estimate the effect of ACE on smoking and daily drinking and document that it does not have a positive impact on these risky health behaviors, either. Coupled with those on employment and income, these results, do not recommend that the impact of ACE on our outcomes operates through mental distress.

Finally, exposure to an environment where resorting to violence is a socially acceptable method of mitigating crisis may trigger a learning process that leads to the normalization of violence (Bandura, 1973; Horowitz and Solomon, 1978; Wood, 2008). Moreover, evolutionary accounts argue that intergroup competition (i.e., war exposure) has been responsible for the emergence of adaptive psychological properties geared towards "solidifying interdependent groups and strengthening norms" (Henrich, 2020, p. 328; Alexander, 1987; Boyd et al., 2003; Darwin, 1871[1981]; Henrich, 2004). In addition to in-group prosociality, this theoretical view links armed conflict exposure to increased parochialism in the form of out-group derogation (Bowles, 2006; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Haidt, 2012; Wilson, 2012) and adherence to conservative social norms (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Richerson and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2020). Accordingly, the evolutionary view implies that while war exposure can improve in-group cohesion and cooperative behaviors, it can also lead to less favorable social outcomes, such as hardened social divisions, and reinforced conflict cycles if people become more parochial (Bauer et al., 2016; Henrich, 2020).

In columns (7) and (8) of Table 6, we explore whether parochialism and normalization of violence can explain our findings. Our measure of parochialism is the standardized answers to a question that

[31] The questions are listed in Data Appendix E.

requires respondents to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale how much they agree with the statement that "the key to living well is obedience, discipline, and compliance with ethical behavior." Then, in column (7), using Anderson's methodology (2008) as described above, we construct an *Aggression Index* based on a brief version of the Buss-Perry Aggression Scale (Buss and Perry, 1992), capturing thoughts, emotions, and behaviors intended to harm others. The questions, as shown in Data Appendix D, constitute the abridged 12-item *Aggression Scale* developed by Webster et al. (2013. Estimated coefficients show that norm tightness and the normalization of violence may explain our findings. In particular, we show that direct armed combat exposure is the primary driver of norm following and aggression, with effect sizes increasing in ACE intensity.

We also investigate if and how much controlling for these potentially endogenous outcomes of conflict exposure, including employment status household income, depressive symptomatology, risky health behaviors, aggression, and norm following, affects our results. Panels I, II, and III of Appendix Table 24 investigate the resilience of our findings on civic participation, animosity towards conflict resolution and minorities, and relative positioning in the political spectrum, in that order. For each summary index outcome measure, in column (1), we show the baseline estimate. We control for unemployment status and family monthly income (column 2), mental health and risky health behaviors (column 3), and aggression and norm following (column 4). Then, column (5) jointly specifies these potential mediators. As depicted by the estimates presented, controlling for these covariates has no bearing on our findings, regardless of whether we specify them individually or jointly.

As exposure during service can make veterans more sensitive to hearing about events and fatalities in their service location, post-deployment conflict intensity may constitute another channel through which ACE can impact veterans. We explore this channel in Appendix Table 25 to find that conflict intensity after discharge does not meaningfully impact our results.

10. Conclusions

In this study, we examine the causal impact of armed conflict exposure on the social and political attitudes and behaviors of the average adult male randomly picked from a population inhabiting a peaceful environment where conflict-induced demand for cooperation is absent. We exploit a novel natural experiment delivered by the deployment lottery embedded in the Turkish conscription system predicting the service location of draftees during the PKK's armed insurgency that has long been

going on in the southeastern parts of the country. We use data from an innovative survey, the EXPOVIBE, which sampled outside of the conflict zone to nullify the potential effects of war that may operate through the social ecology, providing detailed information on conscripts, including service timing and location, military experiences, political and social attitudes, and behaviors. Therefore, we identify the effect of exposure to armed violence in and of itself and decipher the potential explanatory channels these impacts work through without the confounding role of macroenvironmental effects of war.

Equipped with a powerful empirical framework to study the effects of war theatre exposure, we answer long-standing questions in the literature. First, we show that when neoclassical explanations, including the need for social insurance, security concerns, community-level paradigm shifts, and labor market outcomes that may boost demand for cohesion, are minimized, conflict exposure in and of itself is not necessarily conducive to prosocial behaviors. This conclusion helps reconcile the conflicting finding in the literature. In particular, our results recommend that the emergence of the favorable prosociality effects of war may be contingent on whether and to what extent conflict triggers the need for cooperation through the social ecology and people's economic incentives, constraints, and beliefs, and the interactions between these two sets of mechanisms.

To deepen the understanding of this result, it is worth discussing the differences between the war experience of conscripts and those who participate in the conflict in different roles. Our subjects are ex-conscript civilians randomly picked from the general population. While they are exposed to conflict as combatants, they do not self-select into this role. Therefore, their involvement in the conflict is not ideological and does not necessarily involve any sociopolitical concerns. Moreover, unlike insurgent combatants, conscripts do not need to establish local support for survival. As part of the state military, they are already embedded in a well-defined, well-organized, and dense support system. Therefore, they face much lesser incentives to develop prosocial skills and attitudes during service or upon leaving the military. Finally, upon discharge, they return to their peaceful home environments, where there is no reason to expect war-induced paradigm shifts. This description fits the experience of the members of most modern-day armies. In particular, our conclusions are highly relevant for cases where similar institutional setups draft civilians to participate in armed combat away from their homes. A timely example is the recent mobilization of about 300,000 Russian conscripts with minimal military training

to be deployed in the invasion of Ukraine away from their peaceful homes (Roth, 2022).[32] The mass conscription campaign in Eritrea as part of its involvement in neighboring Ethiopia's civil war and the universal draft in Iran alongside the ongoing armed conflict with the PJAK insurgents in the northwest of the country constitute other current cases in which civilian conscripts get exposed to armed violence.[33] Armenia and Azerbaijan have resorted to mass mobilization campaigns and deployed conscripts to armed combat in the latest episodes of their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (Mejlumyan, 2020). Similarly, the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan risks exposing conscripts to an armed conflict environment as the border guards of both countries are staffed largely by conscripts.[34,35 g]

Overall, the findings of this research contrast the conclusion synthesized by Bauer et al. (2016, p. 250) that "people exposed to war violence tend to behave more cooperatively after war." Instead, our findings suggest that when the neoclassical explanatory channels are not at play, war exposure in and of itself is not sufficient to promote cooperative behaviors. Our ability to silence such mediating channels not only solves an important puzzle in the literature, but also underlines the importance of the conflict-induced boost in demand for cooperation in explaining increased prosociality due to war exposure as we do not see any such effect in its absence.

Instead, once such channels are neutralized, parochialism takes over and the adverse effects of war exposure flowing through grievances, subscription to conservative norms, and the normalization of violence become visible. Accordingly, these dynamics may play significant roles in the formation of the infamous *conflict trap* and be highly relevant for understanding why "once a country stumbles into civil war, its risk of further conflict soars" (Collier et al., 2003, pp. 4).

Our findings are consistent with the arguments emphasizing the role of intergroup competition in shaping social norms and preferences and the degree to which people commit to these norms to

[32] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/russia-mobilisation-ukraine-war-army-drive.
[33] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-18/eritrea-goes-for-broke-in-ethiopian-civil-war-to-crush-old-foe
[34] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/centralasia/tajik-personnel.htm
[35] While conscripts make up a significant portion of the Israeli Defense Forces and a significant portion of them get deployed to combat assignments within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Grossman et al., 2015), it differs from our case in that security concerns are not eliminated upon completion of mandatory service and returning home. Similarly, the Colombian conscription is likely to have exposed draftees to the violence of the civil conflict that raged in the country in the 1958-2013 period. However, in the Colombian system, a soldier is usually drafted into the division in his home region (Sacquety, 2006).

promote group survival. Specifically, as discussed previously, in the Turkish case, the in-group identity is defined as loyalty to the state and unification against its enemies. Therefore, the antagonistic attitudes we observe towards minorities, opposition to peaceful conflict resolution methods, support for extreme measures to punish *traitors*, and inclination towards the right-wing ideology suggest war exposure increases subscription to parochial norms and preferences that prescribe hostility towards those who lack that loyalty or threaten the unity of the nation.

There are also limitations to our study that originate from the structure and content of the EXPOVIBE survey. First is the absence of information on parental characteristics like education, occupation, religiosity, or political views; neither do we observe whether respondents grew up in rural or urban areas. While such background characteristics would have enriched our analysis, the EXPOVIBE survey does not include these measures.

Another caveat is the absence of information on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which has been shown to play a central role in explaining the links between combat exposure and subsequent outcomes. We partially address this limitation by using depressive symptoms, which usually co-emerge with PTSD (Dekel et al., 2014; Campbell et al., 2007) and can be considered as a reasonable proxy for similar general traumatic stress construct (O'Donnell et al., 2004; Sher, 2005). Furthermore, as suggested by the associated literature, PTSD and psychological health problems are important risk factors for substance use and can adversely impact labor market outcomes (Kulka et al., 1990; Zatzick et al., 1997). Because we do not find any sizable evidence that ACE influences substance use and labor market outcomes, we infer that psychological health is unlikely to be a lead explanatory mediation pathway. However, as our data on mental health outcomes are relatively limited, investigating the role of mental health is incumbent upon future research.

Finally, as the questions on direct combat experiences were asked earlier in the survey before the outcome variables, priming may occur if recalling direct combat experiences causes the under- or over-reporting of our outcomes of interest. Two pieces of evidence we provide suggest that priming does not influence our findings. First, as more recent traumatic experiences may be remembered more intensely, one would expect that the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates would diminish as time since discharge increases (Moya, 2018.) As presented in Table 4, the magnitudes of the impact of ACE, especially on the *Animosity Index* and *Political Spectrum Index*, do not exhibit a decline. Second, if being

asked about combat experiences were to cause a priming impact, that would be a psychological consequence of conflict exposure itself, and as such it would also be expected to be reflected in the psychological health outcomes we explore. As we do not observe that ACE has any measurable impact on outcomes related to mental health, we infer that it is unlikely that our findings are driven by potential priming effects. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the effects of trauma on behavioral and attitudinal outcomes operate independent of any priming impact (Moya, 2018; American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Kessler et al., 1995; Mcewen and Sapolsky, 1995; Yehuda, 2002).

While we address important gaps in the literature, several related questions remain. For instance, will the favorable prosociality effects of war shown in the literature persist when the conflict-induced environmental needs for cooperation subside? Moreover, if and to what extent does exposure to violence among public servants, such as police officers and professional military members who self-select into their roles, impact their cooperative behaviors and attitudes? Finally, does civilian exposure under different circumstances, such as systemic neighborhood violence versus sporadic victimization, lead to different effects?

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Figure IA. Annual Combatant Fatalities Among the Turkish Security Forces and PKK Recruits by Year between 1984 and 2019



Figure IB. Cumulative Combatant Fatalities by Year Among the Turkish Security Forces and PKK Recruits between 1984 and 2019



Notes: The estimates were obtained from the TPCONED.

Figure II. Sampling distribution versus the distribution of combatant casualties



Table 1. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Full Sample

Variable	(1) *No-ACE* Mean/SD	(2) *Low-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(3) *Medium-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(4) *High-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(5) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)
Height in Centimeters	175.816	175.082	175.650	176.667	0.105	0.024	-0.122
	[15.170]	[12.260]	[6.736]	[19.342]	(0.062)	(0.487)	(0.850)
Turkish Ethnicity	0.916	0.907	0.910	0.933	0.029	0.019	-0.060
	[0.429]	[0.336]	[0.252]	[0.297]	(0.570)	(0.623)	(0.579)
Kurdish Ethnicity	0.062	0.059	0.054	0.047	0.013	0.033	0.060
	[0.305]	[0.228]	[0.244]	[0.276]	(0.606)	(0.452)	(0.892)
Other Ethnicity	0.022	0.034	0.036	0.020	-0.077	-0.090	0.015
	[0.243]	[0.206]	[0.173]	[0.099]	(0.259)	(0.094)	(0.334)
Conscription Age	20.675	20.452	20.421	20.357	0.125	0.140	0.179
	[2.711]	[1.374]	[1.890]	[1.155]	(0.793)	(0.254)	(0.197)
Rank: Private	0.800	0.786	0.811	0.859	0.034	-0.026	-0.145
	[0.593]	[0.460]	[0.509]	[0.367]	(0.336)	(0.924)	(0.696)
Rank: Corporal	0.062	0.063	0.062	0.038	-0.004	-0.001	0.097
	[0.360]	[0.220]	[0.330]	[0.150]	(0.863)	(0.854)	(0.915)
Rank: Sergeant	0.131	0.138	0.122	0.098	-0.019	0.027	0.097
	[0.446]	[0.422]	[0.299]	[0.346]	(0.748)	(0.981)	(0.706)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.007	0.013	0.005	0.005	-0.069	0.017	0.021
	[0.081]	[0.107]	[0.069]	[0.084]	(0.073)	(0.823)	(0.725)
Training Duration in Months	2.617	2.713	2.777	2.773	-0.122	-0.203	-0.199
	[1.667]	[1.306]	[0.917]	[1.460]	(0.329)	(0.892)	(0.422)
Service Length in Months	16.457	16.779	16.904	17.215	-0.118	-0.163	-0.278
	[4.879]	[3.093]	[2.852]	[3.825]	(0.868)	(0.524)	(0.080)
F-test of joint significance (p-value)					*0.442*	*0.834*	*0.311*
	3874	423	318	356			

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for draft year, birth province, training province and service province fixed effects, branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, a half-term service indicator, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis.

Table 2. The Impact of Conflict Zone Deployment on Direct Combat Experiences

VARIABLES	(1) Any Direct Combat Experience	(2) Armed Combat	(3) Injured or Witnessed Casualties
Low-Intensity ACE	0.065*	0.065**	0.026
	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.034)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.110**	0.127***	0.113***
	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.037)
High-Intensity ACE	0.169**	0.195***	0.139**
	(0.066)	(0.059)	(0.062)
Observations	4,968	4,968	4,967
R-squared	0.406	0.400	0.331

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Table 3. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A. Civic Participation Index				
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.046	-0.110**	-0.112***	-0.112**
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.050)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.117*	-0.117**	-0.120**	-0.093
	(0.069)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.069)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.013	-0.007	-0.009	0.010
	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.068)
Observations	4,971	4,971	4,971	4,971
R-squared	0.001	0.072	0.079	0.097
Panel B. Animosity Index				
Low-Intensity ACE	0.164**	0.063	0.055	0.050
	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.059)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.130**	0.042	0.035	0.043
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.062)
High-Intensity ACE	0.296***	0.271***	0.278***	0.300***
	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.092)
Observations	4,969	4,969	4,969	4,969
R-squared	0.007	0.196	0.208	0.225
Panel C. Political Spectrum Index				
Low-Intensity ACE	0.022	0.050	0.054	0.075
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.056)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.064	-0.060	-0.058	-0.029
	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.067)
High-Intensity ACE	0.221***	0.235***	0.243***	0.299***
	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.091)
Observations	4,499	4,499	4,499	4,499
R-squared	0.004	0.147	0.155	0.181
Controls For				
Conditional Random Assignment Variables	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Exogenous Covariates	No	No	Yes	Yes
Service Province Fixed Effects	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Conditional random assignment controls include height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, and a half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Table 4. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Testing Whether the Effects Persist or Dissipate Over Time

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Panel I. Discharged >=10 Years Ago			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.168***	0.027	0.074
	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.063)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.120*	0.053	-0.012
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.066)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.014	0.299***	0.282***
	(0.067)	(0.089)	(0.090)
Observations	4,590	4,588	4,148
R-squared	0.098	0.227	0.184
Panel II. Discharged >=15 Years Ago			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.151**	0.055	0.065
	(0.059)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.108	0.049	-0.044
	(0.077)	(0.060)	(0.074)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.019	0.341***	0.297***
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.085)
Observations	3,650	3,648	3,306
R-squared	0.113	0.235	0.191
Panel III. Discharged >=20 Years Ago			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.108	0.085	0.072
	(0.075)	(0.085)	(0.098)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.124*	0.016	0.070
	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.093)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.077	0.291**	0.350***
	(0.096)	(0.111)	(0.097)
Observations	2,532	2,531	2,302
R-squared	0.141	0.247	0.230

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province, and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Table 5. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low Conflict no DAC	-0.098	-0.008	0.047
	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.069)
Low Conflict with DAC	-0.122**	0.131	0.117
	(0.059)	(0.107)	(0.095)
Medium Conflict no DAC	-0.212**	0.075	-0.013
	(0.095)	(0.083)	(0.084)
Medium Conflict with DAC	0.014	0.021	-0.038
	(0.060)	(0.080)	(0.082)
Intense Conflict no DAC	0.041	0.320	0.294**
	(0.082)	(0.214)	(0.136)
Intense Conflict with DAC	0.014	0.295***	0.304***
	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.107)
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
R-squared	0.098	0.225	0.181

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Table 6. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Potential Mediators

	(1) Unemployed	(2) Log Family Income	(3) Depressed	(4) Standardized Personal Safety Index	(5) Smoker	(6) Daily Drinker	(7) Standardized Aggression Index	(8) Standardized Norm Following
Low Conflict no DAC	0.016	0.022	0.004	-0.014	-0.046	-0.002	0.097	0.067
	(0.013)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.035)	(0.013)	(0.060)	(0.081)
Low Conflict with DAC	0.003	-0.049	0.005	-0.037	0.062*	0.010	0.151	0.184**
	(0.015)	(0.049)	(0.032)	(0.084)	(0.036)	(0.016)	(0.111)	(0.077)
Medium Conflict no DAC	-0.019	0.047	-0.013	0.059	-0.021	-0.013	0.091	0.048
	(0.012)	(0.067)	(0.032)	(0.085)	(0.054)	(0.012)	(0.137)	(0.108)
Medium Conflict with DAC	0.008	-0.061	0.015	-0.052	0.044	-0.025**	0.256***	0.174**
	(0.019)	(0.043)	(0.031)	(0.095)	(0.040)	(0.010)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Intense Conflict no DAC	0.044	-0.362*	0.122*	-0.019	0.022	-0.033	0.067	0.078
	(0.032)	(0.187)	(0.070)	(0.099)	(0.059)	(0.021)	(0.158)	(0.185)
Intense Conflict with DAC	-0.002	-0.059	0.045	-0.058	0.066	-0.024	0.261**	0.131
	(0.014)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.089)	(0.041)	(0.016)	(0.122)	(0.079)
Observations	4,967	4,338	4,971	4,970	4,971	4,965	4,962	4,920
R-squared	0.098	0.210	0.162	0.168	0.140	0.075	0.160	0.223

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Figure I. Geographical distribution of conflict intensity and military placements of respondents

Geographical distribution of total combatant casualties



Geographical distribution of military placements of respondents



Appendix Figure II. Geotemporal evolution of conflict intensity and military deployments

Distribution of Combatant Casualties: 1984-1990	Service Locations of Survey Respondents: 1984-1990
	
Distribution of Combatant Casualties: 1991-1995	Service Locations of Survey Respondents: 1991-1995
	
Distribution of Combatant Casualties: 1996-2000	Service Locations of Survey Respondents: 2001-2005
	
Distribution of Combatant Casualties: 2006-2011	Service Locations of Survey Respondents: 2006-2011
	
Distribution of Combatant Casualties 2006-2011	Service Locations of Survey Respondents – 2006-2011
	

Appendix Figure III. Direct Combat Experiences by the Year of Draft







Appendix Figure IV. Robustness to Dropping Province of Service and Induction Year One at a Time



Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. 95 percent confidence intervals are estimated using robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service

duration.

Appendix Table 1. Estimates of Armed Conflict Exposure Among Turkish Men Conscripted between 1984 and 2011

Direct Combat Experiences	Direct Combat Exposure Risk in Sampling Regions	Total Conscripted Men with Exposure Risk	Estimated Number of Exposed
Armed Combat	15.7%	14,483,828	2,273,961
Injured or Witnessed Casualties	16.2%	14,483,828	2,346,380
Any Direct Combat Experience	21.9%	14,483,828	3,171,958

Notes: These calculations are based on the following numbers. About 16,120,000 (roughly 620,000 per year) male births occurred between 1965 and 1990. During this period, about 97% of Turkish men performed military service as conscripts. The distribution of the population and the distribution of the home provinces of the casualties of the Armed Forces (TPCONED) indicate that about 93% of the drafted are eligible for deployment to conflict locations (due to the military rule that prevents service at home). Direct combat exposure rates come from the Appendix Table 6. The total number of exposed is then calculated by multiplying the total number of conscripted men with the exposure risks.

Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics for Pre-Deployment Variables by Armed Conflict Intensity

Variable	(1) All	(2) *Non-ACE Service*	(3) *Low-Intensity ACE*	(4) *Medium-Intensity ACE*	(5) *High-Intensity ACE*
Height in Centimeters	175.452	175.517	175.024	175.296	175.390
	(6.948)	(7.000)	(6.852)	(6.686)	(6.722)
Turkish Ethnicity	0.906	0.905	0.908	0.906	0.924
	(0.292)	(0.294)	(0.290)	(0.293)	(0.265)
Kurdish	0.068	0.072	0.062	0.050	0.053
	(0.253)	(0.259)	(0.241)	(0.219)	(0.225)
Other Ethnicity	0.025	0.024	0.031	0.044	0.023
	(0.157)	(0.152)	(0.173)	(0.206)	(0.148)
Conscription Age	20.623	20.670	20.492	20.469	20.410
	(1.755)	(1.810)	(1.518)	(1.774)	(1.315)
Rank: Private	0.790	0.786	0.778	0.796	0.843
	(0.407)	(0.410)	(0.416)	(0.404)	(0.365)
Rank: Corporal	0.064	0.067	0.062	0.063	0.045
	(0.245)	(0.249)	(0.241)	(0.243)	(0.208)
Rank: Sergeant	0.137	0.139	0.147	0.135	0.107
	(0.344)	(0.346)	(0.354)	(0.343)	(0.309)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.008	0.008	0.014	0.006	0.006
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.118)	(0.079)	(0.075)
Training Duration	2.645	2.603	2.758	2.808	2.817
	(0.771)	(0.801)	(0.678)	(0.608)	(0.594)
Service Duration	16.500	16.386	16.764	16.815	17.146
	(2.634)	(2.794)	(2.012)	(1.903)	(1.789)
Observations	4971	3874	423	318	356

Standard deviations in parentheses. These estimates are obtained using sampling weights.

Appendix Table 3. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Full Sample, Balance Test by Service in an Armed Conflict Zone with and without Direct Combat Experiences

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Variable	*No-ACE* Mean/SD	*Low-Intensity ACE* No Direct Exposure Mean/SD	*Low-Intensity ACE* With Direct Exposure Mean/SD	*Medium-Intensity ACE* No Direct Exposure Mean/SD	*Medium-Intensity ACE* With Direct Exposure Mean/SD	*High-Intensity ACE* No Direct Exposure Mean/SD	*High-Intensity ACE* With Direct Exposure Mean/SD	Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)	Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(5)	Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(6)	Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(7)
Height in Centimeters	175.816	174.887	175.328	175.255	175.970	175.773	177.065	0.132	0.070	0.080	-0.022	0.006	-0.179
	[15.170]	[7.576]	[15.654]	[6.407]	[6.469]	[15.379]	[24.545]	(0.070)	(0.289)	(0.214)	(0.560)	(0.320)	0.078)
Turkish Ethnicity	0.916	0.905	0.911	0.902	0.917	0.944	0.929	0.037	0.018	0.048	-0.004	-0.095	-0.044
	[0.429]	[0.281]	[0.312]	[0.277]	[0.234]	[0.217]	[0.274]	(0.604)	(0.557)	(0.353)	(0.879)	(0.781)	0.407)
Kurdish	0.062	0.071	0.043	0.068	0.042	0.048	0.046	-0.036	0.076	-0.024	0.079	0.055	0.061
	[0.305]	[0.260]	[0.209]	[0.292]	[0.191]	[0.196]	[0.252]	(0.843)	(0.420)	(0.781)	(0.234)	(0.690)	0.880)
Other Ethnicity	0.022	0.024	0.047	0.030	0.041	0.008	0.025	-0.011	-0.161	-0.052	-0.123	0.092	-0.019
	[0.243]	[0.155]	[0.260]	[0.160]	[0.189]	[0.089]	[0.095]	(0.584)	(0.285)	(0.264)	(0.168)	(0.873)	0.292)
Conscription Age	20.675	20.492	20.401	20.633	20.249	20.362	20.355	0.102	0.152	0.023	0.238	0.174	0.180
	[2.711]	[1.271]	[1.510]	[2.189]	[1.223]	[1.406]	[1.077]	(0.661)	(0.676)	(0.044)	(0.593)	(0.027)	0.636)
Rank: Private	0.800	0.781	0.793	0.845	0.782	0.896	0.842	0.047	0.018	-0.111	0.043	-0.236	-0.104
	[0.593]	[0.384]	[0.520]	[0.306]	[0.581]	[0.499]	[0.268]	(0.153)	(0.826)	(0.902)	(0.735)	(0.931)	0.836)
Rank: Corporal	0.062	0.067	0.058	0.054	0.068	0.022	0.045	-0.021	0.017	0.030	-0.026	0.161	0.068
	[0.360]	[0.317]	[0.219]	[0.202]	[0.334]	[0.061]	[0.162]	(0.726)	(0.799)	(0.875)	(0.802)	(0.560)	0.754)
Rank: Sergeant	0.131	0.128	0.150	0.094	0.144	0.082	0.105	0.009	-0.054	0.107	-0.038	0.143	0.075
	[0.446]	[0.426]	[0.400]	[0.259]	[0.345]	[0.514]	[0.244]	(0.861)	(0.873)	(0.751)	(0.801)	(0.668)	0.985)
Rank: Sub-Lieutenant	0.007	0.024	0.000	0.006	0.005	0.000	0.007	-0.178	0.079	0.010	0.022	0.078	-0.004
	[0.081]	[0.144]	[0.000]	[0.073]	[0.065]	[0.000]	[0.101]	(0.014)	(0.207)	(0.965)	(0.885)	(0.695)	0.954)
Training Duration	2.617	2.733	2.688	2.799	2.759	2.565	2.866	-0.146	-0.090	-0.229	-0.180	0.064	-0.315
	[1.667]	[0.778]	[1.518]	[0.599]	[1.095]	[1.738]	[0.829]	(0.372)	(0.342)	(0.082)	(0.481)	(0.330)	0.667)
Service Duration	16.457	16.746	16.822	16.952	16.866	16.775	17.412	-0.104	-0.132	-0.178	-0.148	-0.114	-0.347
	[4.879]	[2.567]	[2.536]	[2.183]	[2.876]	[3.307]	[3.509]	(0.735)	(0.759)	(0.485)	(0.905)	(0.321)	0.305)
F-test of joint (p-value)								*0.147*	*0.918*	*0.366*	*0.701*	*0.663*	*0.705*
Observations	3874	248	175	140	178	97	259						

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for draft year, birth province, training province and service province fixed effects, branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, a half-term service indicator, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis.

Appendix Table 4. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, High School Sample

Variable	(1) *No-ACE* Mean/SD	(2) *Low-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(3) *Medium-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(4) *High-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(5) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)
Height in Centimeters	175.516	175.046	175.467	176.696	0.068	0.007	-0.171
	[15.198]	[12.024]	[7.091]	[19.641]	(0.234)	(0.413)	(0.875)
Turkish Ethnicity	0.921	0.905	0.912	0.937	0.055	0.030	-0.057
	[0.403]	[0.336]	[0.252]	[0.289]	(0.478)	(0.452)	(0.607)
Kurdish Ethnicity	0.060	0.059	0.054	0.045	0.002	0.024	0.059
	[0.264]	[0.212]	[0.226]	[0.298]	(0.629)	(0.930)	(0.902)
Other Ethnicity	0.019	0.036	0.034	0.018	-0.114	-0.101	0.008
	[0.252]	[0.217]	[0.167]	[0.099]	(0.191)	(0.156)	(0.410)
Conscription Age	20.302	20.193	20.118	20.217	0.108	0.186	0.086
	[1.974]	[1.060]	[0.876]	[1.035]	(0.956)	(0.680)	(0.018)
Rank: Private	0.833	0.819	0.838	0.880	0.036	-0.013	-0.123
	[0.492]	[0.381]	[0.515]	[0.344]	(0.814)	(0.881)	(0.929)
Rank: Corporal	0.063	0.065	0.057	0.038	-0.007	0.025	0.101
	[0.349]	[0.212]	[0.345]	[0.157]	(0.737)	(0.948)	(0.990)
Rank: Sergeant	0.104	0.116	0.105	0.082	-0.038	-0.004	0.070
	[0.349]	[0.348]	[0.298]	[0.352]	(0.933)	(0.864)	(0.914)
Training Duration in Months	2.693	2.750	2.794	2.783	-0.080	-0.142	-0.126
	[1.456]	[1.421]	[0.841]	[1.550]	(0.110)	(0.843)	(0.505)
Service Length in Months	17.011	16.990	17.032	17.336	0.013	-0.013	-0.205
	[2.729]	[2.977]	[2.623]	[3.872]	(0.913)	(0.811)	(0.021)
F-test of joint significance (p-value)					*0.782*	*0.852*	*0.123*
	3249	371	281	330			

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for draft year, birth province, training province and service province fixed effects, branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, a half-term service indicator, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis. Results pertain to the subsample of respondents with at most highschool education.

Appendix Table 5. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, College Sample

Variable	(1) *No-ACE* Mean/SD	(2) *Low-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(3) *Medium-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(4) *High-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(5) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)
Height in Centimeters	177.606	175.337	177.205	176.219	0.320	0.057	0.197
	[12.312]	[8.971]	[4.297]	[4.056]	(0.438)	(0.706)	(0.410)
Turkish Ethnicity	0.887	0.927	0.895	0.879	-0.131	-0.026	0.027
	[0.434]	[0.253]	[0.235]	[0.230]	(0.813)	(0.593)	(0.319)
Kurdish Ethnicity	0.075	0.054	0.053	0.078	0.084	0.090)	-0.012
	[0.404]	[0.215]	[0.175]	[0.274]	(0.304)	(0.591)	(0.586)
Other Ethnicity	0.038	0.019	0.052	0.043	0.100	-0.073	-0.028
	[0.161]	[0.139]	[0.225]	[0.169]	(0.596)	(0.237)	(0.337)
Conscription Age	22.904	22.344	22.996	22.473	0.189	-0.030	0.143
	[3.440]	[2.074]	[4.282]	[2.069]	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.303)
Rank: Private	0.601	0.542	0.575	0.541	0.121	0.055	0.124
	[0.757]	[0.560]	[0.487]	[0.386]	(0.975)	(0.427)	(0.524)
Rank: Corporal	0.055	0.049	0.107	0.036	0.026	-0.215	0.078
	[0.237]	[0.199]	[0.351]	[0.203]	(0.938)	(0.188)	(0.307)
Rank: Sergeant	0.295	0.297	0.266	0.341	-0.006	0.064	-0.102
	[0.686]	[0.545]	[0.384]	[0.264]	(0.627)	(0.891)	(0.986)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.049	0.112	0.052	0.082	-0.273	-0.015	-0.150
	[0.220]	[0.265]	[0.229]	[0.320]	(0.248)	(0.697)	(0.543)
Training Duration in Months	2.159	2.445	2.629	2.627	-0.279	-0.460	-0.460
	[1.482]	[0.802]	[1.025]	[0.632]	(0.530)	(0.697)	(0.089)
Service Length in Months	13.146	15.236	15.814	15.392	-0.431	-0.547	-0.460
	[8.386]	[4.061]	[3.326]	[4.102]	(0.697)	(0.023)	(0.453)
F-test of joint significance (p-value)					*0.580*	*0.564*	*0.688*
	625	52	37	26			

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for draft year, birth province, training province and service province fixed effects, branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, a half-term service indicator, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis. Results pertain to the subsample of respondents with college education.

Appendix Table 6. Summary Statistics for Direct Combat Involvement and Outcome Measures by Armed Conflict Intensity

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) *Non-ACE Service*	(3) *Low-Intensity ACE*	(4) *Medium-Intensity ACE*	(5) *High-Intensity ACE*
Direct Armed Combat Exposure Variables					
Any Direct Combat Experience	0.219	0.129	0.440	0.552	0.692
	(0.414)	(0.335)	(0.497)	(0.498)	(0.463)
Armed Combat	0.157	0.075	0.332	0.458	0.620
	(0.364)	(0.263)	(0.471)	(0.499)	(0.486)
Insured or Witnessed Casualties	0.162	0.094	0.303	0.438	0.528
	(0.369)	(0.292)	(0.460)	(0.497)	(0.500)
Civic Participation Measures					
Standardized Civic Participation Index	-0.014	-0.003	-0.049	-0.119	-0.016
	(0.937)	(0.977)	(0.759)	(0.721)	(0.811)
Standardized Social Group Participation Index	-0.021	-0.014	-0.045	-0.042	-0.052
	(0.926)	(0.954)	(0.774)	(0.763)	(0.898)
Standardized Community Participation Index	-0.013	-0.007	-0.033	-0.072	0.001
	(0.964)	(0.982)	(0.951)	(0.730)	(0.948)
Standardized Political Participation Index	0.026	0.040	-0.014	-0.135	0.055
	(0.969)	(0.944)	(0.988)	(1.247)	(0.936)
Political and Social Attitudes					
Standardized Animosity Index	-0.011	-0.052	0.111	0.078	0.243
	(1.006)	(1.008)	(1.041)	(0.974)	(0.918)
Against Peaceful Solution	0.281	0.268	0.358	0.315	0.312
	(0.450)	(0.443)	(0.480)	(0.465)	(0.464)
Pro Military Solution	0.480	0.479	0.454	0.515	0.482
	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.499)	(0.501)	(0.500)
Feel Distant to Minorities	0.287	0.277	0.326	0.295	0.356
	(0.453)	(0.447)	(0.469)	(0.457)	(0.480)
Against Minority Neighbors	0.656	0.647	0.670	0.661	0.735
	(0.475)	(0.478)	(0.471)	(0.474)	(0.442)
Tolerates Severe Measures	0.713	0.698	0.751	0.746	0.806
	(0.452)	(0.459)	(0.433)	(0.436)	(0.396)
Standardized Left vs. Right Political Spectrum Index	0.019	0.006	0.028	-0.058	0.227
	(0.988)	(0.991)	(0.986)	(0.965)	(0.954)
Potential Mediators					
Unemployed	0.035	0.033	0.045	0.036	0.049
	(0.185)	(0.179)	(0.208)	(0.187)	(0.216)
Monthly Income	3678.577	3716.345	3729.245	3598.738	3266.098
	(2025.606)	(2026.957)	(2151.143)	(1959.483)	(1875.129)
Depression Scale 90th Percent	0.117	0.118	0.093	0.101	0.152
	(0.321)	(0.322)	(0.291)	(0.301)	(0.359)
Standardized Personal Safety Index	-0.010	-0.008	-0.006	0.022	-0.055
	(0.969)	(0.969)	(1.006)	(0.954)	(0.940)
Smoker	0.679	0.674	0.666	0.688	0.743
	(0.467)	(0.469)	(0.472)	(0.464)	(0.438)
Daily Drinker	0.029	0.029	0.037	0.021	0.032
	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.189)	(0.144)	(0.175)
Standardized Aggression Index	0.021	0.015	0.001	0.049	0.098
	(1.001)	(0.996)	(0.970)	(1.028)	(1.061)
Standardized Norm Following	(0.029)	(0.058)	0.060	0.082	0.098
	(1.007)	(1.013)	(1.017)	(0.952)	(0.957)
Observations	4971	3874	423	318	356

Standard deviations are in parentheses. These estimates are obtained using sampling weights.

Appendix Table 7. Correlation Matrix for the Main Outcome Measures

	Standardized Civic Participation Index	Standardized Animosity Index	Standardized Political Spectrum Index
Standardized Civic Participation Index	1		
Standardized Animosity Index	0.0257	1	
Standardized Political Spectrum Index	0.0098	0.2142	1

Appendix Table 8. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on the Components of the Civic Participation Index

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Social Participation Index	(3) Community Participation Index	(4) Political Participation Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.112**	-0.034	-0.146**	-0.038
	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.055)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.093	0.047	-0.129**	-0.072
	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.157)
High-Intensity ACE	0.010	0.071	-0.037	0.026
	(0.068)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.088)
Observations	4,971	4,968	4,968	4,971
R-squared	0.097	0.106	0.103	0.148

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 9. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on the Components of the Animosity Index

VARIABLES	(1) Animosity Index	(2) Against Peaceful Solution	(3) Pro Military Solution	(4) Feel Distant to Minorities	(5) Against Minority Neighbors	(6) Tolerates Severe Measures
Low-Intensity ACE	0.050	0.035	-0.026	0.006	0.002	0.052**
	(0.059)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.043	-0.010	0.059*	0.007	-0.013	0.033
	(0.062)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.026)
High-Intensity ACE	0.300***	0.018	0.029	0.115***	0.069	0.106***
	(0.092)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.033)
Observations	4,969	4,741	4,744	4,927	4,920	4,864
R-squared	0.225	0.142	0.174	0.276	0.169	0.181

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 10. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Heterogeneity by Educational Attainment

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Panel I. High School			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.115**	-0.006	0.095
	(0.045)	(0.069)	(0.071)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.057	0.039	-0.000
	(0.039)	(0.063)	(0.077)
High-Intensity ACE	0.023	0.180**	0.264***
	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.077)
Observations	4,231	4,229	3,816
R-squared	0.082	0.176	0.153
Panel II. College			
Low-Intensity ACE	0.119	0.102	0.051
	(0.155)	(0.213)	(0.218)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.181	-0.177	-0.151
	(0.182)	(0.222)	(0.317)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.005	0.277	0.179
	(0.234)	(0.288)	(0.362)
Observations	740	740	683
R-squared	0.442	0.404	0.399

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 11A. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Continuous Measure of ACE

VARIABLES	(1) Full Sample
Height in Centimeters	0.003
	(0.002)
Kurdish	0.067
	(0.083)
Other Ethnicity	0.011
	(0.044)
Conscription Age	0.000
	(0.007)
Rank: Private	0.033
	(0.028)
Rank: Corporal	-0.047
	(0.036)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.051
	(0.112)
Training Duration in Months	-0.003
	(0.027)
Service Length in Months	0.003
	(0.002)
Joint F-test P-Value	*0.46*
Observations	4,971
R-squared	0.120

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The model accounts for the conditional random assignment controls, including fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, draft year, training and service province.

Appendix Table 11B. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Quartile Categorization of ACE

Variable	(1) *No-ACE* Mean/SD	(2) *Casualty Quartile 1* Mean/SD	(3) *Casualty Quartile 2* Mean/SD	(4) *Casualty Quartile 3* Mean/SD	(5) *Casualty Quartile 4* Mean/SD	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(8) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)	(9) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(5)
Height in Centimeters	175.816	174.482	176.081	174.952	177.692	0.191	-0.038	0.124	-0.269
	[15.170]	[9.861]	[9.901]	[10.011]	[20.607]	(0.086)	(0.149)	(0.266	(0.019)
Turkish Ethnicity	0.916	0.901	0.903	0.949	0.918	0.050	0.045	-0.113	-0.008
	[0.429]	[0.386]	[0.294]	[0.214]	[0.345]	(0.640)	(0.496)	(0.743	(0.096)
Kurdish Ethnicity	0.062	0.063	0.065	0.024	0.059	-0.002	-0.011	0.149	0.012
	[0.305]	[0.251]	[0.314]	[0.167]	[0.303]	(0.606)	(0.944)	(0.119	(0.245)
Other Ethnicity	0.022	0.036	0.032	0.027	0.023	-0.092	-0.067	-0.034	-0.006
	[0.243]	[0.209]	[0.197]	[0.155]	[0.116]	(0.301)	(0.292)	(0.139	(0.266)
Conscription Age	20.675	20.450	20.494	20.316	20.379	0.126	0.100	0.201	0.166
	[2.711]	[1.323]	[2.064]	[1.026]	[1.034]	(0.636)	(0.055)	(0.378	(0.348)
Rank: Private	0.800	0.769	0.804	0.817	0.884	0.074	-0.010	-0.040	-0.207
	[0.593]	[0.464]	[0.519]	[0.496]	[0.186]	(0.122)	(0.747)	(0.632	(0.587)
Rank: Corporal	0.062	0.057	0.091	0.052	0.020	0.021	-0.115	0.039	0.173
	[0.360]	[0.169]	[0.415]	[0.159]	[0.114]	(0.915)	(0.278)	(0.688	(0.344)
Rank: Sergeant	0.131	0.159	0.098	0.128	0.089	-0.081	0.097	0.009	0.122
	[0.446]	[0.427]	[0.355]	[0.392]	[0.178]	(0.174)	(0.062)	(0.356	(0.983)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.007	0.015	0.007	0.003	0.007	-0.082	-0.005	0.040	0.003
	[0.081]	[0.109]	[0.085]	[0.054]	[0.099]	(0.109)	(0.781)	(0.996	(0.942)
Training Duration in Months	2.617	2.797	2.627	2.834	2.740	-0.228	-0.014	-0.275	-0.156
	[1.667]	[0.607]	[1.292]	[0.900]	[1.775]	(0.088)	(0.853)	(0.501	(0.903)
Service Length in Months	16.457	16.874	16.636	17.157	17.180	-0.151	-0.065	-0.255	-0.263
	[4.879]	[2.032]	[3.394]	[2.552]	[4.068]	(0.979)	(0.944)	(0.084)	(0.428)
F-test of joint significance (p-value)						*0.391*	*0.275*	*0.413*	*0.207*
	3874	321	264	241	271				

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis.

Appendix Table 12A: The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Social and Political Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Using a Continuous Measure of ACE

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Standardized Combatant Casualties	0.019**	0.047***	0.018
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.022)
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
R-squared	0.097	0.223	0.177

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 12B. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Social and Political Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Four-cut Armed Conflict Exposure

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Casualties Quartile 1	-0.118**	0.035	0.050
	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.067)
Casualties Quartile 2	-0.088	0.002	0.063
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Casualties Quartile 3	-0.069	0.219*	0.098
	(0.083)	(0.117)	(0.092)
Casualties Quartile 4	0.016	0.244***	0.236**
	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.111)
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
R-squared	0.097	0.224	0.178

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 13. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Controlling for Pre-Deployment Armed Conflict Intensity

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.111**	0.050	0.076
	(0.051)	(0.060)	(0.057)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.093	0.043	-0.028
	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.068)
High-Intensity ACE	0.012	0.300***	0.301***
	(0.068)	(0.089)	(0.093)
Standardized Casualties Prior to Deployment	-0.005	-0.000	-0.006
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
R-squared	0.097	0.225	0.181

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 14A. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Schooling Among Those Serving Full Term without Postponement

VARIABLES	(1) Years of Schooling
Low-Intensity ACE	0.055
	(0.169)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.168
	(0.302)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.158
	(0.294)
Observations	4,165
R-squared	0.332

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 14B. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Limiting the Sample to Those Who Were Likely to be Inducted After Completing Formal Schooling

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.110**	-0.378***	0.069
	(0.053)	(0.117)	(0.059)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.101	-0.368**	-0.036
	(0.069)	(0.151)	(0.066)
High-Intensity ACE	0.019	-0.581***	0.257***
	(0.069)	(0.213)	(0.091)
Observations	4,610	1,106	4,162
R-squared	0.094	0.405	0.190

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 15. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Controlling for Birth Province by Draft Year Fixed Effects

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.104	0.044	0.101
	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.076)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.043	0.010	-0.055
	(0.064)	(0.093)	(0.089)
High-Intensity ACE	0.009	0.371***	0.288***
	(0.071)	(0.101)	(0.104)
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
R-squared	0.334	0.454	0.420

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 16. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on the Likelihood of Non-Response

	(1) Non-Response
Low-Intensity ACE	0.031
	(0.019)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.023
	(0.039)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.001
	(0.024)
Observations	4,971
R-squared	0.157

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 17. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Subsample Analysis

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Panel I. Land Forces Only			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.131**	0.060	0.087
	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.057)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.096	0.046	-0.009
	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.065)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.000	0.311***	0.335***
	(0.071)	(0.095)	(0.092)
Observations	4,660	4,659	4,237
R-squared	0.104	0.229	0.190
Panel II. Full term (>=15 Months) Service			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.112**	0.073	0.066
	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.058)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.101	0.057	-0.041
	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.067)
High-Intensity ACE	0.000	0.313***	0.290***
	(0.069)	(0.094)	(0.097)
Observations	4,760	4,758	4,298
R-squared	0.092	0.220	0.176
Panel III. Draft Age < 22			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.115*	0.073	0.073
	(0.058)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.076	0.030	-0.071
	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.070)
High-Intensity ACE	0.039	0.293***	0.293***
	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.103)
Observations	4,298	4,296	3,881
R-squared	0.109	0.216	0.173
Panel IV. Only Turkish Ethnicity			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.129**	0.056	0.083
	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.058)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.098	0.044	-0.001
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.073)
High-Intensity ACE	0.019	0.303***	0.337***
	(0.071)	(0.098)	(0.093)
Observations	4,505	4,503	4,084
R-squared	0.104	0.227	0.177

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 18: The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Selection on Observables and Unobservables

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.112**	0.050	0.075
	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.056)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.093	0.043	-0.029
	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.067)
High-Intensity ACE	0.010	0.300***	0.299***
	(0.068)	(0.092)	(0.091)
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
Oster's beta: Low-Intensity ACE	-0.157	-0.002	0.094
Oster's beta: Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.097	-0.002	-0.004
Oster's beta: High-Intensity ACE	0.001	0.300	0.385

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 19. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Multiple Hypothesis Testing

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.112**	0.050	0.075
	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.056)
Simes	[0.058]	[0.398]	[0.246]
Hochberg's	[0.088]	{0.398}	{0.369}
FWER	[0.189]	[0.899]	[0.326]
FDR	[0.112]	[0.911]	[0.251]
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.093	0.043	-0.029
	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.067)
Simes	[0.363]	[0.657]	[0.667]
Hochberg's	{0. 545}	{0. 667}	{0. 667}
FWER	[0.522]	[0.048]	[0.825]
FDR	[0.464]	[0.879]	[0.879]
High-Intensity ACE	0.010	0.299***	0.299***
	(0.068)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Simes	[0.879]	[0.003]	[0.003]
Hochberg's	[0.879]	[0.004]	[0.004]
FWER	[0.943]	[0.048]	[0.012]
FDR	[0.761]	[0.068]	[0.023]
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
R-squared	0.097	0.225	0.181

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 20. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Adjusting Standard Errors at Alternate Cluster Units

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.112**	0.050	0.075
Cluster Unit:			
Service Province (Baseline)	(0.050)**	(0.059)	(0.056)
Training Province	(0.037)***	(0.065)	(0.055)
Two-way Service Province and Induction Year	(0.059)*	(0.081)	(0.053)
Service District	(0.047)**	(0.068)	(0.060)
Two-way Service District and Induction Year	(0.057)*	(0.088)	(0.053)
Birth Province	(0.045)**	(0.075)	(0.075)
Branch by Draft Year	(0.050)**	(0.081)	(0.055)
Branch by Occupation	(0.042)**	(0.065)	(0.063)
Branch by Occupation by Draft Year	(0.050)**	(0.070)	(0.064)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.093	0.043	-0.029
Cluster Unit:			
Service Province (Baseline)	(0.069)	(0.062)	(0.067)
Training Province	(0.053)*	(0.082)	(0.057)
Two-way Service Province and Induction Year	(0.077)	(0.058)	(0.073)
Service District	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.077)
Two-way Service District and Induction Year	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.081)
Birth Province	(0.049)*	(0.080)	(0.076)
Branch by Draft Year	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.077)
Branch by Occupation	(0.053)*	(0.072)	(0.074)
Branch by Occupation by Draft Year	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.071)
High-Intensity ACE	0.010	0.299***	0.299***
Cluster Unit:			
Service Province (Baseline)	(0.068)	(0.091)***	(0.091)***
Training Province	(0.059)	(0.133)**	(0.107)***
Two-way Service Province and Induction Year	(0.055)	(0.101)***	(0.116)**
Service District	(0.070)	(0.102)***	(0.101)***
Two-way Service District and Induction Year	(0.056)	(0.111)**	(0.123)**
Birth Province	(0.070)	(0.142)**	(0.119)**
Branch by Draft Year	(0.066)	(0.104)***	(0.100)***
Branch by Occupation	(0.063)	(0.106)***	(0.093)***
Branch by Occupation by Draft Year	(0.077)	(0.101)***	(0.107)***
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
R-squared	0.097	0.225	0.181

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 21. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Controlling for Interviewer Fixed Effects

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.114**	0.054	0.079
	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.061)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.094	0.079	-0.016
	(0.060)	(0.050)	(0.065)
High-Intensity ACE	0.004	0.342***	0.306***
	(0.069)	(0.085)	(0.082)
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
R-squared	0.113	0.302	0.226

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 22. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Excluding Provinces that Could be Partially Impacted by Conflict

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.117**	0.041	0.068
	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.057)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.107	0.031	-0.067
	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.073)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.004	0.292***	0.272***
	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.096)
Observations	4,652	4,650	4,205
R-squared	0.101	0.240	0.180

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. Kayseri and Sivas, which could be partially impacted by conflict were dropped from the analysis sample.

Appendix Table 23A. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Migration

	(1) Migrant
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.030
	(0.019)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.012
	(0.021)
High-Intensity ACE	0.021
	(0.021)
Observations	4,971
R-squared	0.606

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 23B. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Excluding Migrants

VARIABLES	(1) Standardized Civic Participation Index	(2) Standardized Animosity Index	(3) Standardized Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.157***	0.063	0.122*
	(0.057)	(0.067)	(0.065)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.092	0.104	0.031
	(0.081)	(0.064)	(0.083)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.013	0.403***	0.374***
	(0.078)	(0.093)	(0.100)
Observations	3,682	3,681	3,334
R-squared	0.099	0.261	0.203

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 24. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Robustness to Controlling for Unemployment, Family Income, Depression Symptoms, Personal Safety Concerns, Risky Health Behaviors, Aggression, and Norm Following

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel I. Civic Participation Index					
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.112**	-0.111**	-0.107**	-0.114**	-0.109**
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.093	-0.091	-0.087	-0.097	-0.089
	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.071)
High-Intensity ACE	0.010	0.030	0.027	0.011	0.046
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Observations	4,971	4,971	4,971	4,971	4,971
R-squared	0.097	0.104	0.105	0.098	0.112
Panel II. Animosity Index					
Low-Intensity ACE	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.035	0.035
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.043	0.041	0.042	0.026	0.026
	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.062)
High-Intensity ACE	0.300***	0.288***	0.292***	0.294***	0.277***
	(0.092)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.078)
Observations	4,969	4,969	4,969	4,969	4,969
R-squared	0.225	0.226	0.228	0.243	0.247
Panel III. Political Spectrum Index					
Low-Intensity ACE	0.099	0.077	0.078	0.065	0.069
	(0.063)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.013	-0.027	-0.037	-0.045	-0.049
	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.065)
High-Intensity ACE	0.287***	0.305***	0.303***	0.286***	0.295***
	(0.081)	(0.095)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.094)
Observations	4,499	4,499	4,499	4,499	4,499
R-squared	0.153	0.182	0.195	0.197	0.210
Controls for:					
Unemployment and Family Income	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Psychological wellbeing and Risky Health Behaviors	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Aggression and Norm Following	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 25. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes and Behavior, Controlling for Post-Discharge Armed Conflict Intensity

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.110**	0.061	0.074
	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.056)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.090	0.064	-0.031
	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.069)
High-Intensity ACE	0.015	0.333***	0.295***
	(0.069)	(0.096)	(0.089)
Standardized Casualties Post Discharge	-0.003	-0.024	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Observations	4,971	4,969	4,499
R-squared	0.097	0.225	0.181

Notes: These estimates are obtained using sampling weights. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for height, draft year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province and service province fixed effects, dichotomous educational attainment indicators, a half-term service indicator, birth quarter dummies, land ownership status, ethnic minority indicators, draft age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Data Appendix A: Direct Combat Experiences Questions

1. *Were you ever involved in armed combat during your regular service? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
2. *Were you ever wounded in armed combat during your regular service? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
3. *Was anyone around you ever injured or killed during in armed combat during your regular service? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

Data Appendix B: Civic Participation Questions

1. *Are you a member of any charity organization? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
2. *Are you a member of any compatriot association? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
3. *Are you a member of any sports club? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
4. *Are you a member of any trade union? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
5. *Are you a member of any religious club, association, mosque development association or community? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
6. *Are you a member of any environmental organization or association? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
7. *Are you a member of any trade association or chamber of lawyers? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
8. *Are you a member of any alumni association? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
9. *Are you a member of any school family union? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
10. *Are you a member of any community association? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
11. *Are you a member of any social club? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
12. *Are you a member of any political party? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
13. *Did you vote in the last local elections that were held on March 31, 2019? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
14. *Did you vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections that were held on June 24, 2018? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

Data Appendix C: Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities Questions

1. *How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'The government should try every means of negotiation and communicate with everyone who can help to resolve the Kurdish issue peacefully'? (Possible Answers: 1 = "I disagree completely"; 2 = "I somewhat disagree"; 3 = "I am undecided"; 4 = "I somewhat agree"; 5 = "I completely agree"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

2. *Which of the following do you think is the best method for bringing an end to the armed conflict and terrorism that has been going on in the south-east of our country since 1984? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Peace talks*

between all parties"; 2 = "The formulation of a political solution in the Turkish Grand National Assembly"; 3 = "Intensifying military operations, armed combat"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)

3. *For everyone, there are identities that are distant. Please indicate whether you think the following identities are distant to you. (Possible Answers: 1 – Yes, 2 – No, 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
    a. *Do you find the Kurdish identity distant?*
    b. *Do you find the Alevite identity distant?*
    c. *Do you find the Circassian identity distant?*
    d. *Do you find the Laz identity distant?*

4. *Please indicate if you would object to having the following people as your neighbors. (Possible Answers: 1 – I would object, 2 – I would not object, 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
    a. *Would you object to having a Kurdish family as your neighbors?*
    b. *Would you object to have a family that speaks a different native language to you as your neighbors?*
    c. *Would you object to have a Syrian refugee family as your neighbors?*
    d. *Would you object to have an Alevite family as your neighbors?*

5. *Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: 'Our country is in such a mess that even the most stringent measures can be used so long as they put us back on the right path and eradicate the traitors.' (Possible Answers: 1 = "I disagree completely"; 2 = "I somewhat disagree"; 3 = "I am undecided; 4 = I somewhat agree"; 5 = "I agree completely"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

6. *We often hear about the left and right in politics. Where would you locate your political position on the left-right point scale below in which zero indicates far-left and 10 indicates far-right? (Possible Answers: Scale 1 to 10: 0 = "Far-left", 10 = "Far-right"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

Data Appendix D: Aggression Questions
The Brief Aggression Questionnaire (Webster et al., 2013)

Using the 5-point scale, indicate how much the following statement represents you (Scale 1 to 5: 1 = "I am not like this at all", 5 = "I am completely like this"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)

1. *"If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will."*
2. *"When people are especially nice to me, I wonder what they want."*
3. *"I tell my friends openly when I disagree with them."*
4. *"Given enough provocation, I may hit another person."*
5. *"Good things always seem to happen to others."*
6. *"I am an even-tempered person."*
7. *"When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them."*
8. *"There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows."*
9. *"Sometimes I fly off the handle for no good reason."*
10. *"I sometimes feel that people are laughing at me behind my back."*
11. *"I have trouble controlling my temper."*
12. *"My friends say I am somewhat argumentative."*

Data Appendix E: Personal Safety Perception Questions
The Subjective Insecurity Scale (Vélez et al., 2016)

Please indicate on the 5-point scale below how much you feel the following statements apply to the place that you live. (Scale 1 to 5: 1 = "Completely disagree", 2 = "I somewhat disagree"; 3 = "I am undecided"; 4 = "I somewhat agree"; 5 = " I completely agree"; 98 - Don't understand; 99 – Don't know/no answer)

1. *"I feel safe when I go out at night."*
2. *"I think I might encounter life threatening situations where I live."*
3. *"I am fearful for my life."*
4. *"'I think there are security risks associated with participating in political meetings."*
5. *"I am fearful of being robbed during the day."*
6. *"I am fearful of being robbed in the night."*
7. *"I am fearful of encountering violence on the street in the day."*
8. *"I am fearful of encountering violence on the street in the night."*

Data Appendix F: Conscription Classification Procedure by the Turkish Ministry of Defence
https://www.msb.gov.tr/Askeralma/icerik/siniflandirma-islemleri