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WAR DOES NOT FOSTER COOPERATION WHEN NEOCLASSICAL MECHANISMS ARE ABSENT! EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT AMONG TURKISH CONSCRIPTS

Arzu Kibris
Resul Cesur

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War Does not Foster Cooperation when Neoclassical Mechanisms are Absent! Evidence from a Natural Experiment among Turkish Conscripts

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ABSTRACT

Exploiting a natural experiment and an innovative survey design, we study the social and political legacies of armed conflict exposure (ACE) among Turkish conscripts. Our empirical framework identifies the causal impact and the mediating pathways for the average male randomly picked from the population. Contrary to the arguments that ACE fosters prosociality and posttraumatic growth, we find little evidence that ACE promotes cooperative behaviors. As the study design eliminates the need for social insurance, security concerns, and community-level paradigm shifts, and our analysis rules out labor market outcomes from the list of the usual suspects, we conclude that violence exposure may not be sufficient to foster prosociality in the absence of favorable neoclassical mediating pathways boosting demand for cooperation. Moreover, we show that intense ACE increases opposition to peaceful means of conflict resolution and animosity towards minorities and promotes the tendency to support right-wing political parties. Auxiliary analysis nominates war-driven grievances and the normalization of violence in everyday life as the likely explanations. These findings are consistent with (i) evolutionary theories linking war exposure to out-group derogation and adherence to local social norms and (ii) the arguments that war-driven grievances may lead to the perpetuation of violence.

Arzu Kibris
University of Warwick
a.kibris@warwick.ac.uk

Resul Cesur
University of Connecticut
School of Business
2100 Hillside Road
Storrs, CT 06269
and IZA
and also NBER
cesur@uconn.edu

1. Introduction

What are the political and social legacies of armed conflict exposure? The extant literature so far offers compelling but conflicting answers. On the one hand, emerging evidence from different disciplines shows that exposure to war violence induces individuals to exhibit prosocial behaviors (Bauer et al., 2016). In particular, using different identification strategies, several studies show evidence that war exposure leads to increased civic engagement, political participation, collective action, trustworthiness, interpersonal trust, and generosity and inequality aversion towards in-group members (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan et al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2014, Bauer et al., 2016, Bauer et al., 2018; Jha and Wilkinson, 2012).[1] On the other hand, there is the observed persistence of conflicts and their tendency to recur, and the argument that this pattern can be explained by war-induced grievances leading to adverse socio-political outcomes like increased nationalism, polarization, loss of trust, reduced social engagement, and prosociality (Collier et al., 2003; Rohner et al., 2013a, b; Grossman et al., 2015; Hager et al., 2019; Conzo and Salustri, 2019; De Juan et al., 2022; Vlachos, 2022).[2] This seeming contrast stems from the challenges in identifying and isolating the complex psychological, economic, and social mechanisms, linking war exposure to subsequent political and societal attitudes and behaviors and the effects they transmit (Blattman and Bauer, 2010; Bauer et al., 2016; Cederman and Vogt, 2017; Couttenier et al., 2019). Therefore, several vital questions on war exposure's political and social legacies remain intact, inviting the use of suitable natural

[1] The role of war in enabling and enhancing large-scale cooperation has also been discussed. For instance, it has been held responsible for the formation of states form chiefdoms and strengthening existing ones (Carneiro, 1970; Flannery and Marcus, 2003; Tilly, 1985; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Morris, 2014; Diamond, 1999). Moreover, potentially via influencing human psychology, it has also been argued that war has contributed to the emergence of complex social organization (Bowles, 2008; Turchin, 2016).

[2] There is also work showing mixed findings on the impact of war exposure on trust (Cassar et al., 2013).

experiments and creative research designs to fill the void in the literature (Blattman and Bauer, 2010).

In this study, exploiting variation in conflict exposure of draftees enabled by a deployment location lottery embedded in Turkey's universal conscription system, we identify the political and social legacies of armed conflict exposure (ACE). Specifically, we examine the causal impact of ACE on cooperative behaviors, namely social and political participation, altruism, attitudes towards conflict resolution and minorities, and general political inclination, and we investigate the potential explanatory channels.

We exploit arguably the most potent and comprehensive empirical framework to study the implications of ACE on the subsequent outcomes of the average male randomly picked from the population. The strength of our empirical setup stems from the strict universal military conscription system in Turkey, deploying millions of young men to deadly armed combat zones since the beginning of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) uprising in 1984 in eastern and southeastern parts of the country, and an innovative survey providing detailed information on military experiences and political and social outcomes. This study design provides us with unique capabilities. First, the draft system in Turkey mandates every healthy male citizen to serve in the Armed Forces and the random assignment of draftees to service locations via a deployment lottery; hence, we identify the causal effect of ACE for the *average Joe*. Second, our empirical setup takes advantage of the geographical concentration of the conflict and, by sampling from provinces outside the conflict zone, eliminates both the potential bias that may stem from unobserved exposure in civilian roles and any confounding macroenvironmental effects of war; consequently, we capture the impact of isolated and limited duration ACE during military service. Third, the

richness of our data allows us to test the predictive power of our exposure measure on actual armed violence experiences, such as armed combat involvement, injury, and witnessing casualties.

Equipped with these capabilities, we tackle major questions in the literature for which the verdict is still out. First, we fill the void regarding whether and to what extent conflict exposure in and of itself is conducive to prosocial behaviors when neoclassical explanations, including the need for social insurance, security concerns, community-level paradigm shifts, and labor market outcomes, which are conducive to producing cohesion, are minimized. Second, we test whether war exposure feeds the self-perpetuating dynamics of conflict. Third, we explore the effect of war theatre exposure on psychological mechanisms, including parochial norms and preferences, post-traumatic growth, war-induced grievances, and the normalization of violence.

Our natural experiment is created by the random assignment of draftees to service locations all around the country, enabled by the Turkish military's conscript deployment system, which relies on an assignment lottery to determine service locations right after draftees complete their basic training program. The military rules imply that conditional on the branch of service, military occupation, province of registration, and educational attainment, the service location assignment of draftees is orthogonal to pre-deployment characteristics of individuals (Official Gazette, 1927; 2019; Mater, 1999 pp. 42,114).[3] The same military policies also render the rank of draftees unrelated to assignment location.

The outcome measures come from the Exposure to Political Violence and Individual Behavior (EXPOVIBE) survey, designed to explore the individual-level effects of armed conflict exposure.

[3] These rules are stated in the *Conscription Law* (Law Number: 1111), which was originally legislated in 1927. The province of registration coincides with birthplace in an overwhelming majority of the cases. Mater interviews 42 ex-conscripts who had been deployed to intense conflict areas during their service. The interviews contain frequent references to the "lottery."

The survey was conducted in western Turkey in 2019 with 5,024 randomly selected adult males who completed their military service between 1984 and 2011. By sampling from the western provinces away and with negligible in-migration from the conflict areas, the EXPOVIBE avoids the conflation of exposure during service from that of civilian experiences and other possible conflict-induced changes in the socio-economic environment, thereby capturing isolated and finite duration exposure to conflict during military service as conscripts returned to their peaceful hometowns upon discharge.

Exogenous conflict exposure indicators are constructed by tracking conflict intensity at each individual's location and time of service. In particular, *Low*-, *Medium*-, and *High-Intensity ACE* are created using the total number of combatant deaths in deployment districts during service. While the information on individuals' military service dates and location(s) comes from EXPOVIBE, the information on casualties within those geo-temporal coordinates comes from the Turkish State-PKK Conflict Event Dataset (TPCONED) (Kıbrıs, 2021).

We start our analysis by testing and showing the orthogonality of deployment location to pre-deployment characteristics, such as height, ethnic background, draft age, training length, service length, and the military rank of conscripts, controlling for conditional random assignment covariates as described above. We then examine the impact of ACE intensity on direct combat experiences. These estimates document that conflict intensity at the time and place of service substantially increases the likelihood of involvement with at least one direct armed combat experience, i.e., enemy firefight, injury, and witnessing casualties, with effect sizes ranging between 22 and 55 percentage points.

This 'first-stage' analysis also provides evidence supporting our identifying assumptions. First, we show that controlling for pre-enlistment characteristics does not explain any of the impact of

ACE intensity on direct combat experiences. Second, we show that controlling for the branch of service, military occupation, and birth province fixed effects, which are our conditional random assignment variables, explains only a modest share of the impact of ACE intensity on direct combat experiences. Therefore, we conclude that our natural experiment not only randomly assigns ACE intensity but also powerfully explains the direct combat experiences of conscripts.

Upon showing evidence supporting our identification strategy's credibility and its potency in predicting direct combat experiences, we estimate the impact of ACE on our primary outcomes of interest. We do not find any statistically or economically measurable impact on a broad measure of prosociality we constructed, namely the *Civic Participation Index*, summarizing answers to membership in various community organizations, political party membership, and voting in previous local and general elections. Then, we examine altruistic behavior through a simple dictator game in which respondents were given a monetary endowment out of which they could donate to an anonymous needy family with an implied ethnic identity. While the results indicate a negative impact of ACE on donations in general, we do not observe any significant in- or out-group differentials within this impact. All in all, we find little evidence that exposure to violence during war promotes prosociality.

Then, we continue our analysis of the effect of ACE on attitudes towards conflict resolution and minorities, as well as self-placement in the left-right political spectrum. We find that service in an intense conflict area increases the likelihood of being against multilateral deliberations for a peaceful solution to the ongoing conflict between the Turkish State and PKK, supporting further military intervention as the best way to resolve it, feeling distant to minorities, being averse to living with minority neighbors, and supporting an iron-fist rule that would not hesitate to employ "even the harshest measures to destroy traitors and restore order in the country." Specifically, we

find that service in an intense conflict area leads to a 0.20 standard deviations increase in the *Standardized Animosity Index*, which summarizes the answers to the aforementioned questions. Moreover, serving in a high-intensity armed conflict locality increases the propensity to lean towards the right side of the *Political Spectrum Index* by 0.23 standard deviations. These results are not transitory, persisting 20 years after discharge, and do not get weaker over the years.

We undertook a battery of robustness exercises to check the sensitivity of our estimates, including the use of nonlinear estimation methods (logistics model) for binary outcomes; undertaking subsample analysis by excluding sailors and airmen, those who served less than a year, respondents who got inducted after their twenty-second birthday, and those who grew up in households with languages spoken other than Turkish; Oster's (2019) methodology to address the selection on observable and unobservables; multiple hypothesis testing; and clustering the standard errors at arguably relevant different geographic levels. Our findings are robust to each of these exercises, bolstering our confidence in the soundness of our conclusions.

Upon identifying the causal impact of ACE and establishing its robustness, we now focus on tackling the major void in this line of inquiry—unearthing the mediating pathways between ACE and prosociality. What may explain our findings? Theoretical reasoning based on economic, evolutionary, and psychological approaches suggests that ACE may impact the subsequent political and social attitudes and behaviors through (i) neoclassical economic explanations, (ii) parochial norms and preferences, and (iii) general preferences and other psychological mechanisms (Bauer et al., 2016). The first set of channels, namely the neoclassical mediating pathways, operating via changes in constraints, economic payoffs, and beliefs, either do not apply to or play a minimal role for the population under study. To begin, because the EXPOVIBE survey was implemented outside of conflict zones, our survey participants did not live in areas with

physical destruction of war, they did not need to take part in any form of post-conflict reconstruction, nor did they bear any risks to personal security or their property rights. Second, unlike rebel fighters who depend on and therefore strive to build local support for their survival (Kalyvas, 2006), conscripts face lesser incentives to hone their prosocial skills and attitudes because well-defined institutional structures provide them with the social and technical support they need on the field as conflict actors. Third, as noted, the induction of conscripts takes place after the completion of formal schooling. Fourth, we are unaware of any financial compensation for service in conflict zones (excluding those who were disabled due to severe injury during service) or any favorable treatments directed to conscripts in their civilian lives upon discharge (Açiksöz, 2015).[4] Finally, our investigation does not show any evidence that labor market outcomes or household income as mediating pathways, consistent with Kıbrıs and Cesur (2022) finding little evidence that ACE impacts these outcomes. Moreover, as war theatre exposure applies to a subset of the population, the community-level paradigm shifts to a new equilibrium are unlikely. Therefore, the potential roles that the community-level armed conflict exposure could play in influencing investments in social capital due to the need for social insurance and the potential trade-offs in human and physical capital versus social capital investments are eliminated from the list of the usual suspects.

The second set of potential pathways is based on the evolutionary accounts arguing that intergroup competition (i.e., war exposure) may have been responsible for the emergence of adaptive psychological properties conducive to producing cohesion to succeed against 'the enemy'

[4] Only a very small 0.5 per thousand of the conflict area veterans receive veteran's compensation. This is because gaining disability status is subject to close scrutiny and only provided to those with more than 40% impairment in accordance with Article 52 of the 5434 Law on the Pension Fund of the Turkish Republic due to injury during service (https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/2.3.41053.pdf). Unlike the veterans in the USA, psychological ailments, such as PTSD, do not usually quality a former conscript to receive disability status (Güloğlu, 2016).

(Alexander, 1987; Boyd et al., 2003; Darwin, 1871[1981]; Henrich, 2004). Accordingly, the purely genetic version of the intergroup competition theorem argues that exposure to armed conflict may promote in-group prosociality and out-group derogation (Bowles, 2006; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Haidt, 2012; Wilson, 2012). The gene-culture variant anticipates that war-theatre exposure leads to increased adherence to social norms and cooperative behaviors and promotion of institutional practices and cultural beliefs supporting culturally defined in-groups (Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Richerson and Boyd, 2001). Our findings that *High-Intensity ACE* increases opposition to peaceful ways of conflict resolution and animosity towards minorities are consistent with the purely genetic variant of the intergroup competition hypothesis. Moreover, the result that ACE boosts the tendency to support right-wing political parties is in line with predictions of the gene-culture variant to the extent that the right-wing political agenda favors conservative social norms and culturally defined in-groups while incorporating antagonistic attitudes towards out-groups. Nevertheless, in stark contrast to the predictions based on the intergroup competition hypothesis and the synthesis reached by Bauer et al. (2016) based on a review of evidence from different fields, we find little evidence that ACE promotes subsequent cooperative behaviors.

The third set of potential mechanisms focuses on the effects of armed conflict exposure on general preferences. On the one hand, an emerging line of inquiry shows evidence that exposure to war may lead to post-traumatic growth, the argument that experiencing traumatic events incites positive change (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004; Blattman, 2009; Bauer et al., 2016). We, however, do not find any evidence supporting the post-traumatic growth effects of ACE.

On the other hand, exposure to an environment where resorting to violence is a socially acceptable method of mitigating crisis may trigger a learning process in the opposite direction and lead to the normalization of violence (Bandura, 1973; Horowitz and Solomon, 1978). In line with

this argument, we document that war theater exposure causes the normalization of violence in everyday life, gauged by increased aggression, including the readiness to resort to physical violence to resolve personal problems.

It has been argued that war-trauma-induced grievances can contribute to the perpetuation of conflict because conflict continuation is about "repeated decisions to fight" (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Cederman and Vogt, 2017). Consistent with this explanation, our analysis shows that direct combat experiences, such as armed combat involvement, injury, and witnessing casualties, are the primary mechanisms through which ACE impacts the outcomes of interest. Finally, we explored whether these effects disappear over time. We document that these effects persist among those discharged from service at least 20 years ago.

Overall, combined with the theoretical structure, our findings suggest that when the neoclassical explanatory channels are not at play, ACE in and of itself may not be sufficient to promote cooperative behaviors. Instead, once such channels are neutralized, the adverse effects flowing through war-induced grievances and subscription to violence become visible. Accordingly, these dynamics may play significant roles in the formation of the infamous *conflict trap* and be highly relevant for understanding why "once a country stumbles into civil war, its risk of further conflict soars" (Collier et al., 2003, pp. 4). Our findings, therefore, contain important policy implications as they indicate that societies with a history of conflict can risk further armed violence unless resolution efforts and reconstruction policies acknowledge and address war-induced grievances and involve measures to re-establish and strengthen peaceful social and behavioral norms. They also suggest that the employment of conscription armies and mass mobilization campaigns might add to the perpetuation risk by exposing civilians to the violence of

armed conflicts, which then gets transmitted into social and political life through accumulated grievances and social norms as violence becomes an acceptable way to solve problems.

These conclusions are highly relevant for cases where similar institutional setups draft civilians to participate in armed combat away from their homes. A timely example is the recent mobilization of about 300,000 Russian conscripts with minimal military training to be deployed in the invasion of Ukraine away from their peaceful homes (Roth, 2022).[5] The mass conscription campaign in Eritrea as part of its involvement in neighboring Ethiopia's civil war and the universal draft in Iran alongside the ongoing armed conflict with the PJAK insurgents in the northwest of the country constitute other current cases in which civilian conscripts get exposed to armed violence.[6] Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have resorted to mass mobilization campaigns and deployed conscripts to armed combat in the latest episodes of their conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (Mejlumyan, 2020). Similarly, the border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan risks exposing conscripts to an armed conflict environment as the border guards of both countries are staffed largely by conscripts.[7,8]

In addition to the impact of ACE on subsequent cooperative behaviors, altruism, and political and social attitudes, this study speaks to several other pieces of literature. Using different identification strategies, a body of work studies the impact of military conscription on crime, political behavior, personality and beliefs, intimate partner violence, and nation-building

[5] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/russia-mobilisation-ukraine-war-army-drive.
[6] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-10-18/eritrea-goes-for-broke-in-ethiopian-civil-war-to-crush-old-foe
[7] https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/centralasia/tajik-personnel.htm
[8] While conscripts make up a significant portion of the Israeli Defense Forces and a significant portion of them get deployed to combat assignments within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Grossman et al., 2015), it differs from our case in that security concerns are not eliminated upon completion of mandatory service and returning home. Similarly, the Colombian conscription is likely to have exposed draftees to the violence of the civil conflict that raged in the country in the 1958-2013 period. However, in the Colombian system, a soldier is usually drafted into the division in his home region (Sacquety, 2006).

(Hjalmarsson and Lindquist, 2019; Gibbons and Rossi, 2020; Cáceres-Delpiano et al., 2021; Fize and Louis-Sidois, 2020; Navajas et al., 2022). Exploiting variation in draft eligibility in the USA and Australia, a number of studies examine the impact of draft and deployment during the Vietnam era on labor market performance, health, intimate partner abuse, and criminal behavior (Angrist and Chen, 2008; 2011; Angrist et al., 2010; Autor et al., 2011; Conley and Herwig, 2012; Rohlfs, 2010; Johnston et al., 2016). Another line of inquiry focuses on professional military service members in the USA to study the effects on various indicators of crime, risky health behaviors, and health and family outcomes of deployment versus non-deployment, as well as of combat versus non-combat service among the deployed (Lyle, 2006; Engle et al., 2010; Anderson and Rees, 2015; Cesur et al., 2013, 2016, 2022; Cesur and Sabia 2016).

The rest of the article unfolds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the background information on the Turkish and PKK conflict. Section 3 describes the universal draft system in Turkey and introduces the service location lottery, which is the source of our identifying variation. Section 4 presents the data and variables we use. Section 5 describes the econometric models we undertake. Section 6 presents the results, performs robustness tests, and explores the mechanism. Finally, section 7 discusses the findings and concludes.

2. Conflict Between the Turkish State and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

The conflict between the Turkish state and the insurgent armed group Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) started in 1984 and has been raging since. First founded as a separatist organization to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, the PKK shifted its political agenda during the 90s towards a more moderate goal of a federational structure that would grant more autonomy to the region (Kıbrıs, 2011). Importantly, however, the armed conflict has endured

over the years with heavy damages including tens of thousands of casualties, and always remained geographically concentrated in the southeastern and eastern parts of the country.

The evolution of armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK rebels since its ignition in 1984 is demonstrated in Figure 1, with Panels A and B showing the trends in annual and cumulative combatant casualties over the 1984-2018 period. These figures also present the breakout of the deaths among the members of the Turkish security forces and PKK recruits. The intensity of armed conflict gradually increased until the mid-1990s. It peaked in 1994, reaching 3610 combat deaths, and declined afterward, consistent with the shift of the PKK's focus towards considering a less radical approach (Kıbrıs, 2011). As the Figures demonstrate, combatant fatalities exhibited a slowdown during the times of ceasefires: between 1999 and 2004, after the founding leader of PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured and jailed in February 1999; in 2009, when PKK announced a one-sided cease-fire; and between 2013 and 2015 during the Peace Process (Köse, 2017). Notably, although the information on the death statistics for Turkish military members and PKK rebels come from different sources, the two series exhibit a very high correlation, confirming the validity of the conflict event data we employ.

As we elaborate later, while draftees historically constituted around 85% of fallen soldiers, our analysis of the TPCONED indicates that this number has dramatically declined after the Turkish military started recruiting professional soldiers on fixed-term contracts in 2011 to replace conscripts, especially in conflict zones, as part of a move towards a professional army (Official Gazette, 2011). Therefore, we limit our analysis to the period between 1984 and 2011, given that our interest is in the effects of ACE among conscripts.

Figure 2 maps the geographic distribution of combatant casualties at the province level. It clearly demonstrates that the conflict is concentrated in the southeastern parts of the country, where

a large majority of ethnic Kurds reside, declared by the PKK as the ethnic homeland of the Kurdish people.

It is worth discussing the rhetoric of the Turkish state concerning the armed conflict in the country as this discourse has been instrumental in shaping the public perception and determining the culturally relevant in-groups and out-groups. The official language has always been consistent with the assimilationist state tradition of the Republic, dating back to its inception in 1923 (Yeğen, 2009). Accordingly, the PKK uprising is coined as a problem of terrorism targeting the integrity and sovereignty of the state and Turkish nation, constitutionally established by the bond of citizenship to the country as opposed to ethnic ties. This terrorism frame, which is the mainstream nationalist discourse in the country, defines the conflict as one between the state and a violent terrorist organization that is supported and funded by outside powers (Çelebi et al., 2014). Accordingly, both Turkish and Kurdish citizens are depicted as victims of political violence, and the ethnic nature of the conflict is ignored to minimize ethnic polarization and out-group discrimination across the population that homogenously targets Kurds. In official statements and especially in the military, a strong emphasis has thus been placed on disassociating "citizens with Kurdish ethnic backgrounds" from the enemies of the nation that perpetrate the problem of terrorism. As part of this narrative, while the in-group consists of all loyal Turkish citizens regardless of ethnic identity, the out-group is defined as anyone who poses a threat to the unity of the state with its nation, including not only the PKK but any person or entity opposing or not embracing the official identity (Yeğen, 1996; 1999; 2009).

This rhetoric has been hugely successful in shaping public perceptions and embraced by an overwhelming majority of the nation, even among those with non-Turkish ethnic backgrounds (Çelebi et al., 2014). Therefore, taking this dominant discourse into account, rather than singling

out and focusing on Kurds as an explicitly specified out-group, we examine the preferred policies to resolve the conflict and attitudes towards ethnic minorities.

3. Deployment Lottery Under Universal Conscription as the Source of Identifying Variation

Turkey has a draft military system mandating each Turkish male resident citizen to serve in the Armed Forces. In particular, a young man becomes draft eligible when he turns 20 and typically gets inducted into the military before he turns 22, depending on the current induction term in his registered location (Official Gazette, 1927; 2019). The duration of service within the period we consider ranged between 15 to 18 months. While the required service length for rank-and-file was 18 months in the 80s, it was taken down to 15 months in 1992, brought back up to 18 months in 1995, taken down to 15 months in 2003, and remained so up until 2014. Therefore, service duration in our sample is considerably uniform, allowing us making apples to apples comparisons as variation in service duration may conflate with conflict intensity.

Upon completing up to three months of a basic training program, the conscripts are sent to military bases all over the country, where they serve the rest of their terms. Importantly, conditional on the branch of service and military occupation, the deployment assignment is done randomly via a lottery system (Mater, 1999 pp.13,42,114,131, 136). Moreover, conscripts are not sent to bases in their registered provinces. The needs of the military at the time of service dictate the number of conscripts to be deployed to different bases. According to this system, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, in charge of human resource management, including deployment assignments, determines the staffing needs at different bases across the country. A random

matching is then conducted between the draftees and military bases.[9] The system is publicly known as the "base lottery." As they were conducted in public, recordings of such base-lottery ceremonies can still be found on social media outlets (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3w4i07_Wj4 as an example). Over the years, this institutional setup randomly assigned a significant portion of the draftees to military bases in southeastern and eastern Turkey, and these young men got actively involved in the armed conflict against the PKK.

The regulatory narrative of the Armed Forces suggests that conditional on the branch of service, military occupation, and the residential origin of conscripts, deployment assignment is orthogonal to draftee pre-deployment background characteristics.[10] However, one may still ask if the official narrative of the Turkish military on deployment assignments of conscripts is accurate. To address this concern, we perform formal balance tests below, confirming our identifying assumptions.

While the official claims on the randomness of deployment assignment of conscripts may not be considered sufficient to ensure the exogeneity of service location to pre-deployment characteristics, there also exist plausible explanations and associated anecdotal evidence supporting the regulatory narrative of the military. Needless to mention, because mandatory military service imposes severe morbidity and mortality risks to those serving in the conflict zone, the assignment system and its fairness have always been under close scrutiny by the general public and the media, especially during periods of intensified conflict as a significant number of conscripts lost their lives or got seriously injured in clashes (Yıldırımkaya, 2010; Kıbrıs, 2011).

[9] For a bilingual emphasis on the random nature of base assignments see, https://www.takvim.com.tr/guncel/2020/05/28/kutuge-gore-askerlik-nereye-cikar-kutuge-gore-askerlik-yeri-sorgulama/2

[10] An official statement of the draft system can be found on the information brochures for the prospective draftees by the Military Enrolment Services of the Turkish Defence Ministry last visited on September 27, 2022. https://www.msb.gov.tr/Askeralma/icerik/siniflandirma-islemleri

Consequently, the Turkish Ministry of Defense and the General Staff emphasize in all their communications with the public that the system does not discriminate based on conscripts' socioeconomic status. Anecdotal evidence also supports the argument regarding the non-discriminatory nature of the system. For example, as in the 2007 incident in which the first cousin of the then Secretary of the State died on duty in a PKK attack on the Çeltikli outpost in Bitlis, a south-eastern province, it is not uncommon to observe close relatives of high-level politicians among the fallen soldiers.[11] Furthermore, the fact that the military has long been the most trusted institution in Turkey attests to the fairness perception of the public with regard to military practices (Esmer, 1999; Adaman et al., 2005).

Apparently, a relevant question regarding the credibility of our identification strategy is whether citizens can avoid deployment to conflict zones by dodging the draft, manipulating their service location, or influencing the timing of induction, rendering our natural experiment fail in identifying the causal impact of ACE. Unlike other countries with universal conscription, like Israel or South Korea, where a significant share of eligible men can avoid active duty service, young Turkish men have negligibly limited options to circumvent the strict draft system, and escaping induction is not a practical alternative for them.[12] The likelihood of obtaining a fraudulent health-ailment exemption is slim because it is subject to close scrutiny and requires several steps and approvals from multiple entities.[13] Moreover, for an overwhelming majority of the population,

[11] https://worldbulletin.dunyabulteni.net/archive/turkish-fms-cousin-killed-in-pkk-attack-h10956.html

[12] In the Israeli case, exemptions are made on religious, physical, psychological, or lawful grounds. Also, one can refuse to serve on the grounds of pacifism, antimilitarism, religious philosophy, or political disagreement with Israeli policies. The Israeli High Court of Justice ruled in 2002 that refusal to serve was legal (https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/Refusal_to_serve_in_the_IDF). While the South Korean case allows less evasion, it nonetheless has a broader definition of compulsory service that includes social work, research, full-time reserve enlistment, and industrial technical service.

[13] Those with serious health problems are given exemption if the diagnosis is approved by a panel of military doctors. What constitutes "a serious health problem" is defined in regulations (Turkish Armed Forces, Health Capability Regulation, Official Gazette 29530, 12 November 2015).

evading the draft is not an attractive alternative because evaders face legal consequences and are shunned by society via social rejection and emotional distancing (Altınay and Bora, 2002). The legal consequences include forfeiting paid employment because male employees are legally required to provide their employers with a military discharge certificate upon hiring.[14] Moreover, draft evaders and those who help them face legal charges, including arrest and imprisonment of up to three years if found guilty by the military court.[15] Therefore, the conscription system in Turkey constitutes a rare exception as all Turkish men, except a small fraction who were pardoned due to incapacitating health ailments and those that illegally avoid induction, get drafted and complete their service (Akyürek, 2010).

It is worth noting that while these rules apply to every male regardless of his socioeconomic status, the continuation of educational attainment beyond high school enables one to delay his duty until the completion of formal schooling (Official Gazette, 1927; 2019). Nevertheless, an exceptional feature of the military system in Turkey is that, even though extended schooling beyond high school enables those with more education to receive differential treatment, they remain subject to the lottery-based assignment system. Therefore, our natural experiment holds among less and more educated individuals as long as the analyses for the two groups are performed separately.

This matter merits further elaboration. Although everyone gets the draft call at the age of 20, those who are in school (high school, college, or graduate studies) are allowed to postpone enlistment until they complete their formal education (or until they are 29, whichever comes first).

[14] https://www.haberturk.com/e-devlet-ten-askerlik-durum-belgesi-sorgulama-islemi-nasil-yapilir-hts-2378941.
[15] The Military Penal Code enacted by the law number 1632 states that evading service is punishable by up to three years in prison, and employing a fugitive is punishable by up to two years in prison. https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.3.1632.pdf.

Moreover, while draftees with less than a college degree serve full terms as rank-and-file soldiers, college graduates serve either as full-term sub-lieutenants or serve half-term as rank-and-file depending on the needs of the Armed Forces in that draft period. What is relevant for our purposes is that those who extend their formal schooling beyond high school, including college graduates, are also subject to the service location assignment lottery regardless of their rank and duration of service. However, because of their military occupations, determined by the Armed Forces according to their technical specializations, college graduates have slightly lower odds of assignment to bases in the conflict zone. Consequently, educational attainment must be included among the conditional random assignment covariates to ensure that our identifying assumptions hold.

The differential treatment of conscripts based on their formal schooling has two implications for our purposes. First, while this practice influences the draft age, service duration, military occupation, combat zone assignment probabilities, and direct armed conflict involvement likelihood, it does not constitute a threat to our identification strategy as long as we analyze the two groups separately. Second, because the basis for differential treatment, formal schooling, is fully observable and available to us, our identifying assumptions should hold (i.e., our empirical framework should satisfy the conditional random assignment property) conditional on controlling for educational attainment fixed effects; thus, controlling years of schooling fixed effects, we should be able to estimate our models in the full sample as well.

4. Data and Measures

We use data from two sources to conduct our analysis. First, information on military experiences, including service location, year of induction, and direct combat experiences, was

obtained from the Exposure to Political Violence and Individual Behavior (EXPOVIBE) survey. Second, data on conflict intensity during service come from the Turkish State-PKK Conflict Event Dataset (TPCONED), providing longitudinal and cross-sectional information on combatant casualties since the conflict's inception in 1984.

4.1 The Exposure to Political Violence and Individual Behavior (EXPOVIBE) Data

The EXPOVIBE data are part of a larger project that builds on the Turkish case to explore the individual-level political, social, and economic effects of armed conflict exposure in a civil conflict context. As part of the project, a field survey was conducted by the first author in western Turkey in 2019 with 5,024 randomly selected adult males at their residential addresses. The sampling was performed by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) in 29 western provinces outside of the conflict zone to separate exposure during military service from that of civilian experiences. At each randomly selected address, the eligible participant was the "man of the house" who completed his military service between 1984 and 2011.[16] The survey focused on this period because the Turkish military has been going through structural changes to reduce the involvement of conscripts in combat since 2012.[17]

Figure 3 maps the sample distributions alongside the distribution of combatant casualties to visualize the clear separation between the sampling and conflict areas isolating the ACE during military service from that of civilian experiences. Moreover, separating former combatants' living

[16] We excluded those who were exempt or served an irregularly short period of time due to exceptional circumstances such as health problems.

[17] With new legislation enacted in late 2011 (Official Gazette, 2011), the Armed Forces started recruiting professional soldiers on fixed term contracts to replace conscripts especially in the conflict zone as part of a move towards a professional military. The TPCONED reflects this structural change as most security force casualties of the conflict after 2011 are professional service members. Moreover, with enough professional soldiers in place, regulations were relaxed after 2018 to allow civilians to pay their way out of military service.

environments from the conflict zone by survey design eliminates any influence that conflict may have on potential macroenvironmental mediating pathways, such as the physical destruction of war, post-conflict reconstruction, threats to personal security and property after discharge, and community-level paradigm shifts in political and social attitudes.

The survey questionnaire was designed to collect information on military service experiences and a wide array of economic, social, and political attitudes. Interviews were conducted in Turkish by extensively trained interviewers. Apart from the time, duration, and location of deployment, the EXPOVIBE also collected detailed information on direct combat experiences, including engaging the enemy in firefight, witnessing deaths and injuries, and self-injury during service.

Our first batch of dependent variables, reflecting direct combat experiences, are created based on survey questions displayed in Data Appendix A. In particular, *Armed Combat*, *Injured*, and *Witnessed Casualties* are dichotomous variables indicating whether the respondent engaged in armed combat, was injured, and witnessed deaths or wounding of others during service. The binary variable *Any Direct Combat* reflects whether a respondent experienced at least one of the combat experiences described above.

Appendix Table 1 displays our calculations of the number of Turkish men exposed to direct armed combat during compulsory military service between 1984 and 2011, using exposure risk estimates from the EXPOVIBE and information on the number of men conscripted during the period obtained from the TurkStat birth statistics. The estimates reveal the extent of direct armed combat involvement in Turkish society, with nearly three hundred thousand estimated to be injured, more than 2.3 million directly engaged the enemy in firefight, and 2.1 witnessed deaths and injuries, all together indicating that, within this period, roughly 3 million Turkish men were

exposed to at least one direct armed combat incident. To the best of our knowledge, these statistics represent the highest war theatre exposure rates for the average male among middle- or higher-income nations worldwide.[18]

To examine the impact of ACE on cooperative behaviors, we employ variables reflecting engagement in various community and social organizations, political party membership, and voter turnout, using survey items shown in Data Appendix B. *The Social Participation Index* focuses on engagement in social organizations like alumni associations and social and sports clubs. *The Community Participation Index* provides the corresponding measure for engagement in community organizations like the compatriot and local community associations, school family unions, religious and secular charities, and trade and worker unions. These summary indexes are constructed by utilizing the method of Anderson (2008), a weighted summation of these measures by employing the inverse covariance matrix, lowering the weights of variables with higher correlation levels. In the analysis, we use values of the index measures normalized to mean zero and standard deviation of one. The binary political turnout indicators *Voted in the Local Election* and *Voted in the General Election* capture whether the respondent voted in the most recent local and general elections, respectively. They are coded 1 for those who went to the ballot box in the corresponding election and zero otherwise. We set *Political Party Member* equal to 1 for those who indicated party membership, and it is equated to 0 otherwise. The *Standardized Civic Participation Index* summarizes the answers to all these 14 questions on social and political engagement and electoral turnout.

[18] While exposure rates among conscripts may also be high in cases like Israel, the risk for the average male remains much lower as it applies to at most half the male population because the other half can manage to avoid conscription (Jager, 2018).

The EXPOVIBE survey also includes a field experiment designed to elicit individuals' prosocial behavior by using a simple dictator game. The experiment instructions are displayed in Data Appendix C. The experiment was conducted with a subsample of 1250 respondents randomly selected from the main sample in proportion to province populations.[19] Participants were endowed with 2,500 Turkish liras (TL) and were asked to decide how much of their endowment they would like to donate (if any) to a needy family in a specific province.[20] At the time of the survey, 2,500 TL was slightly higher than the *monthly* legal minimum wage in Turkey and corresponded to approximately $450. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two treatments which differed only in terms of where the needy family was located. The experiment instructions contained no references to the conflict, and no information was given about the receiver's identity except the province of residence. In the *out-group* treatment, the family was in Hakkari, a province at the heart of the conflict region with a nearly 90% ethnically Kurdish population. In the *in-group* treatment, the family was in Amasya, a province with a nearly 100% ethnically Turkish population in a non-conflict region.

In each treatment, respondents were informed at the beginning that two randomly selected participants out of the total 625 would get their allocation decisions implemented. Then, they were instructed to write down their donations and seal the form in complete privacy. Once they completed this part, they were asked about their guess in terms of what the donation of the other winner would be in case they were themselves one of the lucky winners of this game. This final question was designed to measure respondents' beliefs about the average level of altruism in the

[19] The EXPOVIBE includes other field experiments designed to measure economic preferences. Because these experiments were incentivized and contained gains and losses, each experiment was conducted with a randomly selected subsample to ensure that they do not prime each other.

[20] Eckel and Grossman (1996) argue that altruism is more likely to kick in when individuals are given a charitable cause instead of being matched with another participant whose need and/or worthiness of generosity is unknown.

society. Our dependent variables *Self-Donation,* and *Others' Donation Belief* are the amounts donated by the respondents and their guesses about the donation of the other winner, respectively.

Next, we construct variables capturing political attitudes using the survey questions provided in Data Appendix D. *Against Peaceful Solution* is a binary indicator, coded as one for those who are somewhat or entirely against peaceful solutions and zero otherwise. *Pro-Military Solution* is a binary indicator set equal to one for respondents who consider intensified military operations and armed combat as the best solutions to ending the ongoing armed conflict, and it is set equal to zero otherwise. *Feel Distant to Minorities* is a binary variable indicating feeling distant to minority identities, including Kurdish, Alevite, Laz, or Circassian, among others. Dichotomous *Against Minority Neighbors* variable represents whether the respondent would be averse to having a minority neighbor, including Kurdish, Alevite, those who speak other languages, or Syrian refugees. *Tolerates Severe Measures* is coded as one for survey participant who does not (somewhat or entirely) indicate disagreement with using even the most severe measures to put the country on the right path and eradicate the traitors, and zero otherwise. We also construct a *Standardized Animosity Index* aggregating the answers to these five questions to a single indicator following the methodology of Anderson (2008), as described above. Finally, we create the *Standardized Left vs. Right Political Spectrum Index*, the normalized values of respondents' self-reported positioning on a 10-point left-right political ideology scale, with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.

4.2 Constructing the Armed Conflict Exposure (ACE) Variables

We measure ACE by combining the information on the dates and places of service from EXPOVIBE with data on the geotemporal evolution of the conflict from the Turkish State-PKK

Conflict Event Dataset (TPCONED) (Kıbrıs, 2021) to characterize the conflict environment each respondent was exposed to during his time in the military. The TPCONED is a recently released and publicly available dataset that tracks the armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state through conflict events that took place on Turkish soil and in which there was at least one combatant casualty. It contains detailed information on 7,063 conflict events with 17,308 PKK casualties and 7,514 state casualties over the course of the conflict in the 1984–2018 period. For each event, the exact date, location at the district level, number of Turkish security forces (TSF) and PKK casualties, and the data sources are listed. To our knowledge, TPCONED provides the most comprehensive and accurate coverage of this long-running conflict with the highest geotemporal precision.

Figure 4 maps the geographical distribution of the military placements of respondents at the province level. To facilitate interpretation, we categorize those for whom ACE intensity equals zero as having *Non-ACE Service to* armed conflict environment, and we rank those with positive ACE values into three quantiles as having exposure to *Low-, Medium-*, and *High-Intensity ACE*. An additional advantage of using categorical ACE intensity indicators is the potential non-linearities in the effect of ACE intensity on our outcomes of interest.

However, while the use of the aforementioned categorical ACE intensity measures simplifies the interpretation of the impact of ACE and improves the presentation of our findings, using the number of combatant casualties at the location and timing of service as a dose-response measure of the intensity of ACE leads to similar conclusions, as shown later.

5. Econometric Model

We estimate the impact of armed conflict exposure on our outcomes of interest using the following equation:

$$(1) \qquad Y_c = \alpha + £_1(\textit{Low-Intensity ACE})_c + £_2(\textit{Medium-Intensity ACE})_c + £_3(\textit{High-Intensity ACE})_c + \beta\Psi_c + \Phi\Pi_c + \varepsilon_c$$

where Y_c denotes the outcome variables, including *Standardized Civic Participation Index*, *Social Participation Index, Community Participation Index, Political Party Member, Voter in Local Election*, *Voter in General Election, Self-Donation, Others' Donation Belief*, *Standardized Animosity Indicator*, *Against Peaceful Solution, Pro-Military Solution, Feel Distant to Minorities*, *Against Minority Neighbors, Tolerates Severe Measures*, and *Standardized Left-Right Political Spectrum Index* for conscript *c*. Coefficients $£_1$, $£_2$, and $£_3$ capture the impact of our key independent variables, *Low-, Medium-, and High-Intensity ACE,* representing conflict intensity in the deployment district during military service. Ψ is a vector of conditional random assignment covariates, including the fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, educational attainment, draft year, birth province, and training location.

Π_c contains plausibly exogenous pre-deployment characteristics, including Kurdish ethnicity indicator, other minority ethnicity indicator, height in centimeters, draft age, conscript rank, training duration in months, and service length in months. If deployment assignment is done based on the method declared by the Armed Forces, controlling for conditional random assignments variables, training duration, service length, and military rank should not appreciably differ between service members who were deployed to armed conflict zones and those who were

not; hence, we include these variables among pre-service location assignment variables. Finally, ε_c is the idiosyncratic error term. We cluster the standard errors at the service province level.

6. Results

6.1. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Deployment Assignment

The randomization of service location assignment implies that the pre-deployment characteristics of draftees should be unrelated to conflict intensity. We formally test this conjecture for the at-most high school, college, and full samples in Tables 1A, 1B, and 1C, respectively. First, columns (1) to (4) present the means and standard deviations of pre-deployment variables by ACE intensity. Then, conditioning on exogenous random assignment covariates, columns (5) to (7) show the normalized differences and the associated p-values for *Low-*, *Medium-*, and *High-Intensity ACE* relative to *Non-ACE Service*. Specifically, we conduct balance tests on height, Kurdish ethnicity, other minority, conscription age, military rank, training duration, and service length.

In Table 1A, among those with up to 11 years of formal schooling (high school sample), the results support the orthogonality of ACE intensity during service to pre-service-location assignment characteristics. Out of 30 comparisons, compared to those not deployed to conflict zones, the normalized difference is statistically significant at the five percent level in none of the cases. The joint F-test p-values, presented at the bottom row of columns (5), (6), and (7), for normalized differences show that pre-deployment characteristics are jointly unrelated to ACE intensity. In column (6), the normalized difference for other ethnicity is statistically significant at the 10 percent level for *Medium-Intensity ACE. However,* its magnitude is close to zero and statistically insignificant in column (7) for *High-Intensity ACE*, suggesting that the marginally

statistically significant difference in column (6) is sporadic. In columns (5) and (6), the normalized difference for training duration is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, with coefficient estimates suggesting that service in *Low- and Medium-Intensity* ACE is associated with up to 0.21 longer training duration. The small (less than a week), albeit marginally statistically significant, increase in training duration is consistent with the military practice that those randomly selected to serve in armed conflict areas are given additional internal safety training (Mater, 1999, pp. 42). Providing additional safety training to those assigned to conflict zones by the deployment lottery is also in line with the efforts of the Armed Forces to minimize the potential victimization of draftees by the PKK en route to their service basis.[21]

The balance tests for the college and full samples, in Table 1B and 1C, produce remarkably similar results to those presented in the high school sample. Moreover, in Appendix Table 2, we perform the balance tests using the continuous ACE intensity measure, combatant casualties at the location of and time of service. These estimates produce results consistent with Tables 1A, 1B, and 1C and suggest that ACE Intensity is unrelated to pre-assignment variables. Therefore, because the ACE intensity is not related to pre-deployment observable characteristics, these findings support the argument that deployment lottery is orthogonal to pre-deployment characteristics in all samples. All in all, the results, shown in Tables 1A, 1B, and 1C, recommend that our natural experiment identifies the causal impact of ACE intensity for the randomly picked male from the population, rendering the current study to be the first to approximate the average treatment effect (ATE) of ACE.

[21] Upon completing the bootcamp, conscripts are given usually up to 10 days of a break before they join their service base. During this break, it is customary for conscripts to first visit their families and then travel to their service base.

6.2 The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Direct Armed Combat Experiences

We continue our analysis by estimating the impact of ACE intensity on direct armed combat experiences. This exercise allows us to test the impact of our natural experiment on the 'first-stage' outcomes of service in a conflict area by gauging the strength of ACE in predicting an individual draftee's involvement in the war theatre. Moreover, examining the effects of ACE intensity on direct combat experiences enables us to test the identifying assumptions of our empirical strategy.

Tables 2A, 2B, and 2C display the descriptive statistics for the high school, college, and combined samples, respectively. We find that the likelihood of reporting direct combat experiences increases substantially in ACE intensity. For instance, among those with at most 11 years of formal schooling in Table 2A, the share of service members with *Any Direct Combat* involvement is 12, 41, 55, and 73 percent for those performing their conscription in localities with *Non-ACE Service*, *Low-, Medium-*, and *High-Intensity ACE* zones, respectively. The corresponding percentages among college-educated individuals in Table 2B are 12, 42, 62, and 73. Expectedly, summary statistics in the full sample, in Table 2C, is the weighted average of the preceding two tables.

Before moving into regression analysis, in Figure 5, we compare the annual combatant casualties obtained from the TPCONED to direct armed combat exposure rates by draft year in the EXPOVIBE. This exercise shows that the trends in the prevalence of self-reported armed combat experiences by induction year closely track the temporal evolution of the conflict intensity in the TPCONED data; therefore, it provides evidence validating the accuracy and quality of both data sets.

In Table 3, we formally examine the impact of ACE on direct armed combat experiences. Panels I, II, and III contain the results for the high school sample. The first panel shows the

estimates of equation (1) with no control variables specified. We find that *Low-, Medium-* and *High-Intensity ACE* increase the likelihood of engaging in armed combat by 25, 37, and 57 percentage points, respectively. The estimated values of $£_1$, $£_2$, and $£_3$ are 0.021, 0.066, and 0.092 for *Injury*, 0.215, 0.326, and 0.437 for *Witness Casualties*, and 0.296, 0.435, and 0.611 for *Any Direct Combat*. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant in each case at the 1-percent level.

In the second panel, we control for the conditional random assignment covariates. As previously discussed, the Turkish Armed Forces declare that the branch of service, military occupation, and the needs of the military are the key determinants of deployment location, in addition to the fact that conscripts are not assigned to their home provinces. In addition to these covariates, we control for the birth province and service timing fixed effects to satisfy our natural experiment's conditional random assignment property. We also include training location fixed effects among our exogenous control variables to guard against potential bias that may stem from the Armed Forces performing bootcamps in particular provinces to efficiently train the draftees for different tasks, including armed combat. Although no formal military rule suggests that training location determines armed conflict zone assignment, we include training province fixed effects in our models to account for this possibility and address any bias that may stem from this type of practice, if there is any. Finally, we control for educational attainment indicators in Panel II because continued formal schooling is the only legal pathway to delay the conscription age. The findings from these models show that adding these variables to our models explains a modest 6.1 to 13.1 percent of the impact of ACE intensity on direct war theatre involvement.

In Panel III, we add exogenous pre-deployment characteristics to our models, which provides additional information on the plausibility of our identifying assumptions. As these

covariates are orthogonal to the likelihood of assignment to an armed conflict zone, controlling for them should have no significant influence on our coefficient estimates. In Panel III, we observe that conditioning on pre-enlistment characteristics has no measurable effect on our findings. Consistent with our natural experiment's identifying assumptions, the pattern of estimates remains qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged compared to Panel II, suggesting that combat assignment is orthogonal to pre-deployment characteristics.

In Panels IV and V, we show the estimates for the college and full samples using fully saturated models.[22] In Panel IV, although the coefficients are less precisely estimated in the college sample, perhaps due to smaller sample sizes, we find that ACE intensity increases the likelihood of direct armed combat exposure similar to those observed in the high school sample. In the full sample, we find that the impact of ACE on personal involvement in direct combat experiences is qualitatively and quantitatively indistinguishable from the effects we observed in the high school sample.

These findings show that our natural experiment powerfully predicts direct combat involvement among those with at most 11 years of formal schooling and those who continued their schooling beyond high school. Moreover, these results imply that our natural experiment's identifying assumptions rest on hold in the high school, college, and full samples.

[22] To economize on space, we do not present the specifications without any control variables, and conditional random assignment covariates in the college and full samples. These results, available from the authors upon request, exhibit patterns highly similar to those observed in the high school sample, shown in Panels I to III of Table 3.

6.3. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Prosociality

Upon documenting evidence on the exogeneity of ACE exposure and our natural experiment's strength in predicting direct combat involvement, we continue with examining whether and to what extent ACE impacts prosocial behaviors.

In Panels I to III of Table 4, we investigate the impact of ACE on summary indexes for civic, social, and community participation, voter turnout, and political party membership in the high school sample. In Panel I, we do not find any positive impact of ACE on these prosociality indicators. Instead, we find that *Medium-Intensity ACE* lowers civic participation by 0.07 standard deviations (statistically significant at the 5% level), and *Low-Intensity ACE* reduces social participation by 0.06 standard deviations (statistically significant at the 10% level). In Panel II, the inclusion of conditional random assignment covariates slightly increases the magnitudes of the estimates, with four statistically significant coefficients. Finally, in Panel III, we add pre-deployment characteristics to our models. These results show that exposure to *Low-Intensity ACE* leads to 0.10, 0.08, and 0.09 standard deviations reduction in civic, social, and community participation indexes, respectively. In column (1), *Medium-Intensity ACE* lowers civic participation by 0.06 standard deviation. Only in one case in column (6), service in a *High-Intensity ACE* increases the likelihood of political party membership by 2.5 percentage points, which is marginally statistically significant.

In Panel IV, among college-educated individuals, the results are qualitatively similar to those observed in the high school sample, even though coefficients are less precisely estimated. In the whole sample, Panel V, the findings are qualitatively similar to those shown in high school and college samples. In the full sample, the impact of ACE intensity indicators on voting likelihood and political party membership is not statistically significant in any of the specifications. Jointly

evaluating the estimates in Panels III, IV, and V, we do not observe a consistent effect of ACE intensity on either voting likelihood or political party membership.

All in all, the findings presented in Table 4 provide little evidence that ACE improves social and community participation, voting in elections, and political party membership.

6.4. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Altruistic Behavior, The Donation Game

Next, we examine how ACE affects altruistic behavior in a donation game to deepen our investigation of ACE's impact on prosociality. While we conduct this analysis using the full sample to retain statistical power, the results in the high school sample are similar to those presented and are available from the authors upon request. Appendix Table 3A performs balancing tests in the donation sample and shows that pre-deployment characteristics are unrelated to ACE intensity. Appendix Tables 3B and 3C repeat the same exercise for the in-group and out-group samples and document a similar pattern of results to those shown in Appendix Table 3A.

We then present the estimated coefficients we obtain in our fully saturated models with *Self-Donation* and *Others' Donation Belief* as the dependent variables in Turkish Liras denoted by ₺. Table 5A shows the descriptive statistics for these two variables. In Panel I of Table 5B, we find that *Low*- and *High-Intensity ACE* lower charitable giving by ₺144 (statistically significant at 10 percent) and ₺226 (statistically significant at 5 percent), respectively. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the in-group indicator confirms that people donate higher amounts to their fellow in-group members. In columns (2) and (3), we split the sample by in-group and out-group to gauge whether ACE has differential effects on the amount of donation to in-group versus out-group people. In column (2), we find that ACE intensity has a negative (and usually

statistically insignificant) impact on making charitable donations to in-group members. In column (3), we observe smaller and imprecisely estimates effects of ACE intensity on donations towards out-group members. These results show little evidence that exposure to war theater improves prosocial attitudes and behavior. In Panel II, we test if ACE intensity influences the perception of former conscripts regarding how much others would donate. These results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Panel 1, although imprecisely estimated. Hence, we conclude that ACE intensity does not seem to have a consistent and measurable impact on people's perceptions regarding the prosociality of others.

6.5. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political and Social Attitudes

We next explore whether and to what extent ACE intensity impacts attitudes towards conflict resolution and minorities and general political ideology in Table 6. In Panel 1, among those with at most a high school education, while the top panel of Table 6 shows the results with no control variables specified, Panels II and III sequentially include conditional random assignment controls and pre-enlistment characteristics, respectively. The pattern of results we observe across the panels resembles those seen in Tables 3 and 4- it is resilient to adding conditional random assignment variables (Panel II) and exogenous pre-deployment characteristics (Panel III). Therefore, these results bolster our confidence in the credibility of our natural experiment, which exploits variation in service location assignment enabled by a randomized deployment lottery.

As the coefficient estimates are similar across different models, we discuss the results from our fully saturated models in Panel III. In the first column, we start with the *Standardized Animosity Index*, the summary measure of unfavorable attitudes towards conflict resolution and

minorities. We find that *High-Intensity ACE* causes a 0.20 standard deviation increase in the index, and this estimate is statistically significant at the 1-percent level. In columns (2) to (6), results show that service in an intense armed conflict area elevates the likelihood of being against peace talks, supporting military measures for conflict resolution, feeling distant to ethnic minorities, being against having neighbors of minority ethnic origin, and not opposing the use of severe measures against traitors to put the country in the right path by 6.5 (statistically significant at the 1-percent level), 5.0 (statistically significant at the 5-percent level), 5.3 (statistically significant at the 10-percent level), 4.5 (statistically significant at the 5-percent level), and 4 (statistically significant at the 5-percent level) percentage points, in that order. We also find that service under moderate conflict increases the likelihood of supporting military measures to end the conflict by 7.5 percentage points (statistically significant at the 5-percent level). Finally, the coefficient estimates on service in a district with low conflict are usually small and imprecisely estimated.

In column (7), we find that *High-Intensity ACE* causes a 0.21 standard deviation increase in the *Standardized Left versus Right Political Spectrum Index*, implying that conflict boosts the likelihood of support for right-wing political parties.

Next, in Panels IV and V, we present the results from the college and full samples. As the coefficient estimates are similar across different models, we only present the estimates from the fully saturated models.[23] Our estimates among the college-educated individuals are qualitatively similar to the results we find in the high school sample; however, they are less precisely estimated. In the full sample, shown in Panel V, we find similar effect sizes to those in Panels III and IV. In particular, the estimated effect sizes on the *Standardized Animosity Index*, *Against Peaceful*

[23] To economize on space, we do not present the specifications without any control variables, and conditional random assignment covariates in the college and full samples. These results, available from the authors upon request, exhibit patterns highly similar to those observed in the high school sample, shown in Panels I to III of Table 6.

Solution, *Pro-Military Solution*, *Feel Distant to Minorities*, *Against Minority Neighbors*, *Tolerates Severe Measures*, and *Standardized Left vs. Right Political Spectrum Index* are 0.199, 0.054, 0.052, 0.055, 0.042, 0.047, and 0.230.

Consequently, we conclude that service in intense armed conflict localities increases the subsequent animosity towards peaceful means of conflict resolution and towards minorities, as well as positively affecting the tendency to lean towards the right-hand side of the political spectrum.

6.6. Robustness

We explore the robustness of our findings to a battery of specification checks. To economize on space, we perform these exercises using the entire sample because the estimates in high school and college samples are qualitatively similar, as shown by our findings above. Performing the robustness exercises for the high school sample, among whom we find statistically significant effects, leads to identical conclusions and results from these exercises are available from the authors upon request.

We start the sensitivity analysis by investigating the robustness of the linear probability estimates in the main analysis to employing logistic regression, a non-linear estimation method. Appendix Table 4A presents the results for dichotomous political attitudes measures, and Appendix Table 4B performs the corresponding exercise for civic participation indicators. As displayed by the results, the logistic models produce qualitatively and quantitatively similar estimates to our baseline findings.

To economize on space and for ease of presentation, we limit the robustness exercises to the *Civic Participation Index, Animosity Index*, and *Political Spectrum Index* in the remaining part of the paper.

In Panels I and II of Appendix Table 5, we use linearly and quadratically specified number of combatant casualties as the measure of ACE intensity. These exercises produce similar results to our main findings as both linear and quadratic specifications suggest that the *Animosity* and *Political Spectrum Index* increase in combatant casualties.[24]

It is well known that soldiers and gendarmes shoulder the burden of armed conflict as they are more likely to serve in conflict areas and be exposed to direct combat. Hence, in Panel I of Appendix Table 6, we reproduce our estimates by excluding sailors and airmen. These results are fairly similar to our baseline findings, suggesting that our findings are not driven by the systemic differences between service in Land Forces and other branches.

Because of their shorter service duration, those who serve half-term may not be preferred to serve their duties in conflict zones. Hence, to test whether the presence of half-termers in our data biases our findings, we re-estimate our specifications by excluding half-termers, corresponding to roughly five percent of our sample, in Panel II of Appendix Table 6. This exercise produces remarkably similar effect sizes to our baseline estimates, implying that our results are not driven by the systemic differences between the full- and half-term serving conscripts.

We discussed that, for the large majority of cases, a young man becomes liable for induction when he turns 20 and gets conscripted before his 22nd birthday. However, they could

[24] While the quadratic specifications show hump-shaped (first increasing, then decreasing) effects of ACE intensity on *Animosity* and *Political Spectrum Indexes*, the net effect remains positive until the 99th percentile of the continuous ACE measure.

defer the timing of induction beyond age 21 via extended schooling. Therefore, we limit our estimation sample to those inducted before turning 22 to test whether our findings are resilient to dropping them from the estimation sample. As displayed in Panel III of Appendix Table 6, this specification check produces estimates highly similar to our results in the high school sample, presented in Panels I-III in Table 6.

In Panel IV of Appendix Table 6, we exclude individuals with non-Turkish ethnicity, i.e., those who grew up in a household where a language other than Turkish was spoken. The reasoning behind this exercise is that the Kurdish uprising is considered a threat to the integrity of the Turkish state and its unification efforts around a national identity that rests on Turkish citizenship that shuns any emphasis on minority ethnic identities in the public space (Kadıoğlu, 2008). Hence, we investigate whether our findings are robust to excluding those who come from a non-Turkish ethnic background. Results show that this exercise has no bearing on our conclusions.

We also subject our findings to additional scrutiny by undertaking Oster's (2019) omitted variables bias test. Building on Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), this method estimates the relative significance of unobservables by tracking the changes in the value of R-squared and the coefficient of interest when additional observables are added to the estimated models. Following Oster (2019), we fix the R_{max} value to 130% of the R-squared statistic of the specification controlling for observable covariates and assume that observable and unobservable factors have equal weights in determining our outcomes, implying that Oster's δ is set equal to 1. As displayed in Appendix Table 7, Oster's beta values are nearly identical to our baseline estimates, suggesting that our natural experiment identifies unbiased estimates of the impact of ACE.

In the main analysis, we present standard errors corrected for clustering on the military service province. In Appendix Table 8, we check the sensitivity of the precision of our estimates

to clustering at different levels. In Panel I to V, we cluster the standard errors at the training province, birth province, branch by draft year, branch by occupation, and branch by occupation by draft year, respectively. The results show that adjusting for clustering at different levels produces standard errors similar to those presented in our main estimates.

As we examine the impact of ACE on different outcomes, one potential concern is the problem of multiple inferences, which implies that statistically significant estimates may emerge by chance. Recall that, when possible, we already use summary indexes, constructed based on Anderson (2008), to circumvent this possibility. Moreover, we test the robustness of the standard errors to two different multiple-hypothesis testing procedures offered by Simes (1986) and Hochberg (1988). In Appendix Table 9, we present the associated p-values using these approaches along with the baseline estimates and show that our results are robust to multiple inference testing.

Next we explore if and how much controlling for potentially endogenous variables, including employment status, household income, and the family's ability to save money. Theoretically, while these outcomes can serve as potential mediators between ACE political attitudes and civic participation, Kıbrıs and Cesur (2022) find little evidence that ACE significantly impacts labor market outcomes using data from the EXPOVIBE. In Panels I, II, and III of Appendix Table 10, we investigate the resilience of our findings to controlling for these variables for civic participation, animosity towards conflict resolution and minorities, and relative positioning in the political spectrum, in that order. For each summary index outcome measure, in column (1), we show the baseline estimate, and in columns (2) to (4), we control for work status, family monthly income, and monthly savings individually. Then, column (5) jointly specifies them. As depicted by the estimates presented, controlling for these covariates has no bearing on our findings, regardless of whether we specify them individually or jointly.

Finally, Table 7 explores whether these effects dissipate or persist over time. Panels I, II, and III reproduce the impact of ACE by limiting the estimation sample to those discharged at least 10, 15, and 20 years ago, in that order. The results suggest that the impact of ACE on the summary measure of animosity and self-positioning in the political spectrum is not transitory, as reflected by the stability of coefficient estimates across different panels in Table 7.

6.7 Mechanisms

As discussed above, neoclassical explanations based on the differential incentives and payoffs created by the conflict social ecology are irrelevant in our setup. The potential role of the labor market and human capital channels are shown to be minimal by our analysis and suggested by the findings of Kıbrıs and Cesur (2022). What could then explain our findings? The theoretical guidance we discussed leads us to examine psychological mechanisms that may justify increased animosity towards conflict resolution and minorities and to lean toward the right side of the political spectrum. Both direct armed combat involvement and the social-environmental exposure at military establishments during elevated conflict can transmit the outcomes we observe by leading to the normalization of violence and by rendering the use of aggression justifiable (Bandura, 1973; Wood, 2008). Consequently, living through stressful times as a service member during conflict can induce an individual to perceive the use of violence as an acceptable conflict resolution tool. Finally, war-induced traumatic experiences, such as physical injury and witnessing casualties, among veterans can cause grief, boosting negative sentiments toward the out-group members (Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2014; Wood, 2008).[25]

[25] https://forgehealth.com/the-impact-of-grief-and-loss-in-a-veterans-life-and-recovery-may-be-greater-than-people-think/

We start the mediation analysis by separating the impact of direct armed combat involvement from that of environmental exposure in the whole sample. In Appendix Table 11, we present balancing tests based on detailed combat exposure indicators of survey participants. These balance tests produce qualitatively similar results to those presented in Table 1C. Therefore, we infer that our natural experiment enables us to distinguish the impact of individual involvement with violent armed combat from that of environmental exposure to conflict.

The results in Table 8 show that those who served in a locality during intense conflict and experienced direct combat, such as enemy firefight, injury, or witnessing casualties, drive our findings on political attitudes. These findings suggest that direct combat experiences play a stronger role than environmental exposure and that war-induced traumas have significant explanatory power on our findings.

In Table 9, we test whether and to what extent ACE intensity leads to aggression and the normalization of violence. In doing so, we construct an index based on a shortened version of the Buss-Perry Aggression Scale (Buss and Perry 1992), capturing thoughts, emotions, and behaviors intended to harm others (Webster et al. 2013), using Anderson's methodology (2008), as described above. The 5-point Likert scale questions, with answers ranging from “completely false for me” to “completely true for me” regarding how each description represents their character, were used in constructing the abridged 12-item *Aggression Scale*, developed by Webster et al. (2013), are shown in Data Appendix E. We also construct two binary indicators measuring the inclination to use violence in everyday life under different circumstances. *Ready to Use Violence if Necessary* is

https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/globalhealth/2020/03/31/from-war-to-grief-themes-from-the-conflict-and-mental-health-event/
https://www.ocregister.com/2019/11/11/uci-study-examines-unseen-grief-of-soldiers-who-lost-friends-in-combat-or-by-suicide/

a binary indicator coded as 1 if the respondent completely agreed that he could be described as a person who would resort to violence to protect his rights, and zero otherwise. *Ready to Use Violence if Provoked* is a dichotomous variable set equal to 1 if the respondent completely agreed that he could be depicted as a person who would hit someone if he were provoked enough, it is set equal to 0 otherwise. In column (1) of Panel I, *High-Intensity ACE* increases the aggression score by 0.18 standard deviations. Then, in columns (2) and (3), we find that service in a locality with intensified armed conflict elevates the likelihood of resorting to violence to protect oneself, and if provoked enough by 7.3 and 5.5 percentage points, respectively. Then, in Panel II, we separate direct combat experiences' effect from that of environmental exposure. The results reveal the aggressive tendencies that come with *High-Intensity ACE* and imply that the effects are mainly driven by direct combat experiences, including armed combat, injury, and witnessing casualties.

7. Discussion and Conclusions

In this study, we examine the causal impact of armed conflict exposure on the social and political attitudes and behaviors of the average adult male randomly picked from a population inhabiting a peaceful environment where conflict-induced demand for cooperation is absent. We exploit a novel natural experiment delivered by the deployment lottery embedded in the Turkish conscription system predicting the service location of draftees during the PKK's armed insurgency that has long been going on in the southeastern parts of the country. We use data from an innovative survey, the EXPOVIBE, which sampled outside of the conflict zone to nullify the potential effects of war that may operate through the social ecology, providing detailed information on conscripts, including service timing and location, military experiences, political and social attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, we identify the effect of exposure to armed violence in and of itself and

decipher the potential explanatory channels these impacts work through without the confounding role of macroenvironmental effects of war.

Equipped with arguably the most powerful empirical framework to study the effects of war theatre exposure, we answer long-standing questions in the literature. First, we show that when neoclassical explanations, including the need for social insurance, security concerns, community-level paradigm shifts, and labor market outcomes that may boost demand for cohesion, are minimized, conflict exposure in and of itself is not necessarily conducive to prosocial behaviors. This conclusion helps reconcile the conflicting finding in the literature. In particular, our results recommend that the emergence of the favorable prosociality effects of war may be contingent on whether and to what extent conflict triggers the need for cooperation through the social ecology, people's economic incentives, constraints and beliefs, and the interactions between these two sets of mechanisms.

To deepen the understanding of this result, it is worth discussing the differences between the war experience of conscripts and those who participate in the conflict in different roles. Our subjects are ex-conscript civilians randomly picked from the general population. While they are exposed to conflict as combatants, they do not self-select into this role. Therefore, their involvement in the conflict is not ideological and does not necessarily involve any sociopolitical concerns. Moreover, unlike insurgent combatants, conscripts do not need to establish local support for survival. As part of the state Military, they are already embedded in a well-defined, well-organized, and dense support system. Therefore, they face much lesser incentives to develop prosocial skills and attitudes during service or upon leaving the military. Finally, upon discharge, they return to their peaceful home environments, where there is no reason to expect war-induced paradigm shifts. As discussed earlier, this description fits the experience of the members of most

modern-day armies, deploying conscripts to fight away from their peaceful home environments, for whom our findings may be relevant.

Second, we provide a clear explanation as to how war exposure feeds the self-perpetuating dynamics of armed conflicts. Our results indicate long-lasting effects of war-induced grievances on social and political attitudes that are inconducive to peaceful conflict resolution. We also find armed conflict exposure to feed such intransigent attitudes through the normalization of the use of violence as a tool to solve problems.

While we address major gaps in the literature, several related questions remain. For instance, will the favorable prosociality effects of war shown in the literature persist when the conflict-induced environmental needs for cooperation subside? Moreover, if and to what extent does exposure to violence among public servants, such as police officers and professional military members, impact their cooperative behaviors and attitudes? Finally, does civilian exposure under different circumstances, such as systemic neighborhood violence versus sporadic victimization, lead to different effects?

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Figure 1A. Annual Combatant Fatalities Among the Turkish Military Members and PKK Recruits by Year between 1984 and 2019



Figure 1B. Cumulative Combatant Fatalities by Year Among the Turkish Military Members and PKK Recruits between 1984 and 2019



Notes: The estimates were obtained from the TPCONED.

Figure 2. Geographical distribution of total combatant casualties in 1984-2018



Figure 3. Sampling distribution versus the distribution of combatant casualties



Figure 4. Geographical distribution of military placements of respondents

Figure 5. Direct Combat Experiences by the Year of Draft











Table 1A. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, High School Sample

Variable	(1) *No-ACE* Mean/SD	(2) *Low-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(3) *Medium-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(4) *High-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(5) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)
Height in Centimeters	175.083	174.900	175.057	175.314	0.027	0.004	-0.034
	[8.406]	[6.793]	[6.972]	[3.874]	(0.437)	(0.631)	(0.411)
Turkish Ethnicity	0.907	0.906	0.907	0.927	0.004	-0.002	-0.072
	[0.289]	[0.275]	[0.199]	[0.278]	(0.309)	(0.304)	(0.339)
Kurdish Ethnicity	0.073	0.062	0.050	0.051	0.042	0.090	0.084
	[0.239]	[0.212]	[0.188]	[0.296]	(0.536)	(0.595)	(0.370)
Other Ethnicity	0.020	0.032	0.043	0.021	-0.083	-0.152	-0.006
	[0.125]	[0.171]	[0.209]	[0.123]	(0.358)	(0.078)	(0.772)
Conscription Age	20.237	20.216	20.132	20.254	0.021	0.106	-0.017
	[0.887]	[1.063]	[0.978]	[1.136]	(0.388)	(0.203)	(0.435)
Rank: Private	0.821	0.809	0.826	0.867	0.033	-0.011	-0.121
	[0.447]	[0.379]	[0.432]	[0.311]	(0.856)	(0.788)	(0.122)
Rank: Corporal	0.068	0.062	0.057	0.045	0.023	0.043	0.090
	[0.251]	[0.215]	[0.258]	[0.171]	(0.687)	(0.908)	(0.265)
Rank: Sergeant	0.111	0.129	0.117	0.088	-0.058	-0.020	0.075
	[0.321]	[0.342]	[0.299]	[0.313]	(0.585)	(0.615)	(0.409)
Training Duration	2.687	2.797	2.833	2.834	-0.155	-0.205	-0.206
	[0.846]	[0.631]	[0.508]	[0.785]	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.223)
Service Duration	16.974	17.000	16.950	17.272	-0.016	0.015	-0.188
	[1.846]	[2.151]	[2.384]	[2.252]	(0.453)	(0.296)	(0.828)
Joint F-test of P-value for Normalized Differences					*0.392*	*0.307*	*0.687*
Observations	3251	371	281	331			

Notes: In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for enlistment year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province fixed effects, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis. Results pertain to individuals with at most 11 years of formal schooling.

Table 1B. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, College Sample

Variable	(1) *No-ACE* Mean/SD	(2) *Low-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(3) *Medium-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(4) *High-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(5) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)
Height in Centimeters	177.795	175.904	177.108	176.000	0.267	0.098	0.255
	[8.741]	[7.863]	[4.186]	[4.218]	(0.203)	(0.718)	(0.420)
Turkish Ethnicity	0.893	0.923	0.892	0.885	-0.099	0.003	0.026
	[0.341]	[0.263]	[0.239]	[0.228]	0.475	0.901	0.160
Kurdish Ethnicity	0.067	0.058	0.054	0.077	0.038	0.053	-0.039
	[0.264]	[0.225]	[0.179]	[0.269]	(0.501)	(0.258)	(0.548)
Other Ethnicity	0.040	0.019	0.054	0.038	0.108	-0.071	0.008
	[0.166]	[0.143]	[0.231]	[0.152]	(0.761)	(0.491)	(0.231)
Conscription Age	22.920	22.462	23.027	22.385	0.154	-0.035	0.178
	[2.899]	[2.075]	[4.205]	[2.045]	(0.374)	(0.180)	(0.788)
Rank: Private	0.605	0.558	0.568	0.538	0.096	0.076	0.135
	[0.669]	[0.505]	[0.495]	[0.404]	(0.389	(0.767)	(0.564)
Rank: Corporal	0.061	0.058	0.108	0.038	0.013	-0.194	0.094
	[0.255]	[0.225]	[0.353]	[0.213]	(0.914)	(0.342)	(0.638)
Rank: Sergeant	0.283	0.269	0.270	0.346	0.031	0.029	-0.139
	[0.539]	[0.435]	[0.385]	[0.275]	(0.085)	(0.784)	(0.703)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.051	0.115	0.054	0.077	-0.279	-0.013	-0.116
	[0.238]	[0.261]	[0.238]	[0.303]	(0.178)	(0.873)	(0.992)
Training Duration	2.166	2.481	2.622	2.615	-0.308	-0.445	-0.442
	[1.241]	[0.769]	[1.043]	[0.647]	(0.646)	(0.187)	(0.244)
Service Duration	13.331	15.077	15.784	15.462	-0.360	-0.502	-0.436
	[7.020]	[3.662]	[3.364]	[3.970]	(0.419)	(0.027)	(0.208)
Joint F-test of P-value for Normalized Differences					0.754	0.548	0.613
Observations	625	52	37	26			

Notes: In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for enlistment year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province fixed effects, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis. Results pertain to individuals with more than 11 years of formal schooling.

Table 2C. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Full Sample

Variable	(1) *No-ACE* Mean/SD	(2) *Low-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(3) *Medium-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(4) *High-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(5) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)
Height in Centimeters	175.520	175.024	175.296	175.364	0.071	0.032	0.022
	[8.866]	[7.228]	[6.509]	[4.053]	(0.190)	(0.496)	(0.431)
Other Ethnicity	0.905	0.908	0.906	0.924	-0.068	0.007	-0.059
	[0.304]	[0.297]	[0.182]	[0.272]	(0.450)	(0.415)	(0.399)
Kurdish Ethnicity	0.072	0.061	0.050	0.053	0.041	0.085	0.073
	[0.258]	[0.226]	[0.188]	[0.263]	(0.515)	(0.352)	(0.467)
Other Ethnicity	0.023	0.031	0.044	0.022	-0.047	-0.132	0.007
	[0.111]	[0.170]	[0.206]	[0.115]	(0.574)	(0.082)	(0.576)
Conscription Age	20.670	20.492	20.469	20.409	0.100	0.111	0.147
	[1.892]	[1.455]	[2.128]	[1.073]	(0.463)	(0.968)	(0.972)
Rank: Private	0.786	0.778	0.796	0.843	0.021	-0.023	-0.140
	[0.543]	[0.448]	[0.453]	[0.322]	(0.792)	(0.848)	(0.256)
Rank: Corporal	0.067	0.061	0.063	0.045	0.021	0.015	0.088
	[0.246]	[0.198]	[0.260]	[0.164]	(0.611)	(0.962)	(0.175)
Rank: Sergeant	0.139	0.147	0.135	0.106	-0.022	0.010	0.094
	[0.412]	[0.390]	[0.305]	[0.312]	(0.836)	(0.784)	(0.807)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.008	0.014	0.006	0.006	-0.063	0.022	0.030
	[0.102]	[0.111]	[0.079]	[0.089]	(0.111)	(0.874)	(0.993)
Training Duration in Months	2.603	2.758	2.808	2.818	-0.196	-0.260	-0.273
	[1.208]	[0.712]	[0.709]	[0.730]	(0.054)	(0.041)	(0.164)
Service Length in Months	16.387	16.764	16.814	17.140	-0.138	-0.156	-0.276
	[4.373]	[2.289]	[2.546]	[2.654]	(0.261)	(0.710)	(0.527)
F-test of joint significance (p-value)					*0.347*	*0.315*	*0.682*
	3854	422	318	357			

Notes: In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for enlistment year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province fixed effects, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis. Results pertain to the full sample.

Table 2A. Summary Statistics for Direct Combat Involvement by Armed Conflict Intensity, EXPOVIBE Data, High School Sample

Variable	(1) All	(2) *Non-ACE Service*	(3) *Low-Intensity ACE*	(4) *Medium-Intensity ACE*	(5) *High-Intensity ACE*
Armed Combat	0.168	0.077	0.329	0.448	0.646
	(0.374)	(0.267)	(0.470)	(0.498)	(0.479)
Injured	0.022	0.008	0.030	0.075	0.100
	(0.146)	(0.091)	(0.170)	(0.263)	(0.301)
Witnessed Casualties	0.151	0.076	0.291	0.402	0.514
	(0.358)	(0.265)	(0.455)	(0.491)	(0.501)
Any Direct Combat Experience	0.219	0.117	0.412	0.552	0.727
	(0.414)	(0.321)	(0.493)	(0.498)	(0.446)
Standardized Civic Participation Index	-0.023	-0.015	-0.084	-0.083	0.012
	(0.956)	(1.006)	(0.718)	(0.668)	(0.883)
Standardized Social Group Participation Index	-0.044	-0.036	-0.094	-0.072	-0.037
	(0.841)	(0.875)	(0.464)	(0.635)	(0.972)
Standardized Community Participation Index	-0.017	-0.016	-0.054	-0.065	0.049
	(0.976)	(0.992)	(0.933)	(0.767)	(1.025)
Voter in Local Election	0.959	0.958	0.957	0.961	0.961
	(0.199)	(0.200)	(0.203)	(0.195)	(0.195)
Voter in General Election	0.953	0.955	0.943	0.950	0.949
	(0.211)	(0.207)	(0.232)	(0.218)	(0.221)
Political Party Member	0.117	0.116	0.105	0.128	0.133
	(0.321)	(0.320)	(0.307)	(0.335)	(0.340)
Standardized Animosity Index	0.027	0.001	0.027	0.115	0.205
	(0.994)	(0.999)	(1.022)	(0.975)	(0.902)
Against Peaceful Solution	0.456	0.442	0.487	0.506	0.516
	(0.498)	(0.497)	(0.501)	(0.501)	(0.501)
Pro Military Solution	0.477	0.471	0.452	0.533	0.508
	(0.500)	(0.499)	(0.498)	(0.500)	(0.501)
Feel Distant to Minorities	0.284	0.281	0.289	0.280	0.315
	(0.451)	(0.450)	(0.454)	(0.450)	(0.465)
Against Minority Neighbors	0.666	0.661	0.654	0.706	0.699
	(0.472)	(0.474)	(0.476)	(0.456)	(0.459)
Tolerates Severe Measures	0.728	0.721	0.739	0.730	0.785
	(0.445)	(0.449)	(0.440)	(0.445)	(0.411)
Standardized Left vs. Right Political Spectrum Index	0.046	0.029	0.058	(0.006)	0.241
	(0.989)	(0.993)	(0.971)	(0.963)	(0.976)
Standardized Aggression Index	-0.0041	-0.0152	-0.0254	0.0265	0.1032
	(1.007)	(1.004)	(0.980)	(1.043)	(1.023)
Ready to Use Violence if Necessary	0.251	0.246	0.257	0.253	0.298
	(0.434)	(0.431)	(0.437)	(0.435)	(0.458)
Ready to Use Violence if Provoked	0.145	0.140	0.143	0.167	0.177
	(0.352)	(0.347)	(0.350)	(0.374)	(0.383)
Observations	4234	3251	371	281	331

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table 2B. Summary Statistics for Direct Combat Involvement by Armed Conflict Intensity, EXPOVIBE Data, College Sample

Variable	(1) All	(2) *Non-ACE Service*	(3) *Low-Intensity ACE*	(4) *Medium-Intensity ACE*	(5) *High-Intensity ACE*
Armed Combat	0.126	0.071	0.289	0.487	0.615
	(0.332)	(0.256)	(0.458)	(0.507)	(0.496)
Injured	0.016	0.008	0.058	0.083	0.039
	(0.127)	(0.089)	(0.235)	(0.280)	(0.196)
Witnessed Casualties	0.148	0.097	0.308	0.500	0.577
	(0.355)	(0.296)	(0.466)	(0.507)	(0.504)
Any Direct Combat Experience	0.187	0.119	0.423	0.622	0.731
	(0.390)	(0.324)	(0.499)	(0.492)	(0.452)
Standardized Civic Participation Index	0.132	0.139	0.154	0.056	0.033
	(1.215)	(1.253)	(1.147)	(0.929)	(0.711)
Standardized Social Group Participation Index	0.251	0.263	0.206	0.317	-0.034
	(1.614)	(1.641)	(1.699)	(1.531)	(0.606)
Standardized Community Participation Index	0.098	0.010	0.190	-0.042	0.081
	(1.122)	(1.133)	(1.327)	(0.676)	(0.923)
Voter in Local Election	0.934	0.933	0.941	0.919	0.962
	(0.249)	(0.251)	(0.238)	(0.277)	(0.196)
Voter in General Election	0.934	0.934	0.922	0.919	0.962
	(0.249)	(0.248)	(0.272)	(0.277)	(0.196)
Political Party Member	0.087	0.083	0.077	0.135	0.115
	(0.281)	(0.276)	(0.269)	(0.347)	(0.326)
Standardized Animosity Index	-0.154	-0.157	-0.113	-0.286	0.033
	(1.021)	(1.012)	(1.043)	(1.041)	(1.177)
Against Peaceful Solution	0.446	0.441	0.510	0.500	0.346
	(0.497)	(0.497)	(0.505)	(0.507)	(0.485)
Pro Military Solution	0.446	0.438	0.511	0.429	0.565
	(0.498)	(0.497)	(0.505)	(0.502)	(0.507)
Feel Distant to Minorities	0.271	0.264	0.294	0.216	0.462
	(0.445)	(0.441)	(0.460)	(0.417)	(0.508)
Against Minority Neighbors	0.553	0.553	0.539	0.528	0.600
	(0.498)	(0.498)	(0.503)	(0.506)	(0.500)
Tolerates Severe Measures	0.677	0.687	0.628	0.583	0.654
	(0.468)	(0.464)	(0.488)	(0.500)	(0.485)
Standardized Left vs. Right Political Spectrum Index	-0.256	-0.249	-0.174	-0.515	-0.210
	(1.023)	(1.007)	(1.154)	(1.079)	(1.077)
Standardized Aggression Index	0.024	(0.000)	0.161	0.129	0.172
	(0.962)	(0.928)	(1.145)	(1.236)	(0.953)
Ready to Use Violence if Necessary	0.200	0.182	0.289	0.297	0.308
	(0.400)	(0.386)	(0.458)	(0.463)	(0.471)
Ready to Use Violence if Provoked	0.155	0.153	0.192	0.081	0.231
	(0.362)	(0.360)	(0.398)	(0.277)	(0.430)
Observations	740	625	52	37	26

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table 2C. Summary Statistics for Direct Combat Involvement by Armed Conflict Intensity, EXPOVIBE Data, Full Sample

Variable	(1) All	(2) *Non-ACE Service*	(3) *Low-Intensity ACE*	(4) *Medium-Intensity ACE*	(5) *High-Intensity ACE*
Armed Combat	0.162	0.076	0.324	0.453	0.643
	(0.369)	(0.265)	(0.469)	(0.499)	(0.480)
Injured	0.021	0.008	0.033	0.076	0.096
	(0.143)	(0.091)	(0.179)	(0.265)	(0.295)
Witnessed Casualties	0.151	0.080	0.293	0.413	0.518
	(0.358)	(0.271)	(0.456)	(0.493)	(0.500)
Any Direct Combat Experience	0.214	0.117	0.414	0.560	0.728
	(0.410)	(0.321)	(0.493)	(0.497)	(0.446)
Standardized Civic Participation Index	0.000	0.010	-0.055	-0.067	0.014
	(1.000)	(1.051)	(0.786)	(0.703)	(0.870)
Standardized Social Group Participation Index	0.000	0.012	-0.057	-0.027	-0.037
	(1.000)	(1.043)	(0.740)	(0.799)	(0.949)
Standardized Community Participation Index	0.000	.0031	-.0243	-.0624	.0511
	(1.000)	(1.0168)	(.9914)	(.7561)	(1.017)
Voter in Local Election	0.955	0.954	0.955	0.956	0.961
	(0.208)	(0.209)	(0.208)	(0.206)	(0.195)
Voter in General Election	0.950	0.952	0.941	0.946	0.949
	(0.218)	(0.215)	(0.237)	(0.226)	(0.219)
Political Party Member	0.112	0.110	0.102	0.129	0.132
	(0.316)	(0.313)	(0.303)	(0.336)	(0.339)
Standardized Animosity Index	0.000	-0.024	0.010	0.068	0.193
	(1.000)	(1.003)	(1.024)	(0.989)	(0.924)
Against Peaceful Solution	0.455	0.442	0.490	0.505	0.503
	(0.498)	(0.497)	(0.501)	(0.501)	(0.501)
Pro Military Solution	0.472	0.466	0.459	0.521	0.512
	(0.499)	(0.499)	(0.499)	(0.500)	(0.501)
Feel Distant to Minorities	0.282	0.278	0.290	0.272	0.326
	(0.450)	(0.448)	(0.454)	(0.446)	(0.469)
Against Minority Neighbors	0.649	0.644	0.640	0.686	0.692
	(0.477)	(0.479)	(0.481)	(0.465)	(0.462)
Tolerates Severe Measures	0.720	0.715	0.725	0.713	0.776
	(0.449)	(0.451)	(0.447)	(0.453)	(0.418)
Standardized Left vs. Right Political Spectrum Index	0.000	-0.017	0.029	-0.066	0.210
	(1.000)	(1.000)	(0.997)	(0.989)	(0.989)
Standardized Aggression Index	0.000	-.0128	-.0025	.0384	.1082
	(1.000)	(.9923)	(1.0023)	(1.0659)	(1.0164)
Ready to Use Violence if Necessary	0.244	0.236	0.261	0.258	0.298
	(0.429)	(0.424)	(0.440)	(0.438)	(0.458)
Ready to Use Violence if Provoked	0.146	0.142	0.149	0.157	0.181
	(0.353)	(0.349)	(0.356)	(0.365)	(0.386)
Observations	4974	3876	423	318	357

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table 3. The Impact of Conflict Zone Deployment on Direct Combat Experiences

VARIABLES	(1) Armed Combat	(2) Injured	(3) Witnessed Casualties	(4) Any Direct Combat Experience
Panel I: High School Sample, No Controls Variables				
Low-Intensity ACE	0.252***	0.021***	0.215***	0.296***
	(0.025)	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.030)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.371***	0.066***	0.326***	0.435***
	(0.045)	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.051)
High-Intensity ACE	0.568***	0.092***	0.437***	0.611***
	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.035)
R-squared	0.226	0.038	0.160	0.227
Observations	4,231	4,230	4,221	4,232
Panel II: High School Sample, Conditional Random Assignment Controls				
Low-Intensity ACE	0.219***	0.019**	0.195***	0.264***
	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.324***	0.062***	0.296***	0.395***
	(0.040)	(0.010)	(0.035)	(0.045)
High-Intensity ACE	0.495***	0.085***	0.386***	0.545***
	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.324	0.093	0.238	0.314
Observations	4,231	4,230	4,221	4,232
Panel III: High School Sample, Panel II + Exogenous Covariates				
Low ACE	0.218***	0.019**	0.192***	0.261***
	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Medium ACE	0.322***	0.061***	0.295***	0.392***
	(0.040)	(0.010)	(0.036)	(0.046)
Intense ACE	0.496***	0.085***	0.386***	0.546***
	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.032)
R-squared	0.329	0.095	0.244	0.320
Observations	4,231	4,230	4,221	4,232
Panel IV: College Sample, All Controls				
Low-Intensity ACE	0.133**	0.031	0.107	0.221***
	(0.062)	(0.026)	(0.066)	(0.062)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.411***	0.076*	0.389***	0.497***
	(0.091)	(0.045)	(0.112)	(0.107)
High-Intensity ACE	0.501***	0.025	0.438***	0.536***
	(0.075)	(0.035)	(0.085)	(0.080)
R-squared	0.400	0.235	0.364	0.414
Observations	739	738	736	739
Panel II: Full Sample, All Controls				
Low-Intensity ACE	0.211***	0.022**	0.186***	0.257***
	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.329***	0.063***	0.305***	0.399***
	(0.040)	(0.013)	(0.040)	(0.048)
High-Intensity ACE	0.497***	0.081***	0.389***	0.546***
	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.031)
R-squared	0.318	0.088	0.238	0.311
Observations	4,970	4,968	4,957	4,970

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, and training location. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Table 4. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Civic Participation

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Social Participation Index	(3) Community Participation Index	(4) Voted Local Election	(5) Voted General Election	(6) Political Party Member
Panel I. High school Sample, No Control Variables						
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.070	-0.058*	-0.039	-0.002	-0.012	-0.010
	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.068**	-0.036	-0.050	0.002	-0.005	0.013
	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.024)
High-Intensity ACE	0.027	-0.001	0.064	0.002	-0.006	0.017
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.016)
Observations	4,234	4,231	4,231	4,226	4,222	4,229
Panel II. High school Sample, Conditional Random Assignment Controls						
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.102***	-0.082**	-0.083*	-0.002	-0.012	-0.010
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.063*	-0.029	-0.051	0.002	0.001	0.023
	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.022)
High-Intensity ACE	0.016	0.017	0.041	-0.001	-0.003	0.023
	(0.058)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Observations	4,234	4,231	4,231	4,226	4,222	4,229
Panel III. High school Sample, Panel II + Exogenous Covariates						
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.102***	-0.082**	-0.085*	-0.002	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.047)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.064**	-0.030	-0.055	0.002	0.001	0.021
	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.023)
High-Intensity ACE	0.017	0.020	0.041	-0.001	-0.003	0.025*
	(0.058)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Observations	4,234	4,231	4,231	4,226	4,222	4,229
Panel IV. College Sample, All Controls						
Low-Intensity ACE	0.054	-0.125	0.192	0.006	-0.005	-0.017
	(0.151)	(0.223)	(0.168)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.040)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.153	-0.030	-0.145	-0.033	-0.061	0.112*
	(0.162)	(0.286)	(0.141)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.058)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.197	-0.318	-0.081	-0.006	-0.016	0.014
	(0.210)	(0.257)	(0.262)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.075)
Observations	740	740	740	738	737	740
Panel V. Full Sample, All Controls						
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.097**	-0.095**	-0.061	-0.004	-0.013	-0.016
	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.012)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.070*	-0.011	-0.068*	-0.001	-0.004	0.024
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.022)
High-Intensity ACE	0.003	-0.003	0.033	-0.001	-0.004	0.023
	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Observations	4,974	4,971	4,971	4,964	4,959	4,969

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, and training location. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. In Panels I, II, and III, results pertain to individuals with at most 11 years of formal schooling. Panels IV and V present the results for the college and full samples.

Table 5A. Summary Statistics for Direct Combat Involvement by Armed Conflict Intensity, EXPOVIBE Data, Donation Sample

Variable	(1) All	(2) *Non-ACE Service*	(3) *Low-Intensity ACE*	(4) *Medium-Intensity ACE*	(5) *High-Intensity ACE*
Self-Donation	1758.95	1791.91	1681.83	1643.04	1614.04
	(886.19)	(877.40)	(888.56)	(907.58)	(941.35)
Others' Donation Belief	1278.37	1301.12	1257.21	1156.96	1177.11
	(850.46)	(849.11)	(829.10)	(898.78)	(841.72)
Observations	1154	888	104	79	83

Standard deviations in parentheses

Table 5B. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Charitable Donations

VARIABLES	(1) All	(2) In-Group	(3) Out-Group
Panel II. The dependent variable is the Self-Donation Amount			
Low-Intensity ACE	-143.889*	-376.379**	42.015
	(85.723)	(157.398)	(120.873)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-127.866	-121.027	-76.828
	(100.428)	(170.621)	(156.931)
High-Intensity ACE	-226.139**	-260.822	-113.087
	(110.510)	(185.487)	(229.144)
In-Group	114.689**		
	(54.624)		
Observations	1,198	613	585
Panel II. The dependent variable is Others' Donation Belief			
Low-Intensity ACE	-12.597	7.044	-66.665
	(100.059)	(141.277)	(129.815)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-79.230	-147.478	18.591
	(95.497)	(183.688)	(177.277)
High-Intensity ACE	-110.040	-180.294	43.732
	(107.694)	(142.493)	(201.780)
In-Group	27.220		
	(49.067)		
Observations	1,154	593	561

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models specify the full set of controls, including conditional random assignment control variables and exogenous covariates. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. Results pertain to the donation game sample.

Table 6. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities, and Self-Placement in the Right Versus Left Political Spectrum

VARIABLES	(1) Animosity Index	(2) Against Peaceful Solution	(3) Pro Military Solution	(4) Feel Distant to Minorities	(5) Against Minority Neighbors	(6) Tolerates Severe Measures	(7) Political Spectrum Index
Panel I. High school Sample, No Control Variables							
Low-Intensity ACE	0.026	0.045	-0.019	0.008	-0.007	0.018	0.029
	(0.070)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.048)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.113**	0.063*	0.062**	-0.002	0.045	0.010	-0.035
	(0.049)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.072)
High-Intensity ACE	0.204***	0.074***	0.037*	0.034	0.039*	0.065***	0.212***
	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.044)
Observations	4,232	4,037	4,057	4,192	4,192	4,143	3,819
Panel II. High school Sample, Conditional Random Assignment Controls							
Low-Intensity ACE	0.006	0.042	-0.015	-0.010	0.006	0.011	0.050
	(0.061)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.047)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.079	0.052	0.077***	-0.001	0.028	-0.015	-0.042
	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.066)
High-Intensity ACE	0.189***	0.063***	0.043**	0.053*	0.041*	0.038**	0.200***
	(0.038)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.042)
Observations	4,232	4,037	4,057	4,192	4,192	4,143	3,819
Panel III. High school Sample, Panel II + Exogenous Covariates							
Low-Intensity ACE	0.002	0.043	-0.014	-0.013	0.005	0.009	0.049
	(0.062)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.049)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.074	0.052	0.074**	-0.003	0.027	-0.016	-0.046
	(0.054)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.067)
High-Intensity ACE	0.201***	0.069***	0.050**	0.053*	0.045**	0.040**	0.206***
	(0.036)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.039)
Observations	4,232	4,037	4,057	4,192	4,192	4,143	3,819
Panel IV. College Sample, All Controls							
Low-Intensity ACE	0.093	0.063	0.009	0.059	0.013	-0.018	0.041
	(0.155)	(0.083)	(0.103)	(0.062)	(0.091)	(0.099)	(0.219)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.189	0.042	-0.058	-0.060	-0.010	-0.111	-0.236
	(0.151)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.082)	(0.067)	(0.245)
High-Intensity ACE	0.259	-0.089	0.162	0.143	0.003	0.089	0.207
	(0.210)	(0.117)	(0.131)	(0.113)	(0.104)	(0.094)	(0.279)
Observations	740	707	690	738	731	724	683
Panel V. Full Sample, All Controls							
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.002	0.045*	-0.010	-0.012	-0.004	0.007	0.049
	(0.053)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.046)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.061	0.055*	0.065**	-0.009	0.014	-0.010	-0.061
	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.057)
High-Intensity ACE	0.199***	0.054**	0.052**	0.055**	0.042*	0.047**	0.230***
	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.044)
Observations	4,972	4,744	4,747	4,930	4,923	4,867	4,502

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, and training location. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. In Panels I, II, and III, results pertain to individuals with at most 11 years of formal schooling. Panels IV and V present the results for the college and full samples.

Table 7. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities, and Civic Participation, Testing Whether the Effects Persist or Dissipate Over Time

VARIABLES	(1) Any Direct Combat Experience	(2) Civic Participation Index	(3) Animosity Index	(4) Political Spectrum Index
Panel I. Discharged >=10 Years Ago				
Low-Intensity ACE	0.260***	-0.140***	-0.017	0.060
	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.402***	-0.080**	0.070	-0.044
	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.057)
High-Intensity ACE	0.562***	0.004	0.198***	0.204***
	(0.030)	(0.055)	(0.036)	(0.046)
	4,589	4,592	4,590	4,150
Panel II. Discharged >=15 Years Ago				
Low-Intensity ACE	0.261***	-0.121***	0.006	0.062
	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.390***	-0.072	0.081	-0.066
	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.059)	(0.066)
High-Intensity ACE	0.579***	-0.006	0.213***	0.208***
	(0.032)	(0.064)	(0.038)	(0.047)
Observations	3,649	3,652	3,650	3,308
Panel III. Discharged >=20 Years Ago				
Low-Intensity ACE	0.266***	-0.088*	0.019	0.032
	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.075)	(0.075)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.409***	-0.083**	0.067	-0.038
	(0.054)	(0.042)	(0.074)	(0.079)
High-Intensity ACE	0.602***	-0.029	0.205***	0.185***
	(0.041)	(0.069)	(0.043)	(0.054)
Observations	2,532	2,534	2,533	2,304

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models specify the full set of controls, including conditional random assignment control variables and exogenous covariates. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. In each Panel, results pertain to the full sample of individuals satisfying the sample inclusion criterion. Panel I includes those discharged less than twenty years ago. Panel II includes those discharged from service less than twenty years ago.

Table 8. Separating the Impact of Conflict Zone Assignment with and without Direct Combat Exposure on Civic Participation and Political Attitudes

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity Conflict Zone Assignment	-0.105*	-0.012	0.036
	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.063)
Low-Intensity Conflict Zone Assignment with Direct Armed Combat	-0.085	0.016	0.070
	(0.062)	(0.083)	(0.075)
Medium-Intensity Conflict Zone Assignment	-0.144***	0.072	-0.046
	(0.044)	(0.085)	(0.060)
Medium -Intensity Conflict Zone Assignment with Direct Armed Combat	-0.013	0.057	-0.069
	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.087)
High-Intensity Conflict Zone Assignment	0.076	0.100	0.139
	(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.085)
High -Intensity Conflict Zone Assignment with Direct Armed Combat	-0.024	0.244***	0.270***
	(0.052)	(0.058)	(0.050)
Observations	4,974	4,972	4,502

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models specify the full set of controls, including conditional random assignment control variables and exogenous covariates. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. In Panel I, the results pertain to the high school sample. In Panel II, the results pertain to the full sample.

Table 9. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure Intensity on the Aggression Index and Propensity to Resort to Violence, Full Sample

VARIABLES	(1) Aggression Index	(2) Ready to Use Violence if Necessary	(3) Ready to Use Violence if Provoked
Panel I. The Impact of ACE Intensity			
Low-Intensity ACE	0.051	0.029	0.015
	(0.040)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.093	0.025	0.030
	(0.063)	(0.034)	(0.021)
High-Intensity ACE	0.178**	0.072**	0.052**
	(0.067)	(0.033)	(0.025)
Panel II. Separating the Impact of ACE Intensity with and without Direct Combat Exposure			
Low-Intensity ACE	0.011	-0.009	-0.010
	(0.054)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Low-Intensity ACE with Direct Armed Combat	0.113*	0.086***	0.054**
	(0.064)	(0.025)	(0.026)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.003	-0.025	0.013
	(0.110)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Medium -Intensity ACE with Direct Armed Combat	0.168**	0.069	0.046*
	(0.066)	(0.049)	(0.024)
High-Intensity ACE	0.088	-0.013	0.010
	(0.105)	(0.052)	(0.034)
High -Intensity ACE with Direct Armed Combat	0.219***	0.109***	0.070**
	(0.074)	(0.038)	(0.031)
Observations	4,965	4,956	4,958

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models specify the full set of controls, including conditional random assignment control variables and exogenous covariates. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. In Panel I, the results pertain to the high school sample. In Panel II, the results pertain to the full sample.

Appendix Table 1. Estimates of Armed Conflict Exposure Among Turkish Men Conscripted between 1984 and 2011

Direct Combat Experiences	Direct Combat Exposure Risk	Total Conscripted Men With Exposure Risk	The total Number of Exposed
Armed Combat	16.2%	14,072,760	2,279,787
Injured	2.1%	14,072,760	295,528
Witnessed Casualties	15.1%	14,072,760	2,124,987
Any Direct Combat Experience	21.4%	14,072,760	3,011,571

Notes: These calculations are based on the following numbers. About 16,120,000 (roughly 620,000 per year) male births occurred between 1965 and 1990. During this period, about 97% of Turkish men performed military service as conscripts, with close to 90% being eligible to serve in conflict zones. Therefore, about 14,072,760 men were conscripted and had the risk of exposure to direct armed combat between 1984 and 2011. Direct combat exposure rates come from Table 2C. The total number of exposed is calculated by multiplying the total number of conscripted men with the associated exposure risk.

Appendix Table 2. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Robustness to Using Continuous Combatant Casualties at the Location and Time of Service as the Indicator of Armed Conflict Exposure

VARIABLES	(1) High school Sample	(2) College Sample	(3) Full Sample
Height in Centimeters	0.068	-0.033	0.056
	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.046)
Kurdish	2.388	0.231	1.926
	(2.598)	(1.296)	(2.072)
Other Ethnicity	-1.660	1.451	-0.730
	(1.889)	(1.565)	(1.339)
Conscription Age	0.130	-0.017	-0.042
	(0.341)	(0.188)	(0.178)
Rank: Private	1.849	-1.998	1.246
	(1.167)	(1.621)	(0.814)
Rank: Corporal	-0.980	1.606	-0.981
	(0.964)	(2.453)	(0.812)
Sub-Lieutenant		-0.662	0.299
		(3.105)	(2.680)
Training Duration in Months	0.218	0.003	0.201
	(0.797)	(0.594)	(0.589)
Service Length in Months	0.045	-0.796	-0.214
	(0.312)	(0.541)	(0.301)
Joint F-test	*1.20*	*0.86*	*0.87*
Joint F-test P-Value	*0.31*	*0.56*	*0.56*
Observations	4,234	740	4,974
R-squared	0.127	0.271	0.125

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models control for conditional random assignment controls, including fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, and training location. Columns (1), (2), and (3) pertain to the high school, college, and full sample, respectively.

Appendix Table 3A. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Donation Sample

Variable	(1) *Non-ACE Service* Mean/SD	(2) *Low-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(3) *Medium-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(4) *High-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(5) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)
Height in Centimeters	175.778	174.773	176.167	175.876	0.144	-0.056	-0.014
	[8.836]	[6.682]	[7.266]	[4.278]	(0.552)	(0.653)	(0.059)
Turkish	0.915	0.937	0.917	0.944	-0.080	-0.007	-0.105
	[0.321]	[0.260]	[0.222]	[0.168]	(0.843)	(0.481)	(0.606)
Kurdish	0.069	0.045	0.048	0.011	0.097	0.086	0.236
	[0.266]	[0.190]	[0.170]	[0.083]	(0.841)	(0.666)	(0.377)
Other Ethnicity	0.016	0.018	0.036	0.045	-0.016	-0.150	-0.215
	[0.136]	[0.135]	[0.191]	[0.152]	(0.906)	(0.129)	(0.225)
Conscription Age	20.786	20.730	20.750	20.461	0.029	0.018	0.169
	[1.961]	[2.001]	[2.304]	[1.115]	(0.140)	(0.021)	(0.417)
Rank: Private	0.780	0.748	0.738	0.843	0.076	0.099	-0.154
	[0.447]	[0.352]	[0.409]	[0.276]	(0.760)	(0.306)	(0.980)
Rank: Corporal	0.064	0.081	0.083	0.067	-0.069	-0.079	-0.014
	[0.274]	[0.206]	[0.240]	[0.287]	(0.847)	(0.506)	(0.643)
Rank: Sergeant	0.149	0.162	0.179	0.079	-0.037	-0.082	0.201
	[0.338]	[0.279]	[0.355]	[0.206]	(0.971)	(0.358)	(0.449)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.007	0.009	0.000	0.011	-0.018	0.090	-0.043
	[0.085]	[0.095]	[0.000]	[0.083]	(0.517)	(0.249)	(0.498)
Training Duration	2.601	2.883	2.738	2.775	-0.342	-0.166	-0.210
	[0.910]	[0.539]	[0.652]	[1.063]	(0.002)	(0.493)	(0.625)
Service Duration	16.217	16.712	16.679	16.876	-0.174	-0.163	-0.231
	[3.076]	[2.137]	[1.781]	[2.150]	(0.602)	(0.364)	(0.971)
F-test of joint significance (p-value)					*0.250*	*0.136*	*0.643*
Observations	939	111	84	89			

Notes: In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for enlistment year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province fixed effects, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis. Results pertain to the full sample.

Appendix Table 3B. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Donation In-Group Sample

Variable	(1) *Non-ACE Service* Mean/SD	(2) *Low-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(3) *Medium-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(4) *High-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(5) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)
Height in Centimeters	175.470	176.115	176.167	175.566	-0.095	-0.102	-0.014
	[8.349]	[6.733]	[4.006]	[6.212]	(0.354)	(0.683)	(0.499)
Turkish	0.917	0.943	0.944	0.962	-0.098	-0.101	-0.169
	[0.284]	[0.239]	[0.213]	[0.178]	(0.950)	(0.867)	(0.374)
Kurdish	0.073	0.038	0.028	0.019	0.138	0.177	0.215
	[0.261]	[0.203]	[0.145]	[0.116]	(0.869)	(0.597)	(0.090)
Other Ethnicity	0.010	0.019	0.028	0.019	-0.080	-0.162	-0.080
	[0.100]	[0.135]	[0.176]	[0.150]	(0.766)	(0.540)	(0.713)
Conscription Age	20.630	20.887	21.500	20.585	-0.150	-0.483	0.027
	[1.450]	[2.453]	[2.968]	[1.808]	(0.188)	(0.068)	(0.301)
Rank: Private	0.765	0.717	0.639	0.887	0.113	0.294	-0.292
	[0.417]	[0.398]	[0.406]	[0.229]	(0.392)	(0.302)	(0.750)
Rank: Corporal	0.069	0.075	0.111	0.038	-0.027	-0.165	0.125
	[0.281]	[0.229]	[0.251]	[0.206]	(0.997)	(0.476)	(0.876)
Rank: Sergeant	0.156	0.189	0.250	0.075	-0.089	-0.255	0.226
	[0.319]	[0.366]	[0.388]	[0.210]	(0.521)	(0.392)	(0.740)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.010	0.019	0.000	0.000	-0.080	0.106	0.108
	[0.092]	[0.135]	[0.000]	[0.000]	(0.174)	(0.287)	(0.726)
Training Duration	2.601	2.925	2.667	2.792	-0.395	-0.079	-0.229
	[0.902]	[0.590]	[0.741]	[1.051]	(0.009)	(0.721)	(0.666)
Service Duration	16.422	16.792	16.583	16.906	-0.143	-0.062	-0.187
	[2.594]	[2.518]	[2.238]	[2.060]	(0.917)	(0.320)	(0.398)
F-test of joint significance (p-value)					0.331	0.381	0.538
Observations	481	52	36	53			

Notes: In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for enlistment year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province fixed effects, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis. Results pertain to the full sample.

Appendix Table 3C. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Donation Out-Group Sample

Variable	(1) *Non-ACE Service* Mean/SD	(2) *Low-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(3) *Medium-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(4) *High-Intensity ACE* Mean/SD	(5) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(2)	(6) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(3)	(7) Normalized Difference & P-value (1)-(4)
Height in Centimeters	176.103	173.569	176.167	176.333	0.355	-0.009	-0.033
	[6.747]	[6.138]	[8.803]	[7.749]	(0.026)	(0.953)	(0.376)
Turkish	0.913	0.931	0.896	0.917	-0.066	0.059	-0.014
	[0.302]	[0.214]	[0.260]	[0.173]	(0.582)	(0.352)	(0.296)
Kurdish	0.066	0.052	0.062	0.000	0.056	0.012	0.274
	[0.250]	[0.187]	[0.215]	[0.000]	(0.791)	(0.972)	(0.779)
Other Ethnicity	0.022	0.017	0.042	0.083	0.032	-0.130	-0.384
	[0.164]	[0.134]	[0.202]	[0.173]	(0.762)	(0.201)	(0.128)
Conscription Age	20.950	20.586	20.188	20.278	0.168	0.354	0.309
	[2.137]	[1.711]	[0.882]	[0.838]	(0.888)	(0.671)	(0.800)
Rank: Private	0.795	0.776	0.812	0.778	0.047	-0.044	0.042
	[0.383]	[0.338]	[0.348]	[0.401]	(0.446)	(0.804)	(0.241)
Rank: Corporal	0.059	0.086	0.062	0.111	-0.113	-0.015	-0.215
	[0.218]	[0.249]	[0.208]	[0.317]	(0.744)	(0.955)	(0.062)
Rank: Sergeant	0.142	0.138	0.125	0.083	0.011	0.049	0.170
	[0.350]	[0.306]	[0.416]	[0.173]	(0.766)	(0.725)	(0.962)
Sub-Lieutenant	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.028	0.070	0.070	-0.301
	[0.061]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.123]	(0.104)	(0.887)	(0.212)
Training Duration	2.602	2.845	2.792	2.750	-0.294	-0.233	-0.181
	[0.779]	[0.514]	[0.596]	[0.613]	(0.063)	(0.907)	(0.747)
Service Duration	16.002	16.638	16.750	16.833	-0.206	-0.245	-0.269
	[3.369]	[1.538]	[1.051]	[1.664]	(0.777)	(0.293)	(0.530)
F-test of joint significance (p-value)					*0.023*	*0.883*	*0.087*
Observations	458	58	48	36			

Notes: In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for enlistment year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province fixed effects, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis. Results pertain to the out-group sample.

Appendix Table 4A. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Political Participation and Party Membership, Marginal Effects from Logistic Estimates

VARIABLES	(1) Voted Local Election	(2) Voted General Election	(3) Political Party Member
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.006	-0.015*	-0.017
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.003	-0.004	0.029
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.021)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.004	-0.007	0.024*
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.015)
Observations	4,407	4,408	4,549

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. Results pertain to the full sample. Only binary outcome variables are included in this robustness check.

Appendix Table 4B. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities, Marginal Effects from Logistic Estimates

VARIABLES	(1) Against Peaceful Solution	(2) Pro Military Solution	(3) Feel Distant to Minorities	(4) Against Minority Neighbors	(5) Tolerates Severe Measures
Low-Intensity ACE	0.044*	-0.010	-0.011	-0.003	0.006
	(0.024)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.023)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.055*	0.068***	-0.010	0.016	-0.008
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.016)
High-Intensity ACE	0.053**	0.052**	0.054**	0.042*	0.051***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Observations	4,702	4,679	4,862	4,884	4,801

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. Results pertain to the full sample. Only binary outcome variables are included in this robustness check.

Appendix Table 5: The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities, Left-Right Political Leaning, and Civic Participation, Robustness to Using a Measure of Continuous Conflict

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Panel I. Linearly Specified Combatant Casualties in 10			
Combatant Casualties in 10	0.00300	0.02056***	0.01002*
	(0.00396)	(0.00297)	(0.00539)
Observations	4,974	4,972	4,502
Panel II. Quadratically Specified Combatant Casualties in 10			
Combatant Casualties in 10	0.00292	0.02740***	0.04075***
	(0.01015)	(0.00539)	(0.00618)
Combatant Casualties in 10 Squared	0.00000	-0.00028*	-0.00128***
	(0.00027)	(0.00017)	(0.00019)
Observations	4,974	4,972	4,502

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. Results pertain to the full sample. Only binary outcome variables are included in this robustness check.

Appendix Table 6. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities, and Civic Participation Robustness to Subsample Analysis

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Panel I. Land Forces Only			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.107***	-0.005	0.042
	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.074**	0.050	-0.073
	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.062)
High-Intensity ACE	-0.016	0.185***	0.234***
	(0.057)	(0.038)	(0.045)
Observations	4,663	4,662	4,240
Panel II. Months Service >=12			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.090**	0.003	0.041
	(0.039)	(0.056)	(0.045)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.070*	0.058	-0.071
	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.056)
High-Intensity ACE	0.000	0.197***	0.220***
	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.046)
Observations	4,763	4,761	4,301
Panel III. Draft Age < 22			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.103**	0.005	0.062
	(0.044)	(0.060)	(0.048)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.048	0.043	-0.109*
	(0.041)	(0.054)	(0.062)
High-Intensity ACE	0.030	0.184***	0.218***
	(0.059)	(0.042)	(0.052)
Observations	4,301	4,299	3,884
Panel IV. Only Turkish Ethnicity			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.120***	-0.002	0.042
	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.046)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.081*	0.068	-0.041
	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.056)
High-Intensity ACE	0.008	0.181***	0.247***
	(0.058)	(0.036)	(0.048)
Observations	4,508	4,506	4,087

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models specify the full set of controls, including conditional random assignment control variables and exogenous covariates. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. In each Panel, results pertain to the full sample of individuals satisfying the sample inclusion criterion. Panel I excludes sailors and airmen. Panel II excludes those who served less than a year. Panel III excludes those who were drafted after 21 years of age. Panel D excludes those reporting non-Turkish ethnic backgrounds.

Appendix Table 7: The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities, Left-Right Political Leaning, and Civic Participation, Robustness to Selection on Observables and Unobservables

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.096***	-0.002	0.049
	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.046)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.002	0.061	-0.061
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.057)
High-Intensity ACE	0.030	0.199***	0.230***
	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.044)
Observations	4,972	4,972	4,972
Oster's beta: Low-Intensity ACE	-0.108	-0.006	0.055
Oster's beta: Medium-Intensity ACE	0.007	0.058	-0.058
Oster's beta: High-Intensity ACE	0.029	0.195	0.232

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. Results pertain to the full sample. Only binary outcome variables are included in this robustness check.

Appendix Table 8. The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities, Full Sample, Robustness Clustering at Different Levels

VARIABLES	(3) Civic Participation Index	(1) Animosity Index	(2) Left vs. Right Politic al Spectrum Index
Panel I. Training Province			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.096**	-0.002	0.049
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.041)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.002	0.061	-0.061
	(0.038)	(0.057)	(0.056)
High-Intensity ACE	0.030	0.199***	0.230***
	(0.069)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Panel II. Birth Province			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.096**	-0.002	0.049
	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.064)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.002	0.061	-0.061
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.060)
High-Intensity ACE	0.030	0.199***	0.230***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.075)
Panel III. Branch by Draft Year			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.096**	-0.002	0.049
	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.048)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.002	0.061	-0.061
	(0.069)	(0.050)	(0.067)
High-Intensity ACE	0.030	0.199***	0.230***
	(0.058)	(0.073)	(0.071)
Panel IV. Branch by Occupation			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.096***	-0.002	0.049
	(0.034)	(0.069)	(0.056)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.002	0.061	-0.061
	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.069)
High-Intensity ACE	0.030	0.199***	0.230***
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.070)
Panel V. Branch by Occupation by Draft Year			
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.096*	-0.002	0.049
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.002	0.061	-0.061
	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.059)
High-Intensity ACE	0.030	0.199***	0.230***
	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.073)
Observations	4,974	4,972	4,502

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the birth province are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models specify the full set of controls, including conditional random assignment control variables and exogenous covariates. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. All results pertain to the full sample.

Appendix Table 9: The Impact of Armed Conflict Exposure on Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities, and Civic Participation, Robustness to Multiple Hypothesis Testing

VARIABLES	(1) Civic Participation Index	(2) Animosity Index	(3) Political Spectrum Index
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.015	-0.002	0.049
	(0.012)	(0.053)	(0.046)
	[0.179]	[0.971]	[0.545]
	{0.179}	{0.971}	{0.726}
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.024	0.061	-0.061
	(0.022)	(0.052)	(0.057)
	[0.976]	[0.448]	[0.448]
	{0.976}	{0.597}	{0.597}
High-Intensity ACE	0.022	0.199***	0.230***
	(0.015)	(0.039)	(0.044)
	[0.633]	[0.002]	[0.003]
	{0.633}	{0.002}	{0.003}
Observations	4,969	4,972	4,502

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models specify the full set of controls, including conditional random assignment control variables and exogenous covariates. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration. The results pertain to the full sample. Multiple hypothesis testing p-values based on Simes' (1986) method are in square brackets. Multiple hypothesis testing p-values based on Hochberg's (1988) method are in curly brackets.

Appendix Table 10. Robustness to Controlling for Work Status, Income, and Ability to Save

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel I. Civic Participation Index					
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.097**	-0.090**	-0.092**	-0.099**	-0.087**
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.070*	-0.071**	-0.069*	-0.069*	-0.069*
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)
High-Intensity ACE	0.003	-0.002	0.009	0.004	0.004
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Observations	4,974	4,974	4,974	4,974	4,974
Panel II. Animosity Index					
Low-Intensity ACE	-0.002	-0.001	-0.005	-0.003	-0.005
	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Medium-Intensity ACE	0.061	0.060	0.057	0.058	0.053
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
High-Intensity ACE	0.199***	0.199***	0.196***	0.202***	0.199***
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Observations	4,972	4,972	4,972	4,972	4,972
Panel III. Political Spectrum Index					
Low-Intensity ACE	0.049	0.047	0.049	0.045	0.042
	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.049)
Medium-Intensity ACE	-0.061	-0.061	-0.059	-0.059	-0.059
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.055)
High-Intensity ACE	0.230***	0.229***	0.229***	0.231***	0.225***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Observations	4,502	4,502	4,502	4,502	4,502
Controls for:					
Work status	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Income	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Monthly savings	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the province of military service are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All models specify the full set of controls, including conditional random assignment control variables and exogenous covariates. Conditional random assignment controls include fixed effects for the branch of service, military occupation, birth province, educational attainment, service timing, training location, and half-term service indicator. Exogenous covariates include height, minority status indicators, enlistment age, military rank dummies, training, and service duration.

Appendix Table 11. Evidence on the Exogeneity of Armed Conflict Exposure, Full Sample, Balance Test by Service in an Armed Conflict Zone with and without Direct Combat Experiences.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
	Non-ACE Service	*Low-Intensity ACE* No Direct Exposure	*Low-Intensity ACE* With Direct Exposure	*Medium-Intensity ACE* No Direct Exposure	*Medium-Intensity ACE* With Direct Exposure	*High-Intensity ACE* No Direct Exposure	*High-Intensity ACE* With Direct Exposure	Normalized Difference & P-value	Normalized Difference & P-value	Normalized Difference & P-value	Normalized Difference & P-value	Normalized Difference & P-value	Normalized Difference & P-value
Variable	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	Mean/SD	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(1)-(4)	(1)-(5)	(1)-(6)	(1)-(7)
Height in Centimeters	175.520	175.049	174.989	175.014	175.517	174.969	175.548	0.067	0.076	0.073	0.001	0.079	-0.004
	[8.866]	[5.833]	[8.142]	[6.615]	[5.383]	[7.465]	[2.550]	(0.146)	(0.661)	(0.259)	(0.785)	(0.333)	(0.059)
Turkish Ethnicity	0.905	0.903	0.914	0.907	0.904	0.928	0.923	0.004	-0.033	-0.009	0.000	-0.079	-0.062
	[0.304]	[0.300]	[0.257]	[0.188]	[0.229]	[0.214]	[0.267]	(0.316)	(0.924)	(0.242)	(0.787)	(0.412)	(0.488)
Kurdish	0.072	0.073	0.046	0.057	0.045	0.062	0.050	-0.002	0.102	0.058	0.105	0.039	0.085
	[0.258]	[0.270]	[0.201]	[0.201]	[0.199]	[0.198]	[0.241]	(0.277)	(0.473)	(0.447)	(0.046)	(0.156)	(0.756)
Other Ethnicity	0.023	0.024	0.040	0.036	0.051	0.010	0.027	-0.005	-0.108	-0.080	-0.175	0.088	-0.023
	[0.111]	[0.167]	[0.172]	[0.190]	[0.208]	[0.110]	[0.114]	(0.843)	(0.597)	(0.441)	(0.103)	(0.543)	(0.305)
Conscription Age	20.670	20.492	20.491	20.714	20.275	20.464	20.390	0.099	0.099	-0.025	0.220	0.114	0.157
	[1.892]	[1.295]	[1.787]	[2.319]	[1.355]	[1.603]	[0.952]	(0.572)	(0.891)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.680)	(0.647)
Rank: Private	0.786	0.798	0.749	0.821	0.775	0.887	0.826	-0.029	0.092	-0.086	0.027	-0.246	-0.098
	[0.543]	[0.380]	[0.515]	[0.284]	[0.511]	[0.377]	[0.326]	(0.936)	(0.705)	(0.994)	(0.786)	(0.156)	(0.658)
Rank: Corporal	0.067	0.056	0.069	0.064	0.062	0.031	0.050	0.041	-0.008	0.009	0.019	0.144	0.066
	[0.246]	[0.227]	[0.256]	[0.218]	[0.240]	[0.106]	[0.156]	(0.547)	(0.986)	(0.766)	(0.819)	(0.062)	(0.352)
Rank: Sergeant	0.139	0.121	0.183	0.107	0.157	0.082	0.116	0.052	-0.127	0.092	-0.053	0.164	0.067
	[0.412]	[0.382]	[0.377]	[0.276]	[0.364]	[0.395]	[0.340]	(0.692)	(0.404)	(0.796)	(0.596)	(0.691)	(0.995)
Rank: Sub-Lieutenant	0.008	0.024	0.000	0.007	0.006	0.000	0.008	-0.167	0.093	0.012	0.029	0.092	0.006
	[0.102]	[0.144]	[0.000]	[0.085]	[0.074]	[0.000]	[0.104]	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.977)	(0.822)	(0.145)	(0.785)
Training Duration	2.603	2.734	2.793	2.793	2.820	2.711	2.857	-0.164	-0.239	-0.239	-0.273	-0.136	-0.321
	[1.208]	[0.802]	[0.452]	[0.526]	[0.802]	[0.434]	[0.808]	(0.212)	(0.081)	(0.012)	(0.243)	(0.329)	(0.197)
Service Duration	16.387	16.685	16.874	16.893	16.753	16.814	17.270	-0.108	-0.177	-0.183	-0.133	-0.154	-0.322
	[4.373]	[2.452]	[1.317]	[2.035]	[2.501]	[2.698]	[2.033]	(0.085)	(0.863)	(0.641)	(0.414)	(0.778)	(0.517)
F-test of joint (p-value)								*0.151*	*0.503*	*0.488*	*0.440*	*0.705*	*0.704*
Observations	3876	247	175	140	178	97	259						

Notes: In columns (1) to (4), means and standard deviations by ACE are presented. Standard deviations are in square brackets. In columns (5) to (7), normalized differences are obtained by controlling for enlistment year fixed effects, the branch of service indicators, military occupation dummies, birth province fixed effects, training province fixed effects, and dichotomous educational attainment indicators. P-values, adjusted for clustering on the province of military service, for normalized differences are in parenthesis. Results pertain to the full sample.

Data Appendix A: Direct Combat Experiences Questions

1. *Were you ever involved in armed combat during your regular service? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
2. *Were you ever wounded in armed combat during your regular service? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
3. *Was anyone around you ever injured or killed during in armed combat during your regular service? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

Data Appendix B: Civic Participation Questions

1. *Are you a member of any charity organization? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
2. *Are you a member of any compatriot association? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
3. *Are you a member of any sports club? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
4. *Are you a member of any trade union? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
5. *Are you a member of any religious club, association, mosque development association or community? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
6. *Are you a member of any environmental organization or association? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
7. *Are you a member of any trade association or chamber of lawyers? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
8. *Are you a member of any alumni association? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
9. *Are you a member of any school family union? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
10. *Are you a member of any community association? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
11. *Are you a member of any social club? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
12. *Are you a member of any political party? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
13. *Did you vote in the last local elections that were held on March 31, 2019? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
14. *Did you vote in the presidential and parliamentary elections that were held on June 24, 2018? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

Data Appendix C: Altruism Questions

In this part of our survey, you have a chance to earn a monetary prize as well as a chance to make a donation. In cooperation with local NGO's and municipalities in Amasya (Hakkari) we have identified a family in need. Your donation will go to this family anonymously. Your identity will not be told to anyone so you can freely make your decision. We give you a 2500 TL budget and we ask you to determine how much you would like to donate to this family in need. The money you decide not to donate is going to be your own payoff from this question.

This donation question will be asked to 1250 randomly selected respondents like yourself. When our field survey is completed, your answers will be coded into an electronic database and according to the order of coding of questionnaire forms, each participant will be given an id number from 1 to 1250. The lucky participants whose forms get coded in the 500th and 1000th order and thus receive id numbers 500 and 1000 will actually realize their choices in question. They will each receive from us a gift check in the amount they did not donate while we will give the family the total amount they donated.

Now please indicate the amount you would like to donate to this family. To guarantee the privacy of your answers the interviewer will turn his back to you when you write down your answer. When you are finished, please fold the page from the dotted lines to cover your answers and take out the protective band at the corner to fix the fold.

I donate .....TL to the family in need.

(To be asked after the respondent hands in the sealed form)

Here is a final question that can get you another 500TL prize. How much do you think the other lucky participant will have donated? If you can guess the other donation with a 200 TL error margin, in the event that you win we will add 500TL to your gift check.

Data Appendix D: Attitudes Towards Conflict Resolution and Minorities Questions

1. *How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 'The government should try every means of negotiation and communicate with everyone who can help to resolve the Kurdish issue peacefully'? (Possible Answers: 1 = "I disagree completely"; 2 = "I somewhat disagree"; 3 = "I am undecided"; 4 = "I somewhat agree"; 5 = "I completely agree"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

2. *Which of the following do you think is the best method for bringing an end to the armed conflict and terrorism that has been going on in the south-east of our country since 1984? (Possible Answers: 1 = "Peace talks between all parties"; 2 = "The formulation of a political solution in the Turkish Grand National Assembly"; 3 = "Intensifying military operations, armed combat"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

3. *For everyone, there are identities that are distant. Please indicate whether you think the following identities are distant to you. (Possible Answers: 1 – Yes, 2 – No, 99 – Don't know/no answer)*
    a. *Do you find the Kurdish identity distant?*
    b. *Do you find the Alevite identity distant?*
    c. *Do you find the Circassian identity distant?*
    d. *Do you find the Laz identity distant?*

4. *Please indicate if you would object to having the following people as your neighbors. (Possible Answers: 1 – I would object, 2 – I would not object, 99 – Don't know/no*

answer)

a. *Would you object to having a Kurdish family as your neighbors?*
b. *Would you object to have a family that speaks a different native language to you as your neighbors?*
c. *Would you object to have a Syrian refugee family as your neighbors?*
d. *Would you object to have an Alevite family as your neighbors?*

5. *Using the 5-point scale below, please indicate how much you agree with the following statement: 'Our country is in such a mess that even the most stringent measures can be used so long as they put us back on the right path and eradicate the traitors.' (Possible Answers: 1 = "I disagree completely"; 2 = "I somewhat disagree"; 3 = "I am undecided; 4 = I somewhat agree"; 5 = "I agree completely"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

6. *We often hear about the left and right in politics. Where would you locate your political position on the left-right point scale below in which zero indicates far-left and 10 indicates far-right? (Possible Answers: Scale 1 to 10: 0 = "Far-left", 10 = "Far-right"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)*

Data Appendix E: Aggression Questions
The Brief Aggression Questionnaire (Webster et al., 2013)

Using the 5-point scale, indicate how much the following statement represents you (Scale 1 to 5: 1 = "I am not like this at all", 5 = "I am completely like this"; 99 – Don't know/no answer)

1. *"If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will."*
2. *"When people are especially nice to me, I wonder what they want."*
3. *"I tell my friends openly when I disagree with them."*
4. *"Given enough provocation, I may hit another person."*
5. *"Good things always seem to happen to others."*
6. *"I am an even-tempered person."*
7. *"When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them."*
8. *"There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows."*
9. *"Sometimes I fly off the handle for no good reason."*
10. *"I sometimes feel that people are laughing at me behind my back."*
11. *"I have trouble controlling my temper."*
12. *"My friends say I am somewhat argumentative."*