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OPIOID USE AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. MILITARY

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**ABSTRACT**

There is significant interest in understanding the labor market consequences of the opioid epidemic, but little is known about how opioid use impacts on-the-job productivity. We analyze the impact of opioid initiation in the emergency department (ED) on workforce outcomes in the Military using linked medical and administrative personnel data for active duty service members from 2008 to 2017. Exploiting quasi-random assignment of patients to physicians in the ED, we find that assignment to a high-intensity opioid prescribing physician increases the probability of long-term opioid use and leads to subsequent negative effects on work capacity, job performance, and productivity. We also analyze the mechanisms underlying these negative workforce outcomes. While opioid use does not negatively affect measures of physical job performance, we find large increases in behavioral problems which lead to disciplinary actions and job separation.

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## 1. Introduction

The United States is in the midst of an unprecedented opioid epidemic. Since 1999, opioid prescriptions have quadrupled and there have been almost 500,000 overdose deaths involving opioids (CDC (2021)). While much of the evidence has focused on the mortality and health consequences of this epidemic (Maclean et al. (2021)), the impacts on the U.S. labor market and economy are less explored. Krueger (2017) conjectured that the massive decline in the labor force participation rate since 2000 could be driven in part by the opioid epidemic, which began around the same time as this decline.<sup>1</sup> Some have also speculated that rising opioid use during the coronavirus pandemic contributed to recent labor shortages (Rockeman (2021)). However, evidence suggests that the direction of causality runs in both directions; while opioid abuse may lead to job loss (e.g., Aliprantis et al. (2019), Harris et al. (2020), Park and Powell (2021)), job loss also spurs more opioid abuse (e.g., Case and Deaton (2015); Hollingsworth et al. (2017), Pierce and Schott (2020), Venkataramani et al. (2020)). Furthermore, a multitude of other factors—such as population aging, trade shocks, and automation—have contributed to the two-decade-long decline in labor supply (Abraham and Kearney (2020)).

Prior research on the labor market consequences of the opioid epidemic has largely focused on aggregate and extensive margin measures of labor supply—primarily employment. However, 63% of adults who report misusing prescription opioids are currently employed (NSDUH, 2020).<sup>2</sup> How opioid use impacts workers' performance and productivity on the job is largely unknown. In this paper, we provide some of the first evidence on how opioid use affects work capacity, job performance, and productivity. We unpack the mechanisms leading to job separation and study behaviors impacting productivity.

To do this, we use administrative data from the U.S. military, the largest employer in the country. We link medical and personnel records for the universe of active duty soldiers from 2008 to 2017. The medical records include medical and prescription drug claims and random drug screenings for active duty military members. Personnel files contain employment and performance measures, such as promotions and demotions, disciplinary actions, physical fitness

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<sup>1</sup> The CDC dates the first wave of the opioid epidemic as beginning in the 1990s (<https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html>).

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.samhsa.gov/data/report/2019-nsduh-detailed-tables> (see Table 1.60A). This figure represents the proportion of adults ages 18+ reporting misuse of opioids who are employed full-time or part-time.

metrics, and job separations. The records include detailed codes describing the reason for job separation, allowing us to observe voluntary and involuntary discharges. These measures provide an unusually rich characterization of productivity and workforce capability that goes beyond the labor supply outcomes studied in the prior literature.

The military setting is ideal for studying the impacts of opioid use on workforce outcomes for several reasons. First, the Military Health System (MHS) provides a data linkage between longitudinal healthcare and personnel workforce records that is not typically available in the U.S. labor market. This allows us to observe how job performance evolves after an initial opioid prescription. Second, we are able to continuously follow a large proportion of members over time due to multi-year enlistment contracts which limit turnover in the military. Third, job performance is frequently evaluated and observed through records of promotions and demotions, and direct performance measures (e.g., physical fitness tests) that are assessed at least annually. These outcomes are rarely observed and collected in the civilian labor market. Fourth, military members are highly exposed to opioids, with almost one-quarter of active duty military members filling an opioid prescription in 2017 (Peters et al. (2019)), and are at risk for negative long-term consequences of opioid use. Finally, opioid use driven productivity consequences have important policy implications for the military's readiness for future missions.

Our empirical approach leverages the quasi-random assignment of patients to physicians when they visit the emergency department (ED) in the military health system. We show that there is wide variation in opioid prescribing behavior across emergency medicine physicians, even within the same hospital and for patients with the same diagnosis. We use the physician's opioid prescribing propensity as an instrument for whether the patient receives an opioid prescription in the ED. We then estimate the impact of receiving an opioid prescription on long-term opioid use and workforce outcomes. We estimate these effects for opioid-naïve individuals to measure the impact of initial opioid exposure. We focus on the ED because patients do not have the ability to request a specific physician in this setting and opioids are frequently prescribed in the ED—about one-quarter of the visits in our sample resulted in an opioid prescription. Prior work has used this strategy to show that receiving an opioid prescription in the ED increases the probability of long-term opioid use, opioid use disorder, and overdose death

(Barnett et al. (2017), Barnett et al. (2019), Eichmeyer and Zhang (2021)). However, this strategy has not been used to study labor market outcomes.

Conditioning on hospital, diagnosis, and other patient characteristics, we find that patients assigned to a physician with a 10 percentage point higher prescribing propensity are 8.7 percentage points more likely to receive an opioid prescription in the ED. In line with the prior literature, our instrumental variable estimates show that receiving an opioid prescription in the ED increases the probability of long-term opioid use (filling more than 180 days supply of opioids in the following year) and doctor shopping—two indicators of potential opioid misuse. We further find that individuals who receive an opioid in the ED are 37% more likely to fail a drug screening test in the year following the visit. However, since the majority of the increase in drug test failures are for individuals with a legal opioid prescription, the screening tests do not alone trigger disciplinary actions or job separations.

While the pain relief benefits of opioids could have positive effects on productivity after an acute injury or condition, we find that opioid initiation has, on average, large downstream negative impacts on workforce measures that reduce the productivity of military personnel. Three main findings lead to this conclusion. First, job performance declines following opioid initiation. Our instrumental variable estimates show that the probability of receiving a job promotion decreases by 5% in the year after obtaining a first opioid prescription (relative to a baseline promotion rate of 28%). Job demotions, which occur more infrequently, increase by 3%, although this estimate is not statistically significant. These negative job performance effects persist through our two years of follow-up.

Second, we document behavioral problems that contribute to lower productivity and job separations. We find an 11% increase in the likelihood that a military member is flagged for an adverse action, i.e., misconduct that could result in discipline or separation, including tardiness, unexcused absences, poor attitude, or not performing assigned duties satisfactorily. In contrast, we do not find evidence of an increase in being flagged for a criminal investigation or drug abuse. The latter finding is consistent with our results that most opioid-positive drug tests are accompanied by a legal prescription. Overall, job separations increase by 8% following opioid initiation. Discipline-related discharges increase by 24% and explain almost half of this increase while the remainder of the increase is due to voluntary separations—non-renewal of contracts

and retirement— which may reflect changes in members’ preferences for work or reduced ability to work. Additionally, we show that receiving an opioid prescription has no effect on job separations for medical disability or death, supporting our identifying assumption that patients’ assignment to physicians is unrelated to the severity of their injury or health condition. Thus, the receipt of an opioid, and not the medical condition itself, is the mechanism underlying changes in workforce outcomes.

Third, we do not find evidence that a member’s physical job performance is limited after opioid initiation. Physical fitness test scores and test passing rates are unchanged following receipt of an opioid prescription. The ability to manage pain may offset the negative effects of opioids in this case. However, an important caveat is that our physical fitness test results exclude the most severely injured who can be excused from testing with a physician’s note.

In summary, we find significant negative effects of opioids on work performance and turnover, which may impact employers’ overall productivity and generate higher recruitment and employee retention costs. These effects are largely driven by behavioral issues rather than limitations to physical work capacity. Moreover, behavioral infractions are more common than criminal misconduct among opioid users. Finally, our heterogeneity analyses show that the likelihood that members transition from opioid initiation to negative employment outcomes is related to socio-demographic characteristics. For example, having less than a college education or pre-existing mental health conditions predicts a greater likelihood of negative workforce outcomes in response to opioid initiation. The findings suggest that policies improving the targeting of opioid treatment and access to substance abuse treatment can enhance productivity.

This study contributes to several lines of research. First, we contribute to the literature on the impact of opioid use on labor market outcomes by using individual-level data to study a rich set of performance and productivity outcomes within the firm. Prior studies find negative effects of opioid use on employment and earnings (Aliprantis et al. (2019), Savych et al. (2019); Harris et al. (2020), Park and Powell (2021), Powell (2021), Beheshti (2022)). However, none of these studies provide insights into workplace productivity outcomes such as job performance and work capacity, nor do they distinguish the mechanisms behind job separations. Furthermore, there is limited evidence using individual-level data due to the difficulty of linking prescriptions with workforce outcomes. Two exceptions are studies using Danish administrative data that leverage

patient movers (Laird and Nielsen (2017)) and physician peer effects (Thingholm (2020)) to study the impact of opioid use on earnings and receipt of sick leave or disability insurance.

Second, we contribute to the nascent research on behavioral issues and criminal activity in the workplace. Long-term opioid use has been associated with a wide variety of cognitive and mental changes, including mood alteration, difficulty fulfilling obligations, and less attentiveness that can affect workplace behavior and lead to criminal activity (Winkelman (2018)). However, little evidence documents how workplace behavior changes after opioid initiation. Evidence on the impact of opioid use on criminal activity is more well established, however, the magnitudes of the effects vary dramatically (Meinhofer (2016), Mallat (2018), Mallat (2020), Dave et al. (2021), Deiana et al. (2021)). Relative to the literature, we find small effects of opioid use on criminal behavior, but large effects on non-criminal behavioral problems.

Third, we add to the broader literature studying the relationship between medical innovations and labor supply. Access to non-opioid pain medications has been shown to improve labor market outcomes (Garthwaite (2012), Bütikofer and Skira (2018)), although these drugs do not have the same addictive properties as opioids. Generally, prior studies have focused on innovations which improve both health and economic well-being (Currie and Madrian (1999)), however, we show that medical innovations, such as those in pain management, can create a tradeoff between health benefits and risks that can have detrimental labor supply effects.

Finally, we show how opioid use has negatively impacted military productivity for active duty service members. Prior research has focused largely on veterans and on the health consequences of opioid use. Opioid abuse among veterans is a growing concern, as opioid-related mortality among veterans increased by 50% from 2000 to 2016 (Lin et al. 2019). Eichmeyer and Zhang (2021) find that opioid initiation in the ED among veterans increases long-term opioid use by 21%, and opioid overdose mortality by 45% within 3 years.<sup>3</sup> Cesur et al. (2019) find that combat induced opioid abuse leads to annual healthcare costs of \$1.04 billion.

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<sup>3</sup> Barnett et al. (2019) show that veterans' opioid initiation in the ED increases long-term opioid use. In ongoing work, Eichmeyer and Zhang (2020) find similar results on long-term opioid use for veterans exposed to a high prescribing primary care physician, suggesting that the effects may generalize across healthcare service settings.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide institutional background on the Military Health System. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy. We present the results in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.

## **2. Background on the Military Health System**

The setting for this paper is the Military Health System (MHS), a distinct entity from the Veterans Health Administration, which is both a payer and provider of care for active duty military service-members, military retirees, and their families. The MHS is a two part system. It provides care in a “direct-care” system that includes 51 military hospitals on military bases and over 400 outpatient clinics. The MHS also includes the Tricare insurance benefit that pays for medical services both in the direct-care system and in the civilian market (“purchased care”). Active duty military beneficiaries must enroll in “Tricare Prime,” an HMO plan that has near-zero out-of-pocket costs and requires that members receive most care in Military facilities. Active duty members can obtain primary care in the civilian market, but only if they live more than 1 hour away from the nearest military clinic. Additionally, active duty members must have pre-authorization before seeking care in a civilian emergency room or urgent care clinic unless they are traveling and away from their assigned military base. For this reason, most active duty members will receive care at the military base where they reside.

We focus on military emergency departments in this study. MHS EDs are run in a similar fashion as civilian EDs, with the main difference being that they employ active duty physicians. The emergency care physician assignment to a patient in a military hospital is quasi-random. A patient that enters the ED is first triaged by a nurse and then placed in a queue for the next available ED physician. Hospitals vary in how they determine the next available ED physician — i.e., it could be based on the provider’s assigned bed or first-come first-serve (see Chan (2016) for an example) — but at no time can the patient request a specific physician.

## **3. Data**

We use administrative medical data for the universe of active duty soldiers from the Military Health System Data Repository (MDR) covering 2008-2017. The MDR data include medical claims for inpatient and outpatient services as well as pharmaceutical records. These records include all claims for military members regardless of the site of care, including claims from

civilian medical providers. We use data from all military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) for most of our analyses, although we focus on the Army in some specifications where the outcome measure is unavailable for other services.

We link these medical records with a rich dataset of workforce measures that come from multiple military personnel systems including the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and Integrated Total Army Personnel Database (ITAPD). These data include information on employment, promotions, demotions, adverse disciplinary actions, separations, and drug and physical fitness testing. Demographic variables include age, race, gender, marital status, education, military rank, job title, and military tenure.

### *3.1 Sample Construction*

We construct a sample of emergency department (ED) visits in hospitals located on U.S. military bases. We allocate prescription opioids filled within 7 days of the ED visit to the ED physician.<sup>4</sup> As described in more detail in Section 4, we compute a leave-out, residualized opioid prescribing rate for each physician as our instrument for receiving an opioid prescription. We restrict our sample to physicians that treat more than 10 patients in the ED in a year. We also limit our sample to ED visits for patients who are opioid-naïve (i.e., patients who did not fill an opioid prescription within the 6 months prior to the index ED visit (Barnett et al. 2017)). This allows us to measure outcomes associated with opioid initiation. Our final sample includes 1,658,881 ED visits from 2008-2017.

### *3.2 Outcome Measures*

#### *3.2.1 Opioid Prescriptions and Misuse*

We use multiple measures to track opioid use in the year following the index ED visit. We examine the number of opioid prescriptions filled and whether the patient received opioid prescriptions from 7 or more different providers—an indicator of “doctor shopping”.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The cutoff of 7 days is a common metric used in the literature (Barnett et al. 2017). There is only a slight difference in the number of prescriptions included in our sample when we use smaller windows such as 3 days. Although relatively rare, we allow for multiple ED visits for the same person and treat each one as a new index visit. However, we exclude any ED visits occurring within 7 days of the initial visit to allow for accurate attribution of the opioid prescription.

<sup>5</sup> While prior work often uses 5 or more opioid prescribers in the year to measure doctor shopping (e.g., Buchmueller and Carey (2018)) we use a cutoff of 7 or more opioid prescribers because military members generally

Additionally, we measure long-term opioid use, which is defined as filling more than 180 days supply of opioids within the year following the ED visit, excluding the initial prescription. This measure, which has been used in prior work (Barnett et al. 2017), is an indicator of potential opioid dependency or misuse since clinical guidelines recommend a much shorter course of treatment for acute medical conditions (CDC (2020a) & (2020b)).

As a complementary measure of opioid misuse, we use data from random drug screening tests. The military randomly tests 10% of service members each month and tests 100% of members once per year. We measure whether the patient failed a drug test within one year following the ED visit by type of drug (opioid, heroin, marijuana, benzodiazepines, and all other drugs). We also observe whether the member had an “excused reason” for test failure (i.e., they had been prescribed an opioid). The drug screening data allow us to capture illicit opioid and other drug use not captured in the prescription data.

### *3.2.2 Job Performance*

First, we study promotions and demotions as an observable measure of job performance. Promotions occur frequently in the military. Promotions for the lowest ranks (Private through Private First Class) are largely automatic based on time in service, but there is some discretion in promotion decisions at the margin. Promotions for mid-level enlisted ranks (Specialist to Staff Sergeant), however, are largely merit based. We exclude promotions for officers because they are rare in our data and made through a centralized decision process, some of which must be approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee. We would be underpowered to identify effects on these types of promotions. We also study demotions, which occur less frequently (about 4% of service members are demoted each year). Demotions occur when a service member violates the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and can include relatively minor infractions such as showing up late for work or disrespecting a more senior non-commissioned officer as well as larger infractions that could result in a court-martial.<sup>6</sup>

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have a higher number of visits with different providers compared to other populations (only 0.3% of military service members are categorized as exhibiting doctor shopping behavior).

<sup>6</sup> We measure promotions by evaluating whether a service member’s rank is higher than the rank at the time of the ED visit within 1 and 2 years after the ED visit. Likewise, we evaluate a demotion if the rank is lower than the rank at the time of the ED visit. In some instances, it is possible that a member is promoted and demoted. In such cases, we only count the first change in rank. If multiple promotions and demotions occur (which happens in only <0.2% of cases) we count these events as both promotions and demotions.

Second, we study disciplinary actions, formally known as “Suspension of Favorable Personnel Actions (SFPA) Flags.” These records are available for the Army only. We evaluate whether any SFPA was recorded and the type of SFPA: discipline flag, criminal investigation flag, and flag for drug or alcohol abuse. The “discipline flag” includes minor infractions, such as being late to work and unexcused absences, but excludes drug and alcohol offenses and all other categories such as security violations and domestic violence.

Third, we study failure to obtain a security clearance which is an indicator of performance issues. Security clearances are essential for performing the tasks of most military jobs and are needed for career advancement (among our ED sample, 79% hold a security clearance at baseline). Obtaining a security clearance involves an extensive background check. Some of the factors that contribute to being denied a security clearance could include drug and alcohol involvement, criminal conduct, and financial considerations (e.g., running up debt). Moreover, once a member has a security clearance, having it revoked is considered a serious violation that would end most military careers. We focus on three binary outcomes: whether one holds a security clearance, whether one was denied a security clearance, and whether one had their security clearance revoked.

### *3.2.3 Work Capacity*

As a direct measure of work capacity, we use data from physical fitness tests to measure an individual’s physical readiness for the job. The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) is administered to each Army service member at least once per year, although most service members will take 2 tests per year (often in the spring and fall). The APFT is designed to test physical strength, endurance, and cardio-respiratory fitness. Individuals who are injured are exempt from taking the test as long as they have a formal medical provider’s note. We study whether individuals take the APFT, pass the APFT, and whether their test score (which is standardized to the Z-score) is impacted by opioid receipt.

We also evaluate the physical capabilities of Army members with scores from the Physical Capability Grading System. These scores are derived from the Periodic Health Assessment (PHA) that Army members receive annually. In this assessment, a physician

conducts a physical exam to assess a member's current health status and identifies any medical conditions. They also conduct a behavioral health screening. We focus on the physical and the behavioral assessment Z-score as our outcomes of interest.

### 3.2.4 *Employment Separation*

Finally, we study job separations as a consequence of poor performance or limited work capacity. Approximately 17% of service members in our data leave the military within a year of the index ED visit. Job separations occur for voluntary and non-voluntary reasons. Voluntary separations generally occur when the current contract expires and the service member makes the choice to not sign a new contract.<sup>7</sup> Non-voluntary exits occur generally for disciplinary or medical reasons.

Military separations are classified in two distinct ways in our data. First, a reason code is entered for the separation. There are more than one-hundred reason codes which are highly descriptive. The most common reason is "expiration of term of service," or the end of the contract. Other codes include reasons such as: "pattern of minor disciplinary infractions", "civil court conviction" and "desertion." We analyze the universe of discharges and create 7 categories to classify the reason codes as follows: non-renewal of contract or retirement, discipline, failure to meet physical standards, substance abuse, other non-discipline, medical, and uncharacterized.

Second, service member exits are separately given a character of separation code that impacts their military benefits: "Honorable", "General", "Other than Honorable," "Bad Conduct", and "Dishonorable." An important note is that while the reason code is not punitive in nature, a "General" discharge, for instance, makes the service member ineligible to reenter the military and precludes use of GI bill education benefits. Any discharge below "Honorable" requires legal justification and is administratively burdensome. This means that a service member may exit with a negative reason code but still receive an honorable discharge. Thus, Honorable discharges can be given for both voluntary (e.g., contract end date) and involuntary (e.g., disciplinary actions) separations if the infractions are considered fairly minor. In our

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<sup>7</sup> Senior ranks are not required to sign contracts and can remain in the military until they serve a maximum number of years or request to leave. However, the military maintains "retention control points". For instance, a Staff Sergeant must either be promoted to Sergeant First Class or leave the military after 20 years of active duty service.

analysis, we categorize separations as either “Honorable” or “Non-Honorable” (which includes all discharges excluding Honorable).

#### 4. Empirical Strategy

We estimate the causal effects of receiving an opioid prescription during an ED visit on long-term opioid use and workforce outcomes. Receiving an opioid prescription is correlated with injury severity or pain and these traits themselves predict negative workforce outcomes. To address this endogeneity issue, we exploit variation in physicians’ propensities to prescribe opioids. We instrument the receipt of an opioid prescription in the ED with physician-level residualized (leave-one-out) opioid prescribing propensities. We focus on the ED setting where patients do not have the ability to request a specific physician during their visit, creating quasi-random assignment of patients to physicians. Our identification strategy relies on idiosyncratic differences in patients’ probability of receiving an opioid prescription stemming only from differences in physician practice styles.

Following a strategy used in prior work (Eichmeyer and Zhang (2021); Barnett et al. (2017)), we construct an instrument that measures physician opioid prescribing intensity. In the first step, we estimate residuals from the following regression:

$$Prescription_{ijt} = \alpha_{ht} + \theta_d + X'_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where  $Prescription_{ijt}$  is a binary indicator that equals 1 if patient  $i$  received an opioid prescription within 7 days of their ED visit with physician  $j$  in month-year  $t$ . We control for hospital-month-year fixed effects  $\alpha_{ht}$  to account for differences in prescribing rates across hospitals and time. We include diagnosis fixed effects  $\theta_d$  to account for the possibility that some ED physicians may specialize in treating certain diagnoses or higher severity cases and would have a higher tendency to prescribe opioids.<sup>8</sup> We also control for patient demographic characteristics  $X_{it}$ , including indicators for age group, white, female, married, college educated, military rank, and military tenure. Additionally, we include Military Service-by-occupation fixed effects to account for differences in leadership and culture across military occupational specialties (MOS). After conditioning on these fixed effects, the residual variation in the prescribing rate  $\epsilon_{ijt}$  represents idiosyncratic factors affecting physician prescribing decisions.

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<sup>8</sup> We define diagnoses by the first 3-digits of the primary ICD-9 or ICD-10 code on the ED claim.

For each patient, we then construct our residualized, leave-out instrument of physician opioid prescribing intensity,  $Intensity_{ijy}$ , as the mean of the physician's residuals across the calendar year from equation (1), leaving out the residual for patient  $i$ :

$$Intensity_{ijy} = \frac{1}{N_{-ijy}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{-ijy}} \hat{\epsilon}_{-ijy} \quad (2)$$

where  $N_{-ijy}$  is the number of ED encounters for physician  $j$  in year  $y$ , excluding patient  $i$ . We leave out patient  $i$  to avoid bias from including the error term in both the instrument and outcome variables. This instrument allows us to measure differences in the opioid prescribing rate across physicians within the same hospital who are treating the same diagnosis. We also construct an alternative binary instrument used in some specifications where we define physicians as having a prescribing  $Intensity_{ijy}$  in the first versus fourth quartile of the distribution (henceforth, “low intensity” and “high intensity” opioid prescribers).<sup>9</sup>

Our first stage relationship is estimated with the following equation:

$$Prescription_{ijt} = \delta Intensity_{ijy} + \alpha_{ht} + \theta_d + X'_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (3)$$

We then estimate our second stage using 2SLS, taking the general form:

$$Y_{ijt} = \gamma \widehat{Prescription}_{ijt} + \alpha_{ht} + \theta_d + X'_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{ijt} \quad (4)$$

where  $Y_{ijt}$  measures long-term opioid use or workforce outcomes in the 1-2 years following the initial ED visit. In both equations, we include the full set of controls from equation (1). When studying promotions, we also include individual rank fixed effects as different ranks face different probabilities of promotion in a year. Standard errors are clustered by physician. We interpret differences in outcomes between patients assigned to higher or lower intensity opioid prescribing physicians as the effect of a change in the probability of receiving an opioid prescription. Identification relies on the assumption that our instrument does not operate through channels other than opioid prescribing. Additionally, we assume monotonicity in opioid prescribing intensity across patients. We provide evidence supporting these assumptions in Section 5.5.

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<sup>9</sup> In the 1<sup>st</sup> versus 4<sup>th</sup> quartile specification, we compute our  $Intensity_{ijy}$  instrument including patient  $i$ . This allows for physicians to be consistently defined as either high or low intensity prescribers across all patients within a year. Since this is a binary instrument, whether we include or exclude patient  $i$  does not meaningfully impact the results.

## 5. Results

### 5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Balance Test

Figure 1 shows the distribution of the raw mean opioid prescribing rate and the residualized instrument for each physician-year. There is significant variation in both of these measures across ED physicians. The opioid prescribing rate ranges from 13.5% to 30.8% when comparing the mean rate for the bottom and top quartiles of physicians. After controlling for hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and patient characteristics, we find that moving from the bottom to top quartile physician increases the mean prescribing rate by 17.8 percentage points.<sup>10</sup>

In Table 1, we provide descriptive statistics for the sample of ED patients (Column 1) and a balance test showing the relationship between patient characteristics and our instruments (Columns 2-7). The average military ED patient is 27 years old, predominately male (78%), white (66%), married (55%), does not have a college degree (87%), has junior rank (55%), and has a military tenure of 6 years. At baseline, 16% are receiving medication for depression or anxiety and 3% have been diagnosed with alcohol or drug abuse disorder.<sup>11</sup> Relative to the commercially insured and Medicare populations, the military ED patient is younger, more likely to be male, and exhibits a lower likelihood of college education, however, the ED opioid prescribing rate of 22% is quite similar (e.g., Barnett et al (2017), Alpert et al (2020)). To provide evidence of quasi-random assignment of patients to ED physicians, we regress each patient characteristic on our instrument for physician prescribing intensity. Column 2 shows coefficients on the continuous instrument of prescribing intensity and Column 5 shows coefficients on the binary (top vs. bottom quartile intensity) instrument. If patients are randomly assigned to ED physicians, we would expect that the demographic characteristics would be unrelated to prescribing intensity. Indeed, we do not observe statistically significant differences across patients seen by a higher or lower opioid prescribing physician for any of the demographic characteristics.

### 5.2 Opioid Prescription and Misuse Outcomes

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<sup>10</sup> The 5<sup>th</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup> and 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles of the raw opioid prescribing rate distribution are: 0.06, 0.14, 0.27, 0.40. The same percentiles of the residualized distribution are: -0.12, -0.05, 0.03, 0.12.

<sup>11</sup> Depression/Anxiety diagnoses are defined based on prescription fills in the year prior to the index ED visit for one of the following therapeutic classes: Benzodiazepines, Antidepressants, or Antipsychotic agents. Service members with a drug abuse disorder diagnoses are identified based on having at least two claims that include acute intoxication, alcohol or drug abuse, or alcohol or drug dependence in the year prior to the index visit.

The existing literature has shown that assignment to a high intensity physician increases the probability of receiving an opioid prescription in the ED and long-term opioid use for veterans and Medicare beneficiaries (Barnett et al (2017), Eichmeyer and Zhang (2021)). In Table 2, we first replicate these findings using our sample of active-duty military members. In Column 1, we estimate the first stage relationship between the physician prescribing intensity and the probability of receiving an opioid prescription following the ED visit. Panel A shows the results for the continuous prescribing intensity instrument and Panel B shows the results for the binary (top vs. bottom quartile) instrument. Both instruments have a strong association with a patient's probability of receiving an opioid prescription. Panel A shows that patients assigned to a physician with a 10 percentage point higher prescribing intensity are 8.7 percentage points more likely to receive an opioid prescription, while Panel B shows that assignment to a physician in the top quartile of prescribing intensity increases the probability of receiving an opioid prescription by 18.2 percentage points compared to the bottom quartile.

In Columns 2-4 we display the results from the 2SLS regressions for long-term opioid use. Column 2 shows the number of opioid prescriptions filled during the first year of follow-up; Column 3 shows an indicator of doctor shopping (having 7 or more prescribers); and Column 4 shows an indicator for long-term opioid use (180 days supply within one year). The results are similar for both instruments and we focus on the continuous instrument, which uses the full sample, in our discussion. For the continuous instrument, the results show that after receiving an opioid prescription in the ED, an individual has 13% more opioid prescription fills (baseline mean fill rate of 0.35), is 54% more likely to exhibit doctor shopping behavior (baseline mean of 0.28%), and is 63% more likely to have long-term opioid use (baseline mean of 0.27%).<sup>12</sup>

Table 3 presents complementary evidence of long-term opioid use from random drug screening tests in the year following the ED visit. Unlike the prescription data, drug screenings capture opioid use from both medical and illicit sources, which prior studies have not been able to examine. Column 1 shows that the probability of failing a drug test increases by 1 percentage point (37% increase relative to the baseline mean) after receiving an opioid prescription. Column 2 shows that the increase in drug test failures is predominantly driven by opioid drug test failures for members who have a legal prescription recorded (0.8 percentage point increase,

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<sup>12</sup> In our sample, about one percent of the opioid-naïve who are prescribed an opioid in the ED will have long-term opioid use (0.27/22).

or 122% increase relative to the mean). There is no statistically significant increase in drug test failures coming from opioids without a prescription (Column 3). In Columns 4-7 we look at other drug test failures that could be substitutes (heroin and marijuana) or complements (benzodiazepines) for prescription opioids, and other drugs. We find that the probability of a heroin drug test failure decreases by 0.05 percentage points, potentially stemming from patients' expanded access to prescription opioids following an initial opioid prescription.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, we find no changes in failed drug tests for marijuana, benzodiazepines, or all other drugs.

The results in this section are broadly consistent with the prior findings in the literature—individuals who encounter a high intensity prescriber in the ED are significantly more likely to initiate long-term opioid use. However, an important question remains: how does opioid initiation (which leads to long-term opioid use) impact work capacity and job performance? We bring to bear our linked healthcare and workforce data to examine this question.

### *5.3 Workforce Outcomes*

In this section, we examine the effects of opioid initiation on job performance, work capacity, and job separations. We then analyze how these outcomes vary across subgroups of the population defined by socio-economic characteristics and pre-existing mental health conditions.

#### *5.3.1 Job Performance*

In Table 4, we examine promotions and demotions among enlisted service members. Promotions are a high frequency outcome in the military with about 28% of enlisted members receiving a promotion within one year of the ED visit and 39% within two years. Demotions for poor job performance, on the other hand, are quite rare (about 4%). Using the continuous instrument in Panel A, we find that the probability of receiving a promotion decreases by 1.4 percentage points within one year of receiving an opioid in the ED and by 1.1 percentage points within two years. These findings imply 5% and 3% fewer promotions, respectively, relative to the baseline means. Results from the binary high intensity instrument are similar. Not surprisingly, the estimates for demotions are noisier given their infrequent occurrence. The

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<sup>13</sup>Heroin use is generally hard to capture in drug tests because it metabolizes quickly (Cone et al, 1991). The large reduction could be picking up reductions along both the extensive and intensive margins. Patients may be less likely to use heroin at all, but also may use less heroin due to having access to opioids.

probability of being demoted increases by 0.29% after one year (relative to the baseline mean of 3.5%) and 3.9% in the second year (baseline mean of 4.6%), although these estimates are not statistically different from zero. The larger effects for demotions in the second year could reflect the longer time it takes for demotions to pass through legal and administrative channels, while promotions are more quickly implemented by superiors.

### 5.3.2 Mechanisms: Physical Work Capacity

Our results on promotions show a sizeable decline in job performance following opioid initiation. We take advantage of our detailed workforce data to explore the potential mechanisms driving these results in order to understand how opioids impact work capacity. We first examine how opioids affect physical performance. Similar to many physically-demanding civilian jobs such as construction, manufacturing, and mining, it is essential for military members to maintain a high level of physical fitness for performing the core functions of their jobs. Opioids, even when taken as prescribed, have known physiological effects on physical performance, such as slowed breathing and heart rate and delayed reaction times, which reduce endurance and make exercise more difficult (Mayo Clinic (2020)). Moreover, opioids can have negative effects on mental functioning and could lead to depression, which may also lead military members to put less effort into their training (Mazereeuw et al. (2018), NIDA (2020), Smith (2021)). On the other hand, opioid use could potentially improve physical performance by reducing the pain from an acute injury or medical condition. Whether these conflating effects translate into meaningful reductions in work capacity are unknown. The military is a useful setting for studying this question because service members are required to take physical fitness tests that have an explicit passing threshold reflecting the physical demands of the job. Thus, we can observe whether opioid initiation impacts workers' ability to meet these physical demands.

Table 5 displays the effects of opioid use on physical performance outcomes from the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) in the year after the ED visit. Army members typically take the APFT at least once per year. In Column 1, we show that there is not a statistically significant decline in the probability of taking this test after receiving an opioid prescription, even though members could receive permission to delay testing due to the injury or medical condition. This finding is in line with our expectation that we would not see *differential* reductions in test taking based on the doctor's propensity to prescribe an opioid given the initial randomization.

Conditional on taking the APFT, the probability of passing the test decreases by about 0.8%, although this is not statistically significant. The Z-score standardized physical fitness test score decreases by a statistically insignificant 0.03 standard deviations (SD=44 points on a scale of 300 points). Overall, we find little evidence that opioid initiation affects physical fitness scores.

### 5.3.3 Mechanisms: Behavioral Problems and Criminal Activity

We also consider the effects of opioid use on workplace behavioral problems that can affect the likelihood of promotions and demotions as well as job separations. In cases of long-term use, opioids have been associated with a wide variety of mental health changes, including mood alteration, difficulty fulfilling obligations, lower attention span and less attentiveness (AJMC Perspectives (2020), Meyer (2019), Richards et al. (2018)). More broadly, opioids can increase absenteeism (CDC, 2019), and opioid use is associated with criminal justice system involvement (Winkelman (2018)). All of these factors could lead to problematic workplace behaviors that limit productivity and performance. However, there is little causal evidence for most of these relationships. The best available causal evidence links prescription opioids and crime, though the literature is inconclusive (Meinhofer (2016), Mallat (2018) & (2020), Dave et al. (2021), Deiana et al. (2021)), and some have suggested that this link may not be as strong as it is for illicit drugs (Maclean et al. (2021)).

In Table 6 we evaluate whether receiving an opioid prescription changes the probability that a disciplinary flag (known as a “Suspension of Favorable Personnel Actions (SFPA) Flag”) was recorded. There are 19 distinct groups for which an individual may receive a flag for problematic behaviors. We look at four specific flag groups (which we combine into three outcome variables) where we would expect to see the largest effects of opioids: a flag for discipline, a flag for criminal investigation, and a flag that combines the drug and alcohol abuse groups.<sup>14</sup> The discipline category includes minor infractions such as being late to work and unexcused absences, but excludes drug and alcohol offenses and all other categories such as security violations, and domestic violence.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> There is no separate flag or data recording absenteeism or missed days of work.

<sup>15</sup> The subgroup categories do not sum to the total SFPA flags since we have excluded specific flags that are rarely observed or would be unlikely to be related to opioid use.

Overall, we find evidence of a small and marginally significant 1.4 percentage point increase (6% relative to the baseline mean of 22%) in having any flag within one year of receiving an opioid prescription. This outcome, however, is broad and includes many types of flags that would not likely be impacted by opioid use. In Column 2, we hone in on discipline-related flags, specifically, and find larger effects. The probability of receiving a discipline flag increases by 11% after one year. Estimates in year two are of similar magnitude, but estimated with less precision. Column 3 shows results for flags given for criminal investigation. These effects are small and statistically insignificant. However, they become larger in magnitude in the second year, which may be suggestive that criminal behaviors could materialize in the longer run. We also do not find effects of opioid initiation on drug and alcohol flags (Column 4). This is consistent with our earlier drug test results in Table 3. Despite an increase in long-term opioid use, most of these individuals are obtaining legal prescriptions and thus would not be flagged for drug abuse. This highlights the challenge of detecting problematic opioid use in the workplace through drug screening.

Another outcome which may indicate behavioral problems is the probability of obtaining a security clearance or having a security clearance revoked. Obtaining a security clearance involves an extensive background check of a military member's history including drug and alcohol involvement, criminal conduct, and financial records (e.g., running up debt). Appendix Table 1 shows results for three security clearance outcomes: whether one holds a security clearance, whether one was denied a security clearance, and whether one had a security clearance revoked. Opioid use after an ED visit leads to a higher probability of receiving a denial of a security clearance by 0.5 percentage points after one year (31% increase relative to the baseline mean of 1.7%), but has no effect on the more serious infraction of having one's security clearance revoked. The probability of holding a security clearance is also unaffected by the small change in denials and revocations. Similar, but statistically insignificant, results emerge after two years, where the probability of having a security clearance denied increases by 0.5 percentage points (21% increase relative to the baseline mean of 2%).

These findings are consistent with the overall picture of worsening job performance among those who initiated opioid use. From this set of results, it appears that the negative effects of opioids on performance are largely driven by behavioral issues rather than physical

limitations. Moreover, we find that minor behavioral infractions are more common than criminal misconduct among opioid users.

#### *5.3.4 Job Separations*

The lower rate of promotions along with the higher rate of disciplinary actions and security clearance denials may eventually lead to involuntary discharges from the military. Voluntary separations may also occur if opioid use changes an individual's preferences for work. Members could decide not to renew their military contract or to retire because of the health challenges associated with long-term opioid use that make them less able to work.

In Column 1 of Table 7, we show that the probability of being discharged from the military for any reason increases by 1.4 percentage points within one year of the ED visit. The magnitude of this effect is substantial and represents an increase in separations of 8% relative to the baseline mean of 17%. We find similar effect sizes two years after opioid initiation, although the effect is only statistically significant for the high-intensity instrument.

In Columns 2-8, we categorize discharges based on the military's separation reason code. We find that the largest proportional increase in discharges is for discipline-related reasons,<sup>16</sup> which increased by 24% relative to the baseline mean. The number of discipline discharges remained elevated (16% increase) in the second year after the ED visit. Voluntary discharges, which occur when a member does not renew their contract or retires, increased by 15% within the first year, but the estimates are not statistically significant in the second year. Although we observe a faster rate of increase for discipline-related discharges, they are a smaller share of overall discharges and account for about 42% of the overall discharge effect stemming from opioid use. Thus, voluntary discharges due to non-renewal of contracts and retirement comprise the majority of the increase in discharges.

For the remaining discharge types, the estimates are not statistically distinguishable from zero. Finding no effect for discharges due to failure to meet weight and body fat standards is consistent with our prior results which showed that opioid use did not impact physical fitness test

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<sup>16</sup> Discipline discharges are given for the following reasons: civil court conviction, security, court martial, AWOL/Desertion, Good of the Service (discharge in lieu of court martial), misconduct, pattern of minor disciplinary infractions, Commission of a Serious Offense, failure to meet minimum qualifications for retention, unsatisfactory performance, unfitness or unacceptable conduct, discreditable incidents, imprisonment/desertion, failure of course of instruction, failure of selection for promotion, motivational problems (apathy).

scores. Additionally, we do not find an increase in discharges due to substance abuse. While this might seem counterintuitive, it is consistent with the drug screening test results showing that the increase in positive opioid tests is driven by members with a legal prescription. Given the ease of obtaining an opioid prescription and the significant increase in doctor shopping we observe, it is likely that a proportion of these individuals are misusing opioids. However, it is difficult for the military to discharge individuals for opioid abuse on the basis of drug screenings because of the presence of legal prescriptions.

The remaining three categories of discharges serve as placebo tests. “Other non-discipline discharges” contain a dozen other reasons for discharge that should be unrelated to opioid use—for example, early release to attend school, pregnancy or parenthood, and errors made by the military in the enlistment process (e.g., underage enlistment). Indeed, we do not find any impact of receiving an opioid on these outcomes. We also examine medical-related discharges which include disability and death. The effects of receiving an opioid prescription on medical discharges are close to zero and statistically insignificant. This further supports our identifying assumption that patients’ assignment to ED doctors is unrelated to the severity of their injury or health condition. Finally, we find no evidence of changes in uncharacterized discharges.

Finally, in Columns 9-10 we examine discharges using the broader “Character of Separation” codes which determine veteran benefits. We report discharges as falling into two separate categories: “Honorable” or “Non-Honorable (which contains the negative discharge categories “General”, “Other than Honorable”, “Bad Conduct”, and “Dishonorable”). Most service members receive honorable discharges, meaning their service was not marred by anything negative. Given the lengthy administrative process involved in obtaining a non-honorable discharge, many members discharged for minor disciplinary reasons will actually be classified as an honorable discharge.<sup>17</sup> Only serious offenses such as drug possession, assault, and criminal misconduct will generally trigger non-honorable discharges. We find that the increase in discharges are driven by honorable discharges in the first year. Column 9 shows that honorable discharges increase by 1 percentage point within the first year after the ED visit (9% increase). After two years, we do not find a change in honorable discharges, but an increase in

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<sup>17</sup> In our sample, 22% of discipline discharges are classified as Honorable Discharges, 54% are General Discharges, and 25% are Other than Honorable Discharges.

non-honorable discharges. Specifically, we find that non-honorable discharges increased by 0.8 percentage points (13% increase). It is not surprising that we find delayed effects for non-honorable discharges because it takes time for formal investigations to conclude, while honorable discharges can be implemented more expeditiously. While both categories can include discipline-related discharges, the non-honorable discharges will contain more serious infractions while honorable discharges will be a mix of minor infractions and discharges unrelated to misconduct (e.g., for medical reasons, pregnancy, end of service term). Overall, the results in this section show large increases in discipline-related discharges from opioid use.

#### *5.4 Heterogeneity Analyses*

Next, we consider how the IV estimates for long-term opioid use and workforce outcomes vary across different subgroups of the sample. We consider subgroups based on demographic characteristics such as age, race, gender, marital status, education, and pre-existing health risk factors such as depression and anxiety. Figure 2 shows the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals from estimating the IV regression in equation (4) separately for each demographic subgroup.

The first two panels display the results for long-term opioid use (180 days supply) and doctor shopping. Receiving an opioid prescription in the ED predicts an increase in long-term opioid use and doctor shopping for almost all subgroups, although not all estimates are statistically significant. We find slightly larger effects for white military members and those without a college education. This is especially pronounced for doctor shopping, which is the strongest indicator of opioid misuse. The point estimates also suggest that military members with depression or anxiety are more likely to transition from an initial opioid prescription to long-term use and doctor shopping. These effects are noisy and statistically insignificant due to the small sample size (16% of members have depression or anxiety), however, the confidence intervals suggest that we cannot rule out large effect sizes. These results are broadly consistent with the findings of Case and Deaton (2015) which showed that white non-Hispanic men and women with less than a college education have been most impacted by the opioid crisis.

In the remaining panels of Figure 2, we examine heterogeneity in workforce outcomes. We focus on promotions, discipline flags, discipline discharges and non-honorable discharges for which we found the largest effects in the full sample. For promotions, although effects are

roughly similar across subgroups, we find larger negative point estimates for military members who are white, without a college education, and for those who have depression or anxiety. The most pronounced differences occur by race. White members experience a much larger negative effect of opioid use on the likelihood of a promotion, while the effect for non-white members is not statistically distinguishable from zero. When examining discipline flags, discipline discharges, and non-honorable discharges we do not find differential effects by race. Instead, the characteristics that most strongly predict a higher likelihood of disciplinary action or discharge are: younger than age 30, single, no college education, and having depression or anxiety. These results show that certain demographic factors predict a greater likelihood that initial opioid exposure results in negative performance and employment consequences.

## *5.5 Robustness Tests and Alternative Explanations*

### *5.5.1 Exclusion Restriction*

Our instrumental variable analysis finds worse workforce outcomes for those who received an opioid in the ED. One alternative explanation for these findings may be that these individuals have a (unobservably) more serious or lasting injury that would independently lower job performance. If this was correlated with being assigned to a high propensity opioid prescriber, then this could bias our estimates upward in magnitude. To test this alternative hypothesis, we examine whether there are differences in health status among patients who received an opioid prescription in the ED. If we do not find any effect of receiving an opioid prescription on health status after the ED visit, then this provides strong evidence that randomization holds.<sup>18</sup> We conduct this test using the Physical Capability Grading System score, which is derived from annual health assessments of Army members. In this assessment, a medical provider conducts a physical exam to assess a member's current health status and to identify any medical conditions. They also conduct a behavioral health screening. In Appendix Table 2, our IV estimates show that there is no effect of receiving an opioid prescription on the Z-scores for the physical and behavioral assessments in the year following the ED visit. Thus, members who received an opioid prescription are as physically capable as those who did not receive an opioid prescription, suggesting that the severity of the medical condition cannot

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<sup>18</sup> While receiving an opioid prescription could have a direct causal impact on health status on its own, finding a null effect would suggest both that there is no impact of the opioid itself on health and that patient assignment to physicians is uncorrelated with the severity of the medical condition.

explain the lower job performance outcomes we observe. These results are consistent with Table 7, which showed that opioid receipt did not predict a higher likelihood of being discharged from the military for a medical reason. Taken together, these results demonstrate that it is the receipt of an opioid prescription rather than the injury or medical condition itself that leads to negative workforce outcomes.

Another potential concern is that a physician's opioid prescribing propensity could be correlated with their propensity to provide other medical services during the ED visit which also impact downstream outcomes. To the extent there is a positive correlation in these propensities, additional medical services would most likely (weakly) improve health outcomes and work performance, hence biasing our estimates towards zero. To test for this, we construct a leave-out residualized instrument analogous to equation (2) for two measures of medical treatment intensity: Berenson-Eggers Type of Service (BETOS) codes and log work relative value units (wRVUs).<sup>19</sup> We then control for each medical treatment intensity measure in the main 2SLS equation (4). Appendix Table 3 shows that our main results for long-term opioid use, promotions and discipline flags are robust to controlling for each measure of medical treatment intensity suggesting that receiving an opioid prescription predicts these outcomes independent of other medical services rendered during the ED visit.

### *5.5.2 Instrument Monotonicity*

An assumption of our 2SLS estimates is that the relationship between physician prescribing propensities and the likelihood of receiving an opioid is monotonic. In other words, a patient that receives an opioid from a low propensity physician would also receive one from a high propensity physician. If the monotonicity assumption is violated, then we are unable to interpret our estimates as local average treatment effects (LATE). Heterogeneous treatment effects could indicate a violation of the monotonicity assumption. In Appendix Table 4, we conduct two tests to provide support for this assumption. In Column 1, following Eichmeyer and Zhang (2021), we estimate the first stage regression for age, gender, marital status, race, education, and depression subsamples. This leads to 12 distinct subsamples in which we can

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<sup>19</sup> BETOS codes are clinically meaningful categories of HCPCS procedure and service codes. Specifically, we include the number of BETOS codes for procedures, diagnostic tests and imaging. We exclude Evaluation & Management (E&M) codes since nearly every visit includes one claim per patient, as well as durable medical equipment, and unclassified codes. We take the log of wRVUs given considerable skewness in this variable. Results are similar in magnitude when we use wRVUs.

observe whether prescribing probabilities generate heterogeneous effects. Across all subsamples we find a robust statistically significant positive relationship between the instrument (physician prescribing propensity) and the probability of receiving an opioid. Additionally, the coefficient on the first stage is similar in magnitude across all subsamples. In Column 2, we leave out each subsample in constructing the instrument and then run the first stage on the left-out subsample. Again we find similarly sized positive estimates across most of the subsamples.

### *5.5.3 Sample Attrition*

Finally, we consider how attrition from the military affects our main estimates. About 17% of military members exit the sample within a year of the ED visit due to job separation. We explore how these individuals differ from the sample that does not attrit, in terms of their pre-attrition opioid use and job performance outcomes, and we estimate their contribution to the overall results. Given that we find large effects of opioid receipt on job separations (as discussed in Section 5.3.4), those who leave the military are more likely to be misusing opioids and have worse job performance outcomes. Thus, excluding attriters from our sample could understate the effects of receiving an opioid prescription on labor market outcomes.

Panel A of Appendix Table 5 displays our main results excluding attriters. Column 1 shows the full sample as a reference. Column 2 shows results excluding those who exit the military within 6 months after the ED visit and Column 3 excludes those who exit between 6 months and 1 year. Column 2 results are similar to the full sample. Thus, it appears that members who leave the military within six months after the ED visit do so for reasons unrelated to opioid use, promotion, or adverse performance. This is not surprising given that it would take time for a person to transition from an initial opioid prescription to opioid misuse and problematic work behaviors. The results in Column 3 are broadly the same, although the estimates for disciplinary actions decrease and become statistically insignificant. Overall, these results are consistent with our main results on job separations. They show that members with negative job performance outcomes following an opioid prescription are most likely to leave the military. Thus, excluding these members would slightly understate the negative effects of opioid

use on workforce outcomes.<sup>20</sup> However, since these differences are small, our main results are relatively insensitive to whether or not we exclude attriters.

## 6. Conclusion

This paper adds to the nascent literature on the impact of opioid use on workforce outcomes. We focus our analysis on the U.S. military because of the unique ability to link medical records with detailed job performance outcomes. Relative to the existing literature, we provide the first evidence, to our knowledge, on the broader implications of opioid initiation on workforce productivity, capability, and disciplinary actions. We investigate the relationship between opioid use and employment outcomes by employing a 2SLS identification strategy that relies on the quasi-random assignment of patients to physicians in the ED and the physician's historic opioid prescribing propensity at the time of the patient's ED visit.

Our results have three main take-aways. First, we show that opioid initiation reduces job performance. We observe fewer promotions, increases in demotions, and fewer military members obtaining security clearances. Most of these negative outcomes emerge within one year after opioid initiation. Second, we show that opioid initiation leads to behavioral problems that increase the likelihood of disciplinary action and discharges. These findings suggest lower job productivity and point towards higher employee turnover that can lead to increased recruitment and employee retention costs. Effects on disciplinary actions are concentrated among minor infractions, such as being late to work and unexcused absences. We do not, however, find increases in serious criminal activities. While about half of the effect on discharges comes from increases in contract non-renewal or retirement, we also observe substantial increases in discipline-related discharges. Third, while we observe negative productivity and workforce outcomes related to behavioral issues, we do not find reductions in members' physical capability following opioid initiation. However, our physical performance

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<sup>20</sup> This conclusion is also supported by the summary statistics shown in Panel B of Appendix Table 5, which displays sample means for those who exit the military. Members who exited between 6-12 months after the ED visit have a much higher probability of problematic opioid behaviors such as long-term opioid use and doctor shopping relative to the full sample, even despite the shorter follow-up period. These individuals are also more likely to have worse job performance outcomes. On the other hand, members who exited between 0-6 months are much less likely to have problematic opioid use (unsurprisingly since the follow-up period for these individuals is very short) and subsequent negative employment outcomes.

outcomes are conditional on testing, thus leaving open the possibility that some individuals with difficulties meeting physical expectations were able to avoid testing.

In summary, these findings show that the opioid epidemic has had significant negative consequences for the labor market. They also suggest that opioid misuse has negatively impacted the military's productivity and readiness for future missions. Moreover, additional military resources have been dedicated to job performance reprimands that could have otherwise been used for productive workforce related efforts. Improving the targeting of opioid treatment and increasing investment in substance abuse treatment has the potential to reduce job loss and behavioral problems in the workplace, mitigating their impact on productivity. Although employer spending on substance abuse treatment has increased in recent years—large employer health plans spent \$2.6 billion on treatment for opioid addiction and overdoses in 2016, up from \$828 million in 2010 (KFF, 2018)—further expansions may be warranted. Identifying those in need of opioid treatment in the workplace, however, is challenging. We show that the behavioral consequences of opioid misuse are more likely to trigger disciplinary actions and separations than drug and medical screenings, since legal prescriptions are typically present.

Our paper has several limitations. First, we estimate the effects of opioid initiation for active duty military members receiving care on U.S. military bases. This may not generalize to military members serving in combat overseas or to veterans, though previous work has shown similar opioid use patterns for veterans (Barnett et al. (2019); Zhang (2021)). However, our sample more closely resembles civilian workers in physically demanding jobs relative to other military populations, thus broadening its applicability. Second, it is possible that our results reflect lower bound estimates of negative workforce outcomes since negative work performance requires a formal administrative process to record disciplinary actions. Some commanding officers may not pursue this process for minor infractions, thus, we may not capture all behavioral problems. Finally, our 2SLS strategy relies on the assumption that our instrument does not operate through channels other than opioid prescribing in the ED. In particular, a physician who is a high-intensity opioid prescriber may also provide other types of care to the patient more (or less) intensively. Although we cannot control for unobserved components of patient care, we find that opioid prescribing independently predicts long-term opioid use and negative workforce outcomes when controlling for observable measures of medical care intensity.

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
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
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Figure 1: Distribution of Physician Opioid Prescribing Rate



Notes: Figure displays the distribution of physicians mean opioid prescribing rate for each year (labeled as “raw”). The residualized prescribing rate for each physician-year is shaded which reflects idiosyncratic factors affecting prescribing decisions that are unrelated to hospital, time, diagnosis, and patient sociodemographic characteristics.

Figure 2: Heterogeneity of IV Results



Notes: Figure displays subsample analysis of the instrumental variable results using the prescribing rate instrument for six main outcomes. Other than Honorable Discharge (2 Yr) includes all Non-honorable discharges within 2 years of the ED visit (“General”, “Other than Honorable,” “Bad Conduct”, and “Dishonorable”).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Balance Test

	Full Sample Mean	Prescribing Intensity			High Prescribing Intensity		
		Coefficient	Std. Error	p-value	Coefficient	Std. Error	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Age	27.12	-0.215	(0.563)	0.703	-0.073	(0.105)	0.486
Race - White	0.66	0.005	(0.027)	0.865	0.002	(0.005)	0.763
Female	0.22	-0.027	(0.025)	0.285	0.002	(0.005)	0.643
Rank - Junior	0.55	0.005	(0.037)	0.884	0.001	(0.007)	0.867
College	0.13	-0.012	(0.025)	0.621	-0.003	(0.004)	0.515
Marital Status - Married	0.55	0.001	(0.023)	0.980	-0.004	(0.004)	0.426
Military Tenure (Yrs)	6.12	-0.089	(0.462)	0.847	-0.023	(0.088)	0.794
Pre-Existing Condition: Depression or Anxiety	0.16	0.010	(0.018)	0.581	0.003	(0.003)	0.384
Pre-Existing Condition: Drug or Alcohol Abuse	0.03	0.001	(0.006)	0.866	0.001	(0.001)	0.635
Observations	1,658,881	1,658,881	1,658,881	1,658,881	737,638	737,638	737,638

Notes: Means in Column 1 are calculated based on the patient's characteristics at the time of the ED visit. Coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for the continuous Prescribing Intensity instrument (Columns 2-4) and the binary indicator for High Prescribing Intensity (Columns 5-7) stem from a regression with the demographic characteristic as the dependent variable and the residualized instrument as the independent variable. Each cell represents results from a separate regression and standard errors are clustered by physician.

Table 2: Probability of Opioid Prescription in ED and Long-Term Opioid Use

	First Stage	2SLS - Opioid Use Within 1 Year		
	Prescription in ED (1)	Number of Prescriptions (2)	Doctor Shopping (3)	Long Term Use (180 Days Supply) (4)
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>				
Prescribing Intensity	0.874*** (0.008)			
Prescription in ED		0.0443*** (0.0151)	0.0015** (0.0007)	0.0017** (0.0007)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>				
High Prescribing Intensity	0.182*** (0.003)			
Prescription in ED		0.0686*** (0.0145)	0.0017** (0.0007)	0.0021*** (0.0007)
Full Sample Mean	0.22	0.3476	0.0028	0.0027
Total Observations	1,658,881	1,658,881	1,658,881	1,658,881

Notes: This table presents coefficients obtained from the first stage (Column 1) and the second stage (Columns 2-4) of the instrumental variable regressions on the impact of an opioid prescription on long-term opioid use after the ED visit. Panel A uses the residualized continuous prescribing rate as an instrument while Panel B uses the binary version of the same variable (equal to one if the residualized prescribing rate is in the top quartile and zero if it is in the bottom quartile) for the endogenous variable of whether a patient filled an opioid prescription within 7 days of the ED visit. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. Doctor shopping is defined as having 7 or more different prescribers in 1 year. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

Table 3: IV Results for Probability of Drug Test Failure

	Drug Test Failure Involving:						
	Drug Test Failure (1)	Opioid with Prescription (2)	Opioid without Prescription (3)	Heroin (4)	Marijuana (5)	Benzos (6)	Other Drugs (7)
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>							
Prescription in ED	0.0099*** (0.0030)	0.0079*** (0.0019)	-0.0002 (0.0009)	-0.0005** (0.0002)	0.0004 (0.0016)	-0.0002 (0.0007)	0.0008 (0.0014)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>							
Prescription in ED	0.0109*** (0.0027)	0.0086*** (0.0016)	0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0004 (0.0016)	0.0001 (0.0006)	0.0006 (0.0014)
Full Sample Mean	0.027	0.0065	0.003	0.00021	0.011	0.0015	0.0081
Total Observations	1,176,676	1,176,676	1,176,676	1,176,676	1,176,676	1,176,676	1,176,676

Notes: This table presents coefficients obtained from the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions on the impact of an opioid prescription on the probability of drug test failure in the year after the ED visit. Panel A uses the residualized continuous prescribing rate as an instrument while Panel B uses the binary version of the same variable (equal to one if the residualized prescribing rate is in the top quartile and zero if it is in the bottom quartile) for the endogenous variable of whether a patient filled an opioid prescription within 7 days of the ED visit. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

Table 4: IV Results for Probability of Promotion and Demotion (Junior Soldiers Only)

	Promotion (1 Yr)	Promotion (2 Yr)	Demotion (1 Yr)	Demotion (2 Yr)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>				
Prescription in ED	-0.0143** (0.0056)	-0.0112* (0.0063)	0.0001 (0.0026)	0.0018 (0.0031)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>				
Prescription in ED	-0.0148*** (0.0055)	-0.0124** (0.0061)	0.0002 (0.0026)	0.0024 (0.0030)
Full Sample Mean	0.28	0.39	0.035	0.046
Total Observations	1,478,916	1,478,916	1,478,916	1,478,916

Notes: This table presents coefficients obtained from the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions on the impact of an opioid prescription on the probability of promotion and demotion within 1 and 2 years after the ED visit. Panel A uses the residualized continuous prescribing rate as an instrument while Panel B uses the binary version of the same variable (equal to one if the residualized prescribing rate is in the top quartile and zero if it is in the bottom quartile) for the endogenous variable of whether a patient filled an opioid prescription within 7 days of the ED visit. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

Table 5: IV Results for Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) - Army Only

	Take an APFT (1)	Pass an APFT (2)	Z-Score APFT (3)
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>			
Prescription in ED	-0.0066 (0.0086)	-0.0075 (0.0058)	-0.03 (0.0222)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>			
Prescription in ED	-0.0112 (0.0084)	-0.0041 (0.0056)	-0.0293 (0.0226)
Full Sample Mean	0.57	0.93	-
Total Observations	735,125	418,601	418,601

Notes: This table presents coefficients obtained from the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions on the impact of an opioid prescription on Army Physical Fitness test outcomes in the year after the ED visit. Panel A uses the residualized continuous prescribing rate as an instrument while Panel B uses the binary version of the same variable (equal to one if the residualized prescribing rate is in the top quartile and zero if it is in the bottom quartile) for the endogenous variable of whether a patient filled an opioid prescription within 7 days of the ED visit. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

Table 6: IV Results for Disciplinary Actions

	Reason for Flag:			
	Any Flag (1)	Discipline Flag (2)	Criminal Investigation Flag (3)	Drug or Alcohol Flag (4)
<u>Within 1 Year Following ED Visit:</u>				
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>				
Prescription in ED	0.0140* (0.0078)	0.0097* (0.0051)	0.0009 (0.0011)	0.0002 (0.0017)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>				
Prescription in ED	0.0133* (0.0076)	0.0107** (0.0050)	0.0016 (0.0011)	0.0002 (0.0015)
Full Sample Mean	0.2200	0.0850	0.0056	0.0081
<u>Within 2 Years Following ED Visit:</u>				
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>				
Prescription in ED	0.0117 (0.0081)	0.0075 (0.0057)	0.0019 (0.0015)	0.0013 (0.0020)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>				
Prescription in ED	0.0093 (0.0080)	0.0096* (0.0055)	0.0027* (0.0016)	0.001 (0.0019)
Full Sample Mean	0.3	0.12	0.0095	0.012
Total Observations	735,125	735,125	735,125	735,125

Notes: This table presents coefficients obtained from the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions on the impact of an opioid prescription on the probability of disciplinary actions within 1 and 2 years after the ED visit. Panel A uses the residualized continuous prescribing rate as an instrument while Panel B uses the binary version of the same variable (equal to one if the residualized prescribing rate is in the top quartile and zero if it is in the bottom quartile) for the endogenous variable of whether a patient filled an opioid prescription within 7 days of the ED visit. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

Table 7: IV Results for Military Discharges

	Reason for Discharge:						Character of Separation:			
	Any Discharge	Non-Renewal of Contract or Retirement	Discipline	Failure to Meet Weight or Body Fat Standards	Substance Abuse	Other Non-Discipline	Medical	Uncharacterized	Honorable	Non-Honorable
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
<u>Within 1 Year Following ED Visit:</u>										
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>										
Prescription in ED	0.0136** (0.0059)	0.0098*** (0.0033)	0.0057*** (0.0020)	0.0009 (0.0009)	-0.0008 (0.0015)	0.001 (0.0017)	-0.0005 (0.0025)	-0.0025 (0.0021)	0.0111** (0.0050)	0.0048 (0.0030)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>										
Prescription in ED	0.0118** (0.0052)	0.0087*** (0.0032)	0.0056*** (0.0019)	0.0011 (0.0010)	-0.0024* (0.0015)	0.0008 (0.0015)	0.0004 (0.0022)	-0.0024 (0.0019)	0.0095** (0.0045)	0.0041 (0.0027)
Full Sample Mean	0.170	0.065	0.024	0.004	0.012	0.017	0.025	0.020	0.12	0.038
<u>Within 2 Years Following ED Visit:</u>										
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>										
Prescription in ED	0.0090 (0.0069)	0.005 (0.0043)	0.0062** (0.0025)	0.0004 (0.0012)	-0.0013 (0.0018)	0.0019 (0.0024)	-0.001 (0.0033)	-0.0022 (0.0023)	0.0045 (0.0062)	0.0075** (0.0035)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>										
Prescription in ED	0.0125** (0.0062)	0.0056 (0.0043)	0.0075*** (0.0025)	0.0008 (0.0012)	-0.0016 (0.0018)	0.0009 (0.0021)	0.0014 (0.0029)	-0.0022 (0.0022)	0.0061 (0.0056)	0.0091*** (0.0032)
Full Sample Mean	0.300	0.130	0.039	0.007	0.018	0.030	0.051	0.027	0.23	0.056

Notes: This table presents coefficients obtained from the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions on the impact of an opioid prescription on the probability of military discharge within 1 and 2 years after the ED visit, reason for discharge and “character of separation.” Panel A uses the residualized continuous prescribing rate as an instrument while Panel B uses the binary version of the same variable (equal to one if the residualized prescribing rate is in the top quartile and zero if it is in the bottom quartile) for the endogenous variable of whether a patient filled an opioid prescription within 7 days of the ED visit. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. honorable + non-honorable discharge do not add up to any discharge because there are some discharges that are unclassified. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

**FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION**

**Appendix**

Appendix Table 1: IV Results for Probability of Obtaining a Security Clearance

	<u>Within 1 Year following ED Visit</u>			<u>Within 2 Years following ED Visit</u>		
	Hold a Security Clearance (1)	Denied a Security Clearance (2)	Security Clearance Revoked (3)	Hold a Security Clearance (4)	Denied a Security Clearance (5)	Security Clearance Revoked (6)
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>						
Prescription in ED	0.0028 (0.0068)	0.0053*** (0.0020)	0.0006 (0.0021)	0.0061 (0.0066)	0.0045* (0.0023)	-0.0016 (0.0025)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>						
Prescription in ED	0.0044 (0.0068)	0.0046** (0.0022)	0.0005 (0.0019)	0.0089 (0.0064)	0.0035 (0.0024)	-0.0005 (0.0023)
Full Sample Mean	0.79	0.017	0.012	0.81	0.021	0.018
Total Observations	735,125	735,125	735,125	735,125	735,125	735,125

Notes: This table presents coefficients obtained from the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions on the impact of an opioid prescription on the probability of security clearance outcomes within 1 and 2 years after the ED visit. Panel A uses the residualized continuous prescribing rate as an instrument while Panel B uses the binary version of the same variable (equal to one if the residualized prescribing rate is in the top quartile and zero if it is in the bottom quartile) for the endogenous variable of whether a patient filled an opioid prescription within 7 days of the ED visit. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

Appendix Table 2: IV Results for Physical Capability

	Physical Z Score (1)	Psych Z Score (2)
<i>Panel A: Prescribing Rate Instrument</i>		
Prescription in ED	-0.0093 (0.0197)	-0.0100 (0.0208)
<i>Panel B: High vs. Low Instrument</i>		
Prescription in ED	-0.0094 (0.0184)	-0.0100 (0.0195)
Total Observations	735,135	735,135

Notes: This table presents coefficients obtained from the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions on the impact of an opioid prescription on physical and psychiatric capability (as measured by the Physical Capability Grading System score) within the year after the ED visit. Panel A uses the residualized continuous prescribing rate as an instrument while Panel B uses the binary version of the same variable (equal to one if the residualized prescribing rate is in the top quartile and zero if it is in the bottom quartile) for the endogenous variable of whether a patient filled an opioid prescription within 7 days of the ED visit. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. The raw physical and psych scale ranges from 1 to 5 with lower scores implying higher capability. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

Appendix Table 3: Controlling for Intensity of Medical Treatment during ED visit

<i>Panel A: IV Results</i>	Full Sample	Controlling for BETOS Number of Tests and Images Propensity	Controlling for BETOS Number of Tests, Images, and Procedures Propensity	Controlling for Log of Work RVU Propensity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prescriptions in 1 year	0.0443*** (0.0151)	0.0432*** (0.0150)	0.0391*** (0.0150)	0.0408*** (0.0152)
7 Providers in 1 year	0.0015** (0.0007)	0.0017** (0.0007)	0.0017** (0.0007)	0.0017** -0.0007
180 days of supply in 1 year	0.0017** (0.0007)	0.0016** (0.0007)	0.0015** (0.0007)	0.0016** (0.0007)
Promotion in 1 year (enlisted only)	-0.0143** (0.0056)	-0.0136** (0.0055)	-0.0099* (0.0055)	-0.0092* (0.0054)
Adverse flag in 1 year (army enlisted only)	0.0097* (0.0051)	0.0092* (0.0051)	0.0071 (0.0050)	0.0093* (0.0051)

Notes: This table presents in the first column the baseline coefficients obtained from the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions on our outcomes of interest: long-term opioid use, promotions and disciplinary flags. Column 1 displays the results from the previous baseline results. Columns 2 and 3 present 2SLS results that include the residualized BETOS control variable that measures the intensity of treatment with the performed number of tests and images during the ED visit and the number of performed tests, images, and procedures during the ED visit, respectively. The last column displays results controlling for the residualized log work RVU measure. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

Appendix Table 4: Monotonicity Tests

	Instrument	Reverse-Sample Instrument
	(1)	(2)
Age < 30	0.8570*** (0.0090)	0.5557*** (0.0179)
Age 30+	0.9176*** (0.0117)	0.8189*** (0.0201)
White	0.8793*** (0.0086)	0.7737*** (0.0190)
Non-White	0.8664*** (0.0116)	1.0256*** (0.0143)
Female	0.7836*** (0.0179)	0.7237*** (0.0194)
Male	0.8968*** (0.0078)	0.5100*** (0.0158)
Single	0.8284*** (0.0106)	0.6776*** (0.0153)
Married	0.9120*** (0.0084)	0.7412*** (0.0166)
College	0.7935*** (0.0156)	1.0358*** (0.0097)
Less than College	0.8861*** (0.0079)	0.3287*** (0.0142)
Depression	0.8690*** (0.0090)	0.8515*** 0.0091
No Depression	0.8930*** (0.0205)	1.0319*** (0.0100)
Full Sample	0.874*** (0.008)	-

Notes: This table displays results from two versions of the monotonicity test. In Column 1 we estimate the first stage by regressing the probability of receiving an opioid within 7 days of the ED visit on the continuous residualized prescribing rate instrument separately for each of the socio-demographic subsamples. In column 2 we leave out each respective subsample in constructing the residualized prescribing rate instrument and then run the first stage regression on the left-out subsample. This analysis can reveal heterogeneous treatment effects that could indicate a violation of the monotonicity assumption. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.

Appendix Table 5: Attrition Tests

<i>Panel A: IV Results</i>	Full Sample	Excl. Attrition <6 months	Excl. Attrition 6-12 months
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prescriptions in 1 year	0.0443*** (0.0151)	0.0504*** (0.0163)	0.04454*** (0.0161)
7 Providers in 1 year	0.0015** (0.0007)	0.0018** (0.0007)	0.0017** (0.0007)
180 days of supply in 1 year	0.0017** (0.0007)	0.0019** (0.0008)	0.0017* (0.0007)
Promotion in 1 year (enlisted only)	-0.0143** (0.0056)	-0.0127** (0.0062)	-0.0123** (0.0062)
Discipline flag in 1 year (army enlisted only)	0.0097* (0.0051)	0.0108** (0.0054)	0.0043 (0.0051)
<i>Panel B: Means for Members who Attrit</i>	Full Sample Mean	Attrit <6 months	Attrit 6-12 months
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Prescriptions in 1 year	0.3500	0.0230	0.2800
7 Providers in 1 year	0.0027	0.0007	0.0039
180 days of supply in 1 year	0.0027	0.0007	0.0043
Promotion in 1 year (enlisted only)	0.2800	0.0230	0.1060
Discipline flag in 1 year (army enlisted only)	0.0850	0.0780	0.1900
Observations	1,658,881	128,043	146,499

Notes: This table presents in Panel A coefficients obtained from the second stage of the instrumental variable regressions on the impact of an opioid prescription on long-term opioid use, promotions and disciplinary action in the year after the ED visit. Column 1 displays the results from the previous baseline results for the full sample, while Columns 2 and 3 exclude those who exit the military within 6 months and 6 months to 1 year after the ED visit, respectively. Panel A uses the residualized continuous prescribing rate as an instrument. All regressions include the full set of fixed effects (hospital-month-year, diagnosis, and military service-by-occupational specialty) and the sociodemographic control variables. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* display statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Panel B displays mean outcomes for the full sample, and those that attrit within 6 months and 6 months to 1 year, respectively.