TRADITIONAL SUPERNATURAL BELIEFS AND PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR

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ABSTRACT

In sub-Saharan Africa, traditional supernatural beliefs, including belief in witchcraft, black magic, or fetishism, are widespread. Some have hypothesized that these beliefs help to sustain cooperative behavior in a setting where the state is often absent. Others have documented that, at least at a macro-level, such beliefs are negatively associated with prosocial behavior. We contribute to a better understanding of the causal effects of these traditional supernatural beliefs by using lab-in-the-field experiments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Participants complete a range of experimental tasks where one player chooses whether to act in a prosocial manner towards another player. Participants are randomly assigned to another player that has either a strong or weak belief in witchcraft, and this information is known by the players. We find that participants act less prosocially towards randomly-assigned partners who believe more strongly in witchcraft. We also find that antisocial behavior is more socially acceptable and prosocial behavior less socially acceptable when playing with a partner who believes more strongly in witchcraft. Our findings suggest that the negative relationship between witchcraft and prosocial outcomes observed in the data may, in fact, be due to the causal effect of the presence of traditional supernatural beliefs on people's behavior.

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1. Introduction

Belief in the supernatural is nearly universal across societies. These supernatural beliefs range from beliefs in monotheistic religions that feature a moralizing high God to less centralized religious beliefs that involve ancestors, witchcraft, and sorcery. There is accumulating evidence that monotheistic religions – namely, those with a moralizing "Big God" like Christianity and Islam – have important positive effects on the level of cooperation in a society (Norenzayan, 2013, Norenzayan, Shariff, Gervais, Willard, McNamara, Slingerland and Henrich, 2016). In contrast, despite being widespread and pervasive in the daily life of much of the world, we still have limited evidence of the causal effects of less centralized religious beliefs that involve ancestors, witchcraft, and sorcery.

These types of traditional supernatural beliefs are commonly referred to as belief in "witchcraft." The prevalence of these beliefs continues to be widespread in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, a 2010 PEW survey of approximately 25,000 respondents from 19 sub-Saharan Africa countries finds that 45.6% of respondents report believing in witchcraft. Similarly, 42.4% of respondents report using traditional religious healers. Such beliefs co-exist with the Big God religions. In the same survey, 96 percent of respondents report being either Christian or Muslim. These beliefs are not confined to the African continent; rather, they are also prevalent throughout the world and throughout history (Thomas, 1997, Vyse, 2014, Gershman, 2015, 2021).

The existing evidence for the causal effects of traditional supernatural beliefs, which is based on cross-sectional correlations, shows that witchcraft is associated with less trust in sub-Saharan Africa (Gershman, 2016). However, there is concern that the correlations are driven by selection and unobserved heterogeneity. For example, if individuals who are in economically dire circumstances or who have experienced adverse shocks are more likely to turn to traditional supernatural beliefs and practices, then this would induce a negative correlation between witchcraft and better social outcomes. In addition, previous studies have found that, within Africa, the slave trade is associated with more distrust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011) and with a stronger belief in witchcraft (Gershman, 2020); thus, the slave trade may confound these correlations.

If one interprets the negative relationship between witchcraft and trust as causal, then this raises the question of why people would choose to engage in witchcraft if it is associated with lower trust. The dominant explanation for the prevalence of Big God religions is that they provide

benefits for the societies who adopt them (Norenzayan, 2013). If traditional supernatural beliefs do not provide benefits but instead result in lower levels of trust, it is puzzling that these beliefs have been so persistent and continue to be widespread, even with the spread of Christianity across the continent.

A potential explanation is that traditional supernatural beliefs have benefits. It is possible that in the absence of a well-functioning state and a resulting rule of law, traditional beliefs help to ensure good behavior. If individuals believe that bad behavior might be identified and punished through the use of supernatural forces, then the presence of witchcraft might induce more cooperative or prosocial behavior (Niehaus, 2001, Johnson and Kruger, 2004, Platteau, 2009, Hadnes and Schumacher, 2012). Therefore, similar to how Big God religions induce good behavior, traditional supernatural beliefs may do the same. Big God religions incentivize cooperation through assignment to heaven or hell after death while traditional supernatural beliefs may incentivize cooperation through the threat of harm through supernatural means.[1] Holland (2001, ch. 1) describes this consequence of traditional beliefs, writing, "belief in witchcraft exerts a unique influence on society. It promotes polite behavior, serving as a warning against hostile words and deeds. People are constantly reminded not to offend others because they might turn out to be witches...A sort of negative morality results: it is better not to make enemies because hatred is the mainspring of witchcraft." A similar argument is made in Leeson (2021, p. 17): "Belief in harmful magic enables a technology for governing the group: the expectation that members you have rankled will target you with such magic. It is wise, then, to try to avoid rankling members of your group and, when that fails, to resolve matters with those you have rankled."

This study aims to improve our understanding on these issues by providing estimates of the causal effects of traditional supernatural beliefs using lab-in-the field experiments implemented in northern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Although we are not able to randomize the presence or absence of traditional supernatural beliefs among respondents in our sample, we are able to randomize the beliefs of the person they are paired with in experimental tasks. This is done by randomly matching players in behavioral games, while providing some information about the other player: their age group, sex, education level, whether they are a coethnic, strength

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[1] This explanation is often called the 'Supernatural Punishment Hypothesis.' For proponents of the hypothesis, see Johnson and Kruger (2004), Johnson and Bering (2006), Schloss and Murray (2011), and Jones (2016).

of belief in the Christian God, strength of belief in traditional supernatural forces, and whether they grew up in the city of the study. The term used for belief in the supernatural is "*bokoko*," which is the word used in Lingala that captures a bundle of traditional beliefs, including belief in witchcraft, sorcery, and ancestors.[2]

Our sample comprises 520 individuals who live in a city in the north of the DRC. As is common in sub-Saharan Africa, we find that the population reports believing strongly in both witchcraft and in Christianity. Everyone reports believing strongly or very strongly in Christianity with 21.5% reporting believing 'strongly' and 78.5% reporting believing 'very strongly.' In terms of witchcraft beliefs, 46.9% report believing 'very strongly,' 26.0% report believing 'strongly,' 10.6% report 'neither believing or disbelieving,' and 16.5% report a 'weak' or 'very weak' belief. Thus, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, our population both believes in Christianity but also has traditional supernatural beliefs.

We implement the following three games: the Dictator Game (DG), Choose Your Dictator Game (CYD), and Joy of Destruction Game (JOD). In each game, two rounds are played, each time with a different randomly-chosen player. In the DG, player 1 chooses how much of an endowment of 1000 Congolese Francs (CF) to allocate to player 2. This amount is equal to about half a day's wage. This is generally considered a measure of altruism. In the CYD game, a player chooses a person to play the role of player 1 in the DG. The other player is chosen from two individuals. This is a measure of how altruistic the respondent perceives the other player to be as well as a measure of the respondent's altruism toward that player. In the JOD game, player 1 and player 2 are each given an endowment of CF 2000 (which is equal to approximately 2 US dollars or about 1 day's wage). Player 1 then can take one of three actions: (1) Do nothing, in which case both players keep their endowments; (2) Pay CF 200 to reduce the other player's endowment by CF 1000; (3) Pay CF 200 to increase the other player's endowment by CF 1000. The JOD measures spitefulness toward the other player.

We randomly assign participants to complete lab experiments with individuals who have different strength of supernatural beliefs (*bokoko*) and examine whether the participants behave in a more or less cooperative and prosocial manner when playing against those who believe more strongly in witchcraft. We find our participants choose less prosocial actions in the games when

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[2] Both players are given the same information about the other player. The fact that both players are given this information is known to all players.

paired with a player 2 with a stronger belief in witchcraft. If a player 2 believes more strongly in witchcraft, they are given less in the DG, they are less likely to be chosen in the CYD game, and they are more likely to have their payoff reduced and less likely to have their payoff increased in the JOD game.

We are also interested in whether this effect varies depending on the extent to which the respondent believes in witchcraft. We find that the antisocial effects of player 2's witchcraft beliefs are present even if player 1 believes in witchcraft and that the coefficients tend to be similar in magnitude and significance.

Although decisions in the games are made in private, there is still concern about experimenter demand effects. Motivated by this, we also consider a second set of outcomes, which measure the acceptability of actions taken in the game. Using the method developed by Krupka and Weber (2013), we measure how socially acceptable the actions in the games are when paired with a player with certain characteristics. Participants are asked to choose the most common response chosen by others for how acceptable an action is in a game. Participants are paid if their answers are correct for all decisions for a game. Thus, their responses are incentivized, and they are not asked about their own view, but about their view of how others' perceive the social acceptability of a given behavior. Participants are asked about each possible action taken in each game (11 possible allocations in the DG, two possible choices in the CYD, and three choices in the JOD).

Our findings for the perceived norms of behavior in the games align with the estimates based on actions taken in the games. If player 2 believes more strongly in witchcraft, then it is perceived as more socially acceptable to give smaller allocations to player 2 in the DG and less socially acceptable to give player 2 larger allocations. In the CYD, it is viewed as more socially acceptable to not select the individual with a strong belief in witchcraft and less socially acceptable to select them. In the JOD game, decreasing the payoff of player 2 is viewed as being more socially acceptable if the player believes more strongly in witchcraft. Increasing the payoff of player 2 is less socially acceptable if they believe more strongly in witchcraft. Doing nothing is viewed as being equally acceptable regardless of player 2's traditional supernatural beliefs.

Our findings provide causal evidence that complements existing observational studies that examine the likely effects of traditional belief systems such as witchcraft or the evil eye. Gershman (2016) documents a negative relationship between beliefs in witchcraft and trust within regions of Africa and globally. While these conditional correlations are important, they stop short of

providing definitive evidence of causal effects. For example, recent evidence shows that the slave trades appear to be associated with stronger witchcraft beliefs today (Gershman, 2020). Thus, it is possible that the negative relationship between witchcraft and trust observed in the data is due to omitted variables bias. Both were affected by the slave trade, which reduced trust and increased the prevalence of beliefs in witchcraft.

Prior evidence can also be gleaned from Hadnes and Schumacher's (2012) study of traditional beliefs in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The authors find that when participants partook in focus groups that discussed issues related to jealousy, moral behavior, and traditional religion, they were more prosocial in a trust game that followed. While indirect, their findings are consistent with traditional religion enforcing prosocial behavior.[3] A different picture emerges from the study by Mace, Thomas, Wu, He, Ji and Tao (2018) of a farming community in China where certain individuals, who are labelled as *zhu*, are believed to have supernatural abilities. The authors find no evidence of greater prosocial behavior associated with *zhu* households. They find that they are less socially connected to non-*zhu* households, they receive less farm help, and receive less money in a dictator game.

We also contribute to existing theoretical and case study analyses of the consequences of supernatural beliefs. Examples include Leeson's (2014) study of the use of oracles in conflict dispute resolution, taking as an example the well-known supernatural beliefs of the Azande (Evans-Pritchard, 1976) or Nunn and Sanchez de la Sierra's (2017) analysis of magical bullet-proofing beliefs in contemporary Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Our results complement existing evidence for the causal effects of beliefs in a monotheistic Big God religions on behavior (e.g., Norenzayan, 2013, Benjamin, Choi and Fisher, 2001, Xygalatas, Kotherova, Mano, Kundt, Cigan, Klocova and Lang, 2018, Bryan, Choi and Karlan, 2021, Auriol, Delissaint, Fourati, Miquel-Florensa and Seabright, 2021, Caicedo, Dohmen and Pondorfer, 2021). In contrast to this literature, our interest is in understanding the consequences of smaller-scale indigenous religious beliefs systems. In addition, we are also interested in the social consequences of the beliefs. Therefore, rather than studying how an individual's beliefs affect how they treat others, our analysis studies how an individual's beliefs affect how others treat them.

Our findings are also related to existing empirical studies that attempt to understand the

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[3] Other subsequent studies that also examine the effects of different types of priming tend to find mixed results. See for example, McNamara and Henrich's (2018) study of Yasaw Island, Fiji, which found that traditional belief primes increased prosociality among those in the local community.

consequences of traditional medicine (Bennett, Naqvi and Schmidt, 2018) or traditional superstitious beliefs (Mocan and Yu, 2017, Alonso, Houssa and Verpoorten, 2016, Halla, Liu and Liu, 2019) in developing country contexts. They also complement empirical studies that examine the determinants of witchcraft rather than its consequences, either historically (Oster, 2004, Leeson and Russ, 2018) or in contemporary settings (Miguel, 2005, Gershman, 2020, Stoop and Verpoorten, 2020). They also relate to the large literature in anthropology examining the social function of witchcraft in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Krige, 1947, Gluckman, 1955, Evans-Pritchard, 1976, Geschiere, 1997, Douglas, 2004)

Our findings raise a number of additional questions that we view as important avenues for future research. The natural next question is why the "Small God" beliefs of our setting persist given their adverse consequences. One possibility is that there are other benefits that are outside of our experimental set up. For example, traditional beliefs may have psychological benefits such as reduced anxiety or depression and improved mental health (Malinowski, 1975, Sosis and Handwerker, 1988, Vyse, 2014, Krige, 1947). It is also possible that traditional supernatural beliefs have political benefits, providing a source of legitimacy and authority for local Chiefs, which allow them to better settle arguments and resolve disputes within villages (Leeson, 2012, 2014, Geschiere, 1997, MacGaffey, 2000). Another possibility is that traditional beliefs are an example of cultural mismatch. That is, they were beneficial in the past but they are no longer beneficial today. The antisocial behavior induced by traditional beliefs could be due to the spread of Christianity, particularly of born-again religions that recognize but vilify traditional supernatural beliefs in their teachings.

The following section describes the setting in which the experiment is implemented. Section 3 describes the experimental design. This is followed by Section 4, which reports the estimating equations. Section 5 reports our findings, and Section 6 concludes.

2. Background and Description of Traditional Supernatural Beliefs in Africa and the DRC

The traditional religious belief systems in the Democratic Republic of the Congo share many of the features that are more common globally (Singh, 2021). The belief system includes beliefs in supernatural forces and ancestral spirits. There are individuals who can cast spells, provide supernatural protection, and see into the future – e.g., witchdoctors, sorcerers, diviners, etc.

Magical power can be embodied in objects like amulets or fetishes. While many of these features are also characteristics of more-organized Big God religions, like Christianity and Islam, the one characteristic of these indigenous belief systems is that there is no moral judgement by gods or spirits and no assignment to heaven or hell. Thus, unlike Christianity or Islam, there is no moralizing high God that is present. Because these non-high God supernatural beliefs appear to be ubiquitous historically (Singh, 2021), we refer to them in the paper as "traditional supernatural beliefs." In the surveys and experiments, the relevant term that we use is a participant's belief in *bokoko*, which is the Lingala word that refers to the set of traditional beliefs that includes belief in the supernatural, witchcraft, ancestors, and sorcery.

Despite the widespread adoption of Islam and Christianity on the African continent, traditional belief systems have persisted. To see this, consider Figure 1, which shows the average share of surveyed individuals who report believing in "witchcraft." The data are from individual-level surveys collected from 2009–2011 by Gallup and PEW. We aggregate the data to create averages at the subnational region level. It is clear that beliefs in witchcraft continue to be widespread in many parts of the continent. One exception is Ethiopia, which has a particularly long history of Christianity. In many countries, the proportion that believes in witchcraft is above 50%, and a number of regions have shares that are in excess of 90%. The region in which our study takes place has 70–80% of respondents believing in witchcraft.

The Gallup survey asks a subsample of 18,000 respondents the main reason for going to see a witch doctor. The most common reasons listed are: to cure an illness or disease (22.9%), to place a spell on someone (19.3%), to become rich/find job (19.1%), to cure a spell placed on them by a witch (13.8%), to inflict pain on someone (12.2%), to find a husband/wife (2.2%), and to have children (2.0%). Interestingly, three of the top 5 reasons listed – to place a spell on someone, cure a spell placed by another, and to inflict pain on someone – can be associated with revenge or retribution, which confirms the plausibility of witchcraft serving the role of providing a threat of supernatural punishment, which can support cooperative or prosocial behavior, especially when the state is absent (Platteau, 2009).

The Gallup data are consistent with our impression from focus groups and interviews of the role of witch doctors in the location of our study. The most common reasons to use magic are to defend against the spells of others and to hurt others. It is also very common for individuals to use magic to make themselves healthier, wealthier, or more successful in life (e.g., having a

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
Figure 1: The share of individuals who report believing in either witchcraft or the evil eye. The data are from *Sub-Saharan Africa Religion Survey, 2010* and Gallup (2009 and 2011, waves 4 and 6). Dark grey indicates missing data. Light grey indicates no data.

successful business, finding a spouse or having many children). Among the participants in our study, 53% report having been affected by witchcraft or other supernatural means in the past and 26% report worrying about being affected by witchcraft in the future. Given our interest in the possibility that witchcraft works as a supernatural threat that promotes prosocial behavior, we asked our participants if they thought that witchcraft is an effective means of harming others. The most common response is that it is "very effective," and 70% of the sample believe that witchcraft is either 'somewhat effective' or 'very effective.'

At the very end of our survey, we ask respondents an open ended question about beliefs in witchcraft and how witchcraft is used. The responses reflect that the most common reasons that individuals use witchcraft is to harm others, defend against harm from others or to be more successful. Examples of responses that indicate its use to harm others include: "Witchcraft has several uses, either to harm or to destroy or to impede the progress of others"; "to be successful and to harm"; "to protect themselves and to destroy the others"; "to harm others, throw bad spells at others, to kill the people and to eat them at night." The following are examples of responses that describe its use to provide protection from others: "to protect themselves, to have hidden wealth, domination, to have better grades.."; "for their protection, but also to harm others"; "it is a power that helps according to the usage: protection, sanction or to procure happiness." In general, the responses suggest that witchcraft is taken seriously and believed to be an active and relevant force.

3. Data and Experimental Design

The data were collected in a city in Sud-Ubangi province.[4] We used Google satellite imagery from June 2015 to develop a sampling frame. We divided the city into enumeration areas – i.e., polygons – whose shapes were determined by natural boundaries, such as roads and rivers. We estimated the population size within each polygon by counting the number of houses. See Figure A1 for a map showing the satellite imagery of the city and the polygons.

We randomly selected 26 out of the 89 polygons to be visited by survey enumerators. We used a probability-proportional-to-size (PPS) sampling method so that the probability of choosing a particular polygon was proportional to its estimated population size. Thus, more populated polygons had a higher probability of being selected. The target number of observations for the

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[4] The IRB asked us to conceal our study location.

study was 520 people. Twenty households were visited in each polygon. To ensure geographic coverage within a polygon, enumerators followed a skip pattern that was determined by the estimated population and the target number of observations.

For each household that was visited, enumerators asked to speak to the head of the household. If the head of the household was not available, the enumerator asked to interview an adult member of the household. If the individual agreed to participate, they first completed a short screening survey that collected basic demographic information. A sub-sample of those who completed the screening survey were asked to participate in the lab experiments. For logistical reasons related to the matching of participants in the games, we did not include individuals in the study who had characteristics that were uncommon. Specifically, we excluded individuals who were not from one of the three largest ethnic groups in the area (Ngbaka, Ngwandi, and Ngombe); the largest ethnic groups comprise 81 percent of the screening survey random sample. We also exclude individuals who did not have a strong or very strong belief in the Christian God; 88 percent of the screening survey sample have a strong or very strong belief in the Christian God.[5] Respondents who completed the screening survey received CF 500, and respondents who were invited to complete the lab experiments received CF 1,000 (approximately 1 USD) for completing a slightly longer version of the survey.

3.1. Experimental Design

As part of the screening survey described above we asked individuals how strongly held their traditional supernatural beliefs are. The survey question is "How strongly held are your beliefs in supernatural powers, such as witchcraft?" The response options are: very weak, weak, neither believe nor disbelieve, strong, and very strong. In pre-testing, individuals very rarely chose very weak or weak belief in witchcraft and so for the experiment, we aggregated the categories 'very weak' and 'weak.' Thus, in the end, each individual's belief in witchcraft falls into one of the following four categories: (1) very weak or weak, (2) neither believe nor disbelieve, (3) strong, and (4) very strong. Appendix Tables A1 and A2 present the correlations between respondent characteristics and strength of traditional supernatural beliefs.

[5] Of the 733 people were randomly chosen for our screening survey, 520 eventually completed the experiments. Of the 213 that do not complete the experiments, 131 were excluded because they were not from a main ethnic group, 72 did not have a strong of very strong belief in the Christian God, and 10 declined to participate.

Individuals were not given the identities of the other player with whom they were playing in the experimental tasks. However, they were given the following information about the other player: their age group, sex, educational attainment, whether they are a coethnic, strength of belief in the Christian God, strength of traditional beliefs (*bokoko*), and whether they grew up in the study city. They were also told that the other player would have the same information about them. For the other player's characteristics, their age group is either young or old; their sex is either male or female; their education is has not completed primary school, has completed primary school, or has completed secondary school or higher; ethnicity is either same ethnicity as the respondent or a different ethnicity; their strength of belief in a Christian God is either a strong belief in the Christian God or a very strong belief in the Christian God; their strength of traditional beliefs is weak or very weak, neither believe nor disbelieve, strong, or very strong; and whether they grew up in the study city is either grew up in the city or not.

The primary experimental manipulation is the randomization of the strength of the traditional beliefs of the other player in the experiment. Participants completed two iterations of each experimental activity. The assignment of the other player's characteristics was stratified so that in one of the two iterations (randomly chosen), the participant is paired with someone with either 'strong' or 'very strong' traditional beliefs, and in the other, they are paired with someone with 'weak or very weak' traditional beliefs or who 'neither believe or disbelieve.'

Each participant plays three different experimental games: the Dictator Game (DG), Choose Your Dictator Game (CYD), and Joy of Destruction Game (JOD). In each game, two rounds are played, each time with a different player. We now turn to a detailed description of each of the three games.

Dictator Game

The first activity is a variant of the standard DG. The participant is given CF 1,000 (in the form of ten CF 100 bills) to allocate between themselves and the other player. The participant is told that they will not know the exact identity of the other player, but they will have several pieces of information about the other player. The pieces of information are described above. Likewise, the participant is told that the other player will have the same information about them. The participant then makes their allocation in private, dividing the ten CF 100 bills into two envelopes, one for themselves and one for the other player. An umbrella is used to shield their choice from

the enumerator. The participant keeps their own envelope and puts the envelope for the other player in a bag located next to the participant that is eventually collected by the enumerator after the conclusion of all rounds of the games.

Choose Your Dictator Game

The second game is a version of a standard CYD game. In the DG, a player 1 chooses to allocate money between themselves and a player 2. In the CYD, the participant, who is player 2 in this experiment, chooses who their player 1 will be. They are presented with two possible player 1s, who we call person A and person B. The participant must choose one of the two individuals to be the player 1. As in the DG above, the participant is given information on person A and person B – i.e., on the two potential people that can be chosen to be the player 1. The participant knows that person A and person B also have the same information about them when they make their allocation decision. The participant tells the enumerator which person (A or B) they choose to have as player 1 in the DG.

Joy of Destruction Game

The final game is a one-sided joy-of-destruction game, which is also often called a money-burning game (Zizzo and Oswald, 2001). In this activity, the participant is told that they and another player have each been given CF 2,000. The other player is anonymous, but the participant is provided with the information described above. They are also told that the other player will have the same information about them. The participant is then given three choices: (1) They can pay CF 200 from their own endowment of CF 2,000 to reduce the endowment of the other player by CF 1,000; (2) They can pay CF 200 from their own endowment to increase the endowment of the other player by CF 1,000; (3) They can choose to neither increase nor decrease the amount of the other player so that they both receive CF 2,000. Choosing to neither increase nor decrease the payoff of the other player comes at no cost. The participant makes their decision by marking an "X" next to their choice on a sheet of paper that provides an illustrated version of the options. The decision is made in private, using an umbrella as a shield. The marked sheet is put in an envelope, sealed, and placed in a bag collected by the enumerator.

4. Estimating Equations

We are interested in how the behavior of participants changes when paired with a player that has strong traditional beliefs relative to being paired with a player that has weak traditional beliefs. Our baseline estimating equation has the following form:

$$
\begin{aligned}
y_{ij} =\ & \alpha_{a(i)} + \alpha_{a(j)} + \alpha_{g(i)} + \alpha_{g(j)} + \alpha_{e(i)} + \alpha_{e(j)} + \alpha_{v(i)} + \alpha_{v(j)} + \alpha_{b(i)} + \alpha_{b(j)} \\
& + \alpha_{c(ij)} + \beta_1\, \textit{Traditional Beliefs}_i + \beta_2\, \textit{Traditional Beliefs}_j + \varepsilon_{ij}.
\end{aligned}
\tag{1}
$$

The unit of observation is a participant i who plays against another player j. We estimate equation (1) separately for each action of a game. Thus, y_{ij} denotes the action in a game by individual i when playing against individual j. The equation includes fixed effects for participant i's age group $\alpha_{a(i)}$, gender $\alpha_{g(i)}$, education $\alpha_{e(i)}$, strength of belief in the Christian God $\alpha_{b(i)}$, and whether the individual is from the study city $\alpha_{v(i)}$, as well as fixed effects for these same characteristics of player j: $\alpha_{a(j)}$, $\alpha_{g(j)}$, $\alpha_{e(j)}$, $\alpha_{b(j)}$, and $\alpha_{v(j)}$. In addition, we also control for a fixed effect that equals one if player i and player j belong to the same ethnicity, $\alpha_{c(ij)}$. We present both robust standard errors and standard errors clustered at the individual level.

The variable $\textit{Traditional Beliefs}_j$ is a measure of the strength of player j's belief in *bokoko*. Similarly, $\textit{Traditional Beliefs}_i$ is the analogous measure for player i. Our primary interest is in the sign of the coefficient β_2, which provides an estimate of whether the behavior of a player changes when the other player has strong traditional beliefs. The secondary coefficient of interest is β_1. This tells us whether a player's behavior is affected by his or her own strength of traditional beliefs. Because we can randomize the characteristics of player j but not of player i, the interpretation of β_2 as the causal effect of traditional beliefs is more straightforward than for β_1.

We also estimate a second baseline equation that replaces player i characteristics with player i fixed effects. Thus, the estimates of interest are derived from differences of play within players when paired with other players. The equation is:

$$
y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \alpha_{a(j)} + \alpha_{g(j)} + \alpha_{e(j)} + \alpha_{v(j)} + \alpha_{b(j)} + \alpha_{c(ij)} + \beta\, \textit{Traditional Beliefs}_j + \varepsilon_{ij}.
\tag{2}
$$

where all definitions are as before and α_i denotes player i fixed effects. Because these fixed effects absorb $\textit{Traditional Beliefs}_i$, this variable, as well as all other player i characteristics, does not appear in equation (2).

We use a number of different measures of *Traditional Beliefs*. First, we measure the strength of the belief on an integer scale that ranges from one to four and is increasing in strength. Second, we use a set of indicator variables, one for each category. Third, we collapse the data into the two categories for which randomization occurs: (1) "weak," which is defined as those who report 'very weak or weak' or 'neither believe nor disbelieve' and (2) "strong," which is defined as those who report a 'strong' or 'very strong' traditional beliefs. We then create an indicator variable that equals one if the participant has a strong or very strong belief.

The full experiments, including the games played, the measurement, and the econometric specifications, were pre-registered with registration numbers AEARCTR-0003276 and AEARCTR-0004878 (Lowes and Nunn, 2018, 2019).

5. Empirical Results

5.1. Game Results

We now turn to our estimates of equation (1). The estimates for the DG are reported in Table 1. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the amount given to player 2 by player 1 out of a total of CF 1,000. The odd numbered columns report specifications without player i (i.e., player 1) fixed effects, and the even numbered columns report specifications with the fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates where beliefs are measured on an integer scale that ranges from 1 to 4. We find that a one-unit increase in player 2's belief in witchcraft is associated with a decline in the amount received of about CF 12. Thus, a change from 1 to 4 is associated with a CF 36 decrease in the amount received by player 2. Columns 3 and 4 report estimates where witchcraft beliefs are measured flexibly using an indicator variable for each belief category, with weak belief in witchcraft as the omitted category. We find that the amount given to player j (i.e., player 2) is CF 27 lower if they believe strongly or very strongly in witchcraft. Columns 5 and 6 report estimates where beliefs are measured using an indicator variable that equals one if the participant believes strongly or very strongly in witchcraft. The estimates show that such beliefs by player 2 are associated with a CF 30 decrease in the amount they receive.

The table also reports the estimated coefficient for the beliefs of player 1 – i.e., β_1 in equation (1). As we have noted, the interpretation of this coefficient is less clear since we are unable to randomize the characteristics of player 1 as we are able to do for player 2. With this caveat in

Table 1: Dictator Game (DG) Estimates

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Amount Sent to Other Player					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-11.364	-12.198				
	[4.932]**	[3.903]***				
	(3.941)***	(5.522)**				
Neither Weak nor Strong			6.228	8.523		
			[15.666]	[16.827]		
			(15.562)	(23.808)		
Strong			-27.452	-27.828		
			[16.027]*	[15.722]*		
			(14.398)*	(22.244)		
Very Strong			-26.373	-22.339		
			[15.570]*	[13.582]		
			(13.558)*	(19.216)		
Strong or Very Strong					-29.882	-29.265
					[11.257]***	[8.406]***
					(8.525)***	(11.894)**
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-8.230					
	[5.142]					
	(6.257)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-23.028			
			[21.984]			
			(27.598)			
Strong			-16.788			
			[18.245]			
			(22.454)			
Very Strong			-28.714			
			[16.577]*			
			(20.458)			
Strong or Very Strong					-15.162	
					[12.711]	
					(15.661)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include Player 1 fixed effects. *Amount Sent to Other Player* is the amount Player 1 sends to Player 2 in an anonymous dictator game. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

mind, we find some weak evidence that participants with a stronger belief in witchcraft give less in the dictator game. Although the estimated effect of this belief is always negative, it is never statistically significant and always much smaller in magnitude than the analogous effect for player 2.

The estimates for the CYD are reported in Table 2. In this game, we call the player who is choosing which of two players to play with player 1 (i.e., player i) and the players who might be chosen player 2 (i.e., player j). After a player 2 is chosen as a dictator, they choose the amount of 1000 CF to allocate to player 1. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if player 2 is chosen by the participant. We find very strong evidence that player 2's beliefs in witchcraft negatively affect the probability that they are chosen in the CYD. When beliefs are measured using a 1–4 integer scale, we find that a one-point increase in witchcraft beliefs is associated with a decrease in the probability of being chosen of 15 percentage points (columns 1 and 2). Thus, a full three point increase is associated with a decrease of about 45 percentage points. According to the estimates reported in columns 3 and 4, a player is 40 percentage points less likely to be chosen if they have strong traditional beliefs and 25 percentage points less likely to be chosen if they have very strong traditional beliefs. Lastly, if one has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, the probability of being chosen is reduced by 37 percentage points. Not only are the estimated effects highly significant, but they are also extremely large in magnitude. Each of the estimated estimates reported above should be compared to the mean probability of being picked which, by design, is 50%.

These effects are significant. To the extent that behavior in the game reflects behavior in real life, the findings suggest that individuals are extremely hesitant to engage in a relationship with those who believe in witchcraft.

We next turn to our JOD estimates, which are reported in Table 3. In these regressions, the dependent variable is a measure that is increasing in the extent to which player 1 makes a prosocial decision. The variable takes on the value of -1 if player 1 chooses to pay to reduce the payoff of player 2; it takes on the value of 0 if player 1 chooses to do nothing, and it takes on the value 1 if player 1 chooses to pay to increase the payoff of player 2. 52% of the sample chooses do nothing. However, 32% of the sample chooses to increase the endowment of the other player and 16% of the sample chooses to decrease the endowment of the other player.

We find that consistent with the estimates from the DG and CYD games, player 1 behaves less

Table 2: Choose Your Dictator (CYD) Game Estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			OLS, Dep. Var.: Chose Player as Dictator			

Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.142	-0.149				
	[0.009]***	[0.011]***				
	(0.013)***	(0.016)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.013	-0.017		
			[0.029]	[0.038]		
			(0.028)	(0.043)		
Strong			-0.403	-0.416		
			[0.029]***	[0.036]***		
			(0.037)***	(0.048)***		
Very Strong			-0.345	-0.338		
			[0.029]***	[0.036]***		
			(0.037)***	(0.048)***		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.367	-0.366
					[0.020]***	[0.024]***
					(0.032)***	(0.036)***

Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.001					
	[0.009]					
	(0.002)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.004			
			[0.041]			
			(0.005)			
Strong			-0.002			
			[0.032]			
			(0.004)			
Very Strong			0.001			
			[0.028]			
			(0.004)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.000	
					[0.023]	
					(0.002)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose Player as Dictator* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if this player was selected. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

prosocially when randomly paired against a player 2 that has stronger traditional supernatural beliefs. Each of our measures of stronger traditional beliefs is negatively associated with prosocial behavior in the JOD. The estimates are not as large or robust as the DG or the CYD game, but they are consistently negative and generally significant.

We also examine results by each possible JOD choice – to increase, to decrease, or to do nothing using OLS – where the outcome is equal to 1 if that action was chosen (see B.1). The result observed in Table 3 – that individuals are less prosocial to those who have strong traditional beliefs – is driven by being less willing to increase the endowment of the other player if they have strong traditional beliefs. Individuals are seven percentage points less likely to increase the endowment of a player with a strong or very strong belief in witchcraft (see Table B4). Players are only marginally more likely to reduce the endowment of the other player if the other player has strong traditional beliefs; they are 4 percentage points more likely to reduce the endowment of the other player if the other player has strong traditional beliefs (see Table B5). The other player's traditional beliefs has no effect on choosing to do nothing in the JOD (see Table B6).

In the appendix we present the following robustness tests. We present the CYD results with a logit specification, and the DG and JOD results with payout inequality (the difference between player 1 and 2 payouts) as the outcome (B.1). We also present all games results with: an interaction between player 1 and player 2 beliefs (B.2), controlling for bilateral characteristics between player 1 and player 2 (B.3), two-way clustered standard errors (B.4), randomization inference standard errors (B.5), game iteration, day and enumerator fixed effects (B.6), interactions between player 2 supernatural beliefs and other player 2 characteristics (B.7).

5.2. *Norm Measurement Results*

We now turn to our second set of outcomes which measure participants' perceptions of the social acceptability of different actions in different games. As mentioned, this is motivated by two facts. First, there is now ample evidence that norms underlie actions in behavioral experiments, not to mention behavior in everyday life. Second, we expect these measures to be less prone to experimenter demand effects. Participants do not report their beliefs, but their expectation of what others will report about the social acceptability of different actions. Additionally, their responses are incentivized. If their answers are accurate, participants receive sizable payments.

Table 3: Joy of Destruction (JOD) Game Estimates

	OLS: Dep. Var.: Choice in JOD					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.040 [0.020]** (0.018)**	-0.039 [0.019]** (0.027)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.026 [0.060] (0.060)	0.051 [0.079] (0.111)		
Strong			-0.148 [0.059]** (0.057)**	-0.131 [0.069]* (0.097)		
Very Strong			-0.088 [0.063] (0.060)	-0.024 [0.069] (0.098)		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.107 [0.043]** (0.040)***	-0.107 [0.040]*** (0.057)*
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.017 [0.019] (0.020)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.017 [0.080] (0.085)			
Strong			0.021 [0.071] (0.076)			
Very Strong			0.045 [0.063] (0.066)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.042 [0.048] (0.051)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Choice in JOD* takes the value of -1 if Player 1 chose to decrease the endowment of Player 2, 0 if Player 1 chose to do nothing, and 1 if Player 1 chose to increase the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

The measures were collected during an additional round that occurred approximately one year after the first round of visits. We were able to reinterview 449 of the original 520 respondents. We purposefully used the same sample of individuals because they had past experience with the behavioral games. Understanding the games and the choices that can be made in them is crucial to being able to answer the questions about how appropriate different actions are. Informal interviews suggest that while respondents remembered participating in the activities, they did not remember the specifics of who they had been paired with or what allocation choices they had made.

The strategy that we use to measure norms follows the method developed by Krupka and Weber (2013). Individuals were reminded of the three experimental tasks that they had participated in, and we reviewed how they are played. Participants were then asked to imagine that there is a hypothetical decision maker who is completing the experimental task. This is a hypothetical player 1 in the experiments. The participant is given information on the identity of the person that the decision maker in the task has been paired with. This is player 2. For each possible choice that the decision maker in the task could make, the participant is asked: "Is this choice very socially inappropriate, somewhat socially inappropriate, somewhat socially appropriate, very socially appropriate?" Earlier in the protocol participants are given the following explanation about the meaning of socially appropriate:

> "After I describe the situation and decision made by the person, I would like you to evaluate the decision and decide whether the action is 'socially appropriate' and 'consistent with moral or proper social behavior' or 'socially inappropriate' and 'inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior.' By socially appropriate, I mean behavior that most people in the study city agree is the 'correct' or 'ethical' thing to do."

To elicit norms, we do not ask participants to choose the answer that they think is correct. Instead, we ask them to choose the most common response to the question of what will be the most common response of the others. That is, all individuals are trying to choose what will be the most common choice of others trying to make the same decision. To encourage individuals to consider their answers carefully, the responses are incentivized. For each game, if all of a respondent's responses about the appropriateness of each choice is the most common response among all participants, then the respondent received CF 5,000. If they get one or more answers incorrect, they receive no payment.

As in the experiments, individuals are not given the exact identity of the player that player 1 is paired with; they are given the same information as in the original experiments. As before, the primary experimental manipulation is the other player's strength of traditional supernatural beliefs. Participants complete two iterations of the set of questions about each experimental activity, stratified by the other player's traditional beliefs. Each participant responded to questions regarding the socially appropriate action in the dictator game (DG), choose-your-dictator game (CYD), and the joy-of-destruction game (JOD). For the dictator game, there are 11 possible allocation choices (corresponding to each possible amount from 0 CF and 1000 CF that can be allocated to the other player); in the CYD game two possible choices (choose Player A or choose Player B); and in the JOD game there are three possible choices (decrease the endowment of the other player, do nothing, increase the endowment of the other player).

We code participant responses of how socially appropriate actions are using a 1–4 integer scale where 1 corresponds to 'very socially inappropriate' and 4 to 'very socially appropriate.' We then re-estimate equations (1) and (2) with this as the outcome of interest. The regressions are estimated separately for each potential action that could be chosen in each game. In this way, we are able to estimate how the social appropriateness of an action depends on whether the other player believes strongly in witchcraft or not.

We first consider the dictator game. The coefficients of interest are summarized in Figure 2 and the full estimates are reported in appendix Tables C30 to C40. Figure 2a reports the estimated coefficient (and 95% confidence intervals) for the 1-4 integer measure of player 2's belief in witchcraft. This is β_2 in equation (1). The right panel presents the estimates from equation (2) with player 1 fixed effects. A clear pattern emerges from the estimates. For amounts allocated to player 2 that are CF 500 (50%) or above, the stronger the traditional supernatural beliefs held by player 2, the less socially appropriate it is to allocate large amounts to them. By contrast, for amounts below CF 500 (50%), a stronger belief by player 2 is associated with it being more socially appropriate to allocate a smaller amount to them. More generally, with the exception of the zero allocation, there is a nearly perfect monotonic ordering of the estimate for each allocation. It is perceived that allocating smaller amounts to someone who believes in witchcraft more strongly is more socially acceptable than to someone who believes less strongly in witchcraft. For the zero allocation, the overwhelming belief is that it is not acceptable to give nothing to the other player whether or not they believe in witchcraft – 98% of respondents say it is very socially inappropriate

to send zero to the other player. Thus, the estimated coefficient is zero.

Figure 2b reports the same estimates, but for the case where we create indicators for each potential belief in witchcraft. We see the same pattern here. If someone believes very strongly or strongly in witchcraft then it is less socially acceptable to give them higher allocations and more socially acceptable to give them lower allocations (relative to someone who believes more weakly in witchcraft). For completeness, Figure 2c reports estimates for an indicator variable that equals one if player 2 believes either strongly or very strongly in witchcraft.

Estimates for the CYD game are reported in Table 4. As with the previous results, choosing a person to be the dictator in the dictator game is seen as less socially appropriate if that person has stronger traditional beliefs. This finding is robust to quantifying stronger traditional beliefs using each of our three measures. The table also reports estimated coefficients for player 1's beliefs in witchcraft – i.e., β_1 in equation (1). Consistent with all of our previous findings, the beliefs of player 1 are uncorrelated with the outcomes of interest. However, as we report in appendix Table C44, we observe marginally significant positive interactions between player 1 and player 2's beliefs in witchcraft; however, these results are not robust to clustering standard errors at the individual level.

Estimates of the JOD game are summarized in Figure 3. The full estimates are reported in appendix Tables C42 to C43. For each game, there are three potential choices: decrease the other player's payoff, do nothing, and increase the other player's payoff. The findings for this game echo the findings from the previous two games. Participants feel that it is more socially appropriate to decrease the payoff of the other player when the other player has stronger traditional beliefs. Similarly, they feel that it is less socially appropriate to increase the payoff of the other player when the other player has strong traditional beliefs. Lastly, it is equally appropriate to do nothing.

In the appendix we present the following robustness tests. We present the DG and JOD results for each outcome (C.1). We also present all games results with: an interaction between player 1 and player 2 beliefs (C.2), controlling for bilateral characteristics between player 1 and player 2 (C.3), two-way clustered standard errors (C.4), game iteration, day and enumerator fixed effects (C.5), interactions between player 2 supernatural beliefs and other player 2 characteristics (C.6).

Figure 2: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the DG

(a) Traditional Beliefs as a 1 to 4 integer

(b) Traditional Beliefs indicators: Neither Strong nor Weak, Strong, Very Strong

(c) Strong or V. Strong Traditional Beliefs Indicator

Notes: The eleven choices in the DG correspond to the amounts between 0 and 1000 CF that can be sent to the other player. *Appropriate* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is a weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, (4) very strong traditional beliefs.

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Table 4: How Appropriate to Choose Player in Choose Your Dictator (CYD)

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Chose Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.272	-0.286				
	[0.019]***	[0.020]***				
	(0.025)***	(0.029)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.186	0.233		
			[0.057]***	[0.072]***		
			(0.056)***	(0.082)***		
Strong			-0.572	-0.539		
			[0.063]***	[0.067]***		
			(0.074)***	(0.089)***		
Very Strong			-0.671	-0.658		
			[0.061]***	[0.065]***		
			(0.073)***	(0.087)***		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.712	-0.712
					[0.043]***	[0.044]***
					(0.058)***	(0.067)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.003					
	[0.021]					
	(0.020)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.070			
			[0.086]			
			(0.076)			
Strong			0.058			
			[0.067]			
			(0.065)			
Very Strong			0.017			
			[0.063]			
			(0.063)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.003	
					[0.050]	
					(0.046)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Choose Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. All columns also include a fixed effect for the iteration of the game. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 3: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Appropriate Choices are in JOD

(a) Traditional Beliefs as a 1 to 4 integer

(b) Traditional Beliefs indicators: Neither Weak nor Strong, Strong, Very Strong

(c) Strong or V. Strong Traditional Beliefs Indicator

Notes: The three choices in the JOD are to decrease, do nothing, or increase the endowment of the other player. *Appropriate* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Witchcraft* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is a weak belief in witchcraft, (2) neither strong nor weak belief in witchcraft, (3) strong belief in witchcraft, (4) very strong belief in witchcraft.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

In this study, we examined how the strength of an individual's traditional supernatural beliefs affects how they are treated by others. We designed and implemented lab-in-the field experiments in northern DRC. In the experiments, we randomly matched players and provided information about the other player in the game. Individuals were not given the exact identity of the other player but were given the following information: their age group, sex, education level, ethnicity, strength of belief in the Christian God, strength of traditional supernatural beliefs, and whether they grew up in the study city. After being matched, participants then played the following games: the Dictator Game (DG), Choose Your Dictator Game (CYD), and Joy of Destruction Game (JOD). To study the relationship between traditional supernatural beliefs and prosocial treatment, we rely on two types of measures. The first is actual behavior chosen in the games. Motivated by the possibility of experimenter demand effects, we also consider a second measure that is incentivized and asks respondents to choose how socially acceptable actions in each game are (given the players and their characteristics).

We found strong evidence that when paired with a player with strong traditional supernatural beliefs, the behavior of the respondent was less prosocial. Across the three games, individuals consistently chose actions that were less beneficial for the other player when the other player had stronger traditional supernatural beliefs. Players gave less in the DG, they were less likely to choose to partner with the player in the CYD game, and they were more likely to reduce the other player's payoff and less likely to increase their payoff in the JOD game. When we study measures of what behaviors are viewed as socially acceptable, we find the same pattern. In each game, when the other player has stronger traditional supernatural beliefs, acting less prosocially towards them is viewed as being more socially acceptable and acting more prosocially towards them is viewed as being less socially acceptable.

Overall, the estimates provide evidence of traditional supernatural beliefs – i.e., Small God religions – being associated with less prosocial behavior. This is in contrast to the hypothesis that Small God religions serve to induce greater group cohesion through the threat of supernatural retaliation, particularly in settings where formal state institutions are absent. The estimates suggest that the negative relationship that has been documented between witchcraft and measures of prosociality (i.e., trust) in aggregate observational data may, in fact, be causal.

In the experiment, we were able to vary the strength of traditional supernatural beliefs of the other player (i.e., player 2). Because we could not do the same for the decision maker (i.e., player 1), we are unable to obtain causal estimates of the effect of the respondent's traditional beliefs on how prosocial they acts towards others. Although we are not able to estimate causal effects, we are able to estimate conditional correlations that control for important observable characteristics. In all games and all specifications, we consistently find that the respondent's own (i.e. player 1's) beliefs do not affect how prosocially they act towards the other player. In addition, we also find that the effect of player 1's beliefs do not vary based on the strength of traditional beliefs of the other player.

Our findings help to better understand many social phenomena in Africa. First, they provide insight as to why there is an asymmetry in how secretive traditional Small God religions are compared to Big God religions like Christianity and Islam. Given our findings, it is not surprising that, despite traditional practices still being extremely common, they are typically always done in secret and people are hesitant to admit to having traditional beliefs or engaging in traditional practices. The estimates may help to explain why witchcraft accusations are common. Our findings suggest that if the other person believes in witchcraft, it is more socially acceptable to not give to them (e.g., giving in the DG), to not associate with them (e.g., choosing them in the CYD), to not help them (increasing their payoff in the JOD game), or to sabotage them (decreasing their payoff in the JOD game). In short, accusing others of believing in witchcraft may be an excuse that justifies acting less prosocially or even antisocially towards them.

Despite increasing our understanding of the full set of religious beliefs in the DRC, our findings also raise as many questions as they help to answer. For example, they raise the question of why Small God beliefs persist and why people continue to use traditional magic by engaging in the use of rituals, spells, amulets, and fetishes given their adverse consequences. One view of their persistence, particularly in the face of the rapid adoption of Christianity on the continent, is that there are benefits, either at the group or individual level, to holding traditional beliefs. While our study provides no evidence of benefits, there may be other benefits that we did not test for. For example, traditional beliefs may have psychological benefits such as reduced anxiety or depression and improved mental health. It is also possible that such beliefs have political benefits, increasing the legitimacy and authority of local village Chiefs who rely on the 'bokoko' as a source of political power. Another possibility is that while these beliefs were beneficial in the past,

due to recent events such as European contact, the emergence of nation-states, and the spread of Christianity, they are no longer beneficial today. For example, antisocial behavior towards those who hold traditional supernatural beliefs may be a result of the spread of Christianity, particularly of born-again religions that recognize but vilify traditional supernatural beliefs in their teachings. Because of the stickiness of culture and religion, traditional beliefs persist even when no longer beneficial. We view these and related questions as extremely important avenues for future research.

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Web Appendix for

Traditional Supernatural Beliefs and Prosocial Behavior

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Appendix A. Additional Tables and Figures

Figure A1: Satellite Image of the Study City with Sampling Polygons

There is a positive and significant correlation between strength of traditional supernatural beliefs and belief in the Christian God in Table A1. While this at first may appear surprising, it is important to note that churches in the region, particularly Evangelical and Born Again churches, often integrate traditional supernatural beliefs into their teachings. Thus, belief in witchcraft and belief in God are not at odds in this setting.

Table A1: Correlates of Belief in Witchcraft

	Panel A: Correlates of Belief in Witchcraft					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Male	-0.147 (-1.50)	-0.0868 (-0.85)	-0.152 (-1.54)	-0.154 (-1.59)	-0.141 (-1.43)	-0.0719 (-0.69)
Completed Primary		0.0450 (0.35)				-0.00697 (-0.05)
Completed Secondary		-0.275* (-1.84)				-0.352** (-2.29)
Grew up in city in Northern DRC			0.0454 (0.41)			0.0148 (0.13)
Very Strong Belief in Christian God				0.354*** (2.87)		0.372*** (3.06)
Ngombe					0.0560 (0.34)	0.153 (0.91)
Ngbandi					0.112 (0.75)	0.150 (1.02)
Observations	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	3.033	3.033	3.033	3.033	3.033	3.033

	Panel B: Correlates of Affected by Witchcraft in the Past					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Male	-0.0716 (-1.52)	-0.0438 (-0.90)	-0.0806* (-1.69)	-0.0722 (-1.53)	-0.0717 (-1.50)	-0.0474 (-0.94)
Completed Primary		-0.0447 (-0.71)				-0.0563 (-0.88)
Completed Secondary		-0.143** (-2.07)				-0.152** (-2.12)
Grew up in city in Northern DRC			0.0692 (1.31)			0.0588 (1.10)
Very Strong Belief in Christian God				0.0479 (0.88)		0.0549 (1.01)
Ngombe					-0.00580 (-0.08)	0.0363 (0.51)
Ngbandi					0.0244 (0.35)	0.0495 (0.73)
Observations	485	485	485	485	485	485
Mean Dep. Var.	0.528	0.528	0.528	0.528	0.528	0.528

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All columns include controls for age and age squared. *Witchcraft* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is a weak belief in witchcraft, (2) neither strong nor weak belief in witchcraft, (3) strong belief in witchcraft, and (4) very strong belief in witchcraft. *Affected by Witchcraft* is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent has been affected by witchcraft in the past. *Completed Primary* is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent completed primary but did not complete secondary school. *Completed Secondary* is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent completed secondary school. The excluded category is did not complete primary. *Very Strong Belief in Christian God* is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports a very strong belief in the Christian God. The omitted category is a somewhat strong belief in the Christian God. Ngombe and Ngbandi are fixed effects for two of the three ethnic groups. The omitted category is Ngbaka. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table A2: Correlates of Belief in Witchcraft

	Panel A: Correlates of Worried About Being affected by Witchcraft in the Future					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Male	0.0136 (0.34)	0.0444 (1.05)	0.00583 (0.14)	0.0136 (0.33)	0.0114 (0.28)	0.0371 (0.87)
Completed Primary		-0.0927 (-1.57)				-0.0938 (-1.56)
Completed Secondary		-0.165*** (-2.66)				-0.161** (-2.48)
Grew up in city in Northern DRC			0.0620 (1.43)			0.0499 (1.12)
Very Strong Belief in Christian God				0.00353 (0.07)		0.0130 (0.28)
Ngombe					-0.0389 (-0.66)	-0.000426 (-0.01)
Ngbandi					-0.0114 (-0.19)	0.0136 (0.23)
Observations	519	519	519	519	519	519
Mean Dep. Var.	0.264	0.264	0.264	0.264	0.264	0.264

	Panel B: Correlates of Trust People in [City in Northern DRC] Who Believe in Witchcraft					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Male	0.123** (2.28)	0.141** (2.57)	0.133** (2.46)	0.127** (2.37)	0.124** (2.28)	0.155*** (2.80)
Completed Primary		-0.0906 (-1.26)				-0.0737 (-1.06)
Completed Secondary		-0.100 (-1.27)				-0.0905 (-1.16)
Grew up in city in Northern DRC			-0.0687 (-1.07)			-0.0752 (-1.13)
Very Strong Belief in Christian God				-0.182** (-2.57)		-0.175** (-2.51)
Ngombe					0.0115 (0.13)	0.0188 (0.20)
Ngbandi					-0.0437 (-0.58)	-0.0519 (-0.67)
Observations	493	493	493	493	493	493
Mean Dep. Var.	1.254	1.254	1.254	1.254	1.254	1.254

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All columns include controls for age and age squared. *Worried about Being Affected by Witchcraft in the future* is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent is worried about being affected by witchcraft in the future. *Trust People that Believe in Witchcraft in city* ranges from (1) not at all to (4) completely. *Completed Primary* is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent completed primary but did not complete secondary school. *Completed Secondary* is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent completed secondary school. The excluded category is did not complete primary. *Very Strong Belief in Christian God* is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent reports a very strong belief in the Christian God. The omitted category is a somewhat strong belief in the Christian God. Ngombe and Ngbandi are fixed effects for two of the three ethnic groups. The omitted category is Ngbaka. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Appendix B. Robustness Analysis for Games Results

B.1. Additional Outcomes and Specifications

Table B3: Choose Your Dictator (CYD) Game Logit Estimates

| | *Logit - Marginal Effects at Means:* | | | | | |
| | *OLS, Dep. Var.: Chose Player as Dictator* | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.151	-0.159				
	[0.011]***	[0.011]***				
	(0.016)***	(0.017)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.013	-0.018		
			[0.029]	[0.033]		
			(0.028)	(0.037)		
Strong			-0.406	-0.419		
			[0.029]***	[0.031]***		
			(0.037)***	(0.042)***		
Very Strong			-0.347	-0.340		
			[0.029]***	[0.031]***		
			(0.037)***	(0.041)***		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.387	-0.388
					[0.024]***	[0.024]***
					(0.037)***	(0.037)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.001					
	[0.010]					
	(0.002)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.004			
			[0.048]			
			(0.005)			
Strong			-0.003			
			[0.037]			
			(0.005)			
Very Strong			0.001			
			[0.033]			
			(0.004)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.000	
					[0.027]	
					(0.003)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose Player as Dictator* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if this player was selected. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table B4: JOD Chose to Increase

		OLS: Dep. Var.: Chose to Increase in JOD				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.025	-0.022				
	[0.014]*	[0.013]*				
	(0.013)*	(0.018)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.014	0.055		
			[0.043]	[0.052]		
			(0.043)	(0.074)		
Strong			-0.099	-0.068		
			[0.040]**	[0.046]		
			(0.039)**	(0.064)		
Very Strong			-0.053	0.001		
			[0.043]	[0.047]		
			(0.041)	(0.067)		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.070	-0.064
					[0.029]**	[0.027]**
					(0.027)***	(0.038)*
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.007					
	[0.013]					
	(0.014)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.076			
			[0.055]			
			(0.060)			
Strong			0.035			
			[0.047]			
			(0.050)			
Very Strong			0.004			
			[0.043]			
			(0.046)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.044	
					[0.033]	
					(0.036)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	0.323	0.323	0.323	0.323	0.323	0.323

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose to Increase in JOD* takes the value 1 if Player 1 chose to increase the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table B5: JOD Chose to Decrease

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			OLS: Dep. Var.: Chose to Decrease in JOD			
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.015	0.017				
	[0.010]	[0.011]				
	(0.010)	(0.015)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.012	0.005		
			[0.031]	[0.045]		
			(0.031)	(0.063)		
Strong			0.049	0.062		
			[0.032]	[0.040]		
			(0.032)	(0.056)		
Very Strong			0.036	0.025		
			[0.033]	[0.038]		
			(0.032)	(0.054)		
Strong or Very Strong					0.037	0.043
					[0.023]	[0.023]*
					(0.022)	(0.032)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.010					
	[0.011]					
	(0.011)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.059			
			[0.045]			
			(0.045)			
Strong			0.013			
			[0.040]			
			(0.043)			
Very Strong			-0.041			
			[0.035]			
			(0.036)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.002	
					[0.026]	
					(0.027)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159	0.159

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose to Decrease in JOD* takes the value 1 if Player 1 chose to decrease the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table B6: JOD Chose to Neither

	OLS: Dep. Var.: Chose to do Nothing in JOD					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.010	0.004				
	[0.014]	[0.014]				
	(0.013)	(0.020)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.002	-0.060		
			[0.044]	[0.058]		
			(0.044)	(0.081)		
Strong			0.050	0.006		
			[0.043]	[0.051]		
			(0.042)	(0.072)		
Very Strong			0.017	-0.026		
			[0.045]	[0.051]		
			(0.043)	(0.072)		
Strong or Very Strong					0.033	0.022
					[0.031]	[0.029]
					(0.029)	(0.041)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.003					
	[0.014]					
	(0.015)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.135			
			[0.061]**			
			(0.063)**			
Strong			-0.048			
			[0.051]			
			(0.053)			
Very Strong			0.036			
			[0.046]			
			(0.049)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.047	
					[0.036]	
					(0.038)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	0.519	0.519	0.519	0.519	0.519	0.519

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose to do Nothing in JOD* takes the value 1 if Player 1 chose neither to increase nor to decrease the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table B7: Payout Inequality in DG

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			OLS, Dep. Var.: Payout Inequality in DG			
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	6.338	10.194				
	[7.377]	[5.883]*				
	(5.997)	(8.324)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			7.312	17.182		
			[23.007]	[23.748]		
			(22.848)	(33.601)		
Strong			44.236	43.873		
			[23.555]*	[20.201]**		
			(19.851)**	(28.582)		
Very Strong			7.745	18.977		
			[23.282]	[22.001]		
			(21.338)	(31.129)		
Strong or Very Strong					23.404	23.929
					[16.688]	[12.177]**
					(12.229)*	(17.229)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	9.502					
	[7.673]					
	(9.414)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			8.919			
			[33.526]			
			(40.712)			
Strong			40.273			
			[26.409]			
			(32.159)			
Very Strong			29.197			
			[24.718]			
			(30.573)			
Strong or Very Strong					30.568	
					[18.776]	
					(22.829)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	252.5	252.5	252.5	252.5	252.5	252.5

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include Player 1 fixed effects. *Payout Inequality in DG* is the absolute value of the difference in payouts between Player 1 and Player 2 in an anonymous dictator game. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table B8: Payout Inequality in JOD

	OLS: Dep. Var.: Payout Inequality JOD					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-17.843	-12.135				
	[15.812]	[15.273]				
	(14.709)	(21.610)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-7.674	69.962		
			[49.104]	[62.054]		
			(49.029)	(87.800)		
Strong			-79.583	-32.030		
			[47.293]*	[54.591]		
			(45.959)*	(77.241)		
Very Strong			-34.521	20.956		
			[50.045]	[55.829]		
			(47.837)	(78.993)		
Strong or Very Strong					-54.403	-43.089
					[34.453]	[31.685]
					(31.542)*	(44.832)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.749					
	[15.702]					
	(16.956)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-138.899			
			[65.688]**			
			(70.297)**			
Strong			52.293			
			[55.106]			
			(57.722)			
Very Strong			-27.240			
			[50.201]			
			(53.708)			
Strong or Very Strong					55.068	
					[38.820]	
					(42.080)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	514.3	514.3	514.3	514.3	514.3	514.3

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Payout Inequality JOD* is the absolute value of the difference in payouts between Player 1 and Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

B.2. Interaction between Player 1 and Player 2 Beliefs

Table B9: DG Estimates with Interactions

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Amount Sent to Other Player					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-13.455	-3.937				
	[14.406]	[9.401]				
	(9.920)	(13.302)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			4.256	16.365		
			[20.706]	[18.941]		
			(18.125)	(26.800)		
Strong			-31.439	-11.790		
			[31.060]	[22.417]		
			(22.415)	(31.718)		
Very Strong			-32.379	2.015		
			[43.750]	[29.841]		
			(30.749)	(42.222)		
Strong or Very Strong					-14.118	-10.838
					[21.302]	[13.379]
					(13.239)	(18.930)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-9.935					
	[11.906]					
	(9.869)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-24.578			
			[24.787]			
			(28.909)			
Strong			-20.035			
			[28.262]			
			(27.309)			
Very Strong			-33.592			
			[36.431]			
			(30.812)			
Strong or Very Strong					-4.334	
					[16.902]	
					(16.937)	
Interactions between Pl. 1 & Pl. 2 Trad. Beliefs:						
Pl 2 Int. Measure*Pl 1 Int. Measure	0.691	-2.723	0.661	-2.678		
	[4.428]	[3.093]	[4.438]	[3.102]		
	(3.219)	(4.376)	(3.216)	(4.389)		
Pl 2 SVS Indicator*Pl 1 SVS Indicator					-21.585	-25.189
					[25.271]	[17.333]
					(17.238)	(24.524)
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Amount Sent to Other Player* is the amount Player 1 sends to Player 2 in an anonymous dictator game. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Table B10: CYD Estimates with Interactions

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Chose Player as Dictator					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.137 [0.027]*** (0.039)***	-0.147 [0.032]*** (0.047)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.004 [0.039] (0.046)	-0.009 [0.050] (0.062)		
Strong			-0.385 [0.058]*** (0.081)***	-0.399 [0.069]*** (0.100)***		
Very Strong			-0.318 [0.080]*** (0.114)***	-0.313 [0.097]*** (0.140)**		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.399 [0.039]*** (0.059)***	-0.399 [0.044]*** (0.068)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.003 [0.022] (0.030)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.011 [0.046] (0.030)			
Strong			0.013 [0.052] (0.059)			
Very Strong			0.023 [0.067] (0.088)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.022 [0.032] (0.035)	
Interactions between Pl. 1 & Pl. 2 Trad. Beliefs:						
Pl 2 Int. Measure*Pl 1 Int. Measure	-0.002 [0.008] (0.012)	-0.001 [0.010] (0.014)	-0.003 [0.008] (0.012)	-0.003 [0.010] (0.014)		
Pl 2 SVS Indicator*Pl 1 SVS Indicator					0.044 [0.046] (0.070)	0.045 [0.052] (0.081)
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose Player as Dictator* takes the value 1 if Player 1 chose to Player 2 as their dictator. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table B11: JOD Estimates with Interactions

	OLS: Dep. Var.: Choice in JOD					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.131 [0.055]** (0.052)**	-0.147 [0.054]*** (0.077)*				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.124 [0.080] (0.081)	-0.067 [0.099] (0.141)		
Strong			-0.342 [0.119]*** (0.116)***	-0.360 [0.129]*** (0.183)**		
Very Strong			-0.374 [0.165]** (0.159)**	-0.355 [0.168]** (0.238)		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.213 [0.079]*** (0.072)***	-0.228 [0.071]*** (0.101)**
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.059 [0.045] (0.044)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.100 [0.089] (0.093)			
Strong			-0.140 [0.108] (0.108)			
Very Strong			-0.194 [0.138] (0.135)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.031 [0.065] (0.065)	
Interactions between Pl. 1 & Pl. 2 Trad. Beliefs:						
Pl 2 Int. Measure*Pl 1 Int. Measure	0.030 [0.017]* (0.016)*	0.036 [0.017]** (0.024)	0.032 [0.017]* (0.016)*	0.037 [0.017]** (0.024)		
Pl 2 SVS Indicator*Pl 1 SVS Indicator					0.146 [0.093] (0.086)*	0.166 [0.085]* (0.120)
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Choice in JOD* takes the value of -1 if Player 1 chose to decrease the endowment of Player 2, 0 if Player 1 chose to do nothing, and 1 if Player 1 chose to increase the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

B.3. Controls for Bilateral Characteristics

Table B12: DG Estimates with Bilateral Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
								OLS, Dep. Var.: Amount Sent to Other Player								
Pl 2 Strength of Traditional Beliefs Int. Measure, 1-4	-11.432 [4.898]** (3.951)***	-12.717 [3.961]*** (5.604)**	-11.468 [4.894]** (3.956)***	-12.480 [3.955]*** (5.596)**	-11.374 [4.895]** (3.946)***	-12.493 [3.943]*** (5.579)**	-11.447 [4.898]** (3.956)***	-12.729 [3.954]*** (5.595)**	-11.450 [4.894]** (3.951)***	-12.682 [3.949]*** (5.587)**	-11.461 [4.894]** (3.948)***	-12.772 [3.958]*** (5.601)**	-10.931 [5.179]** (4.137)***	-11.732 [4.035]*** (5.709)**	-10.810 [5.200]*** (4.152)***	-11.294 [4.058]*** (5.742)**
Pl 1 Strength of Traditional Beliefs Int. Measure, 1-4	-8.033 [5.000] (6.135)		-8.028 [4.999] (6.134)		-7.994 [4.997] (6.130)		-7.874 [5.019] (6.163)		-8.067 [5.000] (6.135)		-8.019 [4.997] (6.126)		-8.104 [4.995] (6.127)		-7.924 [5.030] (6.173)	
Same Sex	1.308 [11.291] (11.436)	1.032 [11.590] (16.399)													1.660 [11.334] (11.462)	1.684 [11.477] (16.238)
Same Age			1.361 [11.233] (11.447)	-18.290 [13.377] (18.927)											1.928 [11.323] (11.534)	-17.420 [13.263] (18.765)
Same Educ. Level					-7.321 [12.256] (11.466)	-25.217 [11.259]** (15.930)									-7.264 [12.316] (11.580)	-24.134 [11.206]** (15.856)
Same Tribe							-6.937 [11.264] (11.605)	0.043 [13.740] (19.440)							-7.469 [11.293] (11.542)	-2.134 [13.406] (18.969)
Same City									6.258 [11.245] (10.548)	5.796 [12.702] (17.972)					6.861 [11.276] (10.506)	6.054 [12.408] (17.556)
Same Christian Belief											-1.061 [11.242] (10.660)	-3.939 [11.411] (16.145)			-1.526 [11.296] (10.688)	-4.056 [11.282] (15.962)
Same Traditional Beliefs													-4.812 [12.976] (11.393)	-9.184 [11.189] (15.832)	-5.306 [13.065] (11.384)	-8.798 [11.102] (15.708)
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). Even numbered columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4. *Amount Sent to Other Player* is the amount Player 1 sends to Player 2 in an anonymous dictator game. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table B13: CYD Estimates with Bilateral Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
								OLS, Dep. Var.: Chose Player as Dictator								
Pl 2 Strength of Traditional Beliefs Int. Measure, 1-4	-0.142	-0.149	-0.142	-0.149	-0.142	-0.149	-0.142	-0.149	-0.142	-0.150	-0.142	-0.149	-0.139	-0.147	-0.140	-0.147
	[0.009]***	[0.011]***	[0.009]***	[0.011]***	[0.009]***	[0.011]***	[0.009]***	[0.011]***	[0.009]***	[0.011]***	[0.009]***	[0.011]***	[0.010]***	[0.012]***	[0.010]***	[0.012]***
	(0.013)***	(0.016)***	(0.013)***	(0.016)***	(0.013)***	(0.016)***	(0.013)***	(0.016)***	(0.013)***	(0.016)***	(0.013)***	(0.016)***	(0.014)***	(0.017)***	(0.014)***	(0.017)***
Pl 1 Strength of Traditional Beliefs Int. Measure, 1-4	-0.002		-0.002		-0.002		-0.001		-0.002		-0.002		-0.001		-0.001	
	[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]		[0.009]	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Same Sex	0.002	0.004													0.003	0.006
	[0.021]	[0.028]													[0.021]	[0.028]
	(0.021)	(0.032)													(0.021)	(0.032)
Same Age			0.011	0.010											0.011	0.011
			[0.021]	[0.028]											[0.021]	[0.028]
			(0.022)	(0.033)											(0.022)	(0.033)
Same Educ. Level					0.007	0.008									0.006	0.007
					[0.022]	[0.029]									[0.022]	[0.029]
					(0.022)	(0.033)									(0.022)	(0.033)
Same Tribe							-0.026	-0.034							-0.026	-0.034
							[0.021]	[0.028]							[0.021]	[0.028]
							(0.022)	(0.035)							(0.022)	(0.035)
Same City									0.018	0.022					0.019	0.025
									[0.021]	[0.027]					[0.021]	[0.027]
									(0.022)	(0.032)					(0.022)	(0.032)
Same Christian Belief											-0.007	-0.011			-0.007	-0.012
											[0.021]	[0.027]			[0.021]	[0.027]
											(0.021)	(0.031)			(0.021)	(0.031)
Same Traditional Beliefs													-0.023	-0.024	-0.023	-0.025
													[0.025]	[0.032]	[0.025]	[0.032]
													(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.041)
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). Even numbered columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose Player as Dictator* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if this player was selected. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B14: JOD Choice Estimates with Bilateral Characteristics

							OLS, Dep. Var.: Choice in JOD									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Pl 2 Strength of Traditional Beliefs Int. Measure, 1-4	-0.039	-0.038	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.040	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.050	-0.046	-0.049	-0.046
	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.019]**	[0.020]**	[0.020]**	[0.020]**	[0.020]**
	(0.018)**	(0.026)	(0.018)**	(0.027)	(0.018)**	(0.027)	(0.018)**	(0.027)	(0.018)**	(0.027)	(0.018)**	(0.027)	(0.019)***	(0.028)	(0.019)***	(0.028)*
Pl 1 Strength of Traditional Beliefs Int. Measure, 1-4	0.020		0.020		0.021		0.021		0.021		0.021		0.021		0.020	
	[0.019]		[0.019]		[0.019]		[0.019]		[0.019]		[0.019]		[0.019]		[0.019]	
	(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)		(0.020)	
Same Sex	0.057	0.110														0.112
	[0.042]	[0.054]**														[0.054]**
	(0.041)	(0.076)														(0.076)
Same Age			0.062	0.048											0.060	0.048
			[0.042]	[0.055]											[0.042]	[0.055]
			(0.042)	(0.078)											(0.042)	(0.078)
Same Educ. Level					-0.005	-0.003									-0.007	0.004
					[0.045]	[0.060]									[0.045]	[0.061]
					(0.045)	(0.085)									(0.046)	(0.086)
Same Tribe							-0.015	-0.091							-0.013	-0.088
							[0.042]	[0.054]*							[0.042]	[0.055]
							(0.042)	(0.077)							(0.042)	(0.077)
Same City									0.052	0.048					0.056	0.043
									[0.042]	[0.056]					[0.042]	[0.057]
									(0.043)	(0.080)					(0.043)	(0.081)
Same Christian Belief											0.016	0.004			0.016	0.002
											[0.042]	[0.053]			[0.042]	[0.053]
											(0.039)	(0.075)			(0.039)	(0.075)
Same Traditional Beliefs													0.103	0.063	0.098	0.050
													[0.051]**	[0.063]	[0.051]*	[0.063]
													(0.051)**	(0.089)	(0.051)*	(0.090)
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). Even numbered columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Choice in JOD* takes the value of -1 if Player 1 chose to decrease the endowment of Player 2, 0 if Player 1 chose to do nothing, and 1 if Player 1 chose to increase the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

B.4. Two-Way Clustered Standard Errors

Table B15: DG Estimates with Two-Way Clustered Standard Errors

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Amount Sent to Other Player					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-11.364	-12.198				
	[4.457]**	[7.018]*				
Neither Weak nor Strong			6.228	8.523		
			[14.346]	[23.498]		
Strong			-27.452	-27.828		
			[15.901]*	[20.366]		
Very Strong			-26.373	-22.339		
			[15.067]*	[21.820]		
Strong or Very Strong					-29.882	-29.265
					[9.942]***	[15.487]*
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-8.230					
	[5.721]					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-23.028			
			[22.600]			
Strong			-16.788			
			[20.181]			
Very Strong			-28.714			
			[17.978]			
Strong or Very Strong					-15.162	
					[15.074]	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040
Clusters	158	158	158	158	158	158
Mean Dep. Var.	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9

Notes: Two-way clustered standard errors in []. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include Player 1 fixed effects. *Amount Sent to Other Player* is the amount Player 1 sends to Player 2 in an anonymous dictator game. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table B16: CYD Estimates with Two-Way Clustered Standard Errors

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Chose Player as Dictator					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.142	-0.149				
	[0.014]***	[0.023]***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.013	-0.017		
			[0.029]	[0.055]		
Strong			-0.403	-0.416		
			[0.040]***	[0.063]***		
Very Strong			-0.345	-0.338		
			[0.040]***	[0.061]***		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.367	-0.366
					[0.032]***	[0.046]***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.001					
	[0.007]					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.004			
			[0.027]			
Strong			-0.002			
			[0.025]			
Very Strong			0.001			
			[0.023]			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.000	
					[0.016]	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080
Clusters	162	162	162	162	162	162
Mean Dep. Var.	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

Notes: Two-way clustered standard errors in []. The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose Player as Dictator* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if this player was selected. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Table B17: JOD Estimates with Two-Way Clustered Standard Errors

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Choice in JOD					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.040	-0.039				
	[0.018]**	[0.032]				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.026	0.051		
			[0.061]	[0.109]		
Strong			-0.148	-0.131		
			[0.060]**	[0.102]		
Very Strong			-0.088	-0.024		
			[0.057]	[0.102]		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.107	-0.107
					[0.043]**	[0.072]
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.017					
	[0.019]					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.017			
			[0.086]			
Strong			0.021			
			[0.075]			
Very Strong			0.045			
			[0.062]			
Strong or Very Strong					0.042	
					[0.049]	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	156	156	156	156	156	156
Mean Dep. Var.	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164

Notes: Two-way clustered standard errors in []. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include Player 1 fixed effects. *Choice in JOD* takes the value of -1 if Player 1 chose to decrease the endowment of Player 2, 0 if Player 1 chose to do nothing, and 1 if Player 1 chose to increase the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individuals has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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B.5. *Randomization Inference Standard Errors*

Table B18: DG Estimates with Randomization Inference Standard Errors

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Amount Sent to Other Player			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:				
Integer Measure, 1-4	-11.364	-12.198		
	[4.932]**	[3.903]***		
Strong or Very Strong			-29.882	-29.265
			[11.257]***	[8.406]***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:				
Integer Measure, 1-4	-8.230			
	[5.142]			
Strong or Very Strong			-15.162	
			[12.711]	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040
Mean Dep. Var.	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9

Notes: Randomization Inference standard errors in []. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, and 3 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Columns 2, and 4 include Player 1 fixed effects. *Amount Sent to Other Player* is the amount Player 1 sends to Player 2 in an anonymous dictator game. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table B19: CYD Estimates with Randomization Inference Standard Errors

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Chose Player as Dictator			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:				
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.142 [0.009]***	-0.149 [0.011]***		
Strong or Very Strong			-0.367 [0.020]***	-0.366 [0.024]***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:				
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.001 [0.009]			
Strong or Very Strong			-0.000 [0.023]	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2080	2080	2080	2080
Mean Dep. Var.	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

Notes: Randomization Inference standard errors in []. The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose Player as Dictator* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if this player was selected. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Table B20: JOD Estimates with Randomization Inference Standard Errors

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Choice in JOD			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:				
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.040	-0.039		
	[0.020]**	[0.019]**		
Strong or Very Strong			-0.107	-0.107
			[0.043]**	[0.040]***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:				
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.017			
	[0.019]			
Strong or Very Strong			0.042	
			[0.048]	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022
Mean Dep. Var.	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164

Notes: Randomization inference standard errors in []. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1 and 3 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Columns 2 and 4 include Player 1 fixed effects. *Choice in JOD* takes the value of -1 if Player 1 chose to decrease the endowment of Player 2, 0 if Player 1 chose to do nothing, and 1 if Player 1 chose to increase the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an ndividual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.6. Game Iteration, Day, and Enumerator Fixed Effects

Table B21: DG Estimates with Game Iteration Fixed Effects

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Amount Sent to Other Player					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-11.347	-12.169				
	[4.932]**	[3.896]***				
	(3.936)***	(5.512)**				
Neither Weak nor Strong			6.200	8.396		
			[15.691]	[16.880]		
			(15.589)	(23.884)		
Strong			-27.355	-27.602		
			[15.997]*	[15.660]*		
			(14.333)*	(22.157)		
Very Strong			-26.383	-22.484		
			[15.586]*	[13.673]		
			(13.579)*	(19.346)		
Strong or Very Strong					-29.818	-29.144
					[11.250]***	[8.375]***
					(8.488)***	(11.850)**
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-8.230					
	[5.145]					
	(6.261)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-23.018			
			[21.989]			
			(27.610)			
Strong			-16.792			
			[18.256]			
			(22.465)			
Very Strong			-28.710			
			[16.584]*			
			(20.466)			
Strong or Very Strong					-15.162	
					[12.718]	
					(15.669)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Columns 2, 4, and 6 include Player 1 fixed effects. *Amount Sent to Other Player* is the amount Player 1 sends to Player 2 in an anonymous dictator game. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. All columns also include a fixed effect for the iteration of the game. *p<0.1;**p<0.05;***p<0.01

Table B22: CYD Estimates with Game Iteration Fixed Effects

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Chose Player as Dictator					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.142	-0.149				
	[0.009]***	[0.011]***				
	(0.013)***	(0.016)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.013	-0.017		
			[0.029]	[0.038]		
			(0.028)	(0.043)		
Strong			-0.403	-0.416		
			[0.029]***	[0.036]***		
			(0.037)***	(0.048)***		
Very Strong			-0.345	-0.337		
			[0.029]***	[0.036]***		
			(0.037)***	(0.048)***		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.367	-0.366
					[0.020]***	[0.024]***
					(0.032)***	(0.036)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.001					
	[0.009]					
	(0.002)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.004			
			[0.041]			
			(0.005)			
Strong			-0.002			
			[0.032]			
			(0.004)			
Very Strong			0.001			
			[0.028]			
			(0.004)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.000	
					[0.023]	
					(0.002)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose Player as Dictator* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if this player was selected. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. All columns also include a fixed effect for the iteration of the game. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table B23: JOD Estimates with Game Iteration Fixed Effects

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Choice in JOD					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.041	-0.040				
	[0.020]**	[0.019]**				
	(0.018)**	(0.027)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.027	0.049		
			[0.060]	[0.079]		
			(0.060)	(0.111)		
Strong			-0.147	-0.128		
			[0.059]**	[0.069]*		
			(0.057)**	(0.097)		
Very Strong			-0.092	-0.030		
			[0.063]	[0.070]		
			(0.060)	(0.098)		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.108	-0.108
					[0.043]**	[0.040]***
					(0.040)***	(0.057)*
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.017					
	[0.019]					
	(0.020)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.017			
			[0.080]			
			(0.085)			
Strong			0.021			
			[0.071]			
			(0.076)			
Very Strong			0.045			
			[0.063]			
			(0.066)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.042	
					[0.048]	
					(0.051)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Choice in JOD* takes the value of -1 if Player 1 chose to decrease the endowment of Player 2, 0 if Player 1 chose to do nothing, and 1 if Player 1 chose to increase the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. All columns also include a fixed effect for the iteration of the game. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table B24: DG Estimates with Day of Enumeration, and Enumerator Fixed Effects

| | OLS, Dep. Var.: Amount Sent to Other Player | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-11.376			-11.004		
	[4.945]**			[4.866]**		
	(3.949)***			(3.936)***		
Neither Weak nor Strong		6.800			7.526	
		[15.709]			[15.238]	
		(15.584)			(15.091)	
Strong		-27.112			-27.592	
		[16.023]*			[15.789]*	
		(14.438)*			(14.242)*	
Very Strong		-26.253			-24.546	
		[15.636]*			[15.373]	
		(13.618)*			(13.479)*	
Strong or Very Strong			-29.913			-29.695
			[11.282]***			[11.081]***
			(8.549)***			(8.556)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-8.994			-6.103		
	[5.310]*			[5.778]		
	(6.464)			(6.891)		
Neither Weak nor Strong		-24.953			-20.612	
		[22.427]			[22.696]	
		(28.193)			(27.526)	
Strong		-18.903			-8.942	
		[18.636]			[18.767]	
		(23.062)			(22.604)	
Very Strong		-31.529			-21.824	
		[17.130]*			[17.871]	
		(21.147)			(21.459)	
Strong or Very Strong			-16.603			-7.501
			[13.061]			[14.077]
			(16.177)			(16.956)
Day FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Enumerator FE	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. All columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 4 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 2 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 3 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1, 2, and 3 also include a fixed effect for the day of enumeration and columns 4, 5, and 6 also include a fixed effect for the enumerator. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table B25: CYD Estimates with Day of Enumeration, and Enumerator Fixed Effects

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Chose Player as Dictator					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.142			-0.142		
	[0.009]***			[0.009]***		
	(0.013)***			(0.013)***		
Neither Weak nor Strong		-0.013			-0.014	
		[0.029]			[0.029]	
		(0.028)			(0.028)	
Strong		-0.403			-0.404	
		[0.029]***			[0.029]***	
		(0.038)***			(0.038)***	
Very Strong		-0.345			-0.345	
		[0.029]***			[0.029]***	
		(0.037)***			(0.038)***	
Strong or Very Strong			-0.367			-0.367
			[0.020]***			[0.020]***
			(0.032)***			(0.032)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.002			0.000		
	[0.010]			[0.012]		
	(0.002)			(0.002)		
Neither Weak nor Strong		0.003			0.006	
		[0.042]			[0.045]	
		(0.005)			(0.005)	
Strong		-0.003			-0.003	
		[0.033]			[0.037]	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Very Strong		0.000			0.000	
		[0.029]			[0.035]	
		(0.004)			(0.004)	
Strong or Very Strong			-0.000			-0.001
			[0.024]			[0.029]
			(0.002)			(0.003)
Day FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Enumerator FE	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. *Chose Player as Dictator* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if this player was selected. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 4 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 2 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 3 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1, 2, and 3 also include a fixed effect for the day of enumeration and columns 4, 5, and 6 also include a fixed effect for the enumerator. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table B26: JOD Estimates with Day of Enumeration, and Enumerator Fixed Effects

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Choice in JOD					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.039			-0.040		
	[0.020]**			[0.020]**		
	(0.018)**			(0.018)**		
Neither Weak nor Strong		-0.021			-0.027	
		[0.061]			[0.060]	
		(0.061)			(0.060)	
Strong		-0.147			-0.152	
		[0.059]**			[0.059]**	
		(0.058)**			(0.057)***	
Very Strong		-0.085			-0.086	
		[0.062]			[0.063]	
		(0.060)			(0.060)	
Strong or Very Strong			-0.107			-0.108
			[0.043]**			[0.043]**
			(0.040)***			(0.040)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.013			0.013		
	[0.020]			[0.024]		
	(0.021)			(0.024)		
Neither Weak nor Strong		-0.035			0.033	
		[0.081]			[0.089]	
		(0.086)			(0.094)	
Strong		0.006			0.024	
		[0.072]			[0.077]	
		(0.076)			(0.082)	
Very Strong		0.031			0.043	
		[0.064]			[0.073]	
		(0.067)			(0.075)	
Strong or Very Strong			0.035			0.020
			[0.048]			[0.058]
			(0.052)			(0.059)
Day FE	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
Enumerator FE	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. *Choice in JOD* takes the value of -1 if Player 1 chose to decrease the endowment of Player 2, 0 if Player 1 chose to do nothing, and 1 if Player 1 chose to increase the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 4 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 2 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 3 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1, 2, and 3 also include a fixed effect for the day of enumeration and columns 4, 5, and 6 also include a fixed effect for the enumerator. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

B.7. Interaction between Player 2 Beliefs and Other Player 2 Characteristics

Table B27: DG Estimates with Interactions between Player 2's Traditional Beliefs and Player 2's Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
						OLS, *Dep. Var.: Amount Sent to Other Player*						
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:												
Strong or Very Strong	-24.835 [15.753] (13.908)*	-33.057 [13.492]** (19.090)*	-31.210 [15.948]* (14.389)**	-41.193 [15.890]*** (22.483)*	-25.564 [15.629] (13.462)*	-29.291 [12.770]** (18.068)	-16.464 [20.283] (18.385)	-38.280 [16.764]** (23.719)	-40.360 [15.657]* (14.775)***	-54.089 [14.292]*** (20.222)**	-33.853 [16.007]** (14.997)**	-41.822 [17.131]** (24.238)*
# Same Tribe	-10.161 [22.594] (22.215)	7.638 [21.435] (30.328)										
# Sex			2.635 [22.641] (22.111)	23.696 [25.632] (36.267)								
# Age					-8.773 [22.608] (22.373)	0.051 [22.369] (31.650)						
# Completed Primary							1.686 [28.436] (29.162)	11.913 [31.067] (43.956)				
# Completed Secondary							-39.782 [27.404] (27.259)	15.074 [24.454] (34.599)				
# Grew Up City									20.152 [22.408] (24.088)	47.824 [23.113]** (32.703)		
# Very Strong Belief in Christian God											7.708 [22.653] (23.472)	24.385 [26.037] (36.840)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:												
Strong or Very Strong	-15.329 [12.742] (15.715)		-15.304 [12.854] (15.780)		-15.107 [12.725] (15.677)		-13.199 [12.774] (15.731)		-15.355 [12.723] (15.691)		-15.287 [12.692] (15.613)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040	1040
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9	468.9

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Amount Sent to Other Player* is the amount Player 1 sends to Player 2 in an anonymous dictator game. *Traditional Beliefs* is a an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table B28: CYD Estimates with Interactions between Player 2's Traditional Beliefs and Player 2's Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
						OLS, Dep. Var.: Chose Player as Dictator						
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:												
Strong or Very Strong	-0.371	-0.372	-0.395	-0.405	-0.364	-0.363	-0.321	-0.309	-0.376	-0.379	-0.371	-0.372
	[0.029]***	[0.036]***	[0.028]***	[0.035]***	[0.028]***	[0.035]***	[0.037]***	[0.047]***	[0.029]***	[0.036]***	[0.029]***	[0.037]***
	(0.037)***	(0.047)***	(0.036)***	(0.046)***	(0.037)***	(0.046)***	(0.045)***	(0.060)***	(0.038)***	(0.048)***	(0.038)***	(0.049)***
# Same Tribe	0.009	0.012										
	[0.041]	[0.054]										
	(0.040)	(0.062)										
# Sex			0.059	0.080								
			[0.041]	[0.054]								
			(0.039)	(0.060)								
# Age					-0.005	-0.008						
					[0.041]	[0.053]						
					(0.040)	(0.059)						
# Completed Primary							-0.074	-0.094				
							[0.051]	[0.067]				
							(0.052)	(0.079)				
# Completed Secondary							-0.057	-0.075				
							[0.051]	[0.068]				
							(0.051)	(0.077)				
# Grew Up City									0.018	0.024		
									[0.041]	[0.054]		
									(0.041)	(0.062)		
# Very Strong Belief in Christian God											0.008	0.010
											[0.041]	[0.055]
											(0.041)	(0.063)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:												
Strong or Very Strong	-0.000		-0.001		-0.000		-0.001		-0.000		-0.000	
	[0.023]		[0.023]		[0.023]		[0.023]		[0.023]		[0.023]	
	(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080	2080
Clusters	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520	520
Mean Dep. Var.	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500	0.500

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Chose Player as Dictator* takes the value 1 if Player 1 chose to Player 2 as their dictator. *Traditional Beliefs* is a an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has a strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table B29: JOD Estimates with Interactions between Player 2's Traditional Beliefs and Player 2's Characteristics

					OLS, Dep. Var.: Choice in JOD							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:												
Strong or Very Strong	-0.111	-0.153	-0.134	-0.125	-0.087	-0.154	-0.087	-0.168	-0.084	-0.053	-0.137	-0.096
	[0.058]*	[0.066]**	[0.060]**	[0.071]*	[0.060]	[0.069]**	[0.074]	[0.093]*	[0.061]	[0.070]	[0.061]**	[0.071]
	(0.056)**	(0.094)	(0.058)**	(0.100)	(0.058)	(0.097)	(0.076)	(0.131)	(0.058)	(0.099)	(0.060)**	(0.101)
# Same Tribe	0.009	0.098										
	[0.085]	[0.117]										
	(0.085)	(0.166)										
# Sex			0.057	0.038								
			[0.085]	[0.116]								
			(0.087)	(0.163)								
# Age					-0.039	0.093						
					[0.085]	[0.114]						
					(0.086)	(0.161)						
# Completed Primary							-0.014	0.122				
							[0.106]	[0.143]				
							(0.108)	(0.202)				
# Completed Secondary							-0.043	0.063				
							[0.103]	[0.136]				
							(0.103)	(0.192)				
# Grew Up City									-0.044	-0.105		
									[0.085]	[0.110]		
									(0.082)	(0.156)		
# Very Strong Belief in Christian God											0.057	-0.022
											[0.085]	[0.117]
											(0.089)	(0.165)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:												
Strong or Very Strong	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.041	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042
	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]	[0.048]
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022	1022
Clusters	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513	513
Mean Dep. Var.	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164	0.164

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Choice in JOD* takes the value of -1 if Player 1 chose to decrease the endowment of Player 2, 0 if Player 1 chose to do nothing, and 1 if Player 1 chose to increase the endowment of Player 2. *Traditional Beliefs* is a an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Appendix C. Robustness Analysis for Norms Results

C.1. Additional Outcomes and Specifications

Table C30: DG Appropriate to Send 0 CF

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 0 CF to the Other Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.003	0.003				
	[0.007]	[0.007]				
	(0.007)	(0.010)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.007	0.005		
			[0.025]	[0.030]		
			(0.025)	(0.043)		
Strong			0.001	-0.006		
			[0.023]	[0.032]		
			(0.023)	(0.045)		
Very Strong			0.010	0.019		
			[0.023]	[0.021]		
			(0.023)	(0.030)		
Strong or Very Strong					0.002	0.004
					[0.016]	[0.014]
					(0.015)	(0.020)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.013					
	[0.006]**					
	(0.006)**					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.007			
			[0.015]			
			(0.015)			
Strong			-0.001			
			[0.013]			
			(0.014)			
Very Strong			0.033			
			[0.018]*			
			(0.019)*			
Strong or Very Strong					0.023	
					[0.013]*	
					(0.013)*	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	1.031	1.031	1.031	1.031	1.031	1.031

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 0 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C31: DG Appropriate to Send 100 CF

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 100 CF to the Other Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.031	0.035				
	[0.019]	[0.014]**				
	(0.014)**	(0.020)*				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.054	0.166		
			[0.059]	[0.061]***		
			(0.059)	(0.086)*		
Strong			0.108	0.209		
			[0.057]*	[0.049]***		
			(0.048)**	(0.069)***		
Very Strong			0.084	0.097		
			[0.059]	[0.056]*		
			(0.052)	(0.079)		
Strong or Very Strong					0.070	0.073
					[0.043]	[0.030]**
					(0.030)**	(0.042)*
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.005					
	[0.022]					
	(0.027)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.222			
			[0.086]**			
			(0.102)**			
Strong			-0.246			
			[0.075]***			
			(0.091)***			
Very Strong			-0.048			
			[0.072]			
			(0.088)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.030	
					[0.051]	
					(0.062)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	1.402	1.402	1.402	1.402	1.402	1.402

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 100 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C32: DG Appropriate to Send 200 CF

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 200 CF to the Other Player, 1-4			
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.025	0.045				
	[0.021]	[0.015]***				
	(0.015)	(0.021)**				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.087	0.062		
			[0.067]	[0.068]		
			(0.068)	(0.096)		
Strong			0.069	0.147		
			[0.067]	[0.053]***		
			(0.055)	(0.075)*		
Very Strong			0.034	0.108		
			[0.065]	[0.056]*		
			(0.056)	(0.080)		
Strong or Very Strong					0.094	0.098
					[0.048]*	[0.032]***
					(0.032)***	(0.045)**
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.018					
	[0.024]					
	(0.030)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.285			
			[0.104]***			
			(0.128)**			
Strong			-0.155			
			[0.086]*			
			(0.107)			
Very Strong			-0.029			
			[0.080]			
			(0.098)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.044	
					[0.060]	
					(0.075)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	1.864	1.864	1.864	1.864	1.864	1.864

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 200 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C33: DG Appropriate to Send 300 CF

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 300 CF to the Other Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.000	0.028				
	[0.022]	[0.013]**				
	(0.015)	(0.019)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.093	0.049		
			[0.073]	[0.059]		
			(0.073)	(0.083)		
Strong			0.016	0.016		
			[0.073]	[0.044]		
			(0.058)	(0.063)		
Very Strong			-0.034	0.121		
			[0.069]	[0.052]**		
			(0.059)	(0.073)*		
Strong or Very Strong					0.036	0.045
					[0.051]	[0.028]
					(0.029)	(0.040)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.010					
	[0.025]					
	(0.032)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.288			
			[0.114]**			
			(0.146)**			
Strong			-0.105			
			[0.086]			
			(0.115)			
Very Strong			-0.048			
			[0.078]			
			(0.102)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.051	
					[0.064]	
					(0.083)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	2.321	2.321	2.321	2.321	2.321	2.321

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 300 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C34: DG Appropriate to Send 400 CF

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 400 CF to the Other Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.009	0.019				
	[0.020]	[0.012]				
	(0.013)	(0.017)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.005	0.092		
			[0.066]	[0.055]*		
			(0.066)	(0.077)		
Strong			0.030	0.034		
			[0.065]	[0.039]		
			(0.051)	(0.056)		
Very Strong			0.022	0.104		
			[0.061]	[0.045]**		
			(0.051)	(0.063)*		
Strong or Very Strong					0.024	0.025
					[0.045]	[0.027]
					(0.027)	(0.038)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.013					
	[0.022]					
	(0.028)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.330			
			[0.105]***			
			(0.137)**			
Strong			-0.040			
			[0.071]			
			(0.093)			
Very Strong			-0.047			
			[0.067]			
			(0.087)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.090	
					[0.057]	
					(0.073)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	2.784	2.784	2.784	2.784	2.784	2.784

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 400 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C35: DG Appropriate to Send 500 CF

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 500 CF to the Other Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.032	-0.033				
	[0.015]**	[0.013]***				
	(0.013)**	(0.018)*				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.006	-0.010		
			[0.044]	[0.051]		
			(0.045)	(0.072)		
Strong			-0.062	-0.070		
			[0.047]	[0.049]		
			(0.043)	(0.069)		
Very Strong			-0.088	-0.084		
			[0.047]*	[0.049]*		
			(0.046)*	(0.069)		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.072	-0.072
					[0.034]**	[0.026]***
					(0.027)***	(0.037)*
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.002					
	[0.016]					
	(0.018)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.075			
			[0.065]			
			(0.079)			
Strong			-0.112			
			[0.054]**			
			(0.060)*			
Very Strong			-0.026			
			[0.050]			
			(0.056)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.026	
					[0.038]	
					(0.044)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.759	3.759	3.759	3.759	3.759	3.759

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 500 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table C36: DG Appropriate to Send 600 CF

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	*OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 600 CF to the Other Player, 1-4*					

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.034	-0.026				
	[0.019]*	[0.015]*				
	(0.015)**	(0.021)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.164	-0.073		
			[0.064]**	[0.069]		
			(0.065)**	(0.098)		
Strong			-0.161	-0.095		
			[0.060]***	[0.050]*		
			(0.051)***	(0.071)		
Very Strong			-0.110	-0.081		
			[0.060]*	[0.055]		
			(0.054)**	(0.078)		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.056	-0.053
					[0.045]	[0.034]
					(0.034)*	(0.047)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.009					
	[0.021]					
	(0.025)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.224			
			[0.096]**			
			(0.114)*			
Strong			0.003			
			[0.067]			
			(0.080)			
Very Strong			-0.085			
			[0.065]			
			(0.078)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.044	
					[0.052]	
					(0.063)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.537	3.537	3.537	3.537	3.537	3.537

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 600 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table C37: DG Appropriate to Send 700 CF

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 700 CF to the Other Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.058	-0.050				
	[0.025]**	[0.016]***				
	(0.017)***	(0.023)**				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.235	-0.187		
			[0.083]***	[0.072]***		
			(0.083)***	(0.102)*		
Strong			-0.193	-0.153		
			[0.079]**	[0.059]**		
			(0.066)***	(0.084)*		
Very Strong			-0.202	-0.198		
			[0.079]**	[0.059]***		
			(0.065)***	(0.084)**		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.084	-0.085
					[0.058]	[0.036]**
					(0.036)**	(0.051)*
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.025					
	[0.027]					
	(0.035)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.138			
			[0.112]			
			(0.135)			
Strong			-0.116			
			[0.093]			
			(0.118)			
Very Strong			-0.111			
			[0.086]			
			(0.111)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.049	
					[0.066]	
					(0.083)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.218	3.218	3.218	3.218	3.218	3.218

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 700 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C38: DG Appropriate to Send 800 CF

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 800 CF to the Other Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.063	-0.052				
	[0.031]**	[0.018]***				
	(0.022)***	(0.026)**				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.178	-0.017		
			[0.107]*	[0.076]		
			(0.107)*	(0.108)		
Strong			-0.201	-0.138		
			[0.099]**	[0.067]**		
			(0.080)**	(0.094)		
Very Strong			-0.199	-0.116		
			[0.099]**	[0.066]*		
			(0.083)**	(0.094)		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.114	-0.118
					[0.072]	[0.038]***
					(0.040)***	(0.054)**
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.007					
	[0.034]					
	(0.044)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.224			
			[0.142]			
			(0.185)			
Strong			-0.220			
			[0.116]*			
			(0.152)			
Very Strong			-0.084			
			[0.109]			
			(0.143)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.035	
					[0.083]	
					(0.109)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	2.837	2.837	2.837	2.837	2.837	2.837

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 800 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C39: DG Appropriate to Send 900 CF

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 900 CF to the Other Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.075	-0.067				
	[0.036]**	[0.018]***				
	(0.023)***	(0.026)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.179	-0.122		
			[0.122]	[0.080]		
			(0.122)	(0.113)		
Strong			-0.208	-0.198		
			[0.114]*	[0.074]***		
			(0.091)**	(0.105)*		
Very Strong			-0.239	-0.192		
			[0.113]**	[0.062]***		
			(0.091)***	(0.088)**		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.137	-0.137
					[0.082]*	[0.041]***
					(0.042)***	(0.057)**
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.041					
	[0.039]					
	(0.051)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.143			
			[0.167]			
			(0.212)			
Strong			-0.358			
			[0.135]***			
			(0.176)**			
Very Strong			-0.161			
			[0.124]			
			(0.163)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.167	
					[0.096]*	
					(0.124)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	2.551	2.551	2.551	2.551	2.551	2.551

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 900 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C40: DG Appropriate to Send 1000 CF

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Send 1000 CF to the Other Player, 1-4					

Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.097	-0.098				
	[0.040]**	[0.021]***				
	(0.026)***	(0.029)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.171	-0.171		
			[0.133]	[0.089]*		
			(0.133)	(0.126)		
Strong			-0.285	-0.295		
			[0.125]**	[0.077]***		
			(0.097)***	(0.108)***		
Very Strong			-0.283	-0.274		
			[0.127]**	[0.077]***		
			(0.105)***	(0.109)**		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.202	-0.202
					[0.091]**	[0.044]***
					(0.045)***	(0.062)***

Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.008					
	[0.042]					
	(0.055)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.165			
			[0.184]			
			(0.233)			
Strong			-0.316			
			[0.148]**			
			(0.195)			
Very Strong			-0.032			
			[0.136]			
			(0.178)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.059	
					[0.105]	
					(0.137)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	2.354	2.354	2.354	2.354	2.354	2.354

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are two observations per respondent for the two rounds of the DG. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Send 1000 CF to Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C41: JOD Appropriate to Increase

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS: Dep. Var.: Appropriate to					
	Increase Payout of Other Player, 1-4					
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.034	-0.043				
	[0.019]*	[0.016]***				
	(0.016)**	(0.023)*				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.024	-0.060		
			[0.061]	[0.070]		
			(0.062)	(0.098)		
Strong			-0.100	-0.118		
			[0.063]	[0.066]*		
			(0.054)*	(0.094)		
Very Strong			-0.086	-0.122		
			[0.060]	[0.057]**		
			(0.056)	(0.081)		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.081	-0.089
					[0.044]*	[0.035]**
					(0.035)**	(0.049)*
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.008					
	[0.020]					
	(0.024)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.062			
			[0.084]			
			(0.096)			
Strong			0.003			
			[0.072]			
			(0.083)			
Very Strong			0.037			
			[0.066]			
			(0.077)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.000	
					[0.050]	
					(0.058)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.653	3.653	3.653	3.653	3.653	3.653

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Increase Payout of Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C42: JOD Appropriate to Decrease

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			OLS: Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Decrease Payout of Other Player, 1-4			
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.040	0.051				
	[0.016]**	[0.014]***				
	(0.013)***	(0.019)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.040	0.076		
			[0.046]	[0.058]		
			(0.046)	(0.082)		
Strong			0.143	0.134		
			[0.051]***	[0.054]**		
			(0.046)***	(0.076)*		
Very Strong			0.097	0.151		
			[0.049]**	[0.050]***		
			(0.045)**	(0.071)**		
Strong or Very Strong					0.100	0.103
					[0.036]***	[0.029]***
					(0.028)***	(0.041)**
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.001					
	[0.017]					
	(0.019)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.010			
			[0.077]			
			(0.090)			
Strong			-0.008			
			[0.058]			
			(0.067)			
Very Strong			0.001			
			[0.053]			
			(0.061)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.006	
					[0.042]	
					(0.048)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	1.239	1.239	1.239	1.239	1.239	1.239

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Decrease Payout of Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table C43: JOD Appropriate to Neither

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS: Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Neither					
	Increase nor Decrease Payout of Other Player, 1-4					
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.003	0.002				
	[0.020]	[0.013]				
	(0.014)	(0.018)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.112	-0.035		
			[0.065]*	[0.053]		
			(0.065)*	(0.075)		
Strong			-0.058	0.021		
			[0.064]	[0.050]		
			(0.054)	(0.070)		
Very Strong			-0.029	-0.028		
			[0.065]	[0.049]		
			(0.055)	(0.069)		
Strong or Very Strong					0.014	0.014
					[0.046]	[0.026]
					(0.027)	(0.037)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	0.045					
	[0.023]*					
	(0.030)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.120			
			[0.098]			
			(0.122)			
Strong			0.053			
			[0.083]			
			(0.104)			
Very Strong			0.152			
			[0.077]**			
			(0.099)			
Strong or Very Strong					0.070	
					[0.058]	
					(0.073)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	898	898	898	898	898	898
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.385	3.385	3.385	3.385	3.385	3.385

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Neither Increase nor Decrease Payout of Other Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

C.2. Interaction between Player 1 and Player 2 Beliefs

Figure C2: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the DG: Interactions between Player 1 and Player 2 Traditional Beliefs

Table C44: CYD Appropriate with Interactions

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Choose Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.377	-0.390				
	[0.055]***	[0.057]***				
	(0.073)***	(0.087)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.086	0.136		
			[0.076]	[0.090]		
			(0.087)	(0.116)		
Strong			-0.767	-0.725		
			[0.119]***	[0.125]***		
			(0.159)***	(0.190)***		
Very Strong			-0.966	-0.940		
			[0.165]***	[0.171]***		
			(0.215)***	(0.255)***		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.836	-0.837
					[0.082]***	[0.085]***
					(0.119)***	(0.138)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.089					
	[0.045]**					
	(0.056)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			-0.009			
			[0.093]			
			(0.092)			
Strong			-0.102			
			[0.101]			
			(0.120)			
Very Strong			-0.223			
			[0.133]*			
			(0.166)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.088	
					[0.063]	
					(0.071)	
Interactions between Pl. 1 & Pl. 2 Trad. Beliefs:						
Pl 2 Int. Measure*Pl 1 Int. Measure	0.034	0.034	0.032	0.031		
	[0.017]**	[0.018]*	[0.017]*	[0.017]*		
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.026)		
Pl 2 SVS Indicator*Pl 1 SVS Indicator					0.170	0.173
					[0.097]*	[0.099]*
					(0.137)	(0.158)
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Choose Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Figure C3: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the JOD: Estmates with Interactions between Player 1 and Player 2 Traditional Beliefs

C.3. Controls for Bilateral Characteristics

Figure C4: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the DG: Estimates with Bilateral Characteristics

Table C45: CYD Appropriate with Bilateral Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
								OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Choose Player, 1-4								
P1 2 Strength of Traditional Beliefs Int Measure, 1-4	-0.274	-0.288	-0.273	-0.286	-0.274	-0.288	-0.274	-0.288	-0.275	-0.288	-0.275	-0.289	-0.277	-0.294	-0.277	-0.293
	[0.019]***	[0.020]***	[0.019]***	[0.020]***	[0.019]***	[0.020]***	[0.019]***	[0.020]***	[0.019]***	[0.020]***	[0.019]***	[0.020]***	[0.020]***	[0.020]***	[0.020]***	[0.020]***
	(0.025)***	(0.029)***	(0.025)***	(0.029)***	(0.025)***	(0.029)***	(0.025)***	(0.029)***	(0.025)***	(0.029)***	(0.025)***	(0.029)***	(0.025)***	(0.030)***	(0.025)***	(0.029)***
P1 1 Strength of Traditional Beliefs Int Measure, 1-4	-0.003		-0.002		-0.003		-0.003		-0.002		-0.003		-0.003		-0.001	
	[0.020]		[0.020]		[0.020]		[0.020]		[0.020]		[0.020]		[0.020]		[0.020]	
	(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.019)		(0.019)	
Same Sex	0.030	-0.011													0.034	-0.008
	[0.044]	[0.052]													[0.044]	[0.052]
	(0.044)	(0.060)													(0.044)	(0.060)
Same Age			-0.049	-0.076											-0.051	-0.075
			[0.044]	[0.053]											[0.044]	[0.053]
			(0.048)	(0.065)											(0.048)	(0.065)
Same Educ. Level					0.050	0.016									0.051	0.017
					[0.046]	[0.052]									[0.046]	[0.053]
					(0.047)	(0.063)									(0.047)	(0.063)
Same Tribe							0.007	0.007							0.007	0.004
							[0.044]	[0.051]							[0.044]	[0.051]
							(0.045)	(0.059)							(0.044)	(0.059)
Same City									0.040	0.022					0.039	0.019
									[0.044]	[0.050]					[0.044]	[0.050]
									(0.047)	(0.059)					(0.047)	(0.059)
Same Christian Belief											-0.028	-0.021			-0.027	-0.018
											[0.044]	[0.053]			[0.044]	[0.053]
											(0.044)	(0.061)			(0.044)	(0.061)
Same WC Belief													0.033	0.060	0.031	0.058
													[0.051]	[0.057]	[0.051]	[0.057]
													(0.059)	(0.076)	(0.059)	(0.076)
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). Even numbered columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Choose Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Figure C5: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the JOD: Estimates with Bilateral Characteristics

C.4. Two-Way Clustered Standard Errors

Table C46: CYD Appropriate with Two-Way Clustered Standard Errors

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Choose Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.272	-0.286				
	[0.018]***	[0.033]***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.185	0.232		
			[0.059]***	[0.091]**		
Strong			-0.572	-0.539		
			[0.075]***	[0.103]***		
Very Strong			-0.672	-0.659		
			[0.051]***	[0.086]***		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.712	-0.712
					[0.050]***	[0.071]***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.003					
	[0.022]					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.070			
			[0.076]			
Strong			0.058			
			[0.076]			
Very Strong			0.017			
			[0.070]			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.003	
					[0.052]	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796
Clusters	155	155	155	155	155	155
Mean Dep. Var.	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076

Notes: Two-way clustered standard errors in []. The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Columns 1, 3, and 5 include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Choose Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Figure C6: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the DG: Two-Way Clustered Standard Errors


Figure C7: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the JOD: Estimates with Two-Way Clustered Standard Errors

C.5. *Game Iteration, Day, and Enumerator Fixed Effects*

Figure C8: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the DG: Game Iteration Fixed Effects

Table C47: CYD Appropriate with Game Iteration Fixed Effects

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Chose Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.272	-0.286				
	[0.019]***	[0.020]***				
	(0.025)***	(0.029)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.186	0.233		
			[0.057]***	[0.072]***		
			(0.056)***	(0.082)***		
Strong			-0.572	-0.539		
			[0.063]***	[0.067]***		
			(0.074)***	(0.089)***		
Very Strong			-0.671	-0.658		
			[0.061]***	[0.065]***		
			(0.073)***	(0.087)***		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.712	-0.712
					[0.043]***	[0.044]***
					(0.058)***	(0.067)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.003					
	[0.021]					
	(0.020)					
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.070			
			[0.086]			
			(0.076)			
Strong			0.058			
			[0.067]			
			(0.065)			
Very Strong			0.017			
			[0.063]			
			(0.063)			
Strong or Very Strong					-0.003	
					[0.050]	
					(0.046)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Choose Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. All columns also include a fixed effect for the iteration of the game. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table C48: CYD Appropriate with Day of Enumeration, and Enumerator Fixed Effects

	OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Chose Player, 1-4					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.272	-0.273				
	[0.019]***	[0.019]***				
	(0.025)***	(0.025)***				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.185	0.187		
			[0.057]***	[0.056]***		
			(0.056)***	(0.056)***		
Strong			-0.572	-0.572		
			[0.063]***	[0.062]***		
			(0.074)***	(0.074)***		
Very Strong			-0.672	-0.671		
			[0.061]***	[0.059]***		
			(0.074)***	(0.073)***		
Strong or Very Strong					-0.712	-0.713
					[0.043]***	[0.043]***
					(0.058)***	(0.059)***
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:						
Integer Measure, 1-4	-0.001	0.033				
	[0.021]	[0.023]				
	(0.020)	(0.020)				
Neither Weak nor Strong			0.085	0.153		
			[0.087]	[0.086]*		
			(0.079)	(0.070)**		
Strong			0.077	0.090		
			[0.068]	[0.070]		
			(0.067)	(0.064)		
Very Strong			0.028	0.119		
			[0.064]	[0.070]*		
			(0.064)	(0.063)*		
Strong or Very Strong					0.004	0.043
					[0.050]	[0.055]
					(0.047)	(0.046)
Day FE	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N
Enumerator FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Choose Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a variable from 1 to 4, where (1) is weak traditional beliefs, (2) neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs, (3) strong traditional beliefs, and (4) very strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1 and 2 present the results with traditional beliefs as a 1 to 4 variable. Columns 3 and 4 present the results with fixed effects for the traditional beliefs of Players 1 and 2, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs. Columns 5 and 6 present the results with an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. Columns 1, 2, and 3 also include a fixed effect for the day of enumeration and columns 4, 5, and 6 also include a fixed effect for the enumerator. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Figure C9: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the JOD: Estimates with Game Iteration Fixed Effects


Figure C10: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the DG: Day of Enumeration, and Enumerator Fixed Effects

Figure C11: Effect of Player 2's Traditional Beliefs on How Socially Appropriate Choices are in the JOD: Estimates with with Day of Enumeration, and Enumerator Fixed Effects

C.6. Interaction Between Player 2 Beliefs and Other Player 2 Characteristics

Table C49: CYD Appropriate with Interactions between Player 2's Traditional Beliefs and Player 2's Characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
						OLS, Dep. Var.: Appropriate to Choose Player, 1-4						
Player 2's Traditional Beliefs:												
Strong or Very Strong	-0.662	-0.624	-0.698	-0.699	-0.743	-0.744	-0.760	-0.773	-0.773	-0.805	-0.774	-0.756
	[0.063]***	[0.070]***	[0.062]***	[0.068]***	[0.061]***	[0.065]***	[0.076]***	[0.083]***	[0.060]***	[0.063]***	[0.060]***	[0.065]***
	(0.075)***	(0.092)***	(0.072)***	(0.090)***	(0.071)***	(0.085)***	(0.084)***	(0.107)***	(0.068)***	(0.082)***	(0.073)***	(0.090)***
# Same Tribe	-0.100	-0.177										
	[0.087]	[0.102]*										
	(0.088)	(0.116)										
# Sex			-0.028	-0.025								
			[0.087]	[0.101]								
			(0.082)	(0.110)								
# Age					0.062	0.064						
					[0.087]	[0.099]						
					(0.083)	(0.111)						
# Completed Primary							0.081	0.062				
							[0.107]	[0.123]				
							(0.111)	(0.151)				
# Completed Secondary							0.062	0.121				
							[0.107]	[0.120]				
							(0.100)	(0.135)				
# Grew Up City									0.122	0.188		
									[0.087]	[0.099]*		
									(0.081)	(0.106)*		
# Very Strong Belief in Christian God											0.122	0.087
											[0.087]	[0.101]
											(0.087)	(0.118)
Player 1's Traditional Beliefs:												
Strong or Very Strong	-0.003		-0.003		-0.001		-0.002		-0.005		-0.002	
	[0.050]		[0.050]		[0.050]		[0.050]		[0.050]		[0.050]	
	(0.046)		(0.046)		(0.046)		(0.046)		(0.046)		(0.046)	
Player 1 FE	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796	1796
Clusters	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449	449
Mean Dep. Var.	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076	3.076

Notes: Robust standard errors in []. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in (). The data are stacked so that there are four observations per respondent, one corresponding to each person that they could choose between for the two rounds of the CYD. All columns include fixed effects for Player 2 characteristics: sex, educational attainment, grew up in [city in Northern DRC], strength of belief in Christian God, and same tribe as Player 1. Odd columns include fixed effects for the equivalent Player 1 characteristics. Even columns include Player 1 fixed effects. *Appropriate to Choose Player* is a 1 to 4 variable, where (1) is very socially inappropriate, (2) is somewhat socially inappropriate, (3) is somewhat socially appropriate, and (4) is very socially appropriate. *Traditional Beliefs* is a an indicator variable that equals 1 if an individual has strong or very strong traditional beliefs, where the omitted category is weak traditional beliefs or neither weak nor strong traditional beliefs. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01