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THE OTHER GREAT MIGRATION:
SOUTHERN WHITES AND THE NEW RIGHT

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The Other Great Migration: Southern Whites and the New Right
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ABSTRACT

This paper shows how the migration of millions of Southern whites in the 20th century shaped the cultural and political landscape across America. Racially and religiously conservative, Southern white migrants created new electoral possibilities for a broad-based coalition with economic conservatives. With their considerable geographic scope, these migrants hastened partisan realignment and helped to catalyze and bolster a New Right movement with national influence over the long run. More than just augmenting the conservative voter base outside the South, they influenced non-Southerners by building evangelical churches, diffusing right-wing media, and mixing through intermarriage and residential integration. Tracking non-Southern households, we show that exposure to Southern white neighbors increased adoption of conservative religious norms. Overall, our findings suggest that this mass migration blurred the North–South cultural divide and reshaped the geography of conservatism in the U.S.

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1 Introduction

Migration has shaped and reshaped the geography of culture and politics throughout U.S. history. Several groups left a distinctive imprint, including Europeans through the “Age of Mass Migration” (Gigliano and Tabellini, 2020; Grosjean, 2014) and Southern Blacks during the “Great Migration” (Calderon et al., 2022; Fouka et al., 2022). In this paper, we study the cultural and political impacts of Southern white migration across the U.S. during the 20th century. Despite being larger in scale than the Black Great Migration, this episode has received far less attention.¹ We examine how this “other Great Migration” influenced the trajectory of the New Right, a coalition of economic, racial, and religious conservatives that began to emerge in the 1960s.² Our findings suggest that the Southern white diaspora played an important role in shaping this durable movement mobilized behind the Republican Party.

In the early 20th century, millions of Southern whites migrated across the U.S., settling in rural areas, small towns, and big cities. They brought with them a distinctive set of conservative attitudes on race and religion tied to the history of the South. Survey evidence through the 1960s shows that, relative to non-Southern whites in the same non-Southern county, whites born in the South were on average more likely to identify as evangelical, to favor various forms of racial segregation, and to oppose racially-inclusive forms of economic redistribution. This historical background informs our analysis of how the mass migration of Southern whites influenced U.S. politics.

We begin by establishing the impact of the Southern white diaspora on Republican Party presidential vote shares in the 21st century, a proxy for the local strength of the New Right in the long run. We rely on county-level variation in exposure to Southern white migrants as measured using complete-count Census data from 1940, a year that predates the partisan realignments of the postwar era. As a key part of our identification strategy, we develop a shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) based on “push factors,” as in Boustan (2010) and Derenoncourt (2022), who study the Black Great Migration. Our SSIV combines predetermined Southern white migration networks as of 1900 (shares) with predicted aggregate migration flows out of the South for each decade from 1900 to 1940 (shifts). This approach addresses biases due to economic or ideological sorting as well as place-based confounders of conservative politics. To ensure that pre-1900 migrants are not driving later outcomes, we also control for 1900 migrant shares, thus identifying the distinct influence of changes in Southern white migrant population shares from 1900 to 1940. We further allay concerns about early migrant sorting by developing an alternative IV strategy based on Sequeira et al. (2020), which leverages the coincidental timing of initial railroad connections outside the South and overall white migrant flows from the South.

The SSIV estimates indicate that Southern white migration in the early 20th century is associated with significantly higher Republican vote shares in the 21st century. This finding is robust to (i) alternative definitions of the North–South divide (our baseline defines the South as the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma), (ii) omitting individual origin and destination states, (iii) re-weighting counties by their electoral importance, (iv) identification and inference checks for SSIVs (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2022; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020), (v) constructing the SSIV based on Southern-origin counties rather than states, (vi) accounting for the simultaneous effects of Southern Black migrants, and (vii)

¹Among the exceptions referenced throughout the paper is the important historical research of Gregory (2005) on the Black and white “Southern diaspora,” a term that we adopt.

²Following previous studies, we use the term “racial conservatism” to characterize opposition to legislation and policies designed to change the prevailing racial hierarchy at given moment in time (Bateman et al., 2017; Feinstein and Schickler, 2008; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Schickler, 2016). Such opposition does not necessarily entail overt expressions of racism, even if it often appears in combination with racial grievance, resentment, or animus.

including fixed effects for within-state county pairs with the most similar 1870 Southern white migrant shares, 1900 Republican vote shares, or changes in Republican vote shares from 1900–40, which account for heterogeneity in early political leanings. Together with the similar estimates based on the railroad-connection IV, these results point to a causal interpretation.

Our IV estimates imply sizable electoral influence, with each additional migrant in 1940 associated with more than one conservative vote in the 21st century. We identify tipping points underlying these more-than-compositional effects: Southern white migrants had an outsized influence on voting outcomes in counties where they reached a critical mass. Such nonlinearities are suggestive of cultural transmission to non-Southerners, which we explore later in the paper. We also use a heuristic exercise to quantify decisiveness in close elections and find that the broad geographic scope of the diaspora bolstered its influence via the Electoral College, which assigns greater weight to low-population states.

Having identified the diaspora’s legacy in the 21st century, we then go back in time to understand how Southern white migration shaped the historical trajectory of conservative alignment behind the modern Republican Party. We trace out voting impacts across the 20th century, identifying significant effects beginning in the 1960s as large-diaspora counties moved away from the Democratic Party. These county-level estimates are consistent with American National Election Survey (ANES) data showing that, after the mid-1960s, Southern white migrants were more likely to dealign from the Democratic Party than were non-Southerners in the same county. Democrats ultimately lost not only the South (as shown by [Kuziemko and Washington, 2018](#)) but also diaspora communities *outside* the South.

We shed further light on the emergence of the New Right with three complementary analyses. First, we find that the Southern white diaspora played an important role at a critical juncture of partisan realignment in the 1968 election, when migrants amplified support for third-party candidate George Wallace. Known for his segregationist positions as Governor of Alabama, Wallace campaigned on a unique combination of racial and religious conservatism with working-class appeal ([Carter, 1995](#)). His strong support in large-diaspora counties foreshadowed their consolidation behind the Republican Party in the 1970s. This Southern white influence was distinctive. Although Northern white migrants also contributed to the emerging New Right coalition by bringing economic conservatism to new areas of the country, we find that they reduced support for Wallace and had smaller effects on partisan realignment. In the lineage of the New Right, Southern white migrants may have been an early harbinger of change, illuminating a viable path for the Republican’s “Southern Strategy” to move beyond the South.

Second, we revisit the origins of the New Right coalition to understand how Southern white migrants helped consolidate different strands of conservatism behind the Republican Party. The New Right emerged in the second half of the 20th century, bringing racially and religiously conservative voters together with supporters of previous conservative coalitions defined by fiscal conservatism and anti-communism. As the Democratic Party came to favor racially-inclusive federal redistribution, racially conservative Southern Democrats increasingly aligned with economically conservative Northern Republicans ([Black and Black, 2003](#); [Lowndes, 2009](#); [Schickler, 2016](#)). Meanwhile, religious conservatives decried federal overreach in education and marriage and saw traditional family values as inconsistent with growing Democratic interventionism. We characterize this dynamic coalition-building process using data on congressional representatives’ voting behavior and speech, state-level party platforms, and survey data on voter preferences and partisan identification. Across these domains, we see an increasing coalescence of economic conservatism with racial and religious conservatism after the 1960s.

Third, we show that the Southern white diaspora helped catalyze and expand this New Right coalition. Using a congressional-district-level SSIV, we find that a larger diaspora is associated with racially

conservative voting and greater deployment of religious rhetoric by House representatives. As large-diaspora districts realigned toward Republicans over time, those representatives voted more conservatively on economic issues, too. Migrants also influenced local policy agendas, as reflected in the text of state-level party platforms compiled by [Hopkins et al. \(2022\)](#). While most platforms moved left on race after 1964, Republican platforms in states with a larger diaspora became more racially conservative as we show in state-level SSIV regressions. Together with our findings on presidential elections, these results suggest that diaspora whites were not merely following a nationwide realignment already underway but rather played a direct role in the grassroots shift towards the Republican Party.

In the final part of the paper, we examine several potential channels through which Southern white migrants transmitted culture and expanded the conservative voting base beyond the initial diaspora. We begin by showing that purely demographic mechanisms—differential fertility and chain migration—led to intergenerational growth of the diaspora, albeit not enough to explain its more-than-compositional effects on long-run voting outcomes. This motivates our focus on horizontal and oblique cultural transmission, and we find evidence in support of several complementary mechanisms.

First, we see a larger electoral imprint of the Southern white diaspora in counties with greater residential mixing and intermarriage between Southern and non-Southern whites, relative to random matching rates. These results echo [Giuliano and Tabellini’s \(2020\)](#) findings on European immigrant integration and electoral influence. Our findings suggest that social integration may have facilitated cultural transmission and thus amplified the rightward shift at the ballot box in large-diaspora counties.

Second, Southern white migrants hastened the diffusion of religious conservatism through evangelical institutions and right-wing radio. We show that the diaspora provided the leadership and congregant foundations of evangelical expansion and innovation outside the South. This includes, most prominently, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), which had defended slavery and split from the national Baptist church over the issue in the 1850s. When the SBC began allowing congregations outside the South in the 1940s, migrants helped the church expand into new areas. These churches, along with others (e.g., Pentecostal), would become a key force in mobilizing the religious vote behind the Republican Party later in the 20th century (see [Butler, 2021](#); [Jones, 2018](#)). We find a similarly large diaspora imprint on the spread of conservative talk radio beginning in the 1950s with religious radio programs like Carl McIntire’s *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* and persisting through the 21st century with the preeminent *Rush Limbaugh Show*. By differentially entering markets with a larger diaspora, these conservative broadcasters expanded the orbit of right-wing messaging beyond the South.

Finally, we use individual-level data to provide direct evidence of cultural transmission from Southern to non-Southern populations. Tracking non-Southern-origin families who moved between Census rounds, we find that greater exposure to Southern white migrants within small neighborhoods increased the likelihood of giving one’s children Biblical names. This increase in religiosity suggests that localized contact facilitated cultural change, which helps explain why residential mixing had persistent impacts on voting. Moreover, such hyper-local transmission complemented the broader reach of evangelical churches and right-wing radio. Together with the spread of Southern food and country music via diaspora communities, these findings clarify how the “other Great Migration” contributed to the “Southernization” of the U.S.—a process of longstanding popular interest (see [Applebome, 1997](#); [Cox Richardson, 2020](#); [Egerton, 1974](#); [Gaillard and Tucker, 2022](#)).

This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of migration, cultural change, and conservatism in America. Economists have largely focused on Southern Black migration ([Boutan, 2010, 2016](#); [Derenoncourt, 2022](#); [Fouka et al., 2022](#)), with a few studies characterizing the migration of both

Blacks and whites (Collins and Wanamaker, 2015; Stuart and Taylor, 2019). Calderon et al. (2022) show that Southern Black migrants increased support for civil rights legislation among Northern whites. We show that Southern white migrants also left a major historical imprint as they helped bolster a new conservative movement with far-reaching political consequences.³ Moreover, we relate Black and white settlement patterns and argue that the two together offer a more complete characterization of how the Great Migration transformed American politics.

We offer some of the first quantitative evidence connecting the insights of historians on the Southern white diaspora (Berry, 2000; Dippel, 2005; Dochuk, 2010; Gregory, 2005) with those of political scientists on the realignment (Schickler, 2016) and the New Right (Lowndes, 2009). We identify critical junctures in the New Right trajectory and use congressional data and state party platform texts to provide a sharper lens on the coalescence of economic, racial, and religious conservatism after the 1960s. Our evidence on the transmission of religious ideology and shifts in racial politics illustrates a key role for this historical migration episode in shaping the political landscape across 21st century America.

Our findings offer a new perspective on the origins and consequences of partisan realignment. The realignment of racially conservative white voters within the South is well understood (Black and Black, 2003; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). We show that a similar realignment took hold in white diaspora communities outside the South. The geographic dispersion of these communities, and their pervasiveness across the Western U.S., may have increased the electoral viability of Republican Party efforts to court the racially conservative vote nationally. The partisan dynamics we identify support the conjecture that racial animus drives some of the unique opposition to redistribution in the U.S. (Alesina et al., 2001). By bundling aspects of racial resentment with religious and economic conservatism, the Republican Party assembled a broad and durable electoral coalition—what political scientists Maxwell and Shields (2019) call the “Long Southern Strategy,” riffing on Nixon’s original Southern Strategy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Our paper provides quantitative evidence on the role of the white Great Migration in the formation and electoral effectiveness of this right-wing movement.

We also contribute to a growing literature on the role of migrants in fostering cultural change throughout American history. Recent work explores the influence of European immigrants on redistributive preferences (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020), honor culture (Grosjean, 2014), and gender norms (Haddad, 2021), as well as the influence of frontier settlers on a culture of rugged individualism (Bazzi et al., 2020). We explore an understudied episode of mass migration and trace out its long-run implications for the geography of culture and politics. While hiding in plain sight, the influence of the Southern white diaspora cuts across many domains of public life. Its contribution to the New Right coalition helped to reshape the geography of polarization across America: while the North–South divide dominated historically, today’s landscape reveals sharp divisions *within* regions.⁴

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides historical background on Southern white migration. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. Section 4 establishes the impacts on electoral outcomes

³Two recent studies also explore how waves of Southern white migrants strengthened conservative politics outside the South. Ramey (2021) examines this for white Plains migrants settling in California during the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, and Reisinger (2021) examines this for Southern white migrants as of 1970 across the non-South. Among other differences, our study is distinct in four key ways: (i) our analysis of realignment, the critical 1968 election, and the bundling of racial, religious, and economic conservatism, (ii) our evidence on racial sorting and coalition change, (iii) our exploration of multiple cultural and ideological channels of transmission, and (iv) our evidence of causal exposure effects and cultural change among non-Southern whites. We learned of these studies after distributing our working paper in 2021.

⁴We offer here a note on interpretation. While identifying an important role for Southern white migrants in right-wing politics outside the South, we are not ruling out a large influence of non-Southern whites in driving those same outcomes. Nor are we arguing that all Southern white migrants had the same attachments to Southern culture or that all supporters of the New Right were equally attached to the movement’s racial, religious, and economic conservatism.

in the 21st century. Section 5 works backward in time to characterize the trajectory of Southern white diaspora influence on partisan realignment and the foundation of the New Right movement in the 20th century. Section 6 identifies mechanisms for cultural transmission from Southern white migrants. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of future research on the legacy of the Great Migrations.

2 Background on the Southern White Diaspora

This section provides background on Southern white migration. We first describe key historical episodes and then characterize migrant selection and sorting. We conclude with an in-depth look at distinctive features of Southern culture that would prove influential in shaping the New Right.

2.1 From the Postbellum Era to the Great Migration

Small waves of whites left the South during the 19th century. Many followed Gold Rush routes westward, seeking land on which to rebuild estates lost during the war and in the economic fallout thereafter. Historians emphasize the importance of racial ideology in fueling this westward trajectory (Cox Richardson, 2020; Dippel, 2005; Waite, 2021).⁵ Historically, Southern whites had long been mobile, following economic opportunities from the East Coast and Appalachia to the Ozarks and the Great Plains, and finally to the West. Agriculture as well as oil, mining, and timber industries all created novel pathways out of the South (Gregory, 2005). These early movers, motivated by economic and ideological factors, laid the foundation for future chain migration out of the South.

While early postbellum outflows of Southern whites initiated new migration corridors, those flows were dwarfed by the large-scale migration to the North and West after 1900. Figure 1 shows these outflows growing as World War I and immigration restrictions led to increased demand for labor. By 1940, nearly 11% of Southern-born whites lived outside the South compared to 15.6% of Southern-born Blacks, the latter being a smaller overall population. These outflows persisted, as sustained industrial growth across the country spurred a more general exodus of Southern workers during the 1940s and continued for several decades. By 1970, nearly 20% of Southern-born whites lived outside the South.

2.2 Migrant Destinations, Origins, and Socioeconomic Backgrounds

Southern whites migrated to many parts of the westward-moving country. By 1940, there were large migrant populations in the West Census Region, the Ohio River Valley, and lower Plains (see Figure 2, Appendix Figures G.1 and G.2). While border states just outside the former Confederacy were popular destinations, large diaspora communities could be found in faraway regions of central California, eastern Washington, Oregon, and much of Wyoming. Southern whites were less prevalent in former Union states, especially in the Northeast and upper Midwest, where Southern Black migrants were more prevalent (Figure 2).⁶ Southern whites were also more likely to settle across the density distribution, from rural areas to small towns to large cities, whereas Southern Blacks concentrated in the densest urban areas (see Appendix Figure G.3).⁷

⁵Famous California farmer Walter Knott, the son of one such migrant, would later remark that “the carpetbaggers [a derogatory term for Northerners] came down South and disenfranchised every Southerner that had been in the war” (Dochuk, 2010, p. 7). Knott would later play an important role in building the conservative movement in California and the U.S. more broadly.

⁶Southern whites largely avoided Utah, perhaps due to religious and other cultural differences with Mormons.

⁷Collins and Wanamaker (2015) characterize racial differences in sorting across regions from 1910 to 1930. In Bazzi et al. (2023b), we explore these differences from 1850 to 1940, highlighting the importance not only of traditional forces like distance and networks but also ideological and economic differences. For example, Southern whites sorted towards counties

Just as their destination choices differed, Black and white migrants also came from different regions of the South. While Blacks hailed from the “deep South” Cotton Belt, whites left a vast stretch of the “outer South,” including the Great Plains of Oklahoma and north Texas, and the Appalachian hills of Tennessee and northern Alabama (see Appendix Figure G.1 and Gregory, 2005). Push factors were important: in the Plains, the Dust Bowl caused pervasive drought and farm failure in the 1930s (see Arthi, 2018; Hornbeck, 2012), while in Appalachia, the Depression severely contracted its industrial sector.⁸ More generally, dwindling farm acreage, declining rates of farm ownership, and manufacturing sector malaise pushed whites out across the South (see Appendix Table A.2 and Fligstein, 1981). Yet, despite popular media stereotypes about poor, welfare-seeking Southern migrants—disparagingly called “Okies,” “hillbillies,” and “rednecks”—many of these migrants integrated into destination labor markets and were comparable to other white groups in terms of income and education. In fact, they spanned the socioeconomic distribution, and in some periods, white outmigrants were positively selected.⁹

2.3 Characterizing Southern White (Diaspora) Culture

Southern and non-Southern whites exhibited significant cultural differences historically. Southern whites have often been associated with evangelical Protestantism, racial conservatism, and populist ideals rooted in localism and dislike of elites (Dochuk, 2010; Gregory, 2005). Racial animus among Southern whites has been linked to the history of slavery and Jim Crow (see, e.g., Engerman, 2020; Green, 1988), while the importance of evangelicalism traces back to the formation of the “Bible Belt” in the South, driven by Baptists and Methodists (Boles, 1996; Heyrman, 2013). This section uses survey data to characterize this distinctive Southern culture and its pervasiveness in the diaspora.

Using data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) waves through 1970, Table 1 compares Southern- and non-Southern-born whites living in the same non-Southern county. Southern white migrants are substantially more likely to be evangelical Protestant (column 1) and to hold conservative religious beliefs (column 2). They are also more supportive of racial segregation in various domains (columns 3–5). While Southern whites are no more opposed in general to government intervention in the economy (column 6), they are significantly more likely to oppose interventions designed to help support Blacks (column 7). These patterns highlight a well-established intersection between racial and economic conservatism that became especially important beginning in the Civil Rights era.

The conservative attitudes in the diaspora have roots in the South. Appendix Figure G.4 displays a continuum of conservatism across whites in America: across all outcomes, responses in the diaspora fall squarely between those of Southerners in the South and non-Southerners outside the South (panel a). Those in states bordering the former Confederacy—West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware—generally lie in between (panel b). In other words, while conservative culture is pervasive across white Americans, there is a clear gap between those with and those without Southern heritage, and Southern migrants maintain some of that cultural distinction when living outside the South.

outside the South that (i) were more suitable for plantation crops and extractive commodities, and (ii) had a higher vote share for the pro-slavery Southern Democrat candidate, John C. Breckinridge, in the 1860 election.

⁸In addition to some of the same economic factors driving white outmigration, previous work has emphasized factors such as racial violence and hostility as important push factors for Southern Blacks (Boustan, 2016; Calderon et al., 2022).

⁹See Appendix G.2 for evidence from individual Censuses from 1900–40. Gregory (2005, p. 24) argues that wealthy and educated Southern whites were overrepresented, with “Northern economic opportunities” spurring their migration more so than “Southern distress.” Dochuk (2010), meanwhile, describes the mass migration of “Okies,” predominantly agricultural settlers from not only Oklahoma but also Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. These settlers, he argues, were not destitute but rather working-class laborers, upended by the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, who followed Route 66 in search of industrial work in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and the Pacific Northwest.

Evangelical Protestantism is an essential feature of diaspora culture and integral to its politics. In the early 20th century, evangelical presence was limited outside the South. By the end of the century, Southern Baptist and Pentecostal denominations could be found across America. Historians provide numerous accounts of Southern white migrants founding such churches (Dochuk, 2010; Gregory, 2005; Woodberry and Smith, 1998). The seeds of their leadership can be seen in complete-count Census data from 1900–40, which shows that, within non-Southern counties, these migrants were overrepresented in religious occupations (see Appendix Table G.1). By the 1960s, evangelicals began to engage more formally in politics, becoming outspoken on moral issues, such as sex education in schools. Southern evangelical leaders such as J. Frank Norris, Carl McIntire, and Billy Graham appealed widely throughout the diaspora and beyond as a new “Christian Right” coalition gained influence within the Republican Party in the late 20th century (Wilcox and Robinson, 2011).

3 Empirical Strategy

As our core identification strategy, we build a shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) that combines predetermined migrant networks with exogenous shocks pushing migrants out of the South. Following Sequeira et al. (2020), we also develop a complementary strategy based on different identifying variation due to the coincidental timing of non-Southern railroad expansion and Southern outmigration.

Our main estimating equation takes the following form:

$$\text{vote}_c = \alpha_s + \beta \cdot \% \text{Southern Whites}_{c,1940} + \mathbf{X}'_c \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_c, \quad (1)$$

where vote_c is the vote share in non-Southern county c for the Republican or other conservative presidential candidate in a given election, and the regressor of interest is the Southern-born white population share in county c in 1940. At the time of writing, 1940 is the last year for which the full-count U.S. Census of Population is available; it also predates the critical juncture of partisan realignment in the 1960s. We include state fixed effects, α_s , and \mathbf{X}_c is a varying set of controls detailed below and including the 1900 Southern-born white population share. Our baseline sample comprises 1,888 counties in the conterminous U.S. outside the South defined as the former Confederate states and Oklahoma. We cluster standard errors across counties within 60×60 mile grid cells following Bester et al. (2011) and show robustness to other forms of spatial correlation (Adao et al., 2019; Conley, 1999).

Endogenous location choices imply that OLS estimates of β could be biased. The historical record, discussed in Section 2.2, points to two countervailing forces. Ideological sorting implies upward bias as Southern whites move to locations with higher levels of conservatism due to preexisting residents and place-based features conducive to such attitudes. Economic sorting implies downward bias as Southern whites—like most migrants—move to economically-vibrant locations, attractive to and capable of hosting large, diverse populations in search of opportunity. Such place-based confounders would create a downward bias even if Southern migrants made these destinations more conservative over time.

We address these biases in multiple ways, beginning with a SSIV strategy combining two sources of variation. The first is the *share* of all Southern white migrants from Southern origin j residing in non-Southern county c as of 1900, which we denote $\pi_{jc,1900}$. Our baseline measure of $\pi_{jc,1900}$ defines j at the level of 12 Southern states, following Boustan (2010), Calderon et al. (2022), and Fouka et al. (2022).¹⁰

¹⁰Our results are robust to defining j at the level of 1,220 Southern counties. However, this approach requires omitting areas that cannot be linked to the 1880 Census, including Oklahoma and Texas, which are important origins of the Southern white diaspora in 1940. As a result, the state-level approach is less noisy and delivers a stronger first stage.

The second is the change, or *shift*, in the number of whites from origin j living outside the South from 1900–40, $\Delta M_{j,1900-40}$. Building on [Boustan \(2010\)](#) and [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#), we use predicted shifts, based on origin-county-specific push factors for each Census decade during the 1900–40 period. The stock of Southern white migrants in c in 1940 is then given by:

$$Z_{c,1940} = \sum_{j=1}^J \pi_{jc,1900} \widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40}. \quad (2)$$

Scaling $Z_{c,1940}$ by the 1900 county population gives the SSIV for the 1940 Southern white population share in equation (1).¹¹ As specified, the SSIV isolates the component of the 1940 diaspora due to changes in Southern white inflows from 1900 to 1940 (see Appendix Figure A.1 for intuition).

Our use of *predicted* shifts, $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40}$, increases the validity of the SSIV. We first use linked Census records from the Census Linking Project ([Abramitzky et al., 2020](#)) to build a measure of white outmigrant flows from each Southern county o to all non-Southern counties $d = 1, \dots, D$ for each Census year $t \in \{1910, 1920, 1930, 1940\}$.¹² Then, we use origin-county o push factors to predict Southern white outflows from decade-specific zeroth stage regressions similar to [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#):

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{ot} = \alpha + \text{push}'_{o,t-10} \boldsymbol{\eta} + \phi \text{population}_{o,t-10} + \varepsilon_{ot}. \quad (3)$$

Following prior work since [Boustan \(2010\)](#), we choose push factors from relevant measures of urbanization, development, and extractive industries, including the square and cross-term interaction of all predictors. Using a LASSO algorithm, we shrink the set of predictors to an optimal subset, $\text{push}_{o,t-10}$, from which $\widehat{\text{Southern white migrants}}_{ot}$ is generated for each t . The predicted shift is then the sum of these origin-county o decade-specific shifts, further aggregated to the origin-state j level in our baseline:

$$\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40} = \sum_{o \in j} \sum_{t=1910}^{1940} \widehat{\text{Southern white migrants}}_{ot}. \quad (4)$$

Appendix A.1 provides further details on the SSIV, including zeroth stage estimates.

Underlying SSIV approaches is the empirical regularity that migrants tend to settle where other migrants from their own group had settled previously, a process commonly referred to as *chain migration*. The shares $\pi_{jc,1900}$ reflect such historical, pre-1900 migrations of Southern whites. We choose 1900 as the base year because it captures many of the important migration networks established in the postbellum period, and it predates the onset of mass migration out of the South. Although predetermined, these initial migrant networks—established through economic and ideological sorting—may be endogenous

¹¹Specifically, this generates the following first-stage estimating equation:

$$\% \text{Southern Whites}_{c,1940} = \alpha_s + \delta \left(\frac{Z_{c,1940}}{\text{population}_{c,1900}} \right) + \mathbf{X}'_c \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_c.$$

¹²Concretely, we use the linked Census records together with the complete-count Census to generate

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{ot} = \sum_{d=1}^D \left(\frac{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } t-10 \text{ linked to } d \text{ in } t}{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } t-10 \text{ linked to Census } t} \right) \times \text{Southern whites}_{o,t-10},$$

where o denotes origin counties, d denotes destination counties, and $\text{Southern whites}_{o,t-10}$ is from the full-count Census. This allows us to approximate, for each decade, total Southern white outmigration from o to all non-Southern counties, which we then put on the left-hand-side of equation (3). For 1930–40, the intercensal match rate among white men is 28.6%, and our measure is highly correlated ($\text{corr.} = 0.93$) with an alternative one based on outmigration flows inferred from the five-year backward-looking residency question only available in the 1940 Census (see Appendix Figure A.2). Correlations are similarly strong for various migrant subsamples (see Appendix A.1).

with respect to the long-run trajectory of conservatism.

By combining these networks with *predicted* shifts based on Southern-origin push factors, we build a stronger case for validity of the SSIV. In the standard SSIV with actual shifts, the identifying assumption is that, conditional on controls, the unobserved factors that influence political outcomes must not be jointly correlated with the 1900 share of Southern white migrants in non-Southern county c and overall Southern white outmigration from 1900 to 1940. In contrast, our “push factor” SSIV can satisfy the exclusion restriction even if the initial migrant shares are endogenous insofar as the predicted shifts are exogenous to destination county conditions (see [Borusyak et al., 2022](#), for theoretical foundations).

In addition to this SSIV strategy, \mathbf{X}_c in equation (1) includes an array of potential confounders that may have affected migrant sorting and downstream politics. None of our results hinge on these controls, but they do provide further evidence of robustness. These include (i) historical economic factors such as population density, manufacturing employment, and average farm values, measured in 1940 and/or 1900 ([Haines, 2010](#); [Manson et al., 2020](#)), as well as (ii) ideological factors such as Union Army enlistment and mortality rates from the U.S. Civil War ([Dupraz and Ferrara, 2021](#)) and the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912.¹³ Secondary specifications control for additional potential sorting correlates, including (iii) geographic factors such as ruggedness, (iv) extractive commodity and plantation crop potential, and (v) the vote share for the pro-slavery John C. Breckinridge in 1860, which was associated with Southern white migration in the early postbellum era ([Eli et al., 2018](#)). Further robustness checks adopt a [Belloni et al. \(2014\)](#) double LASSO procedure to select optimal controls among this large set.

Finally, we also report SSIV estimates controlling for %Southern Whites _{$c,1900$} . This renders equation (1) equivalent to one with the *change* in the share of Southern whites from 1900 to 1940 as the key regressor. While we are interested in how the presence of Southern whites in 1940 shaped the evolution of the New Right, controlling for diaspora size in 1900 helps mitigate concerns about a direct, confounding effect of early migrants, whose presence is part of the SSIV construction. Together, the covariates help address concerns about SSIVs related to endogenous sorting and the exclusion restriction if the pre-1900 Southern white migrants independently affect long-run political outcomes, for example, by shaping initial institutions.

Alternative Identification Strategy. While our SSIV approach delivers consistent causal estimates, it does so based on a particular combination of push and pull factors. We also develop a complementary IV that does not rely on initial migrant networks to determine settlement patterns in ensuing decades. This IV isolates variation in diaspora size based on the coincidental timing of migrant outflows from the South and initial railroad connections in counties outside the South.¹⁴ [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#) develop this strategy to capture exogenous variation in European immigration flows across the U.S. from 1860 to 1920. We adapt their framework to Southern white migration from 1880 to 1940.

We construct this IV in several steps detailed at length in Appendix B and summarized briefly here. The core ingredient is a zeroth stage panel regression from 1880 to 1940 with county and decade fixed effects in which the Southern white population share in non-Southern county c in year t is predicted based on the interaction of (i) an indicator for whether c was connected to the railroad in $t - 10$ and (ii) the total outflow of Southern white migrants from $t - 10$ to t . Given the history of westward

¹³See the notes to Table 2 for a full elaboration of the different control variable sets.

¹⁴To gain intuition for the mechanics of the railroad IV, consider Marin and Mariposa County in California in 1940. Marin was connected to the railroad in 1883 and Mariposa was connected in 1912. Since Southern white migration was much more limited between 1880 and 1900 (see Figure 1), Marin’s Southern white population only reached 6.7% in 1940 compared to 10.2% in Mariposa. In 2016, Marin had a significantly lower Republican vote share than Mariposa.

expansion and migrants' use of the railroad (see [Waite, 2021](#)), we allow the effects of railroad access to vary across Western and non-Western regions. This increases instrument strength and is in line with regional sub-sample results in [Sequeira et al. \(2020, Tables 2 and 3\)](#). The predictions for the average share of Southern whites from the zeroth stage, $\text{Avg. \%Southern Whites}_c$, are then used as an instrument for (i) $\text{Avg. \% Southern Whites}_c$ between 1880 and 1940, analogous to the specification from [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#) for 1860–1920, and (ii) our baseline measure, $\text{\%Southern Whites}_{c,1940}$, in equation (1). Together, these specifications deliver very similar results as the SSIV, which, combined with a host of other identification checks described below, support a causal interpretation of our findings.

4 Right-Wing Politics: Long-Term Effects of Southern White Migration

This section establishes the long-run political legacy of Southern white migration, focusing on elections in the 21st Century. We first provide causal estimates and then assess electoral implications.

4.1 Voting in the 21st Century

Table 2 reports estimates of β in equation (1) for the vote share of Donald Trump in 2016 (panel a) and the average Republican candidate vote share from 2000–20 (panel b). Results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar across the two outcomes; for brevity, we reference the latter when discussing magnitudes. OLS estimates with state fixed effects suggest that a 1 p.p. increase in the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 is associated with a statistically significant 0.4 p.p. increase in the Trump vote share (column 1). Adding \mathbf{X}_c controls from 1940 increases the explanatory power (R^2 increases from 0.42 to 0.67) as well as the effect size from 0.4 to 0.63 p.p. (column 2).

The remaining columns of Table 2 report SSIV estimates. While the OLS estimates significantly differed with the inclusion of controls, the IV analogues are nearly identical (columns 3 and 4). Additional controls for place-based confounders (e.g., extractive commodity potential and pre-1900 voting behavior) leave the estimates largely unchanged (column 5). This suggests that the SSIV isolates variation in the Southern white diaspora size that is orthogonal to important confounders of conservative politics.

When controlling for the initial 1900 share of Southern whites, the coefficient increases substantially (column 6) and remains large with the full set of controls (column 7). Recall that these specifications are equivalent to having the *change* in the share of Southern whites from 1900 to 1940 as the key endogenous regressor. In the preceding columns 3–5, the SSIV isolated the share of the 1940 diaspora driven by exogenous migration flows from 1900 and 1940. However, those estimates did not allow for independent influence of the pre-existing diaspora in 1900. In controlling for such influence, we find an even larger imprint of the white Great Migration on 21st century conservative politics.¹⁵

The IV estimates are sizable and statistically significant in all specifications. The first-stage F statistic is over 100 in columns 3–5, pointing to the strength of chain migration in this context. In columns 6–7, controlling for the initial 1900 share leads to a weaker first stage (with F statistics just over 10) and noisier estimates in the second. Yet, the estimates remain precise and also hold up to weak-

¹⁵This increasing coefficient size, when switching to a specification in changes, is consistent with theoretical insights in [Jaeger et al. \(2018\)](#): since SSIVs defined over a window from t to $t + s$ are often correlated with migration flows prior to t , controlling for those prior migration waves can change the estimates and interpretation of the coefficients on migration from t to $t + s$. In our case, inclusion of the initial 1900 share helps disentangle the effect of Southern white migration from 1900 to 1940, which appears to be larger than the effects conflated with the pre-1900 migrants. The larger effects of the more recent migration wave may reflect decaying effects of the previous one, particularly strong effects of the 1900–40 migrants, and/or a change in the composition of Southern white migrants over time.

instrument-robust inference (see the [Anderson and Rubin, 1949](#), p-values at the bottom of the table) and a conservative test for underidentification (see the [Kleibergen and Paap, 2006](#), p-values).

In panel (b), the IV estimates imply that each additional Southern white migrant in 1940 is associated with 0.8–1.6 additional votes for conservative politics in the 21st century. In 1940, first-generation Southern whites comprised 2.9% of the population in the average county (standard deviation of 5%). Going from zero Southern-born whites to the average is thus associated with a 2.3–4.7 p.p. increase in the Republican vote share. In the American voting system where small margins in a few states determine election outcomes, shifts like this could prove pivotal, a possibility we investigate later in this section.

In all cases, the IV estimates are somewhat larger than corresponding OLS ones.¹⁶ This is consistent with two possibilities: (i) economic sorting is more pervasive than ideological sorting, and/or (ii) a local average treatment effect (LATE) whereby counties with the strongest chain migration are those where the initial migrants, and those that followed, retained the deepest attachment to Southern conservatism.¹⁷

Robustness Checks. Before providing further insights on the electoral implications of our findings, we conduct a suite of additional checks to solidify a causal interpretation of our SSIV estimates. We report several crucial checks in Table 3 with further results referenced in the Appendix.

Alternative Standard Errors. The significance of our estimates is robust to an array of inference procedures that guard against biases due to correlated unobservables across counties with similar fundamentals. Appendix Table A.3 reports standard errors based on the [Conley \(1999\)](#) approach with cutoffs at 200 and 500 km, (ii) the [Colella et al. \(2020\)](#) generalization using Bartlett kernels, (iii) a wild cluster bootstrap at the state level, and (iv) the [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#) correction for SSIV estimators.

Alternative Samples. Importantly, the core estimates in Table 2 are not sensitive to our particular demarcation of Southern states. In row 3 of Table 3, we exclude the border states of West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, and in row 4, we additionally consider them as Southern migrant-sending states. Whites from these states have cultural attachments that are more similar to those of Southern whites, relative to those from the rest of the U.S. (see Appendix Figure G.4). With the latter redefinition, the Southern white diaspora comprises 5.8 percent of the average non-Southern county in 1940, and the resulting IV estimates are very similar to our baseline in panel (a) of Table 2. Moreover, the estimates are not driven by any particular origin or destination state (see Appendix Figure A.3). The stability of estimates in these exercises points to an electoral legacy that is common across Southern white migrants even though they may vary in their attachments to Southern culture.

Row 5 of Table 3 reports an additional exercise on a restricted sample, in this case focusing on counties that were not yet fully settled as of 1860. With <2 people per square mile at the time, these counties had more limited scope to attract early Southern white migrants on the basis of pre-existing groups and institutions that might also have directly affected conservative attitudes over the long run. Similar estimates hold in this subsample where the migrant shares—and hence the chain migration underlying the SSIV—are effectively based on some of the earliest white settlers in each county.

Varying Control Sets. We further address concerns about control choice by varying the components of \mathbf{X}_c used in Table 2. The point estimates remain sizable and statistically significant at conventional levels

¹⁶This mirrors a similar pattern of OLS and IV estimates in SSIV applications to the Black Great Migration ([Boustan, 2010](#); [Calderon et al., 2022](#); [Derenoncourt, 2022](#); [Fouka et al., 2022](#)) and immigration to the U.S. since 1990 ([Mayda et al., 2022](#)).

¹⁷[Calderon et al. \(2022\)](#) make a similar argument in explaining differences between OLS and IV estimates for the Black Great Migration. [Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. \(2020\)](#) argue that, in general, SSIVs do not have an immediate LATE interpretation when the “Rotemberg weights,” which reflect the contribution of each origin state to identifying variation in the instrument, are negative. In our case, the vast majority (96%) of these weights are positive.

across the following alternatives: no controls or state FE (row 6 of Table 3), initial 1900 share control only (row 7), 1900 controls and initial 1900 share control (row 8), as well as double LASSO control selection applied to columns 6 and 7 of Table 2 (rows 9 and 10, respectively).¹⁸

SSIV Based on Origin Counties. Our baseline SSIV uses origin-state shares in equation (2). In row 11 of Table 3, we use origin-county shares based on linked Census data to determine migrants’ origins. Despite a weaker first stage and a less precise second stage, the estimates are quite close to the analogous baseline ones in row 2. The noisier results are consistent with classical measurement error inherent to record-linking as well as the omission from the SSIV of migrants hailing from counties in West Texas and Oklahoma, which were not yet incorporated in the 1880 Census.

Matching Exercises. Three additional checks suggest limited residual sorting biases in the SSIV estimates. First, we create matched pairs of counties *within* states based on nearest neighbors in terms of Republican vote shares in 1900. Including these 900+ county-pair FE leaves the core findings unchanged (row 12 of Table 3). Even among such geographically and once-politically proximate counties, the electoral impact of Southern white migrants from 1900–40 remains just as large and significant. Second, we find similar robustness for pairs matched on *changes* in Republican vote shares between 1900 and 1940, which captures confounding trends in political orientation (row 13). Third, we consider pairs matched on the Southern white migrant share in 1870, which captures the early Confederate diaspora around the Civil War. Again, the estimates remain economically and statistically significant despite this demanding set of fixed effects (row 14). Appendix A.4 reports additional matching specifications.

Random Shifts. In Appendix A.4, we also show, using a procedure developed by Adao et al. (2019), that the shares are not driving SSIV identification. We replace the predicted shifts, $\widehat{\Delta M}_j$, in the SSIV equation (2) with randomly generated shifts, M_j^{rand} , and find a negligible share of statistically significant estimates across 1,000 trials.¹⁹ This offers prima facie evidence that the predicted shifts, rather than the potentially endogenous shares alone, are fundamental to the identifying variation in our SSIV.

Alternative Identification Strategy. In addition to the suite of robustness checks on the SSIV, we also find similar results using the alternative railroad-expansion-based IV in Table 4. Following Sequeira et al. (2020), we cluster standard errors using the Conley (1999) spatial HAC with a 200 km bandwidth and include averages of the controls used in the zeroth stage regression (see Appendix Table B.1), the log number of years since the first railroad connection, and cubic polynomials in latitude and longitude. Both measures of the Southern white diaspora have sizable effects on Republican vote shares in the 21 century. At the mean, a 1 p.p. increase in the Southern white share in 1940 is associated with a 2.5 p.p. increase in the average Republican vote share from 2000–20 (column 3). Although this is somewhat larger than the analogous SSIV estimate in Table 2, the two are statistically indistinguishable. Together, these two complementary but distinct identification strategies point to a similarly large and persistent influence of the Southern white diaspora on conservative politics over the long run.

The Black Great Migration. Concurrent with this “other Great Migration,” millions of Southern

¹⁸Point estimates are also insensitive to controlling for recently identified drivers of Republican voting in the 21st century. The “China shock” measure from Autor et al. (2020) slightly reduces the coefficient in column 6 of Table 2 to 1.77 (0.56), while the “total frontier experience” from Bazzi et al. (2020) slightly increases it to 1.86 (0.59).

¹⁹Concretely, we construct a pseudo-SSIV by interacting actual migration shares from 1900 with shifts drawn from a random normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 5 and then repeat the baseline analysis with controls 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 trials, 5.4 percent of coefficients are statistically significant—positive or negative—at the 1% level and 11.5 percent at the 5% level (which compares favorably with 16.1 percent of coefficients in Derenoncourt, 2022). Controlling for 1900 initial shares reduces those to 0 and 0.4 percent, respectively. See Appendix Figure A.4 for a coefficient plot from this exercise.

Blacks were also moving north and west. Appendix Table D.1 shows, for the 2016 election, that the effect of the Southern white diaspora is distinct from that of the Southern Black diaspora. Calderon et al. (2022) find that Southern Black migration worked against the Republican Party during the mid- to late-20th century. Our estimates, based on an analogous SSIV, suggest that this relationship persisted through the 21st century. In terms of magnitudes, the absolute coefficient for Southern Black migrants is roughly 2–3 times larger than for whites: moving from zero to the mean Southern Black share (0.4% of the total population) implies a similar effect size as a 1 p.p. increase in the Southern white share.²⁰

Importantly, the estimates for Southern whites in Appendix Table D.1 show little difference with the baseline estimates in Table 2. Hence, the two Great Migration SSIVs are indeed capturing orthogonal variation in race-specific migration flows. This is consistent with the two groups’ migrant networks forming along distinct origin–destination corridors as Southern Blacks concentrated in urban areas while Southern whites spread across the density spectrum.

4.2 Assessing Magnitudes: From Causal Estimates to Electoral Impacts

The estimates in Table 2 point to a sizable impact of the Southern white diaspora on the success of the Republican Party over the long run. This section presents several exercises aimed at clarifying the magnitude of this impact. Our findings suggest that Southern white migrants may have swung close elections towards the Republican candidate and influenced voting behavior beyond those in the diaspora.

Electoral Significance. We begin by providing a heuristic quantitative interpretation of our causal estimates given the unique U.S. electoral system, which bases the winner off of Electoral College (EC) votes—apportioned in favor of less-populated states—as opposed to a national “one person, one vote” system. In Table 3, we re-weight counties so as to better reflect their electoral significance (see also Appendix Table C.1). Re-weighting by state-specific EC vote allocations (row 15 of Table 3) increases coefficients relative to the corresponding unweighted estimates in Table 2. This is consistent with the fact that Southern whites migrated in large numbers to more sparsely-populated Western states (see Figure 2), whose voters often have outsized representation in the EC. At the same time, migrants often settled in population centers within states. Consistent with this, re-weighting by county population (row 16, as in Calderon et al., 2022) and total votes cast in the county (row 17, as in Autor et al., 2020) also leads to larger coefficients. While these weights may be affected directly by Southern white migration, their use makes clear that our core findings above are not driven by small, electorally unimportant counties.

To illustrate the electoral implications, we go a step further and implement a quantification exercise motivated by Autor et al. (2017, 2020). Given our SSIV estimates, we assess how small changes in the population of Southern white migrants might have affected state-level two-party vote margins and hence the general election winner.²¹ Appendix Table C.2 shows results for three elections won by

²⁰This large political legacy of Black migration is consistent with three possibilities: (i) Southern Black migrants induced Northern white flight, which, in some cases, meant the departure of conservative white voters from a county (Boustan, 2010), (ii) Southern Black migration induced a leftward turn among more liberal whites remaining in Northern cities as Democrats built a cross-racial class-based coalition (Calderon et al., 2022), and (iii) the Black diaspora as of 1940 attracted many more Black migrants over the ensuing years who would further grow the Democratic base in urban areas.

²¹Concretely, for each county in a given election, we estimate the share of two-party votes that would have been obtained by the Democrat instead of the Republican candidate if the Southern white diaspora had been $n\%$ smaller. We first compute the county-specific product of (i) the total-vote-weighted SSIV estimate (with qualitatively similar results based on population-weighting), (ii) the Southern white share, and (iii) the total number of two-party votes. Next, we reduce the share of Southern whites in (ii) by 10, 20, and 30 percent of the actual shares and ask how much two-party vote margins change at the state and then national level accounting for the EC allocations to each state. This counterfactual does not consider the implications of those $n\%$ fewer Southern white migrants remaining in their Southern home states. Insofar as these movers were, on average,

Republican candidates in the 21st century. Small reductions of 10 and 20 percent in the size of the Southern white diaspora would have flipped the 2000 and 2004 elections, respectively, in favor of the Democratic candidate whereas even a 30 percent reduction would not have flipped the 2016 election. While this exercise highlights the potentially pivotal role of the diaspora, we emphasize that it hinges on very strong all-else-equal assumptions and that many factors could be decisive in close elections.

More-Than-Compositional Effects. Although a compositional transfer of votes across states could be sufficient to sway general election outcomes, the magnitude of our IV estimates are consistent with each Southern white migrant causing more than one additional vote for conservatives in the 21st century. In the extreme case where 100% of Southern whites vote Republican and nobody else does, the mechanical effect of Southern white migration would be a one-for-one change in Republican votes (i.e., a coefficient equal to 1). In practice, the partisan differential between Southern and non-Southern whites is not so extreme. Thus, in our voting regressions, while a coefficient of 1 would be an upper bound for a mechanical composition effect, the available data on partisan gaps between Southern and Northern voters points to smaller thresholds, likely below 0.5.²² Looking across Tables 2–4, the IV magnitudes suggest more-than-compositional effects with some large enough to reject the null that $\beta \leq 1$ (e.g., p-value = 0.08 in column 6 of Table 2).

Nonlinear Effects. These more-than-compositional long-run estimates are consistent with nonlinearities in diaspora influence. We use two distinct but complementary methods to characterize outsized effects of Southern white migrants once they reach a critical threshold in the county’s population.

First, we allow the effect of Southern white migrants in equation (1) to take unknown form, $f(\cdot)$, which we estimate semiparametrically using the Robinson (1988) partially linear, double-residual framework. Figure 3 reports $f(\% \text{Southern Whites}_{c,1940})$ for the Republican vote share from 2000–20. Panel (a) shows the OLS estimate based on Robinson (1988), and (b) shows the IV estimate based on a control function approach proposed in Su and Ullah (2008), operationalized in Henderson and Parmeter (2015, p.p. 271-78), and detailed in the figure notes.²³ The estimates in Figure 3 point to significant nonlinearities across the distribution of local diaspora size. Both the OLS and IV figures suggest that the voting effects are driven by counties with above-mean Southern white shares (2.9%). Below that threshold, the diaspora community is perhaps too small to influence local culture and institutions dominated by non-Southern voters. Above that threshold, we see suggestive evidence of tipping points where small increases in diaspora size lead to much larger increases in Republican vote shares.

Second, we use a more formal approach to identify these potential tipping points. Following a procedure detailed in Advani and Reich (2015), we find statistically significant tipping when Southern whites reach 14% of the population, beyond which the Republican Party vote share jumps by 4.7 p.p., continuing to grow thereafter.²⁴ Stanislaus County, California is closest to this threshold and is, in

less conservative than those who stayed, their votes could have made the South less Republican but would not have been pivotal there given the wide Republican margins in the region.

²²To illustrate why 0.5 may be a more realistic upper bound than 1, note that, according to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) in 2017, white voters were 50 p.p. more likely to vote for Trump in 2016 in Louisiana than in Massachusetts—two states with the most extreme two-party vote differential across the North–South divide. Other data might suggest an even lower threshold. For example, prior to 1970, whites living in the South were 20 p.p. more conservative than those outside the South, according to the mean of religious, racial, and economic conservatism proxies in Table 1.

²³See Appendix Figure F.1 for robustness to alternative kernels, bandwidths, and definition of Southern migrants. The Hardle and Mammen (1993) test rejects that the curve in Figure 3 is linear (p-value = 0.04) or quadratic (p = 0.09).

²⁴This is based on a series of OLS regressions that allow the effect of $\% \text{Southern Whites}_{c,1940}$ to vary above and below some threshold τ . We vary τ in increments of 0.5 across the distribution of Southern white shares, test for the joint significance on the threshold dummy and Southern white shares above that threshold, and then identify the value of τ with the largest

some ways, emblematic of large-diaspora counties in the Western U.S.²⁵ Figure 3(a) hints at another tipping point around 25% Southern white, but we are underpowered to detect such tipping in our baseline where less than 2% of counties have more than 20% Southern white shares. However, when expanding Southern whites to include migrants from border states as in Table 3 (rows 3 and 4), we find clearer visual evidence of tipping around 25% (see panels c and f of Appendix Figure F.1).

The results above suggest that Southern white migrants had disproportionate influence on long-run voting behavior in communities where they reached a critical size. Some of this influence may arise from intergenerational diaspora growth through differential fertility and chain migration. Other effects may have been amplified through transmission from those in the diaspora to their non-Southern neighbors. Before exploring these channels in Section 6, we first investigate *how* Southern white migrants shaped the trajectory of conservative politics through the 20th century.

5 Forging the New Right

Having established the impact of historical Southern white migration on conservative politics in the 21st century, we now work backward in time to understand the origins and evolution of this legacy. We identify such influence fairly early, with a critical turning point in the 1960s. The scale and geographic scope of the diaspora helped to make the Republican Party’s all-encompassing rightward turn an effective electoral strategy at this time. These migrants brought racial and religious conservatism to new regions, creating fresh opportunities for a powerful alliance with economic conservatives, a perennial Republican constituency. This New Right coalition coalesced over time, first as racial conservatives defected from the Democratic Party in the 1950s and 1960s, and later as evangelical Protestants mobilized around religious issues taken up by the Republican Party in the 1970s. Shared ambition to limit federal government intervention unified these groups. As economic conservatives pushed back against New Deal welfare programs, racial conservatives opposed federally mandated integration, and religious conservatives opposed top-down schooling initiatives and gay rights.

This section examines how Southern white migrants shaped this reconfiguration of conservative politics. First, we show gradual dealignment from the Democratic Party among Southern whites in the diaspora, which, in turn, hastened realignment nationally in the latter half of the 20th century. Second, we characterize the policy dimensions underlying this reconfiguration. Finally, we link the diaspora to the supply of this policy bundle and to its consolidation within the Republican Party since the 1940s.

5.1 Southern White Migrants and Partisan Realignment in the 20th Century

We begin by estimating the trajectory of diaspora influence on elections from 1900 to 2020:

$$\% \text{ Republican}_{ct} = \sum_{t \neq 1900}^{2020} \beta_t [\% \text{ Southern Whites}_{c,1940} \times I(\text{election} = t)] + \alpha_c + \phi_{st} + \varepsilon_{ct}, \quad (5)$$

where α_c and ϕ_{st} are county and state \times election-year FE, respectively, and the Southern white share in 1940 is interacted with election-year FE (with 1900 as the reference). Figure 4 reports OLS and

F statistic. Appealing to Table 1 in Andrews (1993) (with critical values for multiple hypothesis testing in changepoint regressions), we find that the associated F statistic of 3.12 at $\tau = 14\%$ exceeds the critical value for significance at the 10% level. Note that this method is not amenable to IV estimation, and hence our focus on the OLS estimates.

²⁵Like other Western counties, Stanislaus saw a large influx of migrants in the 1930s hailing from Dust Bowl-affected areas of Oklahoma, Texas, which, together with Arkansas, comprised 84 percent of its Southern white population by 1940.

SSIV estimates of β_t , which reveal a strong positive relationship beginning in the 1960s.²⁶ Prior to that, and beginning in the early 1900s as the Great Migration gained momentum, the diaspora was instead associated with lower Republican vote shares—similar to their brethren in the South.²⁷ These long-run electoral dynamics are not driven by changes in voter turnout (Appendix Figure E.6) or by latent voting differentials before 1900 (Appendix Table A.7).

Alongside this gradual move towards the Republican Party in white-diaspora communities was a similarly large and opposing move in Black-diaspora communities. Figure 5 traces out that differential partisan shift over time by augmenting equation (5) to include an analogously instrumented term for Southern Black migrants. By the mid-20th century, counties with a large Southern Black migrant population had begun to swing away from the Republican Party, and this persisted through the 21st century as discussed in Section 4.1. Together, these results suggest that the Great Migration of Southern Blacks and whites jointly galvanized long-run changes in the geography of partisanship across America.

George Wallace and Democratic Dealignment. The 1960s were a turning point for right-wing politics in the U.S., and the influence of Southern white migrants during this period may have been a harbinger of change to come. A critical juncture came in 1968 with George Wallace’s third-party presidential run. After running in the Democratic primary in 1964, the segregationist governor of Alabama split with the Party following their leftward turn on civil rights. His politics resonated with whites across the South, where he won five states in 1968, and in diaspora communities; he won nearly 10% of votes in the average county outside the South (see Appendix Figure E.5).

Table 5 uncovers a significant diaspora imprint on one of the strongest third-party performances in American history. In the IV specification in column 3, moving from zero to the mean Southern white share increases the Wallace vote by 1.7 p.p. relative to a mean of 9.4 p.p. Wallace ostensibly captured some of the votes that would have otherwise gone to Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate in 1968 (note in Figure 4 the drop in β_t from 1964 to 1968). While Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate in 1964, also ran a racially conservative campaign, he lacked the folksy, blue-collar appeal of Wallace, who attracted some economic moderates. The strong Wallace performance may have foreshadowed the looming mass departure of Southern whites from the Democratic Party.²⁸

Just as whites in the South increasingly left the Democratic Party, so too did those in the diaspora. Kuziemko and Washington (2018) show that after 1964, whites in the South were significantly less likely to identify with the Democratic Party compared to whites in the non-South. In Appendix Table E.1, we provide analogous evidence of dealignment from the Democratic Party among Southern whites in the diaspora. After 1964, Southern white migrants were 7.5–8.5 p.p. less likely to identify as Democrats compared to their neighbors without Southern heritage living within the same county (columns 1–3).

²⁶Note that the β_t coefficients prior to 1940 should not be interpreted as a pre-period in the difference-in-differences sense given that the stock of Southern white migrants in 1940 reflects many years of prior migration flows, which may have dynamically changed the voting outcomes from 1900 to 1940. See Appendix Figure A.5 for comparable estimates in pre-1940 elections based on contemporaneous variation in Southern white shares.

²⁷The 1928 election of Herbert Hoover was an important exception, rooted in Democrat Al Smith’s Catholicism and opposition to Prohibition. See Appendix E.5 for a related discussion of the diaspora influence on the Progressive movement in the early 20th century. The elections of 1976 and 1980 also break the overall trend somewhat, which may be due to the Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter’s Southern origin and, especially, his evangelical, Southern Baptist religious affiliation. See Appendix Table A.8 for a tabular version summarizing some of the key periods in the figure.

²⁸In his biography of Wallace, Carter (1995, p. 12) notes that “[t]he genius of George Wallace lay in his ability to link traditional conservatism to an earthy language that voiced powerful cultural beliefs and symbols with a much broader appeal to millions of Americans: the sanctity of the traditional family, the centrality of overt religious beliefs, the importance of hard work and self-restraint, the celebration of the autonomy of the local community.” In chapter 12 of the book, Carter describes the impact that Wallace had on the Nixon campaign in 1968 and its reelection strategy in 1972. There was a concerted effort by Republican strategists to identify and capture Wallace voters through deliberate messaging.

Returning to Table 5, columns 4–7 suggest that the Republican Party was able to capitalize on this disaffection among formerly Democratic voters in the diaspora. Moving from zero to the mean Southern white share is associated with a 3.8 p.p. swing from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 (column 6).²⁹ This effect size is on par with the 1948–2000 partisan swing predicted by the Wallace vote share in 1968 (column 7).³⁰ In other words, the diaspora may have been among the bellwether demographics, along with their brethren in the South, in leading the shift of conservative whites towards the Republican Party in the second half of the 20th century. If Wallace had been the political “weathervane in the America of the 1960s and 1970s” (Carter, 1995, p. 12), the Southern white diaspora was a key constituency driving changes across the North–South divide.

In fact, Southern white migrants appear to have been distinctive in contributing to the success of Wallace and the trajectory of partisan realignment outside the South. While *Northern* white migrants also contributed to the emerging New Right coalition, they did not affect partisan realignment to the same extent. Appendix Table D.2 explores these two migrant populations’ respective influences in Western states to which both groups migrated in large numbers by 1940. Conditional on migrating to the West, an additional Southerner in 1940 is associated with a larger effect on the 2016 Trump vote share than an additional Northerner (columns 1–2). Yet, unlike Southern white migrants, those from the North reduced support for Wallace in 1968 (columns 3–4) and had more limited effects on the partisan swing from 1948 to 2000 (columns 5–6).

Economic conservatism helps explain this distinctive pattern. Long a mainstay of the Republican Party, such preferences were more pervasive among Northern white migrants than Southern white migrants, who instead brought a novel, or least amplified, religious and racial conservatism to the West (see Appendix Table D.3).³¹ These different economic preferences clarify why Northern white migrants reduced support for Wallace, who advocated for (white) working-class rights and populist economic policies. As we show in the next section, it was after this election that the Republican Party would begin to forge a cohesive New Right movement that bridged the apparent divide between economic conservatives on the one hand and racial and religious conservatives on the other.

Together with the analysis in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), the above results offer a new perspective on the scope of partisan realignment beginning in the 1960s. Just as Democrats lost the South, they also lost communities home to Southern-born whites *outside* the South. Ultimately, these Southern white migrants helped to solidify a new conservative white voting bloc that cut across large swathes of the country and reshaped partisan politics over the long run. We turn now to a deeper exploration of the political processes driving the formation of this new voting bloc.

5.2 Characterizing the New Right Policy Bundle

Before identifying how Southern white migrants shaped the New Right, we need to characterize the emergence of this novel alliance of economic, racial, and religious conservatives. At the vanguard of

²⁹This result holds with (i) the matching exercises described above (Appendix Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6), (ii) the alternative IV strategy (Appendix Table B.2), and (iii) various county weights (Appendix Table C.1). Moreover, Appendix Figure F.2 reveals similar nonlinear threshold effects for this partisan swing from 1948 to 2000 as seen for the 21st century Republican vote share in Figure 3. Note that we choose 2000 as the endpoint for two reasons. First, it was a competitive election with significant regional variation in party preferences, whereas the landslide elections of the 1970s–90s saw nationwide partisan swings. Second, although Nixon and Reagan consolidated much of the Southern white vote, these elections were punctuated by Carter’s and Clinton’s (two Southern white Democratic candidates) in which that electorate remained splintered.

³⁰It is also sufficient to explain the flip from Democrat to Republican in many western states from 1948 to 2000.

³¹One potential explanation for the economic conservatism of late 19th and early 20th century Northern white migrants is that they brought to the West a culture of rugged individualism opposed to taxation and redistribution (see Bazzi et al., 2020).

this process was George Wallace, an “alchemist of the new social conservatism as he compounded racial fear, anticommunism, cultural nostalgia, and traditional right-wing economics into a movement that laid the foundation for the conservative counterrevolution that reshaped American politics in the 1970s and 1980s” (Carter, 1995, p. 13). Wallace’s strong showing outside the South in 1968 may have signaled the viability, on a national scale, of Nixon’s Southern Strategy campaign for racial conservatives and Reagan’s subsequent Moral Majority campaign for religious conservatives.

This section uses congressional voting and speech data to show how these three strands of conservatism came together over time in the New Right. We measure economic conservatism using the first dimension of DW-Nominate indices (Lewis et al., 2021) and racial conservatism using the Bateman et al. (2017) index. Both are based on House representatives’ “ideal points” according to their voting record and capture ideology on a left-to-right continuum centered on 0.³² We measure religious conservatism using an original religious rhetoric index (RRI). For a given legislator, we sum words with Biblical roots (God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen) and divide by all words spoken (see Appendix H).

Appendix Figure E.2 shows how the elements of the New Right bundle intensified and coalesced among Republican legislators. Using congressional-district-level regressions, we plot the evolution of the average difference between Republican and Democratic legislators in levels (panels a and b) and relative to a base year of 1940 (panels c and d). Estimates confirm the long-standing economic conservatism of the Republican Party. They also show an increase in relative conservatism among Republicans, as measured by a composite index (panels e and f). This is explained by increasing concentrations of religious and especially racial conservatism among Republicans. Prior to the 1960s, Democrats had been slightly more likely to employ religious rhetoric.³³ Meanwhile, racial conservatives had been split between parties as Democrats moved left on race after the 1930s in urban areas while maintaining pro-segregation platforms in rural areas and in the South (Feinstein and Schickler, 2008; Schickler, 2016).

By the 1960s, as Democrats expanded their national, pro-redistribution platform to be more racially inclusive, Republicans courted disaffected racial conservatives. Nixon’s Southern Strategy deployed rhetoric on crime and welfare that increased Republican appeal among conservative whites across America (Carter, 1999; Maxwell and Shields, 2019). By 1990, the average House Republican was two standard deviations more racially conservative than the average Democrat, both in and outside the South.

Religious rhetoric follows a similar albeit smaller shift, with a half standard deviation swing in RRI from Democrats to Republicans over the period of study. From the mid-1980s, Republicans were consistently associated with more religious rhetoric in the House, reflecting the political mobilization of evangelicalism during the Reagan era (Balmer, 2021; Kruse, 2015). Together, the patterns in Appendix Figure E.2 are consistent with Lowndes’s (2009) argument that racial factors were a driving force behind the emergence of the New Right and partisan realignment (see also Appendix Table E.4).

The bundling of different strands of conservative ideology was an integral part of the pathway to polarization. Appendix Figure E.3 demonstrates this connection by plotting the distribution of our composite index across representatives in the U.S. House in 1940 and again in 1990. The shift from a single peaked distribution in 1940 to a bimodal one in 1990 reflects the increased coincidence of the three dimensions within members, on both the left and right of the ideological spectrum.

The same dynamic bundling patterns can also be found on the political *demand* side, among voters in the ANES. After 1964, identification with the Republican Party is increasingly associated with evangeli-

³²Note that congressional ideal points are defined relative to the average representative *in a given year*. For instance, while favoring segregation was a racially conservative albeit mainstream position in the 1960s, such a view would be extreme today.

³³Religion had been more salient among the political left through the 1960s (see Appendix E.2 for background).

calism and opposition to civil rights (Appendix Table E.2). While Republican voters' greater opposition to government intervention in the economy is more stable across time, the reasons for such opposition broadened with the mass entry of racial conservatives into the party. The Wallace-to-Nixon voters in Appendix Table E.3 illustrate this shift: among Nixon voters in 1972, those who voted for Wallace in 1968 express stronger opposition to advancing civil rights but no less opposition to government intervention unless that intervention supports Blacks. These voters are emblematic of those disillusioned with the Democratic Party as it shifted towards more racially-inclusive approaches to redistribution. Wallace's campaign in 1968 showed Republican political strategists how to capture these alienated voters and drive a wedge between class- and race-based identity.

5.3 Southern White Migrants and New Right Representation

Having established the emergence of a New Right policy bundle under the Republican Party umbrella, we now show how Southern white migrants influenced the consolidation of these policy dimensions and the path of conservative political representation throughout the 20th century. We link the diaspora to increases in the supply of conservative ideology among federal legislators and state-level political parties, mirroring the increased demand for conservative policy among local voters over the long run.

Congressional Ideology. Figure 6 reports OLS and IV estimates of a congressional-district-level specification analogous to equation (5) but with state and congress-year FE.³⁴ We focus on the period of partisan realignment from 1940–90 with outcomes being representatives' party affiliation (panel a) and proxies for their racial (panel b), economic (panel c), and religious ideology (panel d).

The dynamic path of coefficients further corroborates the influence of Southern whites on partisan realignment and the corresponding evolution of the New Right. First, Southern white migrants are associated with greater Democratic representation in the 1940s but shifted significantly towards the Republican Party by the 1970s (panel a). Second, although Democrats were already shifting to the left on racial issues in the 1940s, even then the representatives with which Southern white migrants associated were more racially conservative (panel b).³⁵ This association deepened after the 1960s. Third, large-diaspora districts preferred economically moderate Democrats in the 1940s only to shift towards more fiscally conservative Republicans in the 1990s (panel c), to the extent they were similarly racially conservative. This process is consistent with a "Long Southern Strategy": by equating welfare policy with pro-Black redistribution, Republican strategists forged a marriage of convenience between racial and economic conservatives that would prove central to the New Right coalition (Maxwell and Shields, 2019). We saw in Section 5.1 how this alliance attracted new voters to the Republican Party. Figure 6 provides a window into the legislative dynamics behind this realignment. Finally, we see a related diaspora impact on representatives' religious rhetoric, the timing of which aligns with the growing politicization of the evangelical movement after the 1960s (see Appendix E.2).

To better understand the ideological shifts among representatives, Appendix Figure E.4 relates the

³⁴Since district boundaries change frequently, harmonization may not result in stable, meaningful units of analysis (see Appendix H for details). We therefore treat district-years as units and include state-level FE to capture time-invariant unobservables. While boundary changes may be endogenous to the political changes we study, such is not the case with state boundaries, which constitute the scope of our analysis of local party platforms below. We also do not control for the 1900 Southern white share in these figures given power limitations. Instead, we include that control in Appendix Table E.5, which reports estimates from analogous but more parsimonious specifications.

³⁵Political scientists and economists have linked the Democrats' shifting racial platform to the incorporation of Blacks in the growing urban North (Calderon et al., 2022; Schickler, 2016). In line with this change, we observe earlier shifts toward the Republican Party in white-diaspora districts with large Black shares and dense populations (see Appendix Figure D.1).

Southern white diaspora to 13 landmark votes in the House of Representatives, spanning economic, racial, and religious issues since the late 1940s.³⁶ To benchmark one salient example, moving from zero to the mean migrant share is associated with a 5 p.p. increase in the likelihood that the representative voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (relative to a 10% mean outside the South). We find a similar effect size in 2021 when many Republican legislators objected to certifying President Biden’s victory.

State Party Platforms. Many of the same dynamics can be seen in state party platforms. Historically, these local party agendas often differed from those in national party platforms, and as such provide a unique lens on how the diaspora impacted local politics. Our analysis relies on new data from [Hopkins et al. \(2022\)](#), from which we extract trigrams evoking support for (i) civil rights, (ii) traditionalism, and (iii) small government (see Appendix H). This data suggest limited differences between Democratic and Republican state party platforms outside the South prior to 1964 (Appendix Table E.6). After 1964, platforms began to diverge, first on civil rights and later on traditionalism and small government, as Republicans became more conservative and both parties cohered their national- and state-level agendas.

Mirroring the patterns for congressional politics, Southern white migrants helped fuel partisan divergence at the state level. Although Republican platforms became more supportive of civil rights after 1964, the diaspora pushed against this progressive change. Appendix Table E.7 shows, using a state-level SSIV approach, that a 1 p.p. increase in Southern whites in 1940 is associated with a 4–8 p.p. decrease in the probability of pro-civil rights rhetoric among state Republican parties, relative to before 1964 (columns 1–3). This suggests that diaspora whites were not merely swept up in or following a nationwide realignment of racial conservatives but rather helped to move local Republican Party politics in this direction. The diaspora played a similar role in pushing local Republican Parties rightward on religion (columns 4–6) and the economy (columns 7–9). In Appendix E.2, we provide in-depth historical context for these platform changes and the role of Southern white migrants therein.

Local Policy Preferences. These local political supply-side responses to the Southern white diaspora are consistent with voter preferences in these areas. Using the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) since 2007, Appendix Table E.9 shows that residents of large-diaspora counties exhibit more conservative attitudes along dimensions of the New Right bundle, including, among others, views about the size of government and the existence of systemic racism. These OLS results are restricted to the white population and, like the district-level analysis, hold across counties within states.

6 Cultural Transmission and Change

The results thus far demonstrate how Southern white migrants hastened partisan realignment and helped consolidate the New Right during the 20th century, ultimately leaving a sizable electoral imprint in the 21st century. In this final section, we explore several channels through which the initial diaspora could exert such a large and persistent influence on politics over the long run. We start by showing that,

³⁶These include (by year) the Taft-Hartley Union Ban Act (1947); Refugee Relief Act (1953); Civil Rights Act (1964); Social Security Amendments (1965), which created Medicare and Medicaid; Voting Rights Act (1965); Equal Rights Amendment vote (1971); Equal Employment Opportunity Act (1972); Economic Recovery Tax Act (1981), i.e., the Reagan tax cuts; Deficit Control Act (1985), which formally constrained the federal budget; the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of (1993), which established background checks and waiting periods for firearms sales; Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act (2003); Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act (2010); and the 2021 Electoral College vote count, which saw widespread objections to states’ certifications of the 2020 election by allies of President Trump, in an effort to overturn the majority vote in those states. Roll calls before 1990 come from [Swift et al. \(2009\)](#) and after 1990 from the [Clerk of the United States House of Representatives \(2021\)](#). For the Electoral College vote, a representative voted “yea” if they objected to no state count.

although important, population growth in the diaspora, through fertility and chain migration, cannot fully explain the magnitude of our voting estimates. This points to the importance of horizontal and oblique cultural transmission, as our nonlinear estimates in Section 4.2 suggested.

We provide several pieces of evidence consistent with such transmission. We show that intermarriage and residential integration between Southern and non-Southern whites may have increased the scope for Southern whites to influence voting behavior in their communities. Moreover, the diaspora built evangelical churches that outlived the initial migrants and grew faster in areas with greater integration between Southern and non-Southern whites. Conservative media complemented these brick-and-mortar institutions by entering markets with a larger diaspora and eventually reaching a wider non-Southern audience. We conclude with direct evidence of spillovers: neighborhood-level exposure to Southern white migrants induced non-Southern parents to give their children Biblical names, consistent with a broader shift towards conservative cultural norms.

6.1 Diaspora Growth and Intergenerational Transmission

One potential vehicle for persistent political influence lies in sustained growth of the diaspora. Even if some migrants shed their conservative attitudes or only partially transmitted those attitudes to second-generation kids, differential fertility and chain migration could have been sufficient to explain the more-than-compositional effects of Southern white migrants in 1940 on 21st century voting outcomes. The evidence in this section suggests that such demographic changes, although important, are too small to explain the magnitude of our estimates in Section 4.

In Appendix Table F.1, we find roughly one-for-one diaspora growth through both fertility and chain migration. Here, we estimate equation (1) for alternative outcomes measuring the population shares of second-generation Southern white children (columns 1–4) and of Southern white migrants over the long run (columns 5–8). For each Southern-born migrant in 1940, we observe 0.92–1.16 additional second-generation children as a share of kids outside the South (columns 2 and 4). Conditional on the 1900 Southern white share, we cannot reject that $\beta \leq 1$, which implies limited scope for differential fertility to cause more-than-proportional growth of the population with Southern ancestry. Similarly, we cannot reject that $\beta \leq 1$ for Southern white migrant population shares in 1970 (column 6) or 2000 (column 8). Chain migration was crucial in sustaining Southern culture in the diaspora, but it was not strong enough, in the average county, to create an even larger diaspora over the long run.

To better understand the legacy of vertical transmission, we augment %Southern White_{c,1940} in equation (1) to include children born to Southern white migrants by 1940 but after they left the South. Table 6 relates this combined first- and second-generation diaspora to the Republican vote share in the 2000s. Using the original SSIV based on those born in the South, the LATE thus includes the fertility effects in Appendix Table F.1. Looking across columns, the estimates are smaller than the baseline in Table 2, which suggests that the second-generation may have had more limited influence on long-run voting than their Southern-born parents. This is consistent with (i) the second generation having more limited tenure and hence scope for influencing non-Southerners in destination communities, and (ii) evidence on the *partial* intergenerational transmission of political attitudes within families (see Jennings et al., 2009).

While second-generation diaspora whites and post-1940 chain migrants from the South shaped electoral outcomes, the magnitude of demographic change through these two channels is too limited to explain the large and persistent effects of the migrants as of 1940.³⁷ Our estimates suggest that those

³⁷ Another potentially important demographic mechanism might stem from the role of Southern white migrants in crowding out

initial movers catalyzed a long-run process of political change that exceeded their compositional share in the electorate. We turn now to evidence on where and how that disproportionate impact materialized.

6.2 Social Integration

The political influence of Southern whites varied depending on how much they interacted with non-Southerners. Cultural transmission across groups can occur in many settings, including interactions between neighbors and mixing in the marriage market. If Southern whites lived in isolated enclaves, their opportunities to transmit conservative values to non-Southerners would have been limited. In Table 7, we explore the role of social integration in amplifying horizontal and oblique transmission. Our analysis relies on two proxies for integration. The first captures the rate of intermarriage between Southern and non-Southern-born whites. The second captures residential integration, based on the [Logan and Parman \(2017\)](#) next-door-neighbor segregation measure. Both measures account for relative population shares and hence can be interpreted as integration beyond random matching.

Table 7 shows that Southern white migrants in 1940 are associated with more Republican voting over the long run in counties where they lived closer to and intermarried more frequently with non-Southerners. Greater mixing in housing and marriage markets is associated with greater support for the Republican Party (columns 1–2, 5–6). A one standard deviation (s.d.) increase in intermarriage (adjusted for random matching) is associated with around 2 p.p. more Republican votes, and a similar magnitude holds for residential integration. Moreover, such mixing is associated with greater diaspora influence (columns 3–4, 7–8). Southern whites have a roughly 20% larger association with Republican vote shares in counties with 1 s.d. greater intermarriage and a roughly 10% larger association in counties with 1 s.d. greater residential integration.

Of course, both integration proxies may be jointly determined with political outcomes. For example, non-Southern whites may be more likely to intermarry Southern white migrants if they share similar political preferences. Yet, if horizontal and oblique transmission are important mechanisms, then we should observe the electoral influence of Southern whites being larger in places where they mix more frequently with non-Southerners. And even if such transmission is confounded by endogenous assortative matching, such matching has the potential to build a larger and more cohesive conservative voting bloc than would have emerged had Southern whites not migrated to the county in such large numbers.

Together, the results in Table 7 are consistent with cultural spillovers between Southern and non-Southern populations mixing within neighborhoods and households. Although suggestive, these results do not yet clarify which institutions may facilitate such mixing or the direction of those spillovers. We now offer direct evidence on these two important questions.

6.3 Churches and Media

In this section, we show that Southern whites provided the leadership and congregant foundations for evangelical expansion outside the South. First, we find sizable diaspora effects on evangelical church formation. Second, we identify a complementary effect on the diffusion of conservative media, which

minority, and especially Black, populations from the county through exclusionary policies and racially-biased institutions. We discuss evidence along these lines in an initial version of this paper ([Bazzi et al., 2021](#)) as well as in [Bazzi et al. \(2023a\)](#). Given those minority groups lean strongly Democratic post-realignment, such population changes might further contribute to the sizable effects of the Southern white diaspora on long-run Republican support. However, if these changes were large enough to explain our findings, then we would have plausibly seen a bigger drop in the IV coefficient for Southern whites when accounting for the causal effects of Southern Black migration (Figure 5 and Appendix Table D.1).

have long been a key mouthpiece for the religious right. Together with the micro-level evidence of exposure effects in Section 6.4, these results offer clear evidence that Southern white migrants helped to spread religious traditionalism and expand the conservative vote beyond the diaspora.

Evangelical Institution Building. Evangelical churches, like many others, can be a focal point of social life and key vehicle for cultural transmission outside the home. We begin by connecting Southern white migrants to the spread of these churches. We use Censuses of Churches from [The Association of Religious Data Archives \(2021\)](#) and follow [Steensland et al. \(2000\)](#) in defining evangelical denominations, the most prominent being Southern Baptists. Table 8 shows that a 1 p.p. increase in the Southern white share in 1940 is associated with 0.8–1.2 p.p., or 10%, greater evangelical affiliation in 2010 (columns 1–2). As with the voting outcomes in Section 4.1, these estimates could plausibly imply a more-than-one-for-one effect size, with Southern whites in the diaspora having both compositional and transmission effects on evangelicalism outside the South.³⁸ Indeed, we find similar evidence that Southern white integration with non-Southerners, through marital and residential mixing, was important in spreading evangelicalism within large-diaspora counties (Appendix Table F.2).

Much of this church-building took place during the Great Migration period. As early as 1952, we see sizable diaspora influence on evangelical church presences (columns 3–4 of Table 8). This finding complements descriptive evidence in Section 2 on the occupational overrepresentation of Southern white migrants in the religious sector in 1940. Together, these results are consistent with migrants playing a vanguard role in building novel evangelical institutions outside the South. This is especially true for the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC). Once the church allowed formal congregations outside the South in the 1940s, the diaspora quickly mobilized to expand SBC infrastructure across America.³⁹

This early diaspora imprint on evangelical church formation persists through the late 1900s (columns 5–8 of Table 8). To put these estimates in perspective, an increase of 150–200 Southern white migrants per 10,000 residents in 1940 is associated with approximately one new evangelical church per 10,000 residents. The stability of coefficients from 1952 to 2010 suggests that these institutions spread through the diaspora in the mid-20th century and survived long after the initial migrants had passed.

A large literature on American religion suggests that these evangelical churches could have been important conduits for conservative ideological transmission.⁴⁰ Churches are useful for disseminating not only religious values but also broader moral and political ones ([Wald et al., 1988](#)). Evangelicals became increasingly politicized on the right in the second half of the 20th century, espousing conservative stances on moral issues like gay marriage and abortion as well as the role of government in aiding the poor or promoting racial equity ([McKenzie and Rouse, 2013](#); [Williams, 2015](#)). Today, evangelical voters are significantly more likely to vote for right-wing candidates.⁴¹ Putting all this together suggests

³⁸Evangelical affiliation among whites in the South (in the diaspora) is around 40 p.p. (20 p.p.) higher than non-Southern-born whites before 1970 according to the ANES data in Appendix Figure G.4. This suggests that a reasonable benchmark for compositional effects lies somewhere in the 0.2–0.4 p.p. range. Of course, if all Southern whites in the diaspora identify as evangelical, then the testing benchmark could be as much as 1 p.p., but that seems unduly extreme, just as it did for voting.

³⁹[Gregory \(2005, p. 209\)](#) recounts early SBC leaders in California beckoning, in 1942, for preachers in the South to head West to tend to the growing flock of “Southern Baptists . . . sheep scattered abroad not having a shepherd.”

⁴⁰A theoretical literature in economics on religion can help explain the persistence of evangelical attitudes within churches across generations and their transmission within broader communities. By limiting members’ exposure to the “mainstream” (e.g., public education, secular media), churches regulate cultural transmission as well as cultivate investment by members in the production of religious services ([Carvalho, 2016, 2019](#); [Iannaccone, 1992, 1994](#)). For evangelicals, these include “evangelizing,” i.e., efforts to preach the Christian gospel *beyond* the church.

⁴¹Survey data confirms the link between evangelicalism and right-wing political participation. For instance, white evangelicals heavily favored Trump in 2016 ([Pew Research Center, 2016](#)), and among white evangelicals, support for Trump’s presidency increased with church attendance ([Pew Research Center, 2017](#)).

an important role for Southern white migration in the modern history of religious politics in America.

Conservative Media. A related channel through which Southern white migrants transmitted culture was via media. To the extent that Southern whites preferred radio programs prone to right-wing politics or religious sermonizing, diaspora communities would have increased demand for such media outside the South. With time, this could result in greater exposure to novel, conservative voices among non-Southerners. We explore this mechanism by linking the diaspora to the geography of right-wing talk radio. Such media has long trumpeted New Right causes. However, its origins go back nearly a century, to conservative religious leaders such as Charles Coughlin and Carl McIntire whose shows attracted audiences in the tens of millions (Matzko, 2020; Wang, 2021).

Our analysis in Table 9 relates a county's share of Southern white migrants in 1940 to the presence of a radio station broadcasting (i) Carl McIntire's *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* talk radio show during its run from the late 1950s through the early 1970s, and (ii) the *Rush Limbaugh Show* as of 2020. Both shows were broadcast from over 600 stations at their peak with McIntire directly broadcasting in 12% of counties and Limbaugh in 17%. The association with the Southern white diaspora is similar across both commentators. In the IV specifications, a 1 p.p. increase in the share of Southern white migrants implies a 2–5 p.p. increase in the probability that a county had access to McIntire's show half a century ago and Limbaugh's show in 2020 (columns 2 and 5). This suggests a plausible connection between the diaspora and local media consumption outside the South. We find such a connection not only in radio but also in television: a 1 p.p. increase in the Southern white share as of 1940 is associated, albeit imprecisely, with a 0.5–0.7 p.p. increase in the share of CCES respondents stating that Fox News is the fairest and most balanced news channel (columns 7–9).

These results complement the descriptive findings in Appendix Table G.1 on the occupational overrepresentation of Southern white migrants in print and broadcast media in the early 20th century. Together, this evidence points to the diaspora playing an important role, both as consumers and producers, in developing a novel conservative media infrastructure in communities outside the South.

6.4 Micro Evidence of Exposure Effects

The results above suggest that Southern white migrants shaped cultural and political attitudes of their *non-Southern* neighbors through the diffusion of evangelical churches and right-wing media.⁴² In this final subsection, we provide direct, individual-level evidence of cultural change induced by exposure to Southern white migrants. Our empirical strategy draws on recent innovations in the study of place-based exposure effects. We show that non-Southern parents are more likely to give their children Biblical names after moving to locations with larger Southern white populations. Biblical name choices contain a strong signal of religiosity: as a validation check, Appendix Table F.3 shows that children with fathers working in religious occupations are 6–9 p.p. more likely to have a Biblical name relative to a mean of 15% for children with fathers in other occupations living within the same county.⁴³

We examine how non-Southern white parents name their children before and after moving, as a function of the Southern white diaspora at destination. Following the mover-based strategy in Bazzi et al.

⁴² Appendix F.4 provides additional evidence that the diaspora helped diffuse country music and barbecue cuisine beyond the South. While not instrumental for politics, such cultural markers provide another window into the process of Southernization.

⁴³ We extract from behindthename.com a comprehensive list of names featured in the Bible. These names span common and uncommon names in the population. In 1940, for example, popular Biblical names included John and Mary, while popular non-Biblical names included William and Charles. Among less popular names, Biblical ones included Sarah and Ruth, while non-Biblical ones included Lillian and Frances (see Table 6 in Ferrara and Testa, 2022).

(2020), we pool children born to white non-Southern parents across Censuses in $\tau = \{1910, \dots, 1940\}$ (i.e., cohorts 1901–40). We then consider households with ≥ 2 children: ≥ 1 born in the state of residence at time τ and ≥ 1 born in a different state by time $\tau + 10$. To avoid double counting, we restrict to children aged 0–9. We then estimate the time of household move, $\tilde{\tau}$, as the midpoint between the birth years of the children born in different states, where child year of birth is defined as $\tilde{\tau} + j$ for possible $j = -9, \dots, 9$.⁴⁴ The final sample includes 2,491,260 children in 846,073 households.

We estimate the following equation, which relates the given name of child i to whether their household h had yet moved to non-Southern county c at their time of birth $\tilde{\tau} + j$, interacted with location ℓ 's Southern white share in the previous (pre-move) Census period, $\tau - 1$:

$$\text{Biblical name}_{ih\ell\tau} = \theta_h + \beta \cdot \% \text{Southern Whites}_{\ell, \tau-1} \times \text{Born After Move}_i + \mathbf{X}'_{i\tau} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ih\ell\tau}, \quad (6)$$

where we consider the share of Southern Whites in the county ($\ell = c$) and in the local neighborhood ($\ell = n$) defined as the 20 households surrounding h with 10 on each side in the enumeration listing (following Brown et al., 2021).⁴⁵ The household fixed effects, θ_h , absorb origin Southern white shares and other characteristics of h 's destination county, as well as all time-invariant characteristics of h , including its cultural attitudes, its place of origin, and factors affecting destination choice. The $\mathbf{X}_{i\tau}$ vector includes the child's sex, birth order, birth period, and dummies for child birth year relative to the time of the move. Standard errors are clustered by the contemporaneous destination county.

In panel (a) of Table 10, the baseline estimate in column 1 reveals that a 1 p.p. increase in Southern white migrant shares at the county level is associated with a 0.13 p.p. increase in the probability that parents give their children a Biblical name, relative to a child born prior to the move. Going from zero to the mean Southern white share (3 percent) thus implies a 0.4 p.p. increase in the likelihood of religious name choices, relative to a mean of 15. Put differently, this effect explains 7 percent of the gap between children named by fathers working in religious occupations and those working non-religious occupations. This core result is robust to a subsample of households moving from Northern, Union territory to Western states (column 2), accounting for correlation in the share of Southern whites between origin state and destination county (column 3), addressing confounding effects on individualistic name choices (column 4), and including more granular birth-period fixed effects (column 5).

Moreover, we find similar estimates in panel (b) of Table 10 based on neighborhood-level exposure. One additional Southern white neighbor (out of 20) is associated with roughly a 0.2–0.3 p.p. increase in the likelihood that a non-Southern parent gives their child a Biblical name. Appendix Table F.4 shows that this is robust to the inclusion of county FE \times born-after-move, effectively leveraging variation in exposure to Southern whites across neighborhoods within counties.

A causal interpretation of $\hat{\beta}$ implies that greater exposure to Southern white migrants at destination induced a shift towards more religious names among whites without Southern heritage. The key identifying assumption is that, within households, the likelihood of Biblical name-giving would have followed parallel trends had the household not moved to a location with a large Southern white migrant population. One important concern lies in the possibility of confounding, time-varying shocks to house-

⁴⁴Consider, for example, a household on the Oregon coast in 1910 with four children: Lawrence born in 1901, Henrietta in 1903, John in 1907, and Marie in 1910. We see Lawrence and Henrietta are born in Minnesota and John and Marie in Oregon. Hence, we impute $\tilde{\tau} = 1905$ and $j = -4$ for Lawrence, -2 for Henrietta, $+2$ for John and $+5$ for Marie.

⁴⁵When using neighborhood-level exposure, we measure the share of nearby households headed by Southern whites contemporaneously (i.e., in period τ) since we cannot measure Southern white presence in previous census periods at the neighborhood level (prior to h 's residing in the given location).

hold h that cause it to move to locations with a large Southern white diaspora and increase the parents' propensity to give their later-born children Biblical names.

Using the following event-study specification, we not only illustrate the dynamics of religious name choices among movers but also provide evidence in support of the identifying assumptions:

$$\text{Biblical name}_{ih\ell\tau} = \theta_h + \sum_{j=-9}^9 \beta_j [\% \text{Southern Whites}_{\ell,\tau-1} \times 1(\text{born in } \tilde{\tau} + j)] + \mathbf{X}'_{i\tau} \gamma + \varepsilon_{ih\ell\tau}, \quad (7)$$

which allows the β in equation (6) to vary with the child birth year relative to the household move, $j = -9, \dots, 9$. Figure 7 reports estimates of β_j for relatively balanced event years, $j = -5, \dots, 5$.

The estimates point to a causal, exposure-based interpretation. We see limited evidence of pre-trends in Biblical naming patterns based on Southern white shares in the eventual destination county (panel a) and neighborhood (panel b; see Appendix Figure F.3 for a specification with county FE \times born-after-move). Biblical name choices increase over time after non-Southern households move to locations with more Southern whites. Whereas a confounding shock at the time of moving would imply an immediate jump in Biblical name choices, the gradually increasing $\beta_{j \geq 1}$ in Figure 7 are consistent with exposure-based mechanisms as contact and interactions with Southern white neighbors expanded.

Together, these results suggest that Southern white migrants transmitted religious cultural norms to non-Southern populations outside the South. This individual-level evidence resonates both with the diffusion of evangelical Christianity across diaspora communities and the role of residential mixing in shaping the long-run political legacy of the diaspora. Having documented exposure effects in one important domain of diaspora culture, it seems plausible that other domains beyond religion could also have causally changed as a result of greater contact with Southern white migrants.

7 Conclusion

Millions migrated out of the American South in the 20th century. Scholars have written extensively about the Great Migration of Southern Blacks. Much less is known about the Great Migration of Southern whites. This paper provides a systematic empirical account of how Southern white migrants transformed politics and culture across the United States. We provide descriptive and causal evidence on the role of the Southern white diaspora in facilitating cultural changes that would redefine and reinvigorate the conservative movement. These migrants, dispersed and influential as they were, paved the way for a successful racially conservative politics on the right. Media and evangelical religion provided important later vehicles for diaspora impacts, which, in turn, hastened partisan realignment and reshaped the political landscape along a pathway running through George Wallace to Donald Trump.

Our findings suggest that some of America's deep cultural divides and growing polarization may have roots in the Great Migration. In related work, we explore Southern white influence on the geography of race and racism across America (Bazzi et al., 2023a), explicitly tracking the role of former slaveowners in shaping the institutional foundations of racial inequity outside the South. Together with the present study, we offer a new empirical take on the long-run process of Southernization noted by historians and popular observers. While Southern migrants were not necessarily the instigators of cultural change everywhere they settled, they undoubtedly impacted its evolution locally and perhaps even nationally. Our research agenda aims to elucidate this historical process and ultimately help inform public debate across a deep cultural divide in America.

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
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Figures


Figure 1: Southern-born Whites and Blacks Living Outside the South, 1850–2010




Notes: The graph plots the number of white and Black individuals born in the South who reside outside the South in a given Census year between 1850 and 2010. Percentages for select years that are central to our analyses are expressed relative to the total white or Black Southern population to show the magnitudes of the Southern outmigration over time by group. We define Southern states as those belonging to the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma. The data for the graph was taken from [Ruggles et al. \(2020\)](#). For Southern-born individuals, the dashed lines were produced using the full-count Census files and the solid lines were produced using the 1% samples (1910-70 and 2000-10) multiplied by 100 and the 5% samples (1980, 1990) multiplied by 20. The period of overlap between the full-count and 1% samples from 1910 to 1940 was chosen to show that the scaled IPUMS samples match the full-count data.

Figure 2: Mapping Southern-born Whites and Blacks Outside the South in 1940

(a) Southern Whites




(b) Southern Blacks




Notes: This figure maps the county-level population share of (a) white and (b) Black individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1940 according to the full-count 1940 Census. The legend shows the identical intervals considered for each split.

Figure 3: Semiparametric Estimates—Average Republican Vote Share, 2000–20

(a) OLS




(b) IV



Notes: This figure reports semiparametric estimates of equation (1) using the [Robinson \(1988\)](#) partially linear estimator. The graphs show the resulting regression curve and 95% confidence intervals based on a local linear regression. In panel (a), the OLS specification is based on a local linear estimator with an Epanechnikov kernel and optimal bandwidth. In panel (b), the IV specification is based on a semiparametric IV procedure developed in [Su and Ullah \(2008\)](#) and operationalized as a control function estimator by [Henderson and Parmeter \(2015\)](#): (i) we estimate a first stage [Robinson \(1988\)](#) regression based on a local cubic estimator, (ii) we include the residual Southern white share from that first stage estimator and include that as a regressor in the second stage, (iii) we estimate the second stage [Robinson \(1988\)](#) regression with local linear estimator, Epanechnikov kernel, and an optimal bandwidth. In both panels, we include the full set of covariates used in column 5 of Table 2, and in the IV panel (b), we additionally include the Southern white migrant share in 1900 as in column 7 of Table 2. While all counties are included in the estimation, for presentational purposes, the graphs only report those with less than 30 percent Southern white share in 1940.


Figure 4: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Republican Presidential Vote Share, 1900–2020




Notes: Coefficients from panel OLS and IV regressions of vote share for the Republican candidate in 31 U.S. presidential elections between 1900 and 2020 on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Data on presidential election outcomes come from [MIT Election Data and Science Lab \(2018\)](#), the presidential election atlas for years after 1912 ([Leip, 2021](#)), and the election dataset compiled by [Clubb et al. \(2006\)](#) for 1912 and prior. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Regression includes county and state \times election year fixed effects, based on equation (5). The coefficients from these share effects are expressed relative to the base year 1900. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 60×60 mile grid cells following the approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#), where the median cell contains 7 non-Southern counties. For estimates based on contemporaneous variation in Southern white shares for pre-1940 elections, see Appendix Figures A.5. See Appendix Table A.8 for an alternative, more parsimonious approach to the analysis that controls for 1900 controls and 1900 Southern white shares.

Figure 5: Southern Blacks and Whites and Republican Presidential Vote Share

(a) Panel OLS estimates




(b) Panel IV estimates




Notes: Coefficients from pooled OLS and IV regressions of vote share for the Republican candidate in 31 U.S. presidential elections between 1900 and 2020 on the shares of Southern white migrants and Southern Black migrants in all non-Southern counties. All regressions include state \times election year fixed effects. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#).

Figure 6: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Congressional Ideology, 1940–1990



Notes: Coefficients from pooled OLS (left) and IV (right) regressions, respectively, of (a) an indicator for legislator party affiliation (Republican = 1) in the U.S. House, (b) congressional ideal points from Bateman et al. (2017), based on racial and civil rights voting patterns, (c) congressional ideal points from the time-varying DW-Nominate score (dimension 1) by Lewis et al. (2021), covering economic issues, and (d) our relative religious rhetoric (RRI) scores on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940. RRI scores are calculated from congressional speech by totaling a legislator's words with Biblical roots—God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen—and dividing by total words spoken. All regressions include Congress and state fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 is interacted with the Congress fixed effect. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. See Appendix Table E.5 for an alternative, more parsimonious approach to the congressional ideology analysis that controls for 1900 Southern white shares.

Figure 7: Cultural Transmission: Exposure to Southern Whites and Religious Child Names



Notes: This figure isolates within-household, cross-child variation in parental exposure to Southern white migrants in the destination county in panel (a) and the neighborhood within the county in panel (b) where the neighborhood for household h is defined as 20 households around h , 10 on each side in the enumeration listing (following [Brown et al., 2021](#)). Each graph reports estimates of β_j and 95% confidence intervals in equation (6) for $j = -5, \dots, 5$. Each β_j can be interpreted as the differential effect of exposure to Southern white migrants on the likelihood of a biblical name given to a child born j years before/after their non-Southern-born parents moved to the county, relative to a child born one year prior to the household move. The sample includes 2,491,260 white, U.S.-born children of non-Southern-born parents in 846,073 households with at least one child born before the move and at least one born after the move. The mean (standard deviation) of the Southern white share in panel (a) is 1.8 (2.7) and in panel (b) is 2.8 (5.9). Estimates control for household fixed effects as well as child sex, birth order, and birth decade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county.

Tables

Table 1: Relative Attitudes of Southern Whites Outside the South

Dependent Variable:	Religious		Racial			Economic	
	Identify as Evangelical (1)	Believe Bible is literal word of God (2)	Favor any segregation (3)	Oppose residential integration (4)	Oppose school integration (5)	Oppose gov't intervention for any (6)	Oppose gov't intervention for Blacks (7)
Southern White	0.199*** (0.037)	0.095** (0.039)	0.094** (0.039)	0.089** (0.035)	0.106*** (0.037)	-0.034 (0.034)	0.120*** (0.045)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey waves	1960-70	1964-68	1964-70	1964-70	1964-70	1956-68	1964-68
Observations	4,603	1,924	2,458	2,908	2,680	4,087	1,630
Counties	118	95	96	97	97	116	92
Control outcome mean	0.15	0.47	0.47	0.26	0.45	0.46	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.11	0.08	0.14	0.07	0.14	0.03

Notes: Regressions of survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES), applicable waves through 1970, on a dummy for whether a white respondent is from any of the twelve excluded Southern sending states. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Our definition of Southern whites includes those respondents that were born and/or grew up in the South. Each dependent variable is a binary outcome equal to one if the respondent answered affirmatively to the given question. The estimates in columns 6 and 7 hold using a fixed respondent sample from 1964 and 1968: -0.010 (0.051) and 0.117 (0.058)***, respectively. The control outcome mean is the mean of the dependent variable for non-Southern whites. Sample excludes respondents living in the South as well as non-whites. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. All regressions include county and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Presidential Vote Shares in the 21st Century

(a) Dependent Variable: Trump Vote Share, 2016							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.395*** (0.105)	0.632*** (0.076)	1.004*** (0.257)	1.026*** (0.167)	0.853*** (0.155)	1.779*** (0.563)	1.530*** (0.435)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share control						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.7	62.6	62.7
Adj. R ²	0.42	0.67					
F-statistic			109.1	115.0	100.9	10.2	10.7
Anderson-Rubin, p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
KP Underident., p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.007

(b) Dependent Variable: Republican Vote Share Average, 2000–20							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.381*** (0.107)	0.549*** (0.067)	0.810*** (0.231)	0.887*** (0.148)	0.737*** (0.138)	1.627*** (0.503)	1.396*** (0.390)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share control						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,887	1,885	1,887	1,885	1,883	1,885	1,883
Outcome mean	59.4	59.4	59.4	59.4	59.5	59.4	59.5
Adj. R ²	0.42	0.65					
F-statistic			109.5	115.4	100.9	10.2	10.7
Anderson-Rubin, p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
KP Underident., p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.007

Notes: Regressions of (a) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election and (b) Republican vote share averages across the 2000–20 presidential elections on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties (mean of 2.9%). Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Columns 3–7 instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Historical controls for 1900 include log population density (per square mile), percent employed in manufacturing, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy. Additional controls capturing sorting correlates include vote shares for Breckinridge in 1860 and Jennings Bryan in 1896, dummies for whether a county was unincorporated and “unsettled,” (i.e., < 2 persons per square mile) as of 1860, dummies for any major oil fields (as of 1900 and 1940) and for any mines, measures of cotton and overall agricultural potential, and a set of geographic controls (for elevation, ruggedness, distance to coast, and distance to nearest river). Columns 6 and 7 also control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 60 × 60 mile grid cells following the approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#), where the median cell contains 7 non-Southern counties. The Anderson-Rubin p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the endogenous regressor is statistically significant and that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the Kleibergen-Paap LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Selected Identification and Robustness Checks on IV Estimates in Table 2

	Dependent Variable:	
	Trump Vote Share, 2016 (1)	Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20 (2)
<i>Alternative Standard Errors</i>		
1. Baseline (column 4 of Table 2)	1.026***	0.887***
Bester et al. (2011) 60 mi ² grid-cell	(0.167)	(0.148)
Conley (1999) 500 km spatial HAC	(0.280)	(0.227)
Adao et al. (2019) SSIV adjustment	(0.102)	(0.070)
2. Baseline w/ Initial 1900 Shares (column 6 of Table 2)	1.779***	1.627***
Bester et al. (2011) 60 mi ² grid-cell	(0.563)	(0.503)
Conley (1999) 500 km spatial HAC	(0.965)	(0.882)
Adao et al. (2019) SSIV adjustment	(0.510)	(0.415)
<i>Alternative Samples</i>		
3. Excluding Border States (column 6 of Table 2)	2.098***	1.604***
	(0.730)	(0.582)
4. Border States as Senders (column 6 of Table 2)	2.327*	1.617*
	(1.234)	(0.868)
5. “Unsettled” Counties Only (column 6 of Table 2)	1.691***	1.219***
	(0.444)	(0.365)
<i>Varying Control Sets</i>		
6. No Controls or Fixed Effects	0.720**	0.983***
	(0.291)	(0.265)
7. Initial 1900 Share Control Only	2.072**	1.709**
	(0.924)	(0.776)
8. 1900 Controls and Initial 1900 Share Control	1.217**	0.995**
	(0.574)	(0.497)
9. Post-LASSO w/ Baseline + Initial 1900 Share Controls (column 6 of Table 2)	2.150***	1.969***
	(0.762)	(0.679)
10. Post-LASSO with All Controls (column 7 of Table 2)	2.097***	1.900***
	(0.767)	(0.639)
<i>Alternative SSIV Construction</i>		
11. Push-Factor SSIV with Origin County Shares	1.499*	1.505*
	(0.877)	(0.824)
<i>Matching Exercises</i>		
12. Baseline w/ Initial 1900 Shares + Within-State County Pair FE Matched on 1900 Vote Share	1.583***	1.499***
	(0.386)	(0.421)
13. Baseline w/ Initial 1900 Shares + Within-State County Pair FE Matched on 1900–40 Vote Share Changes	1.521***	1.326***
	(0.235)	(0.231)
14. Baseline w/ Initial 1900 Shares + Within-State County Pair FE Matched on 1870 Southern White Shares	2.890**	2.645**
	(1.201)	(1.147)
<i>Electoral Importance Re-Weighting</i>		
15. Weighting by State’s Electoral College Votes	2.258***	2.324***
	(0.746)	(0.747)
16. Weighting by 1940 Population	2.283**	2.706**
	(1.063)	(1.058)
17. Weighting by Total County Votes	2.662**	3.051**
	(1.175)	(1.229)

Notes: See the following page.

Table 3 (continued): Selected Identification and Robustness Checks on IV Estimates in Table 2

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 using a variety of robustness specifications. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of controls. All regressions include state fixed effects, except for row 6. All rows instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#), with the first two rows also reporting standard errors based on the [Conley \(1999\)](#) spatial HAC with a very wide bandwidth of 500 km and the [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#) adjustment for SSIV estimators. See Appendix Table A.3 for a larger set of alternative inference approaches. Row 3 excludes counties in the former border states during the Civil War (Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and West Virginia). Row 4 additionally treats those border states as additional Southern sending states in defining the population of Southern Whites in 1940. Row 5 uses only counties that were classified by the Census Bureau as “unsettled” by non-natives as of 1860 (i.e., using the Census definition of < 2 persons per square mile). The mean Southern white shares for the samples used in rows 3–5 are 2.7%, 5.8%, and 7.9%, respectively. Rows 9–10 choose optimal controls from these sets using the [Belloni et al. \(2014\)](#) double LASSO procedure. This procedure first runs a LASSO regression of the Southern white share on the set of controls. It then does the same using the given outcome. Lastly, it runs the IV regression using all of the controls that were selected in the first two steps. Row 11 uses a shift-share IV based on origin-county instead of origin-state shares. Rows 12–14 control for county pairs within states matched on similarity in (i) 1900 Republican presidential vote shares, (ii) 1900–40 changes in Republican presidential vote shares, and (iii) 1870 Southern white shares (see Appendix A.4). Rows 15–17 weight regressions by (i) state electoral votes in 2016 and 2000, (ii) county population in 1940, and (iii) total county votes in 2016 and 2000 (see Appendix Table C.1). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Re-estimating Table 2 with an Alternative Instrument

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Republican Vote Share Average, 2000–20	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.988** (1.298)		2.505** (1.124)	
Average % Southern Whites, 1880–1940		3.083*** (1.135)		2.585** (1.009)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,887	1,887	1,885	1,885
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	59.4	59.4
F-statistic	10.1	23.8	10.2	24.2

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 using a version of the first rail road instrument from Sequeira et al. (2020), as described above. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. All regressions include state fixed effects. As in Sequeira et al. (2020), we always control for averages of the controls used in the zeroth stage, the log number of years since the first railroad connection (relative to the year 2016), and cubic polynomials of county latitude and longitude, as well as allow for spatial autocorrelation in the errors using the procedure described in Conley (1999). See Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2 for zeroth and first stage estimates as well as the analysis using other outcomes. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Southern White Migrants in 1940, Wallace in 1968, and Partisan Realignment

Dependent Variable:	Third-party Vote for George Wallace in 1968			Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.248*** (0.050)	0.358*** (0.086)	0.570** (0.272)	0.741*** (0.064)	0.839*** (0.160)	1.318*** (0.471)	
% Wallace Voters, 1968							0.722*** (0.077)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes	
Observations	1,883	1,883	1,883	1,882	1,882	1,882	1,882
Outcome mean	9.4	9.4	9.4	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
Adj. R ²	0.68			0.64			0.64
F-statistic		115.2	10.3		117.1	10.6	
Anderson-Rubin, p-val		0.000	0.006		0.000	0.007	
KP Underident., p-val		0.000	0.011		0.000	0.010	

Notes: Regressions of the third-party vote share for George Wallace of the American Independent Party in the 1968 presidential election (columns 1–3) and of the change in vote share from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000, i.e., Republican vote share in 2000 minus (100 - Democratic vote share in 1948) (columns 4–7) on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 (columns 1–6) or on the share of votes to George Wallace in 1968 (column 7) in non-Southern counties. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. Columns 3 and 6 control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Combining the First and Second Generation Diaspora, Extending Table 2

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016			Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites (both gen.), 1940	0.445*** (0.055)	0.628*** (0.101)	0.569*** (0.137)	0.386*** (0.049)	0.542*** (0.088)	0.521*** (0.115)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,883	1,883	1,883	1,882	1,882	1,882
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.6	59.4	59.4	59.4
Adj. R ²	0.67			0.65		
F-statistic		147.1	42.4		147.7	42.4
Anderson-Rubin, p-val		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
KP Underident., p-val		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000

Notes: Regressions of (i) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election and (ii) Republican vote share averages between 2000 and 2020 on the share of first- and second-generation Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. A second-generation Southern white is defined as someone born outside the South with a Southern-born white father and/or mother. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. We instrument the share of first- and second-generation Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to Table 2 for details on all controls. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Intergroup Contact, Integration, and Voting

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016				Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.087*** (0.659)	2.213*** (0.776)	2.301*** (0.677)	1.727*** (0.403)	1.892*** (0.592)	2.026*** (0.705)	2.108*** (0.602)	1.508*** (0.348)
Intermarriage Index	2.272*** (0.487)		1.545*** (0.356)		1.951*** (0.430)		1.220*** (0.327)	
Residential Integration Index		2.189** (0.872)		0.976** (0.434)		1.976** (0.813)		0.682* (0.399)
% Southern Whites × Intermarriage			0.437** (0.219)				0.440** (0.199)	
% Southern Whites × Integration				0.133* (0.069)				0.142** (0.060)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883	1,885	1,882	1,885	1,882
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	59.4	59.4	59.4	59.4
F-statistic	8.6	6.8	7.2	42.1	8.6	6.8	7.2	42.0
KP Underident., p-val	0.017	0.021	0.003	0.000	0.017	0.021	0.003	0.000

Notes: Regressions of (1–4) the vote share for Donald Trump in 2016 and (5–8) Republican vote share averages between 2000 and 2020 on the indexes of intermarriage between Southern whites and non-Southern whites and residential segregation from Southern whites, both as of 1940. The intermarriage index divides the actual intermarriage rate between Southern and non-Southern whites by the theoretical matching rate implied by the population share of marriage-age individuals in the two groups. This ratio therefore answers how much intermarriage exists relative to what would be expected without any directed search in the marriage market (see [Bazzi et al., 2019](#), for a related approach). Once standardized, this index spans -4.5 to a sample max of 4.6. The segregation index is a measure based on next-door neighbor integration from Southern whites, based on the segregation measure in [Logan and Parman \(2017\)](#). Once standardized, this index spans -6.8 to 1.3. Evangelical measures here include all such groups in the 2010 religious census from [The Association of Religious Data Archives \(2021\)](#). Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. See the notes to Table 2 for a full description of controls. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Evangelical Communities, 1952–2010

Dependent Variable:	% Evangelical		Evangelical Churches (per 10,000 pop.)					
	2010		1952		1971		2010	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.788*** (0.173)	1.204** (0.572)	0.305*** (0.076)	0.637*** (0.233)	0.283*** (0.083)	0.538** (0.230)	0.241*** (0.076)	0.436* (0.246)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,878	1,878	1,879	1,879	1,886	1,886
Outcome mean	9.8	9.8	4.6	4.6	5.7	5.7	5.4	5.4
F-statistic	105.0	10.1	114.1	10.0	114.9	10.2	105.0	10.1
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.020	0.003	0.069
KP Underident., p-val	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.011

Notes: Regressions of the number of evangelical Protestant Christian churches per 10,000 residents in 1952, 1971, and 2010 or of the share of the county population adhering to those evangelical denominations in 2010 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Evangelical denominations in this table based on [Steensland et al. \(2000\)](#), using denominations (including equivalent merger or splinter groups) measured across those three religious censuses from [The Association of Religious Data Archives \(2021\)](#). All columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. Even columns control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Right-wing Media

Dependent Variable:	County has a Radio Station Airing						Respondent Believes		
	Carl McIntire Program			Rush Limbaugh Program			Fox News is the fairest Media		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.005** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.006** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.045* (0.024)	0.008* (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	0.005 (0.015)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,884	1,884	1,884	1,884	1,884	1,884	3,478	3,478	3,478
Outcome mean	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.35	0.35	0.35
Adj. R ²	0.14			0.20			0.04		
F-statistic		117.0	10.4		117.0	10.4		84.7	7.4
Anderson-Rubin, p-val		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.010		0.311	0.761
KP Underident., p-val		0.000	0.010		0.000	0.010		0.000	0.033

Notes: Columns 1–6 are based on regressions of a dummy for whether a county has had a radio station that aired Carl McIntire’s *20th Century Reformation Hour* (in the 1950s–70s) or the *Rush Limbaugh Show* (in 2020) on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940. Columns 7–9 are based on a regression of a binary indicator for whether Fox News provides, among all television news channels, the most fair and balanced reporting. We take this question from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) in 2007 and restrict the analysis to whites living outside the South. Even columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. In columns 1–6, additional controls for elevation and ruggedness are also included as important predictors of radio signal supply. Respondent controls in columns 7–9 include respondent age, age squared, and sex. Columns 3, 6, and 9 control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Exposure Effects on Non-Southerners' Religious Names

Dependent Variable: Specification:	Child has Biblical Name				
	Base	North Origin to West Dest.	Δ Orig.-Dest. % Southern Whites	Control for Name Freq.	Birth 5-Year FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(a) County-Level Exposure					
% Southern Whites $_{\tau-1} \times$ Born After Move	0.128*** (0.022)	0.081** (0.034)	0.041** (0.017)	0.079*** (0.019)	0.107*** (0.020)
Observations	2,491,260	416,044	2,455,058	2,491,260	2,491,260
(b) Neighborhood-Level Exposure					
% Southern Whites $_{\tau} \times$ Born After Move	0.064*** (0.009)	0.061*** (0.015)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.056*** (0.009)
Observations	2,483,543	414,859	2,447,502	2,483,543	2,483,543
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Year - Move Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Order FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome mean (pre-move)	15.4	14.0	15.4	15.4	15.4

Notes: Regressions of an indicator for whether the non-Southern-ancestry child has a Biblical name ($\times 100$) on a dummy for whether that child in mover household h was born in its post-move county $c \times$ the share of Southern-born whites in location ℓ . In panel (a), we define ℓ as the county, and in panel (b) as the neighborhood of 20 households around h , 10 on each side in the enumeration listing (following [Brown et al., 2021](#)). In panel (a), the Southern white share is measured at the county level in the prior Census period $\tau - 1$; in panel (b), the Southern white share is measured in the contemporaneous period τ as we do not know the exact location of the given household residence in the prior Census round. The full sample includes 2,491,260 white, U.S.-born children of non-Southern parents in 846,073 households with at least one child born before the move and at least one born after the move. The sample differs slightly in panel (b) on account of missing roster information to identify neighbors. The full sample includes movers from all non-Southern origin states. All regressions include fixed effects for child sex, birth order, birth period (decade or 5-year), and birth year minus household year of move. In columns 1, 3, 4, and 5, the sample includes those leaving all non-Southern states and settling in non-Southern destinations. In column 2, movers are restricted to those leaving all Northern states and settling in non-Southern and non-Northern destinations; we define the “North” as the territories of the Union during the Civil War, excluding the western parts (California, Oregon, Nevada). The latter is the same restriction used in [Appendix Table D.2](#) to define Northern migrants. In column 3, the Southern white share captures the difference between origin state and destination county in Census period $\tau - 1$. In panel (a), the mean (standard deviation) of the Southern white share measure is 1.8 (2.7) in columns 1, 4, and 5, 3.3 (3.6) in column 2, and 0.3 (3.0) in column 3. In panel (b), the mean (standard deviation) of the Southern white share measure is 2.8 (5.9) in columns 1, 4, and 5, 4.8 (7.6) in column 2, and 0.6 (5.8) in column 3. Column 4 includes 10 dummies for the decile of given name frequency. In columns 1–4, the birth period FE are decadal and in column 5 five-yearly. Standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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A SSIV Construction and Robustness Checks

A.1 Shift-Share IV with Push Factors

This section provides additional details and results related to our shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) identification strategy. Following [Boustan \(2010\)](#) and [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#), our primary SSIV relies on variation in shifts based on arguably exogenous origin county-level “push factors.” To implement this strategy in our context, we develop a novel approach for predicting Southern outmigration to the non-South, using linked Census records ([Abramitzky et al., 2020](#)). In the absence of net migration rates for years prior to 1930, this linked Census approach allows us to approximate Southern white outmigration from each location and each decade between 1900 and 1940. In contrast to the net-migration approach, ours solely captures outmigration to the non-South. To be precise, we calculate for each Census decade $t = \{1910, 1920, 1930, 1940\}$,

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{ot} = \sum_{d=1}^D \left(\frac{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } t-10 \text{ linked to } d \text{ in } t}{\# \text{ white men in } o \text{ in } t-10 \text{ linked to Census } t} \right) \times \text{Southern whites}_{o,t-10}, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where o indicates Southern origin county, d indicates non-Southern destination county, and where the rightmost term, $\text{Southern whites}_{o,t-10}$, is based on the complete-count Census. Figure [A.2](#) validates the accuracy of the Southern white migrant prediction in equation (A.1) by comparing that measure with an alternative one constructed for the period from 1935–40 based on a direct question in the 1940 full-count Census about county of residence five years prior. Our measure is highly correlated ($\text{corr.} = 0.93$) with these outmigration flows inferred in the 1940 Census. Our linked sample is also highly balanced, relative to the five-year-backward-looking sample, on key observable characteristics. Correlation coefficients for outmigrant levels among various subsamples are 0.91 (married only), 0.90 (unmarried only), 0.92 (ages 35–50), 0.88 (ages 51+), 0.93 (at least some high school), and 0.86 (no high school).¹

We then predict decade-specific shifts from zeroth stage regressions that relate the left-hand-side measure in equation (A.1) to origin-county push factors using the following specification:

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{ot} = \alpha + \text{push}'_{o,t-10} \boldsymbol{\eta} + \phi \text{population}_{o,t-10} + \varepsilon_{ot}. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Following prior literature, we choose push factors from plausibly relevant measures of urbanization, development, and extractive industries that can be found across all four decades. Summary statistics for the full set of variables we consider in the prediction exercise are reported in Table [A.1](#).

Like [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#), we aim to improve prediction by considering nonlinear transformations of the predictors and alternative functional forms. In particular, we include the square and cross-term interaction of each predictor with all other predictors. From these inputs, a LASSO algorithm then shrinks the set of predictors to an optimal subset, $\text{push}_{o,t-10}$, from which Southern white migration is predicted for each decade.

Zeroth stage regressions based on linear LASSO specifications are shown in Appendix Table [A.2](#). Relevant factors driving Southern white outmigration to the non-South include small Black populations, few tenant or large farms, many Black-owned farms, small manufacturing sectors, and boll weevil infestations. Sending counties tended to be somewhat urban on average, consistent with the positive selection

¹As these characteristics are observed in 1940, coefficients are based on a subsample of white men aged 25 or older in 1930. This reduces endogeneity concerns and ensures comparability across linked and full-count samples.


story discussed in Section 2.2.

We then sum the decade-specific Southern white migrants_{ot} to obtain the overall outflows from each sending state, $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40}$, as in equation (4). These are interacted with the initial shares of white migrants from each Southern sending state as of 1900 in order to estimate the predicted stock of Southern white migrants in each non-Southern county in 1940, $Z_{c,1940}$, as in equation (2). As in Boustan (2010), Calderon et al. (2022), and Fouka et al. (2022), our preferred SSIV specification uses shares based on prior origin state, rather than counties. This increases the strength of the IV, since the origin county-based approach using the linked Census records requires the omission of areas such as Western Oklahoma and Texas that cannot be linked to the 1880 Census.

Finally, scaling $Z_{c,1940}$ by the 1900 county population delivers the SSIV for the percent of Southern white migrants in county c population in 1940, as discussed in Section 3. Thirty counties with predicted shares that exceed a value of 100 are truncated at 100 with an indicator for truncated observations added during estimation. This truncation improves IV strength. Results throughout Table 2 are fully robust to instead excluding these counties from the estimating sample (e.g., the estimate for column 6 of panel a becomes 1.82 (0.57) with an F-statistic of 15.4).


Figure A.1 provides the intuition behind the variation exploited by the instrument. Panel (a) shows two counties in the state of Washington, Clark and Yakima, which had almost identical shares of Southern whites in 1900, of 2.5% and 2.6%, respectively. Despite this similarity, the origin states of the Southern white populations were very different. In Clark County, relatively more Southern white migrants came from Arkansas instead of Texas, whereas for Yakima County the opposite was true. Panel (b) then showcases the time-series variation, highlighting that more white Texans left the South for the rest of the country until 1940 and that migrants from Arkansas were fewer in number. As predicted by this combined shift-share, the population share of Southern whites in Yakima rose to 4.8% in 1940. This share reached only 3.8% in Clark. Many years later, in 2016, Yakima also had the higher vote share for Donald Trump with 53.7% as compared to 46.2% in Clark.

Figure A.1: Visual Intuition for the Shift-share Instrument



Notes: Panel (a) demonstrates the cross-sectional variation in baseline shares for two counties in Washington state: Clark County and Yakima County. Both counties had similar shares of Southern whites in 1900, of 2.5% and 2.6%, respectively. The figure breaks these shares down by the respective Southern sending states, showing that Clark County had relatively more people from Arkansas as compared to Texans, while for Yakima County had the opposite. Panel (b) plots the total predicted number of migrants from each state over time, where Texans moved in larger numbers compared to individuals from Arkansas. As predicted by the combined shift-share, Yakima County had a higher share of Southern whites in 1940 (4.8%) compared to Clark County (3.8%). In 2016, Yakima also had the higher vote share for Donald Trump, with 53.7%, while Clark County had just 46.2%.

Figure A.2: Comparing Southern White Migration Measures, Linked versus Full Count Census



Notes: This graph plots the number of whites in a Southern county who moved to a non-Southern county between 1935 and 1940 against an estimate from the linked Census of the number of whites in a Southern county who moved to a non-Southern county between 1930 and 1940. This corresponds to a correlation coefficient of 0.93. We define Southern counties as those belonging to the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma. Non-Southern counties are all others in the conterminous United States.

Table A.1: Summary Statistics of Predictors of Southern Outmigration from 1900–30

Socio-Economic County Characteristics, 1900–30	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
% urban population	6,148	11.86	19.96	0.00	100
% Black population	6,148	23.82	23.02	0.00	94.2
Agricultural potential	6,148	0.55	0.14	0.00	0.69
% of land in farms	6,148	65.73	23.14	0.00	100
% of farms that are tenant farms	6,148	41.76	20.69	0.00	96.8
% of farms that are Black farms	6,148	20.33	23.81	0.00	96.6
% of farms with 1,000+ acres	6,148	3.22	11.89	0.00	100
Log mean land value	6,148	7.99	1.09	5.35	13.7
Tobacco county (above-median potential)	6,148	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Cotton county (above-median potential)	6,148	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Boll weevil county	6,148	0.34	0.48	0.00	1.00
Boll weevil × cotton county	6,148	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00
Manufacturing employees per capita	6,148	2.82	3.74	0.00	118.4
Manufacturing output per capita	6,148	110.86	234.24	0.00	8,442.0
Oil county (any discovered major oilfields)	6,148	0.02	0.14	0.00	1.00
Mining county (any mines)	6,148	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00

Notes: Summary statistics for the migration and socio-economic characteristics of Southern sending counties from which individuals migrated between 1900–30.

Table A.2: Zeroth Stage Regression to Predict Southern Outmigration to Non-Southern Counties

Dependent Variable:	No. Southern white migrants who left Southern county for non-South			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% urban population	4.770*** (1.592)	6.299*** (1.465)	7.446*** (2.624)	2.751 (2.576)
% Black population	-9.842*** (3.696)	-12.150*** (0.916)	-19.145*** (1.560)	-35.646*** (5.812)
Agricultural potential	596.377*** (215.342)		-323.460 (602.230)	-68.871 (346.478)
% of farms that are tenant farms	-7.158*** (1.201)	-10.159*** (1.120)	-7.607*** (1.900)	-8.862*** (2.770)
% of farms that are Black farms	-0.791 (3.693)			12.298** (5.203)
% of farms with 1,000+ acres	-10.685*** (1.238)	-16.621*** (1.512)	-17.242*** (2.882)	-16.452*** (2.752)
Log mean land value	251.650*** (34.668)	215.824*** (28.981)	155.374** (65.855)	30.918 (67.214)
Tobacco county	87.006** (41.851)	-56.310 (42.689)	-106.927 (77.179)	-273.544*** (75.245)
Cotton county	-50.061 (40.890)			632.844*** (112.905)
Boll weevil county	-245.164*** (75.293)	-393.899*** (55.535)	-581.773*** (85.364)	-478.864*** (72.192)
Boll weevil \times cotton county	179.287 (111.388)	221.763*** (67.668)	235.721*** (89.613)	
Manufacturing employees per capita	-47.109*** (12.524)	-95.426*** (10.865)	-20.228* (11.129)	-40.522*** (9.621)
Manufacturing output per capita	2.109*** (0.666)	1.520*** (0.329)		0.055 (0.148)
Mining county	2.383 (40.116)		-143.850* (75.821)	-276.438*** (94.458)
Population size in sending counties	0.045*** (0.004)	0.057*** (0.004)	0.070*** (0.006)	0.055*** (0.005)
% of land in farms		-3.664*** (1.200)	-1.888 (1.773)	4.490** (2.273)
Oil county		84.788 (212.057)	476.141* (254.841)	767.926** (301.914)
Decade	1900–10	1910–20	1920–30	1930–40
Observations	1173	1220	1220	1219
Outcome mean	599.9	905.4	1274.4	1277.6
Adj. R ²	0.734	0.811	0.805	0.787

Notes: Zeroth stage regressions for a shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) using a linear LASSO specification. Sample counties include those in the twelve former Confederate states plus Oklahoma. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.2 Inference

Alternative Inference. Appendix Table A.3 shows that the significance of our estimates is robust to various inference procedures that address downward biased standard errors due to correlated unobservables across space. These include the [Conley \(1999\)](#) spatial HAC approach with bandwidths of 200 and 500 km along with the [Colella et al. \(2020\)](#) generalization using Bartlett rather than uniform kernels. We also use a wild bootstrap with clustering at the state level and the [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#) standard-error correction for SSIV estimators, which allows for correlated unobservables across counties, no matter how geographically distant, with similar initial shares underlying the instrument.

Table A.3: Alternative Approaches to Inference in Table 2


	Dependent Variable: Trump Vote Share, 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.395	0.632	1.004	1.026	0.853	1.779	1.530
Bester et al. (2011) grid	(0.105)	(0.076)	(0.257)	(0.167)	(0.155)	(0.563)	(0.435)
Robust	0.077	0.062	0.182	0.146	0.149	0.648	0.606
Conley (1999) 200 km	0.150	0.089	0.339	0.231	0.198	0.761	0.608
Conley (1999) 500 km	0.210	0.098	0.395	0.280	0.177	0.965	0.556
Colella et al. (2020) 200 km	0.116	0.077	0.272	0.191	0.177	0.715	0.625
Colella et al. (2020) 500 km	0.165	0.092	0.332	0.236	0.182	0.852	0.630
Wild cluster bootstrap	0.186	0.089	0.326	0.232	0.176	0.831	0.576
Adao et al. (2019)			1.624	0.102	0.155	0.510	0.315
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share control						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883
F-statistic			109.2	115.0	100.9	10.2	10.7

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 with different approaches to inference besides the baseline [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#) grid cell clustered standard errors in parentheses. We provide robust standard errors, [Conley \(1999\)](#) standard errors with distance cut-offs at 200 and 500 km as well as a version with distance decay based on the Bartlett kernel provided by [Colella et al. \(2020\)](#) for the same distance thresholds, standard errors clustered at the level of the 36 non-Southern states for which we correct the potential bias from the small number of clusters using the wild-cluster bootstrap [Cameron et al. \(2008\)](#), and the adjusted standard errors for shift-share designs proposed by [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.3 Alternative Samples

Dropping Individual States. Appendix Figure A.3 reveals that estimates are not driven by any particular sending or receiving state. Most importantly, results are similar when excluding the states with the largest Rotemberg weights, such as Texas, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. This is reassuring because these states have some important historical differences with the rest of the South and also constituted a large part of the Southern outmigration in the 1930s as a result of the Dust Bowl.

Figure A.3: Sensitivity to Sample Changes in Table 2



A.4 Identification Checks: Matching Exercises and Placebo Tests

Matching Exercises. We consider three matching exercises. First, in Appendix Table A.4, we find the county pairs within the same state that have the most similar Republican vote share in the 1900 Presidential election. We break ties arbitrarily and then create a fixed effect for each pair of counties. Within pairs, the mean Republican vote share difference is about 0.73 percentage points (p.p.). We then rerun our core IV specifications including these roughly 920 within-state pair fixed effects. The

resulting coefficients identify the effects of greater Southern white migrant inflows from 1900 to 1940 on voting outcomes for counties with nearly identical voting preferences in 1900. This provides additional evidence that Southern white migrants from the Great Migration period specifically were pivotal in shaping both the realignment of American politics and long-run political outcomes.

Table A.4: Voting Effects Among Electorally Similar Counties in 1900

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20		Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	1.583*** (0.386)	1.650*** (0.376)	1.499*** (0.421)	1.562*** (0.418)	1.158*** (0.402)	1.223*** (0.406)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
County pair FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
Sorting controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,858	1,852	1,856	1,852	1,855	1,849
Outcome mean	62.8	62.9	59.6	59.6	4.9	5.0
F-statistic	6.9	9.9	6.9	9.9	7.1	9.9
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.007	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.030	0.010

Notes: Regressions of (i) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, (ii) the vote share average for Republicans from 2000–20 and, (iii) the change in vote share from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. All regressions control for county pair dummies matched within states on 1900 Republican presidential vote share. Counties in Arizona and New Mexico all lack vote share data for 1900 and thus we allow them to retain simple state-level dummies. Standard errors are two-way clustered by grid cell and county pair. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.5: Voting Effects Among Counties with Similar Electoral Trends, 1900–40

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20		Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	1.521*** (0.235)	1.223*** (0.368)	1.326*** (0.231)	1.116*** (0.362)	1.361*** (0.298)	0.989*** (0.328)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
County pair FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
Sorting controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,858	1,852	1,856	1,852	1,857	1,851
Outcome mean	62.8	62.9	59.5	59.6	4.9	4.9
F-statistic	9.5	9.9	9.4	9.9	10.0	10.2
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.017	0.074	0.014	0.072	0.001	0.048

Notes: Regressions of (i) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, (ii) the vote share average for Republicans from 2000–20 and, (iii) the change in vote share from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. All regressions control for county pair dummies matched within states on changes in Republican presidential vote shares between 1900 and 1940. Counties in Arizona and New Mexico all lack vote share data for 1900 and thus we allow them to retain simple state-level dummies. Standard errors are two-way clustered by grid cell and county pair. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Second, in Appendix Table A.5, we repeat the above matching exercise instead using *changes* in Republican vote shares. To deal with the potentially confounding trends in voting prior to the mid-century partisan realignment, we define changes in Republican vote shares between 1900 and 1940 for

each county. We then construct county pairs within states based on similarity in these changes, again breaking ties arbitrarily. Within pairs, the mean difference in Republican vote share is about 0.82 p.p. We then rerun our core IV specifications including these roughly 920 within-state pair fixed effects. The resulting coefficients identify the effects of the 20th century diaspora on political outcomes after 1940 for counties with nearly identical electoral trajectories through 1940.

Third, in Appendix Table A.6, we find the counties within the same state that have the most similar Southern white migrant share in 1870. We break ties arbitrarily, dropping counties that were unincorporated in 1870, and then create a fixed effect for each pair of counties. Within pairs, the mean Southern white migrant share difference is about 0.21 p.p., with a median difference of less than 0.05 p.p. We then rerun our core IV specifications including these roughly 850 within-state pair fixed effects. The resulting coefficients identify the effects of greater Southern white migrant inflows from 1900 to 1940 on Republican vote shares for counties with nearly identical Southern white migrant shares in 1870. Though these county pair dummies prove demanding, the results look very similar, if not somewhat larger, relative to our baseline estimates in the paper. We view these results as providing additional evidence that the SSIV indeed isolates causal effects of *changes* in Southern white migration through 1940.

Table A.6: Voting Effects Among Counties with Similar Southern White Shares in 1870

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20		Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.890** (1.201)	2.986** (1.494)	2.645** (1.147)	2.982** (1.461)	2.342** (1.181)	2.180* (1.200)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
County pair FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
Sorting controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,684	1,678	1,682	1,678	1,676	1,670
Outcome mean	61.5	61.6	58.4	58.4	4.1	4.2
F-statistic	5.0	4.1	4.9	4.1	5.0	4.2
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.006	0.007	0.002	0.003	0.034	0.071

Notes: Regressions of (i) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, (ii) the vote share average for Republicans from 2000–20 and, (iii) the change in vote share from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. All regressions control for county pair dummies matched within states on 1870 Southern white shares. The regression includes only those counties incorporated by the time of the 1870 Census. Standard errors are two-way clustered by grid cell and county pair. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Pre-1900 Elections. As a placebo, we consider an exercise that regresses our baseline regressors and IV on relevant pre-1900 vote share averages. We consider the 1892 and 1896 elections, which both featured populist candidates who were conservatives on relevant issues of the times: Democrat Grover Cleveland in 1892, who railed against free silver, and Democrat and Populist candidate William Jennings Bryan in 1896, who was favored by both agrarian and Protestant interests. Prior to 1892, much of the West was unincorporated. We fail to estimate statistically significant placebo effects in both cases, with no clear trend in coefficient size or sign across specifications.


Table A.7: Placebo: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Pre-1900 Presidential Elections

Dependent Variable:	Cleveland Vote Share, 1892				Jennings Bryan Vote Share, 1896			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	-0.177 (0.262)	-1.760 (1.573)	0.120 (0.254)	-1.356 (1.937)	0.217 (0.368)	-1.784 (2.428)	0.393 (0.384)	-1.642 (3.424)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
1900 share control		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,814	1,814	1,814	1,814
Outcome mean	36.7	36.7	36.7	36.7	46.7	46.7	46.7	46.7
F-statistic	138.1	10.1	128.0	5.1	127.5	8.0	119.2	3.8

Notes: This table uses the estimating strategy from Table 2 using elections from prior to the advent of large-scale Southern white migration. All columns use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to that table for details on the 1900 controls. Even columns control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Random Shifts Placebo Test. When replacing the shifts underlying the SSIV with random noise, we find additional evidence that the shares themselves are not the driving force underpinning our effects. We simulate 1,000 normally distributed random shifts with mean zero and variance five as in [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#). In each trial, we construct the instrument using this random shift, which replaces the $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40}$ term in equation (2). If the shifts do not matter and the results are purely driven by the 1900 shares, for instance due to persistent spatial autocorrelation, then we would expect to find similar but slightly attenuated results compared to the baseline. The estimates resulting from these placebo instruments are statistically significant (positive or negative) at the 5 percent level 11% of the time (compared to 16.1% in [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#) and 55% in [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#)). Significance at the 1 percent level is achieved just 3% of the time. If we include the 1900 Southern white shares as a control, this drops further to 0.1% and 0% significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Overall, this suggests that the baseline shares do require meaningful shifts and that effects are not merely driven by spatial noise. A coefficient plot of 1,000 placebo shift-share IV regressions is shown in Figure A.4.

Figure A.4: SSIV Using Random Placebo Shifts



Notes: Instrumental variables regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. The share of Southern-born whites in 1940 is instrumented using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and a **randomly generated shift**. The random shift was generated based on a normal distribution with mean zero and variance five as in [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#). The figure shows the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from instrumental variables regressions where the instrument was generated with 1,000 random shifts. Regressions include the set of controls from Table 2 and assume robust standard errors.


A.5 Alternative Time-Varying Vote Share Specifications

Table A.8: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Presidential Elections, 1900–2020

	Dependent Variable: Vote Share Average for ...					
	Republicans, 1900–24 (1)	Herbert Hoover, 1928 (2)	Republicans, 1932–64 (3)	George Wallace, 1968 (4)	Republicans, 1972–2000 (5)	Republicans, 2000–20 (6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	-1.732* (1.023)	1.313* (0.760)	0.411 (0.502)	0.518* (0.277)	0.726* (0.433)	0.995** (0.497)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,792	1,885	1,884	1,885	1,882	1,887
Outcome mean	51.4	62.5	51.0	9.4	53.4	59.4
F-statistic	3.8	8.6	8.9	8.6	9.2	8.6
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.125	0.018	0.379	0.027	0.094	0.032
KP Underident., p-val	0.063	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.013	0.016

Notes: This table uses the estimating strategy from Table 2 using elections from 1900 through 2020. All columns use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to that table for details on the 1900 controls. All columns control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A.5: Republican Vote Share with Contemporaneous Migrant Shares, Extending Figure 4



Notes: Coefficients from IV regressions of vote share for the Republican candidate in 8 U.S. presidential elections between 1912 and 1940 on the shares of Southern white migrants in all non-Southern counties in the Census year prior to election year t . The shift-share instrument uses 1900 as the base year, with predicted shifts using the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 and the nearest Census of election year t , based on flexible LASSO regressions as described above. All regressions include state \times election year fixed effects. Regressions in (b) also include county fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 and shift-share instrument are interacted with the election year fixed effect. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#).

B Alternative IV Based on the Coincidental Timing of Railway Access

This section provides additional details and results related to our alternative IV strategy, based on [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#). This IV, which we adapt for internal South-to-non-South white migration within the U.S., is constructed through a zeroth stage in which the share of Southern whites in a county at time t is predicted based the first connection of a county to the railroad network interacted with the magnitude of the flow of Southern white migrants in that period.

More precisely, we use county-level data from 1870 to 1940 for counties outside the South and estimate the following specification for non-Southern county c in Census year t :

$$\begin{aligned} \% \text{Southern whites}_{ct} = & \alpha_t + \alpha_c + \gamma \cdot \% \text{Southern whites}_{c,t-10} + \delta I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \\ & + \beta_1 \text{Southern white flow}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \\ & + \beta_2 \text{Southern white flow}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \times \text{West}_c \\ & + \theta \text{Industrialization}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \\ & + \phi \text{Population Growth}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} + \mathbf{X}'_{c,t-10} \mathbf{\Gamma} + \varepsilon_{ct}. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.1})$$

The county fixed effects α_c absorb time-invariant pull factors, and Census-decades fixed effects α_t absorb aggregate shocks that affect all non-Southern counties in that decade. We include a lag of the dependent variable to account for the mechanical relationship between the current and past stock of Southern whites. $I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}}$ is the lag of the indicator for the first decade a county is connected to the railroad network, which we also interact with the aggregate outflow of Southern whites from $t - 10$ to t , normalized by the total population outside the South in $t - 10$. We make two minor departures from the specification in [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#). First, we allow the effects of railroad access to vary across Western and non-Western regions, consistent with the historical narrative highlighting that the railroad expansion was key to fuel largely-westward migration of Southern whites in the early 1900s. Second, since we study migration within the country and do not have a subnational measure of industrialization or GDP, we measure industrialization as the lagged change in total manufacturing productivity outside the South, and proxy GDP growth with the lagged population growth outside the South.

After estimating this zeroth stage, we predict the average share of Southern whites in a county as

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{\text{Avg. \% Southern whites}}_c = & \frac{1}{T} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T (\hat{\beta}_1 \text{Southern white flow}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \right. \\ & \left. + \hat{\beta}_2 \text{Southern white flow}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \times \text{West}_c) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.2})$$

We then use the predicted $\overline{\text{Avg. \% Southern whites}}_c$ as an instrument for (i) $\text{Avg. \% Southern whites}_c$ between 1880 and 1940, analogous to the specification from [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#) (for 1860–1920), and (ii) our baseline measure, the share of Southern whites in a county in 1940, $\% \text{Southern whites}_{c,1940}$. We also control for averages of the controls used in the zeroth stage, as well as the log number of years since the first railroad connection relative to the year 2016, and the cubic polynomials of each county’s centroid latitude and longitude coordinates. As in [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#), we allow for spatial autocorrelation in the errors using the [Conley \(1999\)](#) spatial HAC approach. Zeroth and first stage estimates can be found in Table [B.1](#). In the paper, we use this alternative IV to identify the effects of Southern white migration on long-run voting patterns. In Table [B.2](#), we report additional outcomes that replicate using this IV.

Table B.1: Using Railway Access to Predict Southern Outmigration to Non-Southern Counties

Dependent Variable:	% Southern Whites _{ct}	% Southern Whites, 1940	Average % Southern Whites, 1880-1940
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lagged RR access _{ct}	0.000 (0.001)		
Lagged % Southern Whites _{ct} × Lagged RR access _{ct}	0.000 (0.005)		
Lagged % Southern Whites _{ct} × Lagged RR access _{ct} × West _c	0.032*** (0.006)		
Predicted Avg. % Southern Whites, 1880-1940		0.345*** (0.106)	0.335*** (0.067)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS
County FE	Yes		
Year FE	Yes		
State FE		Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes
Observations	7,453	1,887	1,887

Notes: Zeroth and first stage regressions based on the railway instrument variable strategy in Sequeira et al. (2020). Column 1 reports results from estimating the zeroth stage regression in equation (B.1). We use county-level data from 1880 to 1940 to regress the share of Southern whites on its on lag, a lagged indicator for whether a county was connected to the railroad network in the previous decade, an interaction between the lagged railroad access indicator and the aggregate outflow of Southern whites to the rest of the country in the previous decade, and the triple interaction with a West indicator (Pacific and Mountain census regions). We also control for the interaction between the lagged railroad access variable with both the aggregate population growth outside the South and the aggregate industrialization outside the South. Also included are county and census year fixed effects. The predicted average share of Southern whites between 1880 and 1940 is then generated using the estimated coefficients of the interaction between the lagged railroad access indicator and the lagged aggregate outflow of Southern whites, and the triple interaction with the West indicator (see equation (B.2)). We then use the predicted share of Southern whites from the zeroth stage is instrument for the observed shares in column 2 and 3, where column 2 uses our main definition of the treatment variable (% Southern Whites, 1940) and column 3 defines the treatment as the average share of Southern whites between 1880 and 1940 like in Sequeira et al. (2020). The baseline controls are described in the note for Table 2. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.2: Extending Tables 2 and 5 Using the Alternative Railroad-Based Instrument

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Third-party Vote for George Wallace in 1968		Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.988** (1.298)		0.748*** (0.280)		2.712*** (0.791)	
Average % Southern Whites, 1880–1940		3.083*** (1.135)		0.773*** (0.229)		2.797*** (0.661)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,887	1,887	1,883	1,883	1,882	1,882
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	9.4	9.4	4.7	4.7
F-statistic	10.1	23.8	10.0	23.6	9.9	22.4

Notes: Regressions of (a) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, (ii) the third-party vote share for George Wallace of the American Independent Party in the 1968 presidential election and, (iii) the change in vote share from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites, using a version of the first rail road instrument from Sequeira et al. (2020), as described above. See the notes to Table 4 for more details and Table 2 for all other details. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C Interpreting the Voting Effect Sizes

Table C.1: Weighted Voting Regressions, Extending Tables 2 and 5

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016			Republican Vote Share Average, 2000–20			Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.258*** (0.746)	2.283** (1.063)	2.662** (1.175)	2.324*** (0.747)	2.706** (1.058)	3.051** (1.229)	1.844*** (0.662)	2.396*** (0.771)	2.431*** (0.726)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weight by electoral votes	Yes			Yes			Yes		
Weight by 1940 population		Yes			Yes			Yes	
Weight by county votes			Yes			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,882	1,885	1,885	1,882	1,882	1,882	1,882
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.7	59.4	59.4	59.5	4.8	4.8	4.8
F-statistic	12.4	7.0	8.3	11.8	7.0	8.6	11.3	7.1	8.0
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.007	0.003	0.002
KP Underident., p-val	0.011	0.020	0.050	0.013	0.020	0.040	0.010	0.022	0.019
Coeff. ≤ 1 ? p-val	0.046	0.114	0.079	0.039	0.054	0.048	0.101	0.036	0.025

Notes: Regressions of (i) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, (ii) Republican vote share averages across the 2000–20 presidential elections, and (iii) the change in vote share from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. All columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Columns 1, 4, and 7 weight by state electoral votes (in 2016, 2000, or 1948). Columns 2, 5, and 8 weight by county population in 1940. Columns 3, 6, and 9 weight by a county's total votes (in 2016, 2000, or 1948). All regressions include state fixed effects. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of controls. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). The Anderson-Rubin p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the endogenous regressor is statistically significant and that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the Kleibergen-Paap LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix Table C.2 reports on the exercise mentioned in Section 4.2; the notes below the figure fully describe the analysis. The main takeaways are as follows: (i) In 2000, a 10 percent reduction in the Southern white migrant share would have given Arizona to Al Gore, thus flipping the election in his favor. (ii) In 2004, a 20 percent reduction would have given Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Iowa to John Kerry. (iii) The 2016 election was close, and the Southern white diaspora was large enough to flip Arizona and Michigan, but this was insufficient to flip the outcome nationally. Together, these results suggestively illustrate the relative importance of the Southern white diaspora and also point to their outsized influence in certain parts of the U.S.

Table C.2: Counterfactual Electoral Outcomes in Closely Contested States

	Vote Margin in Favor of the Republican Candidate with a ... Southern White Population Share							
	Actual Outcome (1)		10% Smaller (2)		20% Smaller (3)		30% Smaller (4)	
	(a) 2000 Election							
West Virginia	40,960	(6.32%)	32,061	(4.95%)	23,161	(3.57%)	14,262	(2.20%)
Arizona	96,306	(6.28%)	-784	(-0.05%)	-97,873	(-6.38%)	-194,963	(-12.71%)
Ohio	165,000	(3.51%)	139,652	(2.97%)	114,304	(2.43%)	88,956	(1.89%)
Nevada	17,861	(3.03%)	2,211	(0.38%)	-13,439	(-2.28%)	-29,089	(-4.93%)
New Hampshire	7,212	(1.27%)	6,483	(1.14%)	5,754	(1.01%)	5,025	(0.88%)
New Mexico	-371	(-0.06%)	-35,040	(-5.85%)	-69,710	(-11.65%)	-104,379	(-17.44%)
Wisconsin	-5,720	(-0.22%)	-9,038	(-0.35%)	-12,357	(-0.48%)	-15,675	(-0.60%)
Elec. Votes Republican	271		263		259		259	
Elec. Votes Democrat	266		274		278		278	
	(b) 2004 Election							
Arizona	210,768	(10.47%)	62,459	(3.10%)	-85,850	(-4.26%)	-234,159	(-11.63%)
Colorado	99,505	(4.67%)	52,136	(2.45%)	4,766	(0.22%)	-42,603	(-2.00%)
Nevada	17,763	(2.20%)	-7,266	(-0.90%)	-32,295	(-4.00%)	-57,324	(-7.11%)
Ohio	11,8578	(2.11%)	83,511	(1.48%)	48,444	(0.86%)	13,377	(0.24%)
New Mexico	5,982	(0.79%)	-43,520	(-5.75%)	-93,022	(-12.30%)	-142,524	(-18.84%)
Iowa	10,041	(0.67%)	4,569	(0.30%)	-904	(-0.06%)	-6,376	(-0.42%)
Wisconsin	-11,390	(-0.38%)	-15,811	(-0.53%)	-20,231	(-0.68%)	-24,652	(-0.82%)
Elec. Votes Republican	286		276		259		250	
Elec. Votes Democrat	251		261		278		287	
	(c) 2016 Election							
Ohio	467,192	(8.44%)	443,137	(8.00%)	419,081	(7.57%)	395,026	(7.13%)
Arizona	81,887	(3.14%)	-51,021	(-1.96%)	-183,929	(-7.06%)	-316,837	(-12.16%)
Pennsylvania	70,653	(1.15%)	54,381	(0.88%)	38,109	(0.62%)	21,837	(0.35%)
Wisconsin	21,915	(0.74%)	18,864	(0.63%)	15,812	(0.53%)	12,761	(0.43%)
Michigan	22,050	(0.46%)	-1,560	(-0.03%)	-25,170	(-0.52%)	-48,779	(-1.01%)
New Hampshire	-2,736	(-0.37%)	-3,511	(-0.47%)	-4,286	(-0.58%)	-5,061	(-0.68%)
Minnesota	-44,733	(-1.52%)	-47,902	(-1.63%)	-51,072	(-1.73%)	-54,241	(-1.84%)
Elec. Votes Republican	306		279		279		279	
Elec. Votes Democrat	232		259		259		259	

Notes: This figure reports the results of the quantification exercise discussed in Section 4.2 and following an analogous exercise in Autor et al. (2017, 2020). Column 1 reports the state-specific two-party vote margin for the Republican candidate in (a) 2000, (b) 2004, and (c) 2016 elections. We report results for several pivotal swing states in the given election (none of those unreported see their outcomes change under the assumed counterfactual), in this case focusing on those that went for Bush and Trump because the counterfactual here is one in which we remove the Southern white voter effect, which helped Republicans. Columns 2–4 report counterfactual vote margins based on a two-step exercise. First, we estimate the election-specific effect of Southern white migrants based on the specification in row 13 of Table 3 (and columns 3, 6, and 9 of Appendix Table C.1). Results are qualitatively unchanged when instead using the estimates from rows 11 (EC allocation weighting) and 12 (1940 population weighting) of Table 3 (and corresponding columns of Appendix Table C.1). Second, we multiply those coefficients by (i) the Southern white share in a given county, (ii) the total two-party vote share in the county, and (iii) 0.1 in column 2, 0.2 in column 3, and 0.3 in column 4. We then subtract the resulting product from the Republican vote margin in column 1. At the bottom of each panel, we report the implied total electoral votes based on Electoral College allocations.


D Southern Whites, Southern Blacks, and Northern Whites

Table D.1: Comparing the Black and White Great Migrations, Extending Table 2

	Dependent Variable: Trump Vote Share, 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.734*** (0.099)	0.653*** (0.079)	1.880*** (0.335)	1.249*** (0.214)	1.141*** (0.192)	1.915*** (0.642)	1.693*** (0.528)
% Southern Blacks, 1940	-3.140*** (0.950)	-0.675** (0.265)	-6.594*** (1.253)	-2.411*** (0.663)	-2.685*** (0.633)	-4.289** (2.119)	-4.859** (2.107)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share controls						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.7	62.6	62.7
Adj. R ²	0.468	0.667					
F-statistic			188.4	158.6	149.1	31.2	31.5
Coeff. equality p-value	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.013	0.005

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 augmented with the Southern Black share in 1940. Columns 3–7 instrument the share of Southern-born white and Black residents using shift-share instruments based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born individuals in each group and the predicted aggregate change in the Southern white or the Black population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The controls are as in Table 2 but exclude the Black population shares from the baseline and 1900 control sets. The coefficient equality test is an F test for whether the coefficient on the share of Southern-born whites is statistically indistinguishable from the coefficient on the share of Southern-born Blacks. The associated p-value is reported in the bottom row. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure D.1: Southern White Migrants, Blacks, and Congressional Party, 1940–1990



Notes: Coefficients from pooled regressions of an indicator for legislator party affiliation (Republican = 1) in the U.S. House from 1940 to 1990 on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern congressional districts. Regressions include Congress and state fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 and shift-share instrument are interacted with the Congress fixed effect, which are in turn interacted with (a) above-median Black shares in 1940 and (b) above-median population density in 1940. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Table D.2: Comparing the Migration of Northern and Southern Whites, Extending Table 2

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Third-party Vote for George Wallace in 1968		Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.836*** (0.163)	1.499** (0.592)	0.365*** (0.062)	0.601** (0.286)	0.753*** (0.170)	1.749** (0.690)
% Northern Whites, 1940	0.647*** (0.194)	0.654*** (0.197)	-0.091*** (0.033)	-0.088*** (0.033)	0.308* (0.173)	0.316* (0.167)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 SW share control		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	950	950	947	947	946	946
Outcome mean	64.9	64.9	10.6	10.6	11.1	11.1
F-statistic	106.8	7.9	106.9	8.2	104.6	7.6
Coeff. equality p-value	0.488	0.200	0.000	0.019	0.090	0.057

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 and Table 5 augmented with the share of Northern-born whites in 1940. We define the “North” as the territories of the Union during the Civil War, excluding the western parts (California, Oregon, Nevada). The analysis is restricted to counties outside both Northern and Southern sending states. All columns instrument the share of Southern-born (Northern-born) white residents using a version of the shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born (Northern-born) white individuals and the aggregate change in Southern (Northern) white population living outside both the Northern and Southern sending states from 1900 to 1940. The coefficient equality test is an F test for whether the coefficient on the share of Southern-born whites is statistically indistinguishable from the coefficient on the share of Northern-born whites. The associated p-value is reported in the bottom row. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.3: Relative Attitudes of Southern and Northern White Migrants, Extending Table 1

Dependent Variable:	Religious		Racial			Economic	
	Identify as Evangelical	Believe Bible is literal word of God	Favor any segregation	Oppose residential integration	Oppose school integration	Oppose gov’t intervention for any	Oppose gov’t intervention for Blacks
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Southern White	0.182*** (0.043)	0.102* (0.053)	0.092* (0.054)	0.125*** (0.035)	0.080* (0.046)	-0.001 (0.049)	0.088 (0.068)
Northern White	0.015 (0.024)	-0.031 (0.050)	-0.077* (0.038)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.036 (0.043)	0.079*** (0.026)	-0.035 (0.052)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey waves	1960-70	1964-68	1964-70	1964-70	1964-70	1956-68	1964-68
Observations	1,766	764	976	1,131	1,055	1,477	665
Counties	43	34	35	35	35	42	34
Outcome mean	0.25	0.47	0.47	0.31	0.49	0.47	0.54
Adjusted R ²	0.25	0.16	0.09	0.19	0.10	0.12	0.03

Notes: Regressions of various survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES), applicable waves through 1970, on a dummy for whether a white respondent is from any of the twelve excluded Southern sending states as well as dummy for whether a white respondent is from any of the “Northern” territories of the Union during the Civil War, excluding the western parts (California, Oregon, Nevada). Our definition of Southern (Northern) whites includes those respondents that were born and/or grew up in the South (North). Sample excludes respondents living in the South and the North as well as non-whites. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. All regressions include county and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E Further Results on Partisan Realignment and the New Right

E.1 Dealignment in the Diaspora

Table E.1: Southern White Dealignment Outside the South

	Dependent Variable: Respondent Identifies as a Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Southern White	0.112*** (0.035)	0.114 (0.070)	0.212*** (0.074)	5.925** (2.687)	5.401** (2.718)	4.825* (2.748)
Southern White \times After 1964	-0.085** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.038)	-0.075* (0.038)			
Southern White \times (Year/100)				-0.298** (0.136)	-0.271** (0.137)	-0.237* (0.139)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income fixed effects		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
City-size fixed effects			Yes			Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,180	19,804	19,804	21,180	19,804	19,804
Counties	205	205	205	205	205	205
Control outcome mean (pre-64)	0.492	0.492	0.492	0.492	0.492	0.492
Adj. R ²	0.052	0.062	0.064	0.052	0.065	0.065

Notes: Regressions of various survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES), all applicable waves, on a dummy for whether a white respondent is from any of the twelve excluded Southern sending states. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Our definition of Southern whites includes those respondents that were born and/or grew up in the South. Sample excludes respondents living in the South as well as non-whites. “After” is a pre-/post-1964 survey wave indicator variable; “Year” is a linear time trend from 0. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. Additional controls include income (five categories) and city-type (three categories) fixed effects. As in [Kuziemko and Washington \(2018\)](#), where applicable, income and city-type fixed effects have each been interacted with “Southern White” (separately) and with “After” (when “Southern White \times After” is the explanatory variable of interest) or “Year” (when Southern White \times Year is the explanatory variable of interest). The control outcome mean is the mean of the dependent variable among non-Southern whites in the years prior to 1964. All regressions include county and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.2 Characterizing the New Right

In Section 5.2, we characterized a three-dimensional New Right policy “bundle” made up of economic conservatism, racial conservatism, and religious conservatism. This coalition of conservatives coalesced behind the Republican Party during the second half of the 20th century, as we show in Table E.2 using data on voters from the American National Election Survey (ANES) and in Figure E.2 using congressional-district-level data on representatives. In this Appendix, we provide a brief history behind each of these three dimensions as useful context for some of our results.¹

Economic Conservatism. Economic conservatives in the U.S. have historically been a core constituency of the Republican Party, long prior to the emergence of the New Right. A prominent pre-New Deal example was President Calvin Coolidge (1923–29), who was progressive on racial and social issues yet gained a reputation as being a fiscal conservative and proponent of small government. Later, a “conservative coalition” of economically conservative Republicans as well as some Democrats formed in opposition to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda ([Patterson, 1967](#)). In the decades after, this coalition united behind an array of anti-communist and pro-federalist causes.

¹We choose not to focus on other dimensions of ideology, most notably foreign policy, to the extent that they do not clearly pertain to the study of the Southern white diaspora and its political influence.

This coalition of economic conservatives was, importantly, not unified on issues of civil rights, especially across party lines. During the New Deal era, some conservative Democrats supported racially exclusive aspects of the New Deal agenda, such as in agricultural policy (Derenoncourt and Montaloux, 2021; Johnson, 2011). Later, prominent conservative Republicans, such as Senator Everett Dirksen, broke with conservative Democrats to help advance President Lyndon B. Johnson’s civil rights agenda. In other words, the relationship between economic and racial conservatives in Congress was often fraught prior to the 1970s. Thereafter, as the latter’s policy goals of the 1960s became less popular, Nixon’s political team implemented a “Southern Strategy” to bring racially conservative Democrats—dismayed by their party’s stronger leftward turn on racial issues—into the Republican Party, where economic conservatives’ opposition to federal intervention and the welfare state more closely aligned with racially conservative voters’ policy goals (Maxwell and Shields, 2019). Our findings throughout Section 5 and in this Appendix suggest that such political strategizing occurred in response to white conservatives’ dealignment from the Democratic Party. We saw strong evidence of this shift in Southern white diaspora communities, which began to trend towards Republican and economically conservative legislators around this time.

Racial Conservatism. Unlike economic conservatism, racial conservatism in the U.S. saw its issues and its political home evolve throughout the 20th century. The political positions that have been considered “racially conservative” within mainstream political discourse have changed substantially over time—a fact that complicates the equation of that term with “racial animus” or “racial resentment.” For example, racially conservative voters or politicians in the 1870s would have been opposed to Blacks being able to vote; in the 1960s, to racial integration; and in the 2010s to affirmative action and diversity quotas. There is of course no moral or ideological equivalence between these three positions, and a racial conservative today might indeed be considered racially progressive 50 years ago. Yet all of these positions advocate for the racial status quo of their respective times, a fact which makes them relatively “conservative” (Schickler, 2016).

Because of these dynamics, it can be a challenge to characterize the racially conservative agenda. There was, of course, a cohesive bloc of racial conservatives within Congress prior to the 1970s, made up largely of Southern Democrats (“Dixiecrats”) as well as some Northern Republicans opposed to Black integration and advancement. Between the 1930s and 1960s, however, the national Democratic Party gradually embraced racially-inclusive federal redistribution, fueled in part by large Black constituencies in Northern cities (Schickler, 2016). By the 1970s, most segregationists remaining in Congress had disavowed their former positions and adopted either more progressive viewpoints on race (as was often the case among those who remained Democrats, such as Senator Robert Byrd) or small government and states’ rights rhetoric, with greater emphasis placed on economic or religious issues (as was the case with Senator Strom Thurmond and former Alabama Governor George Wallace) (Lowndes, 2009). This latter coalescence with the economic and religious dimensions of the emergent New Right, with special emphasis on local sovereignty, allowed such politicians to continue to appeal to racially conservative voters. As a result, over time, those voters increasingly aligned with the Republican Party in national and local elections—especially after the 1990s, as the two saw greater down-ballot alignment (Hopkins et al., 2022; Schickler, 2016).

Religious Conservatism. The final dimension of the New Right “bundle” to emerge was religious conservatism, in the 1970s. Balmer (2021) characterizes the modern religious right as an offshoot of racial conservatism, which emerged as the latter’s policy goals of the 1960s became less politically acceptable.

Figure E.1: “Religious Leaders Who Know Governor George C. Wallace”: 1964 Campaign Ad

**Religious Leaders
who know**

**Governor
GEORGE C.
WALLACE
OF ALABAMA**

**Say this
about him...**

★ I have noticed certain officials that refer to you as a racist, bigot, carpet bagger, which I resent as I know you as a man devoted to family and... In my searching of your records, never have I read or heard of any instance where you have advocated any solution to any problem that would not be within the framework of the laws of our state.
SOLOMON ACRISH, Rabbi
Congregation ETZ AHATAM, Montgomery, Ala.

★ If the Civil Rights Bill, as it is before the Senate now is passed, it will spell the greatest calamity that has ever befallen our country for it will mean the end of Constitutional Government. I am with Governor George C. Wallace wholeheartedly and wish him 100% success.
REV. HANS REUTER
First Lutheran Church, Birmingham, Alabama

★ We are indeed fortunate to have as our Governor, the Hon. George C. Wallace, a man of deep and profound religious convictions, and a man who has shown love and respect for all our people. I think the true picture of Governor Wallace was displayed in his inaugural address when he said: "And my prayer is that the Father who reigns above us will bless all the people in this great sovereign State and Nation, both black and white." By no stretch of the imagination is George C. Wallace a racist.
DR. HENRY L. LYON, Pastor
Highland Avenue Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama

★ I was Governor George C. Wallace's Pastor for several years at his home town, Clayton, Alabama, and I was closely associated with him. I feel that as a Circuit Judge and as Governor, he has shown fairness to all people, regardless of race or color. I have never heard George C. Wallace remark against any person because of his race or color and it is my opinion, that he is no racist or hate-monger nor does he have hatred in his heart for anyone.
R. I. LAWRENCE, Pastor
First Methodist Church, Florida, Alabama

"STAND UP FOR AMERICA"
VOTE FOR
GOV. GEORGE C. WALLACE
FOR PRESIDENT

Notes: A newspaper advertisement from the Milwaukee Journal on April 7, 1964, the day before the Democratic Party presidential primary, seemingly attempting to appeal to both racial conservatives and (anti-racist) religious conservatives simultaneously. Wallace won about a third of the vote the next day. Source: <https://shepherdexpress.com/culture/milwaukee-history/dixie-north-george-wallace-1964-wisconsin-presidential-primary>.

For instance, some religiously conservative activists organized in the 1970s on the basis of religious freedom—in opposition to federal intervention into racial policies at some private religious educational institutions. Separately, former Alabama Governor Wallace cited support from religious leaders as part of his political outreach efforts to non-Southerners during his 1960s campaigns for president (see, for instance, Figure E.1). He later became a born-again Christian, renouncing his segregationism for a “states’ rights” philosophy (Carter, 1999).

Despite this overlap, not all religiously conservative causes initially resonated with racially or economically conservative white voters. Tables E.6 and E.7, shown below in Appendix E.4, reveal that traditionalist (religious) rhetoric was exceedingly rare in Republican Party state platforms prior to 1990, and, in fact, initially grew somewhat more slowly in places with larger Southern white migrant populations. The latter reflects the fact that Southern whites tended to be evangelical, whereas abortion was initially the domain of Catholic activists, who were often Democratic and politically left-leaning (Williams,

2015).² In contrast, evangelicals at that point were not well-represented politically and tended to support some degree of abortion rights.

This began to change in the 1970s, as President Richard Nixon staked a position to the right of Democrats on abortion, declaring it “an unacceptable form of population control” that should be regulated by “the states, not the federal government” (Williams, 2011). Within a decade, a “Christian Right” coalition made up of Catholic and evangelical activists had formed, increasingly united behind the Republican Party (Wilcox and Robinson, 2011). Over time, the issues of the religious right became multifarious, with increased focus on abstinence education and traditional families, including the banning of gay marriage. Consistent with this shift, our district- and state-level analyses in Figure 6 and other results below show that the Republican Party increasingly associated with religious and traditionalist rhetoric in the 1980s and 1990s. Such rhetoric grew faster in places outside the South that received more Southern white migrants (who spread evangelicalism) earlier in the 20th century.


Table E.2: Changing Characteristics of Republicans and the New Right “Bundle”

Dependent Variable:	Identify as Evangelical		Oppose civil rights		Oppose gov’t intervention	
	Pre-1964 (1)	Post-1964 (2)	Pre-1964 (3)	Post-1964 (4)	Pre-1964 (5)	Post-1964 (6)
Republican	0.012 (0.014)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.012 (0.008)	0.036*** (0.007)	0.177*** (0.022)	0.145*** (0.010)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,822	15,048	4,059	15,146	3,291	10,503
Counties	108	180	109	180	106	178
Control outcome mean	0.15	0.15	0.32	0.32	0.60	0.60
Adjusted R ²	0.18	0.15	0.70	0.46	0.16	0.06

Notes: Regressions of various survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES), applicable waves through 1990, on a dummy for whether a respondent identifies as a Republican. Regressions are further split into “1964 and prior” and “post-1964” election cycles. “Opposes civil rights” is a composite of the racial variables from Table 1, which equals 1 if any of those outcomes equal 1. Sample excludes respondents living in the South as well as non-whites. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. The control outcome mean is the mean of the dependent variable for those not identifying as Republican. All regressions include county and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


² Abortion was the dominant religious issue among the very few found in mainstream political discourse prior to the 1980s, and it could be found in the vast majority of religious trigrams found in state party platforms analyzed by Hopkins et al. (2022) during this period.

Figure E.2: Emergence of the New Right “Bundle”, 1940–1990



Notes: Coefficients in panels (a-d) are from pooled regressions of (i) congressional ideal points from [Bateman et al. \(2017\)](#), based on race and civil rights voting patterns, (ii) congressional ideal points from the time-varying DW-Nominate score (dimension 1) by [Lewis et al. \(2021\)](#), covering economic issues, and (iii) our relative religious rhetoric (RRI) scores on an indicator for legislator party affiliation (Republican = 1) in the U.S. House from 1940 to 1990. Coefficients represent the average difference between Republican and Democratic legislators in levels (panels a and b) and relative to differences in a base year of 1940 (panels c and d). Coefficients in panels (e-f) are from regressions of a composite score that averages the three indexes on an indicator for legislator party affiliation in the U.S. House and are relative to differences in a base year of 1940. All regressions include Congress and state fixed effects. The explanatory variable is interacted with the Congress fixed effect. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Figure E.3: The New Right “Bundle” and Polarization: The Changing Distribution of Ideology



Notes: Curves show the distribution of our composite scores, as featured in Figure E.2, across members of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1940 and in 1990.

Table E.3: Wallace-to-Nixon Voters and the New Right “Bundle”

Dependent Variable:	Voted Nixon in 1972 (1)	Nixon voters only			
		Identifies as Evangelical (2)	Opposes civil rights (3)	Opposes gov’t intervention for any (4)	Opposes gov’t intervention for Blacks (5)
Wallace Support/100	0.359*** (0.059)	0.016 (0.061)	0.181*** (0.063)	-0.041 (0.066)	0.175* (0.088)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,085	717	719	640	545
Counties	84	79	79	79	78
Outcome mean	0.56	0.16	0.31	0.67	0.51
Adjusted R ²	0.08	0.13	0.06	0.04	0.04

Notes: Regressions of various survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES) in the 1972 wave on a respondent’s thermometer support, ranging from 0 to 100, for George Wallace. “Oppose civil rights” is a composite of the racial variables from Table 1, which equals 1 if any of those outcomes equal 1. Sample excludes respondents living in the South as well as non-whites. Sample in columns 2–5 include only Nixon voters. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. All regressions include county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.3 Congressional Ideology and Roll Calls

Table E.4: The Evolution of GOP versus Dem. Congressional Ideology Outside the South, 1940–90

Dependent Variable:	Racial Conservatism Index		Religious Rhetoric in Congressional Speech		Economic Conservatism Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GOP representative	0.639*** (0.027)	0.480*** (0.028)	-0.332*** (0.047)	-0.277*** (0.046)	0.671*** (0.008)	0.629*** (0.010)
GOP rep. \times After 1964	0.581*** (0.058)	0.662*** (0.062)	0.384*** (0.056)	0.315*** (0.056)	-0.028** (0.014)	-0.024 (0.017)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1940 density control		Yes		Yes		Yes
1940 % Black control		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	8,139	8,125	8,125	8,111	8,460	8,446
Dem. rep. mean, 1940–1964	0.19	0.19	0.34	0.34	-0.27	-0.27
Dem. rep. mean, 1965–1990	-0.42	-0.42	-0.18	-0.18	-0.31	-0.31

Notes: Regressions of (a) congressional ideal points from [Bateman et al. \(2017\)](#), based on racial and civil rights voting patterns, (b) our relative religious rhetoric (RRI) scores and (c) congressional ideal points from the time-varying DW-Nominate score (dimension 1) by [Lewis et al. \(2021\)](#), covering economic issues, on a Republican state party platform indicator, interacted with dummies for the periods 1940–1964 and 1964–1990. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. RRI scores are calculated by totaling a legislator’s words with Biblical roots—God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen—and dividing by total words spoken. Even columns control for log population density and percent Black in 1940, interacted with period indicators. All regressions include state and Congress fixed effects. To account for spatial autocorrelation, we use the procedure described in [Conley \(1999\)](#) with a bandwidth of 500 km. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.5: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Congressional Ideology, 1940–90

Dependent Variable:	Racial Conservatism Index			Religious Rhetoric in Congressional Speech			Economic Conservatism Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.030*** (0.005)	0.063*** (0.008)	0.188** (0.089)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.021* (0.012)	0.162 (0.116)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.009** (0.005)	0.076 (0.048)
% Southern Whites \times After 1964	0.015*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.127*** (0.032)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.016* (0.008)	0.013 (0.067)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.022*** (0.002)	0.028* (0.014)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes			Yes
Observations	8,125	8,125	8,125	8,111	8,111	8,111	8,446	8,446	8,446
Outcome mean, 1940–1964	-0.38	-0.38	-0.38	0.15	0.15	0.15	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Outcome mean, 1965–1990	-0.27	-0.27	-0.27	-0.15	-0.15	-0.15	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09
F-statistic		99.0	8.2		96.6	8.8		100.3	8.9

Notes: Regressions of (a) congressional ideal points from [Bateman et al. \(2017\)](#), based on racial and civil rights voting patterns, (b) our relative religious rhetoric (RRI) scores and (c) congressional ideal points from the time-varying DW-Nominate score (dimension 1) by [Lewis et al. \(2021\)](#), covering economic issues, on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940, interacted with dummies for the periods 1940–1964 and 1964–1990. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. RRI scores are calculated by totaling a legislator’s words with Biblical roots—God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen—and dividing by total words spoken. Columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 9 use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Columns 3, 6, and 9 control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900, also interacted with period dummies. All regressions include state and Congress fixed effects. To account for spatial autocorrelation, we use the procedure described in [Conley \(1999\)](#) with a bandwidth of 500 km. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.4 State-Level Party Platforms

Table E.6: The Evolution of GOP versus Dem. State Party Platforms Outside the South, 1940–2017

Dependent Variable:	Support for Civil Rights		Support for Traditionalism		Support for Small or Local Government	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GOP Platform	-0.056 (0.047)	-0.057 (0.047)	0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.037)
GOP Platform×1965–1990	-0.216*** (0.071)	-0.212*** (0.071)	0.036 (0.033)	0.039 (0.032)	-0.020 (0.062)	-0.020 (0.061)
GOP Platform×1991–2017	-0.116* (0.062)	-0.121* (0.062)	0.573*** (0.037)	0.570*** (0.036)	0.365*** (0.059)	0.363*** (0.058)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Platform year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1940 density control		Yes		Yes		Yes
1940 % Black control		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,192	1,192	1,192	1,192	1,192	1,192
Dem. platform mean, 1940–1964	0.61	0.61	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.19
Dem. platform mean, 1965–1990	0.86	0.86	0.04	0.04	0.49	0.49
Dem. platform mean, 1991–2017	0.81	0.81	0.22	0.22	0.54	0.54


Notes: Regressions of indicators of trigram phrase incidences in Republican state party platforms between 1940 and 2017 from [Hopkins et al. \(2022\)](#) related to (i) support for civil rights, (ii) opposition to abortion and gay marriage, and (iii) support for small or local government on a Republican state party platform indicator, interacted with dummies for the periods 1940–1964, 1964–1990, and 1991–2017. See Appendix H for more details. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Even columns control for log population density and percent Black in 1940, interacted with period indicators. All regressions include state and platform year fixed effects. To account for spatial autocorrelation, we use the procedure described in [Conley \(1999\)](#) with a bandwidth of 500 km. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.7: Southern Whites and the Evolution of Republican State Platforms, 1940–2017

Dependent Variable:	Support for Civil Rights			Support for Traditionalism			Support for Small or Local Government		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Southern Whites×1965–1990	-0.040** (0.019)	-0.052** (0.023)	-0.081** (0.036)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.064*** (0.016)	-0.045** (0.018)	-0.003 (0.029)
% Southern Whites×1991–2017	-0.001 (0.010)	0.003 (0.021)	-0.040 (0.042)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.015** (0.006)	0.025** (0.010)	0.048** (0.023)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Platform year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes			Yes
Observations	544	544	544	544	544	544	544	544	544
Outcome mean, 1940–1964	0.55	0.55	0.55	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.18	0.18	0.18
Outcome mean, 1965–1990	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.45	0.45	0.45
Outcome mean, 1991–2017	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.90	0.90	0.90
F-statistic		26.1	16.1		26.1	16.1		26.1	16.1

Notes: Regressions of indicators of trigram phrase incidences in Republican state party platforms between 1940 and 2017 from [Hopkins et al. \(2022\)](#) related to (i) support for civil rights, (ii) opposition to abortion and gay marriage, and (iii) support for small government and fiscal conservatism on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940, interacted with dummies for the periods 1940–1964, 1964–1990, and 1991–2017. See Appendix H for more details. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 9 use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Columns 3, 6, and 9 control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900, also interacted with period dummies. All regressions include state and platform year fixed effects. To account for spatial autocorrelation, we use the procedure described in [Conley \(1999\)](#) with a bandwidth of 500 km. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure E.4: Southern White Migrants and Congressional Vote Patterns, 1947–2021



Notes: Coefficients from pooled IV regressions of an indicator for right-wing votes in roll calls for thirteen key pieces of legislation by U.S. House Representatives on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern congressional districts. The acronym DADT stands for “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.” All regressions include bill and state fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 and shift-share instrument are interacted with the bill fixed effect. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

E.5 The Early Diaspora and the Progressive Movement

Southern white migrants appear to have had a complicated relationship with the progressive movement of the early 20th century, alienation from which coincided with their shift away from the Democratic Party between 1920 and 1970. Early on, pro-agrarian and working class policies adopted by some progressives, such as Robert M. La Follette, aligned well with the bundle that we associate with the Southern white diaspora, which was not per se opposed to fiscal redistribution. Later, support for racial equity, opposition to prohibition, and political alliances with urban Catholics among some progressive Democrats, such as Al Smith in the 1928 election, saw Southern whites move toward the more populist right-wing politics crystallized by politicians like George Wallace. Appendix Table E.8 provides estimates in support of this history.

Table E.8: Southern White Migrants and the Progressive Movement

Dependent Variable:	Theodore Roosevelt, 1912		Vote Share Average for... Robert M. La Follette, 1924		Al Smith, 1928		Did U.S. House Rep. Vote for Social Security Act of 1935	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, t	-0.023 (0.100)	-0.067 (0.135)	0.149*** (0.051)	0.150* (0.086)	-0.122* (0.063)	-0.406*** (0.152)	0.022** (0.011)	-0.013 (0.018)
Estimator	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,877	1,877	1,883	1,883	1,879	1,879	261	261
Outcome mean	26.3	26.3	8.8	8.8	36.7	36.7	0.2	0.2
Adj. R^2	0.04		0.10		0.40		0.09	
F-statistic		30.6		32.6		161.3		20.3

Notes: This table uses the estimating strategy from Table 2 using outcomes from 1900–40 and contemporaneous Southern white shares. All columns use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to nearest Census year t . The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to that table for details on the baseline controls, of which this table uses contemporaneous versions. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011), except for columns (7–8) which use congressional districts. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.6 Additional Results


Table E.9: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Modern-day Attitudes

Dependent Variable:	Opposes legal abortion (1)	Opposes gay marriage (2)	Believes No systemic racism (3)	Opposes assault rifle ban (4)	Opposes CO2 regulation (5)	Favors ACA repeal (6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.008** (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey waves	2007	2009-16	2010-14	2014	2014	2014
Observations	5,739	82,094	83,446	29,202	29,022	29,239
Counties	1,017	1,732	1,750	1,533	1,528	1,534
Outcome mean	0.52	0.41	0.50	0.36	0.32	0.53
Adjusted R^2	0.05	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.02


Notes: OLS regressions of reported attitudes of white individuals living outside the South on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Outcomes are responses to binary-coded questions from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Respondent controls include their reported age, age squared, and sex. All regressions include state and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure E.5: Third-party Vote for George Wallace in 1968 and Southern Whites in 1940

(a) % Wallace Votes, 1968




(b) Share of Southern-born Whites by County, 1940



Notes: This figure maps the percent of votes for the third-party candidate, George Wallace, in 1968, as well as the share of whites born in the South and residing outside the South in 1940 according to the full-count Census. The legend shows the intervals considered for each split.

Figure E.6: Southern White Migrants and Voter Turnout, 1900–2020



Notes: Coefficients from IV regressions of voter turnout between 1900 and 2020 on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Regressions include election year fixed effects interacted with state dummies and 1900 Southern white shares. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the grid cell level.

F Further Results on Cultural Transmission



F.1 Probing the Nonlinear Effects

Figure F.1: Further Checks on Semiparametric Estimates in Figure 3

OLS

(a) Bandwidth = 1.5 p.p.



(b) Incl. Border State Migrants



IV


(c) Bandwidth = 1.5 p.p.

(d) Incl. Border State Migrants



Notes: This figure reports versions of Figure 3 based on an alternative, fixed bandwidth of 1.5 p.p. (panels a and c), and, as in row 4 of Table 3, the alternative definition of Southern and non-Southern counties to include border state migrants (panels b and d).

Figure F.2: Semiparametric Estimates—Change in Vote Share from Democratic to Republican Party, 1948–2000



Notes: This figure reports semiparametric estimates of columns 4 and 6 in Table 5 using the Robinson (1988) partially linear estimator. The graphs show the resulting regression curve and 95% confidence intervals based on a local linear regression. In panel (a), the OLS specification is based on a local linear estimator with an Epanechnikov kernel and optimal bandwidth. In the panel (b), the IV specification is based on a semiparametric IV procedure developed in Su and Ullah (2008) and operationalized as a control function estimator by Henderson and Parmeter (2015): (i) we estimate a first stage Robinson (1988) regression based on a local cubic estimator, (ii) we include the residual Southern white share from that first stage estimator and include that as a regressor in the second stage, (iii) we estimate the second stage Robinson (1988) regression with local linear estimator, Epanechnikov kernel, and an optimal bandwidth. While all counties are included in the estimation, for presentational purposes, the graphs only report those with less than 30 percent Southern white share in 1940.

F.2 Intergenerational Growth and Cultural Transmission

Table F.1: Demographic Growth in the Diaspora: Fertility and Chain Migration

Dependent Variable:	% Destination-born Children with Southern-born White...				% Southern Whites, 1970		% Southern Whites, 2000	
	Father		Mother					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	1.106*** (0.036)	0.918*** (0.158)	1.149*** (0.033)	1.156*** (0.157)	0.782*** (0.109)	1.103** (0.533)	0.661*** (0.087)	0.945** (0.467)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,681	1,681	1,683	1,683
Outcome mean	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.8
F-statistic	115.0	10.2	115.0	10.2	107.2	5.4	96.4	5.2
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
KP Underident., p-val	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.052	0.000	0.055
Coeff. ≤ 1 ? p-val	0.002	0.697	0.000	0.160	0.977	0.423	1.000	0.547

Notes: Regressions of (1–2) the share of non-Southern-born white children born to Southern-born white dads in a given non-Southern place as of 1940 based on the full count Census, (3–4) same but for Southern-born moms, (5–6) the share of Southern-born whites in 1970, and (7–8) the share of Southern-born whites in 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. 1970 and 2000 shares are based on the Census definition of the South, which also includes Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and West Virginia. See the notes to Table 2 for a full description of controls. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table F.2: Intergroup Contact, Integration, and Evangelicalism

Dependent Variable:	Evangelical Churches (per 10,000 pop.)				% Evangelical, 2010			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	1.274** (0.574)	1.538** (0.761)	1.506** (0.611)	0.985*** (0.300)	1.871** (0.824)	2.308** (1.098)	2.180*** (0.831)	1.431*** (0.388)
Intermarriage Index	1.265*** (0.371)		0.475** (0.240)		1.209** (0.511)		0.162 (0.325)	
Residential Integration Index		2.061** (0.906)		0.680*** (0.253)		2.880** (1.308)		0.689* (0.362)
% Southern Whites \times Intermarriage			0.475** (0.189)				0.630** (0.276)	
% Southern Whites \times Integration				0.152** (0.060)				0.241*** (0.073)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883
Outcome mean	11.2	11.1	11.2	11.1	16.1	16.1	16.1	16.1
F-statistic	8.6	6.8	7.2	42.1	8.6	6.8	7.2	42.1
KP Underident., p-val	0.017	0.021	0.003	0.000	0.017	0.021	0.003	0.000

Notes: Regressions of (1–4) evangelical Protestant Christian churches per 10,000 residents in 2010 and (5–8) the share of evangelicals in 2010 on the indexes of intermarriage between Southern whites and non-Southern whites and residential segregation from Southern whites, both as of 1940. See the notes to Table 7 for details on the specification. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


F.3 Further Results on Religious Names

Table F.3: Validating the Religious Content of Biblical Names

Dependent Variable: Census Year:	Child has Biblical Name			
	1910 (1)	1920 (2)	1930 (3)	1940 (4)
father has religious occupation	5.986*** (0.214)	6.228*** (0.231)	7.729*** (0.226)	8.832*** (0.201)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome mean	14.7	15.5	15.3	15.0
Observations	16,223,562	18,930,606	19,327,349	17,132,508

Notes: OLS regressions of an indicator for whether a child has a Biblical name on an indicator ($\times 100$) for whether the child's father has a religious occupation. These includes the following occupations from the full-count Census: religious workers (occ1950=78) and clergymen (occ1950=9). The sample is restricted to all white, U.S. born-children. Each column is a separate regression for the given Census year listed at the top of the column. All regressions include county fixed effects as well as a set of child controls: fixed effects for child gender and birth year. Standard errors are clustered by county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure F.3: Cultural Transmission: Exposure to Southern Whites and Religious Child Names
Neighborhood-Level Exposure with County Fixed Effects \times Born After Move



Notes: This figure re-estimates panel (b) in Figure 7 with county fixed effects \times born after move. See the notes below that figure for details on the specification. The 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county.

Table F.4: Exposure Effects on Non-Southerners' Religious Names Neighborhood-Level Exposure with County Fixed Effects \times Born After Move

Dependent Variable:	Child has Biblical Name				
	Base	North Origin to West Dest.	Δ Orig.-Dest. % Southern Whites	Control for Name Freq.	Birth 5-Year FE
Specification:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% Southern Whites _{τ} \times Born After Move	0.044*** (0.011)	0.059*** (0.019)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.031*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.011)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE \times Born After Move	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Year - Move Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Order FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,483,543	414,859	2,447,502	2,483,543	2,483,543
Outcome mean (pre-move)	15.4	14.0	15.4	15.4	15.4

Notes: This table re-estimates panel (b) of Table 10 with county fixed effects \times born after move. See the notes below that table for details on the specification. Standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

F.4 Cultural Spillovers: Music and Cuisine


Southern food and music may have provided additional pathways for cultural transmission from Southern to non-Southern whites. Southern cuisine prominently features barbecue and meat-heavy meals. These traveled with Southern white migrants outside the South. Appendix Table F.5 (columns 1–4) shows that Southern white migrants in 1940 are associated with greater popularity of barbecue and steak restaurants, relative to traditionally non-Southern staples, such as pizza and other Italian foods. We find analogous results for fried chicken—another Southern-origin cuisine—looking at the prevalence of Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) fast-food restaurants (columns 5–6). The popularity of country music follows a similar pattern. Holding urban density fixed, Southern white migrants correlate strongly with country music radio station locations outside the South, as illustrated in Appendix Figure F.4.

The diaspora helps explain how so much of the non-South (outside the biggest cities) came to embrace Southern culture, giving rise to a so-called Southernization noted as early as the 1970s (Egerton, 1974). Southernization of culture, in turn, may have increased the scope for Southernization of politics. As Southern culture gained traction outside the South and traditional North–South cultural divides faded, it was easier for right-wing movement leaders to forge new political coalitions. For instance, many of country music’s “biggest stars signed up to help [George] Wallace in 1968 performing with the governor as he crisscrossed the country.” Nixon followed suit in the next election as he repeatedly espoused “fondness for country music” and “courted musicians and Nashville executives, knowing that these entertainers would help secure the new voting blocs that Republicans counted on” both inside and outside the South (Gregory, 2005, p. 313). Another example was George Wallace floating Colonel (Harland David) Sanders of KFC as a possible vice presidential running mate in the 1968 election.

Table F.5: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Modern-day Cuisine

Dependent Variable:	Share of Visits to ... Restaurant				Any Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurants	
	BBQ and steak (1)	(2)	Italian and pizza (3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886
Outcome mean	0.06	0.06	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.41
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.26	0.20	0.37

Notes: OLS regressions of county-level restaurant visit shares for various cuisines (1-4) and a dummy for any Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurants in a county as of 2022 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Restaurant visit data from Google News Lab (2021). Counties with insufficient visit data for a particular cuisine are considered zeroes for coding purposes. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


Figure F.4: Southern White Migrants and Country Music Radio Stations

Notes: Binned scatter plots of the number of country music stations in a county in 2021 over the average county-level share of Southern white migrants in 1940. The sample consists of 1,888 counties outside the South, which excludes states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma, plus the District of Columbia. Southern Whites are defined as individuals who were classified as white in the U.S. Census in 1940 and who were born in a Southern state. Radio station estimates are generated from partialling out log population density in 1940. County music data comes from the websites of iHeartRadio, Cumulus, and Audacy, the top three radio companies in the United States.

G Further Background on Southern White Migrants


G.1 The Geography of the Great Migration

Figure G.1: Composition for Sending States and Receiving Regions, 1850–2020




Notes: Panel (a) plots the percentage of Southern whites from each of the 12 sending states (as share of all Southern whites who lived outside the South) in each decade from 1850 to 2020. Panel (b) shows which regions, as defined by U.S. census regions, had the largest stock of Southern white migrants who lived outside the South in each decade for the same time period. Shares were computed using the full count census files from 1850 to 1940, as well as the 1% census files for 1950, 1960, 1970, the 1% American Community Survey files for 2010 and 2020, the 5% files for 1980 and 1990, and the 0.1% American Community Survey file for 2000.

Figure G.2: Mapping Southern-born Whites Outside the South in 1900



Notes: This figure maps the shares of white individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1900 according to the full-count Census. The legend shows the intervals considered for each split.

Figure G.3: Geographic Sorting of Black and Southern Whites By Location Population Density



Notes: These figures report the share of all Black and white Southern-born living outside the South across ventiles of the destination county population in (a) 1900 and (b) 1940.

G.2 Characterizing Southern White Migrants: Ideology and Economics

The figures above illustrate the geography of Southern white migration. In this section, we further characterize these migrants, building upon the discussion in Section 2.

First, Appendix Figure G.4 reports differences in ANES question responses across groups of white respondents prior to 1970, distinguishing between Southern stayers and movers, border-state stayers and movers, and non-Southern stayers. These figures provide a unique window into the attitudes of those in the diaspora in the mid-20th century (as early as comprehensive data allow).

Second, we explore a few relevant occupational sorting patterns of Southern white migrants in their destinations. Appendix Table G.1 shows that Southern white migrants sorted into radio and other me-

dia occupations in the early 20th century. Like Carl McIntire and other prominent right-wing media evangelists of Southern origin, such as Billy James Hargis and Pat Robertson, Southern white migrants selected into the media sector. Early migrants were significantly more likely to work at newspapers than other residents within the same county (column 3). By 1940, radio and TV had become more attractive as Southern whites differentially sorted into occupations such as radio broadcasting (columns 5–6). Together, these results provide individual-level evidence of Southern whites shaping media production through occupational choices, complementing the county-level results in Section 6.3.

Third, the zeroth stage estimates in Appendix Table A.2 reveal several relevant economic factors driving Southern white outmigration to the non-South, including small Black populations, few tenant or large farms, many Black-owned farms, small manufacturing sectors, and boll weevil infestations. Sending counties tended to be somewhat urban on average, consistent with the positive selection narrative discussed in Section 2.2.

Fourth, Figure G.5 uses full-count Census from 1900–40 to compare demographic and economic characteristics of five distinct white population groups: Southern migrants, Southern stayers, non-Southern migrants, non-Southern “natives” (i.e., individuals born outside the South who lived in their state of birth at the enumeration date), and foreign-born individuals. Even though Southern white migrants were slightly older in the beginning of the sample and had a higher share of men (0.2 p.p.), they tended to be fairly comparable to other white groups in terms of their occupational income scores, labor force participation, and skill group.


Table G.1: Southern White Migrants and Occupational Sorting at the Individual Level

Dependent Variable:	Individual Works in a ... Occupation					
	Religious		Newspaper		Radio and TV	
	1900 (1)	1940 (2)	1900 (3)	1940 (4)	1900 (5)	1940 (6)
Southern White	0.393*** (0.039)	0.154*** (0.031)	0.067*** (0.022)	-0.004 (0.018)	–	0.041*** (0.011)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	Yes
Observations	16,187,176	30,054,255	16,187,176	30,054,255	–	30,054,255
Outcome mean	0.37	0.31	0.11	0.12	–	0.07


Notes: Regressions of a binary indicator for whether the individual worked in the respective occupation (multiplied by 100). Religion includes the following occupations from the full-count Census: religious workers (occ1950=78) and clergymen (occ1950=9). Newspaper includes the editors and reporters occupation (occ1950=36). Radio and TV includes the radio operators occupation (occ1950=75) and the radio broadcasting and television industry (ind1950=856). The sample, based on the complete-count Population Census data in 1900 (odd-numbered columns) and 1940 (even-numbered columns), includes all white men between the ages of 18 and 64 living outside of the South in 1900 and 1940, respectively. Column 5 is empty as radio and TV were not yet available. Excluded Southern areas are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Regressions include controls for a cubic in age and county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level shown in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure G.4: Attitudes and Beliefs of Southern White Migrants

(a) Southern Versus Non-Southern Whites




(b) Southern, Border State, and Non-Southern Whites




Notes: Average responses to binary-coded questions on relevant issues for white individuals from the American National Election Survey (ANES), waves through 1970. Across panels (a) and (b), respondents (R) are considered Southern if they were born or raised in the states of the former Confederacy as well as Oklahoma; South and non-South samples include and exclude those states, respectively. In panel (b) respondents are considered as being from or residing in border states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, or West Virginia.

Figure G.5: Characteristics of Southern White Migrants Compared to Other Groups



Continued on next page

Figure G.5 (Continued): Characteristics of Southern White Migrants Compared to Other Groups



Notes: Time series plots of average individual characteristics by group from 1900 to 1940 based on the full count U.S. decennial census files. The groups are i) Southern-born white individuals living outside the South, ii) Southern-born white individuals living in the South, iii) non-Southern-born white individuals living outside their state of birth (not in the South), iv) non-Southern-born white individuals living in their state of birth, and v) white foreign-born individuals. The sample consists of those aged 16-65 who lived in private households (i.e., not in group quarters, such as prisons, mental institutions, military facilities, or college dormitories). Occupational and industry classifications follow those laid out by the Census Bureau's 1950 definitions.

H Data Appendix

Table H.1: Summary Statistics for County-level Controls, Historical

	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Baseline controls					
Log population density (1940)	1,889	3.27	1.55	-1.62	11.31
% manufacturing employment (1940)	1,889	2.95	3.97	0	44.36
% unemployment (1940)	1,889	3.09	1.46	0.16	12.39
% labor force participation (1940)	1,889	37.12	3.70	25.41	54.22
% Black residents (1940)	1,889	1.67	4.15	0	46.55
% Mexican-born (1940)	1,889	0.18	0.86	0	18.50
% German-born (1940)	1,889	0.79	0.83	0	6.03
% Canadian-born (1940)	1,889	0.64	1.34	0	15.19
% Irish-born (1940)	1,889	0.17	0.34	0	4.51
% Italian-born (1940)	1,889	0.42	0.94	0	6.81
% acres of land in farms (1940)	1,889	67.72	28.74	0	100
Log mean farm value (1940)	1,887	8.74	0.68	6.54	11.42
% vote share for Wilson (1912)	1,889	39.04	11.06	0	80.20
% Union Army enlistment (1861-65)	1,889	22.56	27.55	0	100
% Civil War deaths (1861-65)	1,889	2.84	4.73	0	87.50
1900 controls					
Log population density (1900)	1,889	2.93	1.62	0	10.35
% manufacturing empl. (1900)	1,889	3.23	4.35	0	34.51
% Black residents (1900)	1,889	2.19	5.57	0	54.63
% Mexican-born (1900)	1,889	0.19	1.84	0	42.27
% German-born (1900)	1,889	3.10	3.26	0	21.86
% Canadian-born (1900)	1,889	1.83	3.51	0	37.29
% Irish-born (1900)	1,889	1.15	1.40	0	12.01
% Italian-born (1900)	1,889	0.34	0.86	0	8.61
% acres of land in farms (1900)	1,889	62.27	35.49	0	100
Log mean farm value (1900)	1,889	7.74	0.99	0	10.56
Sorting controls					
% vote share for Breckinridge (1860)	1,889	7.69	15.02	0	79.81
% vote share for Jennings Bryan (1896)	1,889	44.87	20.11	0	98.10
Dummy for missing Breckinridge vote	1,889	0.41	0.49	0	1
Dummy for missing Jennings Bryan vote	1,889	0.04	0.20	0	1
County unincorporated in 1860	1,889	0.17	0.38	0	1
Unsettled in 1860 (>2 pop per sq. mile)	1,889	0.33	0.47	0	1
Any major oil fields, 1900	1,888	0.09	0.28	0	1
Any major oil fields, 1940	1,888	0.23	0.42	0	1
Any mines	1,888	0.26	0.44	0	1
Cotton potential	1,887	0.19	0.26	0	0.74
Agricultural potential	1,889	0.41	0.18	0	0.63
Distance to nearest coast (log)	1,889	13.16	1.28	4.76	14.29
Distance to nearest river (log)	1,889	10.23	1.14	0.24	12.55
Mean elevation	1,887	563.80	587.17	-1259.14	3502
Mean ruggedness	1,889	0.07	0.09	0	0.57

Boundary Harmonization

For county-level data, all boundaries are standardized in GIS software to 2010 boundaries, following the procedure introduced in [Hornbeck \(2010\)](#) and expanded upon in [Perlman \(2021\)](#) and [Ferrara et al. \(2021\)](#) in order to consistently match them with census data and to avoid issues of the merging or splitting of counties over time.

This process involves creating unique units (henceforth county parts), based on where historical and 2010 counties intersect. Areas in square miles are calculated for each county part. A share of each historical count variable being interpolated is assigned to each county based on the county part's share of the total area of the historical county in which it lies. These approximated counts are then summed by 2010 county.

For the 1952 and 1971 religious censuses from [The Association of Religious Data Archives \(2021\)](#), county boundaries are first determined using the Atlas of Historical County Boundaries to modify the Tiger/Line county boundaries from the U.S. Census Bureau.¹

For congressional district (CD) level data, county-level data are harmonized to the boundaries of the particular CD-year. However, in contrast to our county-level analyses, we do not harmonize CD boundaries to any particular CD boundary standard, given the numerous and complex changes in CD boundaries and to the number of CDs within states over time. For instance, over a third of sample states have at-large (i.e., statewide) CDs at some point during the sample period, often for only a few years. As an example, only 14 of the CDs in the 1960s (i.e., around 5%) have time-invariant boundaries over those five congresses, excluding at-large CDs. As such, we eschew within-district analysis for our CD-level results. We instead opt to use state-level fixed effects to capture time-invariant unobservables.

Constructing the Religious Rhetoric Index (RRI)

To construct our religious rhetoric index, we analyze the universe of congressional speech data and identify words with inarguable Biblical roots: God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen. We count the total number of instances in which a given legislator (identified using their ICPSR code) used any of these words over the period of study of our congressional-district-level analysis (1940–90). We then divide this sum by their total word count. This produces a time-invariant religious rhetoric measure for each legislator. We opt not to construct a time-varying measure, as there are often too few religious words being spoken in any given Congress year. This nonetheless lets us examine how the composition of Congress changes, with respect to the rhetorical religiosity of legislators, as legislator replacement occurs, similar to [Bate-man et al. \(2017\)](#). In our analysis, we adopt a standard normal transformation of this measure as our primary religious rhetoric index (RRI).

Constructing the State Platform Dimensions

The state platform analysis featured in Appendix Tables [E.6](#) and [E.7](#) defines the content of state Republican and Democratic Party platforms outside the South along three dimensions: (i) support for civil rights, (ii) support for traditionalism, and (iii) support for small or local government. These categories are defined using indicators for whether a state platform, drafted in a given state-year, contained any of a set of trigrams (i.e., three word) phrases consistent with a given dimension. Trigrams are extracted from

¹See <https://publications.newberry.org/ahcbp/> (last accessed on Dec. 1, 2020).

the state platforms and coded in terms of their frequency. These trigram and frequency data are from [Hopkins et al. \(2022\)](#) and were provided to us by the authors. We describe their content here.

As in that paper, we ignore trigrams related to committee processes (e.g., “platform_committee_report,” “adopt_state_convent”) and focus on prominent political trigrams, which we define as ones that appear 50 times or more over the 1940–2017 period. We then code for all state-years during that period in which a platform was drafted three indicator variables, for whether that platform expressed (i) support for civil rights, (ii) support for traditionalism, and (iii) support for small or local government. These are based on the appearance of any of the following trigrams, which we deem to be highly likely to be related to and politically in support of a given cause:

Support for civil rights. men_creat_equal, without_regard_race, regardless_race_creed, regardless_race_color, regardless_race_gender, race_creed_color, race_color_creed, race_color_religion, race_religion_nation, sex_nation_origin, creed_nation_origin, color_nation_origin, color_nation_origin, nation_origin_religion, religion_nation_origin, civil_right_act, equal_protect_law, vote_right_act, civil_right_law, equal_employ_opportun, support_equal_right, discrim_base_race, civil_right_commiss, support_equal_access, human_civil_right, equal_right_equal, believ_equal_right, citizen_regardless_race, civil_human_right, civil_right_liberti, discrimin_base_race, elimin_form_discrimin, endow_creator_certain, equal_opportun_citizen, equal_treatment_law, fair_employ_practic, free_fair_elect, make_clear_fourteenth, fourteenth_amend_protect, human_right_commiss, justic_equal_opportun, nation_origin_disabl, opportun_regardless_race, protect_civil_right, right_equal_justic, right_equal_opportun, right_everi_person, support_affirm_action.

Support for traditionalism. innoc_human_life, man_one_woman, partial_birth_abort, sanctiti_human_life, human_life_amend, embryon_stem_cell, adult_stem_cell, tradit_famili_valu, marriag_one_man, union_one_man, support_human_life, appli_unborn_children, famili_valu_sanctiti, fundament_right_life, individu_right_life, life_begin_concept, life_concept_natur, protect_appli_unborn, protect_innoc_human, respect_tradit_famili, right_life_infring, sanctiti_innoc_human, stem_cell_research, unborn_child_fundament, defens_marriag_act, provid_altern_abort.

Support for small or local government. free_enterpres_system, believ_free_enterpris, privat_properti_right, protect_privat_properti, sovereignti_unit_state, state_local_level, believ_unit_state, believ_state_govern, local_unit_govern, unit_state_govern, unit_state_support, support_unit_state, state_govern_believ, support_local_control, support_right_individu, parent_right_respons, health_care_choic, health_care_decis, local_control_educ, local_control_school, protect_individu_right, support_right_parent, proper_role_govern, without_govern_interfer.