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THE OTHER GREAT MIGRATION:
SOUTHERN WHITES AND THE NEW RIGHT

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The Other Great Migration: Southern Whites and the New Right
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ABSTRACT

This paper shows how the migration of millions of Southern whites in the 20th century shaped the cultural and political landscape across America. Racially and religiously conservative, Southern white migrants created new electoral possibilities for a broad-based coalition with economic conservatives. With considerable geographic scope, these migrants hastened partisan realignment and helped to catalyze and sustain a New Right movement with national influence over the long run. More than just a novel voting bloc outside the South, they transmitted conservative ideology and cultural norms to non-Southern populations. Southern white migrants expanded the scope for such transmission by building evangelical churches and by helping to diffuse right-wing media. Residential integration and intermarriage also facilitated spillover effects. Using a mover-based strategy, we show that exposure to Southern white neighbors increased adoption of conservative religious norms. Overall, our findings suggest that this mass migration may have blurred the North–South cultural divide and reshaped the geography of conservatism in the U.S.

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1 Introduction

Migration has shaped and reshaped the geography of culture and politics throughout U.S. history. Many groups left a distinctive imprint, including Europeans (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020; Grosjean, 2014), Latin Americans (Mayda et al., 2022), and Southern-born Blacks during the Great Migration (Calderon et al., 2022; Fouka et al., 2022). In this paper, we study the cultural and political impacts of Southern white migration across the U.S. during the 20th century. Despite being larger in scale than the Black Great Migration, this episode has received far less attention. We examine how this “other Great Migration” influenced the trajectory of the New Right, a coalition of economic, racial, and religious conservatives that began to emerge in the 1960s.¹ Our findings suggest that the Southern white diaspora played an important role in shaping this durable movement mobilized behind the Republican Party.

In the early 20th century, millions of Southern whites migrated across the U.S., settling in rural areas, small towns, and big cities. They brought with them a distinctive set of conservative attitudes on race and religion tied to the history of the South. Survey evidence through the 1960s shows that, relative to non-Southern whites in the same non-Southern county, whites born in the South were on average more likely to identify as evangelical, to favor various forms of racial segregation, and to oppose racially-inclusive forms of economic redistribution. We explore how these new voters outside the South directly influenced politics and transmitted cultural values to non-Southerners.

Our primary analysis relies on county-level variation in exposure to the Southern white diaspora as of 1940. The complete-count Census in that year provides a population-level measure that predates the partisan realignments of the postwar era. We develop a shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) based on “push factors,” as in Boustan (2010) and Derenoncourt (2022), who study the Black Great Migration. Our SSIV combines predetermined Southern white migration networks as of 1900 (shares) with predicted migration flows out of the South for each decade from 1900 to 1940 (shifts). This approach addresses biases due to economic or ideological sorting as well as place-based confounders of conservatism. To ensure that pre-1900 migrants are not driving later outcomes, we also control for 1900 migrant shares, thus identifying the distinct influence of changes in Southern white migrant population shares from 1900 to 1940. We further allay concerns about early migrant sorting by developing an alternative IV strategy based on Sequeira et al. (2020), which leverages the coincidental timing of initial railroad connections outside the South with overall white migrant flows from the South.

Using our SSIV strategy, we show that Southern white migration in the early 20th century is associated with significantly larger Republican Party presidential vote shares in the 21st century. This finding is robust to (i) alternative definitions of the North–South divide (our baseline defines the South as the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma), (ii) omitting individual origin and destination states, (iii) re-weighting counties by their electoral importance, (iv) standard identification and inference checks for SSIVs (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2022; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020), and (v) constructing the SSIV based on Southern-origin counties rather than states. The results also hold conditional on fixed effects for within-state county pairs with the most similar 1900 Republican vote shares and 1870 Southern white migrant shares. Together with the similar estimates based on the railroad-connection IV, these results point to a causal interpretation.

Our IV estimates are consistent with sizable electoral influence. Such influence may have impli-

¹Following previous studies, we use the term “racial conservatism” to characterize opposition to legislation and policies designed to change the prevailing racial hierarchy at given moment in time (Bateman et al., 2017; Feinstein and Schickler, 2008; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Schickler, 2016). Such opposition does not necessarily entail overt expressions of racism, even if it often appears in combination with racial grievance, resentment, or animus.

cations for national elections, given the geographic spread of Southern white migrants and the skewed importance of low-population states in the Electoral College. We illustrate this possibility using a heuristic exercise following [Autor et al. \(2017, 2020\)](#) to quantify decisiveness in recent close elections. Our IV estimates are also consistent with a more-than-compositional effect: each additional Southern white migrant in 1940 is associated with more than one conservative vote in the 21st century. This resonates with the nonlinear effects that we identify through semiparametric and tipping point analysis and with the evidence of horizontal cultural transmission that we present in the final part of the paper.

Having identified the diaspora's legacy in the 21st century, we then show how Southern white migration shaped the historical trajectory of conservative alignment behind the modern Republican Party. Tracing out the diaspora's influence across the 20th century, we identify significant effects on Republican Party vote shares that date back to at least the 1970s. This followed a period of partisan realignment during which large-diaspora counties began to shift away from the Democratic Party. These county-level estimates are consistent with American National Election Survey (ANES) data showing that, after the mid-1960s, Southern white migrants were more likely to dealign from the Democratic Party than were non-Southerners in the same county. Thus, Democrats lost not only the South (as shown by [Kuziemko and Washington, 2018](#)) but also communities home to Southern-born whites *outside* the South.

The Southern white diaspora left an especially large imprint on the 1968 election, when they amplified support outside the South for third-party candidate George Wallace. Known for his staunchly segregationist positions as Governor of Alabama, Wallace campaigned on a unique combination of racial and religious conservatism with working-class appeal ([Carter, 1995](#)). His strong support in large-diaspora counties foreshadowed their consolidation behind the Republican Party in the 1970s. This Southern white influence was distinctive. Although Northern white migrants also contributed to the emerging New Right coalition, as they brought economic conservatism to new areas of the country, we show that they tended to reduce support for Wallace and had limited effects on partisan realignment. In the lineage of the New Right, Southern white migrants may have been an early harbinger of change, illuminating a viable path for the Republican Party's "Southern Strategy" to move beyond the South.

The New Right, as characterized by [Dochuk \(2010\)](#), [Lowndes \(2009\)](#), and others, emerged in the second half of the 20th century, bringing racially and religiously conservative voters together with supporters of previous conservative coalitions defined by fiscal conservatism and anti-communism. As the national Democratic Party came to favor racially-inclusive federal redistribution, racially conservative politicians became more closely aligned with economic conservatives, in a process that brought together Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans ([Black and Black, 2003](#); [Lowndes, 2009](#); [Schickler, 2016](#)). Later, religious conservatives decried federal overreach in various domains, such as education and marriage, and as such generally saw traditional family values as inconsistent with interventionist policies favored by Democrats. We characterize this dynamic coalition-building process using data on congressional representatives' voting behavior and speech, state-level party platforms, and survey data on voter preferences and partisan identification. Across all these domains, we observe an increasing coalescence of economic conservatism—long a mainstay of the Republican Party outside the South—with racial and religious conservatism after the 1960s.

We uncover an important role for the Southern white diaspora in the emergence and success of this New Right coalition. Using a congressional-district-level SSIV, we find that a larger diaspora is associated with racially conservative voting in the U.S. House—as proxied by the [Bateman et al. \(2017\)](#) index—and greater deployment of religious rhetoric on the House floor. As these districts realigned toward Republican representation over time, they saw increasingly conservative voting on economic

issues, too, as proxied by the first dimension of the [Lewis et al. \(2021\)](#) DW-Nominate score. We further show that the Southern white diaspora influenced local policy agendas, as reflected in the text of state-level party platforms newly compiled by [Hopkins et al. \(2022\)](#). While most of these platforms started becoming more racially liberal after 1964, Republican platforms in states with larger Southern white migrant populations became more racially conservative. Together with our findings on presidential elections, these results suggest that diaspora whites were not merely following a nationwide realignment already underway but rather played a direct role in the grassroots shift towards the Republican Party.

To better understand the importance of racial politics in this process, we consider the electoral impacts of Southern Black migrants together with those of Southern whites. Our results suggest that the spatial sorting of Southern Blacks and whites during the Great Migration(s) contributed to partisan differentiation along racial lines. While Southern whites dispersed across the country, from the rural West to Northern cities, Southern Blacks were more likely to settle in the densest urban areas and increasingly so over time. Using a combined shift-share strategy, we show that just as Southern white migrants hastened Republican Party gains, Southern Black migrants hastened Democratic Party gains (in line with [Calderon et al., 2022](#)). As large Black constituencies in Northern cities drove changes in national Democratic platforms ([Schickler, 2016](#)), disaffected whites in the South *and* in large-diaspora counties across America increasingly mobilized behind the Republican Party. More than mirror images, the impacts of the Great Migrations interacted: we find that the effects of the Southern white diaspora were larger in locations with a stronger presence of Blacks and higher urban density.

Overall, our findings suggest that Southern whites not only introduced a novel conservative voting bloc outside the South but also helped grow that base through cultural transmission beyond the first-generation diaspora. We explore several potential transmission pathways and begin by ruling out a purely demographic channel. In particular, we show that intergenerational growth of the diaspora, through differential fertility and chain migration, is important but not large enough to explain the persistent effects on voting outcomes. This motivates our focus on horizontal transmission, and we find evidence of several complementary mechanisms. First, we see a larger electoral imprint of the Southern white diaspora in counties with greater residential mixing and intermarriage between Southern and non-Southern whites, relative to random matching rates.² These results suggest that social integration may have facilitated horizontal transmission and thus amplified the rightward shift at the ballot box.

Second, Southern white migrants hastened the diffusion of religious conservatism through evangelical institutions and right-wing radio. We show that the diaspora provided the leadership and congregant foundations of evangelical expansion and innovation outside the South. This includes, most prominently, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), which had defended slavery and split from the national Baptist church over the issue in the 1850s. When the SBC began allowing congregations outside the South in the 1940s, migrants helped the church expand into new areas. These denominations, along with others (e.g., Pentecostal), would become a key force in mobilizing the religious vote behind the Republican Party later in the 20th century (see [Butler, 2021](#); [Jones, 2018](#)). We find a similarly large diaspora imprint on the spread of conservative talk radio beginning in the 1950s with religious radio programs like Carl McIntire's *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* and persisting through the 21st century with the preeminent *Rush Limbaugh Show*. By differentially entering markets with a larger diaspora, these conservative broadcasters expanded the orbit of right-wing messaging beyond the South.

Finally, we use individual-level data to provide direct evidence of horizontal transmission from

²These results echo [Giuliano and Tabellini's \(2020\)](#) findings on European immigrant integration and electoral influence.

Southern to non-Southern populations. In locations with a larger Southern white diaspora, non-Southern-born parents were more likely to give their children Biblical names. Using a mover-based identification strategy with household fixed effects, we show that this is due, in part, to causal exposure effects and is not solely due to selection of more religious non-Southern families into diaspora communities. We find similar estimates for exposure at the county and neighborhood levels, with the latter defined as the 10 neighbors on each side of a given non-Southern household. This points to a highly localized contact-based mechanism of conservative cultural change, complementing the broader reach of evangelical churches and right-wing radio. Together with the spread of Southern-origin food and country music via diaspora communities, these findings clarify how the “other Great Migration” may have contributed to the “Southernization” of the U.S.—a process of longstanding popular interest (see [Applebome, 1997](#); [Cox Richardson, 2020](#); [Egerton, 1974](#); [Gaillard and Tucker, 2022](#)).

This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of migration, cultural change, and conservatism in America. Economists have largely focused on Southern Black migration ([Boustan, 2010, 2016](#); [Derenoncourt, 2022](#); [Fouka et al., 2022](#)), while a small subset has characterized the collective migration of Blacks and whites ([Collins and Wanamaker, 2015](#); [Stuart and Taylor, 2019](#)). [Calderon et al. \(2022\)](#) show that Southern Black migrants increased support for civil rights legislation among Northern whites. We show that Southern white migrants also left a major historical imprint as they helped bolster a new conservative movement with far-reaching political consequences.³ Moreover, we relate Black and white settlement patterns and argue that the two together offer a more complete characterization of how the Great Migration transformed American politics.

We offer some of the first quantitative evidence connecting the insights of historians on the Southern white diaspora ([Berry, 2000](#); [Dippel, 2005](#); [Dochuk, 2010](#); [Gregory, 2005](#)) with those of political scientists on the realignment ([Schickler, 2016](#)) and the New Right ([Lowndes, 2009](#)). We identify critical junctures in the New Right trajectory and use congressional data and state party platform texts to provide a sharper lens on the coalescence of economic, racial, and religious conservatism after the 1960s. Our evidence on the transmission of religious ideology and shifts in racial politics illustrates a key role for this historical migration episode in shaping the political landscape across 21st century America.

Our findings offer a new perspective on the origins and consequences of partisan realignment. The realignment of racially conservative white voters within the South is well understood ([Black and Black, 2003](#); [Kuziemko and Washington, 2018](#)). We show that a similar realignment took hold in white diaspora communities outside the South. The geographic dispersion of these communities, and their pervasiveness in large swathes of the West, may have increased the electoral viability of Republican Party efforts to court the racially conservative vote nationally. The partisan dynamics we identify support the conjecture that racial animus drives some of the unique opposition to redistribution in the U.S. ([Alesina et al., 2001](#)). By bundling aspects of racial resentment with religious and economic conservatism, the Republican Party assembled a broad and durable electoral coalition, what political scientists [Maxwell and Shields \(2019\)](#) call the “Long Southern Strategy,” riffing on Nixon’s original Southern Strategy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Our paper provides quantitative evidence on the role of the white Great

³Since first distributing our working paper in June 2021, we learned of two concurrent studies also showing how waves of Southern white migrants strengthened conservative politics outside the South. [Ramey \(2021\)](#) shows this for white Plains migrants settling in California during the Dust Bowl of the 1930s, and [Reisinger \(2021\)](#) shows this for Southern white migrants as of 1970 across the non-South. Our study is distinct in four ways: (i) our analysis of realignment, the critical 1968 election, and the bundling of racial, religious, and economic conservatism, (ii) our evidence on racial sorting and coalition change, (iii) our exploration of multiple cultural and ideological channels of transmission, and (iv) our evidence of causal exposure effects and cultural change among non-Southern whites.

Migration in the formation and electoral effectiveness of this right-wing movement.

We also contribute to a growing literature on the role of migrants in fostering cultural change throughout American history. Recent work explores the influence of European immigrants on redistributive preferences (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020), honor culture (Grosjean, 2014), and gender norms (Haddad, 2021), as well as the influence of frontier settlers on a culture of rugged individualism (Bazzi et al., 2020). We explore an understudied episode of mass migration and trace out its long-run implications for the geography of culture and politics. Although it may have been hiding in plain sight, the influence of the Southern white diaspora cut across many domains of public life. Their contribution to the New Right coalition helped to reshape the geography of polarization across America: while the North–South divide dominated historically, today’s landscape reveals sharp divisions *within* regions.⁴

2 Background on the Southern White Diaspora

This section provides background on white migration out of the South. We first describe key historical episodes and then characterize migrant selection and sorting. We conclude with an in-depth look at distinctive features of Southern culture that would prove influential in shaping the New Right.

2.1 From the Postbellum Era to the Great Migration(s)

Comparatively small waves of Southern outmigration took place during the 19th century. Many Southern whites followed Gold Rush routes westward, seeking land on which to rebuild estates lost during the war and in the economic fallout thereafter (Cox Richardson, 2020; Dippel, 2005; Waite, 2021). Historians emphasize the importance of racial ideology in fueling this westward trajectory. Famous California berry farmer Walter Knott, the son of one such migrant, would later remark that “the carpetbaggers [a derogatory term for Northerners] came down South and disenfranchised every Southerner that had been in the war” (Dochuk, 2010, p. 7).⁵ Historically, Southern whites had long been mobile, following the search for cheaper land, cattle, and crops from the East Coast and Appalachia, to the Ozarks and the Great Plains, and finally to the West. Agricultural opportunities as well as oil, mining, and timber industries all created novel pathways out of the South (Gregory, 2005). These early movers, motivated by both economic and ideological factors, laid the foundation for future chain migration out of the South.

While early postbellum outflows of Southern whites were important in initiating novel migration pathways, those flows were dwarfed by the large-scale migration to the North and West after 1900. Figure 1 shows these outflows beginning at a time when World War I and immigration restrictions led to increased demand for labor. By 1940, nearly 10.9% of Southern-born whites lived outside the South (compared to roughly 15.6% of, albeit fewer, Southern-born Blacks). These migration outflows persisted into the postwar era, as sustained industrial growth across the country spurred a more general exodus of Southern workers during the 1940s, which continued for several decades. By 1970, nearly 20% of Southern-born whites lived outside the South.

⁴We offer here a note on interpretation. While identifying an important role for Southern white migrants in right-wing politics outside the South, we are not ruling out a large influence of non-Southern whites in driving those same outcomes. Nor are we arguing that all Southern white migrants had the same attachments to Southern culture or that all supporters of the New Right were equally attached to the movement’s racial, religious, and economic conservatism.

⁵Knott would later play an important role in building the conservative movement in California and the U.S. more broadly.

2.2 Migrant Destinations, Origins, and Socioeconomic Backgrounds

Southern whites migrated towards many parts of the westward-moving country. By 1940, there were large Southern white populations in the West Census Region, the Ohio River Valley, and lower Plains (see Figure 2 and Appendix Figures G.1 and G.2). While border states just outside the former Confederacy were popular destinations, large diaspora communities could be found in faraway regions of central California, eastern Washington, Oregon, and much of Wyoming. Southern whites were less prevalent in former Union states, especially in the Northeast and upper Midwest, where, instead, Southern Black migrants were more likely to settle (see Figure 2).⁶ Southern whites were also more likely to settle across the entire density distribution, ranging from rural areas to small towns to large cities, whereas Southern Blacks concentrated in the densest urban areas (see Appendix Figure G.3).⁷

Just as their destination choices differed, Black and white migrants also came from different regions of the South. While Blacks migrated primarily from the Cotton Belt, whites migrated from a vast stretch comprising the “outer South,” which includes the Great Plains of Oklahoma and northern Texas as well as the Appalachian hills of Tennessee and northern Alabama, (see Appendix Figure G.1 and Gregory, 2005). Push factors were important here: in the Plains, the Dust Bowl caused pervasive drought and farm failure in the 1930s (see Arthi, 2018; Hornbeck, 2012), while in Appalachia, the Depression severely contracted its industrial sector.⁸ In general, declining white farm ownership or tenancy, declining farm acreage, and shrinking manufacturing sectors were important push factors (see Appendix Table A.2 and Fligstein, 1981). Yet, despite popular media stereotypes about poor, welfare-seeking Southern migrants—disparagingly called “Okies,” “hillbillies,” and “rednecks”—many of these migrants integrated into destination labor markets and were comparable to other white groups in terms of income and education. In fact, they spanned the socioeconomic spectrum, and in some periods, white outmigrants were positively selected along socioeconomic status and literacy. See Appendix G.2 for evidence from individual Censuses from 1900–40 and from a linked sample of migrants from 1930–1940.⁹

2.3 Characterizing Southern White (Diaspora) Culture

Southern and non-Southern whites exhibited significant cultural differences historically. Southern whites have often been associated with evangelical Protestantism, racial conservatism, and populist ideals rooted in localism and dislike of elites (Dochuk, 2010; Gregory, 2005). Racial animus among Southern whites has been linked to the history of slavery and Jim Crow (see, e.g., Engerman, 2020; Green, 1988), while the importance of evangelicalism traces back to the formation of the “Bible Belt” in the South, driven by Baptists and Methodists (Boles, 1996; Heyrman, 2013). This paper does not attempt to explain the origins of these salient characteristics. Rather, we take them as given, provide empirical evidence of

⁶Southern whites largely avoided Utah, perhaps due to religious and other cultural differences with Mormons.

⁷Collins and Wanamaker (2015) characterize racial differences in sorting across regions from 1910 to 1930. In separate work, we explore these differences from 1850 to 1940, highlighting the importance not only of traditional forces like distance and networks but also ideological and economic differences. For example, conditional on distance and networks, Southern whites sorted towards counties outside the South that (i) were more suitable for plantation crops and extractive commodities, and (ii) had a higher vote share for the pro-slavery Southern Democrat candidate, John C. Breckinridge, in the 1860 election.

⁸In addition to some of the same economic factors, previous work has emphasized factors such as racial violence and hostility as important push factors for Southern Blacks (Boustan, 2016; Calderon et al., 2022).

⁹Gregory (2005, p. 24) argues that wealthy and educated Southern whites were overrepresented, with “Northern economic opportunities” spurring their migration more so than “Southern distress.” Dochuk (2010), meanwhile, describes the mass migration of “Okies,” predominantly agricultural settlers from not only Oklahoma but also Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. These settlers, he argues, were not destitute but rather working-class laborers, upended by the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, who followed Route 66 in search of industrial work in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and the Pacific Northwest.

their prevalence among whites in the South, and show that these same distinctive attitudes can be seen among Southern whites in the diaspora.

Using data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) waves through 1970, Table 1 compares Southern- and non-Southern-born whites living in the same non-Southern county. Southern white migrants are substantially more likely to be evangelical Protestant (column 1) and to hold conservative religious beliefs (column 2). They are also more supportive of racial segregation in various domains (columns 3-5). While Southern whites are no more opposed in general to government intervention in the economy (column 6), they are significantly more likely to oppose interventions designed to help support Blacks (column 7).¹⁰ These patterns highlight a well-established intersection between racial and economic conservatism that became especially important during the Civil Rights era.

The conservative attitudes in the diaspora have roots in the South. Appendix Figure G.4 displays a continuum of conservatism across whites in America: across all outcomes, responses in the diaspora fall squarely between those of Southerners in the South and non-Southerners outside the South (panel a). Those in states bordering the former Confederacy—West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware—generally lie in between (panel b). In other words, while conservative culture is pervasive across white America, there is a clear gap between those with and those without Southern heritage, and Southern migrants maintain some of that cultural distinction when living outside the South.

Evangelical Protestantism is an especially salient feature of Southern white culture and remained so in the diaspora. In the early 20th century, evangelical presence was limited outside the South; the Southern Baptist Convention would not build churches in Northern Baptist territory until the 1940s. As Southern white migrants spread such denominations to other regions, they helped “to shape some of the values and politics circulating in those settings” (Gregory, 2005, p. 227). By the 1960s, evangelical leaders had begun to engage more formally in politics, becoming outspoken on moral issues, such as sex education in schools (Woodberry and Smith, 1998). The Southern white diaspora in California established Southern-style schools and churches, advancing conservative Christian causes and anti-Communist politics (Dochuk, 2010). Southern evangelical leaders such as J. Frank Norris, Carl McIntire, and Billy Graham also appealed to non-Southerners and non-evangelicals, helping to forge a right-wing coalition that would become integral to the Republican Party (Wilcox and Robinson, 2011).

3 Empirical Strategy

As our core identification strategy, we build a shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) that combines predetermined Southern migrant networks with exogenous shocks pushing migrants out of the South. Following Sequeira et al. (2020), we also develop an alternative, complementary strategy that relies on distinct identifying variation from the SSIV, based on the coincidental timing of migrant outflows from the South with railroad expansion outside the South.

Our main estimating equation takes the following form:

$$\text{vote}_c = \alpha_s + \beta \% \text{ Southern Whites}_{c,1940} + \mathbf{X}'_c \gamma + \varepsilon_c, \quad (1)$$

where vote_c is the vote share in county c for the Republican or other conservative presidential candidate in a given election, and the regressor of interest is the Southern-born white population share in county c in 1940. At the time of writing, 1940 is the last year for which the full-count U.S. Census of Population

¹⁰These results hold using a fixed respondent sample from 1964 and 1968: -0.010 (0.051) and 0.117 (0.058)** in columns 6-7.

is available; it also predates the critical juncture of partisan realignment in the 1960s. We include state fixed effects, α_s , and \mathbf{X}_c is a varying set of controls detailed below and includes the 1900 Southern-born white population share. Our baseline includes 1,888 counties in the conterminous U.S. outside the South, which comprises the former Confederate states and Oklahoma. For robustness, we expand the South to include border states. We cluster standard errors across counties within 60-square-mile grid cells following [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#) and show robustness to other forms of spatial autocorrelation ([Conley, 1999](#)), clustering units, and alternative standard error adjustments.

Endogenous location choices imply that OLS estimates of β could be biased. The historical record, discussed in [Section 2.2](#), points to two countervailing forces. Ideological sorting implies upward bias as Southern whites move towards locations with higher levels of conservatism due to preexisting residents and/or place-based features conducive to such attitudes (e.g., suitability for plantation agriculture). Economic sorting implies downward bias as Southern whites—like most migrants throughout history—move towards economically vibrant locations that tend to be more welcoming of outsiders and capable of hosting large, diverse populations in search of opportunity. Such place-based confounders would create a downward bias even if Southern migrants made these destinations more conservative over time.

We address these biases in multiple ways, beginning with a SSIV identification strategy. This approach combines two sources of variation. The first is the *share* of all white migrants from Southern origin j living in non-Southern county c in 1900, which we denote $\pi_{jc,1900}$.¹¹ The second is based on the change, or *shift*, in the number of whites from Southern origin j living outside the South from 1900 to 1940, $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40}$. Building on [Boustan \(2010\)](#) and [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#), we predict the shifts using origin-specific push factors during the 1900–40 period. The stock of Southern white migrants in c in 1940 is then predicted as

$$Z_{c,1940} = \sum_{j=1}^J \pi_{jc,1900} \widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40}. \quad (2)$$

Scaling $Z_{c,1940}$ by the 1900 county population delivers the SSIV for the actual share of Southern white migrants in 1940. As specified, the SSIV isolates the component of the 1940 diaspora that is due to changes in Southern white inflows from 1900 to 1940.

Our baseline specification constructs the $\pi_{jc,1900}$ shares defining origins j at the level of 12 Southern states, following [Boustan \(2010\)](#), [Calderon et al. \(2022\)](#), and [Fouka et al. \(2022\)](#). For robustness, we define j at the level of 1,220 Southern counties.¹² The state-level approach increases the strength of the IV, given that the county-level approach necessitates the omission of areas such as Western Oklahoma and Texas that cannot be linked to the 1880 Census.

[Appendix Figure A.2](#) builds intuition for the identifying variation in the SSIV. In 1900, Clark and Yakima Counties, both in Washington state, had similar Southern white populations. Yet the two counties differed in migrants’ origins. Whereas Clark’s migrants were largely Arkansan, Yakima’s were largely Texan. From 1900 to 1940, Texas experienced larger Southern white outflows than Arkansas. As predicted by the combined shift-share, the Southern white diaspora had grown more by 1940 in Yakima (4.8%) than in Clark (3.8%). Looking at downstream electoral outcomes, Yakima registered 8.2% of votes for George Wallace’s third party in 1968 and 55.6% for Republican presidential candidates from 2000–20, compared to 5.7% and 48% in Clark for those respective outcomes.

¹¹The denominator is the total number of j -born residents living outside the South in 1900, and the numerator is the number of those j -born residents living in c .

¹²Two prior studies define origins at the county level: [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#) uses the backward-looking residency question only available in the 1940 Census, and [Calderon et al. \(2022\)](#), like us, use linked Census records for robustness.

Underlying SSIV approaches is the empirical regularity that migrants tend to settle where other migrants from their own group had settled previously, a process commonly referred to as *chain migration*. $\pi_{jc,1900}$ reflects such historical, pre-1900 migrations of Southern whites. We choose 1900 as the base year because it captures many of the important migration networks established in the early postbellum years, while predating the onset of mass migration out of the South (see Figure 1). Although predetermined, these initial migrant networks—established through economic and ideological sorting—may be endogenous with respect to the long-run trajectory of conservatism.

By combining these 1900 migrant networks with *predicted* shifts based on Southern-origin push factors, we build a stronger case for validity of the SSIV. In the standard SSIV with actual shifts, the identifying assumption is that, conditional on controls, the unobserved factors that influence political outcomes must not be jointly correlated with the 1900 share of Southern white migrants in non-Southern county c and overall Southern white outmigration from 1900 to 1940. In contrast, our “push factor” SSIV can satisfy the exclusion restriction even if the initial migrant shares in the IV are endogenous insofar as the predicted shifts are exogenous (see [Borusyak et al., 2022](#), for theoretical foundations).

We construct the predicted shifts, $\widehat{\Delta M}$, in several steps. First, we track migrants from Southern to non-Southern counties using linked Census records from the Census Linking Project ([Abramitzky et al., 2020](#)). Then, we leverage origin-county o push factors to estimate shifts from decade-specific zeroth stage regressions similar to [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#):

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{o,t} = \alpha + \mathbf{Z}'_{o,t-10}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \phi \text{population}_{o,t-10} + \varepsilon_{o,t}. \quad (3)$$

Following prior work, we choose push factors from plausibly relevant measures of urbanization, development, and extractive industries, including the square and cross-term interaction of all predictors. The LASSO algorithm shrinks the set of predictors to an optimal subset, $\mathbf{Z}'_{o,t-10}$, from which *Southern white migrants* $_{ot}$ is predicted for each decade through $t \in \{1910, 1920, 1930, 1940\}$. The $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40}$ in equation (2) is the cumulation of these origin-county o decade-specific shifts, further aggregated to the origin state level in our baseline specification. Appendix A.1 provides further background on the SSIV construction, including estimates of the zeroth stage.

Throughout our SSIV analysis, we also include estimates of equation (1) controlling for $\% \text{Southern Whites}_{c,1900}$. This renders the estimating equation equivalent to one with the *change* in the share of Southern whites between 1900 and 1940 as the key regressor. Although our interest lies in understanding how the Southern white diaspora, as observed in 1940, shaped the evolution of the New Right in the U.S., controlling for the initial diaspora size in 1900 ensures that the earlier migrants informing the $\pi_{jc,1900}$ shares in the SSIV are not having a direct, confounding effect on later outcomes.

In addition to $\% \text{Southern Whites}_{c,1900}$, \mathbf{X}_c in equation (1) includes an array of potential confounders that may have affected Southern white sorting and downstream politics. None of our results hinge on these controls, but they do provide further evidence of robustness to relevant concerns.¹³ These include (i) historical economic factors such as population density, manufacturing employment, labor force participation, unemployment, the share of people from different foreign origins, the share of land in farms and log average farm value, all measured in 1940 and/or 1900 ([Haines, 2010](#); [Manson et al., 2020](#)) and (ii) ideological factors such as Union Army enlistment and mortality rates from the U.S.

¹³See the notes to Table 2 for a full elaboration of the different control variable sets. Consider, for example, population density in 1900. Southern white migrants gravitated toward rural states. Many historically low density areas remain relatively lower density today, and such places also often exhibit greater support for the Republican Party in the 21st century. By controlling directly for density, we shut down confounding influences running through instrumented Southern white shares in 1940.

Civil War (Dupraz and Ferrara, 2021). Secondary specifications control for additional potential sorting correlates, including (iii) geographic factors like ruggedness and distance to the coast, (iv) extractive commodity and plantation crop potential, and (v) electoral support in 1860 for the pro-slavery Southern Democrat, Breckinridge, which was associated with Southern white migration in the early postbellum era (Eli et al., 2018). Further robustness checks adopt a Belloni et al. (2014) double LASSO procedure to select optimal controls among this large set. Together with the control for the 1900 Southern white share, these covariates help address concerns about SSIVs related to endogenous sorting and the exclusion restriction if the pre-1900 Southern white migrants independently affect long-run political outcomes, for example, by shaping initial institutions.

Alternative Identification Strategy. While our SSIV approach delivers consistent causal estimates, it does so based on a particular combination of push and pull factors. We also use a complementary IV that relies on distinct identifying variation. This IV leverages the timing of initial railroad connections in counties outside the South combined with overall migrant flows in the coinciding period. Sequeira et al. (2020) develop this strategy to isolate exogenous variation in European immigration flows across the U.S. from 1860 to 1920. We adapt their framework to Southern white migration from 1880 to 1940. Unlike the SSIV, this strategy does not rely on initial migrant networks to determine settlement patterns in ensuing decades. Rather, it isolates variation in diaspora size based on the coincidental timing of migrant outflows from the South with railroad expansion outside the South.¹⁴

We construct this IV in several steps detailed at length in Appendix B and summarized briefly here. The core ingredient is a zeroth stage panel regression from 1880 to 1940 with county and decade fixed effects in which the share of Southern whites in a county in year t is predicted based on the interaction of (i) an indicator for whether county c was connected to the railroad in $t - 10$ with (ii) the total outflow of Southern white migrants from $t - 10$ to t . Given the history of westward expansion and use of the railroad by Southern white migrants (see Waite, 2021), we allow the effects of railroad access to vary across Western and non-Western regions. This increases instrument strength and is in line with regional sub-sample results in Sequeira et al. (2020, Tables 2 and 3). The predictions for the average share of Southern whites from the zeroth stage, $\widehat{Avg. \%Southern Whites}_c$, are then used as an instrument for (i) $Avg. \%Southern Whites_c$ between 1880 and 1940, analogous to the specification from Sequeira et al. (2020) for 1860–1920, and (ii) our baseline measure in equation (1), $\%Southern Whites_{c,1940}$. Together, these specifications deliver very similar results as the SSIV, which, combined with a host of other identification checks described below, support a causal interpretation of our findings.

4 Southern White Migrants and the Trajectory of Conservative Politics

This section establishes our main findings on the electoral legacy of this “other Great Migration.” Our goal is to understand how this episode of mass migration shaped conservative politics as we know it today. We work our way backwards, first by looking at support for Republican presidential candidates since 2000, and then exploring all elections since 1900. Our results show how the Southern white diaspora influenced partisan realignment and the long-run consolidation of the conservative movement behind the Republican Party.

¹⁴To gain intuition for the mechanics of the railroad IV, consider Marin and Mariposa County in California in 1940. Marin was connected to the railroad in 1883 and Mariposa was connected in 1912. Since Southern white migration was much more limited between 1880 and 1900 (see Figure 1), Marin’s Southern white population only reached 6.7% in 1940 compared to 10.2% in Mariposa. In 2016, Marin had a significantly lower Republican vote share than Mariposa.

4.1 The Southern White Diaspora and Right-wing Politics in the 21st Century

Table 2 reports estimates of β in equation (1) for the Trump vote share in 2016 (panel a) and a more general measure of the New Right, the average Republican vote shares from 2000–20 (panel b). Results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar across the two outcomes; for brevity, we reference the latter when discussing magnitudes. OLS estimates with state fixed effects suggest that a 1 p.p. increase in the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 is associated with a statistically significant 0.4 p.p. increase in the Trump vote share (column 1). Adding baseline \mathbf{X} controls from 1940 increases the explanatory power (R^2 increases from 0.42 to 0.67) as well as the effect size from 0.4 to 0.63 p.p. (column 2).

The remaining columns of Table 2 report SSIV estimates. While the OLS estimates significantly differed with the inclusion of controls, the IV analogues are nearly identical (columns 3 and 4). This suggests that the SSIV isolates variation in the Southern white diaspora size that is orthogonal to important confounders of conservative politics over the long run. Including additional controls for place-based confounders (e.g., extractive commodity potential and pre-1900 voting behavior) leaves the SSIV estimates largely unchanged (column 5).

When controlling for the initial 1900 share of Southern whites, the coefficient increases substantially (column 6) and remains large with the full set of controls (column 7). Recall that these specifications are equivalent to having the *change* in the share of Southern whites from 1900 to 1940 as the key endogenous regressor. In the preceding columns 3–5, the SSIV isolated the share of the 1940 diaspora driven by exogenous migration flows from 1900 and 1940. However, those estimates did not allow for independent influence of the pre-existing diaspora in 1900. In controlling for such influence, we find an even larger imprint of the white Great Migration on 21st century conservative politics.¹⁵

The IV estimates are sizable and statistically significant in all specifications. The first-stage F statistic is over 100 in columns 3–5, pointing to the strength of chain migration in this context. In columns 6–7, controlling for the initial 1900 share leads to a weaker first stage (with F statistics just over 10) and less precise estimates in the second. Yet, the estimates remain precise and also hold up to weak-instrument-robust inference (see the [Anderson and Rubin, 1949](#), p-values at the bottom of the table) and a conservative test for underidentification (see the [Kleibergen and Paap, 2006](#), p-values).

In panel (b), the IV estimates imply that each additional Southern white migrant in 1940 is associated with 0.8–1.6 additional votes for conservative politics in the 21st century. In 1940, first-generation Southern whites comprised 2.9% of the population in the average county (standard deviation of 5%). Going from zero Southern-born whites to the average is thus associated with a 2.3–4.6 p.p. increase in the Republican vote share. In the American voting system where small margins in a few states determine election outcomes, shifts like this could prove pivotal, a possibility we investigate later in this section.

In all cases, the IV estimates are somewhat larger than corresponding OLS ones.¹⁶ This is consistent with two possibilities: (i) economic sorting is more pervasive than ideological sorting, and/or (ii) a local average treatment effect (LATE) whereby counties with the strongest chain migration are those where

¹⁵This increasing coefficient size, when switching to a specification in changes, is consistent with theoretical insights in [Jaeger et al. \(2018\)](#): since SSIVs defined over a window from t to $t + s$ are often correlated with migration flows prior to t , controlling for those prior migration waves can change the estimates and interpretation of the coefficients on migration from t to $t + s$. In our case, inclusion of the initial 1900 share helps disentangle the effect of Southern white migration from 1900 to 1940, which appears to be larger than the effects conflated with the pre-1900 migrants. The larger effects of the more recent migration wave may reflect decaying effects of the previous one, particularly strong effects of the 1900–40 migrants, and/or a change in the composition of Southern white migrants over time.

¹⁶This mirrors a similar pattern of OLS and IV estimates in SSIV applications to the Black Great Migration ([Boustan, 2010](#); [Calderon et al., 2022](#); [Derenoncourt, 2022](#); [Fouka et al., 2022](#)) and immigration to the U.S. since 1990 ([Mayda et al., 2022](#)).

the initial migrants, and those that followed, retained the deepest attachment to Southern conservatism.¹⁷

Additional Checks. Before providing further insights on the electoral implications of our findings, we conduct a suite of additional checks to solidify a causal interpretation of our SSIV estimates. We report several fundamental checks in Table 3 with more elaborated results in tables throughout the Appendix.

Alternative Standard Errors. The significance of our estimates is robust to an array of inference procedures that guard against biases due to correlated unobservables across counties with similar fundamentals. Appendix Table A.4 reports standard errors based on, among others, the Conley (1999) approach with cutoffs at 200 and 500 km, (ii) the Colella et al. (2020) generalization using Bartlett kernels, (iii) a wild cluster bootstrap at the state level, and (iv) the Adao et al. (2019) correction for SSIV estimators.

Varying Control Sets. We further address concerns about control choice by varying the components of \mathbf{X}_c used in Table 2. The point estimates remain sizable and statistically significant at conventional levels across the following alternatives: no controls or state FE (Table 3, row 3), initial 1900 share control only (row 4), 1900 controls and initial 1900 share control (row 5), as well as double LASSO control selection applied to columns 6 and 7 of Table 2 (rows 6 and 7, respectively).¹⁸

SSIV Based on Origin Counties. Our baseline SSIV uses origin-state shares in equation (2). In Table 3 (row 8), we use origin-county shares based on linked Census data to determine migrants' origins (see also Appendix Table A.3). Despite a weaker first stage and a less precise second stage, the estimates are quite close to the analogous baseline ones in Table 2. The noisier results are consistent with classical measurement error inherent to record-linking as well as the omission from the SSIV of migrants hailing from counties in West Texas and Oklahoma, which were not yet incorporated in the 1880 Census.

Appendix Table A.3 also re-estimates equation (1) using other alternative SSIVs, including versions based on actual rather than predicted shifts (columns 1–2) and without square and cross-term interactions among push factors (columns 3–4). IV estimates are stable and, if anything, larger when based on the more exogenous “push factor” variation.

Random Shifts. In Appendix A.3, we show, using a procedure developed by Adao et al. (2019), that the shares are not driving SSIV identification. We replace the predicted shifts, $\widehat{\Delta M}_j$, in the SSIV equation (2) with randomly generated shifts, M_j^{rand} , and find a negligible share of statistically significant estimates across 1,000 trials.¹⁹ This offers prima facie evidence that the predicted shifts, rather than the potentially endogenous shares alone, are fundamental to the identifying variation in our SSIV.

Alternative Samples. Importantly, the core estimates in Table 2 are not sensitive to our particular demarcation of Southern states. In Table 4, we exclude the Southern border states of West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware (panel a) and, additionally, consider them as Southern migrant-sending states (panel b). Whites from these states have cultural attachments that are more

¹⁷Calderon et al. (2022) make a similar argument in explaining differences between OLS and IV estimates for the Black Great Migration. Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020) argue that, in general, SSIVs do not have an immediate LATE interpretation when some of the “Rotemberg weights,” which reflect the contribution of each origin state to identifying variation in the instrument, are negative. However, this is not a concern in our setting, where all states exhibit positive weights.

¹⁸Point estimates are also insensitive to controlling for recently identified drivers of Republican voting in the 21st century. The “China shock” measure from Autor et al. (2020) slightly reduces the coefficient in column 6 of Table 2 to 1.77 (0.56), while the “total frontier experience” from Bazzi et al. (2020) slightly increases it to 1.86 (0.59).

¹⁹Concretely, we construct a pseudo-SSIV by interacting actual migration shares from 1900 with shifts drawn from a random normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 5 and then repeat the baseline analysis with controls 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 trials, 3 percent of coefficients are statistically significant—positive or negative—at the 1% level and 11 percent at the 5% level (which compares favorably with 16.1 percent of coefficients in Derenoncourt, 2022). Controlling for 1900 initial shares reduces those to 0 and 0.1 percent, respectively. See Appendix Figure A.3 for a coefficient plot from this exercise.

similar to those of Southern whites, relative to those from the rest of the U.S. (see Appendix Figure G.4). With the latter redefinition, the Southern white diaspora comprises 5.8 percent of the average non-Southern county in 1940, and the resulting IV estimates are highly similar to our baseline in panel (a) of Table 2. Moreover, the estimates are not driven by any particular state as shown in Appendix Figure A.4, which excludes individual receiving and sending states one by one.²⁰ The stability of the estimates in these two exercises points to an electoral legacy that is common across Southern white migrants even though they may vary somewhat in their attachments to Southern culture.

Appendix Table A.8 reports one additional exercise on a restricted sample, in this case focusing on counties that were not yet fully settled as of 1860. With <2 people per square mile at the time, these counties had more limited scope to attract early Southern white migrants on the basis of pre-existing groups and institutions that might also have directly affected conservative attitudes over the long run. Similar estimates hold in this subsample where the migrant shares—and hence the chain migration underlying the SSIV—are based on the initial U.S. settlers in each county.

Matching Exercises. Two additional checks suggest limited residual sorting biases in the SSIV estimates. First, we create matched pairs of counties *within* states based on nearest neighbors in terms of Republican vote shares in 1900. Including these 900+ county-pair FE leaves the core findings unchanged (row 9 of Table 3 and Appendix Table A.5). Even among these geographically and once-politically proximate counties, the electoral impact of Southern white migrants from 1900–40 remains just as large and significant. Second, we create an alternative set of matched county pairs based on nearest neighbors in terms of the Southern white migrant share in 1870, which captures the early Confederate diaspora around the time of the Civil War. Again, the estimates remain economically and statistically significant despite this very demanding set of fixed effects (row 10 of Table 3 and Appendix Table A.6).

The Black Great Migration. Concurrent with this “other Great Migration,” millions of Southern Blacks were also moving North and West. Appendix Table D.1 shows that the effect of the Southern white diaspora is distinct from that of the Southern Black diaspora.²¹ Calderon et al. (2022) show that the Great Migration of Southern Blacks worked against the Republican Party during the mid- to late-20th century. Our estimates, based on an analogous SSIV, suggest that this relationship persisted through the 21st century. Even though these two groups settled in different places, their respective political impacts were intimately connected. We revisit these connections in Section 5.3, showing how the Southern white diaspora changed the scope of race-based coalition building by the two political parties.

Alternative Identification Strategy. In addition to the suite of robustness checks on the SSIV, we also find similar results using the alternative railroad-expansion-based IV developed in Section 3. Table 5 reports estimates for the 21st century voting outcomes. Following Sequeira et al. (2020), we cluster standard errors using the Conley (1999) spatial HAC with a 200 km bandwidth and include averages of the controls used in the zeroth stage regression (see Appendix Table B.1), the log number of years since the first railroad connection relative to the year 2016, and cubic polynomials in latitude and longitude.

²⁰The results are also similar when excluding simultaneously the two states with the largest Rotemberg weights: Texas and Oklahoma. This is reassuring because these states have some important historical differences with the rest of the South and also constituted a large part of the Southern outmigration in the 1930s as a result of the Dust Bowl.

²¹The SSIV estimates for Southern whites show little difference (in magnitude or significance) with the baseline estimates omitting Southern Black migrants (see Table 2). Hence, the two Great Migration SSIVs, which are meant to isolate exogenous variation in group-specific migration flows, are indeed capturing orthogonal variation. This is consistent with the two groups’ migrant networks forming along distinct origin–destination corridors and Southern Blacks being more geographically concentrated in urban areas than Southern whites who spread across the density spectrum.

The estimated effects further substantiate our core findings. Both measures of the Southern white diaspora have sizable, significant effects on the Trump vote share in 2016 (columns 1–2) and the average Republican vote share from 2000–20 (columns 3–4). This alternative IV also leads to larger estimates than the corresponding OLS specification. The IV estimate in column 3, for example, suggests that, at the mean, a 1 p.p. increase in the Southern white share is associated with a 2.3 p.p. increase in the average Republican vote share in the 21st century. Although this is somewhat larger than the analogous SSIV estimate in Table 2, the two are statistically indistinguishable. Together, these two complementary but distinct identification strategies point to a similarly large and persistent influence of the Southern white diaspora on conservative politics across America.

Electoral Significance. The estimates in Tables 2 and 5 point to a sizable impact of the Southern white diaspora on the success of the Republican Party over the long run. Here, we provide a heuristic quantitative interpretation of these causal estimates. To motivate this, in Table 3 (see also Appendix Table C.1), we re-weight counties so as to better reflect their electoral significance. This is especially important given the unique U.S. electoral system, which bases the winner off of Electoral College (EC) votes—apportioned in favor of less-populated states—as opposed to a national “one person, one vote” system. Re-weighting by state-specific EC vote allocations (row 11) increases coefficients relative to the corresponding unweighted estimates in Table 2. This is consistent with the fact that Southern whites migrated in large numbers to more sparsely-populated Western states (see Figure 2), whose voters often have outsized representation in the EC. At the same time, migrants tended to live in population centers within states. Consistent with this, re-weighting by county population (row 12, as in Calderon et al., 2022) and total votes cast in the county (row 13, as in Autor et al., 2020) also leads to larger coefficients. While these weights may be affected directly by Southern white migration, their use makes clear that our core findings above are not driven by small, electorally unimportant counties.

Together, these results suggest that Southern white migrants had a substantial electoral influence. We illustrate this using a quantification exercise motivated by Autor et al. (2017, 2020). Given our SSIV estimates, we assess how small changes in the population share of Southern white migrants might have affected state-level two-party vote margins and hence the outcome of the general election.²² Appendix Table C.2 shows results for three elections won by Republican candidates in the 21st century. Small reductions of 10 and 20 percent in the size of the Southern white diaspora would have been enough to flip the 2000 and 2004 elections, respectively, in favor of the Democratic candidate whereas even a 30 percent reduction would not have flipped the 2016 election. While this exercise illustrates the potentially pivotal role of the Southern white diaspora, we stress that it hinges on very strong all-else-equal assumptions and that many factors could be decisive in close elections.

More-Than-Compositional Effects. Although a compositional transfer of votes across states could be sufficient to sway general election outcomes, the magnitudes of our IV estimates are consistent with each Southern white migrant causing more than one additional vote for conservatives in the 21st century. In

²²Concretely, for each county in a given election, we estimate the share of two-party votes that would have been obtained by the Democrat instead of the Republican candidate if the Southern white diaspora had been $n\%$ smaller. We first compute the county-specific product of (i) the total-vote-weighted SSIV estimate (with qualitatively similar results based on population-weighting), (ii) the Southern white share, and (iii) the total number of two-party votes. Next, we reduce the share of Southern whites in (ii) by 10, 20, and 30 percent of the actual shares and ask how much two-party vote margins change at the state and then national level accounting for the EC allocations to each state. This counterfactual does not consider the implications of those $n\%$ fewer Southern white migrants remaining in their Southern home states. Insofar as these movers were, on average, less conservative than those who stayed, their votes could have made the South less Republican but would not have been pivotal there given the wide Republican margins in the region.

the extreme case where 100% of Southern whites vote Republican and nobody else does, the mechanical effect of Southern white migration would be a one-for-one change in Republican votes (i.e., a coefficient equal to 1). In practice, the partisan differential between Southern and non-Southern whites is not so extreme. For example, prior to 1970, whites living in the South were 20 p.p. more conservative than those outside the South, according to the mean of religious, racial, and economic conservatism proxies in Table 1. Thus, in our voting regressions, while a coefficient of 1 would be an upper bound for a mechanical composition effect, the available data points to smaller thresholds, likely below 0.5.²³

Looking across the IV estimates in Tables 2–5, the coefficient magnitudes suggest more-than-compositional effects (in some cases even large enough to reject the null that they are less than or equal to 1, e.g., p-value=0.08 in column 6 of Table 2). In Section 6, we explore the demographic, social-interaction, and institutional mechanisms through which those initial Southern white migrants shaped conservative political culture across generations in the communities where they settled. These distinct but interrelated pathways clarify how the Southern white diaspora in 1940 could have such persistent influence on electoral outcomes beyond their own numerical importance in the electorate. Before getting there, we first establish how those early migrants affected partisan realignment and the birth of the New Right in the mid- to late-20th century.

4.2 Right-wing Politics and Partisan Realignment in the 20th Century

While 21st century American politics and the 2016 election in particular revealed deep cultural cleavages, the Southern white diaspora had influenced right-wing politics for many decades, with a critical turning point in the 1960s. We show here that these migrants hastened partisan realignment, as racial and religious conservatives joined economic conservatives behind the Republican Party.²⁴

We assess these long-run electoral dynamics by estimating a panel regression from 1900 to 2020:

$$\% \text{ Republican}_{ct} = \sum_{t \neq 1900}^{2020} \beta_t [\% \text{ Southern Whites}_{c,1940} \times I(\text{election} = t)] + \alpha_c + \phi_{st} + \epsilon_{ct} \quad (4)$$

where α_c and ϕ_{st} are county and state \times election-year FE, respectively, and the share of Southern whites in 1940 is interacted with election-year FE (with 1900 as the reference year). We report OLS and IV estimates and cluster standard errors at the grid cell level.²⁵ As with the results for the 2016 election, the IV estimates of β_t are often larger than the OLS ones, especially for elections after the realignment period. This is again consistent with the two possibilities described above: (i) downward bias in the OLS due to economic sorting and (ii) a LATE wherein counties with stronger chain migration (the “compliers” in the SSIV) are those with a diaspora more deeply attached to Southern culture.

The β_t coefficients in Figure 3 reveal a strong positive relationship beginning in the 1960s. The 1960s were a turning point for right-wing politics in the U.S., and the influence of Southern white

²³To illustrate why 0.5 may be a more realistic upper bound than 1, note that, according to the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) in 2017, white voters were 50 p.p. more likely to vote for Trump in 2016 in Louisiana than in Massachusetts—two states with the most extreme two-party vote differential across the North–South divide.

²⁴In the words of Gregory (2005, pp. 302-3), Southern white migrants “helped shape a new form of conservatism that changed the balance of power in American politics . . . providing not the motive for the surge of white working-class conservatism but ideas, symbols, and leaders that would give it particular shape.”

²⁵Note that the β_t coefficients prior to 1940 should not be interpreted as a pre-period in the difference-in-differences sense given that the stock of Southern white migrants in 1940 reflects many years of prior migration flows, which may have dynamically changed the voting outcomes from 1900 to 1940. See Appendix Figure A.5 for comparable estimates in pre-1940 elections based on contemporaneous variation in Southern white shares, and Appendix Figure A.6 for estimates without county FE, which effectively scales down the β_t by an amount equal to β_{1900} .

migrants during this period may have been a harbinger of change to come. Prior to that, and beginning in 1910 as the Great Migration gained momentum (see Figure 1), Southern whites are instead associated with *lower* Republican vote shares, relative to 1900—similar to their brethren in the South itself.²⁶ These long-run electoral dynamics are not driven by patterns of voter turnout, which are stable across time and vary little with Southern white migrant shares after 1940 (see Appendix Figure E.6). Nor are they an artifact of differential voting outcomes prior to 1900 (see Appendix Table A.7).

What is not immediately obvious in Figure 3 is the critical third-party showing of George Wallace in 1968. Disillusioned with the Democrat's leftward turn on civil rights, the governor from Alabama had governed on a hard-line platform of racial segregation that led to his split with the Democratic Party after running in their 1964 primary. His politics resonated with whites across the South, where he won five states, and in diaspora communities across the country; he won nearly 10% of votes in the average county outside the South (see Appendix Figure E.5 for county-level vote shares).

Table 6 bears out this significant diaspora imprint in what remains one of the strongest third-party performances in American history. In the IV specification in column 3, moving from zero to the mean Southern white share increases the Wallace vote by 1.7 p.p. relative to a mean of 9.4 p.p. Wallace ostensibly captured some of the Southern white votes that would have otherwise gone to Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate in 1968 (note in Figure 3 the drop in β_t from 1964 to 1968). While Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate in 1964, also ran a racially conservative campaign, he lacked the folksy, blue collar appeal of Wallace, which helped the latter also win over some economic moderates. In many ways, the strong Wallace performance foreshadowed the looming mass departure of Southern whites from the Democratic Party.²⁷

Indeed, just as whites in the South increasingly left the Democratic Party, so too did Southern whites in the diaspora. Kuziemko and Washington (2018) show in their Table 3 that after 1964, whites in the South were significantly more likely to stop identifying with the Democratic Party compared to whites in the non-South. In Appendix Table E.1, we provide analogous evidence of dealignment from the Democratic Party among Southern whites in the diaspora. After 1964, Southern white migrants were 7.5–8.5 p.p. less likely to identify as Democrats compared to their neighbors without Southern heritage living within the same county (columns 1–3).

Returning to Table 6, columns 4–7 suggest that the Republican Party was able to capitalize on this disaffection among formerly Democratic voters in the diaspora. Moving from zero to the mean Southern white share is associated with a 3.7 p.p. swing from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 (column 6).²⁸ This result holds when implementing the 1900-vote-share matching exercise described above (see Appendix Table A.5) and with the alternative IV strategy (see Appendix Table B.2). The Southern white migrant effect on the 1948–2000 partisan swing is on par with that predicted

²⁶The 1928 election of Herbert Hoover was an important exception, for reasons detailed in Appendix E.5. The elections of 1976 and 1980 also break the overall trend somewhat, which is plausibly due to the Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter's Southern origin and, especially, his evangelical, Southern Baptist religious affiliation. See Appendix Table A.9 for a tabular version summarizing some of the key periods in the figure.

²⁷In his biography of Wallace, Carter (1995, p. 12) notes that “The genius of George Wallace lay in his ability to link traditional conservatism to an earthy language that voiced powerful cultural beliefs and symbols with a much broader appeal to millions of Americans: the sanctity of the traditional family, the centrality of overt religious beliefs, the importance of hard work and self-restraint, the celebration of the autonomy of the local community.” In chapter 12 of the book, Carter describes the impact that Wallace had on the Nixon campaign in 1968 and its reelection strategy in 1972. There was a concerted effort by Republican strategists to identify and capture Wallace voters through deliberate messaging.

²⁸We choose 2000 as the endpoint for two reasons. First, it was a competitive election characterized by significant regional variation in party preferences, whereas the landslide elections of the 1970s–90s saw nationwide partisan swings. Second, although Nixon and Reagan successfully consolidated much of the Southern white vote, these elections were punctuated by Carter's and Clinton's (two Southern white Democratic candidates) in which that electorate remained more splintered.

by the Wallace vote share in 1968 (column 7). In other words, the diaspora may have been among the bellwether demographics, along with their brethren in the South, in leading the shift of conservative whites towards the Republican Party in the second half of the 20th century. If Wallace had been the political “weathervane in the America of the 1960s and 1970s” (Carter, 1995, p. 12), the Southern white diaspora was a key constituency driving the winds of change across the North–South divide.

As a thought experiment, the partisan swing among Southern whites estimated in Table 6 can help explain the movement of that region from solidly Democratic in the 1940s to solidly Republican by the late 1990s. Column 5 suggests that the diaspora effect may have been sufficient to explain the flip from Democrat in 1948 to Republican in 2000 across the states of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and Nevada in the West, as well as Ohio—together worth a total of 45 electoral votes by 2000.²⁹ This mirrors the exercise in Appendix Table C.2, in which just 10% fewer Southern whites in 1940 are sufficient for Bush to lose the 2000 election, and 20% fewer being sufficient for him to lose re-election in 2004.

In fact, Southern white migrants appear to have been distinctive in contributing to the success of Wallace and the trajectory of partisan realignment outside the South. While *Northern* white migrants also contributed to the New Right coalition, they did not affect partisan realignment to the same extent as Southern white migrants. Appendix Table D.2 explores these two migrant populations’ respective influences in Western states to which both groups migrated in large numbers by 1940. Columns 1–2 show that conditional on migrating to the West, an additional Southerner in 1940 is associated with a somewhat larger effect on the 2016 Trump vote share than an additional Northerner as identified through an analogous SSIV. Yet, unlike Southern white migrants, those from the North reduced support for Wallace in 1968 (columns 3–4) and had relatively limited effects on the partisan swing from 1948 to 2000 (columns 5–6). What explains this distinctive pattern? The answer may lie in economic conservatism. Long a mainstay of the Republican Party, such preferences were more pervasive among Northern white migrants than Southern white migrants, who instead brought a novel, or least amplified, religious and racial conservatism to the West (see Appendix Table D.3 for regression evidence).³⁰ These different economic policy preferences may explain why Northern white migrants reduced support for Wallace, who advocated for (white) working-class rights and populist economic policies. However, as we show in the next section, it was through an innovative bundling of racial, religious, *and* economic conservatism that the Republican Party would forge a cohesive New Right movement in the late 20th century.

Together with the analysis in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), the above results offer a new perspective on the scope of partisan realignment beginning in the 1960s. Just as Democrats lost the South, they also lost communities home to Southern-born whites *outside* the South. Ultimately, these Southern white migrants helped to solidify a new conservative white voting bloc that cut across large swathes of the country and reshaped partisan politics over the long run. We turn now to a deeper exploration of the political processes driving the formation of this new voting bloc.

5 Forging the New Right

The Southern white diaspora played an important role in the consolidation of the conservative movement beginning the mid-20th century. Both the scale and geographic scope of the diaspora helped make the

²⁹In 1948, Democratic vote margins were 0.24 p.p. in Ohio, 2.73 in Idaho, 3.11 in Nevada, 5.35 in Colorado, and 9.97 in Arizona. Given with the coefficient of 0.85 from column 5 in Table 6, Southern white shares in 1940 explain swings in those respective states of 1, 3.2, 4.5, 5.7, and 13.8 p.p.

³⁰One potential explanation for the economic conservatism of late 19th and early 20th century Northern white migrants is that they brought to the West a culture of rugged individualism opposed to taxation and redistribution (see Bazzi et al., 2020).

Republican party's all-encompassing rightward turn an effective electoral strategy. By forging a new alliance of *economic* conservatives—a perennial Republican constituency—with *racial* and *religious* conservatives, Republicans unleashed new pathways to power. This section shows how the Southern white diaspora contributed to such a unified conservative movement.

This New Right “bundle” coalesced over time, first as racially conservative voters gradually defected from the Democratic Party in the 1950s and 1960s, and later as evangelical Protestants mobilized around religious issues taken up by the Republican Party in the 1970s (Dochuk, 2010; Lowndes, 2009; Wilcox and Robinson, 2011). Both racial and religious conservatives found common cause with economic conservatives keen to limit federal government intervention. As economic conservatives pushed back against New Deal welfare programs, racial conservatives opposed federally mandated integration, and religious conservatives opposed top-down schooling initiatives and gay marriage.

This is also why the influence of the Southern white diaspora on the 1968 election was particularly important. George Wallace foreshadowed this novel alliance and was, in the words of biographer Carter (1995, p. 13), “the alchemist of the new social conservatism as he compounded [i.e., bundled] racial fear, anticommunism, cultural nostalgia, and traditional right-wing economics into a movement that laid the foundation for the conservative counterrevolution that reshaped American politics in the 1970s and 1980s.” Wallace’s strong showing outside the South was likely influential in signaling the viability, on a national scale, of Nixon’s Southern Strategy campaign for the racial conservative vote and Reagan’s subsequent Moral Majority campaign for the religious conservative vote (Lowndes, 2009).

In what follows, we show how Southern white migrants shaped this *reconfiguration* of right-wing politics as different strands of conservatism coalesced. We begin by characterizing the New Right policy bundle and its coalescence within the Republican Party. We then show that the Southern white diaspora became a bellwether for such movements nationally and contributed to the growing partisan divide in Congress since the 1970s. We close the section by showing how the two Great Migrations of Southern Blacks and whites jointly influenced this process of political change.

5.1 Characterizing the New Right Bundle

Before analyzing the role of the Southern white diaspora, we first document the bundling of economic, racial, and religious conservatism over time, as seen through congressional voting and speech. For the first two elements, we rely on House representatives’ “ideal points” according to their voting record. The economic component comes from the first dimension of DW-Nominate by Lewis et al. (2021) and the racial component from an index developed by Bateman et al. (2017).³¹ Both measures capture ideology on a left–right spectrum centered on 0, with higher scores indicating more right-wing voting patterns. To measure religious conservatism, we construct an original index based on the relative frequency of religious language in congressional speeches. For a given legislator, we total words with obvious Biblical roots—God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen—and divide the sum by all words spoken. We call this an index of relative rhetorical religiosity (RRI) with higher values being consistent with greater religiosity.³² We trace the partisan evolution of this conservative bundle over time using the three indices, appropriately standardized, as well as a composite average index.

Appendix Figure E.2 shows how the elements of the New Right bundle intensified and coalesced

³¹Unlike the second, social dimension of DW-Nominate, which is a residual category varying over time in topical coverage, the Bateman et al. (2017) index fixes the voting agenda such that only racial and civil rights legislation are considered.

³²Religious ideology is not well suited to ideal point analysis given the dearth of clear religious-related votes in Congress. See Appendix H for further discussion of the RRI.

among Republican legislators. Using congressional-district-level regressions, we plot the evolution of the average difference between Republican and Democratic legislators in levels (panels a and b) and with respect to a base year of 1940 (panels c and d). The estimates confirm the long-standing economic conservatism of the Republican Party and show an increase in relative conservatism among Republicans, as measured by our composite index (panels e and f). This is explained by the increasing concentration of religious and especially racial conservatism among Republicans. Prior to the 1960s, Democrats were slightly more likely to employ religious rhetoric.³³ Meanwhile, racial conservatives were split between parties as Democrats moved left on race after the 1930s in urban areas while maintaining pro-segregation platforms in rural areas and in the South (Feinstein and Schickler, 2008; Schickler, 2016).

By the 1960s, the Democratic Party had expanded its national, pro-redistribution platform to be more racially inclusive, and the Republican Party had begun to court disaffected racial conservatives. Nixon's Southern Strategy deployed rhetoric on crime and welfare that increased Republican appeal among conservative whites across America (Carter, 1999; Maxwell and Shields, 2019). By 1990, the average House Republican was nearly two standard deviations more racially conservative than the average Democrat, both in and outside the South.

Religious rhetoric follows a similar albeit smaller shift, with a half standard deviation swing in RRI from Democrats to Republicans over the period of study. From the mid-1980s, Republicans were consistently associated with more religious rhetoric in the House, reflecting the political mobilization of evangelicalism during the Reagan era. Together, the patterns in Appendix Figure E.2 are consistent with racial factors being a driving force behind the emergence of the New Right and the realignment process (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Lowndes, 2009; Schickler, 2016). The same conclusion holds when using 1964 as a turning point in a regression framework, as shown in Appendix Table E.4.

It is important to note that the bundling of different strands of conservative ideology was an integral part of the pathway to polarization. Appendix Figure E.3 demonstrates this connection by plotting the distribution of our composite index across representatives in the U.S. House in 1940 and again in 1990. The shift from a single peaked distribution in 1940 to a bimodal one in 1990 reflects the increased coincidence of the three dimensions within members, on both the left and right of the ideological spectrum.

The same dynamic bundling patterns can also be found on the political *demand* side, among individual voters in the ANES. Appendix Table E.2 illustrates how, after 1964, identification with the Republican Party is increasingly associated with evangelical religion and opposition to civil rights. Meanwhile, Republican voters' greater opposition to government intervention in the economy is more stable across time. However, the reasons for such opposition broadened with the mass entry of racial conservatives into the party. The Wallace-to-Nixon voters in Appendix Table E.3 provide a clear window into this race-based transformation of anti-redistribution ideology on the right. Among Nixon voters in 1972, those who voted for Wallace in 1968 express stronger opposition to advancing civil rights but no less opposition to government intervention unless that intervention supports Blacks. These voters are emblematic of those alienated by the Democratic Party as it shifted towards more racially-inclusive approaches to redistribution. Wallace's campaign in 1968 showed Republican political strategists how to capture these alienated voters and drive a wedge between class- and race-based identity.

³³Religion had been more dominant in national politics among subsets of the political left through the 1960s. For historical context, see Appendix E.2.

5.2 Southern White Migrants and New Right Representation

Having established the emergence and consolidation of a New Right bundle under the Republican Party umbrella, we now show how Southern white migrants influenced this trajectory of conservative political representation throughout the 20th century. We begin by linking the diaspora to changes in the makeup and dynamics of congressional ideology in the U.S. House. We then explore how Southern white migrants affected changes in state-level party politics. Finally, we look at long-run measures of policy demand associated with the diaspora, using 21st century survey data.

Congressional Ideology. Figure 4 reports OLS and IV estimates of a congressional-district-level specification analogous to equation (4) but with state and congress-year FE.³⁴ We focus on the period of partisan tumult from 1940–90 with outcomes being indicators for the party affiliation of the elected representative (panel a) and the aforementioned proxies for his/her racial (panel b), economic (panel c), and religious ideology (panel d). The dynamic path of coefficients further corroborates the influence of Southern whites on partisan realignment and the corresponding evolution of the New Right bundle.

First, Southern white migrants are associated with greater Democratic representation in the 1940s only to shift towards the Republican Party over time (panel a). The coefficient becomes positive and significant starting in 1970, mirroring the post-Wallace shift toward the GOP. Although Democrats were already shifting to the left on racial issues in the 1940s, even then the representatives with which Southern white migrants associated were more racially conservative (panel b). This association is persistent and seems to have grown after the 1960s.

At the same time, estimates for the first dimension of DW-Nominate, shown in panel (c), suggest a growing rightward turn on economic issues in communities home to a large Southern white diaspora. These populations thus preferred economically moderate Democrats in the 1940s only to shift towards more fiscally conservative Republicans in the 1990s, to the extent they were similarly racially conservative.³⁵ This process is consistent with a “Long Southern Strategy”: by equating welfare policy with pro-Black redistribution, Republican strategists forged a marriage of convenience between racial and economic conservatives that would prove central to the New Right coalition (Maxwell and Shields, 2019).³⁶ While such partisan shifts have been documented in prior work looking within the South (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Maxwell and Shields, 2019), our results suggest that these same shifts also took place in communities outside the South with large Southern white populations.

Finally, we see in panel (d) a related imprint of the Southern white diaspora on representatives’ religious rhetoric. Their influence seems to align closely with the growing politicization of the evangelical movement and appeals to religion among the political right after the 1960s (Chen and Lind, 2020; Williams, 2015), as discussed in Appendix E.2. The basic trends across these three dimensions of the New Right bundle hold in more demanding specifications, as shown in Appendix Table E.5.

To better understand the ideological shifts among representatives, Appendix Figure E.4 relates the

³⁴Since CD boundaries changed very frequently, harmonization may not result in stable, meaningful units of analysis (see Appendix H for details). We therefore treat CD–years as units and include state-level FE to capture time-invariant unobservables. While CD boundary changes may be endogenous to the political changes we study, such is not the case with state boundaries, which constitute the scope of our analysis of local party platforms below. We also do not control for 1900 share controls in these figures given power limitations. Instead, Appendix Table E.5 considers an alternative, more parsimonious approach to the congressional ideology IV analysis that include this initial share control.

³⁵Note that congressional ideal points are defined relative to the average representative in a given year. For instance, while favoring segregation was a racially conservative albeit mainstream position in the 1960s, such a view would be extreme today.

³⁶Southern whites appear to have had a similarly complicated relationship with the progressive movement of the early 20th century, as we discuss in Appendix E.5 and show in Appendix Table E.8.

Southern white diaspora to 13 landmark votes in the House of Representatives, spanning economic, racial, and religious issues since the late 1940s.³⁷ A “right-wing vote”, by contemporaneous standards, takes a value of one and zero otherwise. The estimates are positive and significant across all votes. To benchmark one salient example, moving from zero to the mean Southern-white migrant share is associated with a 5 p.p. increase in the likelihood that the representative votes against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (relative to a mean of 10% outside the South). We find a similar effect size in 2021 when many Republican legislators objected to the certification of President Biden’s victory.

State Party Platforms. Many of the same dynamics can be seen in state political party platforms. Historically, these local party agendas often differed significantly from those in national party platforms, and as such provide a unique lens on the role of the diaspora in affecting local politics. Appendix Table E.6 shows that, prior to 1964, Democratic and Republican state party platforms were not different on average outside the South. We document this similarity using data from Hopkins et al. (2022), examining prominent trigram phrases related to support for (i) civil rights, (ii) traditionalism, and (iii) local or small government.³⁸ These authors show that Democratic and Republican state party platforms diverged beginning in the mid-1990s just as state and national platforms began to converge within-party. Along the same lines, we find that state platforms diverged on civil rights after 1964, with Democrats becoming racially progressive, and on traditionalism and small government after 1990, with Republicans becoming more conservative.

Mirroring the patterns we observed for congressional politics, Southern white migrants helped fuel partisan divergence at the state level. Although state Republican party platforms became gradually more supportive of Civil Rights after 1964, Southern white migrants pushed against this progressive change. Appendix Table E.7 shows, using a state-level SSIV approach, that a 1 p.p. increase in Southern whites in 1940 is associated with a 4–7 p.p. decrease in the probability of pro-Civil Rights rhetoric among state Republican parties, relative to before 1964 (columns 1–3). This suggests that diaspora whites were not merely swept up in or following a nation-wide realignment of racial conservatives but rather played a direct role in fueling a grassroots shift in the direction of the Republican Party.

The diaspora played a similar role in shaping the Republican Party’s rightward turn on religion (columns 4–6) and the economy (columns 7–9), with surges in the frequency of those issues among Republican Party state platforms toward the end of the 20th century coinciding with faster increases in places that had received more Southern white migrants. In Appendix E.2, we provide in-depth historical context for these platform changes and the role of Southern whites therein.

Long-run Policy Preferences. These political supply-side responses to the local Southern white diaspora are also consistent with voter preferences in these areas. Using the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) since 2007, Appendix Table E.9 shows that residents of large-diaspora counties exhibit more conservative attitudes along dimensions of the New Right bundle, including, among others,

³⁷These include (by year) the Taft-Hartley Union Ban Act (1947); Refugee Relief Act (1953); Civil Rights Act (1964); Social Security Amendments (1965), which created Medicare and Medicaid; Voting Rights Act (1965); Equal Rights Amendment vote (1971); Equal Employment Opportunity Act (1972); Economic Recovery Tax Act (1981), i.e., the Reagan tax cuts; Deficit Control Act (1985), which formally constrained the federal budget; the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of (1993), which established background checks and waiting periods for firearms sales; Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act (2003); Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act (2010); and the 2021 Electoral College vote count, which saw widespread objections to states’ certifications of the 2020 election by allies of President Trump, in an effort to overturn the majority vote in those states. Roll calls before 1990 come from Swift et al. (2009) and after 1990 from the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives (2021). For the Electoral College vote, a representative voted “yea” if they objected to no state count.

³⁸See Appendix H for details on these trigrams and data construction.

views about the size of government and the existence of systemic racism. These results are restricted to the white population and, like the CD-level analysis, hold across counties within state.

5.3 The Great Migration(s) and Racial Coalition Change

The results thus far suggest that Southern white migrants played an important role in the forging of a New Right coalition after the 1960s that bundled racial conservatism, Christian traditionalism, and opposition to redistribution. In this section, we situate these findings with respect to another concurrent driver of political transformation: the Great Migration of Southern Blacks to the urban North and West. We show how the geographic sorting of Southern Blacks *and* whites during the Great Migration jointly galvanized changes in partisan coalitions along racial lines. Together with work by Calderon et al. (2022) on the political impacts of Southern Black migration, our findings offer a more complete picture of how the two Southern diasporas transformed the geography of partisanship in the 20th century.

We begin by augmenting equation (4) to include Southern Black migrants in 1940 instrumented with an analogous SSIV. Figure 5 reports a negative relationship between Southern migrants and Republican Party support after the New Deal. The Southern Black diaspora hastened the shift towards the Democratic Party nearly two decades before Southern white diaspora communities had turned away from the Democratic Party. The absolute coefficient for Southern Black migrants is 2–3 times larger than for Southern whites in the post-realignment period; in 2016, for example, moving from zero to the mean Southern Black share (0.4% of the total population) implies a similar effect size as a 1 p.p. increase in the Southern white share (see Appendix Table D.1). This large political imprint of the Southern Black diaspora is consistent with three possibilities: (i) Southern Black migration induced Northern white flight, which, in some cases, meant the departure of conservative white voters from a county (Boustan, 2010), (ii) Southern Black migration induced a leftward turn among more liberal whites remaining in Northern cities as Democrats built a cross-racial class-based coalition (Calderon et al., 2022), and (iii) the Black diaspora as of 1940 attracted many more Black migrants over the ensuing years who would further grow the Democratic base in urban areas.

To better understand the dynamics of partisan coalition change along racial lines, we examine how the electoral legacy of the Southern white diaspora varies with the scope for Black voter influence. We proxy for such influence using the total Black population share and local population density, both measured in 1940, and estimate heterogeneous effects of Southern white migration on the party affiliation of House Representatives (as in panel (a) of Figure 4).³⁹ We focus on partisan representation at this CD level as it tends to be more responsive to changes in the composition of local voters and their preferences.

Appendix Figure D.1 shows that prior to 1950, the Southern white diaspora exhibits similar partisan influence across CDs with above- versus below-median Black shares as of 1940. Then, during the 1950s and 1960s, these districts *diverge*. In CDs with above-median Black shares, Southern white migrants are increasingly associated with greater Republican representation, while in CDs with few Blacks, Southern whites have limited influence and, if anything, push towards Democrats. Then, by the 1970s, these districts begin to converge again, consistent with the realignment having largely played out nationally and party platforms coinciding across local and national levels. The same pattern is also present, if not slightly earlier, in a comparison of high- versus low-density CDs, which aligns with the patterns of racial sorting during the Great Migration as described earlier.

³⁹These results should be seen as more associational than causal, insofar as Southern white migrants influenced the location choices of Blacks, complicating the interpretation of these heterogeneous effects.

The timing of the effects observed in Figure 5 and Appendix Figure D.1 are consistent with the hypothesis that the New Right emerged partly as a reaction to the incorporation of Blacks into progressive Democratic Party politics in fast-growing urban areas (a reaction sometimes characterized as “backlash”, see Lowndes, 2009, for a critical discussion). Southern white diaspora communities began to move away from Democrats and towards Republicans only after Southern Blacks began to catalyze shifts in the opposite direction (see Figure 5). Although these shifts took place more prominently in higher-density locations (see Appendix Figure D.1 and Calderon et al., 2022; Schickler, 2016), it was perhaps the combination of a geographically dispersed Southern white diaspora and a geographically concentrated Southern Black diaspora that made the “Long Southern Strategy” viable at the national level and particularly advantageous under the Electoral College. The interrelated effects of these two very large migrant populations changed the landscape of partisanship across America through the 21st century. The remainder of the paper provides deeper evidence on the fundamental ways in which Southern white migrants changed local culture in favor of conservative values and politics.

6 Cultural Transmission and Change

In this final section, we explore the cultural foundations of the Southern white diaspora’s influence on conservative politics over the long run. Section 4 showed that the diaspora hastened partisan realignment and exerted outsized influence on Republican Party vote shares through the 21st century. Here, we provide evidence on how these early migrants shaped culture among their non-Southern neighbors as well as the trajectory of conservatism among future generations. These results help explain how the initial diaspora could leave such a persistent electoral legacy beyond their compositional effect.

Our analysis includes several complementary pieces. First, we identify nonlinear effects on long-run voting behavior: Southern white migrants have outsized influence in counties where they exceed 10 percent of the population. These results clarify the magnitude of causal estimates in Section 4 and offer suggestive evidence of cultural transmission beyond the initial migrants. Second, we show that, although important, population growth in the diaspora, through fertility and chain migration, cannot fully explain the magnitude of our voting estimates. Third, we find that intermarriage and residential integration between Southern and non-Southern whites may have increased the scope for Southern whites to influence voting behavior in their communities. Like Giuliano and Tabellini (2020), who report similar findings for European immigrants, we view this as suggestive of horizontal cultural transmission.

Finally, we provide direct evidence of such transmission, focusing on the diffusion of culture through religious channels. The Southern white diaspora built evangelical Protestant churches, which outlived the initial migrants and grew faster in areas with greater integration between Southern and non-Southern whites. Conservative religious media complemented these brick-and-mortar institutions by differentially entering markets with a larger Southern white diaspora and ultimately reached a wider non-Southern audience. We conclude with individual-level evidence of cultural spillovers: neighborhood-level exposure to Southern white migrants induced non-Southern parents to give their children Biblical names, consistent with a broader shift towards conservative cultural norms.

6.1 Nonlinear Voting Effects

Section 4 reported estimates of equation (1), which suggested a more-than-compositional influence of Southern white migrants on voting returns over the long run. Here, we identify nonlinear threshold

effects consistent with this outsized influence. Specifically, we estimate semiparametric analogues of equation (1) allowing the effect of Southern white migrants to take unknown form, $f(\cdot)$, which we estimate using the [Robinson \(1988\)](#) partially linear, double-residual framework. Figure 6 reports the shape of $f(\%Southern Whites_{c,1940})$ for the Republican Presidential vote share from 2000–20. Panel (a) shows the OLS estimate based on the [Robinson \(1988\)](#) framework, and (b) shows the IV estimate based on a control function approach proposed in [Su and Ullah \(2008\)](#), operationalized in [Henderson and Parmeter \(2015, p.p. 271-78\)](#), and detailed in the figure notes (see Appendix Figure F.1 for robustness).

The estimates in Figure 6 point to significant nonlinearities across the distribution of local diaspora size.⁴⁰ First, we see that the voting effects are driven by counties with above-mean (2.9%) Southern white population shares. Below that threshold, the Southern white population is perhaps too small to influence local culture and institutions dominated by non-Southern voters. Second, there appears to be a tipping point after Southern whites exceed 10 percent of the population. Following a procedure detailed in [Advani and Reich \(2015\)](#), we find statistically significant tipping at 14 percent of the population, beyond which the Republican Party vote share jumps by 4.7 p.p., continuing to grow thereafter.⁴¹ Stanislaus county in California is closest to this threshold, with 14.02 percent Southern whites in 1940, and is, in some respects, emblematic of large-diaspora counties in the Western U.S.⁴² The figures hint at another tipping point around 24–25 percent Southern white, but we are underpowered to detect such breaks (less than 2 percent of counties have more than 20 percent Southern white according to our baseline definition of Southern origins). However, when expanding that definition to include migrants from the border states as in Table 4, we see much clearer evidence of a break around 25 percent, beyond which Republican vote shares jump substantially (see panels c and f of Appendix Figure F.1).

Figure 6 suggests that Southern white migrants had disproportionate influence on voting behavior in communities where they reached a critical size. Some of this influence may arise from intergenerational diaspora growth over the long run, through fertility and chain migration. Other effects may have amplified through horizontal transmission of political culture from those in the diaspora to their non-Southern-born neighbors. We explore each of these channels in the remainder of this section.

6.2 Diaspora Growth and Intergenerational Transmission

One potential vehicle for persistent political influence lies in sustained growth of the diaspora. The initial Southern white migrants may have exerted outsized influence through differential fertility and chain migration. Even if some of the migrants shed their conservative attitudes or only partially transmit those attitudes to second-generation kids, the compositional effects of differential fertility and chain migration could be large enough to explain the more-than-compositional effects of the diaspora in 1940 on voting outcomes in the 21st century. However, the evidence in this section suggests that such demographic changes, although important, are too small to explain the magnitude of our core estimates.

⁴⁰We can reject that the curve is linear (p-value=0.04) or quadratic (p=0.09), based on the [Hardle and Mammen \(1993\)](#) test.

⁴¹This is based on a series of OLS regressions that allow the effect of $\%Southern Whites_{c,1940}$ to vary above and below some threshold τ . We vary τ in increments of 0.5 across the distribution of Southern white shares, test for the joint significance on the threshold dummy and Southern white shares above that threshold, and then identify the value of τ with the largest F statistic. Appealing to Table 1 in [Andrews \(1993\)](#), we find that the associated F statistic of 3.12 at $\tau = 14\%$ exceeds the critical value for significance at the 10% level. [Card et al. \(2008\)](#) propose identifying tipping points based on testing and training samples. Their approach, applied to neighborhoods within cities, requires a much larger sample size than available in our setting. Neither the [Card et al. \(2008\)](#) approach nor the one we use here can readily accommodate instrumental variables. Hence, we rely on OLS estimates to provide a descriptive look at potential tipping points.

⁴²Like other Western counties, Stanislaus saw a large influx of migrants in the 1930s hailing from Dust Bowl-affected areas of Oklahoma, Texas, which, together with Arkansas, comprised 84 percent of its Southern white population by 1940.

Appendix Table F.1 reveals roughly one-for-one diaspora growth through both fertility and chain migration. For each Southern-born migrant in 1940, we observe 0.92–1.16 additional second-generation children as a share of kids outside the South (columns 2 and 4). Conditional on the 1900 Southern white share, we cannot reject that the coefficient is less than or equal to one, which implies limited scope for differential fertility to cause more-than-proportional growth of the population with Southern ancestry. Similarly, we cannot reject that the coefficient on chain migration is less than or equal to one in 1970 (column 6) or 2000 (column 8). This suggests that the growth from the initial first-generation diaspora in 1940 to the first-generation diaspora observed 30 to 60 years later was not significantly larger than one-for-one. Chain migration was crucial in sustaining diaspora ties to Southern culture, but it was not strong enough, in the average county, to create an even larger diaspora over the long run.

To better understand the political legacy of vertical cultural transmission, we augment our measure of the Southern white migrant share in 1940 in equation (1) to include the second generation. Appendix Table F.2 relates this combined first- and second-generation diaspora to the Republican vote share in the 2000s. In the IV estimates, we use the original SSIV based on those born in the South, and the LATE therefore includes the fertility effects in Table F.1. Looking across columns, the coefficients are somewhat smaller than the analogous estimates in Table 2 and significantly different in the IV case conditional on 1900 Southern white shares (columns 3 and 6). This suggests that the second-generation of Southern whites living outside the South have more limited influence on long-run conservative vote shares than their parents. This is consistent with (i) the second generation having more limited tenure and hence scope for influencing non-Southerners in the destination communities, and (ii) available evidence on the *partial* intergenerational transmission of political attitudes within families.⁴³

In sum, both second-generation Southern migrants and subsequent chain migrants from the South shaped electoral outcomes in diaspora communities, but the magnitude of demographic change through these two channels is arguably too limited to explain the large and persistent effects of the initial diaspora in 1940.⁴⁴ Our estimates suggest that those initial migrants from the South catalyzed a long-run process of political change that exceeded their compositional share in the electorate. We turn now to evidence of where that disproportionate impact materialized and then show how Southern whites transmitted conservative cultural norms to non-Southern voters.

6.3 Social Integration

We show here that the political influence of Southern whites varies depending on how much they interact with non-Southerners. Horizontal cultural transmission across groups can occur in many settings, including interactions between neighbors and mixing in the marriage market. If Southern whites lived in isolated enclaves, their opportunities to transmit conservative values to non-Southerners would be limited. In Appendix Table F.3, we explore the role of social integration in amplifying horizontal transmission. Our analysis relies on two proxies for integration. The first measures the rate of intermarriage between Southern and non-Southern-born whites. The second measures residential integration, based

⁴³Jennings et al. (2009) estimate intergenerational correlations in partisan affiliation of around 0.34–0.55.

⁴⁴Another potentially important demographic mechanism might stem from the role of Southern white migrants in crowding out minority, and especially Black, populations from the county through exclusionary policies and racially-biased institutions. We discussed evidence along these lines in an initial version of this paper (Bazzi et al., 2021) as well as in Bazzi et al. (2022b). Given those minority groups lean strongly Democratic post-realignment, such population changes might further contribute to the sizable effects of the Southern white diaspora on long-run Republican support. However, if these changes were large enough to explain our findings, then we would have plausibly seen a bigger drop in the IV coefficient for Southern whites when accounting for the causal effects of Southern Black migration (in Figure 5 and Appendix Table D.1).

on the [Logan and Parman \(2017\)](#) next-door-neighbor segregation measure. Both measures are adjusted for relative population shares and hence can be interpreted as integration beyond random matching.

Of course, both of these measures may be jointly determined with political outcomes. For example, non-Southern whites may be more likely to intermarry Southern white migrants if they share similar political preferences. Yet, if horizontal transmission is an important mechanism, then we should observe the electoral influence of Southern whites being larger in places where they mix more frequently with non-Southerners. Even if horizontal transmission is confounded by endogenous assortative matching, such matching has the potential to build a larger and more cohesive conservative voting bloc than would have emerged had Southern whites not migrated to the county in such large numbers. A related concern is that our findings may reflect horizontal transmission in the other direction, from non-Southern to Southern whites. While such transmission may be important, our IV estimates account for endogenous sorting *across* counties, and in [Section 6.5](#), we report causal exposure effects indicating transmission of religious conservatism from Southern white migrants to non-Southerners *within* counties.

[Appendix Table F.3](#) shows that Southern white migrants in 1940 are associated with more Republican voting over the long run in counties where they lived closer to and intermarried more frequently with non-Southerners. Greater mixing in housing and marriage markets is associated with greater support for the Republican Party (columns 1–2, 5–6). A one standard deviation (s.d.) increase in intermarriage (adjusted for random matching) is associated with around 2 p.p. more Republican votes, and a similar magnitude holds for residential integration. Moreover, such mixing is associated with an amplification of Southern white migrant influence (columns 3–4, 7–8). Southern whites have a roughly 25% larger association with Republican vote shares in counties with 1 s.d. higher intermarriage and a roughly 10% larger association in counties with 1 s.d. greater residential integration.

Together, the results in [Appendix Table F.3](#) are consistent with cultural spillovers between Southern and non-Southern populations mixing within neighborhoods and households. Although suggestive, these results do not yet clarify which social institutions may be facilitating such spillovers or the direction of those spillovers. We now show direct evidence on these two dimensions.

6.4 Evangelicalism and Media

Religion was an important feature of culture and politics in the diaspora. According to historians, Southern whites were instrumental in diffusing evangelical Protestantism beyond the South ([Gregory, 2005](#); [Woodberry and Smith, 1998](#)). Evangelical churches belonging to Southern Baptist and Pentecostal denominations were pervasive in diaspora communities across America in the mid-20th century ([Dochuk, 2010](#)). Evangelical congregants and leaders later became active in politics, motivated by moral issues such as sex education as well as perceived government overreach in various domains, including civil rights. While religious interests were not prominent in U.S. politics for much of the 20th century, this activism found appeal among many non-Southerners and non-evangelicals, and ultimately led to the formation of a “Christian Right” electoral coalition, which became influential in the late 1970s and came to be associated with the national Republican Party ([Wilcox and Robinson, 2011](#)).

In this section, we show that Southern whites provided the leadership and congregant foundations of evangelical expansion and innovation outside the South. First, we identify sizable diaspora effects on evangelical church formation. Second, we identify a complementary effect on the diffusion of conservative media, which have long been a key mouthpiece for the religious right. Together with the micro-level evidence of horizontal transmission in [Section 6.5](#), these results offer clear evidence that Southern white

migrants helped to spread religious traditionalism and expand the conservative vote beyond the diaspora.

Evangelical Institution Building. Evangelical churches, like many others, can be a focal point of social life and key vehicles for cultural transmission outside the home. We begin by connecting Southern white migrants to the spread of evangelical Protestantism. We use the censuses of churches from [The Association of Religious Data Archives \(2021\)](#) and follow [Steensland et al. \(2000\)](#) in defining evangelicals, the most prominent being Southern Baptists. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 show that a 1 p.p. increase in the Southern white share in 1940 is associated with 0.8–1.2 p.p. (or 10%) greater evangelical affiliation in 2010. As with the voting outcomes in Section 4.1, these estimates could reasonably be taken to imply a more-than-one-for-one effect size, with Southern whites in the diaspora having both compositional and transmission effects on the prevalence of evangelicalism outside the South.⁴⁵ Indeed, we find similar evidence that Southern white integration with non-Southerners, through marital and residential mixing, was key in spreading evangelicalism beyond the South, as shown in Appendix Table F.4.

Much of this church-building took place far earlier, during the Great Migration period. As early as 1952, we find a sizable Southern white influence on evangelical church presence (columns 3–4). The IV estimate appears larger than the OLS, and although statistically indistinguishable, this pattern is consistent with a LATE interpretation discussed in Section 4: those counties with the strongest chain migration, identified by the shift share, are places that attracted migrants most attached to Southern evangelical values and to the diaspora networks that sustain and uphold those values.

Table 8 provides further, individual-level evidence consistent with Southern whites playing a leadership role in building this novel religious infrastructure outside the South. In both 1900 and 1940, Southern white migrants were significantly more likely to work in religious occupations (e.g., clergy) than were other residents within the same county (columns 1–2). These estimates, based on complete-count Census data, suggest scope for disproportionate Southern influence on religious institutions.

The expansion of the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) was especially noteworthy. The Baptist church split on the issue of slavery in 1845, and the SBC did not allow its members to establish churches outside the South until the 1940s. As a result, it is difficult to measure evangelicalism outside the South before this time. Those in the diaspora either remained independent or became part of smaller, sometimes informal Baptist denominations. This all changed in the 1940s as SBC churches began to flourish outside the South. Indeed, the occupational sorting of Southern white migrants into religious leadership resonates with the account by [Gregory \(2005, p. 209\)](#) of early SBC leaders in California beckoning, in 1942, for Southern Baptist preachers to head west to tend to the growing flock of “Southern Baptists . . . sheep scattered abroad not having a shepherd.”

The early diaspora imprint on evangelical church formation persists through the late 1900s (columns 5–8 of Table 7). To put these estimates in perspective, an increase of 150–200 Southern white migrants per 10,000 residents in 1940 is associated with approximately one new evangelical church per 10,000 residents. The stability of coefficients from 1952 to 2010 suggests that these institutions spread through the diaspora in the mid-20th century and survived long after the initial migrants had passed.

A large literature on American religion suggests that evangelical churches are important conduits for ideological transmission.⁴⁶ Churches are useful for disseminating not only religious values but also

⁴⁵In particular, Appendix Figure G.4 shows that evangelical affiliation among Southern whites in the South (in the diaspora) is around 40 p.p. (20 p.p.) higher than non-Southern-born whites before 1970. This suggests that a reasonable benchmark for compositional effects lies somewhere in the 0.2–0.4 p.p. range. Of course, if all Southern whites in the diaspora identify as evangelical, then the testing benchmark could be as much as 1 p.p., but that seems unduly extreme, just as it did for voting.

⁴⁶A theoretical literature in economics on religion can help explain the persistence of evangelical attitudes within churches

broader moral and political ones (Wald et al., 1988). Evangelicals became increasingly political on the right in the second half of the 20th century, espousing conservative stances on moral issues (e.g., gay marriage, abortion) as well as the role of government, such as in aiding the poor or promoting racial equity (McKenzie and Rouse, 2013; Williams, 2015). Today, evangelical voters are significantly more likely to vote for right-wing candidates.⁴⁷ Together, our results suggest an important role of Southern white migrants in the evolution of religious politics across America.

Conservative Media. A related channel through which Southern white migrants transmitted their political preferences, and culture more broadly, is via their media consumption. To the extent that Southern whites preferred radio programs prone to right-wing politics or religious sermonizing, diaspora communities would have increased demand for such media outside the South. With time, this could result in greater exposure to novel, conservative media voices among non-Southerners. We explore this mechanism by linking the Southern white diaspora to the geography of right-wing talk radio programs. Talk radio has arguably been an important factor supporting the growth of the New Right in American politics since the 1990s. However, the advent of right-wing talk radio in its modern form goes back nearly a century, to religious leaders such as Charles Coughlin and Carl McIntire (Matzko, 2020; Wang, 2021). Their conservative stances attracted audiences in the tens of millions.

Our analysis in Table 9 relates a county's share of Southern white migrants in 1940 to the presence of a radio station broadcasting (i) Carl McIntire's *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* talk radio show during its run from the late 1950s through the early 1970s, and (ii) the *Rush Limbaugh Show* as of 2020. Both shows were broadcast from over 600 stations at their peak with McIntire directly broadcasting in 12% of counties and Limbaugh in 17%. The relationship with the Southern white diaspora is similar across both commentators. In the IV specifications, a 1 p.p. increase in the share of Southern white migrants implies a 2 p.p. increase in the probability that a county had a radio station carrying McIntire's show half a century ago and Limbaugh's show in 2020 (columns 2 and 5). This suggests a plausible connection between Southern white migrants and local media consumption outside the South. We find such a connection not only in radio but also in television: a one p.p. increase in the Southern white share as of 1940 is associated, albeit imprecisely, with a 0.5–0.8 p.p. increase in the share of CCES respondents stating that Fox News is the fairest and most balanced news channel (columns 7–9).

We also uncover individual-level evidence of Southern whites shaping media production through occupational choices. Table 8 shows that Southern white migrants sorted into radio and other media occupations in the early 20th century. Like McIntire and other prominent right-wing media evangelists of Southern origin, such as Billy James Hargis and Pat Robertson, Southern white migrants selected into the media sector. Early migrants were significantly more likely to work at newspapers than other residents within the same county (column 3). By 1940, radio and TV had become more attractive as Southern whites differentially sorted into occupations such as radio broadcasting (columns 5–6). These results are consistent with Southern whites playing an important role, both as consumers and producers, in developing a novel media infrastructure in communities outside the South.

across generations and their transmission within broader communities. By limiting members' exposure to the "mainstream" (e.g., public education, secular media), churches regulate cultural transmission as well as cultivate investment by members in the production of religious services (Carvalho, 2016, 2019; Iannaccone, 1992, 1994). For evangelicals, these include "evangelizing," i.e., efforts to preach the Christian gospel *beyond* the church.

⁴⁷Survey data confirms the link between evangelicalism and right-wing political participation. For instance, white evangelicals favored Trump by a 4 to 1 ratio in 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2016). Trump support similarly increased with church attendance, and among white evangelicals, support for Trump's presidency increased with church attendance (Pew Research Center, 2017). See Wilcox and Robinson (2011) for more on right-wing political participation among evangelicals.

6.5 Exposure Effects: Micro Evidence of Horizontal Cultural Transmission

The results thus far suggest that Southern white migrants may have shaped cultural and political attitudes of their *non-Southern* neighbors through the diffusion of evangelical churches and right-wing media.⁴⁸ In this final section, we provide direct, individual-level evidence of cultural change induced by exposure to Southern white migrants. Our empirical strategy draws on recent innovations in the study of historical place-based exposure effects. We combine a names-based measure of culture with variation in exposure to Southern white migrants among non-Southern households that move across state lines. We show that non-Southern parents are more likely to give their children Biblical names after moving to locations with larger Southern white shares. Biblical name choices contain a strong signal of religiosity: as a validation check, we show in Appendix Table F.5 that white, U.S.-born children with fathers working in religious occupations are 6–9 p.p. more likely to have a Biblical name relative to a mean of around 15 percent for children with fathers in other occupations living within the same county.⁴⁹

We examine how non-Southern white parents name their children before and after moving, as a function of the share of Southern whites at destination. Our approach follows the mover-based strategy in Bazzi et al. (2020). We pool children born to white non-Southern parents across Census periods $\tau = \{1910, \dots, 1940\}$ (i.e., cohorts 1901–40). We then consider households with at least two children: one born in the household’s state of residence as of time τ and one born in a different state earlier in the same Census period. To avoid double counting, we restrict to children aged 0–9. We then estimate the time of household move, $\tilde{\tau}$, as the midpoint between the birth years of the children born in different states, where child year of birth is defined as $\tilde{\tau} + j$ for possible $j = -9, \dots, 9$.⁵⁰ The final sample includes 2,491,260 white children of non-Southern parents in 846,073 households.

We estimate the following equation, which relates the given name of child i to whether their household h had yet moved to non-Southern county c at their time of birth $\tilde{\tau} + j$, interacted with location ℓ ’s Southern white share in the previous (pre-move) Census period, $\tau - 1$:

$$\text{Biblical name}_{iht\tau} = \theta_h + \beta \% \text{ Southern Whites}_{\ell, \tau-1} \times \text{Born After Move}_i + \mathbf{X}'_{i\tau} \gamma + \varepsilon_{iht\tau}, \quad (5)$$

where we consider the *% Southern Whites* in the county ($\ell = c$) and in the local neighborhood n ($\ell = n$) defined as the 20 households surrounding h with 10 on each side in the enumeration listing (following Brown et al., 2021). The household fixed effects, θ_h , absorb origin Southern white shares and other characteristics of h ’s destination county, as well as all time-invariant characteristics of h , including its cultural attitudes, its place of origin, and factors affecting destination choice.⁵¹ The $\mathbf{X}_{i\tau}$ vector includes

⁴⁸ Additionally, Appendix F.5 provides descriptive evidence that the diaspora helped diffuse country music and barbecue cuisine beyond the South. While not necessarily instrumental for politics, such cultural markers provide another window into the far-reaching process of Southernization described by historians.

⁴⁹ We extract from `behindthename.com` a comprehensive list of names featured in the Bible. These names span common and uncommon names in the population. In 1940, for example, popular Biblical names included John and Mary, while popular non-Biblical names included William and Charles. Among less popular names, Biblical ones included Sarah and Ruth, while non-Biblical ones included Lillian and Frances (see Table 6 in Ferrara and Testa, 2022).

⁵⁰ Consider, for example, a household on the Oregon coast in 1910 with four children: Lawrence born in 1901, Henrietta in 1903, John in 1907, and Marie in 1910. We see Lawrence and Henrietta are born in Minnesota and John and Marie in Oregon. Hence, we impute $\tilde{\tau} = 1905$ and $j = -4$ for Lawrence, -2 for Henrietta, $+2$ for John and $+5$ for Marie. While one can also use linked samples of households to track movers, the approach we use here, based on differences in children’s states of birth, yields a much larger sample (roughly 2.5 million compared to 723 thousand).

⁵¹ In contrast to Bazzi et al. (2020), in which all pre-move (post-move) children were born in non-frontier (frontier) counties, here there may be a positive correlation between origin and destination county Southern white shares. Household fixed effects, which absorb origin Southern white shares, are thus important to avoid some of the bias arising from such correlation. For robustness, we address remaining biases by taking the difference between origin and destination Southern white shares.

the child’s sex, birth order, birth period, and dummies for child birth year relative to the time of the move, j . Standard errors are clustered by the contemporaneous destination county.

In panel (a) of Table 10, the baseline estimate in column 1 reveals that a 1 p.p. increase in Southern white migrant shares at the county level is associated with a 0.13 p.p. increase in the probability that parents give their children a Biblical name, relative to a child born prior to the move. Going from zero to the mean Southern white share (3 percent) thus implies a nearly 0.4 p.p. increase in the likelihood of religious name choices, relative to a mean of 15. Put differently, this effect explains 7 percent of the gap between children named by fathers working in religious occupations and those working non-religious occupations. This core result is robust to a subsample of households moving from Northern, Union territory to Western states (column 2), accounting for correlation in the share of Southern whites between origin state and destination county (column 3), addressing confounding effects on individualistic name choices (column 4), and including more granular birth period fixed effects (column 5).

Moreover, we find similar estimates in panel (b) of Table 10 based on neighborhood-level exposure. One additional Southern white neighbor (out of 20) is associated with roughly a 0.2–0.3 p.p. increase in the likelihood that a non-Southern parent gives their child a Biblical name. Appendix Table F.6 shows that this is robust to the inclusion of county FE \times born-after-move, effectively leveraging variation in exposure to Southern whites across neighborhoods within counties. While we cannot rule out a role for endogenous sorting across neighborhoods within counties, the combined results in panels (a) and (b) highlight the potential for localized intergroup contact to foster cultural change.

A causal interpretation of $\hat{\beta}$ implies that greater exposure to Southern white migrants at destination induced a shift towards more religious names among whites without Southern heritage. The key identifying assumption is that, within households, the likelihood of Biblical name-giving would have followed parallel trends had the household not moved to a location with a high Southern white population share. One important concern lies in the possibility of confounding, time-varying shocks to household h that cause it to move to locations with a high Southern white share and increase the parent’s propensity to give their later-born children Biblical names.

Using the following event-study specification, we not only elucidate the dynamics of religious names among movers but also provide evidence in support of the identifying assumptions:

$$\text{Biblical name}_{ihc\tau} = \theta_h + \sum_{j=-9}^9 \beta_j [\% \text{ Southern Whites}_{\ell,\tau-1} \times 1(\text{born in } \tilde{\tau} + j)] + \mathbf{X}'_{i\tau} \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \varepsilon_{ihc\tau}, \quad (6)$$

which allows the β in equation (5) to vary with the child birth year relative to the household move, $j = -9, \dots, 9$. Figure 7 reports estimates of β_j for relatively balanced event years, $j = -5, \dots, 5$.

Several findings point to a causal, exposure-based interpretation. First, we find limited evidence of pre-trends in Biblical naming patterns based on Southern white shares in the eventual destination county (panel a) and neighborhood (panel b; see Appendix Figure F.2 for a specification with county FE \times born-after-move). In other words, while more religious non-Southern households may be drawn to locations with a large Southern white diaspora, such selection does not significantly vary across the periods leading up to the move. Second, we see significant growth in Biblical names within non-Southern households after moving to locations with more Southern whites. Third, that growth did not happen instantaneously but rather increased dynamically over time as opportunities for contact and interactions with Southern white neighbors increased. This pattern goes against concerns about a confounding shock at the time of moving, which would imply an immediate jump in Biblical name choices rather than the gradual

increase more consistent with an exposure-based mechanism.

Together, these results suggest that Southern white migrants transmitted religious cultural norms to non-Southern populations outside the South. This individual-level evidence resonates with the diffusion of evangelical Christianity across diaspora communities. Having documented exposure effects in one of the important domains of Southern white culture, it seems plausible that other domains beyond religion could also have causally changed as a result of greater contact with the Southern white diaspora.

7 Conclusion

Millions migrated out of the American South in the 20th century. Scholars have written extensively about the Great Migration of Southern Blacks. Much less is known about the Great Migration of Southern whites. This paper provides a systematic empirical account of how Southern white migrants transformed politics and culture across the United States. We provide descriptive and causal evidence on the role of the Southern white diaspora in facilitating cultural changes that would redefine and reinvigorate the conservative movement. These migrants, dispersed and influential as they were, paved the way for a successful racially conservative politics on the right. Media and evangelical religion provided important later vehicles for Southern white influence, which, in turn, hastened partisan realignment and reshaped the political landscape along a pathway running through George Wallace to Donald Trump.

Our study suggests that some of America's deep cultural divides and growing polarization may have roots in the Great Migration. In ongoing work, we explore the microfoundations of Southern white influence on the geography of race and racism across America (Bazzi et al., 2022a). In that work, we also consider the role of former slaveowners in shaping the institutional and cultural foundations of racism outside the South. This new research, combined with the present study, offers a new empirical take on the long-run process of Southernization noted by historians and popular observers. While Southern migrants were not necessarily the instigators of cultural change everywhere they settled, they undoubtedly shaped its evolution locally and perhaps even nationally. Our research agenda aims to elucidate this historical process and ultimately help inform public debate across an ever-widening cultural divide in America.

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
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Figures


Figure 1: Southern-born Whites and Blacks Living Outside the South, 1850–2010




Notes: The graph plots the number of white and Black individuals born in the South who reside outside the South in a given Census year between 1850 and 2010. Percentages for select years that are central to our analyses are expressed relative to the total white or Black Southern population to show the magnitudes of the Southern outmigration over time by group. We define Southern states as those belonging to the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma. The data for the graph was taken from [Ruggles et al. \(2020\)](#). For Southern-born individuals, the dashed lines were produced using the full-count Census files and the solid lines were produced using the 1% samples (1910-70 and 2000-10) multiplied by 100 and the 5% samples (1980, 1990) multiplied by 20. The period of overlap between the full-count and 1% samples from 1910 to 1940 was chosen to show that the scaled IPUMS samples match the full-count data.

Figure 2: Mapping Southern-born Whites and Blacks Outside the South in 1940

(a) Southern Whites




(b) Southern Blacks



Notes: This figure maps the county-level population share of (a) white and (b) Black individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1940 according to the full-count 1940 Census. The legend shows the identical intervals considered for each split.


Figure 3: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Republican Presidential Vote Share, 1900–2020




Notes: Coefficients from panel OLS and IV regressions of vote share for the Republican candidate in 31 U.S. presidential elections between 1900 and 2020 on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Data on presidential election outcomes come from [MIT Election Data and Science Lab \(2018\)](#), the presidential election atlas for years after 1912 ([Leip, 2021](#)), and the election dataset compiled by [Clubb et al. \(2006\)](#) for 1912 and prior. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Regression includes county and state \times election year fixed effects, based on equation (4). The coefficients from these share effects are expressed relative to the base year 1900. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). For estimates based on contemporaneous variation in Southern white shares for pre-1940 elections and for estimates with controls, including an interacted 1900 Southern white share control, see Appendix Figures A.5 and A.6, respectively. See Appendix Table A.9 for an alternative, more parsimonious approach to the analysis that controls for 1900 controls and 1900 Southern white shares.

Figure 4: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Congressional Ideology, 1940–1990


(a) Republican Party Affiliation (OLS and IV)




(b) Bateman et al. (2017) Racial Conservatism Index (OLS and IV)



(c) DW-Nominate Economic Conservatism Index (OLS and IV)




(d) Religious Rhetoric Index, Congressional Speech (OLS and IV)




Notes: Coefficients from pooled OLS and IV regressions, respectively, of (a) an indicator for legislator party affiliation (Republican = 1) in the U.S. House, (b) congressional ideal points from [Bateman et al. \(2017\)](#), based on racial and civil rights voting patterns, (c) congressional ideal points from the time-varying DW-Nominate score (dimension 1) by [Lewis et al. \(2021\)](#), covering economic issues, and (d) our relative religious rhetoric (RRI) scores on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940. RRI scores are calculated by totaling a legislator's words with Biblical roots—God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen—and dividing the sum by the total words spoken. All regressions include Congress and state fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 is interacted with the Congress fixed effect. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. See Appendix Table E.5 for an alternative, more parsimonious approach to the congressional ideology analysis that controls for 1900 Southern white shares.

Figure 5: Southern Blacks and Whites and Republican Presidential Vote Share

(a) Panel OLS estimates




(b) Panel IV estimates




Notes: Coefficients from pooled OLS and IV regressions of vote share for the Republican candidate in 31 U.S. presidential elections between 1900 and 2020 on the shares of Southern white migrants and Southern Black migrants in all non-Southern counties. All regressions include state \times election year fixed effects. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011).

Figure 6: Semiparametric Estimates—Average Republican Vote Share, 2000–20

(a) OLS




(b) IV



Notes: This figure reports semiparametric estimates of equation (1) using the [Robinson \(1988\)](#) partially linear estimator. The graphs show the resulting regression curve and 95% confidence intervals based on a local linear regression. In panel (a), the OLS specification is based on a local linear estimator with an Epanechnikov kernel and optimal bandwidth. In the panel (b), the IV specification is based on a semiparametric IV procedure developed in [Su and Ullah \(2008\)](#) and operationalized as a control function estimator by [Henderson and Parmeter \(2015\)](#): (i) we estimate a first stage [Robinson \(1988\)](#) regression based on a local cubic estimator, (ii) we include the residual Southern white share from that first stage estimator and include that as a regressor in the second stage, (iii) we estimate the second stage [Robinson \(1988\)](#) regression with local linear estimator, Epanechnikov kernel, and an optimal bandwidth. In both panels, we include the full set of covariates used in columns 5 and 7 of Table 2. While all counties are included in the estimation, for presentational purposes, the graphs only report those with less than 30 percent Southern white share in 1940.

Figure 7: Horizontal Transmission: Exposure to Southern Whites and Religious Child Names



Notes: This figure isolates within-household, cross-child variation in parental exposure to Southern white migrants in the destination county in panel (a) and the neighborhood within the county in panel (b) where the neighborhood for household h is defined as 20 households around h , 10 on each side in the enumeration listing (following [Brown et al., 2021](#)). Each graph reports estimates of β_j and 95% confidence intervals in equation (5) for $j = -5, \dots, 5$. Each β_j can be interpreted as the differential effect of exposure to Southern white migrants on the likelihood of a biblical name given to a child born j years before/after their non-Southern-born parents moved to the county, relative to a child born one year prior to the household move. The sample includes 2,491,260 white, U.S.-born children of non-Southern-born parents in 846,073 households with at least one child born before the move and at least one born after the move. The mean (standard deviation) of the Southern white share in panel (a) is 1.8 (2.7) and in panel (b) is 2.8 (5.9). Estimates control for household fixed effects as well as child sex, birth order, and birth decade fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county.

Tables

Table 1: Relative Attitudes of Southern Whites Outside the South

Dependent Variable:	Religious		Racial			Economic	
	Identify as Evangelical (1)	Believe Bible is literal word of God (2)	Favor any segregation (3)	Oppose residential integration (4)	Oppose school integration (5)	Oppose gov't intervention for any (6)	Oppose gov't intervention for Blacks (7)
Southern White	0.199*** (0.037)	0.095** (0.039)	0.094** (0.039)	0.089** (0.035)	0.106*** (0.037)	-0.034 (0.034)	0.120*** (0.045)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey waves	1960-70	1964-68	1964-70	1964-70	1964-70	1956-68	1964-68
Observations	4,603	1,924	2,458	2,908	2,680	4,087	1,630
Counties	118	95	96	97	97	116	92
Control outcome mean	0.15	0.47	0.47	0.26	0.45	0.46	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.11	0.08	0.14	0.07	0.14	0.03

Notes: Regressions of survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES), applicable waves through 1970, on a dummy for whether a white respondent is from any of the twelve excluded Southern sending states. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Our definition of Southern whites includes those respondents that were born and/or grew up in the South. Each dependent variable is a binary outcome equal to one if the respondent answered affirmatively to the given question. The control outcome mean is the mean of the dependent variable for non-Southern whites. Sample excludes respondents living in the South as well as non-whites. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. All regressions include county and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Presidential Vote Shares in the 21st Century

(a) Dependent Variable: Trump Vote Share, 2016							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.395*** (0.105)	0.632*** (0.076)	1.004*** (0.257)	1.026*** (0.167)	0.853*** (0.155)	1.779*** (0.563)	1.530*** (0.435)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share control						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.7	62.6	62.7
Adj. R ²	0.42	0.67					
F-statistic			109.1	115.0	100.9	10.2	10.7
Anderson-Rubin, p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
KP Underident., p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.007

(b) Dependent Variable: Republican Vote Share Average, 2000–20							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.381*** (0.107)	0.549*** (0.067)	0.810*** (0.231)	0.887*** (0.148)	0.737*** (0.138)	1.627*** (0.503)	1.396*** (0.390)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share control						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,887	1,885	1,887	1,885	1,883	1,885	1,883
Outcome mean	59.4	59.4	59.4	59.4	59.5	59.4	59.5
Adj. R ²	0.42	0.65					
F-statistic			109.5	115.4	100.9	10.2	10.7
Anderson-Rubin, p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
KP Underident., p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.007

Notes: Regressions of (a) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election and (b) Republican vote share averages across the 2000–20 presidential elections on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties (mean of 2.9%). Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Columns 3–7 instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Historical controls for 1900 include log population density (per square mile), percent employed in manufacturing, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy. Additional controls capturing sorting correlates include vote shares for Breckinridge in 1860 and Jennings Bryan in 1896, dummies for whether a county was unincorporated and “unsettled,” (i.e., < 2 persons per square mile) as of 1860, dummies for any major oil fields (as of 1900 and 1940) and for any mines, measures of cotton and overall agricultural potential, and a set of geographic controls (for elevation, ruggedness, distance to coast, and distance to nearest river). Columns 6 and 7 also control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). The Anderson-Rubin p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the endogenous regressor is statistically significant and that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the Kleibergen-Paap LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Selected Identification and Robustness Checks on IV Estimates in Table 2

	Dependent Variable:	
	Trump Vote Share, 2016 (1)	Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20 (2)
<i>Alternative Standard Errors</i>		
1. Baseline (column 4 of Table 2)	1.026***	0.887***
Bester et al. (2011) 60 mi ² grid-cell	(0.168)	(0.148)
Conley (1999) 500 km spatial HAC	(0.280)	(0.227)
Adao et al. (2019) SSIV adjustment	(0.102)	(0.070)
2. Baseline w/ Initial 1900 Shares (column 6 of Table 2)	1.779***	1.627***
Bester et al. (2011) 60 mi ² grid-cell	(0.563)	(0.503)
Conley (1999) 500 km spatial HAC	(0.965)	(0.882)
Adao et al. (2019) SSIV adjustment	(0.510)	(0.415)
<i>Varying Control Sets</i>		
3. No Controls or Fixed Effects	0.720**	0.983***
	(0.291)	(0.265)
4. Initial 1900 Share Control Only	2.072**	1.709**
	(0.924)	(0.776)
5. 1900 Controls and Initial 1900 Share Control	1.217**	0.995**
	(0.574)	(0.497)
6. Post-LASSO w/ Baseline + Initial 1900 Share Controls (column 6 of Table 2)	2.150***	1.969***
	(0.762)	(0.679)
7. Post-LASSO with All Controls (column 7 of Table 2)	2.106***	1.869***
	(0.770)	(0.636)
<i>Alternative SSIV Construction</i>		
8. Push-Factor SSIV with Origin County Shares	1.499*	1.505*
	(0.877)	(0.824)
<i>Matching Exercises</i>		
9. Baseline w/ Initial 1900 Shares + within-State County Pair FE Matched on 1900 Vote Share	1.256***	1.218**
	(0.469)	(0.482)
10. Baseline w/ Initial 1900 Shares + within-State County Pair FE Matched on 1870 Southern White Shares	2.984**	2.796**
	(1.282)	(1.241)
<i>Electoral Importance Re-Weighting</i>		
11. Weighting by State's Electoral College Votes	2.258***	2.324***
	(0.746)	(0.747)
12. Weighting by 1940 Population	2.283**	2.706**
	(1.063)	(1.058)
13. Weighting by Total County Votes	2.662**	3.051**
	(1.175)	(1.229)

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 using a variety of robustness specifications. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of controls. All regressions include state fixed effects, except for row 3. All rows instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011), with the first two rows also reporting standard errors based on the Conley (1999) spatial HAC with a very wide bandwidth of 500 km and the Adao et al. (2019) adjustment for SSIV estimators. See Appendix Table A.4 for a larger set of alternative inference approaches. Rows 6–7 choose optimal controls from these sets using the Belloni et al. (2014) double LASSO procedure. This procedure first runs a LASSO regression of the Southern white share on the set of controls, their squares, and cross-interaction terms. It then does the same using the given outcome. Lastly, it runs the IV regression using all of the controls that were selected in the first two steps. Row 8 uses a shift-share IV based on origin-county instead of origin-state shares (see Appendix Table A.3 for more details). Rows 9–10 control for county pairs within states matched on similarity in (i) 1900 Republican presidential vote shares and (ii) 1870 Southern white shares (see Appendix Tables A.5 and A.6). Rows 11–13 weight regressions by (i) state electoral votes in 2016 and 2000, (ii) county population in 1940, and (iii) total county votes in 2016 and 2000 (see Appendix Table C.1). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Varying Treatment of Border States, Extending Table 2

	Dependent Variable: Trump Vote Share, 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	(a) Excluding Border States from Non-South						
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.552*** (0.087)	0.684*** (0.078)	1.520*** (0.472)	1.400*** (0.298)	1.041*** (0.289)	2.098*** (0.730)	1.609*** (0.617)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share control						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,571	1,569	1,571	1,569	1,566	1,569	1,566
Outcome mean	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	61.0	60.9	61.0
Adj. R ²	0.39	0.65					
F-statistic			51.8	53.2	47.5	9.5	8.6
Anderson-Rubin, p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003
KP Underident., p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.009	0.007
	(b) ... and Including Border States in Defining Southern White Migrants						
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.343*** (0.100)	0.522*** (0.068)	1.019*** (0.254)	1.012*** (0.175)	0.836*** (0.182)	2.327* (1.234)	1.917* (0.988)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share control						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,571	1,569	1,571	1,569	1,566	1,569	1,566
Outcome mean	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	61.0	60.9	61.0
Adj. R ²	0.39	0.65					
F-statistic			101.1	98.2	81.6	3.1	2.8
Anderson-Rubin, p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.021
KP Underident., p-val			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.092	0.101

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 excluding all counties in the former border states during the Civil War (Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and West Virginia) (panel a), and then additionally treating those border states as additional Southern sending states in defining the population of Southern Whites in 1940 (panel b). The mean Southern white share is 2.7% in panel (a) and 5.8% in panel (b). See the notes to Table 2 for the list of controls. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bestler et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Re-estimating Table 2 with an Alternative Instrument

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Republican Vote Share Average, 2000–20	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.824** (1.288)		2.316** (1.069)	
Average % Southern Whites, 1880–1940		2.884*** (1.089)		2.365** (0.930)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,887	1,887	1,885	1,885
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	59.4	59.4
F-statistic	9.5	24.3	9.6	24.8

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 using a version of the first rail road instrument from Sequeira et al. (2020), as described above. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. All regressions include state fixed effects. As in Sequeira et al. (2020), we always control for averages of the controls used in the zeroth stage, the log number of years since the first railroad connection (relative to the year 2016), and cubic polynomials of county latitude and longitude, as well as allow for spatial autocorrelation in the errors using the procedure described in Conley (1999). See Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2 for zeroth and first stage estimates as well as the analysis using other outcomes. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Southern White Migrants in 1940, Wallace in 1968, and Partisan Realignment

Dependent Variable:	Third-party Vote for George Wallace in 1968			Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.248*** (0.050)	0.358*** (0.086)	0.570** (0.272)	0.786*** (0.064)	0.852*** (0.161)	1.271*** (0.464)	
% Wallace Voters, 1968							0.731*** (0.079)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes	
Observations	1,883	1,883	1,883	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,883
Outcome mean	9.4	9.4	9.4	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.7
Adj. R ²	0.68			0.63			0.64
F-statistic		115.2	10.3		115.0	10.2	
Anderson-Rubin, p-val		0.000	0.006		0.000	0.016	
KP Underident., p-val		0.000	0.011		0.000	0.012	

Notes: Regressions of the third-party vote share for George Wallace of the American Independent Party in the 1968 presidential election (columns 1–3) and of the change in vote share in from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 (columns 4–7) on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 (columns 1–6) or on the share of votes to George Wallace in 1968 (column 7) in non-Southern counties. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. Columns 3 and 6 control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Evangelical Communities, 1952–2010

Dependent Variable:	% Evangelical		Evangelical Churches (per 10,000 pop.)					
	2010		1952		1971		2010	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.789*** (0.173)	1.206** (0.572)	0.305*** (0.076)	0.637*** (0.233)	0.283*** (0.082)	0.538** (0.230)	0.241*** (0.076)	0.436* (0.246)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,878	1,878	1,879	1,879	1,886	1,886
Outcome mean	9.8	9.8	4.6	4.6	5.7	5.7	5.4	5.4
F-statistic	105.07	10.10	114.17	10.05	114.91	10.23	105.07	10.10
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.000	0.010	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.020	0.003	0.068
KP Underident., p-val	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.011

Notes: Regressions of the number of evangelical Protestant Christian churches per 10,000 residents in 1952, 1971, and 2010 or of the share of the county population adhering to those evangelical denominations in 2010 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Evangelical denominations in this table based on Steensland et al. (2000), using denominations found across the three religious censuses from *The Association of Religious Data Archives* (2021). All columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. Even columns control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Southern White Migrants and Occupational Sorting at the Individual Level

Dependent Variable:	Individual Works in a ... Occupation					
	Religious		Newspaper		Radio and TV	
	1900 (1)	1940 (2)	1900 (3)	1940 (4)	1900 (5)	1940 (6)
Southern White	0.393*** (0.039)	0.154*** (0.031)	0.067*** (0.022)	-0.004 (0.018)	–	0.041*** (0.011)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	Yes
Observations	16,187,176	30,054,255	16,187,176	30,054,255	–	30,054,255
Outcome mean	0.37	0.31	0.11	0.12	–	0.07

Notes: Regressions of a binary indicator for whether the individual worked in the respective occupation (multiplied by 100). Religion includes the following occupations from the full-count Census: religious workers (occ1950=78) and clergymen (occ1950=9). Newspaper includes the editors and reporters occupation (occ1950=36). Radio and TV includes the radio operators occupation (occ1950=75) and the radio broadcasting and television industry (ind1950=856). The sample, based on the complete-count Population Census data in 1900 (odd-numbered columns) and 1940 (even-numbered columns), includes all white men between the ages of 18 and 64 living outside of the South in 1900 and 1940, respectively. Column 5 is empty as radio and TV were not yet available. Excluded Southern areas are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Regressions include controls for a cubic in age and county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level shown in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Right-wing Media

Dependent Variable:	County has a Radio Station Airing						Respondent Believes		
	Carl McIntire Program			Rush Limbaugh Program			Fox News is the fairest Media		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.005** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.006** (0.002)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.045* (0.024)	0.008* (0.004)	0.007 (0.006)	0.005 (0.015)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,884	1,884	1,884	1,884	1,884	1,884	3,478	3,478	3,478
Outcome mean	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.168	0.168	0.168	0.347	0.347	0.347
Adj. R ²	0.14			0.20			0.04		
F-statistic		117.0	10.4		117.0	10.4		84.7	7.4
Anderson-Rubin, p-val		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.010		0.311	0.761
KP Underident., p-val		0.000	0.010		0.000	0.010		0.000	0.033

Notes: Columns 1–6 are based on regressions of a dummy for whether a county has had a radio station that aired Carl McIntire’s *20th Century Reformation Hour* (in the 1950s–70s) or the *Rush Limbaugh Show* (in 2020) on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940. Columns 7–9 are based on a regression of a binary indicator for whether Fox News provides, among all television news channels, the most fair and balanced reporting. We take this question from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) in 2007 and restrict the analysis to whites living outside the South. Even columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. In columns 1–6, additional controls for elevation and ruggedness are also included as important predictors of radio signal supply. Respondent controls in columns 7–9 include respondent age, age squared, and sex. Columns 3, 6, and 9 control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Horizontal Transmission: Exposure Effects on Non-Southerners' Religious Names

Dependent Variable:	Child has Biblical Name				
	Base	North Origin to West Dest.	Δ Orig.-Dest. % Southern Whites	Control for Name Freq.	Birth 5-Year FE
Specification:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(a) County-Level Exposure					
% Southern Whites $_{\tau-1} \times$ Born After Move	0.128*** (0.022)	0.081** (0.034)	0.041** (0.017)	0.079*** (0.019)	0.107*** (0.020)
Observations	2,491,260	416,044	2,455,058	2,491,260	2,491,260
(b) Neighborhood-Level Exposure					
% Southern Whites $_{\tau-1} \times$ Born After Move	0.064*** (0.009)	0.061*** (0.015)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.056*** (0.009)
Observations	2,483,543	414,859	2,447,502	2,483,543	2,483,543
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Year - Move Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Order FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome mean (pre-move)	15.4	14.0	15.4	15.4	15.4

Notes: Regressions of an indicator for whether the non-Southern-ancestry child has a Biblical name ($\times 100$) on a dummy for whether that child in mover household h was born in its post-move county $c \times$ the share of Southern-born whites in location ℓ in the pre-move Census period $\tau - 1$. In panel (a), we define ℓ as the county, and in panel (b) as the neighborhood of 20 households around h , 10 on each side in the enumeration listing (following Brown et al., 2021). The full sample includes 2,491,260 white, U.S.-born children of non-Southern parents in 846,073 households with at least one child born before the move and at least one born after the move. The sample differs slightly in panel (b) on account of missing roster information to identify neighbors. The full sample includes movers from all non-Southern origin states. All regressions include fixed effects for child sex, birth order, birth period (decade or 5-year), and birth year minus household year of move. In columns 1, 3, 4, and 5, the sample includes those leaving all non-Southern states and settling in non-Southern destinations. In column 2, movers are restricted to those leaving all Northern states and settling in non-Southern and non-Northern destinations; we define the “North” as the territories of the Union during the Civil War, excluding the western parts (California, Oregon, Nevada). The latter is the same restriction used in Appendix Table D.2 to define Northern migrants. In column 3, the Southern white share captures the difference between origin state and destination county in Census period $\tau - 1$. In panel (a), the mean (standard deviation) of the Southern white share measure is 1.8 (2.7) in columns 1, 4, and 5, 3.3 (3.6) in column 2, and 0.3 (3.0) in column 3. In panel (b), the mean (standard deviation) of the Southern white share measure is 2.8 (5.9) in columns 1, 4, and 5, 4.8 (7.6) in column 2, and 0.6 (5.8) in column 3. Column 4 includes 10 dummies for the decile of given name frequency. In columns 1–4, the birth period FE are decadal and in column 5 five-yearly. Standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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A SSIV Construction and Robustness Checks


A.1 Shift-Share IV with Push Factors

This section provides additional details and results related to our shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) identification strategy. Following [Boustan \(2010\)](#) and [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#), our primary SSIV relies on variation in shifts based on arguably exogenous origin county-level “push factors.” To implement this strategy in our context, we develop a novel approach for predicting Southern outmigration to the non-South, using linked Census records ([Abramitzky et al., 2020](#)). In the absence of net migration rates for years prior to 1940, this linked Census approach allows us to approximate Southern white outmigration from each location and each decade between 1900 and 1940, and unlike that approach uses only outmigration to the non-South. To be precise, we calculate for each Census decade $t = \{1910, 1920, 1930, 1940\}$,

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{o,t} = \left(\frac{\# \text{ whites in } o \text{ in } t-10 \text{ linked to } d \text{ in } t}{\# \text{ whites in } o \text{ in } t-10 \text{ linked to Census } t} \right) \times \text{Southern whites}_{o,t-10},$$

where o indicates (Southern) origin county, d indicates (non-Southern) destination county, and where the rightmost term, $\text{Southern whites}_{o,t-10}$, is based on the complete-count Census in 1940. A comparison with data from the backward-looking residency question in the 1940 full count Census establishes the accuracy of this measure of Southern white outmigration, as shown in [Figure A.1](#).

Figure A.1: Comparing Southern White Migration Measures, Linked versus Full Count Census



Notes: This graph plots the number of whites in a Southern county who moved to a non-Southern county between 1935 and 1940 against an estimate from the linked Census of the number of whites in a Southern county who moved to a non-Southern county between 1930 and 1940. We define Southern counties as those belonging to the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma. Non-Southern counties are all others in the conterminous United States.

Push factors from each origin county are then used to predict shifts from decade-specific “zeroth” stage regressions, similar to [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#):

$$\text{Southern white migrants}_{o,t} = \alpha + \mathbf{Z}'_{o,t-10}\beta + \phi \text{population}_{o,t-10} + \varepsilon_{o,t}. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Following prior literature, we choose push factors from plausibly relevant measures of urbanization, development, and extractive industries that can be found across all four decades. Summary statistics for the full set of variables we consider in the prediction exercise are reported in Table A.1.

Table A.1: Summary Statistics of Predictors of Southern Outmigration from 1900–30

Socio-Economic County Characteristics, 1900–30	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
% urban population	6,148	11.86	19.96	0.00	100
% Black population	6,148	23.82	23.02	0.00	94.2
Agricultural potential	6,148	0.55	0.14	0.00	0.69
% of land in farms	6,148	65.73	23.14	0.00	100
% of farms that are tenant farms	6,148	41.76	20.69	0.00	96.8
% of farms that are Black farms	6,148	20.33	23.81	0.00	96.6
% of farms with 1,000+ acres	6,148	3.22	11.89	0.00	100
Log mean land value	6,148	7.99	1.09	5.35	13.7
Tobacco county (above-median potential)	6,148	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Cotton county (above-median potential)	6,148	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00
Boll weevil county	6,148	0.34	0.48	0.00	1.00
Boll weevil \times cotton county	6,148	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00
Manufacturing employees per capita	6,148	2.82	3.74	0.00	118.4
Manufacturing output per capita	6,148	110.86	234.24	0.00	8,442.0
Oil county (any discovered major oilfields)	6,148	0.02	0.14	0.00	1.00
Mining county (any mines)	6,148	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00

Notes: Summary statistics for the migration and socio-economic characteristics of Southern sending counties from which individuals migrated between 1900–30.


Figure A.2 provides the intuition behind the variation that is exploited by the instrument. Panel (a) shows two counties in the state of Washington, Clark and Yakima, which had almost identical shares of Southern whites in 1900, of 2.5% and 2.6%, respectively. Despite this similarity, the origin states of the Southern white populations were very different. In Clark County, relatively more Southern white migrants came from Arkansas instead of Texas, whereas for Yakima County the opposite was true. Panel (b) then showcases the time-series variation, highlighting that more white Texans left the South for the rest of the country until 1940 and migrants from Arkansas were fewer in number. As predicted by this combined shift-share, Yakima’s share of total Southern whites rose to 4.8% in 1940. This share reached only 3.8% in Clark County. Many years later, in 2016, Yakima County also had the higher vote share for Donald Trump with 53.7% as compared to 46.2% in Clark County.

To potentially improve the prediction by considering nonlinear transformations of the predictors and alternative functional forms, we also expand the set of predictors by including the square and cross-term interaction of each predictor with all other predictors (see Belloni et al., 2014). From these inputs, a LASSO algorithm then shrinks the set of predictors to an optimal subset, $\mathbf{Z}'_{o,t-10}$, from which Southern white migration is predicted for each decade.

Zeroth stage regressions based on linear LASSO specifications are shown in Appendix Table A.2. Relevant factors driving Southern white outmigration to the non-South include small Black populations, few tenant or large farms, many Black-owned farms, small manufacturing sectors, and boll weevil infestations. Sending counties tended to be somewhat urban on average, consistent with the positive selection story discussed in Section 2.2.

The predicted values obtained are then aggregated up to obtain the overall outflows from each sending state, $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40}$, and used to derive the full SSIV discussed in Section 3. As in Boustan (2010), Calderon et al. (2022), and Fouka et al. (2022), our preferred SSIV specification uses shares based on

Figure A.2: Visual Intuition for the Shift-share Instrument



Notes: Panel (a) demonstrates the cross-sectional variation in baseline shares for two counties in Washington state: Clark County and Yakima County. Both counties had similar shares of Southern whites in 1900, of 2.5% and 2.6%, respectively. The figure breaks these shares down by the respective Southern sending states, showing that Clark County had relatively more people from Arkansas as compared to Texans, while for Yakima County had the opposite. Panel (b) plots the total predicted number of migrants from each state over time, where Texans moved in larger numbers compared to individuals from Arkansas. As predicted by the combined shift-share, Yakima County had a higher share of Southern whites in 1940 (4.8%) compared to Clark County (3.8%). In 2016, Yakima also had the higher vote share for Donald Trump, with 53.7%, while Clark County had just 46.2%.

prior origin state, rather than counties. This increases the strength of the IV, since the origin county-based approach using the linked Census records requires the omission of areas such as Western Oklahoma and Texas that cannot be linked to the 1880 Census.¹ However, we also show robustness under an array of SSIVs, including one based on origin-county shares (see Table A.3).

Estimate size and significance is stable across SSIV specifications, although the “push factor” approach described here increases instrument strength and estimate size and precision somewhat. Estimates from our preferred SSIV using flexible predictors can be found in columns (5) and (6). Ultimately, the usage of origin county shocks in the construction of our SSIV helps ensure its exogeneity (see Borusyak et al. (2022))—even when the initial shares themselves are endogenous, something that is further bolstered by the robustness of effects to also controlling for 1900 Southern white shares directly.

¹The exception in this literature is Derenoncourt (2022), who uses the backward-looking residency question from the 1940 Census to capture shares based on origin counties.

Table A.2: Using Sending County Characteristics to Predict Southern Outmigration to Non-Southern Counties

	Dependent Variable			
	No. Southern white migrants who left Southern county for non-South			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% urban population	4.770*** (1.592)	6.299*** (1.465)	7.446*** (2.624)	2.751 (2.576)
% Black population	-9.842*** (3.696)	-12.150*** (0.916)	-19.145*** (1.560)	-35.646*** (5.812)
Agricultural potential	596.377*** (215.342)		-323.460 (602.230)	-68.871 (346.478)
% of farms that are tenant farms	-7.158*** (1.201)	-10.159*** (1.120)	-7.607*** (1.900)	-8.862*** (2.770)
% of farms that are Black farms	-0.791 (3.693)			12.298** (5.203)
% of farms with 1,000+ acres	-10.685*** (1.238)	-16.621*** (1.512)	-17.242*** (2.882)	-16.452*** (2.752)
Log mean land value	251.650*** (34.668)	215.824*** (28.981)	155.374** (65.855)	30.918 (67.214)
Tobacco county	87.006** (41.851)	-56.310 (42.689)	-106.927 (77.179)	-273.544*** (75.245)
Cotton county	-50.061 (40.890)			632.844*** (112.905)
Boll weevil county	-245.164*** (75.293)	-393.899*** (55.535)	-581.773*** (85.364)	-478.864*** (72.192)
Boll weevil × cotton county	179.287 (111.388)	221.763*** (67.668)	235.721*** (89.613)	
Manufacturing employees per capita	-47.109*** (12.524)	-95.426*** (10.865)	-20.228* (11.129)	-40.522*** (9.621)
Manufacturing output per capita	2.109*** (0.666)	1.520*** (0.329)		0.055 (0.148)
Mining county	2.383 (40.116)		-143.850* (75.821)	-276.438*** (94.458)
Population size in sending counties	0.045*** (0.004)	0.057*** (0.004)	0.070*** (0.006)	0.055*** (0.005)
% of land in farms		-3.664*** (1.200)	-1.888 (1.773)	4.490** (2.273)
Oil county		84.788 (212.057)	476.141* (254.841)	767.926** (301.914)
Decade	1900–10	1910–20	1920–30	1930–40
Observations	1173	1220	1220	1219
Outcome mean	600	905	1274	1278
Adj. R ²	0.734	0.811	0.805	0.787

Notes: Zeroth stage regressions for a shift-share instrumental variable (SSIV) using a linear LASSO specification. Sample counties include those in the twelve former Confederate states plus Oklahoma. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.3: Alternative SSIV Based on Origin Counties

	Dependent Variable: Trump Vote Share, 2016							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.811*** (0.154)	1.104** (0.490)	1.027*** (0.166)	1.792*** (0.566)	1.026*** (0.167)	1.779*** (0.563)	0.832*** (0.163)	1.499* (0.877)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Shifts	Actual	Actual	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO	LASSO
Shares	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual	Linked	Linked
Push factors			Linear	Linear	Flexible	Flexible	Flexible	Flexible
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6
F-statistic	66.0	16.1	116.6	9.9	115.0	10.2	41.7	3.1
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.000	0.049	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.062
KP Underident., p-val	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.013	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.111

Notes: Regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties (mean of 2.9%). Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. All columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. Columns 1–2 use a version of the shift-share based on actual shares and shifts, respectively, in the full count Census data. Columns 3–8 use a version with shifts generated via a set of linear or flexible LASSO regressions, as described above. Columns 7–8 use shares based on 1880–1900 white migration from Southern counties, derived using the linked Census. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. Even columns control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.2 Inference

Table A.4: Alternative Approaches to Inference in Table 2

	Dependent Variable: Trump Vote Share, 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.395	0.632	1.004	1.026	0.853	1.779	1.530
Bester et al. (2011) grid	(0.105)	(0.076)	(0.257)	(0.167)	(0.155)	(0.563)	(0.435)
Robust	0.077	0.062	0.182	0.146	0.149	0.648	0.606
Conley (1999) 200km	0.150	0.089	0.339	0.231	0.198	0.761	0.608
Conley (1999) 500km	0.210	0.098	0.395	0.280	0.177	0.965	0.556
Colella et al. (2020) 200km	0.116	0.077	0.272	0.191	0.177	0.715	0.625
Colella et al. (2020) 500km	0.165	0.092	0.332	0.236	0.182	0.852	0.630
Wild cluster bootstrap	0.186	0.089	0.326	0.232	0.176	0.831	0.576
Adao et al. (2019)			1.624	0.102	0.155	0.510	0.315
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share control						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883
F-statistic			109.2	115.0	100.9	10.2	10.7

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 with different approaches to inference besides the baseline [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#) grid cell clustered standard errors in parentheses. We provide robust standard errors, [Conley \(1999\)](#) standard errors with distance cut-offs at 200 and 500 km as well as a version with distance decay based on the Bartlett kernel provided by [Colella et al. \(2020\)](#) for the same distance thresholds, standard errors clustered at the level of the 36 non-Southern states for which we correct the potential bias from the small number of clusters using the wild-cluster bootstrap [Cameron et al. \(2008\)](#), and the adjusted standard errors for shift-share designs proposed by [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.3 Identification Checks: Matching Exercises and Placebo Tests

Matching Exercises. We consider two matching exercises. First, in Appendix Table A.5, we find the county pairs within the same state that have the most similar Republican vote share in the 1900 Presidential election. We break ties arbitrarily and then create a fixed effect for each pair of counties. Within pairs, the mean Republican vote share difference is less than 0.8 percentage points. We then rerun our core IV specifications including these roughly 920 within-state pair fixed effects. The resulting coefficients identify the effects of greater Southern white migrant inflows from 1900 to 1940 on the change in Republican Party vote share for counties with nearly identical voting preferences in 1900. This provides additional evidence that Southern white migrants from the Great Migration period specifically were pivotal in shaping both the realignment of American politics and long-run political outcomes.

Table A.5: Voting Effects Among Electorally Similar Counties in 1900

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20		Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	1.583*** (0.386)	1.650*** (0.376)	1.499*** (0.421)	1.562*** (0.418)	1.169*** (0.397)	1.211*** (0.402)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
County pair FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
Sorting controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,858	1,852	1,856	1,852	1,858	1,852
Outcome mean	62.8	62.9	59.6	59.6	4.8	4.9
F-statistic	6.9	9.9	6.9	9.9	6.9	9.9
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.007	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.049	0.020

Notes: Regressions of (a) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, (ii) the vote share average for Republicans from 2000–20 and, (iii) the change in vote share in from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. All regressions control for county pair dummies matched within states on 1900 Republican presidential vote share. Counties in Arizona and New Mexico all lack vote share data for 1900 and thus we allow them to retain simple state-level dummies. Standard errors are two-way clustered by grid cell and 1900 electoral pair. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Second, in Appendix Table A.6, we find the counties within the same state that have the most similar Southern white migrant share in 1870. We break ties arbitrarily, dropping counties that were unincorporated in 1870, and then create a fixed effect for each pair of counties. Within pairs, the median Southern white migrant share difference is less than 0.05 p.p. We then rerun our core IV specifications including these roughly 850 within-state pair fixed effects. The resulting coefficients identify the effects of greater Southern white migrant inflows from 1900 to 1940 on the change in Republican vote share for counties with nearly identical Southern white migrant shares in 1870. Though these county pair dummies prove demanding, the results look very similar, if not somewhat larger, relative to our baseline estimates in the paper. We view these results as providing additional evidence that the SSIV indeed isolates causal effects of *changes* in Southern white migration through 1940.

Table A.6: Voting Effects Among Counties with Similar Southern White Shares in 1870

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20		Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.890** (1.201)	2.986** (1.494)	2.645** (1.147)	2.982** (1.461)	2.620** (1.284)	2.289* (1.285)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
County pair FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
Sorting controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,684	1,678	1,682	1,678	1,684	1,678
Outcome mean	61.5	61.6	58.4	58.4	3.9	3.9
F-statistic	5.0	4.1	4.9	4.1	5.0	4.1
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.006	0.007	0.002	0.003	0.025	0.074

Notes: Regressions of (a) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, (ii) the vote share average for Republicans from 2000–20 and, (iii) the change in vote share in from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. All regressions control for county pair dummies matched within states on 1870 Southern white shares. Standard errors are two-way clustered by grid cell and 1870 matched pair. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Pre-1900 Elections. As a placebo, we consider an exercise that regresses our baseline regressors and IV on relevant pre-1900 vote share averages. We consider the 1892 and 1896 elections, which both featured populist candidates who were conservatives on relevant issues of the times: Democrat Grover Cleveland in 1892, who railed against free silver, and Democrat and Populist candidate William Jennings Bryan in 1896, who was favored by both agrarian and Protestant interests. Prior to 1892, much of the West was unincorporated. We fail to estimate statistically significant placebo effects in both cases, with no clear trend in coefficient size or sign across specifications.

Table A.7: Placebo: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Pre-1900 Presidential Elections


Dependent Variable:	Cleveland Vote Share, 1892				Jennings Bryan Vote Share, 1896			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	-0.177 (0.262)	-1.760 (1.573)	0.120 (0.254)	-1.356 (1.937)	0.217 (0.368)	-1.784 (2.428)	0.393 (0.384)	-1.642 (3.424)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
1900 share control		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,814	1,814	1,814	1,814
Outcome mean	36.7	36.7	36.7	36.7	46.7	46.7	46.7	46.7
F-statistic	138.1	10.1	128.0	5.1	127.5	8.0	119.2	3.8

Notes: This table uses the estimating strategy from Table 2 using elections from prior to the advent of large-scale Southern white migration. All columns use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to that table for details on the 1900 controls. Even columns control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Random Shifts Placebo Test. More evidence that the shares themselves are not the driving force un-

derpinning our effects can be found by replacing shifts with random noise. We simulate 1,000 normally distributed random shifts with mean zero and variance five as in [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#). In each trial, we construct the instrument using this random shift, which replaces the $\widehat{\Delta M}_{j,1900-40}$ term in equation (2). If the shifts do not matter and the results are purely driven by the 1900 shares, for instance due to persistent spatial autocorrelation, then we would expect to find similar but slightly attenuated results compared to the baseline. The estimates resulting from these placebo instruments are statistically significant (positive or negative) at the 5 percent level 11% of the time (compared to 16.1% in [Derenoncourt \(2022\)](#) and 55% in [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#)). Significance at the 1 percent level is achieved just 3% of the time. If we include the 1900 Southern white shares as a control, this drops further to 0.1% and 0% significant at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Overall, this suggests that the baseline shares do require meaningful shifts and that effects are not merely driven by spatial noise. A coefficient plot of 1,000 placebo shift-share IV regressions is shown in [Figure A.3](#).

Figure A.3: SSIV Using Random Placebo Shifts




Notes: Instrumental variables regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. The share of Southern-born whites in 1940 is instrumented using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and a **randomly generated shift**. The random shift was generated based on a normal distribution with mean zero and variance five as in [Adao et al. \(2019\)](#). The figure shows the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from instrumental variables regressions where the instrument was generated with 1,000 random shifts. Regressions include the set of controls from [Table 2](#) and assume robust standard errors.


Figure A.4: Sensitivity to Sample Changes in Table 2

(i) Dropping individual receiving states in 2016

(a) IV




(b) IV controlling for 1900 shares




(ii) Dropping individual sending states in 1940

(c) IV



(d) IV controlling for 1900 shares



Notes: Coefficients from regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in non-Southern counties, based on the IV specifications in row (a) of Table 2 with baseline controls, each of which are reported in the solid vertical red line in the respective graphs. Panel (i) excludes receiving states one-by-one where the excluded state is reported on the vertical axis. Panel (ii) excludes Southern sending states one-by-one when constructing the 1940 share of Southern-born whites living outside the South in a given non-Southern county c , with the excluded sending state reported on the vertical axis. The dashed red line marks zero. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

A.4 Alternative Samples

Table A.8: Restricting to “Unsettled” Counties as of 1860, Extending Table 2

	Dependent Variable: Trump Vote Share, 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.510*** (0.101)	0.573*** (0.096)	1.391*** (0.433)	1.236*** (0.218)	1.033*** (0.253)	1.691*** (0.444)	1.536*** (0.460)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share control						Yes	Yes
Observations	813	812	813	812	811	812	811
Outcome mean	64.5	64.6	64.5	64.5	64.6	64.5	64.6
Adj. R ²	0.379	0.585					
F-statistic			49.7	65.6	32.8	16.0	11.3

Notes: This table re-estimates parts of Table 2 using only counties that were classified by the Census Bureau as “unsettled” by non-natives as of 1860 (i.e., using the Census definition of < 2 persons per square mile). The mean Southern white share in this sample is 7.9%. See the notes to that table for other details on the specification. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


A.5 Alternative Time-Varying Vote Share Specifications

Table A.9: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Presidential Elections, 1900–2020

	Dependent Variable: Vote Share Average for . . .					
	Republicans, 1900–24 (1)	Herbert Hoover, 1928 (2)	Republicans, 1932–64 (3)	George Wallace, 1968 (4)	Republicans, 1972–2000 (5)	Republicans, 2000–20 (6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	-1.732* (1.023)	1.313* (0.760)	0.411 (0.502)	0.518* (0.277)	0.726* (0.433)	0.995** (0.497)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,792	1,885	1,884	1,885	1,882	1,887
Outcome mean	51.4	62.5	51.0	9.4	53.4	59.4
F-statistic	3.8	8.6	8.9	8.6	9.2	8.6
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.125	0.018	0.379	0.027	0.094	0.032
KP Underident., p-val	0.063	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.013	0.016


Notes: This table uses the estimating strategy from Table 2 using elections from 1900 through 2020. All columns use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to that table for details on the 1900 controls. All columns control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure A.5: Republican Vote Share with Contemporaneous Migrant Shares, Extending Figure 3



Notes: Coefficients from IV regressions of vote share for the Republican candidate in 8 U.S. presidential elections between 1912 and 1940 on the shares of Southern white migrants in all non-Southern counties in the Census year prior to election year t . The shift-share instrument uses 1900 as the base year, with predicted shifts using the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 and the nearest Census of election year t , based on flexible LASSO regressions as described above. All regressions include state \times election year fixed effects. Regressions in (b) also include county fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 and shift-share instrument are interacted with the election year fixed effect. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#).

Figure A.6: Republican Vote Share without Omitted Year as in Figure 3



Notes: Coefficients from OLS and IV regression of vote share for the Republican candidate in 31 U.S. presidential elections between 1900 and 2020 on the shares of Southern white migrants in all non-Southern counties as of 1940. The shift-share instrument uses 1900 as the base year, with shifts using the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940, based on flexible LASSO regressions as described above. All regressions include state \times election year fixed effects but not county fixed effects as in Figure 3. Regressions (c) and (d) control for 1900 Southern white shares and baseline controls, as described under Table 2. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 and shift-share instrument are interacted with the election year fixed effect to estimate effects by election year. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#).

B Alternative IV Based on the Coincidental Timing of Railway Access

This section provides additional details and results related to our alternative IV strategy, based on [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#). This IV, which we adapt for internal South-to-non-South white migration within the U.S., is constructed through a zeroth stage in which the share of Southern whites in a county at time t is predicted based the first connection of a county to the railroad network interacted with the magnitude of the flow of Southern white migrants in that period.

More precisely, we use county-level data from 1870 to 1940 for counties outside the South and estimate the following specification for non-Southern county c in Census year t :

$$\begin{aligned} \% \text{ Southern whites}_{c,t} = & \alpha_t + \alpha_c + \gamma \% \text{ Southern whites}_{c,t-10} + \delta I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \\ & + \beta_1 \text{Southern white flow}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \\ & + \beta_2 \text{Southern white flow}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \times \text{West}_c \\ & + \theta \text{Industrialization}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \\ & + \phi \text{Population Growth}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} + \mathbf{X}'_{c,t-10} \mathbf{\Gamma} + \epsilon_{c,t}. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.1})$$

The county fixed effects α_c absorb time-invariant pull factors, and Census-decades fixed effects α_t absorb aggregate shocks that affect all non-Southern counties in that decade. We include a lag of the dependent variable to account for the mechanical relationship between the current and past stock of Southern whites. $I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}}$ is the lag of the indicator for the first decade a county is connected to the railroad network, which we also interact with the aggregate outflow of Southern whites from $t - 10$ to t , normalized by the total population outside the South in $t - 10$. We make two minor departures from the specification in [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#). First, we allow the effects of railroad access to vary across Western and non-Western regions, consistent with the historical narrative highlighting that the railroad expansion was key to fuel largely-westward migration of Southern whites in the early 1900s. Second, since we study migration within the country and do not have a subnational measure of industrialization or GDP, we measure industrialization as the lagged change in total manufacturing productivity outside the South, and proxy GDP growth with the lagged population growth outside the South.

After estimating this zeroth stage, we predict the average share of Southern whites in a county as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Avg. } \% \widehat{\text{Southern whites}}_c = & \frac{1}{T} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T (\widehat{\beta}_1 \text{Southern white flow}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \right. \\ & \left. + \widehat{\beta}_2 \text{Southern white flow}_{t-10} \times I_{c,t-10}^{\text{RR Access}} \times \text{West}_c) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.2})$$

We then use the predicted $\text{Av. } \% \widehat{\text{Southern whites}}_c$ as an instrument for (i) $\text{Avg. } \% \text{ Southern whites}_c$ between 1880 and 1940, analogous to the specification from [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#) (for 1860–1920), and (ii) our baseline measure, the share of Southern whites in a county in 1940, $\% \text{ Southern whites}_{c,1940}$. We also control for averages of the controls used in the zeroth stage, as well as the log number of years since the first railroad connection relative to the year 2016, and the cubic polynomials of each county's centroid latitude and longitude coordinates. As in [Sequeira et al. \(2020\)](#), we allow for spatial autocorrelation in the errors using the [Conley \(1999\)](#) spatial HAC approach. Zeroth and first stage estimates can be found in [Table B.1](#). In the paper, we use this IV to identify the effects of Southern white migration on long-run

voting patterns. We use this Appendix to showcase some other findings readily replicated using this IV.

Table B.1: Using Railway Access to Predict Southern Outmigration to Non-Southern Counties

Dependent Variable:	% Southern Whites _{ct} (1)	% Southern Whites, 1940 (2)	Average % Southern Whites, 1880-1940 (3)
Lagged RR access _{ct}	0.001 (0.001)		
Lagged % Southern Whites _{ct} × Lagged RR access _{ct}	0.003 (0.004)		
Lagged % Southern Whites _{ct} × Lagged RR access _{ct} × West _c	0.032*** (0.006)		
Predicted Avg. % Southern Whites, 1880-1940		0.339*** (0.108)	0.332*** (0.066)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS
County FE	Yes		
Year FE	Yes		
State FE		Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes
Observations	7,202	1,887	1,887

Notes: Zeroth and first stage regressions based on the railway instrument variable strategy in Sequeira et al. (2020). Column 1 reports results from estimating the zeroth stage regression in equation (B.1). We use county-level data from 1880 to 1940 to regress the share of Southern whites on its on lag, a lagged indicator for whether a county was connected to the railroad network in the previous decade, an interaction between the lagged railroad access indicator and the aggregate outflow of Southern whites to the rest of the country in the previous decade, and the triple interaction with a West indicator (Pacific and Mountain census regions). We also control for the interaction between the lagged railroad access variable with both the aggregate population growth outside the South and the aggregate industrialization outside the South. Also included are county and census year fixed effects. The predicted average share of Southern whites between 1880 and 1940 is then generated using the estimated coefficients of the interaction between the lagged railroad access indicator and the lagged aggregate outflow of Southern whites, and the triple interaction with the West indicator (see equation (B.2)). We then use the predicted share of Southern whites from the zeroth stage as instrument for the observed shares in column 2 and 3, where column 2 uses our main definition of the treatment variable (% Southern whites, 1940) and column 3 defines the treatment as the average share of Southern whites between 1880 and 1940 like in Sequeira et al. (2020). The baseline controls are described in the note for Table 2. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.2: Extending Tables 2 and 6 Using the Railroad Instrument

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Third-party Vote for George Wallace in 1968		Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.824** (1.288)		0.710** (0.328)		2.868*** (0.860)	
Av. % Southern Whites, 1880-1940		2.884*** (1.089)		0.726*** (0.268)		2.930*** (0.634)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1887	1887	1884	1884	1887	1887
Outcome mean	62.56	62.56	9.378	9.378	4.500	4.500
F-statistic	9.499	24.26	9.467	24.52	9.499	24.26

Notes: Regressions of (a) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, (ii) the third-party vote share for George Wallace of the American Independent Party in the 1968 presidential election and, (iii) the change in vote share in from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites, using a version of the first rail road instrument from Sequeira et al. (2020), as described above. See the notes to Table 5 for more details and Table 2 for all other details. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C Interpreting the Voting Effect Sizes

Table C.1: Weighted Voting Regressions, Extending Tables 2 and 6

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016			Republican Vote Share Average, 2000–20			Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.258*** (0.746)	2.283** (1.063)	2.662** (1.175)	2.324*** (0.747)	2.706** (1.058)	3.051** (1.229)	1.889*** (0.649)	4.387** (1.849)	2.431*** (0.726)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weight by electoral votes	Yes			Yes			Yes		
Weight by 1940 population		Yes			Yes			Yes	
Weight by county votes			Yes			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,882	1,885	1,885	1,882	1,886	1,886	1,882
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.7	59.4	59.4	59.5	4.6	4.6	4.8
F-statistic	12.4	7.0	8.3	11.8	7.0	8.6	11.0	7.0	8.0
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.000	0.002
KP Underident., p-val	0.011	0.020	0.050	0.013	0.020	0.040	0.011	0.020	0.019
Coeff. \leq 1? p-val	0.046	0.114	0.079	0.039	0.054	0.048	0.086	0.034	0.025

Notes: Regressions of (i) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election, (ii) Republican vote share averages across the 2000–20 presidential elections, and (iii) the change in vote share in from Democrat to Republican between 1948 and 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. All columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Columns 1, 4, and 7 weight by state electoral votes (in 2016, 2000, or 1948). Columns 2, 5, and 8 weight by county population in 1940. Columns 3, 6, and 9 weight by a county’s total votes (in 2016, 2000, or 1948). All regressions include state fixed effects. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of controls. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). The Anderson-Rubin p-value corresponds to the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the endogenous regressor is statistically significant and that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. The KP Underidentification test p-value corresponds to the Kleibergen-Paap LM test whose null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix Table C.2 reports on the exercise briefly mentioned in Section 4.1; the notes below the figure full detail on the analysis. The main takeaways are as follows: (i) In 2000, a 10 percent reduction in the Southern white migrant share would have given Arizona to Al Gore, thus flipping the election in his favor. (ii) In 2004, a 20 percent reduction would have given Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Iowa to John Kerry. (iii) The 2016 election was close, and the Southern white diaspora was large enough to flip Arizona and Michigan, but this was insufficient to flip the outcome nationally. Together, these results suggestively illustrate the relative importance of the Southern white diaspora and highlight their outsized influence in the Western U.S. relative to the antebellum Union states of the North.

Table C.2: Counterfactual Electoral Outcomes in Closely Contested States

	Vote Margin in Favor of the Republican Candidate with a . . . Southern White Population Share							
	Actual Outcome (1)		10% Smaller (2)		20% Smaller (3)		30% Smaller (4)	
(a) 2000 Election								
West Virginia	40,960	(6.32%)	32,016	(4.94%)	23,071	(3.56%)	14,127	(2.18%)
Arizona	96,306	(6.28%)	-1,273	(-0.08%)	-98,852	(-6.44%)	-196,431	(-12.80%)
Ohio	165,000	(3.51%)	139,524	(2.97%)	114,048	(2.42%)	88,573	(1.88%)
Nevada	17,861	(3.03%)	2,132	(0.36%)	-13,597	(-2.31%)	-29,326	(-4.97%)
New Hampshire	7,212	(1.27%)	6,479	(1.14%)	5,746	(1.01%)	5,014	(0.88%)
New Mexico	-371	(-0.06%)	-35,215	(-5.88%)	-70,059	(-11.70%)	-104,903	(-17.52%)
Wisconsin	-5,720	(-0.22%)	-9,055	(-0.35%)	-12,390	(-0.48%)	-15,725	(-0.61%)
Elec. Votes Republican	271		263		259		259	
Elec. Votes Democrat	266		274		278		278	
(b) 2004 Election								
Arizona	210,768	(10.47%)	61,843	(3.07%)	-87,082	(-4.32%)	-236,007	(-11.72%)
Colorado	99,505	(4.67%)	51,939	(2.44%)	4,373	(0.21%)	-43,193	(-2.03%)
Nevada	17,763	(2.20%)	-7,370	(-0.91%)	-32,503	(-4.03%)	-57,636	(-7.15%)
Ohio	118,578	(2.11%)	83,365	(1.48%)	48,153	(0.86%)	12,940	(0.23%)
New Mexico	5,982	(0.79%)	-43,726	(-5.78%)	-93,433	(-12.35%)	-143,141	(-18.93%)
Iowa	10,041	(0.67%)	4,546	(0.30%)	-949	(-0.06%)	-6,445	(-0.43%)
Wisconsin	-11,390	(-0.38%)	-15,829	(-0.53%)	-20,268	(-0.68%)	-24,707	(-0.82%)
Elec. Votes Republican	286		276		259		250	
Elec. Votes Democrat	251		261		278		287	
(c) 2016 Election								
Ohio	467,192	(8.44%)	443,137	(8.00%)	419,081	(7.57%)	395,026	(7.13%)
Arizona	81,887	(3.14%)	-51,021	(-1.96%)	-183,929	(-7.06%)	-316,837	(-12.16%)
Pennsylvania	70,653	(1.15%)	54,381	(0.88%)	38,109	(0.62%)	21,837	(0.35%)
Wisconsin	21,915	(0.74%)	18,864	(0.63%)	15,812	(0.53%)	12,761	(0.43%)
Michigan	22,050	(0.46%)	-1,560	(-0.03%)	-25,170	(-0.52%)	-48,779	(-1.01%)
New Hampshire	-2,736	(-0.37%)	-3,511	(-0.47%)	-4,286	(-0.58%)	-5,061	(-0.68%)
Minnesota	-44,733	(-1.52%)	-47,902	(-1.63%)	-51,072	(-1.73%)	-54,241	(-1.84%)
Elec. Votes Republican	306		279		279		279	
Elec. Votes Democrat	232		259		259		259	

Notes: This figure reports the results of the quantification exercise discussed in Section 4.1 and following an analogous exercise in Autor et al. (2017, 2020). Column 1 reports the state-specific two-party vote margin for the Republican candidate in (a) 2000, (b) 2004, and (c) 2016 elections. We report results for several pivotal swing states in the given election (none of those unreported see their outcomes change under the assumed counterfactual), in this case focusing on those that went for Bush and Trump because the counterfactual here is one in which we remove the Southern white voter effect, which helped Republicans. Columns 2–4 report counterfactual vote margins based on a two-step exercise. First, we estimate the election-specific effect of Southern white migrants based on the specification in row 13 of Table 3 (and columns 3, 6, and 9 of Appendix Table C.1). Results are qualitatively unchanged when instead using the estimates from rows 11 (EC allocation weighting) and 12 (1940 population weighting) of Table 3 (and corresponding columns of Appendix Table C.1). Second, we multiply those coefficients by (i) the Southern white share in a given county, (ii) the total two-party vote share in the county, and (iii) 0.1 in column 2, 0.2 in column 3, and 0.3 in column 4. We then subtract the resulting product from the Republican vote margin in column 1. At the bottom of each panel, we report the implied total electoral votes based on Electoral College allocations.


D Southern Whites, Southern Blacks, and Northern Whites

Table D.1: Comparing the Black and White Great Migrations, Extending Table 2

	Dependent Variable: Trump Vote Share, 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.734*** (0.099)	0.653*** (0.079)	1.880*** (0.335)	1.249*** (0.214)	1.141*** (0.192)	1.915*** (0.642)	1.693*** (0.528)
% Southern Blacks, 1940	-3.140*** (0.950)	-0.675** (0.265)	-6.594*** (1.253)	-2.411*** (0.663)	-2.685*** (0.633)	-4.289** (2.119)	-4.859** (2.107)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls					Yes		Yes
Sorting controls					Yes		Yes
1900 share controls						Yes	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.7	62.6	62.7
Adj. R ²	0.468	0.667					
F-statistic			188.4	158.6	149.1	31.2	31.5
Coeff. equality p-value	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01	< 0.01	0.013	0.005

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 augmented with the Southern Black share in 1940. Columns 3–7 instrument the share of Southern-born white and Black residents using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born individuals in each group and the aggregate change in Southern white and Black population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The controls are as in Table 2 but exclude the Black population shares from the baseline and 1900 control sets. The coefficient equality test is an F test for whether the coefficient on the share of Southern-born whites is statistically indistinguishable from the coefficient on the share of Southern-born Blacks. The associated p-value is reported in the bottom row. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure D.1: Southern White Migrants, Blacks, and Congressional Party, 1940–1990



Notes: Coefficients from pooled regressions of an indicator for legislator party affiliation (Republican = 1) in the U.S. House from 1940 to 1990 on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern congressional districts (CDs). Regressions include Congress and state fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 and shift-share instrument are interacted with the Congress fixed effect, which are in turn interacted with (a) above-median Black shares in 1940 and (b) above-median population density in 1940. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Table D.2: Comparing the Migration of Northern and Southern Whites, Extending Table 2

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016		Third-party Vote for George Wallace in 1968		Change in Vote Share from Democrat to Republican, 1948–2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.836*** (0.163)	1.499** (0.592)	0.365*** (0.062)	0.601** (0.286)	0.740*** (0.177)	1.527** (0.714)
% Northern Whites, 1940	0.647*** (0.194)	0.654*** (0.197)	-0.091*** (0.033)	-0.088*** (0.033)	0.279 (0.184)	0.287 (0.179)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 SW share control		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	950	950	947	947	950	950
Outcome mean	64.9	64.9	10.6	10.6	10.7	10.7
F-statistic	106.8	7.9	106.9	8.2	106.8	7.9
Coeff. equality p-value	0.488	0.200	0.000	0.019	0.085	0.103

Notes: This table re-estimates Table 2 and Table 6 augmented with the share of Northern-born whites in 1940. We define the “North” as the territories of the Union during the Civil War, excluding the western parts (California, Oregon, Nevada). The analysis is restricted to counties in outside the Union and Southern states plus Oklahoma. All columns instrument the share of Southern-born (Northern-born) white residents using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born (Northern-born) white individuals and the aggregate change in Southern (Northern) white population living outside the South (North) from 1900 to 1940. The coefficient equality test is an F test for whether the coefficient on the share of Southern-born whites is statistically indistinguishable from the coefficient on the share of Northern-born whites. The associated p-value is reported in the bottom row. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D.3: Relative Attitudes of Southern and Northern White Migrants, Extending Table 1

Dependent Variable:	Religious		Racial			Economic	
	Identify as Evangelical (1)	Believe Bible is literal word of God (2)	Favor any segregation (3)	Oppose residential integration (4)	Oppose school integration (5)	Oppose gov't intervention for any (6)	Oppose gov't intervention for Blacks (7)
Southern White	0.182*** (0.043)	0.102* (0.053)	0.092* (0.054)	0.125*** (0.035)	0.080* (0.046)	-0.001 (0.049)	0.088 (0.068)
Northern White	0.015 (0.024)	-0.031 (0.050)	-0.077* (0.038)	-0.011 (0.027)	-0.036 (0.043)	0.079*** (0.026)	-0.035 (0.052)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey waves	1960-70	1964-68	1964-70	1964-70	1964-70	1956-68	1964-68
Observations	1,766	764	976	1,131	1,055	1,477	665
Counties	43	34	35	35	35	42	34
Outcome mean	0.25	0.47	0.47	0.31	0.49	0.47	0.54
Adjusted R ²	0.25	0.16	0.09	0.19	0.10	0.12	0.03

Notes: Regressions of various survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES), applicable waves through 1970, on a dummy for whether a white respondent is from any of the twelve excluded Southern sending states as well as dummy for whether a white respondent is from any of the “Northern” territories of the Union during the Civil War, excluding the western parts (California, Oregon, Nevada). Our definition of Southern (Northern) whites includes those respondents that were born and/or grew up in the South (North). Sample excludes respondents living in the South and the North as well as non-whites. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. All regressions include county and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E Further Results on Partisan Realignment and the New Right

E.1 De-alignment in the Diaspora

Table E.1: Southern White Dealignment Outside the South

	Dependent Variable: Respondent Identifies as a Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Southern White	0.112*** (0.035)	0.114 (0.070)	0.212*** (0.074)	5.925** (2.687)	5.401** (2.718)	4.825* (2.748)
Southern White \times After 1964	-0.085** (0.038)	-0.081** (0.038)	-0.075* (0.038)			
Southern White \times (Year/100)				-0.298** (0.136)	-0.271** (0.137)	-0.237* (0.139)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income fixed effects		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
City-size fixed effects			Yes			Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	21,180	19,804	19,804	21,180	19,804	19,804
Counties	205	205	205	205	205	205
Control outcome mean (pre-64)	0.492	0.492	0.492	0.492	0.492	0.492
Adj. R ²	0.052	0.062	0.064	0.052	0.065	0.065

Notes: Regressions of various survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES), all applicable waves, on a dummy for whether a white respondent is from any of the twelve excluded Southern sending states. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Our definition of Southern whites includes those respondents that were born and/or grew up in the South. Sample excludes respondents living in the South as well as non-whites. “After” is a pre-/post-1964 survey wave indicator variable; “Year” is a linear time trend from 0. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. Additional controls include income (five categories) and city-type (three categories) fixed effects. As in Kuziemko and Washington (2018), where applicable, income and city-type fixed effects have each been interacted with “Southern White” (separately) and with “After” (when “Southern White \times After” is the explanatory variable of interest) or “Year” (when Southern White \times Year is the explanatory variable of interest). The control outcome mean is the mean of the dependent variable among non-Southern whites in the years prior to 1964. All regressions include county and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.2 Characterizing the New Right

In Section 5.1, we characterize a three-dimensional policy New Right “bundle” made up of economic conservatism, racial conservatism, and religious conservatism. This coalition of conservatives coalesced behind the Republican Party during the second half of the 20th century, as we show in Table E.2 using data on voters from the American National Election Survey (ANES) and in Figure E.2 using congressional-district-level data on representatives. In this Appendix, we provide a brief history behind each of these three dimensions as useful context for some of our results.¹

Economic Conservatism. Economic conservatives in the U.S. have historically been a core constituency of the Republican Party, long prior to the emergence of the New Right. A prominent pre-New Deal example was President Calvin Coolidge (1923–29), who was progressive on racial and social issues yet gained a reputation as being a fiscal conservative and proponent of small government. Later, a “conservative coalition” of economically conservative Republicans as well as some Democrats formed in opposition to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal agenda (Patterson, 1967). In the decades after, this coalition united behind an array of anti-communist and pro-federalist causes.

¹We choose not to focus on other dimensions of ideology, most notably foreign policy, to the extent that they do not clearly pertain to the study of the Southern white diaspora and its political influence.

This coalition of economic conservatives was, importantly, not unified on issues of civil rights, especially across party lines. During the New Deal era, some conservative Democrats supported racially exclusive aspects of the New Deal agenda, such as in agricultural policy (Derenoncourt and Montaloux, 2021; Johnson, 2011). Later, prominent conservative Republicans, such as Senator Everett Dirksen, broke with conservative Democrats to help advance President Lyndon B. Johnson’s civil rights agenda. In other words, the relationship between economic and racial conservatives in Congress was often fraught prior to the 1970s. Thereafter, as the latter’s policy goals of the 1960s became less politically popular, Nixon’s political team implemented a “Southern Strategy” in part to bring racially conservative Democrats—dismayed by their party’s stronger leftward turn on racial issues—into the Republican Party, where economic conservatives’ opposition to federal intervention and the welfare state more closely aligned with racially conservative voters’ policy goals (Maxwell and Shields, 2019). Our findings throughout Section 5 and in this Appendix suggest that such political strategizing occurred in response to white conservative dealignment, including in the Southern white diaspora outside the South, which thereafter exhibits a trend toward favoring Republican and economically conservative legislators.

Racial Conservatism. Racial conservatism in the U.S. unlike economic conservatism, has seen its issues and its political home evolve throughout the 20th century. The political positions that have been considered “racially conservative” within mainstream political discourse have changed substantially over time—a fact that complicates the equation of that term with “racial animus” or “racial resentment”. For example, racially conservative voters or politicians in the 1870s would have been opposed to Blacks being able to vote; in the 1960s, to racial integration; and in the 2010s to affirmative action and diversity quotas. There is of course no moral or ideological equivalence between these three positions, and a racial conservative today might indeed be considered racially progressive 50 years ago. Yet all of these positions advocate for the racial status quo of their respective times, a fact which makes them relatively “conservative” (Schickler, 2016).

Because of these dynamics, it can be a challenge to characterize the racially conservative agenda. There was, of course, a cohesive bloc of racial conservatives within Congress prior to the 1970s, made up largely of Southern Democrats (“Dixiecrats”) as well as some Northern Republicans opposed to Black integration and advancement efforts. Between 1930s and 1960s, however, the national Democratic Party gradually embraced racially-inclusive federal distribution, fueled in part by large Black constituencies in Northern cities (Schickler, 2016). By the 1970s, most segregationists remaining in Congress had disavowed their former positions and adopted either more progressive viewpoints on race (as was often the case among those who remained Democrats, such as Senator Robert Byrd) or small government and states’ rights rhetoric, with greater emphasis placed on economic or religious issues (as was the case with Senator Strom Thurmond and former Alabama Governor George Wallace) (Lowndes, 2009). This latter coalescence with the economic and religious dimensions of the emergent New Right, with special emphasis on local sovereignty, allowed such politicians to continue to appeal to racially conservative voters, who as a result came to be more closely aligned with the Republican Party in national and local elections—especially after the 1990s, as the two saw greater down-ballot alignment (Hopkins et al., 2022; Schickler, 2016).

Religious Conservatism. The final dimension of the New Right “bundle” to emerge was religious conservatism, in the 1970s. Balmer (2021) characterizes the modern religious right as an offshoot of racial conservatism, which emerged as the latter’s policy goals of the 1960s became less politically acceptable. For instance, some religiously conservative activists organized in the 1970s on the basis of religious

Figure E.1: “Religious Leaders Who Know Governor George C. Wallace”: 1964 Campaign Ad

**Religious Leaders
who know**

**Governor
GEORGE C.
WALLACE
OF ALABAMA**

*Say this
about him...*

★ I have noticed certain officials that refer to you as a racist, bigot, carpet bagger, which I resent as I know you as a man devoted to family and . . . In my searching of your records, never have I read or heard of any instance where you have advocated any solution to any problem that would not be within the framework of the laws of our state.
SOLOMON ACRISH, Rabbi
Congregation ETZ AHAYAM, Montgomery, Ala.

★ If the Civil Rights Bill, as it is before the Senate now is passed, it will spell the greatest calamity that has ever befallen our country for it will mean the end of Constitutional Government. I am with Governor George C. Wallace wholeheartedly and wish him 100% success.
REV. HANS REUTER
First Lutheran Church, Birmingham, Alabama

★ We are indeed fortunate to have as 'our Governor, the Hon. George C. Wallace, a man of deep and profound religious convictions, and a man who has shown love and respect for all our people. I think the true picture of Governor Wallace was displayed in his inaugural address when he said: "And my prayer is that the Father who reigns above us will bless all the people in this great sovereign State and Nation, both black and white." By no stretch of the imagination is George C. Wallace a racist.
DR. HENRY L. LYON, Pastor
Highland Avenue Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama

★ I was Governor George C. Wallace's Pastor for several years at his home town, Clayton, Alabama, and I was closely associated with him. I feel that as a Circuit Judge and as Governor, he has shown fairness to all people, regardless of race or color. I have never heard George C. Wallace remark against any person because of his race or color and it is my opinion, that he is no racist or hate-monger nor does he have hatred in his heart for anyone.
R. I. LAWRENCE, Pastor
First Methodist Church, Florida, Alabama

"STAND UP FOR AMERICA"
VOTE FOR
GOV. GEORGE C. WALLACE
FOR PRESIDENT

Notes: A newspaper advertisement from the Milwaukee Journal on April 7, 1964, the day before the Democratic Party presidential primary, seemingly attempting to appeal to both racial conservatives and (anti-racist) religious conservatives simultaneously. Wallace won about a third of the vote the next day. Source: <https://shepherdexpress.com/culture/milwaukee-history/dixie-north-george-wallace-1964-wisconsin-presidential-primary>.

freedom—in opposition to federal intervention into racial policies at some private religious educational institutions. Separately, former Alabama Governor Wallace cited support from religious leaders as part of his political outreach efforts to non-Southerners during his 1960s campaigns for president (see, for instance, Figure E.1) and later became a born-again Christian, renouncing his segregationism for a “states’ rights” philosophy (Carter, 1999).

Despite this overlap, not all religiously conservative causes initially found appeal among white racially conservative voters, such as in the Southern white diaspora, or even among economically conservative voters. Tables E.6 and E.7, shown in Appendix E.4, reveal that traditionalist (religious) rhetoric was highly rare in Republican Party state platforms prior to 1990, and, in fact, initially grew somewhat more slowly in places with larger Southern white shares. The latter reflects the fact that Southern whites tended to be evangelical, whereas abortion was initially the domain of Catholic activists, who were often Democratic and politically left-leaning (Williams, 2015).² In contrast, evangelicals at that point were

²Abortion was the dominant religious issue among the very few found in mainstream political discourse prior to the 1980s,

not well-represented politically and tended to support some degree of abortion rights.

This began to change in the 1970s, as President Richard Nixon staked a position to the right of Democrats on abortion—declaring it “an unacceptable form of population control” that should be regulated by “the states, not the federal government” (Williams, 2011). Within a decade, a “Christian Right” coalition made up of Catholic and evangelical activists had formed, increasingly united behind the Republican Party (Wilcox and Robinson, 2011). As the 1980s and 1990s progressed, the issues of the religious right became multifarious, with increased focus on abstinence education and traditional families, including the banning of gay marriage. Coinciding with this, our CD and state-level analyses in Figure 4 and several other results below show Republican Party party identification to be increasingly associated with religious and traditionalist rhetoric in the 1980s and 1990s, with such rhetoric increasing faster in places outside the South that received more Southern white migrants (who spread evangelicalism) earlier in the 20th century.


Table E.2: Changing Characteristics of Republicans and the New Right “Bundle”

Dependent Variable:	Identify as Evangelical		Oppose civil rights		Oppose gov’t intervention	
	Pre-1964 (1)	Post-1964 (2)	Pre-1964 (3)	Post-1964 (4)	Pre-1964 (5)	Post-1964 (6)
Republican	0.012 (0.014)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.012 (0.008)	0.036*** (0.007)	0.177*** (0.022)	0.145*** (0.010)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,822	15,048	4,059	15,146	3,291	10,503
Counties	108	180	109	180	106	178
Control outcome mean	0.15	0.15	0.32	0.32	0.60	0.60
Adjusted R ²	0.18	0.15	0.70	0.46	0.16	0.06

Notes: Regressions of various survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES), applicable waves through 1990, on a dummy for whether a respondent identifies as a Republican. Regressions are further split into “1964 and prior” and “post-1964” election cycles. “Opposes civil rights” is a composite of the racial variables from Table 1, which equals 1 if any of those outcomes equal 1. Sample excludes respondents living in the South as well as non-whites. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. The control outcome mean is the mean of the dependent variable for those not identifying as Republican. All regressions include county and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


and it could be found in the vast majority of religious trigrams found in state party platform during this period.

Figure E.2: Emergence of the New Right “Bundle”, 1940–1990



Notes: Coefficients in panels (a-d) are from pooled regressions of (i) congressional ideal points from [Bateman et al. \(2017\)](#), based on race and civil rights voting patterns, (ii) congressional ideal points from the time-varying DW-Nominate score (dimension 1) by [Lewis et al. \(2021\)](#), covering economic issues, and (iii) our relative religious rhetoric (RRI) scores on an indicator for legislator party affiliation (Republican = 1) in the U.S. House from 1940 to 1990. Coefficients represent the average difference between Republican and Democratic legislators in levels (panels a and b) and relative differences in a base year of 1940 (panels c and d). Coefficients in panels (e-f) are from regressions of a composite score that averages the three indexes on an indicator for legislator party affiliation in the U.S. House and are relative to differences in a base year of 1940. All regressions include Congress and state fixed effects. The explanatory variable is interacted with the Congress fixed effect. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Figure E.3: The New Right “Bundle” and Polarization: The Changing Distribution of Ideology



Notes: Curves show the distribution of our composite scores, as featured in Figure E.2, across members of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1940 and in 1990.

Table E.3: Wallace-to-Nixon Voters and the New Right “Bundle”

Dependent Variable:	Voted Nixon in 1972	Nixon voters only			
		Identifies as Evangelical	Opposes civil rights	Opposes gov't intervention for any	Opposes gov't intervention for Blacks
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Wallace Support/100	0.359*** (0.059)	0.016 (0.061)	0.181*** (0.063)	-0.041 (0.066)	0.175* (0.088)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,085	717	719	640	545
Counties	84	79	79	79	78
Outcome mean	0.56	0.16	0.31	0.67	0.51
Adjusted R ²	0.08	0.13	0.06	0.04	0.04

Notes: Regressions of various survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES) in the 1972 wave on a respondent's thermometer support, ranging from 0 to 100, for George Wallace. “Oppose civil rights” is a composite of the racial variables from Table 1, which equals 1 if any of those outcomes equal 1. Sample excludes respondents living in the South as well as non-whites. Sample in columns 2–5 include only Nixon voters. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. All regressions include county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.3 Congressional Ideology and Roll Calls

Table E.4: The Evolution of GOP versus Dem. Congressional Ideology Outside the South, 1940–90

Dependent Variable:	Racial Conservatism Index		Religious Rhetoric in Congressional Speech		Economic Conservatism Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GOP representative	0.639*** (0.026)	0.480*** (0.028)	-0.331*** (0.046)	-0.276*** (0.045)	0.671*** (0.008)	0.629*** (0.011)
GOP rep. × After 1964	0.581*** (0.058)	0.662*** (0.063)	0.383*** (0.055)	0.313*** (0.055)	-0.028** (0.014)	-0.024 (0.017)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1940 density control		Yes		Yes		Yes
1940 % Black control		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	8139	8125	8125	8111	8460	8446
Dem. rep. mean, 1940–1964	0.189	0.189	0.342	0.342	-0.269	-0.269
Dem. rep. mean, 1965–1990	-0.422	-0.422	-0.180	-0.180	-0.306	-0.306

Notes: Regressions of (a) congressional ideal points from [Bateman et al. \(2017\)](#), based on racial and civil rights voting patterns, (b) our relative religious rhetoric (RRI) scores and (c) congressional ideal points from the time-varying DW-Nominate score (dimension 1) by [Lewis et al. \(2021\)](#), covering economic issues, on a Republican state party platform indicator, interacted with dummies for the periods 1940–1964 and 1964–1990. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. RRI scores are calculated by totaling a legislator’s words with Biblical roots—God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen—and dividing the sum by the total words spoken. Even columns control for log population density and percent Black in 1940, interacted with period indicators. All regressions include state and Congress fixed effects. To account for spatial autocorrelation, we use the procedure described in [Conley \(1999\)](#) with a bandwidth of 500 km. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.5: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Congressional Ideology, 1940–90

Dependent Variable:	Racial Conservatism Index			Religious Rhetoric in Congressional Speech			Economic Conservatism Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.030*** (0.005)	0.063*** (0.008)	0.188** (0.084)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.021* (0.011)	0.171 (0.109)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.009** (0.005)	0.076 (0.046)
% Southern Whites × After 1964	0.015*** (0.004)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.127*** (0.035)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.016** (0.008)	0.015 (0.064)	0.017*** (0.002)	0.022*** (0.003)	0.028* (0.015)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes			Yes
Observations	8,125	8,125	8,125	8,111	8,111	8,111	8,446	8,446	8,446
Outcome mean, 1940–1964	-0.382	-0.382	-0.382	0.150	0.150	0.150	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0003
Outcome mean, 1965–1990	-0.270	-0.270	-0.270	-0.150	-0.150	-0.150	-0.094	-0.094	-0.094
F-statistic		101.9	9.9		100.2	9.4		103.9	10.5

Notes: Regressions of (a) congressional ideal points from [Bateman et al. \(2017\)](#), based on racial and civil rights voting patterns, (b) our relative religious rhetoric (RRI) scores and (c) congressional ideal points from the time-varying DW-Nominate score (dimension 1) by [Lewis et al. \(2021\)](#), covering economic issues, on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940, interacted with dummies for the periods 1940–1964 and 1964–1990. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. RRI scores are calculated by totaling a legislator’s words with Biblical roots—God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen—and dividing the sum by the total words spoken. Columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 9 use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Columns 3, 6, and 9 control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900, also interacted with period dummies. All regressions include state and Congress fixed effects. To account for spatial autocorrelation, we use the procedure described in [Conley \(1999\)](#) with a bandwidth of 500 km. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.4 State-Level Party Platforms

Table E.6: The Evolution of GOP versus Dem. State Party Platforms Outside the South, 1940–2017

Dependent Variable:	Support for Civil Rights		Support for Traditionalism		Support for Small or Local Government	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GOP Platform	-0.056 (0.047)	-0.057 (0.047)	0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.037)
GOP Platform×1965–1990	-0.216*** (0.071)	-0.212*** (0.071)	0.036 (0.033)	0.039 (0.032)	-0.020 (0.062)	-0.020 (0.061)
GOP Platform×1991–2017	-0.116* (0.062)	-0.121* (0.062)	0.573*** (0.037)	0.570*** (0.036)	0.365*** (0.059)	0.363*** (0.058)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Platform year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1940 density control		Yes		Yes		Yes
1940 % Black control		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1192	1192	1192	1192	1192	1192
Dem. platform mean, 1940–1964	0.612	0.612	0.000	0.000	0.192	0.192
Dem. platform mean, 1965–1990	0.862	0.862	0.040	0.040	0.493	0.493
Dem. platform mean, 1991–2017	0.809	0.809	0.221	0.221	0.544	0.544

Notes: Regressions of indicators of trigram phrase incidences in Republican state party platforms between 1940 and 2017 from [Hopkins et al. \(2022\)](#) related to (i) support for civil rights, (ii) opposition to abortion and gay marriage, and (iii) support for small or local government on a Republican state party platform indicator, interacted with dummies for the periods 1940–1964, 1964–1990, and 1991–2017. See [Appendix H](#) for more details. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Even columns control for log population density and percent Black in 1940, interacted with period indicators. All regressions include state and platform year fixed effects. To account for spatial autocorrelation, we use the procedure described in [Conley \(1999\)](#) with a bandwidth of 500 km. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.7: Southern Whites and the Evolution of Republican State Platforms, 1940–2017

Dependent Variable:	Support for Civil Rights			Support for Traditionalism			Support for Small or Local Government		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
% Southern Whites×1965–1990	-0.040** (0.019)	-0.044* (0.023)	-0.076** (0.037)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.026*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.012)	-0.064*** (0.016)	-0.056*** (0.018)	-0.000 (0.030)
% Southern Whites×1991–2017	-0.001 (0.010)	0.014 (0.016)	-0.029 (0.036)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.007)	0.018* (0.010)	0.015** (0.006)	0.021** (0.009)	0.050** (0.021)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Platform year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes			Yes
Observations	544	544	544	544	544	544	544	544	544
Outcome mean, 1940–1964	0.545	0.545	0.545	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.180	0.180	0.180
Outcome mean, 1965–1990	0.556	0.556	0.556	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.452	0.452	0.452
Outcome mean, 1991–2017	0.636	0.636	0.636	0.823	0.823	0.823	0.900	0.900	0.900
F-statistic		47.1	74.0		47.1	74.0		47.1	74.0

Notes: Regressions of indicators of trigram phrase incidences in Republican state party platforms between 1940 and 2017 from [Hopkins et al. \(2022\)](#) related to (i) support for civil rights, (ii) opposition to abortion and gay marriage, and (iii) support for small government and fiscal conservatism on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940, interacted with dummies for the periods 1940–1964, 1964–1990, and 1991–2017. See [Appendix H](#) for more details. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 9 use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). Columns 3, 6, and 9 control for the share of Southern-born whites in 1900, also interacted with period dummies. All regressions include state and platform year fixed effects. To account for spatial autocorrelation, we use the procedure described in [Conley \(1999\)](#) with a bandwidth of 500 km. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

E.5 The Early Diaspora and the Progressive Movement

Southern white migrants appear to have had a complicated relationship with the progressive movement of the early 20th century, alienation from which coincided with their shift away from the Democratic Party between 1920 and 1970. Early on, pro-agrarian and working class policies adopted by some progressives, such as Robert M. La Follette, aligned well with the bundle that we associate with the Southern white diaspora, which was not per se opposed to fiscal redistribution. Later, support for racial equity, opposition to prohibition, and political alliances with urban Catholics among some progressive Democrats, such as Al Smith in the 1928 election, saw Southern whites move toward the more populist right-wing politics crystallized by politicians like George Wallace. Appendix Table E.8 provides estimates in support of this history.

Table E.8: Southern White Migrants and the Progressive Movement

Dependent Variable:	Vote Share Average for...							
	Theodore Roosevelt, 1912		Robert M. La Follette, 1924		Al Smith, 1928		Did U.S. House Rep. Vote for Social Security Act of 1935	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, t	-0.023 (0.100)	-0.067 (0.135)	0.149*** (0.051)	0.150* (0.086)	-0.117* (0.062)	-0.404*** (0.152)	0.022** (0.011)	-0.013 (0.018)
Estimator	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,877	1,877	1,883	1,883	1,882	1,882	261	261
Outcome mean	26.3	26.3	8.8	8.8	36.6	36.6	0.2	0.2
Adj. R ²	0.04		0.10		0.40		0.09	
F-statistic		30.6		32.6		161.4		20.3

Notes: This table uses the estimating strategy from Table 2 using outcomes from 1900–40 and contemporaneous Southern white shares. All columns use a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to nearest Census year t . The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to that table for details on the baseline controls, of which this table uses contemporaneous versions. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011), except for columns (7–8) which use congressional districts. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


E.6 Additional Results

Table E.9: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Modern-day Attitudes

Dependent Variable:	Opposes legal abortion (1)	Opposes gay marriage (2)	Believes No systemic racism (3)	Opposes assault rifle ban (4)	Opposes CO2 regulation (5)	Favors ACA repeal (6)
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.008** (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey waves	2007	2009-16	2010-14	2014	2014	2014
Observations	5,739	82,094	83,446	29,202	29,022	29,239
Counties	1,017	1,732	1,750	1,533	1,528	1,534
Outcome mean	0.52	0.41	0.50	0.36	0.32	0.53
Adjusted R ²	0.05	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.02

Notes: OLS regressions of reported attitudes of white individuals living outside the South on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Outcomes are responses to binary-coded questions from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Respondent controls include their reported age, age squared, and sex. All regressions include state and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


Figure E.4: Southern White Migrants and Congressional Vote Patterns, 1947–2021




Notes: Coefficients from pooled IV regressions of an indicator for right-wing votes in roll calls for thirteen key pieces of legislation by U.S. House Representatives on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern congressional districts (CDs). The acronym DADT stands for “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.” All regressions include bill and state fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 and shift-share instrument are interacted with the bill fixed effect. See Table 2 for details on all baseline controls. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.

Figure E.5: Third-party Vote for George Wallace in 1968 and Southern Whites in 1940

(a) % Wallace Votes, 1968




(b) Share of Southern-born Whites by County, 1940



Notes: This figure maps the percent of votes for the third-party candidate, George Wallace, in 1968, as well as the share of whites born in the South and residing outside the South in 1940 according to the full-count Census. The legend shows the intervals considered for each split.

Figure E.6: Southern White Migrants and Voter Turnout, 1900–2020




Notes: Coefficients from IV regressions of voter turnout between 1900 and 2020 on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Regressions include election year fixed effects interacted with state dummies and 1900 Southern white shares. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the grid cell level.

F Further Results on Cultural Transmission

F.1 Probing the Nonlinear Effects

Figure F.1: Further Checks on Semiparametric Estimates in Figure 6



Notes: This figure reports versions of Figure 6 based on a Gaussian kernel (panels a and d), alternative, fixed bandwidth of 1.5 p.p. (panels b and e), and, as in panel (b) of Table 4, the alternative definition of Southern and non-Southern counties to include border state migrants (panels c and f).

F.2 Intergenerational Growth and Political Transmission

Table F.1: Demographic Growth in the Diaspora: Fertility and Chain Migration

Dependent Variable:	% Destination-born Children with Southern-born White...				% Southern Whites, 1970		% Southern Whites, 2000	
	Father		Mother		(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
% Southern Whites, 1940	1.106*** (0.036)	0.918*** (0.158)	1.149*** (0.033)	1.156*** (0.157)	0.782*** (0.109)	1.103** (0.533)	0.661*** (0.087)	0.945** (0.467)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control		Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,681	1,681	1,683	1,683
Outcome mean	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.8
F-statistic	115.0	10.2	115.0	10.2	107.2	5.4	96.4	5.2
Anderson-Rubin, p-val	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
KP Underident., p-val	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.052	0.000	0.055
Coeff. ≤ 1 ? p-val	0.002	0.697	0.000	0.160	0.977	0.423	1.000	0.547

Notes: Regressions of (1–2) the share of non-Southern-born white children born to Southern-born white dads in a given non-Southern place as of 1940 based on the full count Census, (3–4) same but for Southern-born moms, (5–6) the share of Southern-born whites in 1970, and (7–8) the share of Southern-born whites in 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. 1970 and 2000 shares are based on the Census definition of the South, which also includes Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and West Virginia. See the notes to Table 2 for a full description of controls. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table F.2: Combining the First and Second Generation Diaspora, Extending Table 2

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016			Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites (both gen.), 1940	0.445*** (0.055)	0.628*** (0.101)	0.569*** (0.137)	0.386*** (0.049)	0.542*** (0.088)	0.521*** (0.115)
Estimator	OLS	IV	IV	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,883	1,883	1,883	1,882	1,882	1,882
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.6	59.4	59.4	59.4
Adj. R ²	0.67			0.65		
F-statistic		147.1	42.4		147.7	42.4
Anderson-Rubin, p-val		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000
KP Underident., p-val		0.000	0.000		0.000	0.000

Notes: Regressions of (i) the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election and (ii) Republican vote share averages between 2000 and 2020 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Panel (a) combines both first and second generation Southern whites, where a second generation Southern white can be born outside the South but must have had at least a Southern white father. Panel (b) estimates coefficients for the two groups separately where the IV regressions only instrument for the first generation. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. We instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the predicted aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. The latter is generated via a set of flexible LASSO regressions, as shown in equation (3). See the notes to Table 2 for details on all controls. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

F.3 Contact and Integration

Table F.3: Intergroup Contact, Integration, and Voting

Dependent Variable:	Trump Vote Share, 2016				Republican Vote Share Avg., 2000–20			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	2.087*** (0.659)	2.213*** (0.776)	2.301*** (0.677)	1.727*** (0.403)	1.892*** (0.592)	2.026*** (0.705)	2.108*** (0.602)	1.508*** (0.348)
Intermarriage Index	2.272*** (0.487)		1.545*** (0.356)		1.951*** (0.430)		1.220*** (0.327)	
Residential Integration Index		2.189** (0.872)		0.976** (0.434)		1.976** (0.813)		0.682* (0.399)
% Southern Whites × Intermarriage			0.437** (0.219)				0.440** (0.199)	
% Southern Whites × Integration				0.133* (0.069)				0.142** (0.060)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883	1,885	1,882	1,885	1,882
Outcome mean	62.6	62.6	62.6	62.6	59.4	59.4	59.4	59.4
KP F-statistic	8.6	6.8	7.2	42.1	8.6	6.8	7.2	42.0
KP Underident., p-val	0.017	0.021	0.003	0.000	0.017	0.021	0.003	0.000

Notes: Regressions of (1–4) the vote share for Donald Trump in 2016 and (5–8) Republican vote share averages between 2000 and 2020 on the indexes of intermarriage between Southern whites and non-Southern whites and residential segregation from Southern whites, both as of 1940. The intermarriage index divides the actual intermarriage rate between Southern and non-Southern whites by the theoretical matching rate implied by the population share of marriage-age individuals in the two groups. This ratio therefore answers how much intermarriage exists relative to what would be expected without any directed search in the marriage market (see [Bazzi et al., 2019](#), for a related approach). This index spans 0 to a sample max of 1.5, with a mean of .73 (.16). The segregation index is a measure based on next-door neighbor segregation from Southern whites, based on the measure in [Logan and Parman \(2017\)](#). This index spans 0 to 1, with a mean of .53 (.07). Evangelical measures here include all such groups in the 2010 religious census from [The Association of Religious Data Archives \(2021\)](#). Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. See the notes to [Table 2](#) for a full description of controls. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table F.4: Intergroup Contact, Integration, and Evangelicalism

Dependent Variable:	Evangelical Churches (per 10,000 pop.)				% Evangelical, 2010			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites, 1940	1.274** (0.574)	1.538** (0.761)	1.506** (0.611)	0.985*** (0.300)	1.871** (0.824)	2.308** (1.098)	2.180*** (0.831)	1.431*** (0.388)
Intermarriage Index	1.265*** (0.371)		0.475** (0.240)		1.209** (0.511)		0.162 (0.325)	
Residential Integration Index		2.061** (0.906)		0.680*** (0.253)		2.880** (1.308)		0.689* (0.362)
% Southern Whites × Intermarriage			0.475** (0.189)				0.630** (0.276)	
% Southern Whites × Integration				0.152** (0.060)				0.241*** (0.073)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 share control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883	1,886	1,883
Outcome mean	11.2	11.1	11.2	11.1	16.1	16.1	16.1	16.1
KP F-statistic	8.6	6.8	7.2	42.1	8.6	6.8	7.2	42.1
KP Underident., p-val	0.017	0.021	0.003	0.000	0.017	0.021	0.003	0.000

Notes: Regressions of (1–4) evangelical Protestant Christian churches per 10,000 residents in 2010 and (5–8) the share of evangelicals in 2010 on the indexes of intermarriage between Southern whites and non-Southern whites and residential segregation from Southern whites, both as of 1940. See the notes to [Table F.3](#) for details on the specification. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of [Bester et al. \(2011\)](#). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


F.4 Further Results on Religious Names

Table F.5: Validating the Religious Content of Biblical Names

Dependent Variable:	Child has Biblical Name			
Census Year:	1910	1920	1930	1940
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
father has religious occupation	5.986*** (0.214)	6.228*** (0.231)	7.729*** (0.226)	8.832*** (0.201)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Child controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Outcome mean	14.7	15.5	15.3	15.0
Observations	16,223,562	18,930,606	19,327,349	17,132,508

Notes: OLS regressions of an indicator for whether a child has a Biblical name on an indicator ($\times 100$) for whether the child's father has a religious occupation (see the notes to Table 8). The sample is restricted to all white, U.S. born-children. Each column is a separate regression for the given Census year listed at the top of the column. All regressions include county fixed effects as well as a set of child controls: fixed effects for child gender, birth year, and birth decade. Standard errors are clustered by county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure F.2: Horizontal Transmission: Exposure to Southern Whites and Religious Child Names
Neighborhood-Level Exposure with County Fixed Effects \times Born After Move



Notes: This figure re-estimates panel (b) in Figure 7 with county fixed effects \times born after move. See the notes below that figure for details on the specification. The 95% confidence intervals are based on standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county.

Table F.6: Horizontal Transmission: Exposure Effects on Non-Southerners’ Religious Names Neighborhood-Level Exposure with County Fixed Effects \times Born After Move

Dependent Variable: Specification:	Child has Biblical Name				
	Base	North Origin to West Dest.	Δ Orig.-Dest. % Southern Whites	Control for Name Freq.	Birth 5-Year FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% Southern Whites $_{t-1} \times$ Born After Move	0.044*** (0.011)	0.059*** (0.019)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.031*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.011)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE \times Born After Move	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Year - Move Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Order FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Birth Period FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,483,543	414,859	2,447,502	2,483,543	2,483,543
Outcome mean (pre-move)	15.4	14.0	15.4	15.4	15.4

Notes: This table re-estimates panel (b) of Table 10 with county fixed effects \times born after move. See the notes below that table for details on the specification. Standard errors are clustered by contemporaneous destination county. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

F.5 Cultural Spillovers: Music and Cuisine

Another potential pathway for cultural transmission from Southern to non-Southern whites was the diffusion of Southern food and music. Southern cuisine prominently features barbecue and meat-heavy meals. These traveled with Southern white migrants outside the South. Appendix Table F.7 (columns 1–4) documents higher visits to barbecue and steak restaurants as a share of total visits, relative to traditionally non-Southern staples, such as pizza and other Italian foods. We find analogous results for fried chicken—another Southern-origin cuisine—looking at the prevalence of Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) fast-food restaurants (columns 5–6). The popularity of country music follows a similar pattern. Holding urban density fixed, historical Southern white concentrations correlate strongly with country music radio station locations outside the South, as illustrated in Appendix Figure F.3.


Southern white migrants plausibly help explain how so much of the non-South (outside the biggest cities) came to embrace Southern culture, giving rise to the so-called Southernization noted as early as the 1970s (Egerton, 1974). Southernization of culture, in turn, increased the scope for Southernization of politics. As Southern culture gained traction outside the South and traditional North–South cultural divides faded, it was easier for right-wing movement leaders to forge new political coalitions. For instance, many of country music’s “biggest stars signed up to help [George] Wallace in 1968 performing with the governor as he crisscrossed the country.” Nixon followed suit in the next election as he repeatedly espoused “fondness for country music” and “courted musicians and Nashville executives, knowing that these entertainers would help secure the new voting blocs that Republicans counted on” both inside and outside the South (Gregory, 2005, p. 313). Another example was George Wallace floating Colonel Sanders of KFC as a possible vice presidential running mate in the 1968 election.

Table F.7: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Modern-day Cuisine

Dependent Variable:	Share of Visits to ... Restaurant				Any Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurants	
	BBQ and steak		Italian and pizza		(5)	(6)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
% Southern Whites, 1940	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.006* (0.003)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886
Outcome mean	0.06	0.06	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.41
Adj. R ²	0.02	0.03	0.24	0.26	0.20	0.37

Notes: OLS regressions of county-level restaurant visit shares for various cuisines (1-4) and a dummy for any Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurants in a county as of 2022 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Restaurant visit data from Google News Lab (2021). Counties with insufficient visit data for a particular cuisine are considered zeroes for coding purposes. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline controls. Standard errors are clustered using the grid cell approach of Bester et al. (2011). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure F.3: Southern White Migrants and Country Music Radio Stations




Notes: Binned scatter plots of the number of country music stations in a county in 2021 over the average county-level share of Southern white migrants in 1940. The sample consists of 1,888 counties outside the South, which excludes states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma, plus the District of Columbia. Southern Whites are defined as individuals who were classified as white in the U.S. Census in 1940 and who were born in a Southern state. Radio station estimates are generated from partialling out log population density in 1940. County music data comes from the websites of iHeartRadio, Cumulus, and Audacy, the top three radio companies in the United States.

G Further Background on Southern White Migrants

G.1 The Geography of the Great Migration


Figure G.1: Composition for Sending States and Receiving Regions, 1850–2020




Notes: Panel (a) plots the percentage of Southern whites from each of the 12 sending states (as share of all Southern whites who lived outside the South) in each decade from 1850 to 2020. Panel (b) shows which regions, as defined by U.S. census regions, had the largest stock of Southern white migrants who lived outside the South in each decade for the same time period. Shares were computed using the full count census files from 1850 to 1940, as well as the 1% census files for 1950, 1960, 1970, the 1% American Community Survey files for 2010 and 2020, the 5% files for 1980 and 1990, and the 0.1% American Community Survey file for 2000.

Figure G.2: Mapping Southern-born Whites Outside the South in 1870 and 1900

(a) 1870




(b) 1900



Notes: This figure maps the shares of white individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1870 and 1900 according to the full-count Census. The legend shows the intervals considered for each split. Note that some “Southern-born” living in West Virginia in 1870 were actually born in parts of West Virginia that had officially been Virginia prior to West Virginian statehood in 1863.

Figure G.3: Geographic Sorting of Black and Southern Whites By Location Population Density



Notes: These figures report the share of all Black and white Southern-born living outside the South across ventiles of the destination county population in (a) 1870, (b) 1900, and (c) 1940.

G.2 Characterizing Southern White Migrants: Ideology and Economics

What are the distinctive characteristics of Southern white migrants? We answered this question in two ways, described briefly in Section 2.3, and elaborated further here. First, Appendix Figure G.4 reports differences in ANES question responses across different groups of white respondents prior to 1970, distinguishing between Southern stayers and movers, border state stayers and movers, and non-Southern stayers. These figures provide a unique window into the attitudes of those in the diaspora in the mid-20th century (as early as comprehensive data allow).

Second, we compare the characteristics of a linked sample of Southern white migrants between 1930 to 1940 as well as individual level data from the Census between 1900 and 1940. We use the 1930 and 1940 full-count Census files together with the crosswalks provided by Abramitzky et al. (2020). Using information on individuals' migration status in the 1940 Census, we then compare the characteristics of individuals who stayed in the South in both years. This allows us to see whether (i) the baseline characteristics of later movers and stayers were different in 1930, and (ii) movers realized greater economic status after moving relative to those who remained in the South.

Table G.1 reports the 1930 mean differences for the Southerners who would later migrate or stay in the South. In 1930, those who would become migrants in the next ten years tended to be single, younger, more urban, and more literate. They were also more likely to have had a radio in their household in 1930, a potential information transmission device to learn about opportunities outside the South. They tended to be employed at a lesser rate with lower occupational income scores, although this to some extent reflects the 3 year age difference on average. Despite the many reasons for which Southern white migrants migrated at the time, these baseline characteristics are similar to the ones described by Gregory (2005) and Collins and Wanamaker (2015).

When we look at the same individuals again in 1940, comparing movers to stayers, movers tended to fare better in terms of their economic outcomes. Again, they are more likely to live in an urban area, have higher house values, and this time they also have a higher employment probability as well as increased occupational income scores compared to those who remained in the South.


We then regress the migrant dummy on 1930 individual characteristics to see how strong their conditional explanatory power is in the determination of the migration outcome. The regressions are reported in Table G.2. Despite their statistical significance, all coefficients are relatively small with the 2.8 to 3 p.p. coefficient on literacy being the largest predictor. In terms of explanatory power, individual characteristics appear to explain little of the migration decision. The adjusted R^2 of 0.01 in column 1 compares to the values of 0.03 and 0.04 in columns 2 and 3, where we included state and county fixed

effects, respectively. Overall, this resonates with [Collins and Wanamaker \(2015, p. 950\)](#), who find that “differences between migrants and non-migrants were small within race categories.”


Going beyond the linked sample, we find similar patterns when using the individual Census data. [Figure G.5](#) plots the characteristics of Southern white migrants, Southern white stayers, non-Southern white migrants, non-Southern white “natives”, i.e. individuals born outside the South who lived in their state of birth at the enumeration date, and white foreign-born individuals. Even though Southern white migrants were slightly older in the beginning of the sample and had a higher share of men (0.2 p.p.), they tended to be very comparable to other white groups in terms of their occupational income scores, labor force participation, and skill group.

Figure G.4: Attitudes and Beliefs of Southern White Migrants

(a) Southern Versus non-Southern Whites



(b) Southern, Border State, and Non-Southern Whites



Notes: Average responses to binary-coded questions on relevant issues for white individuals from the American National Election Survey (ANES), waves through 1970. Across panels (a) and (b), respondents (R) are considered Southern if they were born or raised in the states of the former Confederacy as well as Oklahoma; South and non-South samples include and exclude those states, respectively. In panel (b) respondents are considered as being from or residing in border states of Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, or West Virginia.

Table G.1: Comparing Southern White Migrants and Stayers Using Linked Census Data, 1930-40

	(a) Southern Movers and Stayers Pre-Migration (1930)					
	Mean(Migrants)	No. migrants	Mean(Stayers)	No. stayers	Diff.	Std. Error
Urban = 1	0.330	76,356	0.310	2,579,869	0.020***	0.002
Farm = 1	0.438	76,356	0.470	2,579,869	-0.032***	0.002
Value of home	1033.529	74,457	1100.162	2,531,653	-66.633**	33.379
Owens radio	0.196	76,356	0.181	2,579,869	0.015***	0.001
Family size	5.406	76,356	5.436	2,579,869	-0.030***	0.009
No. of children	0.521	76,356	0.804	2,579,869	-0.282***	0.005
Age	19.242	76,356	22.504	2,579,869	-3.262***	0.048
Single = 1	0.715	76,356	0.619	2,579,869	0.097***	0.002
Literate = 1	0.767	76,356	0.681	2,579,869	0.086***	0.002
Employed = 1	0.431	76,356	0.498	2,579,869	-0.068***	0.002
Occ. income score	7.752	76,356	9.407	2,579,869	-1.654***	0.044

	(b) Southern Movers and Stayers Post-Migration (1940)					
	Mean(Migrants)	No. migrants	Mean(Stayers)	No. stayers	Diff.	Std. Error
Urban = 1	0.498	77,329	0.337	2,586,984	0.161***	0.002
Farm = 1	0.190	77,329	0.428	2,586,984	-0.237***	0.001
Value of home	2601.318	13,314	2197.865	1,235,007	403.454***	42.914
Family size	3.603	77,329	4.700	2,586,984	-1.097***	0.009
No. of children	0.756	77,329	0.956	2,586,984	-0.200***	0.005
Age	29.253	77,329	32.480	2,586,984	-3.227***	0.048
Single = 1	0.444	77,329	0.437	2,586,984	0.007***	0.002
Literate = 1	0.763	77,329	0.676	2,586,984	0.087***	0.002
Employed = 1	0.687	77,329	0.662	2,586,984	0.026***	0.002
Occ. income score	17.234	77,329	15.497	2,586,984	1.737***	0.048


Notes: Summary statistics for Southern migrants and stayers in 1930 and 1940 using linked individual data from the 1930 and 1940 full-count Census files. A stayer is someone who lived in the South in 1930 and still lived there in 1940, whereas a migrant here is characterized as someone who lived in the South in 1930 but who lived outside the South in 1940. For each variable, we report the mean value and number of observations by group as well as the result from a univariate *t*-test across the two groups for which we adjusted standard errors for the unequal group sizes. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table G.2: Regressing Migration Status on 1930 Observables using Linked Census Data

	Pr(Migrated to Outside the South between 1930-40) = 1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Urban = 1	-0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0011*** (0.0003)
Farm = 1	-0.0018*** (0.0003)	-0.0053*** (0.0003)	-0.0045*** (0.0003)
Home owner = 1	-0.0097*** (0.0003)	-0.0067*** (0.0003)	-0.0075*** (0.0003)
Log house value	0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)
Owns radio	0.0038*** (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0003 (0.0003)
Family size	-0.0006*** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
No. of children	0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Age	-0.0005*** (0.0000)	-0.0004*** (0.0000)	-0.0004*** (0.0000)
Single = 1	0.0055*** (0.0004)	0.0069*** (0.0004)	0.0074*** (0.0004)
Literate = 1	0.0304*** (0.0003)	0.0284*** (0.0003)	0.0281*** (0.0003)
Employed = 1	-0.0076*** (0.0003)	-0.0044*** (0.0003)	-0.0033*** (0.0003)
Occ. income score	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)
State FE		Yes	
County FE			Yes
Observations	2,606,110	2,606,110	2,606,110
Outcome mean	0.03	0.03	0.03
Adjusted R ²	0.01	0.03	0.04


Notes: Cross-sectional regression of a dummy for future outmigration from the South on individual characteristics in 1930. A stayer is someone who lived in the South in 1930 and still lived there in 1940, whereas a migrant here is characterized as someone who lived in the South in 1930 but who lived outside the South in 1940. The information on later non-Southern residency was obtained by linking the 1930 to the 1940 Census. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure G.5: Characteristics of Southern White Migrants Compared to Other Groups



Continued on next page

Figure G.5 (Continued): Characteristics of Southern White Migrants Compared to Other Groups



Notes: Time series plots of average individual characteristics by group from 1900 to 1940 based on the full count U.S. decennial census files. The groups are i) Southern-born white individuals living outside the South, ii) Southern-born white individuals living in the South, iii) non-Southern-born white individuals living outside their state of birth (not in the South), iv) non-Southern-born white individuals living in their state of birth, and v) white foreign-born individuals. The sample consists of those aged 16-65 who lived in private households (i.e. not in group quarters, such as prisons, mental institutions, military facilities, or college dormitories). Occupational and industry classifications follow those laid out by the Census Bureau's 1950 definitions.

H Data Appendix

Table H.1: Summary Statistics for County-level Controls, Historical

	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Baseline controls					
Log population density (1940)	1,889	3.27	1.55	-1.62	11.31
% manufacturing employment (1940)	1,889	2.95	3.97	0	44.36
% unemployment (1940)	1,889	3.09	1.46	0.16	12.39
% labor force participation (1940)	1,889	37.12	3.70	25.41	54.22
% Black residents (1940)	1,889	1.67	4.15	0	46.55
% Mexican-born (1940)	1,889	0.18	0.86	0	18.50
% German-born (1940)	1,889	0.79	0.83	0	6.03
% Canadian-born (1940)	1,889	0.64	1.34	0	15.19
% Irish-born (1940)	1,889	0.17	0.34	0	4.51
% Italian-born (1940)	1,889	0.42	0.94	0	6.81
% acres of land in farms (1940)	1,889	67.72	28.74	0	100
Log mean farm value (1940)	1,887	8.74	0.68	6.54	11.42
% vote share for Wilson (1912)	1,889	39.04	11.06	0	80.20
% Union Army enlistment (1861-65)	1,889	22.56	27.55	0	100
% Civil War deaths (1861-65)	1,889	2.84	4.73	0	87.50
1900 controls					
Log population density (1900)	1,889	2.93	1.62	0	10.35
% manufacturing empl. (1900)	1,889	3.23	4.35	0	34.51
% Black residents (1900)	1,889	2.19	5.57	0	54.63
% Mexican-born (1900)	1,889	0.19	1.84	0	42.27
% German-born (1900)	1,889	3.10	3.26	0	21.86
% Canadian-born (1900)	1,889	1.83	3.51	0	37.29
% Irish-born (1900)	1,889	1.15	1.40	0	12.01
% Italian-born (1900)	1,889	0.34	0.86	0	8.61
% acres of land in farms (1900)	1,889	62.27	35.49	0	100
Log mean farm value (1900)	1,889	7.74	0.99	0	10.56
Sorting controls					
% vote share for Breckinridge (1860)	1,889	7.69	15.02	0	79.81
% vote share for Jennings Bryan (1896)	1,889	44.87	20.11	0	98.10
Dummy for missing Breckinridge vote	1,889	0.41	0.49	0	1
Dummy for missing Jennings Bryan vote	1,889	0.04	0.20	0	1
County unincorporated in 1860	1,889	0.17	0.38	0	1
Unsettled in 1860 (≥ 2 pop per sq. mile)	1,889	0.33	0.47	0	1
Any major oil fields, 1900	1,888	0.09	0.28	0	1
Any major oil fields, 1940	1,888	0.23	0.42	0	1
Any mines	1,888	0.26	0.44	0	1
Cotton potential	1,887	0.19	0.26	0	0.74
Agricultural potential	1,889	0.41	0.18	0	0.63
Distance to nearest coast (log)	1,889	13.16	1.28	4.76	14.29
Distance to nearest river (log)	1,889	10.23	1.14	0.24	12.55
Mean elevation	1,887	563.80	587.17	-1259.14	3502
Mean ruggedness	1,889	0.07	0.09	0	0.57

Boundary Harmonization

For county-level data, all boundaries are standardized in GIS software to 2010 boundaries, following the procedure introduced in [Hornbeck \(2010\)](#) and expanded upon in [Perlman \(2021\)](#) and [Ferrara et al. \(2021\)](#) in order to consistently match them with census data and to avoid issues of the merging or splitting of counties over time.

This process involves creating unique units (henceforth county parts), based on where historical and 2010 counties intersect. Areas in square miles are calculated for each county part. A share of each historical count variable being interpolated is assigned to each county based on the county part's share of the total area of the historical county in which it lies. These approximated counts are then summed by 2010 county.

For the 1952 and 1971 religious censuses from [The Association of Religious Data Archives \(2021\)](#), county boundaries are first determined using the Atlas of Historical County Boundaries to modify the Tiger/Line county boundaries from the U.S. Census Bureau.¹

For congressional district (CD) level data, county-level data are harmonized to the boundaries of the particular CD–year. However, in contrast to our county-level analyses, we do not harmonize CD boundaries to any particular CD boundary standard, given the numerous and complex changes in CD boundaries and to the number of CDs within states over time. For instance, over a third of sample states have at-large (i.e., statewide) CDs at some point during the sample period, often for only a few years. As an example, only 14 of the CDs in the 1960s (i.e., around 5%) have time-invariant boundaries over those five congresses, excluding at-large CDs. As such, we eschew within-district analysis for our CD-level results. We instead opt to use state-level fixed effects to capture time-invariant unobservables.

Constructing the Religious Rhetoric Index (RRI)

To construct our religious rhetoric index, we analyze the universe of congressional speech data and identify words with inarguable Biblical roots: God, Christ, lord, almighty, amen. For the period of study of our CD analysis (1940–90), we count the total number of instances in which a given legislator (identified using their ICPSR code) used any of these words and divide it by their total word count. This produces a time-invariant religious rhetoric measure for each legislator. We opt not to construct a time-varying measure, as there are often too few religious words being spoken in any given Congress year. This nonetheless lets us examine how the composition of Congress changes, with respect to the rhetorical religiosity of legislators, as legislator replacement occurs, similar to [Bateman et al. \(2017\)](#). In our analysis, we adopt a standard normal transformation of this measure as our primary religious rhetoric index (RRI).

Constructing the State Platform Dimensions

The state platform analysis featured in Appendix Tables [E.6](#) and [E.7](#) defines the content of state Republican and Democratic Party platforms outside the South along three dimensions: (i) support for civil rights, (ii) support for traditionalism, and (iii) support for small or local government. These categories are defined using indicators for whether a state platform, drafted in a given state-year, contained any of a set of trigrams (i.e., three word) phrases consistent with a given dimension. Trigrams are extracted from

¹See <https://publications.newberry.org/ahcbp/> (last accessed on Dec. 1, 2020).

the state platforms and coded in terms of their frequency. These trigram and frequency data are from [Hopkins et al. \(2022\)](#) and were provided to us by the authors. We describe their content here.

As in that paper, we ignore trigrams related to committee processes (e.g., “platform_committee_report,” “adopt_state_convent”) and focus on prominent political trigrams, which we define as ones that appear 50 times or more over the 1940–2017 period. We then code for all state-years during that period in which a platform was drafted three indicator variables, for whether that platform expressed (i) support for civil rights, (ii) support for traditionalism, and (iii) support for small or local government. These are based on the appearance of any of the following trigrams, which we deem to be highly likely to be related to and politically in support of a given cause:

Support for civil rights. men_creat_equal, without_regard_race, regardless_race_creed, regardless_race_color, regardless_race_gender, race_creed_color, race_color_creed, race_color_religion, race_religion_nation, sex_nation_origin, creed_nation_origin, color_nation_origin, color_nation_origin, nation_origin_religion, religion_nation_origin, civil_right_act, equal_protect_law, vote_right_act, civil_right_law, equal_employ_opportun, support_equal_right, discrim_base_race, civil_right_commiss, support_equal_access, human_civil_right, equal_right_equal, believ_equal_right, citizen_regardless_race, civil_human_right, civil_right_liberti, discrimin_base_race, elimin_form_discrimin, endow_creator_certain, equal_opportun_citizen, equal_treatment_law, fair_employ_practic, free_fair_elect, make_clear_fourteenth, fourteenth_amend_protect, human_right_commiss, justic_equal_opportun, nation_origin_disabl, opportun_regardless_race, protect_civil_right, right_equal_justic, right_equal_opportun, right_everi_person, support_affirm_action.

Support for traditionalism. innoc_human_life, man_one_woman, partial_birth_abort, sanctiti_human_life, human_life_amend, embryon_stem_cell, adult_stem_cell, tradit_famili_valu, marriag_one_man, union_one_man, support_human_life, appli_unborn_children, famili_valu_sanctiti, fundament_right_life, individu_right_life, life_begin_concept, life_concept_natur, protect_appli_unborn, protect_innoc_human, respect_tradit_famili, right_life_infring, sanctiti_innoc_human, stem_cell_research, unborn_child_fundament, defens_marriag_act, provid_altern_abort.

Support for small or local government. free_enterpres_system, believ_free_enterpris, privat_properti_right, protect_privat_properti, sovereignti_unit_state, state_local_level, believ_unit_state, believ_state_govern, local_unit_govern, unit_state_govern, unit_state_support, support_unit_state, state_govern_believ, support_local_control, support_right_individu, parent_right_respons, health_care_choic, health_care_decis, local_control_educ, local_control_school, protect_individu_right, support_right_parent, proper_role_govern, without_govern_interfer.