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THE OTHER GREAT MIGRATION:
SOUTHERN WHITES AND THE NEW RIGHT

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The Other Great Migration: Southern Whites and the New Right
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ABSTRACT

This paper provides a novel perspective on the Great Migration out of the U.S. South. Using a shift-share identification strategy, we show how millions of Southern white migrants transformed the cultural and political landscape across America. Counties with a larger Southern white share by 1940 exhibited growing support for right-wing politics throughout the 20th century and beyond. Racial animus, religious conservatism, and localist attitudes among the Southern white diaspora hastened partisan realignment as the Republican Party found fresh support for the Southern strategy outside the South. Their congressional representatives were more likely to oppose politically liberal legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and to object to the Electoral College count in 2021. These migrants helped shape institutions that reinforced racial inequity and exclusion, they shared ideology through religious organizations and popular media, and they transmitted an array of cultural norms to non-Southern populations. Together, our findings suggest that Southern white migrants may have forever changed the trajectory of American politics.

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1 Introduction

The 20th century witnessed a mass migration out of the American South. Much has been written about the Great Migration of around 6 million Southern Blacks during this episode, including by economists (e.g., Boustan, 2010; Derenoncourt, 2021; Fouka et al., forthcoming). The even larger concurrent outmigration of Southern whites has received much less attention.¹ Yet, this other great migration may have blurred the cultural and political divides that long existed between the South and the rest of the country—a possibility raised in seminal historical work on the Southern diaspora (Gregory, 2005) and in popular writing about the “Southernization” of America (e.g., Applebome, 1997; Egerton, 1974). Today, many of these same divisions exist instead *within* regions and have been accentuated by an ascendent right-wing populist movement, running through George Wallace’s third-party presidential campaign in 1968 to the election of Donald Trump in 2016.

What role did the historical migration of whites out of the South play in driving ideological change across the United States? This paper shows how the “Great White Migration”² of the 20th century contributed to the cultural shifts that gave rise to the modern political right. Southern white migrants brought with them a set of preferences and beliefs, characterized by racial animus, conservative religious attitudes, and localist values that would underpin their right-wing political leanings in the decades to come. As these migrants put down roots, they transmitted cultural values to their non-Southern neighbors and, in turn, influenced politics in their new communities and perhaps even nationally.

We study the long-run influence of this Southern white diaspora, using county-level variation in exposure to these migrants through 1940.³ We identify causal effects using a shift-share instrument that combines two sources of variation to predict the stock of Southern white migrants living in each non-Southern county in 1940. The “shift” captures the overall migration shock, using the change from 1900 to 1940 in the number of Southern-born whites from each state of origin across *all* non-Southern counties. The “shares” capture local exposure, weighting each state’s shift based on the distribution of Southern whites living in a non-Southern county in 1900. By multiplying these, a non-Southern county is predicted to have more Southern white migrants as of 1940 if more of its pre-1900 migrants came from Southern states that subsequently experienced greater outmigration between 1900 and 1940.

We find large effects of the Southern white diaspora on the intensity of right-wing politics outside the South. A one percentage point (p.p.) increase in the share of Southern-born whites in the population in 1940 is associated with about half of a p.p. increase in the vote share for Donald Trump in 2016. This is economically meaningful: the average non-Southern county had around 3% Southern-born whites in 1940, enough to hand Trump the pivotal states of Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, each won with less than a one p.p. margin. We also find effects across different *dimensions* of right-wing politics. Residents of counties with larger Southern white migrant shares exhibit greater racial, religious, and economic conservatism today—a bundle of attributes associated with the American “New Right” and with the Republican Party during its rightward shift.

¹Important exceptions within economics, discussed below, include work by Collins and Wanamaker (2015) on the characteristics of Black and Southern white migrants during the first Great Migration (1910–1930), or studies on the Dust Bowl migration (Arthi, 2018; Hornbeck, 2012). Outside economics, pathbreaking work by Gregory (2005) estimates as many as 8 million Southern Blacks and 19 million Southern whites migrated during the 20th century.

²We use this phrase following Berry (2000) as well as in reference to the title in Collins and Wanamaker (2015).

³We choose this year as it predates key outcomes of interest, including partisan realignments in the postwar era. This is also the last year for which the complete-count Census of Population is available and with which we can credibly measure both migrant exposure at the county level outside the South and migrant state of origin within the South.

We link these findings to deeper political changes across the 20th century as Southern white migrants hastened the process of partisan realignment. Beginning in 1960, counties home to large Southern white populations began to swing away from the Democratic Party. Southern white migrants left an especially large imprint on the 1968 election, when they amplified support outside the South for the hard-line segregationist and third-party candidate, George Wallace. Wallace's strong performance in diaspora communities foreshadowed the broader consolidation of racial conservatives under the Republican Party in 1972. This was also a turning point in partisan realignment among whites within the South, which was itself motivated by racial animus (Feinstein and Schickler, 2008; Kuziemko and Washington, 2018). Together, our results show that the Democrats increasingly not only lost white voters across the South but also in diaspora communities outside the South. Congressional representatives of these communities consistently voted against more liberal roll calls, spanning civil rights, public goods provision, and electoral representation. They later systematically opposed the 2021 Electoral College confirmation.

These core findings on politics are robust to leading identification threats. This includes a host of now-standard estimation and inference diagnostics in the shift-share literature (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2018; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). In addition to a battery of place-based and demographic controls, we develop alternative instruments based on exogenous shifts induced by push factors across Southern origins, ranging from natural disasters to crop failures to New Deal aid (following Boustan, 2010; Derenoncourt, 2021). Our results also hold when extending the migration window back to 1870 and looking at the long-run shift through 1940. This is especially important given the foundational role of the postbellum diaspora in catalyzing the subsequent chain migration throughout the 20th century. Overall, these results clarify the persistent effects of early Southern white migration on the long-run trajectory of local political preferences.

These persistent effects are the outcome of several forces driving cultural change. We provide evidence on five channels through which the "Great White Migration" shaped the trajectory of racial, religious, and economic conservatism, as well as American culture more broadly. They are by no means exhaustive or exclusive of other mechanisms but rather speak to plausible pathways of influence.

First, early postbellum migrants helped to entrench a Confederate culture of racial animus outside the South in the early 20th century. We link these migrants to a surge in Confederate memorialization as seen through the building of monuments and naming of places after Confederate leaders as well as the presence of the United Daughters of the Confederacy, a civil organization that was key to such memorialization efforts. Moreover, both Southern and non-Southern-born parents outside the South were more likely to give their children the names of Confederate leaders when living in communities with a large Southern white diaspora. These migrants helped mobilize white resentment by forming new chapters of the Second Ku Klux Klan. Southern white inflows increased expressions of racial animus in local newspapers, and also contributed to the growing incidence of racial violence outside the South, including lynchings of persons of color. Together, these results point to the significant influence of Southern whites on the diffusion and entrenchment of racism outside the South.

Second, this deepening of racial violence and exclusion led to changes in geographic sorting by race over the long run. While Southern Blacks were more likely to settle in dense urban areas and increasingly so over time, Southern whites dispersed across the country, from rural areas to small towns to big cities. The spread of "sundown towns" was a central yet underappreciated part of this process (Loewen, 2005). As white migrants put down roots, they helped to build these exclusionary institutions, which would

make many areas previously home to Blacks increasingly inhospitable. Implemented through a mix of violent and non-violent means, sundown towns proliferated in the early 20th century, and over time, Black populations could be found in fewer counties outside the South: the share of counties with zero Blacks grew from 4% to 15% between 1910 and 1940. We show that the Southern white diaspora facilitated sundown towns and, in turn, the “Great Retreat” of Black populations from counties across America.⁴ This would forever alter the racial geography of America and ultimately limit the scope for local interracial contact over the long run, which some have shown to break down racist attitudes and undermine support for right-wing politics (Brown et al., 2021).

Third, religious institutions acted as important vehicles for cultural transmission. Historically, Southern white migrants were more likely to sort occupationally into the religious sector, working as clergy and in other outward-facing religious positions. At the same time, the masses of Southern whites brought their evangelical traditions with them, contributing to the explosive growth of these denominations outside the South. This includes, most prominently, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), which split from the national church over the issue of slavery and was an important force behind the spread of conservative evangelical ideology during the 20th century (see Butler, 2021; Jones, 2018). These churches outlived the initial migrant founders and ultimately played a central role in forging the right-wing coalition that catalyzed Republican Party successes in many parts of the country.

Fourth, Southern whites exerted an early and persistent influence on the right-wing media landscape. In counties with a large diaspora, radio stations were more likely to host conservative programs such as the *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour*, which aired from 1955 through the early 1970s featuring Carl McIntire’s diatribes against left-wing causes across a range of political, economic, and cultural domains. This differential media landscape would persist over subsequent generations as Rush Limbaugh rose to prominence in some of the same localities across America. While these conservative cultural broadcasts resonated with the Southern white electorate, they may have also conveyed ideas and values to new non-Southern-origin audiences in diaspora communities outside the South.

Finally, we find evidence of broader cultural spillovers from Southern to non-Southern populations outside the South. In counties with a larger Southern white diaspora in the early 20th century, non-Southern-born parents were increasingly likely to give their children names distinctly popular among whites in the South in the 1860s. Alongside these naming shifts, we see growing rates of intermarriage between Southern and non-Southern spouses as more Southern whites entered the local marriage market. These household-based mechanisms of cultural change are consistent with broader Southern influence as seen, for example, through the diffusion of country music and barbecue cuisine, both of which originated in the South and were important features of life in the diaspora. As these elements of Southern heritage spread outside the South, it may have become easier for right-wing movement leaders to forge new political coalitions across the North–South cultural divide. For instance, over time country music would become increasingly associated with the white working class and imbued with a political conservatism that cut across regions (see Gregory, 2005).

This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of migration, cultural change, and the conservative movement in America. We advance knowledge on the Great Migrations out of the South during the 20th century. Such work in economics has focused on the migration of Southern Blacks

⁴Loewen (2005) coined this phrase—in juxtaposition to the Great Migration—when documenting the pervasive and often forced migration of Blacks out of towns across America through sundown town enforcement.

(Boustan, 2010, 2016; Calderon et al., 2021; Derenoncourt, 2021), while a small subset has characterized the collective migration of Blacks and whites (Collins and Wanamaker, 2015; Stuart and Taylor, 2019). Calderon et al. (2021) find that Southern Black migrants increased support for civil rights legislation among Northern whites. We show how Southern white migration in the early 20th century shaped the evolution of culture and politics across the United States, diffusing both social norms and divisions historically associated with the South. We provide novel empirical support for key channels of political influence through which this Southern diaspora helped reconfigure right-wing politics—racial animus, religious organization, and media—as previously emphasized in pioneering historical work on the diaspora (Dochuk, 2010; Gregory, 2005). We identify far-reaching consequences of this reconfiguration in contemporary U.S. politics. Reisinger (2021) presents concurrent findings on some of those long-run effects, focusing on later Southern white migration, measured in 1970.

Through careful analysis of geographic sorting and with novel measures of historical culture and institutions at the local level, we identify the distinctive influence of early movers on long-run sociopolitical equilibria, in line with a foundational theory of migration and cultural change (Zelinsky, 1973). The “Great White Migration” brought Southern values to communities across the westward-moving country as migrants transmitted cultural norms that would later become central to modern right-wing politics in the U.S. We show that this diaspora accelerated a national partisan realignment in the mid-20th century and the emergence of a New Right coalition made up of racial, religious, and economic conservatives. Such influence parallels other major cultural changes rooted in the historical migration of Southern Blacks (Calderon et al., 2021), Europeans (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020; Grosjean, 2014; Haddad, 2021), and settlers on the U.S. frontier (Bazzi et al., 2020).

Moreover, by connecting migrants to politically salient forms of Confederate memorialization and racial animus outside the South, we extend prior work across the social sciences on the cultural and institutional foundations of racism within the South (e.g., Cox, 2019; Roberts Forde and Bedingfield, eds, 2021; Williams, 2017, 2021). Like Loewen (2005) and MacLean (1994), we find such foundations far beyond the South. Our contribution is to identify an important role of the early Southern white diaspora in this diffusion process that helped entrench sundown towns, the second KKK, and other vehicles of racial animus across America.

Together, these results offer new insight into the origins of conservative politics and right-wing populism in the modern U.S. Recent work connects right-wing political preferences to communal and illiberal moral values (Alexander and Welzel, 2017; Enke, 2020), anti-globalization sentiments (Rodrik, 2020), and low levels of social capital (Giuliano and Wacziarg, 2020). These factors mirror the attitudes and beliefs that we find among Southern white migrants. While European immigrants imported *left-wing* ideology to the U.S. (Giuliano and Tabellini, 2020), Southern whites brought *right-wing* ideology to their non-Southern destinations.

Our results also address increasing polarization and the changing geography of political division in the United States since the mid-20th century. Historically, the North–South divide dominated. Today, however, vast differences exist *within* regions and communities as partisan identity increasingly coincides with ideological bifurcation *throughout* the country (Bertrand and Kamenica, 2018; Desmet and Wacziarg, 2021; Enke, 2020). Our findings on the partisan realignment and racial conservatism in congressional voting suggest that the Southern white diaspora may have been an early driver of polarization, effectively amplifying a local North–South divide within the many regions they settled. By identifying

the origins and persistence of Southern white influence across America, we offer a new perspective on the success of what Maxwell and Shields (2019) call the “Long Southern Strategy” to build an effective right-wing movement for political change. This resonates with Gregory (2005), who argues that Southern white migrants played an important role in “collapsing... huge cultural differences between [the South] and the rest of the United States” and “reshaping American conservatism” at a national level.

Lastly, we add to a growing literature on the deep roots of culture (Giuliano and Nunn, 2020; Tabellini, 2010; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012). We show how certain ideological traits associated with right-wing politics in the U.S. can, in part, be traced back to the antebellum South. Acharya et al. (2016) identify within the South a relationship between historical slavery and the modern prevalence of racial conservatism and anti-Black attitudes. Our results suggest that these cultural norms transmitted within the South were also exported by white migrants and transmitted throughout the country thereafter.

Before turning to background, we offer a few notes on interpretation. While identifying an important role for Southern white migrants in the political economy of racial animus and right-wing politics outside the South, we are by no means ruling out a large influence of non-Southerners in driving those same outcomes. Nor are we arguing that all Southern white migrants had the same attachments to Southern evangelicalism and Confederate culture or had the same impacts on their destination communities. Rather, our findings identify average effects of Southern white migration on culture outside the South. Finally, we are not equating all right-wing politics with racial animus. The New Right coalition brought together an emerging collection of shared interests across racial, religious, and economic conservatives in the postwar period. This does not mean that all of its political expressions or all members of its voting bloc are equally attached to each of its defining attributes.

2 Background on the Southern White Diaspora

This section provides historical background on the migration of whites out of the South. We describe key events and characterize the migrant populations.

2.1 Early Postbellum Migration of Southern Whites

Small waves of migration out of the South ensued after the Civil War (Woodberry and Smith, 1998). Many Southern whites followed Gold Rush routes westward, seeking land on which to rebuild estates lost during the war. Famous California berry farmer Walter Knott, the son of one such migrant, would later remark that “the carpetbaggers came down South and disenfranchised every Southerner that had been in the war” (Dochuk, 2010, p. 7). Oil, mining, and timber industries created new pathways out of the South, which future Southern-born migrants would follow (Gregory, 2005).

Other early Southern migrant families had long been mobile, following the search for cheaper land, cattle, and crops over generations from the East Coast and Appalachia, to the Ozarks and the Great Plains, and finally to the West. Over time, these migrants established pathways and networks alongside them, while bringing ideologies shaped by their extractive and agricultural trades and the harsh and unpredictable experiences that often accompanied them (Dochuk, 2010; Woodberry and Smith, 1998). Recent historical work suggests that many of those moving West in the postbellum era were motivated by ideological grievance. Cox Richardson (2020) notes that Southerners “who hated that racial equality could be enforced by the government, saw the West as the only free place left in America.” And Waite (2021) argues that “[t]he West’s relative lack of African Americans made it a natural escape for the thousands of former Confederates fleeing the fallout of emancipation.” These early movers laid the

foundation for future chains of migration out of the South.

2.2 The Great Migration(s) of the Early 20th Century

A large literature in economics studies the Great Migration of 6 million Blacks out of the South between 1910 and 1970. We know a great deal about the effects on the migrants and their descendants (Black et al., 2015; Collins and Wanamaker, 2014; Derenoncourt, 2021; Eriksson, 2019), on responses among whites in destination cities and labor markets (Boustan, 2010, 2016), and on the demand for civil rights legislation (Calderon et al., 2021). What has received less attention is the even larger migration of Southern whites that also left the South over the course of the 20th century.⁵

While early postbellum outflows of Southern whites were important in initiating novel migration pathways, those flows were dwarfed by the large-scale migration to the North and West after 1900. Figure 1 shows this “Great White Migration” beginning at a time when World War I and immigration restrictions led to increased demand for labor. These migration outflows persisted into the postwar era. World War II cemented industry’s shift to the North and West, spurring a more general exodus of Southern workers during the 1940s, which continued for several decades. By 1970, nearly 20% of Southern-born whites lived outside the South (Collins and Wanamaker, 2015). This trend has continued on a smaller scale into the 21st century. Meanwhile, 35% of Southern-born Blacks lived outside the South by 1970, though many returned to the South in the ensuing decades (see Figure 1).

2.3 Migrant Characteristics

After the Civil War, Southern whites migrated towards particular parts of the westward-moving country. By 1940, one finds large Southern white populations in the West Census Region, the Ohio River Valley, and lower Plains (see Figure 2).⁶ While border states just outside the former Confederacy were popular destinations, large diaspora communities could be found in faraway regions of central California, eastern Washington, Oregon, and much of Wyoming. Southern whites were less prevalent in former Union states, especially in the Northeast and Midwest, where, instead, Southern Black migrants were more likely to settle (see Appendix Figure A.1). Southern whites were also more likely to settle across the entire density distribution, ranging from rural area to small town to large city, whereas Southern Blacks concentrated in the densest urban areas of the country (see Appendix Figure A.12).⁷

Like Black migrants, white migrants often *clustered* at destination, something that Dochuk (2010) and others emphasize in their historical work. This clustering can be seen in Appendix Figure A.3, which colors counties in the top quintile of the Southern-born white population share by state. Appendix Table A.1 formalizes this clustering result: a 1 percentage point (p.p.) increase in the share of Southern whites in county c ’s neighboring counties is associated with a 0.5 p.p. increase in the share of Southern whites in county c . In addition to clustering in nearby counties, white migrants also clustered in certain towns and neighborhoods within counties, a process that interacted with and shaped racial segregation over the

⁵Figure 1 reports absolute numbers to highlight scale differences across white and Black migration flows. Compared to their Southern population shares, the migration of Southern Blacks was relatively larger: by 1940, roughly 8.5% of Southern-born whites lived outside the South compared to roughly 11% of Southern-born Blacks. However, because Southern whites settled in lower-density counties, they constituted a larger share of destination county populations than Southern Blacks.

⁶See Appendix Figure A.2 for 1870 and 1900.

⁷Collins and Wanamaker (2015) characterize racial differences in sorting across regions from 1910 to 1930. In Bazzi et al. (2021), we explore these differences from 1860 to 1940, highlighting the importance not only of traditional forces like distance and networks but also ideological and economic differences. For example, conditional on distance and networks, Southern whites sorted towards counties outside the South that were (i) more suitable for plantation agriculture and (ii) had a higher vote share for the pro-slavery Southern Democrat candidate, John C. Breckinridge, in the 1860 election.

long run, as we show in Section 4.2.

Just as their destinations differed on average, Black and white migrants also came from different regions of the South. While Black migrants came primarily from the Cotton Belt, whites migrated from a vast stretch that also included the more northern “outer South.” This includes the Great Plains of Oklahoma and northern Texas as well as the Appalachian hills of Tennessee and northern Alabama (Gregory, 2005). Push factors were important here: in the Plains, the Dust Bowl caused pervasive drought and farm failure in the 1930s, and in Appalachia, the Depression severely contracted its industrial sector. In general, decreasing white farm ownership or tenantry, decreasing farm acreage, and shrinking manufacturing sectors were important push factors among Southern whites (Fligstein, 1981). Yet despite popular media stereotypes about poor, welfare-seeking Southern migrants—disparagingly called “Okies,” “hillbillies,” and “rednecks”—many of these migrants integrated relatively easily into destination labor markets (Gregory, 2005). In fact, they spanned the socioeconomic spectrum, and in some periods, white outmigrants were positively selected along socioeconomic status and literacy (see Appendix B and Bazzi et al., 2021; Collins and Wanamaker, 2014, for empirical evidence). Gregory (2005, p. 24) argues that wealthy and educated Southern whites were overrepresented in these migrations, with “Northern economic opportunities” spurring their migration more so than “Southern distress.” Dochuk (2010), meanwhile, describes the mass migration of “Okies,” predominantly agricultural settlers from not only Oklahoma but also Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana. He emphasizes that these settlers were not destitute but rather working-class laborers, upended by the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, who followed Route 66 in search of industrial work in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and the Pacific Northwest.

2.4 Characterizing Southern White Culture

In this section, we present evidence on several important cultural distinctions that have existed *on average* between Southern and non-Southern white populations historically. Southern Whites are often associated with evangelical Protestantism, right-wing politics on issues of race and culture, and populist ideals rooted in localism and dislike of elites (Dochuk, 2010; Gregory, 2005). We show that these same cultural tendencies can also be seen among Southern whites living outside the South.

Using data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) waves spanning 1960 to 1980, Table 1 compares Southern- and non-Southern-born whites living in the same non-Southern county. The results suggest that Southern white migrants are on average more likely to be politically conservative (column 1), belong to evangelical churches (column 2), support racial segregation (columns 3 and 4), and believe that people are self-interested (column 5) and cannot be trusted (column 6). Appendix Figure A.4 shows that there is, in fact, a continuum of such attitudes across whites in America: across all six outcomes, responses in the Southern white diaspora fall squarely between those of Southerners in the South and non-Southerners outside the South. In other words, while conservative culture is pervasive across white America, there is a clear divide between those with and those without Southern heritage, and Southern migrants seem to maintain some of that cultural distinction when living outside the South.

Evangelical Protestant identity is an especially salient feature of Southern white culture and, hence, life in the diaspora. In the early 20th century, evangelical presence was limited outside the South; the Southern Baptist Convention would not build churches in Northern Baptist territory until the 1940s. As Southern white migrants spread such denominations to other regions, they helped “to shape some of the values and politics circulating in those settings” (Gregory, 2005, p. 227). By the 1960s, evangelical leaders had begun to engage more formally in politics, becoming outspoken on moral issues, such as

sex education in schools (Woodberry and Smith, 1998). The Southern white diaspora in California established enclaves with Southern-style schools and churches, advancing conservative Christian causes and anti-Communist politics (Dochuk, 2010). Through their politics, evangelicals of Southern origin such as J. Frank Norris, Carl McIntire, and Billy Graham also appealed to non-Southerners and non-evangelicals, helping to forge a right-wing coalition that would become an integral voting bloc for the Republican Party (Wilcox and Robinson, 2011).

Children’s names offer another, unique window into Southern culture. Figure 3 offers two novel depictions of the cultural divide between Southern and non-Southern populations from 1860–1940, a period over which we observe the age and fully enumerated name of everyone living in the United States. Panel (a) shows the evolution of children whose given name can be uniquely attributed to a Confederate Leader, i.e., the unique name of the leader, such as Robert Lee, appears in the child’s *first* name.⁸ Panel (b) shows the evolution of a Southern-Name Index (SNI), which is based on the likelihood that a given name effectively distinguishes Southern from non-Southern residents as of 1860 (this is akin to the Enemy-Name Index in Esposito et al., 2021). Both panels plot the evolution across cohorts for three distinct white populations: Southern-born children in the South, children born outside the South to Southern-born parents, and children born outside the South to non-Southern-born parents.

Two key insights emerge from Figure 3. First, throughout most of the period, one finds a clear continuum, with Southern-resident families giving their kids the most nostalgic, distinctly Southern and Confederate names, followed by Southerners living outside the South and then non-Southern populations. In 1870, nearly 1 out of every 1,000 Southern-born kids was named after a Confederate leader, compared to 1 out of every 2,000 kids born outside the South to Southern-born parents and effectively zero kids born to those without Southern heritage (panel a). Around the same time, there was roughly a 5 p.p. difference across these three groups in the likelihood that a child’s name could effectively distinguish Southern from non-Southern populations prevailing in 1860 (panel b).

Second, and perhaps most striking, there appears to be a resurgence in Confederate and Southern culture beginning around 1920. After waning in popularity, the names of Confederate Leaders and Southerners in 1860 began resurfacing across America. Notably, this cultural resurgence can be seen for those with *and* without Southern heritage. For nearly 60 years after the Civil War, non-Southern-born parents rarely if ever named their children after Confederate leaders. This began to change in the early 1920s just as those names gained popularity again among Southern whites both inside and outside the South. Such names could be found across the United States, excluding the Northeast, by 1940 (see Appendix Figure A.14). As discussed below, these patterns track closely with the rise of the Lost Cause ideology and its violent and non-violent manifestations both inside and outside the South.

The cultural divisions described in this section evolved over many years and across multiple generations. In the remainder of the paper, we examine how Southern whites shaped the process of cultural change outside the South in politically salient ways. Their influence cut across many domains of public life and may have contributed to a narrowing of the longstanding North–South divide and its translation into new geographies of political division across America.

⁸The list of Confederate generals and leaders is derived from the list of honorees of public symbols of the Confederacy collected by the Southern Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) Whose Heritage? Project. We generate variations of the honorees’ names (e.g., Robert Lee, Robert E Lee, R E Lee, etc.) and then code an individual as having a “Confederate name” if the full name or unique nickname (e.g., Stonewall) of a Confederate leader is anywhere in the “firstname” variable.

3 Southern White Migrants and Right-wing Politics

This section establishes our core results on the long-run political impact of the “Great White Migration.” We focus initially on the watershed election of President Donald J. Trump in 2016. We then show how the Southern white diaspora shaped the long-run consolidation of right-wing politics and partisan realignment since 1900 with an important turning point in the 1960s. We link these migrants to a shift away from the Democratic Party as well as greater congressional support for salient right-wing causes throughout the 20th century and beyond. While the 2016 election was important, we show that it was part of a much longer-run trend in right-wing politics as influenced by Southern culture and the migrants that brought that culture to the rest of America. Our full sample throughout includes 1,888 counties located outside the South, i.e., outside the former Confederate states and Oklahoma.⁹

3.1 Southern White Migrants and the Trump Vote

Our baseline specification relates the historical Southern white migrant population to the Trump vote share (sourced from MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2018):

$$\% \text{ Trump}_c = \alpha_s + \beta \% \text{ Southern Whites}_{c,1940} + \mathbf{X}'_c \gamma + \epsilon_c, \quad (1)$$

where α_s are state fixed effects, \mathbf{X} is a varying set of controls, and the regressor of interest is the share of Southern-born whites residing in county c in 1940, the last year for which the full-count U.S. Census of Population is available. As a baseline, we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and show in Appendix Table A.3 that inference is robust to a state-level wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Cameron et al., 2008) and a spatial autocorrelation adjustment with varying bandwidths (Conley, 1999).

The controls in \mathbf{X} address leading historical and geographic confounds. These include log population density, share of manufacturing employment, labor force participation, unemployment, the share of people born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, or Italy, the share of Blacks, the share of land in farms and log average farm value, all measured in 1940, and separately in 1900, drawing on data from decennial U.S. Census of Population county level files (Haines, 2010; Manson et al., 2020). To guard against the possibility that Southern white migrants may have simply settled in places where locals already had significant anti-Black or right-wing attitudes, we control for Union Army enlistment and mortality rates from the U.S. Civil War (Dupraz and Ferrara, 2021), as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912 from Clubb et al. (2006). This was notably the first election in which all lower 48 states participated and took place just prior to an acceleration in migration flows within the United States during World War I. In additional checks on ideological sorting, we control for the pro-slavery Southern Democrat, Breckinridge, vote share in the 1860 election, which was an important factor in Southern white destination choices across Kentucky (Eli et al., 2018) and the rest of the (previously incorporated) United States in the immediate postbellum era (Bazzi et al., 2021).

Shift-Share Instrument for Southern White Migration

Where people settle, both historically and today, is an endogenous choice. We therefore develop a shift-share instrument for the location of Southern white migrants outside the South in 1940. We use two sources of variation. The first is the cross-sectional *share* of whites born in Southern state j living in non-Southern county c in 1900, which we denote as $\pi_{jc,1900}$. This share is expressed relative to *all*

⁹We exclude the geographically distant Alaska and Hawaii.

Southern whites born in Southern state j and residing outside the South as of 1900, and exploits the fact that some whites from each Southern state had already emigrated from the South and were distributed throughout the North and West. The second is the change, or *shift*, in the number of whites from Southern state j living outside the South from 1900 to 1940, $M_{j,1900-40}$. We then predict the stock of Southern whites in a given county in 1940 as

$$Z_{c,1940} = \sum_{j=1}^J \pi_{jc,1900} M_{j,1900-40}. \quad (2)$$

After scaling by the 1900 county population, $Z_{c,1940}$ then serves as an instrument for the actual share of Southern white migrants in 1940. The identifying assumption is that, conditional on controls, the unobserved factors that influence modern-day political outcomes must not be jointly correlated with the 1900 share of whites from Southern states residing in a given non-Southern county and overall migration patterns from Southern states to non-Southern counties from 1900 to 1940. We follow recent literature and validate this shift-share design using a number of diagnostic checks described below (Adao et al., 2019; Borusyak et al., 2018; Jaeger et al., 2018; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020).

The rationale for this instrument lies in the empirical regularity that migrants tend to settle where other migrants from their own group had settled previously, a process commonly referred to as *chain migration*. $\pi_{jc,1900}$ reflects such historical, pre-1900 migrations from Southern states to non-Southern counties. We choose 1900 as the base year because this predates the onset of mass migration out of the South (see Figure 1) and captures many of the important migration networks established in the early postbellum years. In some specifications of equation (1), we control for demographic and geographic factors in 1900 that may be confounded with particularly influential origin-state shares in county c . We also show robustness to an earlier base year of 1870 (for counties incorporated at the time).

Baseline Results

Table 2 reports the results from estimating equation (1). Column 1, which includes only state fixed effects, shows that a 1 p.p. increase in the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 is associated with a statistically significant 0.4 p.p. increase in the vote share for President Trump in 2016. Columns 2 and 3 include the abovementioned \mathbf{X} controls from 1940 and 1900, which together add substantial explanatory power (the R^2 increases from 0.42 to 0.69 in column 3) while leaving a sizable 0.5–0.6 p.p. association between the Southern white population and the Trump vote share.

These relatively large effect sizes in the OLS specification survive the shift-share IV specification in the remaining columns of Table 2. Columns 4 and 5 include the same controls as columns 2 and 3, respectively, while column 6 includes a large additional set of contemporaneous controls for demographic and economic factors typically associated with right-wing voting (see Gelman, 2009).¹⁰ These latter controls are potentially endogenous with respect to the 1940 Southern white share but nonetheless provide some reassurance that the long-run relationship is not merely driven by contemporary factors or location fundamentals. Across all three columns, the first stage F statistic on the excluded instrument is over 120, consistent with the strength of chain migration in this context. While some of these IV

¹⁰These include county log population density (per square mile), the share of voting age men and women, the share of adults over the age of 65 by gender, the share of white, Black, and Hispanic residents, the share of people born in Europe, Asia, Africa, or South America, the share of households on food stamps and public assistance, log per capita income by race, log median rent and house values, the share of unemployment by gender, employment shares by sector, total frontier experience, and various geographic controls, including the distance to the nearest coast or river and mean elevation and ruggedness.

coefficients are slightly larger than their corresponding OLS coefficients, none of these differences are statistically significant. Assuming that the exclusion restriction holds, this suggests that, conditional on controls, endogeneity concerns are less important in the relationship between past Southern white migration patterns and modern political outcomes.

The prevailing effect size, of around half a percentage point, is quantitatively meaningful. The average non-Southern county in 1940 had roughly 3% Southern-born white residents (standard deviation of 5%). Going from zero Southern-born whites to the average is therefore associated with a 1.5 p.p. increase in the Trump vote share. In the American voting system, this could prove pivotal. Trump won the Electoral College as a result of < 1 p.p. victories in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The combined 46 votes from these states put Trump well above the 270 Electoral College votes needed to win. Not winning these three states therefore would have cost him the presidency. In contrast, he easily won all of the Southern sending states in our sample except Virginia. Hence, even a small shift toward Trump due to the Great White Migration could have had national political implications.

While the 2016 election was exceptional for many reasons, the influence of the Southern white diaspora was part of a long rightward shift and partisan realignment taking places in counties where they had settled historically. We show this formally in Section 3.2 but first provide core robustness checks on the shift-share design.

Identification Checks

We validate the shift-share identification strategy with a set of steps described briefly here and detailed at length in Appendix C.

The first concern involves the “shift” portion of the instrument: aggregate outflows from each Southern state to all non-Southern counties. A large number of exogenous shifts are required for the exclusion restriction to hold in this design (Borusyak et al., 2018). While plausibly more exogenous than the county-specific “share” weights (Jaeger et al., 2018), the aggregate shifts may nonetheless be endogenous to local conditions in destination counties.¹¹ Moreover, there are relatively few states contributing to the shift component. We address these concerns by constructing a modified shift component based on exogenous migratory push factors in Southern origin counties, following a now-standard approach in the literature on the Black Great Migration (Boustan, 2010; Derenoncourt, 2021; Fouka et al., forthcoming). If IV estimates are relatively unchanged, this suggests that the identifying variation in the shift component of the instrument is uncorrelated with confounders in destination counties.

For this exercise, we rely on a sub-period of Southern white migration flows for which we can identify origin counties. The 1940 Population Census asks about “prior residence” and allows us to measure total flows Southern counties and non-Southern counties from 1935 to 1940. While this five-year flow is only a subset of the total shift from 1900 to 1940, it does substantially increase the number of origin units (from 12 states to 1,205 counties) with which we can better isolate exogenous components of total outmigration. We estimate outmigration from each Southern county as a function of natural disasters and other county-level characteristics selected either by hand or using the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO). Variables such as crop failure, high unemployment, and more racially-inclusive land ownership are among the important local factors driving Southern white outmigration

¹¹For example, suppose that a group of counties in California experienced a large labor demand shock that induced significant outmigration from Oklahoma during a particular period. If that labor demand shock were correlated with prevailing forces associated with conservative politics, this could create a source of bias in estimating β in equation (1).

(see Appendix Table C.2). We then aggregate predicted county-level outmigration to the state level for use as the shift in equation (2). The instrument remains highly relevant (F statistics > 50) and yields IV estimates that are statistically indistinguishable from our baseline (see Appendix Tables C.3 and C.4). While one might still be concerned about the small number of states in the instrument, Appendix Figure A.5 shows that no particular origin state seems to be driving the results. Nor are the border states of West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware essential for our estimated effects outside the South (see Appendix Table A.2).

The second concern involves the “share” portion of the instrument in equation (2). These shares, based on migration prior to 1900, may reflect endogenous sorting towards places conducive to the rise of the conservative movement over the long run. Recall, however, that our baseline results are robust to factors that may have simultaneously shaped Southern white sorting and downstream politics in the destination, e.g., pre-migration population density and manufacturing presence, and Union Army enlistment and mortality rates from the Civil War. We account for other place-based confounders of ideology in Appendix Table A.6 by controlling for cotton suitability and the Breckinridge vote share in 1860. While these factors add substantial explanatory power to the regressions, they do not significantly affect the estimated effects. Moreover, the precision of our results is not an artifact of correlated unobservables across destination counties with similar fundamentals. We corroborate this using a randomization-inference-type procedure developed by Adao et al. (2019), which shows that random shifts, M_j^{rand} , in the IV equation (2) cannot reproduce our baseline estimate.¹²

Together, these checks suggest that identification comes from a combination of plausibly exogenous shares *and* meaningful shifts in the postbellum era. Moreover, Appendix Table A.4 shows that credible identification holds over other time horizons as well, namely shares from 1870 and shifts from 1870 to 1900 and from 1870 to 1940, each with endogenous migration shares at the respective endpoint. These results deliver similar insights, again reaffirming the important role of chain migration—catalyzed in the early years after the Civil War—in shaping the causal long-run effects of Southern white migrants.

Southern Black Migration

While the Black Great Migration also profoundly shaped electoral politics outside the South, the Southern white diaspora appears to have had a distinct effect. Appendix Table A.5 shows results for the 1940 shares of both white and Southern Blacks, with the instrument for the latter constructed as in equation (2). While historical Black migration mostly worked against Trump, their impacts are less robust than the effect of Southern whites in 1940. These distinct effects of Black and white Southerners is intuitive inasmuch as the two groups often settled in different places, even within the same state (see Section 2.3).

Yet, the political influence of these two large migrant populations outside the South was intimately connected. As Gregory (2005) notes, in describing “America’s right turn”, “. . . if the black diaspora was central to these changes, the white diaspora contributed as well, providing not the motive for the surge of white working-class conservatism but ideas, symbols, and leaders that would give it particular shape.” We explore some of these diffusion pathways in Section 4, but before doing so, we demonstrate the role of Southern whites in shaping the long arc of right-wing politics and partisan realignment running through George Wallace all the way to Donald Trump.

¹²Concretely, we replace the shift-share instrument by interacting migration shares from 1900 with shift shocks drawn from a random normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a variance of 5 and then repeat the baseline analysis 1,000 times. Out of the 1,000 trials, only 12 (1.2%) coefficients are significant at the 1% level and 70 (7%) at the 5% level (see Appendix Figure C.1). Additionally, the Adao et al. (2019) standard error correction can be found in Appendix Table A.3.

3.2 Partisan Realignment and the Populist Right

While the 2016 election brought deep cultural cleavages into focus, the influence of the Southern white diaspora on right-wing politics was by no means novel. Rather, as we show here, these migrants hastened partisan realignment in the mid-20th century and the emergence of the modern New Right coalition made up of racial, religious, and economic conservatives. We assess these long-run electoral dynamics first by estimating the following panel regression from 1900 to 2020:¹³

$$\% \text{ Republican}_{ct} = \sum_{t \neq 1900}^{2020} \beta_t [\% \text{ Southern Whites}_{c,1940} \times I(\text{election} = t)] + \alpha_c + \phi_{st} + \epsilon_{ct} \quad (3)$$

where α_c and ϕ_{st} are county and state \times election-year fixed effects (FE), respectively, and the share of Southern whites in 1940 is interacted with election-year FE. The omitted, reference year for this term is 1900. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. Again, we use the fixed Southern white share in 1940 in part as this is the final year for which this county-level measure can be reliably constructed alongside migrant state-of-origin information. Note that the β_t coefficients prior to 1940 should not be interpreted as a pre-period in the difference-in-differences sense given that the stock of Southern white migrants in 1940 reflects many years of prior migration flows, which may have dynamically changed the voting outcomes from 1900 to 1940.

The β_t coefficients in Figure 4 reveal a strong positive relationship with a clear shift beginning in the 1960s. Similar results hold in the IV specification (see Appendix Figure A.6). Prior to the 1960s, Southern whites are instead associated with relatively *lower* Republican vote shares.¹⁴ This negative relationship took hold after 1910 just as Southern white emigration gains momentum (see Figure 1).

The 1960s were a turning point for right-wing politics in the U.S., and the influence of Southern white migrants seen in Figure 4 may have been a harbinger of change to come. The diaspora, like their brethren in the South, played an important role in the emerging New Right conservative coalition, characterized by a strong evangelical Protestant movement and opposition to civil rights.

What is not shown in Figure 4 is the critical third party showing of George Wallace in 1968. The governor from Alabama ran on a hard-line platform of racial segregation that led to his split with the Democratic Party after running in their primaries in the prior election. His politics resonated with whites across the South, where he won five states, as well as diaspora communities; he won nearly 10% of votes in the average county outside the South. Table 3 bears out this significant diaspora influence in what would become one of the strongest third-party performances in American history. In the IV specification in column 5, moving from zero to the mean Southern white share increases the Wallace vote by 1.1 p.p. relative to a mean of 9.3 p.p. Wallace had ostensibly captured some of the Southern white votes that would have otherwise gone to the Republican candidate Nixon (note the drop in β_t in 1968). While Barry Goldwater, the Democratic candidate in 1964, also ran a racially conservative campaign, he lacked the folksy, blue collar appeal of Wallace. In some ways, the strong Wallace campaign foreshadowed the looming consolidation of racially-motivated voters under the Republican Party in 1972.

¹³Data on presidential election outcomes come from MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2018), the presidential election atlas for years after 1912 (Leip, 2021), and the election dataset compiled by Clubb et al. (2006) for 1912 and prior.

¹⁴The 1928 election of Herbert Hoover was an important exception for which there are a few candidate explanations. First, the Democratic candidate, Al Smith, faced stiff opposition in the party's then-stronghold of the South due to his Catholicism and opposition to Prohibition. Second, Hoover advocated small-government that might have resonated with the culture of rugged individualism pervasive in Western states where many Southern whites had increasingly settled in the early 20th century.

As the Southern white vote increasingly migrated from Democrat to Republican, so too did the Southern white diaspora. To the extent that Southern migrants imported their political preferences and beliefs from the South, this is perhaps unsurprising. Recent work by Kuziemko and Washington (2018) identifies a partisan realignment among whites in the South during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Just as Democrats lost the South, our results suggest that they also lost Southern-born whites living *outside* the South. This reaffirms the historical and survey evidence above, in which Southern white migrants were ideologically similar on average to those who remained in the South, relative to non-Southern whites, and helped to solidify a new conservative white voting bloc outside the South. To better understand how this process unfolded, we now provide evidence linking Southern white migrants to congressional voting on hot-button conservative causes over the last 70 years.

3.3 Congressional Elections and Legislation

We show here how Southern white migrants influenced congressional voting across a *bundle* of issues that increasingly animated right-wing politics in the latter half of the 20th century. We begin by relating Southern white migrants to the ideology of congressional representatives. To measure congressional ideology, we rely on three measures of congressional representatives' ideal points. Our first measure comes from Bateman et al. (2017). The second and third come from DW-Nominate by Lewis et al. (2021). All three capture a congressperson's ideology, using his or her voting record, on a left–right spectrum centered around 0. Both have been used to characterize polarization in the U.S. Congress as well as the ideological realignment of the major parties during the 20th century.

There are nonetheless key differences between them. DW-Nominate scores provide a more comprehensive measure of ideology, using two scores: a first dimension, capturing economic issues (e.g., taxes, expenditures), and a second, residual dimension, capturing various social or cultural issues of the day (e.g., race, religion). Naturally, the set of issues that comprises the latter is time-varying and, as such, DW-Nominate provides a score that varies for each representative across congresses. An important drawback to this is that it complicates comparisons of ideology over time. In contrast, Bateman et al. (2017) fixes the voting agenda such that only race and civil rights legislation are considered. Representatives are assigned a time-invariant civil rights score based on their career voting record, with higher scores attached to more racially conservative positions, such as favoring less federal action to promote racial equality. This in turn lets us compare average scores across congresses and observe changes in the underlying racial conservatism of representatives over time, as representatives leave Congress and are replaced. We therefore use Bateman et al. (2017) scores as our preferred measure of racial conservatism, with the DW-Nominate (Dimension 2) score included for comparison. We use the DW-Nominate (Dimension 1) as our measure of economic conservatism.

Figure 5 identifies Southern white influence on congressional districts (CDs) outside the South using congress-year and state FE.¹⁵ We plot estimates for Bateman et al. (2017) and both DW-Nominate dimensions for every five years from 1940 to 2000, using OLS and IV estimation with instruments constructed based on equation (2) but at the level of CDs rather than counties. We interact each of the

¹⁵This is motivated by the fact that congressional districts frequently change within states, in both area and number, and thus do not constitute meaningful units of analysis over time. For instance, over a third of non-Southern states have at-large (i.e. statewide) districts at some point during the sample period, while only 14 non-statewide districts (i.e., around 5% of the sample) have time-invariant boundaries during the 1961–70 period alone. For more discussion of boundary harmonization, see Appendix D. These time-varying boundaries complicate inference as well. As a baseline we use robust standard errors, and in Appendix Figures A.7 and A.8 we cluster by contemporaneous CD, leaving the qualitative insights unchanged.

congress-year FE with the share of Southern-born whites in 1940, which identifies their influence on the evolution of congressional ideology over the ensuing 60 years.

From this analysis, opposition to civil rights legislation emerges as a key issue associated with Southern white migrants, who consistently push the Bateman et al. (2017) scores rightward over time. That is, constituencies with more Southern white migrants appear to consistently elect more racially conservative representatives, especially after the civil rights movement gained momentum in the late 1960s. The same pattern is present in the second dimension of DW-Nominate but only for 1960–80, when race and civil rights-related legislation were dominant components of that index.

In contrast, the estimates for the first dimension of DW-Nominate suggest relatively more fluid preferences on economic issues, which have *not* undergone the same partisan realignment as racial issues during the 20th century. The increasingly positive coefficients largely reflect the shift from Democratic (i.e., more economically left-wing) to Republican (i.e., more fiscally conservative) vote patterns with which we have shown Southern white migrants to be associated over the same period. This suggests that communities home to a large Southern white diaspora likely preferred economically moderate Democrats in the 1940s only to shift towards economically right-wing Republicans in the 1990s, to the extent they were similarly racially conservative. These findings echo recent work by Kuziemko and Washington (2018) and Maxwell and Shields (2019), who highlight the importance of racial conservatism in driving the partisan realignment of the 1960s and subsequent “Southern strategy,” which increasingly framed economic issues around welfare and tax-based redistribution to appeal to racial conservatives. While these authors, and others across economics and political science, identify such shifts in partisan affiliations within the South, our results suggest that these same shifts took place among communities with large Southern populations outside the South, too. These growing wedges between left- and right-leaning electorates may have laid the groundwork for the deepening polarization that took hold across America beginning in the late 1990s.

Congressional Effects in the 1960s

A case study of the 1960s, during which civil rights legislation was particularly prominent, offers additional clarity on the political changes identified above. Table 4 repeats the Bateman et al. (2017) analysis from above for the 87th through 91st U.S. Congresses, spanning 1961–1970. During this period, civil rights issues dominated Congress, which passed historic legislation including the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, marking the end of Jim Crow and legal segregation. At the same time, racial conflict grew later in the decade alongside the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and the emergence of the Black Power movement. Calderon et al. (2021) show that Southern Black migrants increased the demand for civil rights legislation in the North during this time. Our results show, for the first time, that Southern white migrants pulled demand in the opposite direction.

The estimates in Table 4 again suggest that representatives in non-Southern CDs with larger Southern white populations were more likely to oppose such legislation and vote in a racially conservative manner. A one standard deviation increase in a district’s share of Southern white migrants as of 1940 increases its representative’s Bateman et al. (2017) score in the 1960s by approximately 0.2–0.4 standard deviations, depending on the specification. These patterns are not confounded by CDs’ pre-migration characteristics (e.g., share of Blacks in 1900) or more recent economic factors. This is again consistent with Southern white migrants shaping aggregate political preferences and thus the average vote behavior of elected representatives in their destination communities.

Key Votes in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1953–2021

We offer additional insights into the ideological shifts in Congress by showing how Southern white migrants influenced key votes. These include the Refugee Relief Act of 1953; the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964; the Social Security Amendments of 1965, which created Medicare and Medicaid; the Voting Rights Act of 1965; H.R. 3706 in 1983, which made Martin Luther King, Jr.’s birthday a federal holiday; the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, which established background checks and waiting periods for firearms sales; the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, which allowed LGBT people to serve openly in the U.S. military; and the 2021 Electoral College vote count, which saw widespread objections to individual states’ certifications of the 2020 presidential election by allies of President Trump, in an effort to overturn the majority vote in those states.¹⁶

This analysis of congressional vote patterns, which uses the same empirical strategy as the ideology analyses above, can be seen in Figure 6. Coefficients are negative across all votes for both OLS and IV specifications.¹⁷ These estimates tend to be noisy and closer to zero for key votes in the 1950s and early 1960s before becoming larger and more significant later on, mirroring the increasing Bateman et al. (2017) and DW-Nominate (Dimension 1) coefficients over time. An apparent turning point came with the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, which followed the more modest approaches of the previous two civil rights bills. Similarly oppositional relationships arise for Medicare and Medicaid, MLK Jr. Day, the Brady Handgun Act, and the 2021 Electoral College count. Overall, these results substantiate an increased electoral selection over time, favoring more right-wing representatives in non-Southern districts with more Southern whites. They also point to a more complex ideological impact beyond issues of race and racial inclusion to broader elements of localism and inegalitarianism that tended to characterize Southern-born whites, as discussed in Section 2.

3.4 Modern Survey Evidence on Right-wing Preferences

To conclude this section, we cross-check these district-level patterns with data on individual political preferences over a similar bundle of issues, using survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) since 2007. While the CCES does not report state of birth of individual respondents, it does include a range of attitudes spanning racial, religious, and economic dimensions of politics. Table 5 reveals a pattern that is strikingly similar to the CD-level analysis: individuals living in counties with a larger Southern white diaspora hold relatively right-wing positions on issues such as gay marriage, abortion, racial politics, and the provision of public goods. These attitudes, measured for all respondents in a given county, mirror many of the individual traits associated with Southern white migrants in Table 1 (e.g., cultural conservatism, low social trust). As such, our findings thus far point to a process of cultural diffusion and persistence originating from the Southern white diaspora. Moving forward, we identify several mechanisms that help explain this process of cultural change.

4 Channels of Diffusion

In this final section, we establish five channels through which Southern white migrants shaped culture and politics outside the South. We chart these channels through time, first documenting the Confederate

¹⁶Roll calls before 1990 come from Swift et al. (2009) and after 1990 from Clerk of the United States House of Representatives (2021). For the 2021 Electoral College vote, a representative voted “yea” if they objected to no state in the count.

¹⁷See Appendix Figure A.9 for alternative approaches using individual cross-sections, various controls, and differentially clustered standard errors.

forms of racial animus brought by early waves of Southern whites and their subsequent diffusion through local newspapers. Second, migrants selected into relatively rural and Western destinations, which hastened racial and ideological bifurcation throughout the country. Third, the Southern white diaspora established Southern evangelical institutions, which outlived initial migrants and played a central role in forging the right-wing coalition that emerged in the second half of the 20th century. Fourth, migrant destinations cultivated the rise of right-wing media, including talk radio, where conservative cultural leaders spoke directly to the Southern white electorate and diffused values to new audiences in diaspora communities outside the South. Lastly, more general forms of cultural diffusion to non-Southerners accompanied the migration, for instance through naming patterns, music, and gastronomy. As these other elements of Southern culture spread outside the South, it may have become easier for right-wing movement leaders to build new political coalitions across the North-South cultural divide.

4.1 Racial Animus

Given the centrality of race in 20th century political upheavals, we begin by exploring the role of Southern whites in exacerbating *racial animus* outside the South. Many migrants hailed from Southern communities with a deep-seated Confederate culture of racism. Our findings below suggest that this culture moved with the migrants, as they helped to grow the Second Ku Klux Klan (KKK), to exacerbate racial violence, and to memorialize the Confederacy outside the South in the early 20th century. These early manifestations of racism and Lost Cause ideology may have laid the cultural groundwork for the shift towards racially conservative political representatives in subsequent decades.

Table 6 shows a significant positive relationship between the share of Southern-born whites in 1900—when the larger waves of Southern migration to the rest of the country were just beginning—and different measures of racial animus that were associated with the South in the early 20th century. We report OLS and IV estimates using a shift-share instrument based on equation (2) but for 1870 to 1900. In column 2, a one p.p. increase in the share of Southern-born whites is associated with a 2.3 p.p. increase in the probability of any lynchings of persons of color between 1883 and 1941. This is a large effect given that only 7.6% of counties outside the South saw any reported lynchings over the period. Many of these lynchings were associated with the KKK, and indeed, the effect size in column 4 implies a 10% increase in the probability of having a KKK chapter established between 1910 and 1940.

Alongside increases in racial terror, many of these communities outside the South also saw a revival of Confederate memorialization and Lost Cause ideology. The United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) fueled this revival (Cox, 2019). Southern white migrants were central to this effort outside the South. The IV estimate in column 6 implies that a 1 p.p. increase in the Southern white share leads to a 2.8 p.p. increase in the likelihood of a UDC chapter founded between 1900 and 1920. These chapters were instrumental in building memorials to Confederate leaders and in promulgating Lost Cause ideology inside schools and other public institutions. Not surprisingly, then, Southern white migrants are associated with greater construction of these monuments in the early to mid 20th century. In column 8, a one p.p. increase in Southern whites as of 1900 leads to roughly 3 p.p. higher probability of such monuments, which is quite sizable given that only 13% of non-Southern counties erected these memorials.

Moreover, this resurgence in Confederate nostalgia ran deeper than a few prominent memorials and can be seen in children's names as well. Figure 3 showed a marked increase in Confederate-inspired names among whites in the early 20th century previously (see Section 2). The final columns of Table 6

reveal that the Southern white diaspora contributed to this cultural change outside the South. While still rare, such names were much more common in counties with a larger Southern white diaspora: a one p.p. increase in the Southern white share is associated with a 0.1 p.p. increase (or 6.5% of the mean) in the share of children born from 1900 to 1940 being named after Confederate leaders in the 1860s.

Expressions of racial animus also appeared in and were transmitted through the popular media of the time. Using data from *newspapers.com*, Appendix Figure A.10 plots the average number of pages mentioning racial epithets across Census years from 1850 to 1940, split by the above and below median share of Southern-born whites. These averages are weighted by the total number of pages published in a county.¹⁸ Popular destinations for Southern whites show an increased tendency to publish articles with anti-Black and anti-Asian racial slurs as well as anti-Northern sentiment as embodied in the terms “scalawag” and “carpetbagger.” These patterns are even more pronounced in the Western parts of the country (Appendix Figure A.11) and hold in OLS and IV specifications with the dependent variable aggregated over 1900 to 1940 (Appendix Table A.8). Such findings are consistent with both demand- and supply-side channels. To shed some light on the latter, Table 9 shows that in 1900 Southern whites were significantly more likely to work at newspapers (e.g., as reporters or editors) than were other residents within the same county. By 1940, this correlation disappears as other forms of media, including radio as discussed below, grew in prominence and began to attract Southern white cultural leaders.

Together, these results suggest that migrants helped transmit the Confederate culture of racism beyond the South in the postbellum era. With this cultural diffusion came profound shifts in the geography of race and racism in the early 20th century as we now show.

4.2 Geographic Sorting

The cultural geographer Wilbur Zelinsky (1973) argued that the first settlers of a place can have outsized influence on the evolution of its cultural norms even as they become a smaller and smaller share of the local population over time. Early waves of Southern whites were particularly drawn to the Western United States, an area that was largely unsettled (by non-native peoples) in the early postbellum era. This implied considerable scope for Southern white migrants to shape initial institutions and cultural norms. Relative to Southern Black migrants, whites were much more likely to settle in rural and less densely-populated areas outside the South (see Appendix Figure A.12).

Geographic sorting also *followed* the initial migrations of both Southern whites and Blacks. The spread of “sundown towns” was central to this process. Through a combination of violence, media propagation, and formal enforcement, local white populations precluded Blacks from taking up residence in localities across America. As Loewen (2005) painstakingly documents, these sundown towns proliferated in the early 20th century, and over time, Black populations could be found in fewer and fewer counties outside the South.¹⁹ As Southern white migrants put down roots, they may have helped forge these exclusionary norms that made areas previously home to Blacks increasingly inhospitable.

Table 7 show how Southern white migrants contributed to this process of racial segregation. Column 2 shows that Southern whites hastened the formation of sundown towns within the counties in which they settled. A one p.p. increase in the Southern white share in 1900 led to a 0.1 increase in the number of sundown towns in a county relative to a mean of 0.45. Collectively, these sundown towns hastened the

¹⁸This analysis is restricted to counties outside the South for which newspaper articles were available in *newspapers.com*.

¹⁹Crowe (2012) and O’Connell (2019) relate sundown towns to economic underdevelopment and black–white inequality outcomes at the county level, respectively.

“Great Retreat” of Black populations from counties across America: the share of non-Southern counties with zero Blacks grew from 4% to 15% between 1910 and 1940 (see Figure A.13), and Southern white migrants exacerbated this racial cleansing across counties (see columns 3–4 of Table 7).

This early form of racial exclusion would forever alter the racial geography of America. Indeed, while sundown towns largely disappeared in the late 20th century, racial segregation persists, especially in areas with a larger Southern white diaspora. We measure segregation *within counties* using the isolation index, taken from Logan and Parman (2017) for 1940 and Escarce et al. (2011) for 2000. Southern white migrants had negligible effects on segregation in 1940 (columns 5–6) but seem to have exacerbated segregation over the long run (columns 7–8). The limited effect in 1940 may be due in part to the prevalence of sundown towns, which created more between- than within-county segregation. As those sundown norms began to unwind in the late 20th century, that left more scope to detect Southern white influence on within-county segregation.²⁰

Together, the results in Table 7 suggest that Southern whites exacerbated racial isolation over large and small geographies. Over the long run, this limited the scope for local interracial contact, which, in turn, may have created a more fertile breeding ground for racially conservative politics.²¹

This process of racial bifurcation outside the South likely contributed to the ideological bifurcation across high and low density areas today. The dense urban areas that attracted and retained Southern Black migrants during the Great Migration tended toward left-wing politics and increasing Democratic Party support in the following decades. Meanwhile, less dense areas disproportionately attracted Southern whites and may have actively alienated Blacks, making it easier for the Republican Party to expand its base as the New Right gained traction in the latter part of the 20th century. Table A.9 provides suggestive evidence along these lines, returning to the Trump vote share in 2016. We find that Southern white influence is stronger in counties with lower population density, in the Western part of the country,²² with higher residential segregation, and, although noisier, with lower Black population shares. These estimates should be interpreted with caution as they are jointly determined with the Southern white share in 1940. Yet, they do suggest an important role for sorting in explaining our long-run estimates. They also hint at a plausible link between the differential geography of Black and white Southern migrants historically and the partisan divide across rural and urban areas today.

4.3 Religious Institutions

Beyond racial animus, religious conservatism is another important feature of culture and politics in the Southern white diaspora. The historical literature on the Great Migration suggests that Southern whites were instrumental in diffusing evangelical Protestantism outside the South (Gregory, 2005; Woodberry and Smith, 1998). Evangelical churches belonging to Southern Baptist and Pentecostal denominations were pervasive in diaspora communities across America (Dochuk, 2010). Evangelical congregants and leaders later became active in politics, motivated by moral issues such as sex education as well as perceived government overreach in various domains, including civil rights. This activism appealed to non-Southerners as well and ultimately led to the formation of a “Christian Right” electoral coalition, which later came to be associated with the Republican Party (Wilcox and Robinson, 2011).

²⁰Note that the isolation index is undefined for counties without any Black residents.

²¹Brown et al. (2021) show that whites who grow up with Black neighbors are less likely to vote for right-wing candidates.

²²We separately examine whether effects differ in counties that were unincorporated in 1860 and with greater total frontier experience, as measured in Bazzi et al. (2020). These interaction effects move in different directions from the West effect, suggesting that the latter is not being driven by pre-migration county characteristics associated with being on the frontier.

In this section, we provide empirical evidence consistent with this historical narrative. We show that Southern white migrants selected into religious occupations, and the arrival of Southern whites led to a large increase in evangelical church formation coupled with shifts in denominational affiliation. These churches, like so many others, are a focal point of social life and key vehicles for cultural transmission outside the household. Our findings below suggest that, through these churches, Southern white migrants may have helped solidify the evangelical base of the Republican Party (Pew Research Center, 2016).

Southern White Migrants and the Construction of Evangelical Institutions

We begin by connecting Southern white migrants to evangelicalism over the long run. The Association of Religious Data Archives (2021) provides a census of churches, and we follow Steensland et al. (2000) in defining evangelical ones, most prominent among which are the Southern Baptists.²³ Columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 show that evangelical adherence in 2010 is higher in counties with a larger Southern white population share in 1940. A one p.p. increase in the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 is associated with a roughly 0.5 p.p. (or 10%) increase in evangelical affiliation. Many of these adherents belong to churches founded during the Great Migration. As early as 1952, we find a strong positive effect of Southern white migrants on evangelical church establishments (columns 3–4).

Table 9 provides individual-level evidence consistent with Southern whites playing a role in building this novel religious infrastructure in communities outside the South. In both 1900 and 1940, Southern white migrants were significantly more likely to work in religious occupations (e.g., clergy) than were other residents within the same county.

Furthermore, these early effects on evangelical church formation persist through 1971 and 2010 (columns 5–8 of Table 8).²⁴ To put these estimates in perspective, every 800 Southern white migrants per 10,000 residents in 1940 is associated with approximately one evangelical church per 10,000 residents in a given year. The stability of coefficients from 1952 to 2010 suggests that these institutions spread through the Southern white diaspora in the first half of the 20th century and survived in those communities long after the initial migrants had passed. That these religious institutions continue to exist generations later suggests a role for them in sustaining new political equilibria in destination counties.

How Evangelical Institutions Transmit Southern White Values

A large literature on American religion suggests that evangelical churches could be important vehicles for ideological transmission. Southern whites often formed enclaves at destination, building religious and other social institutions to maintain their culture and identity. Churches are useful for disseminating not only religious values but also broader moral and political ones (Wald et al., 1988). Evangelical churches have become increasingly politicized in the latter part of the 20th century, espousing conservative stances on moral issues (e.g., gay marriage) as well as the role of government, such as in aiding the poor or promoting racial equity (McKenzie and Rouse, 2013; Wilcox and Robinson, 2011). Some of this politicization came from the top, as leaders like Jerry Falwell and Billy Graham began to openly embrace politics. But it also happened organically in many communities as congregants viewed the church as their main channel for mobilizing and acting on grievances. We argue here that Southern

²³Other churches include Wisconsin Evangelical Lutherans, Missouri Lutherans, Seventh Day Adventists, Nazarenes, Church of God Tennessee, Church of God Indiana, Christ Reformed Church, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Church of the Brethren, Evangelical Congregational Church, Free Methodists, and Mennonites.

²⁴Prior to WWII, it is difficult to measure evangelicalism outside of the South, as major denominations such as the Southern Baptists could not yet formally operate in the North, though informal operations were common (Gregory, 2005).

white migrants expedited this political capture of the evangelical church outside the South.

To illustrate the mechanism through which such ideological transmission takes place within churches, we borrow from economic theories of religion and culture. In canonical models of religious clubs (Berman, 2000; Iannaccone, 1992, 1994), religious communities entail costly membership and participation requirements. These play two important strategic roles: (i) they ensure that only true believers join the group (i.e., screening), and (ii) they generate costs to engaging in “mainstream” activities (i.e., substitution), inducing those who remain in the group to shift more of their time and resources to the group (Carvalho, 2019). Carvalho (2016) shows how these features of religious groups contribute to the transmission of their members’ moral beliefs among themselves. By limiting members’ exposure to the “mainstream” (e.g., public education, secular media) and incentivizing them to invest more in the group and those in it, religious communities regulate cultural transmission and cultivate those beliefs.²⁵

By helping transmit such evangelical beliefs, the establishment of churches by Southern white migrants may in turn have favored right-wing political outcomes over the long-run. Polling and empirical evidence suggest that evangelical voters are more likely to vote for right-wing candidates, including President Trump in 2016.²⁶ Our own data reaffirm this link. In Appendix Table A.10, using our full set of controls from Table 2, we show that the presence of evangelical churches strongly predicts support for President Trump in the 2016 election. It seems likely, then, that the Southern white migrants who imported these churches may have been central to the religious-based mobilization for right-wing politics beginning in the late 20th century through the Trump era.

4.4 Right-wing Radio

Another related channel through which Southern white migrants transmitted their political preferences, and culture more broadly, is via their media consumption. To the extent that Southern whites may have preferred to read newspapers or listen to radio programs that were characterized by right-leaning politics or religious sermonizing, these preferences would have been imported with their arrival. At destination, increased demand for such media could in turn have resulted in a greater supply made available to non-Southerners, potentially diffusing the cultural ideals of Southern whites in the process.²⁷

We explore this idea by linking the Southern white diaspora to the geography of right-wing talk radio programs. Talk radio has arguably been an important factor underlying the rise of the New Right in American politics since the 1990s. However, the advent of right-wing talk radio in its modern form goes back nearly a century, to religious leaders such as Charles Coughlin and Carl McIntire (Matzko, 2020; Wang, 2021). Their messages were generally populist and anti-Communist in nature and attracted audiences in the tens of millions. Our findings here suggest that demand for these types of programs may have been a salient mechanism through which Southern white migrants influenced the historical trajectory of right-wing politics.

Our analysis, shown in Table 10, relates a county’s share of Southern white migrants to 1940 to

²⁵In reducing within-church free-riding, such costs also favor more efficient collective production of various religious services (Iannaccone, 1992). For evangelicals, this includes “evangelizing,” i.e., efforts to preach the Christian gospel *beyond* the church. This was prevalent among Southern white migrants and adopted by prominent evangelists such as Billy Graham to spread evangelical doctrine on moral issues (Dochuk, 2010).

²⁶A broad set of polling data confirms the link between evangelicalism and right-wing political participation. For instance, white evangelicals favored Trump by a 4 to 1 ratio in 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2016). Trump support similarly increased with church attendance, and among white evangelicals, support for Trump’s presidency increased with church attendance (Pew Research Center, 2017). See Wilcox and Robinson (2011) for more on both the intensive and extension margins of right-wing political participation among evangelicals.

²⁷The newspaper biases described in Section 4.1 are consistent with such a diffusion process.

the presence of a radio station broadcasting (i) Carl McIntire’s *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* talk radio show during its run from the late 1950s through the early 1970s, and (ii) the *Rush Limbaugh Show* as of 2020.²⁸ Both shows were broadcast from over 600 stations at their peak, but the average *non-Southern* county was about 50% more likely to have had a station airing Limbaugh’s show during its run relative to McIntire’s, illustrating the diffusion of right-wing radio outside the South during the 20th century. The patterns are strikingly similar across the two. A 1 p.p. increase in the share of Southern white migrants implies a 0.5–1.5 p.p. increase in the probability that a county had a radio station carrying McIntire’s show half a century ago *and* Limbaugh’s show in 2020. This pattern persists across specifications and suggests an important connection between Southern white migrant inflows and local media consumption behavior outside the South.

To complement these demand-side results, we offer a look at the supply side in Table 9, which offers individual-level evidence on the sorting of Southern white migrants into radio and other media occupations. Like McIntire and other early right-wing media evangelists of Southern origin, such as Billy James Hargis and Pat Robertson, Southern white migrants disproportionately selected into the media sector. As noted in Section 4.1, early Southern white migrants were significantly more likely to work at newspapers than other residents within the same county. By 1940, radio and TV had become more attractive to Southern whites as they differentially sorted into occupations such as radio broadcasting. Together, these results are consistent with Southern whites playing an important role in developing a novel media infrastructure in communities outside the South.

4.5 General Cultural Spillovers to Non-Southern Whites

Whereas the church and talk radio may have been important vehicles for transmitting right-wing political preferences between Southern and non-Southern whites, these same transmission pathways could have enabled a broader set of mutually reinforcing cultural spillovers. For instance, Southern culture would have been intertwined with not only migrants’ religious and political ideals but also their names, food, and art. The sharing of these customs and norms at destination may have set the stage for interaction and cultural spillovers of *all* forms between migrants and non-Southerners. Indeed, in places where Southern white migrants were relatively concentrated, such as rural areas and in the West, Southern cultural expressions have often come to dominate the mainstream, with the political “Southernization” of rural America following suit (Gregory, 2005).

Here, we provide suggestive evidence of this diffusion process using measures of cultural *expression* (captured by the Southern-Name Index, SNI, described in Section 2.3) and cultural *integration* (captured by intermarriage rates between Southern white migrants and non-Southern whites). We estimate panel regressions that relate contemporaneous Southern white migrant shares from 1870 to 1940 to (i) SNI (based on the population of Southern names in 1860) and (ii) actual intermarriage rates as well as rates relative to random matching. The coefficient plots can be found in Appendix Figures A.15 and A.16 respectively. Both measures exhibit a period of backlash among counties with more Southern white migrants in the aftermath of the Civil War, followed by an increasing trend during the Great Migration from 1900 to 1940. This suggests that early Southern whites may have been more isolated in enclaves but later increasingly intermingled and shared Southern cultural expression with non-Southern “natives.” This echoes the resurgence of Southern names among Southerners and non-Southerners during the mid-20th century (Figure 3) and the broader cultural “Southernization” of America (see, e.g., Egerton, 1974).

²⁸The latter data were downloaded from Rush Limbaugh’s website in December of 2020.

This process of Southernization can also be seen through music and food. Meat-heavy diets in the American South contributed to the emergence of barbecue cuisine, with pork and cattle-based meats featuring prominently in local gastronomy. These preferences follow the Southern white diaspora, as shown in Appendix Table A.11, which documents higher visits for BBQ and steak restaurants as a share of total visits, relative to traditionally non-Southern staples, such as pizza and other Italian foods.

The popularity of country music follows a similar pattern. Holding urban density fixed, larger historical Southern white migrant shares are a strong positive correlate of country music radio station locations outside the South, as illustrated in Appendix Figure A.17. As these elements of Southern heritage, alongside evangelical religion, followed Southern white migration networks across the country, traditional North–South cultural divides have faded, making it easier for right-wing movement leaders to forge new political coalitions across disparate ancestral backgrounds.²⁹

5 Conclusion

Millions migrated out of the American South in the 20th century. Scholars have written extensively about the Great Migration of Southern Blacks. Much less is known about the Great Migration of Southern whites. This paper offers among the first inquiries into the process by which these Southern white migrants transformed politics and culture across the United States. We provide descriptive and causal evidence on the role of the Southern white diaspora in facilitating the sort of cultural change that would ultimately redefine and reinvigorate the conservative movement. The earliest of these migrants transmitted Confederate culture and norms across the country, exacerbating racial politics during the Civil Rights Era and forever changing the geography of racism. Media and evangelical religion provided important later vehicles for Southern white influence, which, in turn, hastened partisan realignment and reshaped the political landscape along a pathway running through George Wallace to Donald Trump.

Our study suggests that some of America’s deep cultural divides and growing polarization may have roots in the Great Migration. In ongoing work, we explore the micro-foundations of the migration and occupational choices that gave rise to the persistent geography of race and racism across America. We also consider the role of former slaveowners in shaping the institutional and cultural foundations of racism outside the South. Each of these have the potential to enrich our understanding of the long-run process of Southernization noted by historians and popular observers. While Southern migrants were not necessarily the instigators of cultural change everywhere they settled, they undoubtedly shaped its evolution locally and perhaps even nationally. Our research agenda aims to better understand this historical process and ultimately help inform public debate across the seemingly ever-widening cultural divide in America.

²⁹For example, many of country music’s “biggest stars signed up to help [George] Wallace in 1968 performing with the governor as he crisscrossed the country,” and Nixon followed suit in the next election as he repeatedly espoused “fondness for country music” and “courted musicians and Nashville executives, knowing that these entertainers would help secure the new voting blocs that Republicans counted on” both inside and outside the South (Gregory, 2005, p. 313).

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
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
Figures

Figure 1: Southern-born Whites and Blacks Living Outside the South, 1850-2010



Note: The graph plots the number of Black and white individuals born in the South who reside outside the South in a given Census year between 1850 and 2010. We define Southern states as those belonging to the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma. The data for the graph was taken from Ruggles et al. (2020). For Southern white-born individuals, the dashed line was produced using the full-count Census files and the solid line was produced using the 1% samples (1910-70 and 2000-10) multiplied by 100 and the 5% samples (1980, 1990) multiplied by 20. Likewise, the short-dashed blue line for Southern-born Blacks was taken from the full-count Census, and the long-dashed line uses the 1 and 5% IPUMS samples of the Census while applying the same multiplication to bring the graph up to scale. The period of overlap between the full-count and 1% samples from 1910 to 1940 was chosen to show that the scaled IPUMS samples match the full-count data.


Figure 2: Mapping Southern-born Whites Outside the South in 1940




Note: This figure maps the share of white individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1940 according to the full-count 1940 Census. The legend shows the intervals considered for each split. Given the skewness of the distribution, this map clearly shows the areas that Southern white migrants tended to prefer (i.e., the Southwest and border states) and to avoid (i.e., former Union states, the northern Midwest, and Utah).

Figure 3: Southern Culture as Seen Through Children’s Names

(a) Confederate Leader Names




(b) Southern-Name Index (1860)




Note: These figures plot cohort time series of names-based proxies for culture using the complete-count censuses from 1850–1940. We identify the three groups based on kids age 0–10 in the given census, and from dark to light red are those kids with Southern-born parents in the South, with Southern-born parents outside the South, and with non-Southern-born parents outside the South. Panel (a) reports the share of children named after Confederate leaders based on the list of honorees of public symbols of the Confederacy collected by the Southern Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) Whose Heritage? Project. We generate variations of the honorees’ names observed in the SPLC list of memorials (e.g., Robert Lee, Robert E Lee, R E Lee, etc.) and identify someone as having a “Confederate Leader Name” if the full name or unique nickname (e.g., Stonewall) of a Confederate leader is anywhere in the individual’s *first name* (e.g., a child with the surname Edwards meeting this criteria would have the first name “Robert Lee”). Panel (b) is based on a Southern-Name Index (SNI), which assigns to each name in each year a likelihood that such name successfully distinguishes Southern- from non-Southern-born children as of 1860. Formally, $SNI_i^{1860} = \frac{name_{n(i),S}}{name_{n(i),S} + name_{n(i),N}}$ for child i in a given cohort where $name$ represents the name frequencies for Southern- (S) and non-Southern- (N) born children. The SNI is akin to the Enemy-Name Index constructed by Esposito et al. (2021) for 1910 and 1920, which like our measure is inspired by efforts to measure the distinctiveness of Black and White Names (see Cook et al., 2014; Fryer Jr. and Levitt, 2004). Appendix Figure A.14 provides maps showing the distribution of Confederate names and SNI as of 1940.

Figure 4: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Republican Presidential Vote Share, 1900–2020




Note: Coefficients from a panel OLS regression of vote share for the Republican candidate in 31 U.S. presidential elections between 1900 and 2020 on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Regression includes county and state-by-election year fixed effects. The coefficients from these share effects are expressed relative to the base year 1900. Error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the county level, which is harmonized from an election year’s nearest census year to modern county borders. For IV estimates and plots of stand-alone cross-sectional estimates with no omitted year, see Appendix Figure A.6.

Figure 5: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Congressional Ideology, 1940–2000



Note: Coefficients from pooled OLS and IV regressions of congressional ideal points from 1940 to 2000 from Bateman et al. (2017), based on race and civil rights voting patterns, and the time-varying DW-Nominate scores by Lewis et al. (2021), covering fiscal issues (Dimension 1) and residual social and cultural issues (Dimension 2), on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern congressional districts. Both the OLS and IV regression include congress and state fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 and shift-share instrument are interacted with the congress fixed effect. Coefficients from these regressions are represented in this figure and error bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the congressional member level (see Appendix Figures A.7 and A.8 for estimates that instead cluster standard errors by district ID).

Figure 6: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Congressional Vote Patterns, 1953-2021



Note: Coefficients from pooled OLS and IV regressions of an indicator for “yes” votes in roll calls for ten key pieces of legislation by 3,019 U.S. House Representatives representing non-Southern congressional districts on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940. The acronym DADT stands for “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.” Both the OLS and IV regression include bill and state fixed effects. The Southern white migrant share in 1940 and shift-share instrument are interacted with the bill fixed effect. The coefficients from the two regressions are represented in this figure and error bars are 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the congressional member level (see Appendix Figure A.9 for estimates that instead cluster standard errors by district ID).

Tables

Table 1: Attitudes of Southern Versus Non-Southern Whites Outside the South

	Conservative?	Evangelical?	Favor any segregation?	Right to white neighborhoods?	People are self-interested	Cannot trust people
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Southerner	0.071* (0.040)	0.187*** (0.026)	0.056** (0.026)	0.041* (0.021)	0.080*** (0.030)	0.059* (0.031)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey waves	1972-80	1960-80	1964-78	1964-76	1964-76	1964-76
Observations	4526	11097	6803	5876	6090	6224
Counties	116	148	128	105	105	105
Outcome mean	0.384	0.168	0.620	0.185	0.414	0.422
Adj. R ²	0.0359	0.179	0.0730	0.141	0.0370	0.0405

Note: Regressions of various survey questions from the American National Election Survey (ANES), applicable waves through 1980, on a dummy for whether a respondent is from any of the twelve excluded Southern sending states. These include states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Our definition of “Southerner” includes survey respondents that were born and/or grew up in the South. The dependent variables include: (1) is a dummy for whether or a not a respondent identifies as a political conservative; (2) is a composite of various questions asking a respondent’s religious denomination and equals 1 if their denomination is an evangelical Protestant Christian one, as defined in Steensland et al. (2000); (3) equals 0, if the respondent believes in integration, or 1, if the respondent believes in some or strict segregation; (4) equals 1 if the respondent believes white people have a right to exclude Blacks from the neighborhood; (5) equals 1 if the respondent believes most people just look out for themselves; and (6) equals 1 if the respondent believes most people cannot be trusted. All regressions control for respondent age, age squared, and sex. All regressions include county and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county-level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Baseline Results: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Trump Vote Share in 2016

Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.395*** (0.077)	0.632*** (0.062)	0.548*** (0.072)	0.813*** (0.152)	0.702*** (0.165)	0.486*** (0.130)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes		Yes	Yes
2010 controls						Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,884
Outcome mean	62.589	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.655
Adj. R ²	0.421	0.670	0.692			
K-P F-statistic				133.915	130.172	118.938

Note: Regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Column 4–6 instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Historical controls for 1900 include log population density (per square mile), percent employed in manufacturing, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy. Contemporary controls measured in 2010 include log population density (per square mile), percent employed in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, wholesale, retail, transport, information, finance, professional occupations, education, public administration, self-employment, and home production, percent unemployed for men and women, percent white, Hispanic, Black, European-born, Asian-born, South American-born, and African-born, log per capita incomes of whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, log median rent and log median house value, percent households on food stamps, percent households receiving public assistance, percent men and women of voting age, percent adults aged 65+ by gender, geographic controls (elevation, ruggedness, distance to coast, distance to nearest river), and years of total frontier experience from Bazzi et al. (2020). All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Third-Party Vote for Wallace in 1968

Outcome: Wallace Vote Share in 1968					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.327*** (0.042)	0.257*** (0.034)	0.269*** (0.034)	0.372*** (0.046)	0.381*** (0.049)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes		Yes
Observations	1,883	1,881	1,881	1,881	1,881
Outcome mean	9.374	9.373	9.373	9.373	9.373
Adj. R ²	0.579	0.662	0.669		
K-P F-statistic				135.307	132.060

Note: Regressions of the vote share for George Wallace of the American Independent Party in the 1968 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Columns 4 and 5 instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline and 1900 controls. All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Civil Rights Voting Patterns in the 1960s

Outcome: Bateman et al Civil Rights Scores, 1961-70						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.035*** (0.007)	0.038*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.009)	0.081*** (0.017)	0.090*** (0.021)	0.078*** (0.021)
Clustering by district s.e.	0.0120	0.0144	0.0145	0.0308	0.0347	0.0342
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes			Yes
Observations	1619	1619	1619	1619	1619	1619
Outcome mean	-0.393	-0.393	-0.393	-0.393	-0.393	-0.393
Adj. R ²	-0.00910	0.153	0.172			
K-P F-statistic				132.2	117.2	103.6

Note: Pooled regressions of congressional ideal points based on civil rights voting patterns in the 1960s from Bateman et al. (2017) on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern congressional districts. Columns 3–6 instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. See the notes to Table 2 for the list of baseline and 1900 controls, defined here at the congressional district level. All regressions include state and congress fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors from clustering by 342 congressional districts are also reported but not preferred due to time variation in district boundaries and in the number of districts in some states. Significance levels from robust standard errors are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Modern-day Attitudes

	Opposes legal abortion	Opposes gay marriage	No systemic racism	Opposes assault rifle ban	Opposes CO2 regulation	Favors ACA repeal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.008** (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey waves	2007	2009-16	2010-14	2014	2014	2014
Observations	5739	82094	83446	29202	29022	29239
Counties	1017	1732	1750	1533	1528	1534
Outcome mean	0.515	0.410	0.504	0.357	0.320	0.527
Adj. R ²	0.0452	0.0856	0.0205	0.0711	0.0660	0.0178

Note: Regressions of reported attitudes of white individuals living outside the South on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Outcomes are responses to binary-coded questions from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Respondent controls include their reported age, age squared, and sex. See Appendix Table A.7 for specifications with county-level controls. All regressions include state and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Early Southern White Migrants, Racial Animus, and Confederate Culture

	Outcome: Any Lynchings of POC		Outcome: Any KKK Chapters		Outcome: Any UDC Chapters		Outcome: Any Confed. Memorials		Outcome: Share Confed. Named Kids	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
% Southern Whites 1900	0.006** (0.003)	0.023* (0.012)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.030** (0.014)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.028*** (0.011)	0.003 (0.004)	0.029** (0.013)	0.000** (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Estimator	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1699	1699	1699	1699	1699	1699	1699	1699	1699	1699
Outcome mean	0.0795	0.0795	0.375	0.375	0.0842	0.0842	0.130	0.130	0.0161	0.0161
Adj. R ²	0.167		0.275		0.296		0.176		0.371	
K-P F-statistic		24.71		24.71		24.71		24.71		24.71

Note: Regressions of a dummy for whether a county had (1-2) any lynchings of persons of color, (3-4) any Ku Klux Klan chapters, (5-6) any United Daughters of the Confederacy chapters, (7-8) any Confederate memorials, and (9-10) the share of children given Confederate leader names from 1900–1940 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1900 in all non-Southern counties. Lynchings data come from Seguin and Rigby (2019) and span 1883-1941. Klan chapters are from the 2nd KKK, spanning 1910-40, sourced from the Virginia Commonwealth Library (2021). UDC chapters data are digitized from the organization’s “Minutes of the Annual Convention” from 1900 to 1920. Confederate memorials include monuments, from the Southern Poverty Law Center (2021), and place names, including cities, streets, or schools named after Confederate leaders, from the Geographic Names Information System (2021). Confederate-0named kids capture the share of all white children born between 1900 and 1940 given the name of a Confederate leader (see Figure 3). The IV columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1900, as well as the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War and the corresponding mortality rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7: Early Southern White Migrants and Racial Exclusion

	Outcome: Sundown towns		Outcome: Lost all Blacks, 1900-40		Outcome: Segregation, 1940		Outcome: Segregation, 2000	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites 1900	0.014*** (0.005)	0.101* (0.057)	0.004* (0.002)	0.015* (0.009)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.002)
Estimator	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1699	1699	1699	1699	1693	1693	1695	1695
Outcome mean	0.469	0.469	0.0859	0.0859	0.0813	0.0813	0.0665	0.0665
Adj. R ²	0.270		0.0887		0.203		0.505	
K-P F-statistic		27.10		27.10		27.51		26.99

Note: Regressions of a measure of a county's (1-2) sundown towns, (3-4) on a dummy of whether it had Blacks in 1900 or prior but not in 1940, (5-6) a measure of residential racial segregation in 1940, and (7-8) a measure of residential racial segregation in 2000 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1900 in all non-Southern counties. All even columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. Sundown towns data is originally from Loewen (2005) and taken from Taylor (2020) via its complementary GIS resource. 1940 segregation data are from Logan and Parman (2017). 2000 segregation data are from Escarce et al. (2011). Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1900, as well as the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War and the corresponding mortality rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Evangelical Communities, 1952–2010

	Outcome: % Evangelical		Outcome: Evangelical Churches (per 10,000)					
	2010		1952		1971		2010	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.405*** (0.051)	0.465*** (0.108)	0.141*** (0.021)	0.223*** (0.055)	0.143*** (0.022)	0.227*** (0.053)	0.130*** (0.025)	0.117** (0.052)
Estimator	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV	OLS	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1886	1886	1878	1878	1879	1879	1886	1886
Outcome mean	8.425	8.425	4.435	4.435	4.753	4.753	4.496	4.496
Adj. R ²	0.560		0.523		0.504		0.431	
K-P F-statistic		124.1		134.8		134.9		124.1

Note: Regressions of the number of evangelical Protestant Christian churches per 10,000 residents in 1952, 1971, and 2010 or of the share of the county population adhering to those evangelical denominations in 2010 on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Evangelical denominations consist of those as defined in Steensland et al. (2000) and featured across all religious censuses from The Association of Religious Data Archives (2021). Even columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Southern White Migrants and Occupational Sorting, 1900 and 1940

	Outcome: Religious occupations		Outcome: Newspaper occupations		Outcome: Radio and TV occupations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Southerner, 1900	0.393*** (0.039)		0.067*** (0.022)		–	
Southerner, 1940		0.154*** (0.031)		-0.004 (0.018)		0.041*** (0.011)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	Yes
Dem. controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	–	Yes
Outcome mean	0.366	0.311	0.110	0.123	–	0.067
Observations	16187176	30054255	16187176	30054255	–	30054255

Note: Regressions of dummy for whether the individual worked in the respective occupation (multiplied $\times 100$). Religion includes the following occupations from the full-count Census: religious workers (occ1950=78) and clergymen (occ1950=9). Newspaper includes the editors and reporters occupation (occ1950=36). Radio and TV includes the radio operators occupation (occ1950=75) and the radio broadcasting and television industry (ind1950=856). Sample includes all white men between the ages of 18 and 64 living outside of the South in 1900 and 1940, respectively. Excluded Southern areas are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Regressions include controls for a cubic in age and county fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level shown in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Right-wing Radio

	Outcome: McIntire Station			Outcome: Limbaugh Station		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.005** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.013** (0.006)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	IV	OLS	OLS	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
Observations	1888	1884	1884	1888	1884	1884
Outcome mean	0.121	0.121	0.121	0.168	0.168	0.168
Adj. R ²	0.0634	0.138		0.0640	0.203	
K-P F-statistic			134.3			134.3

Note: Regressions of a dummy for whether a county has had a radio station that aired Carl McIntire's 20th Century Reformation Hour (in the 1950s-70s) or the Rush Limbaugh Show (in 2020) on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Columns 3 and 6 instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Additional controls for elevation and ruggedness are also included as potential predictors of radio signal supply. All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

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A Additional Empirical Results

Tables

Table A.1: Clustering of Southern Whites in 1940

	% Southern whites 1940			Pr(Above average) = 1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940 (neighbor)	0.488*** (0.039)	0.479*** (0.039)	0.458*** (0.036)			
Pr(Neighbor above average) = 1				0.365*** (0.023)	0.341*** (0.024)	0.337*** (0.023)
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes			Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,886	1,888	1,886	1,886
Outcome mean	2.907	2.907	2.907	0.272	0.272	0.272
Adj. R ²	0.791	0.802	0.813	0.628	0.637	0.641

Note: Regressions of the share of Southern white migrants in county c on the average share of Southern white migrants in adjacent counties in 1940 (columns 1-3), and of an indicator for whether county c has an above average share of Southern white migrants on an indicator for whether at least one adjacent county has an above average share of Southern white migrants in 1940 (columns 4–6). The sample consists of 1,888 non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Historical controls for 1900 include log population density (per square mile), percent employed in manufacturing, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy. All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.2: Excluding Border States

	Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.552*** (0.083)	0.684*** (0.078)	0.643*** (0.089)	1.156*** (0.274)	1.097*** (0.302)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes		Yes
Observations	1,571	1,569	1,569	1,569	1,569
Outcome mean	60.861	60.905	60.905	60.905	60.905
Adj. R ²	0.394	0.647	0.672		
K-P F-statistic				103.039	84.048

Note: This table re-estimates Table 2 excluding from the population of non-Southern counties all those in the former border states (during the Civil War): Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and West Virginia. See the notes to that table for other details on the specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.3: Alternative Approaches to Inference

Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.395*** (0.077)	0.632*** (0.062)	0.548*** (0.072)	0.813*** (0.155)	0.702*** (0.168)
Conley s.e. (50km)	0.078	0.063	0.072	0.109	0.119
Conley s.e. (100km)	0.091	0.067	0.077	0.119	0.128
Conley s.e. (150km)	0.105	0.072	0.082	0.130	0.138
Wild cluster bootstrap s.e.	0.187	0.090	0.102	0.274	0.267
Adao et al (2019) s.e.				0.060	0.080
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes		Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886
Outcome mean	62.589	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628

Note: This table re-estimates columns 1–5 of Table 2 with different approaches to inference besides the baseline robust standard errors in parentheses. We provide Conley (1999) standard errors with distance cut-offs at 50, 100, and 150km, standard errors clustered at the level of the 37 non-Southern states for which we correct the potential bias from the small number of clusters using the wild-cluster bootstrap by Cameron et al. (2008) implemented via the Stata routine provided by Roodman et al. (2019), as well as the standard errors for shift-share designs proposed by Adao et al. (2019). Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.4: Alternative Time Horizons in the Shift-Share IV

Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites, year t	0.459*** (0.075)	0.468*** (0.083)	0.149*** (0.032)	0.627*** (0.139)	0.706*** (0.191)	0.969*** (0.281)
year t	1940	1900	1870	1940	1940	1900
IV base year				1900	1870	1870
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,888	1,701	1,888	1,701	1,701
Outcome mean	62.589	62.589	61.406	62.589	61.406	61.406
Adj. R ²	0.660	0.657	0.652			
K-P F-statistic				126.891	55.936	25.644

Note: This table probes the baseline Trump vote share results allowing the Southern white share and corresponding shift-share instrument to be defined over different time horizons. Columns 4–6 instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the previous cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South between the base year and the year t . Controls are limited to log population density contemporaneous with the treatment, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate in the interest of comparability across specifications. All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.5: Comparing the Black and White Great Migration

Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.734*** (0.089)	0.621*** (0.065)	0.579*** (0.075)	0.815*** (0.172)	0.704*** (0.177)
% Southern Blacks 1940	-3.140*** (0.581)	0.151 (0.292)	-0.565 (0.412)	-0.029 (0.629)	-0.049 (0.589)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes		Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886
Outcome mean	62.589	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628
Adj. R ²	0.468	0.670	0.692		
Cragg-Donald F-statistic				31.486	251.094

Note: This table re-estimates columns 1–5 of Table 2 augmented with the Southern Black share in 1940. Columns 4–5 instrument the share of Southern-born white and Black residents using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born individuals in each group and the aggregate change in Southern white and Black population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.6: Controlling for Place-Based Confounds of Ideological Sorting

Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.317*** (0.065)	0.408*** (0.079)	0.313*** (0.065)	0.551*** (0.072)	0.822*** (0.134)	0.733*** (0.172)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	IV	IV
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls				Yes		Yes
1900 controls	Yes		Yes	Yes		Yes
Ideology controls		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,888	1,888	1,888	1,886	1,888	1,886
Outcome mean	62.589	62.589	62.589	62.628	62.589	62.628
Adj. R ²	0.615	0.427	0.616	0.693		
K-P F-statistic					83.458	120.306

Note: This table adds to our baseline regression in Table 2 additional controls for ideological sorting: cotton suitability in 1850, vote shares for Breckinridge in 1860, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.7: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Modern-day Attitudes: County Controls

	Opposes legal abortion	Opposes gay marriage	No systemic racism	Opposes assault rifle ban	Opposes CO2 regulation	Favors ACA repeal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.005 (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey wave FE	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Survey waves	2007	2009-16	2010-14	2014	2014	2014
Observations	5693	81371	82957	29012	28830	29046
Counties	1016	1731	1749	1532	1527	1533
Outcome mean	0.517	0.411	0.505	0.358	0.321	0.528
Adj. R ²	0.0563	0.0892	0.0291	0.0825	0.0712	0.0266

Note: Regressions of reported attitudes of white individuals living outside the South on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Outcomes are responses to binary-coded questions from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Respondent controls include their reported age, age squared, and sex. County-level controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, unemployment, labor force participation, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. All regressions include state and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.8: Early Southern White Migrants and Racial Animus in Newspapers

	Outcome: Mean annual number of pages mentioning:							
	N-word		"Coon"		"Chink" or "coolie"		"Carpetbagger" or "scalawag"	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
% Southern Whites 1900	3.350** (1.416)	3.549* (1.872)	23.446** (9.409)	18.447 (12.215)	6.500** (2.746)	5.768* (3.336)	0.433* (0.232)	0.661 (0.428)
Observations	845	845	867	867	833	833	751	751
Outcome mean	9.699	9.699	53.647	53.647	11.975	11.975	2.420	2.420
Adj. R ²	0.443		0.449		0.542		0.248	
K-P F-stat		15.835		16.643		11.272		14.340

Note: Regressions of the average number of newspaper pages in a county between 1900–40 that mention (1-2) the N-word, (3-4) "coon", (5-6) "chink" or "coolie" as measures of anti-Asian sentiment, and (7-8) "carpetbagger" or "scalawag" on the share of Southern-born whites in 1900 in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Even columns instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1870 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1870 to 1900. Controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1900, as well as the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War and the corresponding mortality rate. Observations are weighted by the average number of total newspaper pages in a county between 1900-40. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.9: Heterogeneity for Southern White Migrants in 1940 and the Trump Vote Share in 2016

	Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.854*** (0.121)	0.383*** (0.086)	0.636*** (0.064)	0.719*** (0.080)	0.401*** (0.099)	0.684*** (0.074)	0.392* (0.205)
× log pop. density 1940	-0.088** (0.040)						-0.101* (0.053)
× West=1		0.398*** (0.125)					0.341** (0.160)
× Unincorporated in 1860=1			0.080 (0.179)				0.102 (0.189)
× Total frontier experience				-0.064** (0.030)			0.016 (0.042)
× residential segregation 1940					0.439*** (0.147)		0.518*** (0.135)
× % Black population 1940						-0.012 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886
Outcome mean	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628
Adj. R ²	0.671	0.672	0.676	0.672	0.674	0.671	0.684
Joint F-test	52.997	48.206	53.245	50.638	61.038	53.419	17.563
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Note: Regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties together with interactions of the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 with (1) the log population density in 1940, (2) an indicator for states in the west (i.e. the Pacific and Mountain Census regions), (3) an indicator for counties that were unincorporated (i.e. population=.) in 1860, (4) the total frontier experience measure from Bazzi et al. (2020), (5) the residential segregation index in 1940 by Logan and Parman (2017), and (vi) the share of Black population in 1940. All main effects are included in the regression. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. All regressions include state fixed effects. The bottom two rows of the table report the F-test for joint significance of the coefficients of the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 and its interactions, and the associated p-value of the test with the null being no jointly significant effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.10: Evangelical Churches and Trump Vote Share in 2016

	Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Evangelical churches per 10,000, 2010	0.868*** (0.049)	0.539*** (0.042)	0.485*** (0.040)	0.170*** (0.029)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls		Yes	Yes	Yes
1900 controls			Yes	Yes
2010 controls				Yes
Observations	1,888	1,886	1,886	1,884
Outcome mean	62.589	62.628	62.628	62.655
Adj. R ²	0.548	0.695	0.713	0.853

Note: Regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the number of evangelical churches in 2010 per 10,000 residents in non-Southern counties. Evangelical denominations are as defined in the religious census from *The Association of Religious Data Archives* (2021). Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Historical controls for 1900 include log population density (per square mile), percent employed in manufacturing, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy. Contemporary controls measured in 2010 include log population density (per square mile), percent employed in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, wholesale, retail, transport, information, finance, professional occupations, education, public administration, self-employment, and home production, percent unemployed for men and women, percent white, Hispanic, Black, European-born, Asian-born, South American-born, and African-born, log per capita incomes of whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, log median rent and log median house value, percent households on food stamps, percent households receiving public assistance, percent men and women of voting age, percent adults aged 65+ by gender, geographic controls (elevation, ruggedness, distance to coast, distance to nearest river), and years of total frontier experience from *Bazzi et al. (2020)*. All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


Table A.11: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Modern-day Cuisine

	BBQ and steak		Seafood		Italian and pizza	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1888	1884	1888	1884	1888	1884
Outcome mean	0.0546	0.0547	0.187	0.187	0.377	0.377
Adj. R ²	0.0268	0.0286	0.177	0.235	0.250	0.269

Note: Regressions of county-level restaurant visit shares for various cuisines on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Restaurant data from *Google News Lab* (2021). Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Counties with insufficient visit data for a particular cuisine are considered zeroes for coding purposes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include state fixed effects. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


Figures

Figure A.1: Mapping Southern-born Whites and Blacks Outside the South in 1940



Note: This figure maps the counts and shares of white and Black individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1940 according to the full-count 1940 Census. The legend shows the intervals considered for each split.


Figure A.2: Mapping Southern-born Whites Outside the South in 1870 and 1900



Note: This figure maps the counts and shares of white and Black individuals born in the South and residing outside the South in 1870 and 1900 according to the full-count Census. The legend shows the intervals considered for each split.


Figure A.3: Clustering of Southern White Migrants in 1940: Map

Counties in the Top Quintile of the % of Southern-born Whites Distribution by State



Note: This figure maps the indicator for whether a county was in the top quintile of the distribution of % Southern whites in their state in 1940. This shows the spatial clustering of these migrants. See Figure 2 for maps based on shares.


Figure A.4: Attitudes and Beliefs of Southern White Migrants




Note: Average responses to binary-coded questions on relevant issues for white individuals from the American National Election Survey (ANES), waves through 1980. Respondents (R) are considered Southern if they were born or raised in the states of the former Confederacy as well as Oklahoma. Southern and non-Southern samples include and exclude those states, respectively.

Figure A.5: Sensitivity to Sample Changes

Panel (a): sensitivity to dropping individual receiving states in 2016




Panel (b): sensitivity to dropping individual sending states in 1940




Note: Coefficients from regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in 1,888 non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. **Panel (a)** excludes receiving states one-by-one where the excluded state is reported on the vertical axis. **Panel (b)** excludes Southern sending states one-by-one. The 1940 share of Southern-born whites living outside the South in a given non-Southern county c then omits Southern whites outside the South from the state reported on the vertical axis. The instrumental variables regressions instrument the share of Southern-born whites using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1900 to 1940. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. The dashed red line marks zero. The solid red line marks the corresponding baseline estimate based on the full sample. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.6: Republican Presidential Vote Share: Robustness




Note: Coefficients from panel and cross-sectional OLS and IV regressions of vote share for the Republican candidate in 31 U.S. presidential elections between 1900 and 2020 on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. Panel regressions include county and state \times election year fixed effects, using 1900 or 1940 as the omitted year, while cross-sectional regressions include state fixed effects. Error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, and in (a) and (c) are clustered at the county level.

Figure A.7: Congressional Ideology: Dynamic Effects




Note: Coefficients in (a-c) are from pooled OLS and IV regressions of congressional ideal points from 1940 to 2000 from Bateman et al. (2017), based on race and civil rights voting patterns, and the time-varying DW-Nominate score (dimension 2) by Lewis et al. (2021), covering social and cultural issues, on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern congressional districts. Both the OLS and IV regressions include congress and state fixed effects. The treatment and instrument are interacted with the congress fixed effect. Regressions in (b) also include several contemporaneous and historical controls. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Coefficients in (d) are from standalone cross-sectional OLS and IV regressions. The coefficients from each of the OLS and IV regressions for each bill are represented in this figure. Error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, except in (c), which also cluster by district ID. District ID is defined by a district's state and number and is not always fixed over time due to changing district boundaries as well as changes in the number of districts within states.

Figure A.8: Congressional Ideology: DW-Nominate




Note: Coefficients in (a-c) are from pooled OLS and IV regressions of congressional ideal points from 1940 to 2000 based on the time-varying DW-Nominate scores by Lewis et al. (2021), covering economic issues (dimension 1) and social and cultural issues (dimension 2), on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern congressional districts. Both the OLS and IV regressions include congress and state fixed effects. The treatment and instrument are interacted with the congress fixed effect. Regressions in (b) also include several contemporaneous and historical controls. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Coefficients in (d) are from standalone cross-sectional OLS and IV regressions. The coefficients from each of the OLS and IV regressions for each bill are represented in this figure. Error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, except in (c), which also cluster by district ID. District ID is defined by a district's state and number and is not always fixed over time due to changing district boundaries as well as changes in the number of districts within states.

Figure A.9: Congressional Vote Patterns: Robustness




Note: Coefficients in (a-c) are from pooled OLS and IV regressions of an indicator for “yes” votes in roll calls for ten key pieces of legislation by 3019 U.S. House representatives representing non-Southern congressional districts on the share of Southern white migrants in 1940 in all non-Southern congressional districts. Both the OLS and IV regressions include bill and state fixed effects. The treatment and instrument are interacted with the bill fixed effect. Regressions in (b) also control for several contemporaneous and historical controls. Baseline controls include log population per square mile, percent employed in manufacturing, percent participating in the labor force, percent unemployed, percent of land in farms, log average farm value, percent Black, and percent born in Mexico, Germany, Ireland, Canada, and Italy, all in 1940, as well as the vote share for Woodrow Wilson in 1912, the Union Army enlistment rate during the Civil War, and the corresponding mortality rate. Coefficients in (d) are from standalone cross-sectional OLS and IV regressions. The coefficients from each of the OLS and IV regressions for each bill are represented in this figure. The acronym DADT stands for “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.” Error bars represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, except in (c), which also cluster by district ID. District ID is defined by a district’s state and number and is not always fixed over time due to changing district boundaries as well as changes in the number of districts within states.

Figure A.10: Racial Animus in Newspapers in Counties with an Above- versus Below-Median Share of Southern-born Whites, 1850–1940




Note: Plots for the average number of newspaper pages including racial slant by Census year in non-Southern counties split by being above or below the median share of Southern-born whites in 1940. The averages are weighted by the number of total newspaper pages in each county. Panel (a) includes pages that mention the N-word. Panel (b) includes pages that mention the word "coon." Panel (c) includes pages that mention either the word "chink" or "coolie" as measures of anti-Asian sentiment. Panel (d) includes pages that mention either "carpetbagger" or "scalawag," which used to refer to Northerners in a derogatory way.

Figure A.11: Racial Animus in Newspapers in Counties with an Above/Below Median Share of Southern-born Whites, 1850–1940 (West Only)




Note: Plots for the average number of newspaper pages including racial slant by Census year in non-Southern counties in the West (Pacific and Mountain Census divisions) split by being above or below the median share of Southern-born whites in 1940. The averages are weighted by the number of total newspaper pages in each county. Panel (a) includes pages that mention the N-word. Panel (b) includes pages that mention the word "coon." Panel (c) includes pages that mention either the word "chink" or "coolie" as measures of anti-Asian sentiment. Panel (d) includes pages that mention either "carpetbagger" or "scalawag," which used to refer to Northerners in a derogatory way.

Figure A.12: Geographic Sorting of Black and Southern Whites By Location Population Density




Note: These figures report the share of all Black and white Southern-born living outside the South across ventiles of the destination county population in (a) 1870 and (b) 1940. Note the different scales of the y-axis across the two years.

Figure A.13: Southern White Migrants, Sundown Towns, and the “Great Retreat”




Note: The figure shows a binned scatter plot of the number of sundown towns in a county during the 20th century over the average county-level share of Southern white migrants in 1900, as well as a bar graph showing the share of non-Southern counties with no Blacks by decade over the period of study. The full sample consists of 1,888 counties outside the South which excludes states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Southern Whites are defined as individuals who were classified as white in the U.S. Census in 1900 and who were born in a Southern state. Sundown town counts are generated from partialing out log population density in 1900. Census division fixed effects are also partialled out to account for differences in the identification of sundown towns by county in the data. Sundown towns data is originally from Loewen (2005) and sourced from Taylor (2020) via its complementary GIS resource.

Figure A.14: Mapping Southern Names Outside the South in 1940




Note: Panel (a) maps the share of children outside the South with Southern names in 1940, based on a contemporaneous index of Southern names. Panel (b) maps the share of children outside the South with first names that are the same as the names of Confederate generals as of 1940. This figure shows the spatial clustering of Southern-inspired names in many of the same places to which Southern white migrants migrated, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure A.15: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Southern Names Outside the South




Note: Coefficients from panel OLS regressions of the 1860-based Southern-Name Index (SNI) on the contemporaneous share of Southern white migrants in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Regression also include state-by-election year fixed effects. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the county level, which is based on modern county borders.

Figure A.16: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Southern/Non-Southern Intermarriage



Note: Coefficients from panel OLS regressions of (a) intermarriage rates and (b) the ratio of true intermarriage rates to the hypothetical rate from random matching on the contemporaneous share of Southern whiteers in all non-Southern counties. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Regression also include state-by-election year fixed effects. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the county level, which is based on modern county borders.

Figure A.17: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and Country Music Radio Stations



Note: Binned scatter plots of the number of country music stations in a county in 2021 over the average county-level share of Southern white migrants in 1940. The sample consists of 1,888 counties outside the South which excludes states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Southern Whites are defined as individuals who were classified as white in the U.S. Census in 1940 and who were born in a Southern state. Radio station counts are generated from partialing out log population density in 1940. County music data comes from the websites of iHeartRadio, Cumulus, and Audacy, the top three radio companies in the United States.

B Characteristics of Southern White Migrants

What characterizes Southern white migrants? To shed light on this question, we compare the characteristics of a linked sample of Southern white migrants between 1930 to 1940. We use the 1930 and 1940 full-count Census files together with the crosswalks provided by Abramitzky et al. (2020). Using information on individuals' migration status in the 1940 Census, we then compare the characteristics of individuals who stayed in the South in both years. This allows us to see whether (i) the baseline characteristics of later movers and stayers were different in 1930, and (ii) movers realized greater economic status after moving relative to those who remained in the South.

Table B.1 reports the 1930 mean differences for the Southerners who would later migrate or stay in the South. In 1930, those who would become migrants in the next ten years tended to be single, younger, more urban, and more literate. They were also more likely to have had a radio in their household in 1930, a potential information transmission device to learn about opportunities outside the South. They tended to be employed at a lesser rate with lower occupational income scores, although this to some extent reflects the 3 year age difference on average. Despite the many reasons for which Southern white migrants migrated at the time, these baseline characteristics are similar to the ones described by Gregory (2005) and Collins and Wanamaker (2015).

When we look at the same individuals again in 1940, comparing movers to stayers, movers tended to fare better in terms of their economic outcomes. Again, they are more likely to live in an urban area, have higher house values, and this time they also have a higher employment probability as well as increased occupational income scores compared to those who remained in the South.

We then regress the migrant dummy on 1930 individual characteristics to see how strong their conditional explanatory power is in the determination of the migration outcome. The regressions are reported in Table B.2. Despite their statistical significance, all coefficients are relatively small with the 2.8 to 3 p.p. coefficient on literacy being the largest predictor. In terms of explanatory power, individual characteristics appear to explain little of the migration decision. The adjusted R^2 of 0.006 in column 1 compares to the values of 0.031 and 0.037 in columns 2 and 3, where we included state and county fixed effects, respectively. Overall, this resonates with Collins and Wanamaker (2015, p. 950), who find that “differences between migrants and non-migrants were small within race categories.”

Table B.1: Comparing Southern White Migrants and Stayers Using Linked Census Data, 1930-40

Southern Movers and Stayers Pre-Migration (1930)						
	Mean(Migrants)	No. migrants	Mean(Stayers)	No. stayers	Diff.	Std. Error
Urban = 1	0.330	76,356	0.310	2,579,869	0.020***	0.002
Farm = 1	0.438	76,356	0.470	2,579,869	-0.032***	0.002
Value of home	1033.529	74,457	1100.162	2,531,653	-66.633**	33.379
Owns radio	0.196	76,356	0.181	2,579,869	0.015***	0.001
Family size	5.406	76,356	5.436	2,579,869	-0.030***	0.009
No. of children	0.521	76,356	0.804	2,579,869	-0.282***	0.005
Age	19.242	76,356	22.504	2,579,869	-3.262***	0.048
Single = 1	0.715	76,356	0.619	2,579,869	0.097***	0.002
Literate = 1	0.767	76,356	0.681	2,579,869	0.086***	0.002
Employed = 1	0.431	76,356	0.498	2,579,869	-0.068***	0.002
Occ. income score	7.752	76,356	9.407	2,579,869	-1.654***	0.044

Southern Movers and Stayers Post-Migration (1940)						
	Mean(Migrants)	No. migrants	Mean(Stayers)	No. stayers	Diff.	Std. Error
Urban = 1	0.498	77,329	0.337	2,586,984	0.161***	0.002
Farm = 1	0.190	77,329	0.428	2,586,984	-0.237***	0.001
Value of home	2601.318	13,314	2197.865	1,235,007	403.454***	42.914
Family size	3.603	77,329	4.700	2,586,984	-1.097***	0.009
No. of children	0.756	77,329	0.956	2,586,984	-0.200***	0.005
Age	29.253	77,329	32.480	2,586,984	-3.227***	0.048
Single = 1	0.444	77,329	0.437	2,586,984	0.007***	0.002
Literate = 1	0.763	77,329	0.676	2,586,984	0.087***	0.002
Employed = 1	0.687	77,329	0.662	2,586,984	0.026***	0.002
Occ. income score	17.234	77,329	15.497	2,586,984	1.737***	0.048

Note: Summary statistics for Southern migrants and stayers in 1930 and 1940 using linked individual data from the 1930 and 1940 full-count Census files. A stayer is someone who lived in the South in 1930 and still lived there in 1940, whereas a migrant here is characterized as someone who lived in the South in 1930 but who lived outside the South in 1940. For each variable we report the mean value and number of observations by group as well as the result from a univariate t-test across the two groups for which we adjusted standard errors for the unequal group sizes. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B.2: Regressing Migration Status on 1930 Observables using Linked Census Data

	Outcome: Pr(Migrated to Outside the South between 1930-40) = 1		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Urban = 1	-0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0011*** (0.0003)
Farm = 1	-0.0018*** (0.0003)	-0.0053*** (0.0003)	-0.0045*** (0.0003)
Home owner = 1	-0.0097*** (0.0003)	-0.0067*** (0.0003)	-0.0075*** (0.0003)
Log house value	0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0003*** (0.0001)	-0.0002*** (0.0001)
Owns radio	0.0038*** (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0003 (0.0003)
Family size	-0.0006*** (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
No. of children	0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Age	-0.0005*** (0.0000)	-0.0004*** (0.0000)	-0.0004*** (0.0000)
Single = 1	0.0055*** (0.0004)	0.0069*** (0.0004)	0.0074*** (0.0004)
Literate = 1	0.0304*** (0.0003)	0.0284*** (0.0003)	0.0281*** (0.0003)
Employed = 1	-0.0076*** (0.0003)	-0.0044*** (0.0003)	-0.0033*** (0.0003)
Occ. income score	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)	-0.0001*** (0.0000)
State FE		Yes	
County FE			Yes
Observations	2,606,110	2,606,110	2,606,110
Outcome mean	0.029	0.029	0.029
Adj. R ²	0.006	0.031	0.037

Note: Cross-sectional regression of a dummy for future outmigration from the South on individual characteristics in 1930. A stayer is someone who lived in the South in 1930 and still lived there in 1940, whereas a migrant here is characterized as someone who lived in the South in 1930 but who lived outside the South in 1940. The information on later non-Southern residency was obtained by linking the 1930 to the 1940 Census. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

C Shift-Share Identification Checks

The identifying assumption underlying our shift-share instrument is that, conditional on controls, long-run political outcomes and factors driving them must not be simultaneously correlated with the *shift* from 1900 to 1940 in the white population from Southern states to non-Southern counties (i.e., the migration shock) and with the 1900 *share* of whites from Southern states residing in each non-Southern county (i.e., predicted local shock exposure) (Borusyak et al., 2018; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). In this section, we address this assumption at length.

Predicting Exogenous Shifts

As stated in the text, the identifying assumption underlying our instrument may be violated if shocks to non-Southern counties affected the long-run political outcomes in those counties and also triggered greater migration from Southern states that had already sent a disproportionate number of white migrants to those counties as of 1900 (see Borusyak et al., 2018). To rule out such a correlation, we construct alternative versions of the shift-share instrument where the shift part relies only on push factors in Southern sending counties. We consider two types of factors that generate outmigration in Southern counties: natural disasters and local socioeconomic characteristics.

Historical migration information is only available starting in the 1940 Census, which asked individuals about their state and county of residence five years ago. We therefore must consider a shorter shift relative to the overall migratory period spanning 1900 to 1940. However, this will not bias the results in the case of truly exogenous shifts. The backward-looking migration question is also superior to the conventionally used net-migration measure because the latter cannot distinguish between migration within the South and migration to outside the South.¹ We therefore only consider individuals who lived in a Southern county in 1935 and non-Southern county in 1940.

Data on natural disasters, including the number of tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, and other disasters (such as fires, droughts, etc.) come from Boustan et al. (2020), and data on Southern counties' socioeconomic characteristics come from the 1930 county-level Census data (Haines, 2010), as well as from the New Deal spending data compiled by Fishback and Kantor (2018). Summary statistics for the variables we consider in the prediction exercise are reported in Table C.1. We then predict the number of people who lived in a Southern county c in 1935 and who lived outside the South in 1940:

$$\text{migrants}_{c,1935-40} = \alpha + \mathbf{D}'_c \boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{X}'_c \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \phi \text{population}_{1930} + \epsilon_{c,1935-40} \quad (\text{C.1})$$

where \mathbf{D}_c is the vector of natural disasters that occurred between 1930-40, and \mathbf{X}_c are the socioeconomic county characteristics measured in 1930. We predict this shift variable in five different ways: (i) OLS using natural disasters; (ii) OLS using socioeconomic characteristics; (iii) OLS using both natural disaster and socioeconomic characteristics; (iv) LASSO selecting from both sets of predictors; and (v) LASSO selecting from a flexible set of predictors where we include the squares and cross-term interactions of each predictor.

The Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) selects predictors based on the

¹Net migration measures are typically constructed by taking the county-level population differences between t and $t - 1$ while adding births and subtracting deaths. In the absence of measurement error, the remaining variation must be positive or negative migration to or from the county, though the destination of people who left is not known.

following minimization problem,

$$\min \sum_{c=1}^N \left(\text{migrants}_{c,1935-40} - \sum_j \pi_j K_{c,j} \right)^2 + \lambda \sum_{j=1}^p |\pi_j| \quad (\text{C.2})$$

where $K_{c,j} = \{\mathbf{D}_c, \mathbf{X}_c\}$, c indexes counties, and j indexes individual predictors. The penalty term λ has been selected by 10-fold cross validation. The penalty shrinks the coefficients of unimportant predictors to zero while keeping the significant predictors that were the most useful in predicting the outcome.² We follow [Derenoncourt \(2021\)](#) using this approach. To potentially improve the prediction by considering nonlinear transformations of the predictors and alternative functional forms, we also expand the set of predictors by including the square and cross-term interaction of each predictor with all other predictors (see [Belloni et al., 2014](#)).

Once we predicted the number of migrants from each Southern county between 1935–40, we aggregate this to the level of each Southern sending state. This state-level shift then replaces the $M_{j,1900-40}$ term in equation (2). Since we now have a shift from 1935–40, we use the initial shares measured in 1900 and, separately, use the shares measured in 1930 instead with results reported in [Tables C.3 and C.4](#), respectively. Results remain indistinguishable from those in the main specification. They tend to be slightly smaller when using the 1930 shares with a much higher first stage F-statistic, which is to be expected due to the proximity between the initial shares and the endogenous migrant stock is measured. In both tables we use the same set of controls as in the main specification.

²In our prediction exercise, the LASSO selected the number of floods, tornadoes, hurricanes, and other natural disasters, as well as the share of Blacks in the population, the share of large farms, land in farms, and farm land with crop failures, the unemployment rate, the share of manufacturing employment, and the HOLC, CWA, AAA, and FSA grants per capita, as well as 1930 population size.

Table C.1: Summary Statistics of Predictors of Southern Outmigration from 1935-40

	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Migrants and Natural Disasters					
Whites who left the South, 1935-40	1,205	360.66	812.68	1.00	14,506.00
Population size in sending counties, 1930	1,205	25,782.30	34,740.93	195.00	458,762.00
Flood count	1,205	0.37	0.77	0.00	7.00
Hurricane count	1,205	0.20	0.75	0.00	7.00
Tornado count	1,205	0.73	1.08	0.00	6.00
Other disasters count	1,205	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00
Socio-Economic County Characteristics 1930					
% Black population	1,205	25.82	21.90	0.00	85.83
% rural population	1,205	83.47	23.61	0.00	100.00
% of farms with 5,000+ acres (land inequality)	1,205	1.11	6.64	0.00	86.54
% of land in farms	1,205	58.99	24.23	0.00	100.00
% of farmland in Black farms	1,205	14.80	16.40	0.00	85.53
% of acres with crop failures	1,205	1.27	1.69	0.00	21.96
Log mean land value	1,205	7.78	0.88	0.00	11.25
% unemployed	1,205	2.07	1.92	0.00	11.32
% manufacturing employment	1,205	7.59	10.26	0.00	100.00
Home Owners Loan Corporation loans per capita	1,205	6.55	8.76	0.00	79.77
Works Progress Admin. grants per capita	1,205	21.16	31.38	0.00	917.52
Fed. Emergency Relief Admin. grants per capita	1,205	12.52	14.31	0.00	347.96
Civil Works Admin. grants per capita	1,205	5.06	3.08	0.00	23.39
Agric. Adjust. Admin. grants per capita	1,205	33.43	58.76	0.00	852.11
Farm Security Admin. grants per capita	1,205	0.62	1.04	0.00	10.46
Total relief grants per capita	1,205	41.52	39.47	0.00	949.11
Total grants per capita	1,205	102.17	91.41	0.00	1,235.74

Note: Summary statistics for the migration, natural disaster, and socio-economic characteristics of Southern sending counties from which individuals left between 1935-40 as measured by the backward-looking migration question in the 1940 Census. These individuals, who lived outside the South in 1940, were summed to the level of their respective Southern sending county.

Table C.2: Using Natural Disasters and Sending County Characteristics to Predict Southern Outmigration to Non-Southern Counties from 1935-40

	# Southern white migrants who left Southern county for non-South, 1935-40			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Flood count	204.612*** (54.194)		139.462*** (39.054)	143.918*** (21.163)
Hurricane count	-82.275*** (19.730)		-156.247*** (29.032)	-150.271*** (23.725)
Tornado count	70.309** (30.476)		60.458** (26.042)	64.677*** (14.891)
Other disasters count	608.361 (533.418)		406.650 (592.773)	379.961 (240.425)
Population size in sending counties, 1930	0.013*** (0.002)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.001)
% Black population		-10.465*** (1.750)	-7.413*** (1.597)	-7.707*** (0.775)
% rural population		0.469 (1.108)	0.252 (0.966)	
% of farms with 5,000+ acres (land inequality)		-5.883*** (1.578)	-4.383*** (1.514)	-4.316* (2.379)
% of land in farms		2.129*** (0.706)	0.871 (0.729)	1.176 (0.776)
% of farmland in Black farms		4.559** (2.155)	0.120 (2.133)	
% of acres with crop failures		37.854*** (9.873)	26.863*** (8.293)	31.320*** (9.625)
Log mean land value		-54.738** (21.732)	-16.676 (17.728)	
% unemployed		24.601 (15.609)	36.380*** (13.458)	39.696*** (9.855)
% manufacturing employment		-7.764*** (1.463)	-7.929*** (1.500)	-8.232*** (1.647)
Home Owners Loan Corporation loans per capita		18.945** (8.470)	18.086** (7.430)	17.198*** (2.462)
Works Progress Admin. grants per capita		-21.682*** (8.080)	-23.630*** (7.228)	
Fed. Emergency Relief Admin. grants per capita		-21.921*** (8.291)	-23.074*** (7.405)	
Civil Works Admin. grants per capita		-13.975 (11.189)	-14.120 (10.105)	13.107** (5.726)
Agric. Adjust. Admin. grants per capita		-1.228*** (0.349)	-1.041*** (0.344)	-1.378*** (0.320)
Farm Security Admin. grants per capita		84.592*** (20.237)	59.139*** (19.515)	85.553*** (18.226)
Total relief grants per capita		21.602*** (7.996)	23.317*** (7.154)	
Total grants per capita		-0.307 (0.241)	-0.175 (0.225)	
Estimator	OLS	OLS	OLS	LASSO
Natural disasters	Yes		Yes	Yes
1930 county characteristics		Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,205	1,205	1,205	1,205
Outcome mean	360.659	360.659	360.659	360.659
Adj. R ²	0.445	0.546	0.586	0.585

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.3: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and the 2016 Trump Vote Share Using 1900 Shares and Plausibly Exogenous Predicted Shifts from 1935-40

Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.715*** (0.094)	0.708*** (0.089)	0.728*** (0.097)	0.726*** (0.096)	0.725*** (0.095)	0.723*** (0.096)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Shift	Actual	Predicted	Predicted	Predicted	Predicted	Predicted
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886
Outcome mean	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628
K-P F-statistic	88.390	79.036	69.361	72.902	73.108	76.944

Note: Instrumental variables regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. The share of Southern-born whites in 1940 is instrumented using a shift-share instrument based on the **1900 cross-sectional distribution** of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1935 to 1940 using the backward looking migration question from the 1940 full-count Census. This aggregate change (shift) is constructed as follows: column 1 uses the raw shift computed from the backward looking migration question in 1940. Column 2 predicts the shift using data on **natural disasters** in the sending county between 1930-40. Column 3 predicts the shift using **economic characteristics** of the sending county in 1930. Column 4 uses both natural disasters and socio-economic county characteristics (these are described in Tables C.1 and zerothstage. Column 5 uses the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (**LASSO**) to select predictors from the natural disasters and county variables to predict the shift. Column 6 also uses the LASSO but includes the squared terms and cross-term interactions for all predictors from the natural disasters and county variables for a more flexible prediction. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Contemporaneous and historical controls are the same as in the main specification in Table 2. All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table C.4: Southern White Migrants in 1940 and the 2016 Trump Vote Share Using 1930 Shares and Plausibly Exogenous Predicted Shifts from 1935-40

Outcome: Trump Vote Share in 2016						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
% Southern Whites 1940	0.677*** (0.072)	0.671*** (0.069)	0.685*** (0.075)	0.684*** (0.074)	0.683*** (0.073)	0.683*** (0.074)
Estimator	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
Shift	Actual	Predicted	Predicted	Predicted	Predicted	Predicted
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886	1,886
Outcome mean	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628	62.628
K-P F-statistic	860.012	771.215	386.713	481.376	468.175	609.576


Note: Instrumental variables regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. The share of Southern-born whites in 1940 is instrumented using a shift-share instrument based on the **1930 cross-sectional distribution** of Southern-born whites and the aggregate change in Southern white population living outside the South from 1935 to 1940 using the backward looking migration question from the 1940 full-count Census. This aggregate change (shift) is constructed as follows: column 1 uses the raw shift computed from the backward looking migration question in 1940. Column 2 predicts the shift using data on **natural disasters** in the sending county between 1930-40. Column 3 predicts the shift using **economic characteristics** of the sending county in 1930. Column 4 uses both natural disasters and socio-economic county characteristics (these are described in Tables C.1 and zerothstage. Column 5 uses the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (**LASSO**) to select predictors from the natural disasters and county variables to predict the shift. Column 6 also uses the LASSO but includes the squared terms and cross-term interactions for all predictors from the natural disasters and county variables for a more flexible prediction. Excluded Southern counties are those belonging to states of the former Confederacy and Oklahoma. Contemporaneous and historical controls are the same as in the main specification in Table 2. All regressions include state fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Random Shifts and Inference

This finding naturally raises another question: are the results driven by the shares only? Perhaps exposure to the shift shocks is highly correlated across destination counties? To test this, we simulated 1,000 normally distributed random shifts with mean zero and variance five as in Adao et al. (2019). In each trial, we construct the instrument using this random shift, which replaces the $M_{j,1900-40}$ term in equation (2). If the shifts did not matter and the results were purely driven by the 1900 shares, for instance due to persistent spatial autocorrelation, then we would expect to find similar but slightly attenuated results compared to the baseline. The coefficient plot for the 1,000 placebo shift-share IV regressions is shown in Figure C.1. Out of the 1,000 trials, only 12 (1.2%) coefficients were significant at the 1% level and 70 (7%) at the 5% level. This suggests that the baseline shares do require meaningful shifts.

We also apply the standard error correction for shift-share designs proposed by Adao et al. (2019). Estimates remain statistically significant at the 1% level across our baseline specifications. This can be found in Table A.3.

Figure C.1: Baseline Result: SSIV Using Random Placebo Shifts



Note: Instrumental variables regressions of the vote share for Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election on the share of Southern-born whites in 1940 in all non-Southern counties. The share of Southern-born whites in 1940 is instrumented using a shift-share instrument based on the 1900 cross-sectional distribution of Southern-born whites and a **randomly generated shift**. The random shift was generated based on a normal distribution with mean zero and variance five as in (Adao et al., 2019). The figure shows the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from instrumental variables regressions where the instrument was generated with 1,000 random shifts. We include the same contemporaneous and historical controls as in the main specification in Table 2 and computed robust standard errors. There were 12 coefficients (1.2%) with statistical significance at the 1% level and 70 (7%) coefficients that were significant at the 5% level.

D Data Appendix

Table D.1: Summary Statistics for County-level Controls, Modern

	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
% voting age men (2010)	1,886	80.32	3.26	64.18	92.93
% voting age women (2010)	1,886	81.33	3.01	66.55	98.83
% men age 65+ (2010)	1,886	17.69	4.64	3.52	39.32
% women age 65+ (2010)	1,886	21.80	5.28	6.47	43.97
Log population density (2010)	1,886	3.60	1.80	-1.39	10.45
% white population (2010)	1,886	90.43	11.51	6.33	100.00
% Black population (2010)	1,886	2.68	5.33	0.00	64.41
% Hispanic population (2010)	1,886	6.35	10.48	0.00	84.12
% European-born (2010)	1,886	0.16	0.20	0.00	2.04
% Asian-born (2010)	1,886	0.88	1.69	0.00	22.67
% South American-born (2010)	1,886	2.07	3.79	0.00	32.76
% African-born (2010)	1,886	0.13	0.32	0.00	4.55
% households on public assistance (2010)	1,886	2.48	1.60	0.00	19.87
% households on food stamps (2010)	1,886	9.62	5.34	0.00	40.89
% unemployed men (2010)	1,886	4.82	2.22	0.00	23.12
% unemployed women (2010)	1,886	3.49	1.65	0.00	17.47
Log per capita income whites (2010)	1,886	1.11	0.95	0.00	5.18
Log per capita income Blacks (2010)	1,886	2.92	2.35	-6.39	9.37
Log per capita income Hispanics (2010)	1,886	3.19	1.89	0.00	8.98
Log median rent (2010)	1,886	6.39	0.26	5.46	7.45
Log median house value (2010)	1,886	11.71	0.52	9.83	13.82
% employment in agriculture (2010)	1,886	7.62	8.15	0.00	54.94
% employment in construction (2010)	1,886	7.65	2.59	2.08	28.95
% employment in manufacturing (2010)	1,886	12.56	7.33	0.00	43.68
% employment in wholesale (2010)	1,886	2.63	1.22	0.00	13.08
% employment in retail (2010)	1,886	11.33	2.44	0.00	31.62
% employment in transport (2010)	1,886	5.38	2.07	0.00	22.32
% employment in IT (2010)	1,886	1.70	0.92	0.00	8.44
% employment in finance (2010)	1,886	4.83	2.06	0.00	21.63
% employment in professional jobs (2010)	1,886	6.20	3.12	0.00	50.54
% employment in education and health care (2010)	1,886	22.54	4.71	7.47	52.65
% employment in public admin (2010)	1,886	5.15	2.89	0.00	28.49
% self-employed (2010)	1,886	9.69	5.12	1.03	41.02
% employment in home production (2010)	1,886	0.38	0.55	0.00	11.10
Log distance to nearest coast	1,886	13.16	1.27	4.76	14.29
Log distance to nearest river	1,886	10.23	1.14	0.24	12.55
Mean elevation	1,884	562.81	583.46	-1259.14	3368.92
Mean ruggedness	1,886	0.07	0.09	0.00	0.57
Total frontier experience (Bazzi et al)	1,886	1.43	1.09	0.00	4.40

Table D.2: Summary Statistics for County-level Controls, Historical

	Obs.	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Max.
Baseline controls					
Log population density (1940)	1,886	3.26	1.54	-1.62	10.54
% manufacturing employment (1940)	1,886	2.95	3.96	0.00	44.36
% unemployment (1940)	1,886	3.08	1.44	0.16	12.39
% labor force participation (1940)	1,886	37.10	3.67	25.41	54.22
% Black residents (1940)	1,886	1.65	4.09	0.00	46.55
% Mexican-born (1940)	1,886	0.18	0.86	0.00	18.50
% German-born (1940)	1,886	0.79	0.83	0.00	6.03
% Canadian-born (1940)	1,886	0.64	1.34	0.00	15.19
% Irish-born (1940)	1,886	0.17	0.33	0.00	4.51
% Italian-born (1940)	1,886	0.42	0.93	0.00	6.81
% acres of land in farms (1940)	1,886	67.83	28.64	0.18	100.00
Log mean farm value (1940)	1,886	8.74	0.68	6.54	10.97
% vote share for Wilson (1912)	1,886	39.04	11.02	0.00	80.20
% Union Army enlistment (1861-65)	1,886	22.52	27.53	0.00	100.00
% Civil War deaths (1861-65)	1,886	2.84	4.73	0.00	87.50
1900 controls					
Log population density (1900)	1,886	2.92	1.61	0.00	10.35
% manufacturing empl (1900)	1,886	3.22	4.34	0.00	34.51
% Black residents (1900)	1,886	2.18	5.54	0.00	54.63
% Mexican-born (1900)	1,886	0.19	1.84	0.00	42.27
% German-born (1900)	1,886	3.09	3.26	0.00	21.86
% Canadian-born (1900)	1,886	1.83	3.51	0.00	37.29
% Irish-born (1900)	1,886	1.14	1.39	0.00	12.01
% Italian-born (1900)	1,886	0.33	0.84	0.00	8.61
% acres of land in farms (1900)	1,886	62.35	35.46	0.00	100.00
Log mean farm value (1900)	1,886	7.74	0.99	0.00	10.56

Boundary Harmonization

For county-level data, all boundaries are standardized in GIS software to 2010 boundaries, following the procedure introduced in Hornbeck (2010) and expanded upon in Perlman (2021) and Ferrara et al. (2021) in order to consistently match them with census data and to avoid issues of the merging or splitting of counties over time.

This process involves creating unique units (henceforth county parts), based on where historical and 2010 counties intersect. Areas in square miles are calculated for each county part. A share of each historical count variable being interpolated is assigned to each county based on the county part's share of the total area of the historical county in which it lies. These approximated counts are then summed by 2010 county.

For the 1952 and 1971 religious censuses from The Association of Religious Data Archives (2021), county boundaries are first determined using the Atlas of Historical County Boundaries to modify the Tiger/Line county boundaries from the U.S. Census Bureau.¹

For congressional district (CD) level data, county-level data are harmonized to the boundaries of the particular CD–year. However, in contrast to our county-level analyses, we do not harmonize CD boundaries to any particular CD boundary standard, given the numerous and complex changes in CD boundaries and to the number of CDs within states over time. For instance, over a third of sample states have at-large (i.e., statewide) CDs at some point during the sample period, often for only a few years. Smaller CD boundaries change often as well; even for the CD analysis shown in Table 4, in which we use only congresses from the 1960s, only 14 of the CDs in that sample (i.e., around 5%) have time-invariant boundaries over those five congresses, excluding at-large CDs. As such, we eschew within-district analysis for our CD-level results. We instead opt to use state-level fixed effects to capture time-invariant unobservables, although we also report estimates from alternative approaches using individual cross-sections, various historical and contemporaneous controls, and differentially-clustered standard errors.

¹See <https://publications.newberry.org/ahcbp/> (last accessed on Dec. 1, 2020).