

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION:
THE TRUMP EFFECT

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Working Paper 28909
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w28909>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
June 2021

We would like to thank seminar participants at the University of Florida and the 2021 ASSA Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association for helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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NBER Working Paper No. 28909
June 2021
JEL No. J15,J6,J61

ABSTRACT

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of increasingly provocative anti-immigrant politicians in both Europe and the United States. We examine whether the 2016 election of Donald Trump, who made illegal immigration and border enforcement a centerpiece of his campaign, reduced illegal immigration into the U.S. We exploit the fact the election result was widely unexpected and thus generated a large, overnight change in expected immigration policy and rhetoric. We compare migration flows before and after the election and find that while it reduced immigration among deported Mexicans and at least temporarily among Central Americans, it had no effect on the overall inflow of unauthorized Mexican workers.

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1. Introduction

Much of the existing research on immigration has focused on the impact of particular policies and conditions. However, arguably the greatest change in the political climate regarding immigration has been the rise of politicians who combine sharp anti-immigration rhetoric with anti-immigrant policies. This trend was perhaps best exemplified in the U.S. by the election of Donald Trump to the presidency in 2016, who made illegal immigration and border enforcement a centerpiece of his campaign. Similarly, Europe has experienced the emergence of politicians who are sharply critical of legal immigration and especially of refugees (O'Donnell, 2017; Basu, 2018; Davey and Ebner, 2019; Roth, 2019). Despite these trends, however, little is known about how the rise of these politicians has impacted immigration in general, or illegal immigration in particular.

In this paper, we examine the impact of Donald Trump's election on migration flows of unauthorized immigrants to the U.S. before and after the election on November 8, 2016. The advantage of using this approach to study this recent political shift is twofold. First, as alluded to above, the issue of illegal immigration was central to Donald Trump's 2016 campaign. He famously launched his candidacy with a speech in which he stated that Mexico wasn't "sending us their best" and that while some were presumably good people, others were rapists and were bringing drugs and crime. As a result, Trump's election in 2016 generated a significant shift in both political climate and expected policy regarding immigration. The second advantage of studying the impact of the 2016 election is that few predicted Trump would win. Of the six election forecasts tracked by the New York Times, the average probability Trump would win was only 11 percent. This meant that not only did the 2016 election cause a significant change in expected policy and rhetoric on immigration, but it did so overnight.

We examine whether this sudden but lasting change in immigration rhetoric and policy reduced the immigration of undocumented workers from Mexico and Central America. We do so both by examining the inflows of undocumented workers from Mexico and Central America, as well as the intentions of those undocumented Mexican workers who were deported from the U.S. to Mexico.¹ In doing so, this paper contributes to a literature that has focused nearly entirely on the

¹ We examine effects on inflows rather than outflows (i.e., return migration) because the former is more likely to respond quickly to the overnight change in expected immigration policy and rhetoric caused by the 2016 election. Similarly, we do not attempt to measure changes in the stock of undocumented workers in the U.S. This is in part because the stock of unauthorized immigrants is measured with a significant amount of error in the U.S., and in part because even large changes in inflows are likely undetectable in the stock given the large number of total undocumented workers in the U.S. See Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman (2017) for additional discussion of these issues in the context of Arizona's SB 1070.

impact of particular policies.² While these are clearly important, little is known about the joint impact of both expected policy and rhetoric that characterized both the campaign of Donald Trump and his presidency. Yet we would argue this was one of the more important changes in the U.S. immigration policy space in recent years.

Results using data from a Mexican survey of migrants in Mexican border towns indicate the election of President Trump had little effect on the overall inflow of undocumented Mexican workers. In contrast, the data indicate there were large effects among Mexicans who were deported. Mexicans who were deported just after the election were 20 percent less likely to report (in Mexico) that they would return to the U.S., compared to those deported just prior to the election.

In addition, we also show that U.S. apprehensions at the border went down dramatically immediately following the election, a result driven primarily by reduced border crossing by Central Americans in the year following the election. Additional findings confirm this, as data on migration into Mexico demonstrate that the number of Central American migrants destined for the U.S. fell dramatically following the election. We interpret this as evidence the election reduced the migration of Central Americans to the U.S.—at least for a year—even while it had little effect on the overall inflow of undocumented Mexican workers.

These results demonstrate that different populations can respond to changes in expected immigration costs to stark changes in expected immigration policy and rhetoric can differ significantly. In particular, the absence of an overall impact on the migration decisions of undocumented workers from Mexico—and the apparently temporary nature of the effect on Central Americans—highlights how large the perceived marginal benefits from immigrating to the U.S. are.

2. Data and Methods

Much of our data are from the Surveys of Migration across Mexican Borders (EMIF). The EMIF consists of two surveys, the Survey of Migration to the Northern Border of Mexico (EMIF Norte) and the Survey of Migration to the Southern Border of Mexico (EMIF Sur).

EMIF Norte is a cross-sectional survey conducted by Mexican authorities with the objective of measuring a representative sample of the flow of Mexican migrants across the US-Mexico border.

² For example, researchers have examined the effect of enforcement policies such as Arizona SB 1070 (Amuedo-Dorrantes and Lozano 2015; Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman, 2017), E-Verify (Bohn, Lofstrom, and Raphael, 2014), IRCA (Bansak and Raphael, 2001; Lowell, Teachman, and Jing, 1995; Orreinus and Zavodny, 2003), post 9/11 enforcement measures (Orreinus and Zavodny, 2009), INS monitoring strategies (Davila and Pagan, 1997), border enforcement (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999; and local enforcement of federal immigration law (Watson, 2013).

It is conducted in eight border cities. Subjects are interviewed in different zones, including bus stations, train stations, international bridges, and customs inspection points. Importantly, the National Population Council estimates that 94 percent of the total border crossings occur through locations covered by the EMIF (Consejo Nacional de Poblacion 2013). This study uses the surveys of those who intend to cross the border into the United States within the next 30 days, as well as those of return migrants who were deported from the United States back to Mexico. These data consist of individual-level observations, though when looking at total flows we aggregate the data to the monthly level. Importantly, all of the survey respondents are Mexican citizens.

In addition, we use data from EMIF Sur, a cross-sectional survey administered by Mexican authorities on Mexico's southern border. EMIF Sur measures the flows of immigrants across the Guatemala-Mexico border and the flow of immigrants deported by U.S. and Mexican immigration authorities to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. In particular, we use data on the monthly number of individuals from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala who report being destined for the United States but are deported by Mexico back to their home countries. Importantly, individuals from these countries make up the vast majority of Central Americans migrating to the United States through Mexico. In addition, we note that in contrast to the U.S., Mexico deports individuals they apprehend very quickly; the mean time of detention is 5.8 days and the median is 4 days. This means that deportations provide us with a good proxy of immigration flows of Central Americans through Mexico to the United States.

Finally, we also use data on the total number of apprehensions by U.S. border patrol along the southwestern border with Mexico. These data include the total number of apprehensions made along the border, aggregated to the monthly level.

These data offer several advantages for examining the effect of the 2016 election on illegal migration. The most important advantage is they enable us to assess the impact on the flow of workers across the border. As a result, we can avoid inferring changes in migration based on changes to the stock of a population, as measured by U.S. surveys such as the Current Population Survey. In addition, these data enable us to assess directly the impact of the election on those known to not have legal permission to work in the United States. This is true because the EMIF specifically asks individuals whether they have permission—94 percent state they do not—and because 98.3 percent of immigrants in the U.S. apprehension data lack legal documentation.

To estimate effects on the flow of undocumented workers from Mexico to the U.S., we estimate the following event study model:

$$(1) \quad \ln(Migrants)_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PostElection_t + \beta_2 TimeTrend_t + \varepsilon_t$$

where $\ln(Migrants)_t$ is the natural log of the number of migrants heading to the U.S. (or apprehended in the U.S. or Mexico) in month t , and $PostElection_t$ is an indicator equal to one if the month was November of 2016 or later. $TimeTrend_t$ is a linear time trend, though we also show estimates without this variable when there is no clear time trend in the pre-election period. The coefficient of interest is β_1 , which captures the change in log migration after the election relative to before. The identifying assumption is that absent the unexpected outcome of the 2016 presidential election, the (linear) trend in migration or apprehensions would have continued. The primary way in which we assess this assumption is by examining the extent to which immigration followed a linear trend in the years prior. In addition, in other specifications we also include calendar month fixed effects and controls for U.S. unemployment rates.

Finally, we note that while this is a relatively simple research design, we believe it is appropriate in this setting for two reasons. First, as discussed earlier, the “treatment” in this setting—the change in expected immigration policy and rhetoric due to Trump’s 2016 election win—was both large and unexpected. There is little question a Trump presidency was expected to be much different with respect to border enforcement and immigration than a Clinton presidency – or for that matter, nearly any other presidency in recent decades. And as discussed earlier, Trump was a longshot to win. Second, one can reasonably expect our outcome—the flow of unauthorized immigrants across the border—to be impacted within weeks if not days of the election, if the prospect of a Trump presidency were in fact a deterrent. That is because this population had not yet set up residence in the U.S., and had not yet even attempted the costly and uncertain border crossing. As a result, they in a good position to change their minds if they wanted to. In contrast, while other undocumented immigrant populations such as those already in the U.S could well be impacted by the prospect of a Trump presidency, it is much less clear that they would respond similarly quickly. This makes detecting effects much more difficult than it is when examining inflows, as we do here.

3. Results

We begin by addressing the question of how the election affected the flow of undocumented workers from Mexico into the U.S. Results are shown graphically in Figure 1, which reveals a steady decline in the number of EMIF survey respondents who state they intend to cross the border with the

U.S. in the next 90 days. The vertical line corresponds to the election on November 8, 2016. Importantly, there is no evidence of a break in trend following the election, suggesting that the unexpected presidency of Donald Trump had little effect on migration rates. Corresponding estimates are in Table 3. The first column controls only for a linear time trend, while columns 2 and 3 add month fixed effects and controls for U.S. unemployment rates. Estimates are 0.059, 0.068, and -0.01, respectively; none are significant at conventional levels. In short, there is little evidence the election reduced the inflow of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico. This result is striking given both the content and tone of the Trump candidacy as it relates to illegal immigration.³

We also ask whether the election impacted the subset of undocumented immigrants for whom the change in political climate might be most salient: those who were detained and deported back to Mexico. Results are shown in Figure 2, where the outcome is the stated intention to re-emigrate to the U.S.⁴ Panel A shows results for all deportees to Mexico, and shows that while re-emigration rates were roughly constant at around 25 – 30 percent in the 2+ years prior to the election, they fell dramatically immediately following the election to around 15 – 20 percent. In order to ensure this finding is not driven by a change in the composition of those who are deported, in Panels B and C we show results for only those who were detained prior to November 8, 2016 (i.e., election day) or prior to the inauguration on January 20, 2017.⁵ In both cases, re-emigration rates are steady prior to the election at 25 to 35 percent, but drop off dramatically to 10 – 15 percent immediately following the election. Corresponding estimates are shown in Table 4, where Panel A shows results for all deportees. Columns 1 – 3 show estimates without a linear time trend while adding month fixed effects (column 2) and unemployment rates (column 3). Columns 4 – 6 show estimates from similar specifications that include a linear time trend. Estimates range between -4.6 and -7.0 percentage points, all of which are significant at the one percent level and represent a decline of approximately 20 percent relative to the pre-election mean. In Panel B, we show that this estimate is not driven by changes in sample composition by examining only the reentry rates of those who were detained prior to Trump’s inauguration. Estimates are somewhat larger, ranging from -5.5 to -8.6 percentage points, all of which

³ In appendix Figure A1, we show results separately by first-time and repeat migrants, and show there is little effect for either subgroup.

⁴ Importantly, Figure A2 shows the number of deportations remained roughly constant prior the election. This, along with the fact that individuals are detained for long periods of time in the U.S. before being deported, suggests it is unlikely any immediate effect following the election could be due to a change in composition, rather than to the election itself.

⁵ We believe it is unlikely that a change in composition of those deported could drive effects. That is in part because those who are deported from the U.S. are often detained for weeks or months, and so any change in composition would take much longer to show up in the data. In addition, the election itself did not change policy. Instead, it signaled that immigration policy could well change in the following months or years.

are again significant at the one percent level.⁶ In addition, we note we see no evidence of such an effect from the 2014 election, the only previous election for which we have data.⁷

Next, we address the question of whether the election affected illegal immigration by examining data on apprehensions from U.S. Border Patrol. The advantage of these data is that they capture actual crossings by undocumented workers. The disadvantage is that they are necessarily capturing changes in crossings as well as potential changes in enforcement. While this is of minimal concern during the period after the election but before the inauguration – and possibly even for several months after that given policy changes take time – it could be a larger issue for longer time horizons.

We begin by showing the data graphically in Figure 3, where Panel A shows results for total apprehensions and Panel B shows results by region of origin. Results in Panel A indicate there was a large, abrupt decline in apprehensions beginning around January, 2017, though the apprehension rate began to increase again around May 2017 and appeared to return to the pre-election trend by the summer of 2018. Corresponding estimates in Table 5 indicate declines of 39 to 47 percent for models without a linear time trend (columns 1 – 3), and declines of 49 to 57 percent in models with the trend (columns 4 – 6). All six estimates are significant at the five percent level, and five of the six are significant at the one percent level. Estimates also indicate that in the second year after the election – from November 2017 to October of 2018 – the number of apprehensions had returned to pre-election levels (columns 1 – 3) or to trend (columns 4 – 6).

Additionally, Panel B of Figure 3 shows that this reduction in apprehensions at the U.S. border seemed to be driven primarily by a reduction in immigration of Central Americans. In particular, Panel B of Figure 3 shows that while the trend in apprehensions of Central Americans was increasing prior to the election, it dropped off dramatically for the next seven months before steadily increasing one to two years following the election. In addition, we note that the drop in border apprehensions in the months following the 2016 election was exactly the opposite of the typical seasonal pattern. This is shown in Online Appendix Figure A3. It shows that while apprehensions usually rise in the spring, peaking in March (which corresponds to the growing season), following the 2016 election

⁶ In Table 4 we restrict the sample to January 2014 through December 2017 so that we can keep the sample consistent across Panels A and B. A shorter horizon is necessary for Panel B, which restrict to the deportations of those who were detained prior to Trump's inauguration. We note that estimates in columns 4 – 6 of Panel A are nearly identical to those from the longer sample that extends through 2018, which are -0.0499, -0.0535, and -0.0623, respectively.

⁷ Estimates corresponding to the estimates of -0.0495, -0.0517, and -0.0546 in columns 4 – 6 of Panel A of Table 4 are 0.0068, 0.008, and -0.0328 when using data from January of 2013 through November of 2016; none are significant at the 10 percent level.

apprehensions fell before bottoming out in March and April of 2017. This provides further evidence the decline is not driven by seasonality.

In order to assess whether the decline in apprehensions shown in Panel A of Table 3 is due to a reduction in migration of Central Americans, we also examine data on the number of Central Americans deported by Mexico. Results are shown graphically in Figure 4, which shows large, abrupt declines in the number of deportations from Mexico to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. However, consistent with the data on U.S. border apprehensions shown in Figure 3, much of the post-election decline in Figure 4 seemed to dissipate two years after the election. Corresponding estimates are shown in Table 6. Estimates indicate a reduction of 1.0 to 1.1 log points, and all are significant at the one percent level. This represents a reduction from around 7,000 immigrants per month to a low of 2,000, with levels returning to around 7,000 two years after the election. We note, however, that the persistence of this decline depends entirely on whether one assumes the pre-election trend was increasing, as fit by the model estimated in Table 6, or if one believes instead that the reversion to 2016 levels implied the effect was temporary. Our own interpretation is that while there is strong evidence of a large decline following the election, we are more agnostic about whether this was temporary, which we view as probable, or persistent, which we view as possible.

Finally, we note that the reduction in migration of undocumented Central Americans and deported Mexicans is also consistent with the dramatic reduction in the number of individuals who arrived at the southwest US border seeking humanitarian protection under U.S. law. These are individuals formally classified as “inadmissible aliens” and include those who are encountered at the southwest U.S. ports of entry seeking lawful admission into the United States, but are either determined to be inadmissible or withdraw their application and return to their country of origin. This result is shown in Figure 5, with corresponding estimates in Online Appendix Table A1. Results indicate the number of inadmissibles at the U.S. border fell by around 60 percent following the election, and persisted for at least two years.

In summary, results indicate that despite the fact that the 2016 election resulted in the unexpected win of a candidate who made border enforcement a focal point of his campaign—and did it in an arguably hostile way—it had little effect on overall illegal immigration by Mexican citizens. In contrast, we do see reductions for two groups: a persistent reduction in the reentry rates of those deported back to Mexico, and at least a temporary reduction among unauthorized immigrants from Central America.

4. Conclusion

While there has been much interest in understanding the determinants of immigration—including and especially illegal immigration—previous work has focused on the impact of factors such as economic conditions and specific immigration policies. In contrast, little was known about the impact of the recent wave of provocative anti-immigration politicians in general, or Donald Trump in particular. In this paper, we examine how the surprise 2016 election of Donald Trump and the corresponding change in expected immigration policy and rhetoric impacted illegal immigration flows into the United States.

Results provide evidence of a mixed response. On the one hand, there is little evidence that the election of Donald Trump reduced the overall inflow of undocumented Mexicans. This is surprising given the hostility that President Trump had shown throughout his campaign toward unauthorized immigrants in general, and to those from Mexico in particular. The lack of an overall response suggests the expected costs to unauthorized immigrants even under President Trump were small relative to the benefits of working in the United States. However, we do find the election reduced reentry among Mexican immigrants deported from the U.S. Estimates indicate those deported just after the election stated they were 20 percent less likely to reenter the U.S. than those who were deported just before the election. In addition, apprehension data from the U.S. Border Patrol and deportation data from Mexico indicate that the election led to a dramatic, but likely temporary reduction in illegal immigration of Central Americans to the United States.

Collectively, these findings indicate that while the 2016 Trump election did not deter illegal immigration by Mexican nationals, it did deter illegal immigration by Central Americans, at least temporarily. The election also generated a persistent 20 percent reduction in intended re-entry rates among Mexican citizens who were deported. This mixed response highlights how sensitivity to a broad shift in immigration policy and rhetoric can differ across immigrant populations. In addition, the lack of a broad and sustained impact on unauthorized migration flows demonstrates how large the expected benefits are relative to the expected costs for the marginal migrant, and highlights the limits of policy in reducing illegal immigration.

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
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
Figures

Figure 1: Number of illegal border crossings by Mexican citizens into the U.S. (EMIF)




Notes: Figure 1 shows the log of the number of survey respondents to the EMIF who state they intend to cross the border into the U.S. and do not have documentation to work legally in the U.S. The vertical line represents the November 8, 2016 election.


Figure 2: Intention to re-emigrate to the U.S. after deportation to Mexico
 Panel A: All deportees to Mexico



Panel B: Deportees who were detained prior to Election Day, November 8, 2016:




Panel C: Deportees who were detained prior to January 20, 2017




Notes: Each figure shows the proportion of deported Mexican citizens who state that they intend to return to the United States. The vertical line represents the November 8, 2016 election. Panel a shows data from January 2014 through October 2018, while panels b and c show data from January 2014 through October 2017.

Figure 3: Border apprehensions along the southwest U.S. border
 Panel A: Total Apprehensions by U.S. Border Patrol




Panel B: Apprehensions of undocumented migrants from Mexico and Central America




Notes: Panel A shows all apprehensions by U.S. border patrol along the southwest border with Mexico. Apprehensions refer to the physical control or temporary detainment of a person who is not lawfully in the U.S., which may or may not result in arrest. The break in the line is due to missing data for those time periods.

Figure 4: Log of Central Americans destined for the U.S. who were deported by Mexico.



Notes: Figure 4 shows the natural log of the number of individuals from Central America who were destined for the U.S. but deported by Mexico. Mexico deports individuals quickly after apprehension; the average time from apprehension to deportation is 5.8 days, and the median time is 4 days.

Figure 5: Inadmissible aliens along southwest U.S. border (U.S. Border Patrol)



Notes: Inadmissible aliens are individuals encountered at ports of entry who are seeking lawful admission into the United States, such as those seeking humanitarian protection under U.S. law, but are determined to be inadmissible or withdraw an application and return to their country or origin. The vertical line represents the November 8, 2016 election.

Tables

Table 1 – Summary Statistics I: Undocumented immigrants from Mexico with intention to enter the U.S.

Undocumented Immigrants with Intention to Enter the United States			
	All	First Time Migrants	With Migration Experience
Age	34.181 (13.88)	33.659 (14.16)	36.941 (11.98)
Years of schooling	8.209 (3.45)	8.291 (3.51)	7.777 (3.07)
No Education	0.027	0.165	0.020
Primary Education (1-6th grade)	0.333	0.467	0.391
Secondary Education (7th-12th grade)	0.386	0.488	0.361
Tertiary Education	0.255	0.438	0.228
Male	0.804	0.404	0.851
Married	0.591	0.494	0.673
Speaks English	0.205	0.356	0.498
Prior migration experience	0.159	No	Yes
Observations	26,321	21,004	5,317
Sum of weights	715,644	601,782	113,862

Notes: This table shows data on all undocumented immigrants from Mexico who intended to cross into the United States within 90 days.

Source: EMIF

Table 2 – Summary Statistics II – Immigrants Deported by the U.S. and Mexico, by Country of Origin

	Mexicans Deported by	Central Americans Deported by		
	U.S. Authorities	Mexican Authorities		
	Mexico	Guatemala	Honduras	El Salvador
Re-migrate in the future	0.430	0.527	0.803	0.768
Age	30.857 (9.284)	27.388 (7.810)	27.211 (7.240)	27.832 (8.310)
Years of schooling	8.213 (2.94)	6.073 (3.30)	6.446 (2.85)	8.388 (3.62)
No Education	0.03	0.096	0.056	0.041
Primary Education (1-6th grade)	0.267	0.554	0.619	0.237
Secondary Education (7th-12th grade)	0.475	0.231	0.227	0.33
Tertiary Education	0.228	0.119	0.098	0.391
Male	0.884	0.84	0.828	0.747
Married	0.511	0.486	0.402	0.394
Speaks English	0.274	0.019	0.008	0.027
Worked in US	0.315	-	-	-
Left children in US	0.017	-	-	-
Prior migration experience	1	0.04	0.212	0.102
Traveling with children	-	0.054	0.04	0.107
Observations	21,539	8,739	9,040	15,863
Sum of weights	932,311	128,152	212,578	92,549

Notes: The first column shows summary statistics for citizens of Mexico who were deported by the U.S. The last three columns show summary statistics for citizens of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador who were destined for the U.S. and deported by Mexico. Individuals from these countries make up the vast majority of individuals deported by Mexico. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Table 3: The Effect of the 2016 Trump Election on Inflow of Unauthorized Immigrants from Mexico

Log Undocumented Immigrants with Intention to Enter the United States	(1)	(2)	(3)
After election (November 8, 2016- September 2017)	0.0592 (0.1325)	0.0681 (0.1373)	-0.0087 (0.2198)
Linear trend	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for unemployment rates	No	No	Yes
Observations	69	69	69

Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Table 4 – The Effect of the 2016 Trump Election on Reentry Rates among Mexican Immigrants Deported by US Authorities

Intention to reenter within 90 days	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Full Sample						
After election (November 8, 2016-October 2017)	-0.0691*** (0.0104)	-0.0700*** (0.0104)	-0.0463*** (0.0146)	-0.0495*** (0.0145)	-0.0517*** (0.0158)	-0.0546*** (0.0204)
Observations	18,121	18,121	18,121	18,121	18,121	18,121
Panel B: Detained before Trump's Inauguration						
After election (November 8, 2016-October 2017)	-0.0765*** (0.0142)	-0.0846*** (0.0149)	-0.0556*** (0.0204)	-0.0557*** (0.0172)	-0.0644*** (0.0195)	-0.0743*** (0.0256)
Observations	15,099	15,099	15,099	15,099	15,099	15,099
Linear trend	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for unemployment rates	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Notes: Panel A shows effects for the full sample of deported immigrants, while Panel B shows results only for the sample of immigrants who were detained prior to the inauguration of President Trump. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Data are from January, 2014 through October, 2017.

*** denotes statistical significance at the one percent level.

Table 5: The Effect of the 2016 Trump Election on Log U.S. Border Apprehensions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Logarithm of Apprehensions					
Year after election	-0.4658***	-0.4658***	-0.3919**	-0.5019***	-0.4864***	-0.5651***
(November 8, 2016-October 2017)	(0.1256)	(0.1451)	(0.1562)	(0.1413)	(0.1544)	(0.1896)
Second year after election	0.0973	0.0913	0.1025	0.0487	0.0636	-0.2212
(November 2017-December 2018)	(0.0690)	(0.0618)	(0.1018)	(0.0974)	(0.0851)	(0.1775)
Linear trend	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for unemployment rates	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	84	84	84	84	84	84
R-squared	0.2917	0.3646	0.4197	0.2938	0.3653	0.4436

Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

** and *** denote statistical significance at the five and one percent levels, respectively.

Table 6: The Effect of the 2016 Trump Election on Log Deportations by Mexico of Central Americans Destined for the U.S.

Dependent variable: Log of Deportees from Mexico to Central America	(1)	(2)	(3)
Year after election (November 8, 2016-October 2017)	-1.0923*** (0.0937)	-1.0711*** (0.1032)	-1.0570*** (0.1198)
Second year after election (November 2017-December 2018)	-1.0342*** (0.1272)	-1.0052*** (0.1167)	-1.0749*** (0.1745)
Linear trend	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for unemployment rates	No	No	Yes
Observations	244	244	244

Notes: The sample includes all deportees by Mexico of citizens from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador who are destined for the U.S. Each column represents a different regression.

*** denotes statistical significance at the one percent level.

Online Appendix

Online Appendix Figures

Figure A1a: Number of illegal border crossings into the U.S. among first-time migrants




Figure A1b: Number of illegal border crossings into the U.S. among those with prior migration experience




Figure A2: Total number of deportations to Mexico (EMIF)





Figure A3 – U.S. Border Apprehensions in the year before and after U.S. elections, for the 2000 – 2014 elections and the 2016 election



The dashed line shows the log number of border apprehensions along the southwest U.S. border, averaged across each election from 2000 through 2014. The solid line shows the same for the 2016 election. To the left of the solid line is the year of the election; to the right is the last month of the election year and the 12 months of the following year.

Online Appendix Tables

Table A1: The Effect of the 2016 Trump Election on Log Inadmissible Aliens

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Log of Inadmissible Aliens			
Year after election (November 8, 2016-October 2017)	-0.6845*** (0.1396)	-0.6777*** (0.1290)	-0.6862*** (0.1405)
Second year after election (November 2017-December 2018)	-0.5606*** (0.0808)	-0.5688*** (0.0805)	-0.6808*** (0.1524)
Linear trend	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes
Controls for unemployment rates	No	No	Yes
Observations	84	84	84
R-squared	0.6213	0.6657	0.7216

Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** denotes statistical significance at the one percent level.