

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

DESIGNING AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:  
A RESEARCH AGENDA

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Working Paper 27914  
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w27914>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH  
1050 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
October 2020

We thank participants at the Princeton University IR Faculty Colloquium, the 13th annual conference on the Political Economy of International Organization, Simon Fraser University, and the Political Science Friday Speaker Series at the University of Colorado-Boulder for their helpful comments. We are particularly grateful to Duane Layton, Andrew Moravcsik, Krzysztof Pelc, Peter Rosendorff, Christina Schneider, David Steinberg, and Adalbert Winkler for their generous and constructive advice. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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Designing an International Economic Order: A Research Agenda  
Renee Bowen and J. Lawrence Broz  
NBER Working Paper No. 27914  
October 2020  
JEL No. A11,F02,F13,F5,F51,F52,F53,F55,F6,H1,H4,K12,K33

### **ABSTRACT**

The institutions that have sustained global economic cooperation for the past 75 years are under threat. Despite admonitions that global peace and prosperity are at risk, policymakers in important countries have ignored the rules of the multilateral order and moved down the path of unilateralism and economic nationalism. What role can social scientists play in redesigning the international economic order? We offer a research agenda for contributing to the reform and improvement of global institutions. The research agenda is guided by three themes: threats, solutions, and leadership. Threats refer to the deep causes of the crisis in global institutions, not the symptoms or expressions of those problems. Solutions refers to institutional reforms required to address deep threats to the global order. Leadership addresses the challenge of coordinating efforts to supply international institutions, which can be thought of as global public goods. We demonstrate the value of this research agenda by applying it to the World Trade Organization.

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# 1 Introduction

The international organizations that have sustained global economic cooperation since 1944 are under threat. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is in danger of losing legitimacy as important member countries ignore its rules and move down the path of unilateralism and economic nationalism (Bown and Irwin, 2019). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have been weakened by divisions among members over governance and conditionality, leading China to launch its own global institutions, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Despite admonitions that global peace and prosperity are at risk, scholars of international organization have not defined a clear research agenda for responding to the mounting challenges that face the international economic order. While there has been substantial scholarship about various aspects of international institutions, a coherent body of research does not yet exist pointing to how international organizations might be reformed and coordinated in order to maintain and enhance global economic cooperation. In this paper, we develop a research agenda to fill this gap.

*Prima facie*, such an agenda appears to be a daunting task, but we present an approach that we believe is tractable. We begin by identifying significant threats to globalization that have presented themselves in recent history. For example, populism and the emergence of new economic powers are threats to the current liberal international economic order (Frieden, 2019; Nye, 2017). For each salient threat, solutions may have been proposed in popular discourse, policy circles or the academic literature (Bacchetta et al., 2019; Scheve and Slaughter, 2018). The second step is thus to identify proposed solutions to each threat and determine the degree of academic consensus on the efficacy of the solution, if any such consensus exists. Finally, in the absence of a benevolent social planner to act on behalf of the community of nations, the question of implementation of solutions becomes salient. Who should implement these solutions and how? This raises the question of leadership in international economic relations and the role it plays in building consensus for reforms at both the domestic and international levels. Redesigning globalization is a tall order. But modifying existing institutions is possible. This simple framework—threats, solutions, and leadership—is designed to help organize research on international economic order.

Economic globalization rests on a foundation of international and regional institutions constructed in the aftermath of the second World War. Pressures have been building within these institutions for a long time—before populist politicians and political parties gained ascendance

in the United States and Europe. Indeed, the current crisis of globalization, can be understood as the consequence of the failure to respond to weaknesses and tensions in global institutions, not the cause of such tensions.

To illustrate, consider the WTO crisis centered on the Appellate Body. Countries currently have the right to appeal to the WTO's Appellate Body if they disagree with a preliminary panel ruling. But the United States has refused to allow the appointment of new Appellate Body members as old members' terms expire. The Appellate Body now does not have enough members to issue rulings on appeals. This could end the WTO's system of resolving disputes and lead to rampant unilateralism and protectionism (Bown, 2019).

The reason the current U.S. administration is blocking the appointment of judges to the Appellate Body is that the United States (and some other WTO members) believe that the Appellate Body oversteps its authority (United States Trade Representative, 2018; Payosova et al., 2018). This long-standing complaint about judicial overreach is, in turn, rooted in the failure of WTO members to negotiate updates to WTO rules in areas that were left vague, as with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. In other words, the crisis at the WTO is not driven by the disruptive policy actions of a single administration, as it may seem. Nor is it a problem with the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, which has earned a reputation as the "crown jewel" of the global trading system for successfully resolving hundreds of trade disputes. Rather, the crisis reflects the failure of members to clarify existing rules on trade remedies (see below), and to negotiate new rules for members with state capitalist economies, like China. Clearer rules are needed on trade remedies, and new rules are needed for China. But members have not been able to find consensus in these areas since the WTO agreement went into effect in 1995. By consequence, the Appellate Body has been left to render its decisions based on a set of ambiguous and incomplete rules, which provokes controversy.

We suggest that the crisis over appointment of Appellate Body judges is a symptom of the failure to modernize WTO agreements over the past 25 years. The 2018 U.S.-China trade war is also a symptom of the failure of systematic WTO reform. Frustrated by years of fruitless efforts to modernize WTO rules through negotiation, the U.S. imposed \$50 billion of new tariffs on steel and aluminum imports on national security grounds in 2018, claiming that the action did not require WTO review or approval (Bown, 2019). Then the U.S. retaliated against China without going through the WTO's dispute resolution process, imposing tariffs of \$250 billion on Chinese imports. While these unilateral actions contravened WTO rules that require a member to win a dispute before acting against another member (and then, within strict limits,

and only if the member refuses to change its policies), the U.S. claimed that it had run out of WTO-consistent options, citing problems with Appellate Body overreach (United States Trade Representative, 2018).

The U.S. complaint that the Appellate Body is creating law rather than enforcing established rights and obligations stems from a long history of Appellate Body decisions challenging U.S. “trade remedies” —anti-dumping, subsidy, and safeguard measures that protect domestic industries from import competition. Since 1995, the Appellate Body has issued numerous rulings condemning U.S. trade remedies, including safeguards on imported steel. In anti-dumping, the U.S. has lost dozens of WTO cases involving “zeroing,” an approach to calculating anti-dumping tariffs that is strongly biased in favor of more and higher anti-dumping duties (Bown and Prusa, 2011).

The Appellate Body also affirmed a panel ruling that outlawed a U.S. policy, known as the “Byrd Amendment,” that transferred tax revenues from anti-dumping duties directly to the domestic firms that had petitioned for relief. The U.S. was aggrieved because “no provision in the WTO Agreement limits how a WTO Member might choose to make use of the funds collected through anti-dumping and countervailing duties”(United States Trade Representative, 2018, 24). The broader U.S. concern is that Appellate Body rulings routinely constrain its ability to use the agreement’s “escape clause” (trade remedies) to protect politically sensitive domestic industries and jobs that the U.S. deems important. This issue became even more prominent with China’s accession into the WTO in 2001 (United States Trade Representative, 2018).

The current trade war, as well as the stalemate over the appointment of new judges to the Appellate Body, are symptoms of deeper problems in the international economic order. If global capitalism is in trouble, the trouble lies with international institutions and the deeper threats that they face. For the remainder of the paper we cover the three themes and identify the areas of research we see as critical.

## **2 Threats**

Threats are the deeper problems in global institutions, not the symptoms or expressions of those problems. The purpose of an initial diagnosis is to establish a relationship between the underlying threat and its outward expression as a current crisis. In this note, we suggest that the three major threats to the current international economic order are: (1) populism; (2) state-

controlled economies; and (3) national security. For illustration, we focus on the populism threat.

Populist politicians appeal to disaffected voters by posing a stark trade-off between international institutions and national sovereignty. For example, “Take Back Control” was the alluring slogan of the Brexit campaign to leave the European Union while in Italy, Luigi Di Maio of the Five Star Movement spoke of “continuous attacks... from Eurocrats.”<sup>1</sup> In the case of the United States, President Donald Trump vowed before the United Nations General Assembly that “We will never surrender America’s sovereignty to an unaccountable, unelected global bureaucracy. . . We reject the ideology of globalism.”<sup>2</sup>

Two decades ago, economist Dani Rodrik recognized that *international economic integration* and *national sovereignty* are two elements of an irreconcilable “political trilemma of the world economy” (Rodrik, 2000, 180). The third element is *democracy*, which Rodrik referred to as “mass politics.” According to Rodrik, governments can combine any two of these three elements but can never have all three simultaneously. By “international economic integration” Rodrik was referring to reductions in national barriers to trade and capital flows, and the international rules and institutions that help countries sustain these reductions. His term “nation-state” referred to the independent sovereign authority of states to make and administer laws within their territories, while “mass politics” directs attention to democratic political systems in which the franchise is unrestricted, societal actors are highly mobilized, and politicians and political institutions are responsive to mobilized groups (Rodrik, 2000, 180-81).

Rodrik’s insight—which can serve as a useful heuristic for analyzing the populist threat to international institutions—is that global economic integration, national sovereignty and democracy are not attainable simultaneously. Nations can combine any two of these elements but must sacrifice the third. For example, when nation-states pursue deep international economic integration, they face a trade-off. They can retain their national sovereignty and make the pursuit of global economic integration their overriding policy objective. But this choice is incompatible with mass politics because democracies must be responsive to pressures from the workers and the firms that are harmed by globalization. The other alternative is for nation-states to pool their

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<sup>1</sup>The “Take Back Control” campaign website is at <http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org>. Luigi Di Maio was quoted in “Italy’s Populists aim to Challenge EU on Debt and Migrants.” 16 May 2018. *BBC News*. Available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44136218>

<sup>2</sup>“Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly.” 25 September 2018. Available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-United-Nations-General-Assembly-New-York-NY/>.

sovereignty in a “global federation” that tailors mass politics to the needs of global markets. With this choice, as approximated in the Eurozone, mass politics is retained at the level of the federation, but the powers of nation-states are severely circumscribed by supranational rules and authorities.

We take Rodrik’s trilemma as our point of departure for studying the populist threat to international economic institutions. However, we do not conceptualize the trilemma as a stark choice of picking only two elements and none of the third. In geometric terms, that would mean selecting a point in a triangle, and forcing that point to be on the edge of the triangle. Instead, we emphasize that the point can be in the *interior* of the triangle, giving some weight (but not full weight) to all three elements. This allows us to conceptualize populism as a movement that seeks to *re-weight* the elements of the trilemma.

Figure 1 presents a stylized version of the trilemma weights for the European Union, the United States, and China at various points in time. The box on the right identifies three *institutional* developments that altered the weights of the elements in the trilemma, and the arrows suggest the direction of the change in weights implied by these institutional developments.




Figure 1: Global institutions, Rodrik’s “trilemma of the world economy”, and the democracy constraint

The Single European Act of 1986 (SEA)—which combined comprehensive liberalization of the European market with institutional reforms to streamline decision-making, such as qualified majority voting—accelerated economic integration and shifted sovereignty from nation-states to European decision-making institutions (Moravcsik, 1991). As noted in Figure 1 by the trajectory of the EU arrow, the SEA increased the weight on economic integration, decreased national

sovereignty, but retained democracy at the European level.

For the U.S., the Uruguay Round Agreement extended trade liberalization to new areas and established the WTO and its powerful Appellate Body in 1995. These changes contributed to a substantial increase in U.S. integration with the world economy as illustrated in Figure 1. But deeper integration came at the cost of a moderate loss of sovereignty (through the establishment of Appellate Body) and, a loss of democracy (by inadequately responding to losers of integration). Consequently, U.S. politicians faced a backlash from voters and organized groups that were harmed by global integration. This is denoted by the U.S. arrow approaching the “democratic constraint.”

In contrast to the U.S., where low-skilled workers and protectionists mounted challenges to global economic integration (Broz et al., 2020), and western Europe, where populists attacked the EU for eroding the power of nation-states (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), China saw little domestic reaction to its embrace of globalization after it entered the WTO in 2001. As Figure 1 illustrates, China is less constrained by “mass politics” due to its single-party authoritarian political system than is the U.S. and the EU. For example, there was hardly any domestic backlash to the sweeping commitments China made to open its economy in negotiations with the U.S. over WTO membership. There were, however, concerns that rising unemployment in sectors that shrank due to international competition might trigger greater government repression (Halverson, 2004).

If populism (or mass politics) is understood as an effort to reduce the weight on international economic integration, then it suggests that there is a limit to how far governments can move toward this node of the trilemma without triggering a political backlash. We call this limit the “democracy constraint” as illustrated in Figure 1. As nations engage in even deeper forms of economic integration beyond trade—to finance, and domestic regulations of various kinds—these adjustment costs rise, increasing the likelihood that exposed citizens and groups will mobilize against integration. Thus, in democracies, there is a limit to how high these adjustment costs can go before triggering a backlash against international economic integration.

Solutions to the threat of populism will thus involve institutional changes that either: 1) address the distribution of adjustment costs; 2) relax the democracy constraint; or 3) moderate the move towards integration. If the level of economic integration is kept below the “democracy constraint,” then a moderate form of economic integration should be politically and socially sustainable. In other words, it may be possible to redesign global institutions with *intermediate*



solutions that address the limited and specific grievances of populists. For example, current western European populists are not attacking the WTO; their grievances are with the EU.

To this end we ask, which specific areas of U.S. policymaking do populists want to claw back from the WTO and why? National sovereignty is the rallying cry of American populists, but precisely which WTO decisions and policies are causing this grievance, and which mobilized groups within the U.S. are behind the challenge? Relatedly, why do similar WTO decisions evoke different responses from different WTO members? For example, in the 1990s, the European Community used zeroing to calculate antidumping duties but ended the practice with little apparent controversy after the Appellate Body ruled that it was inconsistent with WTO rules. More generally, why are some WTO members more willing to delegate sovereignty to the WTO than others?

While there are detailed literatures on populism and on the WTO, they remain, for the most part, separate literatures. Scholars of trade policy explore how interest group and voter pressures are aggregated through domestic political institutions to shape trade policy outcomes (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Rodrik, 1995). But they neglect how WTO commitments and dispute settlement decisions constrain these outcomes. For their part, WTO experts explore interactions and among member states but neglect how those interactions are shaped and constrained by domestic political pressures within member countries.

We consider that this is an instance of the level-of-analysis problem in research on international institutions. Researchers use “tractability” as the justification to focus on one level of analysis to the exclusion of the other, which makes sense from a research design perspective. We submit, however, that responding to current threats to global economic institutions requires scholars to bring the two levels into a common analytical framework. To continue to do otherwise is to risk irrelevance.

## **2.1 Populism in the United States as a threat to the WTO**

We ask if populism is a threat to global economic cooperation, why might it manifest itself as an attack on the Appellate Body? To do this, we must first understand the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.

The WTO’s dispute settlement process begins when a member mounts a Complaint against another member for violating WTO rules. Next, the parties enter a Consultations phase where

they try to negotiate a mutually acceptable resolution of their dispute. About 60% of all disputes are settled via consultations—an obvious benefit since this avoids costly litigation. In the roughly 40% of cases that remain unresolved, the dispute goes to a Panel of Inquiry, where independent experts, who can't be from a country involved in the dispute, review evidence and then issue a ruling. If either side disagrees with the panel's ruling, they can request Appellate Review. Each appeal is heard by three members of a seven-member Appellate Body. Members of the Appellate Body have four-year terms and broadly represent the range of WTO members. The ruling they issue can uphold, modify or reverse a panel's findings; these Appellate Body reports are final and can only be blocked if all WTO members vote against them (as with panel rulings). The next phase involves implementation of the Appellate Body Report, which aims to bring the “losing” side's policies into conformity. The Appellate Body monitors and reviews compliance and, in the event of non-compliance, allows the complainant to impose retaliatory tariffs against the respondent that has failed to implement.

In the 2016 presidential campaign, candidate Donald Trump described the WTO as a “disaster” and threatened to pull the U.S. out of the organization if it interfered with his plan to impose penalties on U.S. companies that moved jobs offshore.<sup>3</sup> Once elected, President Trump began blocking the appointment of new Appellate Body members.<sup>4</sup> Figure 2 illustrates the WTO dispute settlement process, and the point at which the Trump administration has intervened. This action has crippled the WTO's system for enforcing its rules and opened the door to tit-for-tat trade wars (Hillman, 2018).

As of December 2019, for the first time, the Appellate Body did not have enough members to hear appeals. The absence of the Appellate Body means that members can now block dispute settlement proceedings by appealing panel reports “into the void.” WTO panels will continue to function as normal. But if either party to a dispute requests an appeal, the panel's report cannot be adopted, and the dispute will hang in legal limbo, effectively providing the loser with a veto. This rolls back dispute settlement to the era of the GATT, when any member could block a panel ruling by refusing to consent to it.

Scholars seeking to contribute to forging a new consensus on international institutions might try to understand why the United States is so frustrated with the WTO and the Appellate Body in particular.

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<sup>3</sup>*Meet the Press*, July 24, 2016, available at <https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706>.

<sup>4</sup>Only Congress has the authority to pull the U.S. out of the WTO.




Figure 2: The WTO Dispute Settlement Process. Source: The World Trade Organization, process abridged by Bloomberg

## 2.2 Is the WTO unfair to the United States?

We assess the rhetorical claim that the WTO is unfair to the United States. Figure 3 reports the “win-loss” record of the United States in WTO disputes between 1995 and 2016, as reported by the USTR.<sup>5</sup> The U.S. was the complainant in 108 disputes during this period, and it lost on the core issues only four times (4%), while winning on the core issues 46 times (42%) in litigation, and resolving to its satisfaction in consultations 29 times (27%). If we consider only the 79 U.S. complaints that were completed by the end of 2015, the U.S. has prevailed (in litigation and in consultations) 75 times (95%). By contrast, when the U.S. is the respondent, it loses most of the time. The U.S. was the respondent in 124 disputes to the end of 2015, and 97 of these disputes had worked their way through the dispute settlement process. Of these 97 completed disputes, the U.S. lost on the core issues 57 times (59%). So, it is inaccurate to say that the WTO is unfair to the United States. By the USTR’s own scorekeeping, the U.S. almost always wins the cases it brings against other WTO members, but it loses most of the cases that other members bring against it.

In most of the cases where the U.S. is the respondent, “trade remedies” are involved (Schott and Jung, 2019). Trade remedies are WTO-legal domestic policy tools that allow governments to impose tariffs on imports that are causing material injury to a domestic industry. They provide

<sup>5</sup>Compiled from data provided by the USTR’s “Snapshot of WTO Cases Involving the United States.” December 9, 2015. Available at <https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/overview-dispute-settlement-matters>.





Figure 3: United States “Win-Loss” Record in WTO Disputes, 1995-2016

an element of flexibility in trade agreements and serve as an “escape clause” so that members can be responsive to politically important constituencies when they need to be without abrogating their overall commitment to trade liberalization (Rosendorff and Milner, 2001; Pelc, 2016).

Figure 4 presents data on the 126 disputes where the U.S. was a respondent between 1995 and May 2016.<sup>6</sup> Trade remedies were the source of 74 (59%) of these WTO disputes, with

<sup>6</sup>Compiled from Hoekman, Bernard, Henrik Horn, Louise Johannesson and Petros C. Mavroidis. 2016. The WTO Dispute Settlement Data Set, 1995-2016. Available at: <https://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/research-project/wto-case-law-project/>

complaints about U.S. anti-dumping policies driving nearly half (49%) of all trade remedy disputes. Why are there so many U.S. trade remedy disputes at the WTO?




Figure 4: U.S. WTO Disputes as Respondent

The U.S. has long insisted on its right to use trade remedies when it negotiates trade agreements with other nations. In the Uruguay Round negotiations, the U.S. fought to insulate its trade remedies from challenges by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), obtaining a standard of review (Article 17.6) that imposes constraints on the DSB’s ability to override member governments’ interpretations of the facts in trade remedy cases. The U.S. also successfully prevented a strict prohibition on the practice of “zeroing” in calculating duties in anti-dumping proceedings, but the resulting compromise was vague, and left the door open to many subsequent WTO disputes about zeroing. According to Thomas Prusa, “zeroing has been the single most disputed issue at the WTO.”<sup>7</sup>

We argue that the main reason the United States has crippled the WTO is because the Appellate Body has consistently ruled against the U.S. for abusing trade remedies. These rulings affect a relatively small number of import-competing industries in the United States and less than one percent of all U.S. imports.<sup>8</sup> The research questions are thus: Why are the interests

<sup>7</sup>Thomas Prusa interviewed by Chad P. Bown and Soumaya Keynes. 2018. “Zeroing: The Biggest WTO Threat You’ve Never Heard Of.” Trade Talks podcast Episode 45, July 2. According to Prusa, there have been 30 WTO disputes involving zeroing, and 28 of these disputes involve the U.S. as a respondent.

<sup>8</sup>Chad P. Bown and Soumaya Keynes. 2018. “Zeroing: The Biggest WTO Threat You’ve Never Heard Of.”

of a narrow set of import-competing industries driving U.S. policy toward the WTO? And, why has the U.S. undermined dispute settlement when it wins more disputes than it loses? To address these questions, we encourage scholars to study the impact of WTO decision on politics within the United States. One salient topic, as we discuss below, is whether WTO rulings against the United States contributed to the election of Donald Trump.

### 2.3 Digging deeper: Zeroing and the United States discontent

Zeroing refers to a way of calculating anti-dumping duties that assigns a “zero” to all instances in which the export price of a product is higher than its price in the home market. Since dumping is defined as selling a product abroad for less than it sells for at home, zeroing virtually guarantees that U.S. administrative authorities find evidence of dumping, and impose higher AD duties when they do. Thus, zeroing increases trade protection. Since the U.S. uses zeroing on all its AD determinations, trade protection is higher than it would otherwise be. According to the best available evidence, “were the United States to stop zeroing, perhaps as much as half of all U.S. anti-dumping measures would be removed and the duties in the other cases would fall significantly” (Bown and Prusa, 2011, 360). For this reason, other WTO members that export to the U.S. have repeatedly challenged the U.S. for zeroing, and the Appellate Body has repeatedly ruled in their favor.

Trade remedies—and the esoteric issue of zeroing—appear to be the most important reason why the U.S. has crippled the WTO.<sup>9</sup> Using language that echoes Rodrik’s trilemma, the administration announced that “defending U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy” and “strictly enforcing U.S. trade laws” are its two top trade policy priorities.<sup>10</sup> The concern with “national sovereignty” refers *specifically* to Appellate Body rulings on zeroing—the U.S. position is that, since there is no explicit prohibition against zeroing, Appellate Body rulings against the prac-

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Trade Talks podcast Episode 45, July 2.

<sup>9</sup>According to Thomas Prusa, zeroing “is the single biggest reason behind the US’s current position toward slowing Appellate Body decisions.” Quoted in Chad P. Bown and Soumaya Keynes. 2018. “Zeroing: The Biggest WTO Threat You’ve Never Heard Of.” Trade Talks podcast Episode 45, July 2. This U.S. frustration has been around for years, but it took on greater urgency after China entered the WTO in 2001, as noted by the Trump administration in the President’s Trade Policy Agenda of 2017, prepared by the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Available at <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2017/2017-trade-policy-agenda-and-2016>.

<sup>10</sup>President’s Trade Policy Agenda of 2017, pp. 2-3. Available at <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2017/2017-trade-policy-agenda-and-2016>.

tice infringe on its sovereignty.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, the President’s trade policy agenda is unambiguous about the importance of trade remedies: “Trade remedies are a foundation to the implementation of the WTO agreement...it is critical that WTO members fully recognize their centrality to the international trading system.”<sup>12</sup>

Rodrik (2011, 252-59) proposed reforming the multilateral trade regime to provide nations with more policy space to accomplish their domestic objectives. This is broadly what recent U.S. administrations hope to accomplish by pressing the case for more flexibility on trade remedies. The key question for scholars is, why are trade remedies and zeroing so important to the United States?

We suggest two approaches to answering this question, each of which connects WTO decisions to U.S. domestic politics.: (1) the interest group approach, and (2) the electoral approach. The interest group approach is the mainstay of political economy research on redistributive trade policy, so we begin with it. But the electoral approach is also relevant since it emphasizes the impact of trade on election outcomes. If WTO constraints on trade remedies contributed to the election of Donald Trump, then perhaps there is an electoral basis for the priority the U.S. attaches to trade remedies.

### **2.3.1 The Interest Group Approach to Trade Remedies**

The central insight of the interest group approach is that the relative political influence of the winners and losers of trade protection largely determines trade policy outcomes (see Rodrik (1995) for a review). Interest group influence can take the form of campaign contributions, lobbying, or votes. If the beneficiaries of trade protection can organize to generate these resources more efficiently than the losers, then trade policy will be biased in their favor. Theoretical research supports the finding that the protection received by an industry is higher when it is organized—a function of the number and concentration of firms in the industry—and when its output is high relative to competing imports (Grossman and Helpman, 1994).

The challenge for the interest group approach is to explain why the import-competing bene-

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<sup>11</sup>Stephen Vaughn, former general counsel to the USTR, presents a clear statement of the Trump administration’s trade policy agenda in Chad P. Bown and Soumaya Keynes. 2018. “Trade Policy Under Trump.” Trade Talks podcast Episode 111, November 25. See also (Rushford 2018).

<sup>12</sup>*President’s Trade Policy Agenda of 2017*, pp. 2-3. Available at <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/reports-and-publications/2017/2017-trade-policy-agenda-and-2016>

ficiaries of trade remedies are now so influential that the U.S. is willing to mount an existential challenge to the WTO. The lobbies that back trade remedies—notably, the steel industry—have had disproportionate influence over U.S. trade policy in the past (Blustein, 2009, 114-17). What has changed? Are existing users of trade remedies applying more influence than they used to, or are opponents of trade remedies applying less countervailing pressure? Have new industries joined the fray and put their resources behind trade remedies? More fundamentally, what was the underlying shock that upset the domestic political balance on remedies? Did the rush of imports from China cause the relative influence of the domestic trade remedy lobby to increase?

These questions are amenable to theoretical and empirical research. Data are available to identify which industries utilize trade remedies and which industries do not, and how the distribution of industries changes over time (Bown, 2012). The instrumented “China Shock” measure provides good identification on the industries that were exposed to import competition from China (Autor et al., 2016). Granular data on campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures are readily available to measure the relative political influence of pro- and anti-remedy interest groups in the United States.<sup>13</sup> And legislative proposals in the U.S. Congress to amend U.S. trade remedy statutes provide opportunities for researchers to evaluate the interest group politics of trade remedies at the congressional level.<sup>14</sup>

Congressional proposals on trade remedies have occurred frequently over the years, largely in response to industry concerns that remedy procedures are not meeting their needs. Usually, these proposals aim to amend the criteria for determining injury to make it more likely that determinations will be made in favor of the petitioning industry.<sup>15</sup> Congress also focuses on trade remedy laws during trade agreement negotiations, and when it is considering extending Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to the president. In these instances, members of Congress make observable choices—co-sponsorship of proposals, roll-call voting on final passage—that indicate their support or opposition to trade remedies. We encourage research on interest group influences on congressional behavior regarding trade remedy legislation.

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<sup>13</sup>The Center for Responsive Politics at <https://www.opensecrets.org/> provides campaign contributions data. See (Kim, 2018) and (Bonica, 2016) for lobbying data.

<sup>14</sup>See, for example, (Cooper, 2002).

<sup>15</sup>See, for example, H.R.2523—The American Trade Enforcement Effectiveness Act—was supported by 46 co-sponsors in the 114th Congress (2015-2016) and incorporated into H.R.644, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (Public Law No: 114-125)



### 2.3.2 The Electoral Approach to Trade Remedies

Trade remedies provide WTO members with an escape clause to protect industries from sudden down-turns. Seen in this light, Appellate Body decisions against U.S. trade remedies may have reduced the ability of the U.S. to insulate politically important constituencies from import competition.

The research we propose complements the literature that links international trade to populist election outcomes in the United States and Europe (Autor et al., 2017a,b; Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015; Colantone and Stanig, 2018a,b; Becker et al., 2017; Malgouyres, 2017). This literature establishes that voters in areas harmed by import competition from China were more likely to vote for Donald Trump, right-wing extremist parties in Europe, and Brexit.

Our extension incorporates the WTO as a separate and distinct influence on populist voting. The flood of imports from China caused economic harm to communities where import-competing manufacturers are located. The WTO, in turn, limited the capacity of the U.S. government to cushion the shock. By constraining trade remedies when—and where—they were needed most, voters in exposed regions of the country may have been more likely to be persuaded by Trump’s economic nationalism. Trump won Michigan by 10,000 votes (0.23% margin), Pennsylvania by 67,000 votes (0.72%), and Wisconsin by 22,000 votes (0.77%). He also railed against China and the WTO when campaigning in these states. Given the spatial concentration of manufacturing in these states, our conjecture is that by taking away the escape clause, the WTO magnified the pressures of the China Shock, leaving voters in affected regions vulnerable to Trump’s nationalist rhetoric.

To investigate this conjecture, scholars should identify the products and industries that are affected by WTO rulings on trade remedies and then measure the regional exposure to these rulings across the United States. Given the tendency of industries to cluster in specific areas of the country, regional exposure to WTO rulings will vary, and can be measured by way of employment shares in the affected industries. Following Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2016), the expectation is that adverse WTO rulings will reverberate across the local labor market, affecting aggregate employment, wages, and labor market participation rates. These broader effects are important because they implicate voters in exposed regions, not just the directly affected industries and their lobbies.

We don’t expect adverse WTO rulings to have large *aggregate* effects on the 2016 presiden-

tial election. But we do expect WTO rulings to matter in regions suffering from high exposure to the China Shock. In other words, our conjecture is conditioned by regional exposure to import-competition from China. Furthermore, our electoral approach to trade remedies need not imply that the interest group approach to remedies is irrelevant—both forces may have contributed to current U.S. antagonism toward the WTO. Therefore, we encourage both types of research.

### 3 Solutions

Solutions refers to the institutional reforms that are needed to address threats to the liberal international order. For example, many solutions have been proposed to address the threat of populism—from investing in education, to reducing inequality, to providing a guaranteed minimum income to all citizens. But few solutions have been directed toward the international organizations that sustain global economic cooperation. This is a glaring omission.

The motivation for targeting reforms at international institutions is captured in the following syllogism: if populism is a threat to the global economic order, and if populism is at least in part a consequence of the free trade policies of the WTO, then reform of the WTO must be part of the solution to populism. Rodrik (2011, 252) noted that the major defect of the multilateral trade regime is its “lack of widespread support among ordinary people.” But few scholars have linked solutions to populism to reforms of the WTO. This is surprising because scholars fundamentally agree that the rapid expansion of international trade between developed and developing countries in recent decades would not have been possible without the WTO (Helpman et al., 2008; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; Tomz et al., 2007). They also agree that populist voting in developed countries is a reaction, in part, to the expansion of trade with developing countries (Autor et al., 2017a,b; Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015; Colantone and Stanig, 2018a,b; Becker et al., 2017; Malgouyres, 2017). Trade competition from low-wage developing countries, most notably China, has combined with technological change to devastate many OECD industries, with turbulent effects on local labor markets (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2016; Krugman, 2008).

It is increasingly clear that the current backlash against globalization is driven by economic grievances that implicate the WTO. We identify proposed solutions to the current WTO crisis and then suggest research questions that address the political economy of WTO reform.

### 3.1 Solutions to the Crisis at the WTO

To gain traction on the issues, we treat the WTO agreement of 1994 as an incomplete contract that bound negotiated tariffs and quotas but left significant discretion over trade remedies to national governments (e.g. Horn et al., 2010). The contract was incomplete for two reasons: First, at the time the WTO agreements were negotiated, members could not agree on how much discretion they should have with respect to trade remedies, so these provisions were vaguely worded. For its part, the U.S. explicitly refused to agree to negotiating proposals that would have prohibited zeroing. The resulting vagueness left room for the WTO adjudicating bodies to determine the actual degree of discretion which is why the U.S. is at loggerheads with the Appellate Body today. Second, the agreement was incomplete because it did not (and could not) anticipate China's entry into the WTO in 2001, and the subsequent import surge that decimated manufacturing industries and local labor markets in the United States (Autor et al., 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2016). The link to trade remedies is that, previously, the U.S. had designated China a "non-market economy," which allowed it to use alternative methodologies — not reliant on data provided by China — to assess its countervailing and anti-dumping duties. These alternative methodologies are the equivalent of zeroing: they allowed the U.S. higher protection against imports from China. But in 2011, the Appellate Body reversed an earlier panel ruling that supported the U.S. position that Chinese state-owned enterprises are "public bodies" that potentially provide subsidies to downstream Chinese firms (Stewart and Drake, 2017). The decision alarmed U.S. trade officials because they wanted to use countervailing duties to defend against subsidized imports from China (United States Trade Representative, 2018).

In combination, this incompleteness lies behind the Trump administration's attack on the WTO. On the one hand, the U.S. charges the Appellate Body with judicial "overreach" for constraining U.S. discretion on trade remedies — a grievance that intensified with the China Shock. On the other, the U.S. charges other WTO members with "underreach" for failing to agree on new rules regarding state-capitalist members like China.

Current WTO decision-making rules make it difficult to address these complaints. The "overreach" complaint targets the adjudication wing of the WTO, which operates by reverse consensus rule. This means that all 164 WTO members must agree in order to block a panel or Appellate Body ruling. This rule gives the adjudication wing of the WTO extraordinary power — it is the source of U.S. frustrations with the Appellate Body. The "underreach" complaint targets the negotiating wing of WTO, which operates by normal consensus: to go into effect, new agreements, or modification of the existing rules, must obtain the support of all 164 members.

The consensus rule hampers effort to modernize the rules, address unforeseen contingences, and resolve conflicts.

Unanimity decision rules in both wings of the WTO complicate the process of resolving today's crisis, because they inherently favor the status quo. The U.S. wants to negotiate new rules on China, and new rules for digital commerce; it also wants to clarify existing rules on trade remedies. But if any single member country can frustrate consensus, negotiations will stall. The Appellate Body wants members to clarify existing voids and address new issues but feels compelled to exercise its powers when negotiations stall, inducing charges of judicial overreach. In short, unanimity decision-making is one reason the WTO is on the verge of collapse.

Scholars of the WTO have been proposing reforms since the founding of the institution.<sup>16</sup> But there is little agreement on what can or should be done to get past the prolonged impasse in negotiations. One proposal is to permit agreements between some, but not all, members (Lawrence, 2006; Levy, 2006). Another proposal is to relax the requirement of consensus, adopting some form qualified majority voting.<sup>17</sup> While there are many variations on these themes, research on reforming the WTO has not yet incorporated the current context of the Trump administration's policy toward the WTO.

Solutions to the crisis at the WTO should be grounded in an understating of the main threat. As discussed above, the core reason the United States has provoked a crisis at the WTO is that it has lost a series of trade remedy cases at the Appellate Body — rulings that overturned U.S. anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures. The Appellate Body has repeatedly outlawed the practice of zeroing in the calculation of anti-dumping margins; it has also interpreted the WTO's Safeguards Agreement to mean that safeguards can only be imposed if there is evidence that an import surge occurred as a result of "unforeseen developments." As for U.S. countervailing duties on China, the Appellate Body ruled that majority government ownership alone was insufficient to establish that such firms operated like government entities and thus were capable of conferring subsidies. In short, "the decisions that are at the heart of the United States' substantive concerns are those in the trade remedy arena" (Hillman, 2018, 5).

By blocking appointments to the Appellate Body, the U.S. signaled that trade remedies are important to it. In terms of Rodrik's "trilemma," the U.S. wants more room to opt out of

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<sup>16</sup>See (Hoekman, 2012) for a review and synthesis.

<sup>17</sup>Voting on some issues is already allowed in WTO rules, but has never been used in practice. See (Ehlermann and Ehring, 2005).

its obligations, expanding its policy space to accomplish domestic objectives. In the previous section, we outlined a research agenda that seeks to explain why the U.S. is jeopardizing the WTO over this issue when the economic impact of trade remedies is small. While the amount of trade implicated is probably insignificant, remedies are of great political importance in the United States (either for interest group or electoral reasons). This combination of high political salience in the U.S. and low economic impact suggests that a solution to the crisis is possible.

The logic here is that it was not worth sacrificing the whole system for the sake of issues of marginal economic importance. Other members might potentially be open to solutions that address specific U.S. concerns about trade remedies — including conceding on the zeroing issue — if this is enough to ensure continued U.S. participation and good behavior in the WTO, as well to restore the dispute settlement mechanism and end the costly trade wars. In principle, a targeted solution to the crisis is possible, given the outsized concern the U.S. places on trade remedies.

Conceding on zeroing is just one option of many, and we encourage scholarship along these lines.<sup>18</sup> Disputes involving trade remedies could be handled differently than other disputes. For example, trade remedies disputes could be resolved by non-adjudicative process, or by a temporary moratorium on appeals of trade remedy panel reports. Since the U.S. grievance is about Appellate Body rulings that overturn panel findings on remedies, a temporary moratorium might not be enough to induce U.S. agreement. In that event, members could amend the rules to make panel decisions on trade remedy matters final, thereby eliminating the threat of judicial overreach on these cases. In any case, we encourage the study of solutions that create “A Separate System for Trade Remedies” (Hillman, 2018, 4).

## 4 Leadership

The final part of our research agenda is Leadership. Leadership refers to the most challenging aspect of international organization: building domestic and international consensus for creating and, when necessary, reforming global institutions. Global institutions are public goods, which means they are faced with free-riding problems both within and among countries. In the past, the U.S. government provided global leadership, and this leadership was sustained by a broad consensus within the United States in support of an open world economy (Ruggie, 1982). Today,

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<sup>18</sup>See (Hillman, 2018) for other targeted solutions on trade remedies.

the potential for consensus-building and leadership is in doubt. Research that explores the leadership problem at both levels of analysis is needed.

Problems of international organization require actors willing to expend resources advancing solutions. Previous research has linked support for free trade and international organizations within the United States to constituencies that gain from globalization (Milner and Tingley, 2011; Broz and Hawes, 2006). For example, service-sector firms and manufacturers with global supply chains tend to agglomerate in large prosperous cities (Moretti, 2012), and the congressional legislators that represent these prosperous regions tend to vote in favor of free trade agreements (Jensen et al., 2017). Lobbying by global firms also has been linked to pro-globalization voting in Congress (Osgood, 2018; Kim, 2017). By contrast, legislators representing decaying manufacturing regions with import-competing industries in their districts tend to vote against free trade agreements (Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015). While this research can help us understand patterns of support and opposition to globalization, it does little to inform our understanding of leadership.

We make the case that scholarship on leadership needs to focus more attention on the U.S. Congress rather than the U.S. presidency. Just as scholarship on populism has largely ignored the WTO and other international organizations, research on leadership tends to downplay the role of Congress. This is an important omission since Congress has the constitutional authority to set U.S. trade policy objectives and procedures, while the president is limited to carrying out the will of Congress. Scholars have acknowledged that legislative changes in this principal-agent relationship helped paved the way for U.S. leadership on international trade, with almost all research focused on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (RTAA).<sup>19</sup> With this landmark legislation, Congress delegated (within strict limits) its constitutional authority to set trade policy to the executive branch, and required the president to negotiate reciprocal (equal in value) tariff-reducing trade agreements with other nations. Ever since, presidents have provided global trade leadership, regardless of their partisan affiliations, often building consensus by joining ranks with members of the opposition party to pass free trade legislation (Karol 2000). But Congress has remained deeply involved in U.S. trade leadership, repeatedly modifying the terms of its delegation to the president and adding new procedures and requirements to the trade policymaking framework. We recommend that scholars should move beyond the RTAA to study all the institutional procedures that Congress uses to build and sustain consensus for international trade agreements.

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<sup>19</sup>See, for example, Bailey et al. (1997), Gilligan (1997), Lohmann and O'Halloran (1997), Irwin and Kroszner (1999), and Karol (2000).

## 4.1 Leadership and the World Trade Organization

In this section, we identify a research agenda on the domestic sources of U.S. global leadership. We focus on trade policymaking institutions within the United States because these institutions—which were created by laws such as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (RTAA), “Fast-Track,” and Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)—affect the levels of support and opposition to U.S. trade leadership.<sup>20</sup> Scholars have studied these institutions before, but not as dependent variables related to the concept of leadership. We conceptualize U.S. trade policymaking institutions as outcomes that affect the level of support for international trade agreements in the United States. We encourage scholars to explain changes in these institutions.

To provide guidance, we distinguish between policymaking institutions that generate support for international trade agreements from institutions that reduce opposition to trade agreements. Two institutional procedures that increase support for free trade agreements are: (1) Delegation and (2) Reciprocity. Three institutions that reduce opposition to trade agreements are: (1) The Escape Clause; (2) Notification and Consultation; and (3) Compensation. We summarize these in Figure 5 and provide details below.

### 4.1.1 Delegation

Delegation increases domestic support for tariff-cutting trade agreements because the president is elected by a nationwide constituency and therefore considers the aggregate societal benefits of freer trade. By contrast, members of the House and Senate are beholden to organized interest groups located in their subnational districts and they do not internalize the costs of protectionism on other districts. Because presidents internalize these costs, they have incentives to move trade policy toward the societal optimum *even if voters/consumers are not organized and lobbying for free trade*. Delegation leads to what has been called “Presidential Liberalism” (Lohmann and O’Halloran, 1997; Bailey et al., 1997; Gilligan, 1997; Karol, 2000). Delegation also facilitates global leadership because it allows the United States to speak with a single voice

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<sup>20</sup>Fast Track was enacted under the Trade Act of 1974. It was used to pass the Tokyo Round Agreements Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-39), which implemented agreements negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor to WTO. Fast Track has been renewed five times—1979, 1988, 1993, 2002, and 2015—and was renamed Trade Promotion Authority in 2002. But similar institutions, described below, go back to the RTAA.




Figure 5: Consensus-Building Institutions

in trade negotiations with other nations.<sup>21</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Reciprocity

“Reciprocity” refers to the procedural requirement that the president negotiate trade agreements that elicit reciprocal (equivalent in value) tariff reductions from other countries. Before reciprocity, Congress set tariffs unilaterally and export interests did not have strong incentives to organize to influence trade policy. Import-competing producers were the main mobilized lobby group on trade legislation because they reaped concentrated benefits from high tariffs while the costs were dispersed (Irwin, 2017, 432). Although exporters have a general preference for lower domestic tariffs, the cost to an exporter of a particular tariff is small, so exporters did not organize in opposition to protectionism. However, by institutionalizing reciprocity into the policymaking process, exporters had a concentrated stake in tariff-reducing trade agreements and this shifted the political balance of power toward export interests: “By directly tying lower foreign tariffs to lower domestic tariffs, the RTAA fostered the development of exporters as an organized group opposed to high tariffs and supporting international trade agreements” (Irwin,

<sup>21</sup>The bilateral tariff-reducing agreements that the president negotiated under RTAA went into effect without obtaining Congressional approval, but the RTAA itself required renewal every 1 to 4 years. This renewal feature ensured that presidents remained attentive to Congressional political imperatives.



2017, 432).<sup>22</sup>

After World War II, the United States “multilateralized” the reciprocal method of generating support for trade agreements by incorporating it into the GATT (Irwin, 2017, 455-508). Reciprocity remains the cornerstone of multilateral trade cooperation today. In the WTO, just as with the RTAA, countries negotiate bilaterally on a product-by-product basis with the principal supplier of the good in question. Then they generalize the resulting reciprocal tariff cuts to other members via the most-favored nation clause (MFN).

### **4.1.3 Escape**

Just as delegation and reciprocity help build domestic support for trade agreements, the escape clause serves the function of reducing domestic opposition to trade agreements. The escape clause refers to trade remedies—antidumping and countervailing duty statutes that provide import-competing industries with the means to redress “unfair” foreign trade practices—and safeguards. Trade remedies permit temporary tariffs on imports that are deemed to be unfairly traded and cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to a domestic industry. Safeguards protect domestic industries from import surges. As a consensus-building device, the role of the escape clause is to reduce political opposition to trade agreements.

The escape clause has a long history in U.S. law and has evolved significantly since it was first included in the U.S.-Mexican Trade Agreement of 1943 (Jackson, 1997, 179). In 1947, during negotiations on the GATT, President Truman signed an executive order requiring an escape clause to be included in every agreement negotiated under RTAA authority. In the RTAA Extension Act of 1951, Congress itself mandated that all new trade agreements must include the escape clause. The same year, the escape clause text from U.S. law was incorporated into the GATT, as Article XIX, suggesting that the GATT escape clause was a “direct descendant of the U.S.-Mexican Trade Agreement of 1943” (Ibid). Over the years, Congress has added many new features to the U.S. escape clause, and these changes provide an observable barometer of opposition to the trade agreements program. Authors in economics have studied escape extensively (Bagwell and Staiger, 1990; Rosendorff and Milner, 2001, among others), however, since the political purpose of escape is to mollify opponents of international trade agreements, it would be useful to dig deeper into the domestic political economy factors that drive changes in the escape clause.

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<sup>22</sup>For evidence, see Bailey et al. (1997) and Irwin and Kroszner (1999).

#### **4.1.4 Notification and Consultation**

Another means of assuaging opponents is to institutionalize notification and consultation procedures to ensure that Congress and the private sector play a greater role in shaping trade agreements before they go into effect.<sup>23</sup> While the escape clause applies to industries that have already been exposed to tariff cuts, notification and consultation procedures serve to prevent bargains from taking place that would expose politically-sensitive industries to greater import competition. Since the Trade Act of 1974, Congress has required the executive branch to consult with Congress and private-sector stakeholders prior to and during trade negotiations, as well as upon signing trade agreements.

To ensure that mobilized interest groups have a role in trade negotiations, the Trade Act of 1974 set up a three-tiered system of private-sector consultation. At the top of the system is the 30-member Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) consisting of presidentially-appointed representatives from a broad range of U.S. industries and labor groups.<sup>24</sup> The second tier is composed of advisory committees in specific policy areas: Agriculture, Labor, Trade and Environment, Intergovernmental Policy, and Africa. The third tier consists of 17 sector-specific committees to provide policy advice—one agricultural and 16 industrial sectors. In addition to consultations with the advisory committees, the USTR solicits the views of private actors through Federal Register notices and hearings. These procedures allow trade negotiators to learn which industries are too sensitive to expose to reciprocal tariff reductions; they also allow exporters and global corporations to convey their priorities to U.S. trade negotiators. In combination, consultation and notification requirements facilitate coalition-building on international trade agreements.

#### **4.1.5 Compensation**

The final procedure that ameliorates opposition to trade agreements is compensation. The argument for compensation is that economic policies like free trade improve aggregate social welfare but also have significant distributional effects. In such circumstances, a Pareto improvement is possible if the winners from free trade can compensate the losers, leaving both winners and

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<sup>23</sup>Notification and consultation requirements also help build support for trade agreements by giving export interests the ability to influence trade negotiations.

<sup>24</sup>For the current membership, see <https://ustr.gov/about-us/advisory-committees/advisory-committee-trade-policy-and-negotiations-actpn>

losers better off. In the U.S., there has been a long-standing effort to use compensation to reduce opposition to trade agreements. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 established “adjustment assistance” and placed the program under the authority on the Tariff Commission (Alden, 2017). The program redistributed the gains from trade as compensation to trade-displaced workers, in the form of extended unemployment benefits and retraining and relocation assistance. The Trade Act of 1974 renamed the program “Trade Adjustment Assistance” (TAA), expanded its benefits, and placed it under the Department of Labor, to increase the number of accepted claims (Ibid, 120).

Since 1974, expansions and extensions of TAA have been a regular feature of the renewal of TPA, to appease opposition to trade agreements. As part of the 2002 TPA reauthorization, Congress enlarged the scope of TAA benefits. In 2009 and 2011 Congress again expanded TAA, allowing benefits to service-sector workers for the first time. For decades trade agreements (TPA) and trade adjustment assistance (TAA) were a package deal. But in the 2015, the deal fell apart as organized labor turned against the TPA-TAA package.<sup>25</sup> President Obama had been negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which labor leaders intensely opposed, ending the bargain.

Delegation, reciprocity, the escape clause, notification and consultation, and compensation are the underlying sources of U.S. global leadership. While reciprocity and the escape clause are inventions of Congress, they have been incorporated into the multilateral trading system and thereby help other nations generate internal support for trade cooperation as well. All five institutions have changed in many ways since their genesis. If scholars want to understand how the United States builds and maintains consensus for U.S. leadership in international trade, they need to analyze the factors that drive Congress to change these institutions.

We analyze congressional trade legislation from the 1890s to the present for evidence of change in these institutions. We also develop a methodology for coding the intensity of these changes. Figure 6 displays how each of the five leadership institutions have varied in intensity from 1890 to 2020. Intensity here is defined over a five-point scale from 1 (least intense) to 5 (most intense).<sup>26</sup> The data is drawn from the wording of the specific U.S. trade legislation or

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<sup>25</sup>Russell Berman, “A Big Win for Big Labor,” *The Atlantic*, June 12, 2015. Available at <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/a-big-win-for-big-labor/395699>.

<sup>26</sup>During time periods where we could find no evidence of the existence of an institution, the interval is left empty. The scale for each leadership institution is calculated relative to the extremes in the set of cases over the time period, rather than from an objective rubric. For example, the lowest level of Delegation occurs during the McKinley Tariff of 1890 so the time period for which it was active is coded as 1. This tariff was the first to include

the GATT/WTO resolutions.




Figure 6: U.S. Trade Institutions

The next step is to test hypotheses about the emergence and evolution of these consensus-building institutions. Congress has the prerogative to establish trade policymaking procedures that generate support and reduce opposition to U.S. trade leadership. Our data set will stand as an observable record of these consensus-building efforts over time. As dependent variables, the theoretical challenge is to explain why these institutions change, and how they relate to one another. Are they complements or substitutes? For example, if imports rise dramatically and domestic opposition increases (as with the China Shock), does this lead Congress to reduce delegation or increase compensation, or some combination of the two? Since there are five institutional procedures for reducing opposition and increasing support for trade agreements, why is one institution preferred over the others, and why is any single institutional response superior provisions which provided the President some leeway in negotiating trade deals, but the ultimate trade authority remained with Congress. On the high end of the Delegation spectrum is the Trade Act of 1974 which established the “Fast Track Authority.” This may have increased the President’s power to pursue an independent trade agenda and therefore we code it as a 5 to signify this maximum intensity. For the Compensation category, official reports by the U.S. Department of Labor were used to establish various levels of adjustment assistance. (Irwin 2017) and (Baldwin 2012) served as broader references to get a sense for how these leadership institutions changed over time.

to changes in two or more of the others? Are these institutions complements or substitutes? This research is critical to understanding U.S. leadership in global trade cooperation.

## 5 Discussion

We have outlined a research agenda for contributing to the reform and improvement of global institutions using the WTO as a guiding example. Our agenda is organized around three themes: threats, solutions, and leadership. Threats refer to the underlying cause of a crisis in a global institution, not symptoms like refusing to allow the appointment of Appellate Body judges. Solutions refers to institutional reforms required to address threats to global institutions, and leadership addresses the challenge of coordinating efforts to supply international institutions that have public good characteristics.

What we observed about the WTO crisis is that the threat underlying the Trump Administration's rhetoric and actions is the failure of the members to fill in gaps in the WTO Agreement, especially in the area of the escape clause (i.e., trade remedies). This failure has led the Appellate Body to "overreach" its judicial mandate and infringe on U.S. "national sovereignty" by ruling against methods the U.S. uses to calculate antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard duties on imports from China and other nations. In short, the WTO crisis is centered on vagueness in the escape clause and the willingness of the United States to bring dispute settlement to a halt in order to clarify trade remedy rules.

Having identified the threat, we then outlined a research plan to explain why the Trump Administration feels so strongly about trade remedies (which are of little economic importance). We argued that answering this question requires examining the impact of WTO decisions on politics within the United States. In other words, we advocate scholarship on the WTO crisis that crosses the international and the domestic levels of analysis.

We suggested two approaches for linking WTO actions to U.S. domestic politics: the interest group approach and the electoral approach. The interest group approach recognizes that Appellate Body decisions affect specific industries and firms within the U.S. The electoral approach also recognizes that WTO decisions affect domestic politics, but the channel is through voters and elections, not interest groups (these channels may not be mutually exclusive). Our hypothesis is that Appellate Body decisions against U.S. trade remedies may have contributed to the anti-globalization backlash and the election of Donald Trump by taking away the escape

clause just when and where it was most needed. One way to test this hypothesis is to see if the industries affected by Appellate Body rulings are spatially concentrated in the industrial swing states that Donald Trump won by narrow margins.

As for solutions to the crisis, our preliminary analysis suggests that scholars should be focusing on narrower reforms that address U.S. concerns about trade remedies, rather than grand bargains that would be difficult to get past the unanimity constraint. Trade remedies are politically important to the U.S., but they don't have much economic significance relative to what is at stake. If keeping the United States in the WTO and restoring the dispute settlement mechanism are more valuable to other members than conceding to the U.S. on remedies, then there is room for a narrower solution that carves out a special process for handling trade remedy disputes.

Our analysis of leadership identified five domestic consensus-building institutions; two that generate support (delegation and reciprocity), and three that reduce opposition (the escape clause, notification and consultation, and compensation). Over time, Congress has repeatedly changed these institutions, both individually and in combination. We suggest research that measures and explains these changes. We need to understand the forces that drive change in these institutions because Congressional policymaking procedures directly influence U.S. leadership at the global level. Given the paucity of existing research on these institutions, this is the most challenging part of our research agenda. In terms of the current WTO crisis, it is also the most pressing since, absent a domestic consensus, the U.S. cannot provide leadership on reforming the WTO.

Our framework—threats, solutions, leadership—can guide research on crises in other international organizations. For example, the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement is a symptom of a deeper threat, located in U.S. domestic politics, that needs to be identified and analyzed. Solutions tailored to the threat can then be assessed on their merits and in terms of their political feasibility. Finally, scholars could contribute by examining how the structure of Federal climate change policymaking encourages global leadership. As with international trade, U.S. leadership efforts on climate change are undertaken under laws approved by Congress. While climate change amelioration improves aggregate social welfare, it also imposes costs on certain industries, occupations, and regions. Climate change touches on a wide array of interests, as with trade. The stakes vary from industry to industry and region to region, but an effective solution requires a balancing of those interests, which typically is achieved through the legislative process.

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