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THE SENSITIVITY OF CASH SAVINGS TO THE COST OF CAPITAL

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ABSTRACT

We theoretically and empirically show that in the presence of a time-varying cost of capital (COC), firms save cash from external capital issuance when the firm-specific COC is low to hedge against the risk of underinvestment from a higher COC in the future. This hedging motive drives the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC in both financially constrained and currently unconstrained firms. The sensitivity is especially pronounced among firms that have a stronger correlation between their COC and financing needs for future investments. We establish the COC's causal impact on cash saving from external capital issuance through two quasi-natural experiments, viz., a change in regulatory disclosure requirements and surprises in monetary policy.

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1. Introduction

The extensive literature on the determinants of cash holdings suggests that firms mitigate external financing constraints caused by capital market frictions through cash saved from internal cash flows.¹ However, we document that firms in the United States save 45 cents from each dollar of equity capital raised compared to 28 cents from each dollar of internal cash flows. Moreover, external equity issuance alone explains 15.74% of the variation in corporate cash saving, while internal cash flows explain only 4.31%. We show in this paper, theoretically and empirically, that a time-varying cost of capital can help understand why firms save from external capital.

In the traditional models, financially constrained firms save from cash flows by comparing profitability of current and future investments, while the cash saving policies of unconstrained firms are indeterminate. We add another dimension to this traditional model setting and consider the time-varying cost of external capital. Since external capital is an important source of financing for investment, firms build cash reserves in a manner that lowers the *overall* cost of capital (COC)—averaged over time—for their investment opportunities. We demonstrate theoretically that although raising external capital is costly, firms save cash from external capital issuance when the COC is relatively low in order to hedge against financing future investments at a higher cost, thereby reducing the overall COC. We refer to this incentive as “hedging motive.” The need to hedge against a higher cost of external financing for future investment is driving the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC which is most pronounced in firms that tend to face a higher COC when having greater external capital needs. Under uncertainty, this hedging motive drives the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC for *both* financially constrained and (currently) unconstrained firms.

To test our model’s prediction that the hedging motive drives the sensitivity of cash saving to

¹See [Acharya et al. \(2007\)](#), [Han and Qiu \(2007\)](#), [Bates et al. \(2009\)](#), [Chang et al. \(2014\)](#), [Qiu and Wan \(2015\)](#), and [Graham and Leary \(2018\)](#) among others.

the COC, we measure a firm’s COC by its weighted average cost of capital (WACC) based on its debt to equity ratio and the costs of equity and debt. Our focus on WACC is driven by survey evidence showing that most firms base their decisions on WACC and regularly re-estimate their WACC in response to market dynamics (Zenner et al., 2014). Our estimations of WACC enable us to explore the impact of the firm-level COC on cash saving both cross-sectionally and over time. The cost of equity (COE) is estimated by the implied required rate of return, which is obtained by equating the stock price to the present value of future cash flow forecasts. This implied cost of capital (ICC) approach is used to estimate the COE because previous studies find that the ICC approach outperforms the CAPM and multi-factor models, in measuring the required rate of return both in time series and cross-sectional analyses (Lee, So, and Wang, 2021; Hommel, Landier, and Thesmar, 2023). The cost of debt (COD) is estimated as the actual yield on the debt carried by the firm.²

We first show that the average cash holdings of firms are negatively associated with their average COC over the 39-year sample period (Figure 1). Such opposite movements of cash and the COC are found in all industries (Appendix Figure E.1). Moreover, firms, especially those with high hedging motives, save significantly more when the COC is lower relative to its historical average (Figure 2) and when their future investments are greater (Figure 3). When comparing the relative importance of equity and debt as sources of external capital, we find that firms save significantly more cash from equity issuance than from debt issuance. Moreover, the COE has a stronger impact on cash saving from equity issuance than the COD on cash saving from debt issuance.

²Our approaches to estimate the COE and the COD have been widely used in the literature. Claus and Thomas (2001) and Fama and French (2002) use the ICC to measure the equity premium; Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013) and Lee, So, and Wang (2021) use the ICC to predict stock market return; and Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006), Botosan and Plumlee (2005), Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2009) Frank and Shen (2016), Xu (2020), and Byoun and Wu (2020) use the ICC to estimate the COE. The COD is estimated using the same measure applied in Frank and Shen (2016) and Xu (2020).

We measure a firm’s hedging motive as the regression coefficient of the firm’s external finance needs on the COC based on the standard proxies of external finance needs used in the literature.³ A high value of the coefficient indicates that the firm faces a higher COC when it needs more external capital, i.e., a high hedging motive. Since firms’ cash saving decisions can be influenced by economic conditions, we include year fixed effects to control for the macroeconomic effects. We also include firm fixed effects and investigate the sensitivity of cash saving to the *within-firm* variation of the COC. Employing the firm-level COC allows us to examine the impacts of the time-varying external financing costs as well as the cross-sectional differences in firms’ hedging needs on their cash saving decisions. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that firms’ cash saving from external capital is more sensitive to the COC when their hedging needs are greater; such firms issue significantly more external capital in excess of their current financial needs to save as cash when the COC is relatively low. We also show that future investment needs influence the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC, especially in firms with a strong hedging motive. These findings support our novel perspective that firms save cash to hedge their future investments against a high COC.⁴

To address the endogeneity concern that cash saving may themselves affect the COC or the relationship may be driven by other economic factors, we adopt two identification strategies. The first is to use the Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) in 2000 as a plausibly exogenous shock to the COC and conduct a generalized triple difference analysis. The purpose of Reg FD is to prevent public companies from selectively disclosing material nonpublic information to certain parties without simultaneously disclosing the information to the general public. Reg FD reduced the COC by leveling the information-playing field, especially among firms that are more prone to selective

³We use three proxies to capture firms’ needs for external capital: external finance needs (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), and Byoun (2008)), external finance dependence (Rajan and Zingales (1998)), and the revised KZ index (Baker et al. (2003)).

⁴Our results are also robust to alternative COC measures, adjustments for potential measurement errors, and different sample periods.

disclosure prior to the regulation ([Chen et al., 2010](#)).

To exploit the cross-sectional variation in the impact of Reg FD on the COC, we define treatment and control firms based on the market-to-book ratio before Reg FD because previous studies show that firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to disclose material information privately to selected investors ([Gintschel and Markov \(2004\)](#) and [Hutton \(2005\)](#)). Our results show that treatment firms experience significantly greater decline in the COC and exhibit increased cash saving from external capital after Reg FD relative to control firms. As a result of the lower COC following Reg FD, treatment firms issue more external capital in excess of their current financial needs and increase their cash savings more in the presence of future investment than control firms. These treatment effects are only significant among firms with high hedging motives. We also verify that pre-existing divergent trends cannot explain our results and additional placebo tests suggest that our results are more likely to be driven by changes in the COC following Reg FD rather than by unobservable omitted factors.

The second identification strategy uses the unified monetary policy shock measure developed by [Bu, Rogers, and Wu \(2021\)](#) to capture exogenous shocks to the COC. Treatment and control firms are defined based on the cross-sectional differences in exposures to monetary policy shocks. We first show that contractionary monetary policy shocks increase the COC significantly more for firms with more exposures to monetary policy shocks (treatment firms) than for those with less exposures (control firms). Moreover, following the increased COC stemming from monetary policy shocks, treatment firms with high hedging motives save significantly less from external capital relative to those with less hedging motives. Furthermore, the negative effects of contractionary monetary policy shocks on external capital issuance in excess of their current financial needs and cash saving for future investment are particularly pronounced among treatment firms with high hedging motives.

These results provide further support that the time variation in the COC has causal effects on high hedging motive firms' cash saving from external capital.

We also find that financially constrained and (currently) unconstrained firms *both* save more in response to a low COC. These are interesting results because [Almeida et al. \(2004\)](#) suggest that financially constrained firms save from internal cash flows to mitigate underinvestment due to financial constraints. Our findings suggest that firms save not only from internal cash flows to mitigate the effect of financial constraints, but also from external capital in order to hedge against higher financing costs for future investments. Furthermore, when facing a time-varying COC, *both* constrained and unconstrained firms save from external capital when the COC is relatively low to reduce the overall COC.

Finally, we examine if the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC reflects the market timing or precautionary motives. The market timing motive suggests that firms save from equity issuance proceeds to take advantage of overvalued stock ([Kim and Weisbach \(2008\)](#) and [Bates et al. \(2009\)](#)), whereas the purpose of precautionary saving is to insulate firms from external finance by saving from internal cash flows ([Keynes, 1936](#)). Our evidence reiterates the conclusions of [DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz \(2010\)](#) and [Dittmar, Duchin, and Harford \(2019\)](#) that neither market timing nor the precautionary motive alone can fully explain firms' cash saving behavior. Our hedging motive linked to time-variation in a firm's COC goes beyond unifying these theories and provides a novel perspective to better explain why cash saving is sensitive to the COC. Firms' cash saving decisions depend not only on the COC and cash flows but also on the needs to hedge against higher financing costs for expected (as distinct from precautionary) future investments.

2. Related Literature

The literature has offered several explanations for firms' cash holdings, including macroeconomic conditions ([Graham and Leary \(2018\)](#)), agency conflicts ([Jensen \(1986\)](#), [Dittmar et al. \(2003\)](#); [Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith \(2007\)](#), [Harford et al. \(2008\)](#), and [Nikoloo and Whited \(2014\)](#)), tax considerations ([Foley et al. \(2007\)](#), [Harford et al. \(2017\)](#), and [Faulkender et al. \(2019\)](#)), product market competition ([Fresard \(2010\)](#)), refinancing risk ([Harford et al. \(2014\)](#)), and leverage ([DeAngelo et al. \(2021\)](#)). While most studies focus on the level of cash holdings, we focus on explaining firms' cash saving behavior (changes in cash). Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the importance of the hedging motive for corporate cash saving from external capital in the presence of time-varying COC.

[Kim and Weisbach \(2008\)](#) suggest that firms' saving from equity issuance reflect the market timing motive to take advantage of overvalued stocks, while [McLean \(2011\)](#) finds that equity proceeds are an important source of cash saving for the precautionary motive. We propose a hedging motive for cash saving from external capital where firms consider both the COC and future financing needs when making current cash saving and external financing decisions. This hedging motive can help explain the finding of [DeAngelo et al. \(2010\)](#) that most firms with attractive market timing opportunities fail to issue stocks and that many mature firms without apparent financial difficulties and hence with low precautionary motive issue stocks to save. According to the hedging motive, firms may not issue external capital and save cash to take advantage of overvalued stock if they do not expect future financing needs. Currently unconstrained firms would have incentives to save from external capital when the COC is low to avoid raising capital at a high cost for expected investments. Our hedging motive is also distinct from the precautionary motive in that *both* financially constrained and unconstrained firms save more when the COC is low. In contrast, the precau-

tionary motive predicts that financially constrained firms have a stronger incentive to save because they need cash saving to avoid costly external finance ([Keynes, 1936](#)). [Keynes \(1936\)](#) distinguishes between the transaction motive (for expected expenditures) and the precautionary motive (contingent expenditures) for cash saving. Nonetheless, the literature has not given much attention to the transaction motive. Our hedging motive may reflect more of the transaction motive (for expected future investment) than the precautionary motive.

[McLean \(2011\)](#) examines the impacts of issuance costs on cash saving from equity issuance where issuance costs mainly reflect economic conditions and liquidity. [Morck et al. \(1990\)](#) and [Baker et al. \(2003\)](#), however, suggest that the COC is the key channel through which financial markets affect corporate decisions. Nonetheless, previous studies have not yet provided causal evidence for the effects of the firm-level COC on cash saving. To the best of our knowledge, our study is first to employ the firm-level COC that reflects movements in stock prices and interest rates to provide direct evidence for the impact of the time-varying COC on cash saving from external capital. By exploring two plausibly exogenous shocks to the COC, we show that the COC has a causal impact on cash saving.

Recently, [Huang and Ritter \(2020\)](#) and [Denis and McKeon \(2021\)](#) show that firms' debt and equity financing decisions are driven by the expected cash needs rather than by the volatility of cash flows as suggested by the precautionary motive. While they focus on financing decisions for cash shortfalls, our hedging motive focuses on cash saving driven by the COC for future investment. [Dittmar et al. \(2019\)](#) maintain that the existing theories fail to explain most within-firm variation in cash savings and that the precautionary saving theory does not explain the cash holdings of cash-rich firms. Our study extends the inquiry into the firm-specific COC and explores the cross-sectional variation in the impact of the COC on firms' cash saving decisions in consideration of hedging

needs. We contribute to the literature by showing that corporate cash saving is closely related to the time-varying COC, especially for firms with high hedging needs for future expenditures. [Polk and Sapienza \(2009\)](#) suggest that firms make investment decisions to cater to stock market sentiment. Complementing to their study, we demonstrate that firms' cash saving sensitivity to the COC is also driven by their future investment needs. To the extent that market sentiment affects the COC, sentiment may also influence investment through the COC channel.

[Myers \(1984\)](#) suggests that if information asymmetry disappears from time to time, then firms may issue equity to accumulate financial slack (cash and reserved borrowing power) before it reappears. However, he adds the following footnote to this conclusion: "this observation is probably not much practical help, however, because we lack an objective proxy for changes in the degree of asymmetry (p. 590)". We extend his intuition by considering theoretically and empirically the time-varying COC which reflects the variations in market frictions including asymmetric information and its ensuing agency problems.

We also extend the literature on the effects of financial constraints on cash savings. [Almeida et al. \(2004\)](#) suggest that the cash flow sensitivity of cash captures the effect of financial constraints. [Riddick and Whited \(2009\)](#) challenge this interpretation by showing that financially constrained firms' cash savings and cash flows can be negatively related because firms reduce cash to increase investment after receiving positive cash flow shocks. In the financial constraint models, constrained firms trade off between current and future investments to save from internal cash flows. In our model, firms trade off between not only current and future investments but also the current and future costs of capital in accessing external capital so as to hedge against higher financing costs for future investments. This hedging motive theoretically and empirically drives the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC in *both* financially constrained and (currently) unconstrained firms.

[Acharya, Almeida, and Campello \(2007\)](#) show that financially constrained firms’ preference for cash saving from internal funds over preserving debt capacity depends on their need to hedge investment opportunities against income shortfalls. Our hedging motive is distinct from theirs because we consider cash saving from external capital (especially equity) in response to the COC.

The continuous-time model developed in [Bolton et al. \(2013\)](#) shows that firms respond to fluctuations in financing conditions such as the probability of a crisis by adjusting cash, payout, and investment decisions for a precautionary motive, and by timing the market to raise funds even without immediate funding needs. While their model considers binary good and bad financial market conditions depending on the state of economy, we specifically consider the time-varying COC at the firm level to identify the cash-saving motive to hedge future investment needs stemming from the correlation between the COC and external financing needs beyond the precautionary motive.

Our study is related to [Azar, Kagy, and Schmalz \(2016\)](#) who suggest that the cost of carry for cash holdings, which depends on the risk-free interest rate, is an important factor explaining the trend in corporate cash holdings over time. However, [Gao, Whited, and Zhang \(2021\)](#) find a hump-shaped relationship between cash holdings and interest rates. They suggest that firms’ precautionary cash demand is non-monotonically correlated with interest rates and that interest rates are unlikely to explain the recent rise in corporate cash holdings.⁵

Our paper is also closely related to [Eisfeldt and Muir \(2016\)](#) that find a positive correlation between aggregate external financing and savings waves. Their model and empirical analysis focus on estimating the aggregate cost of capital using the cross-sectional moments by exploiting the correlation between aggregate external finance raised and liquidity accumulation, with the premise that “if firms raise costly external finance and accumulate liquidity, either the cost of external

⁵Unlike [Azar, Kagy, and Schmalz \(2016\)](#), who estimate a weighted regression with the sum of each firm’s total assets as weights, [Gao, Whited, and Zhang \(2021\)](#) estimate an unweighted regression that includes a squared interest rate term to account for the hump-shaped relationship between cash and the interest rate.

finance is relatively low or the total return to liquidity accumulation, including its shadow value as future internal fund, is particularly high (p.116).” We focus on the firm-level analyses to explain cash saving from external capital by the hedging motive, which is driven by the correlation between the COC and external financing needs. Our cross-sectional evidence that firms with high hedging motives save cash from external capital when the COC is lower not only validates the premise of [Eisfeldt and Muir \(2016\)](#), but also identifies the underlying mechanism for such firm behavior.

3. Hypothesis Development

3.1 A Base Model Setting

To identify the crux of how the time-varying COC affects cash saving, we start with a base model wherein a firm endowed with cash W_0 faces two-period financing and investment decisions with a zero discount rate. At $t = 0$, the firm invests I_0 which returns $\pi(I_0)$ at $t = 2$ along with an investment opportunity to expand its operation at $t = 1$.⁶ The firm also chooses external finance X_0 and saves $C_0 = W_0 + X_0 - I_0$ for its investment opportunity at $t = 1$. At $t = 1$, the firm raises additional capital X_1 to invest I_1 which produces $\pi(I_1)$ at $t = 2$. We assume that $\pi_I > 0$ and $\pi_{II} < 0$.⁷

The firm maximizes its value as given by

$$V_0(W_0) = \max_{(X_0, C_0, I_0, X_1, I_1)} \pi(I_0) + \pi(I_1) - X_0 - X_1 - \lambda(\delta_0, X_0) - \lambda(\delta_1, X_1) \quad (1)$$

subject to $I_1 = C_0 + X_1$ and $I_0 = X_0 + W_0 - C_0$.

⁶This assumption is adopted for simplicity and intuitive appeal. In the previous version of the present paper, we assume that $\pi(I_0)$ is realized at $t = 0$ and used for investment at $t = 1$ and obtain similar results.

⁷ f_x and f_{xx} denote the first and second partial derivatives, respectively, of $f(x, y)$ with respect to x .

where the external finance cost is represented by $\lambda(\delta_t, X_t) = \frac{1}{2}\delta_t X_t^2$ with $\delta_t > 0$, for $X_t > 0$ and $t = 0, 1$. When $X_t \leq 0$ (no external capital or payout), external finance costs are zero. The convex external finance cost function implies that the marginal external finance cost increases with the amount of external capital raised. The external finance cost is also an increasing function of δ_t ($\lambda_\delta(\delta_t, X_t) > 0$), which is the time-varying component of the external financing cost related to market frictions such as asymmetric information, agency problems, limited intermediation, and investor preferences that drive fluctuation in market sentiment.⁸ We assume that δ_t is deterministic in the base model and relax this assumption in Section 3.2.

The FOCs are given as follows:

$$\pi_I(I_0) - 1 - \delta_0 X_0 = 0; \tag{2}$$

$$\pi_I(I_1) - 1 - \delta_1 X_1 = 0; \tag{3}$$

$$-\pi_I(I_0) + \pi_I(I_1) = 0. \tag{4}$$

These conditions imply $\pi_I(I_0) = \pi_I(I_1) = 1 + \delta_0 X_0 = 1 + \delta_1 X_1$: the firm's optimal investment decisions are reached by trading off between current and future external finance costs. In particular, when $\delta_0 < \delta_1$ ($\delta_0 > \delta_1$), the firm will issue more (less) X_0 and save more (less) C_0 , while reducing (increasing) X_1 to achieve the optimal investments. Thus, the optimal cash saving is achieved when the marginal benefit of cash saving is equal to the marginal cost of future external finance ($1 + \delta_1 X_1$).

We formalize this observation in the following results:

Result 1 *The optimal external finance, \hat{X}_0 , cash saving, \hat{C}_0 , and investment, \hat{I}_0 , exhibit the fol-*

⁸The convex external finance cost function is obtained under the costly-state-verification approach used by [Froot et al. \(1993\)](#).

lowing properties:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{X}_0}{\partial \delta_0} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \hat{C}_0}{\partial \delta_0} < 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial \hat{I}_0}{\partial \delta_0} < 0.$$

Proof: See Internet Appendix [A.1](#).

Result 1 suggests that the firm reduces (increases) cash saving and external capital raised at $t = 0$ when facing a higher (lower) financing cost (δ_0). If the firm is currently constrained ($W_0 < I_0^*$), where I_0^* is the first-best investment satisfying $\pi_I(I_0^*) = 1$, both external finance constraints at $t = 0$ and 1 are binding and the firm will increase external finance, cash saving and investment in response to a lower COC to satisfy the FOCs. If the firm is currently unconstrained but “overall” intertemporally constrained ($I_0^* \leq W_0 < I_0^* + I_1^*$), although the current external finance constraint is not binding, the external finance constraint at $t = 1$ is still binding. Consequently, the firm will save the remaining W_0 and issue external capital and save for future investment. If δ_0 is lower, the firm will issue more external capital X_0 to save for I_1 . Thus, both currently constrained and future constrained firms may save by issuing excess capital ($X_0 - I_0$) when the COC is lower. Cash saved today reduces future external capital needs and the total costs of external capital.

Given that future investment is certain, it is possible that for a firm with sufficiently large initial endowment ($W_0 \geq I_0^* + I_1^*$), neither of the external finance constraints are binding because the firm has enough cash for both investments at $t = 0$ and 1 and is insulated from external financing. Such firms will not save for future investment. However, facing uncertain investment opportunities and cash flows, no firm will be completely insulated from the external capital market. In the next section, we extend the model to introduce uncertainty in the cost of capital and investment opportunities to show that a hedging motive arises when the firm wants to insulate its future value from the fluctuations in external financing costs.

3.2 Hedging Motive

In the discussion above, we assume that the time-varying cost component of external finance stemming from market frictions and investor preferences, δ , is nonstochastic, and thus independent of external capital needs. We now incorporate uncertainty in external finance costs and investment opportunities and show that the correlation between external finance costs and external capital needs induces an incentive to save more cash in response to the COC to hedge against costs for future external capital needs. We refer to this incentive as the “hedging motive” of cash saving.

We now introduce random cash flow shocks to assets in place at $t = 1$ and $t = 2$, denoted by z_1 and z_2 , respectively. We assume that z is i.i.d., normal with a zero mean and a variance of σ^2 .⁹ The external finance cost and investment opportunity are also correlated with cash flow shock z_1 as they reflect the same underlying uncertainty. Thus, we assume that $\tilde{\delta}_1 = \delta_1 + \alpha z_1$ and $\tilde{\pi} = \pi + \beta z_1$, where α and β measure the strength of the comovements between $\tilde{\delta}_1$ and z_1 and between $\tilde{\pi}$ and z_1 , respectively.¹⁰

The firm maximizes current shareholder wealth as follows:

$$V_0 = \max_{(X_0, C_0, I_0)} E_0\{\pi(I_0) + z_1 - X_0 - \tilde{\lambda}(\delta_0, X_0) + V_1\} \quad (5)$$

$$\text{subject to } I_0 = W_0 + X_0 - C_0,$$

$$\text{where } V_1 = \max_{X_1, I_1} E_1\{\tilde{\pi}(I_1) + z_2 - X_1 - \tilde{\lambda}(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1)\}, \quad \text{and}$$

$$I_1 = X_1 + z_1 + C_0,$$

⁹ “i.i.d” stands for independent and identical distribution across firms and over time.

¹⁰ Market timing occurs when the securities are overpriced or the COC is lower. If there is no fluctuation in the COC, then firms have no needs to time markets. Thus, the market timing motive can be captured by the variation in the COC or the variance of $\tilde{\delta}_1$: $Var(\tilde{\delta}_1) = \alpha^2 \sigma^2$. The precautionary motive is to save for uncertain cash needs. The uncertain cash needs arise when investments exceed available cash ($I_1 - C_0 - z_1$). If the difference is constant, then there would be no need for precautionary cash saving. The precautionary motive becomes stronger as the volatility of the difference increases. Thus, the precautionary motive can be captured by the variance of the difference: $Var(I_1 - C_0 - z_1) = Var(I_1) - 2Cov(I_1, z_1) + \sigma^2 = Var(I_1) - 2\frac{\beta\sigma^2}{\pi_I} + \sigma^2$, where we use the [Rubinstein \(1976\)](#) and [Froot et al. \(1993\)](#) result: $Cov(a(x), b(y)) = E[a_x]E[b_y]Cov(x, y)$, for x and y normally distributed. Specifically, we have $Cov(\tilde{\pi}, z_1) = \tilde{\pi}_I Cov(I_1, z_1)$ and hence $Cov(I_1, z_1) = \frac{\beta\sigma^2}{\pi_I}$. A bar over a variable denotes its expected value.

where $\tilde{\lambda}(\delta_0, X_0)$ and $\tilde{\lambda}(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1)$ are the external finance cost functions at $t = 0$ and $t = 1$, respectively.

The following time line illustrates the firm's cash flows and decisions.

| t=0 | 1 | 2 |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| Firm endowed with W_0 | Cash flow: z_1 | Cash flow: $\pi(I_0) + \tilde{\pi}(I_1) + z_2$ |
| raise X_0 , save C_0 , | cash available: $W_1 = C_0 + z_1$ | |
| invest $I_0 + C_0 = W_0 + X_0$ | raise X_1 | |
| | invest $I_1 = X_1 + W_1$ | |

To explore the optimal cash saving, financing, and investment decisions, we solve the model backwards. At $t = 1$, the firm has the sum of the cash flow and cash saving from $t = 0$: $W_1 = z_1 + C_0$ and the optimization program is to maximize the value of W_1 . With μ_1 being the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint, the FOCs imply

$$\mu_1 = \tilde{\pi}_I(I_1) = 1 + \tilde{\lambda}_X(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1). \quad (6)$$

We can see the direct effects of X_1 on V_1 by considering

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{dV_1(W_1)}{dX_1} &= \frac{dV_1(W_1)}{dz_1} \frac{dz_1}{dX_1} \\
&= \left[\tilde{\pi}_I(I_1) \left[\frac{dX_1}{dz_1} + 1 \right] - \frac{dX_1}{dz_1} - \tilde{\lambda}_X(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1) \frac{dX_1}{dz_1} - \tilde{\lambda}_\delta(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1) \frac{d\tilde{\delta}_1}{dz_1} \right] \frac{dz_1}{dX_1} \\
&= \tilde{\pi}_I(I_1) \left[1 + \frac{dz_1}{dX_1} \right] - 1 - \tilde{\lambda}_X(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1) - \gamma \tilde{\lambda}_\delta(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1) \\
&= \tilde{\pi}_I(I_1) \frac{dz_1}{dX_1} - \gamma \tilde{\lambda}_\delta(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1),
\end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where $\gamma = \frac{d\tilde{\delta}/dz_1}{dX_1/dz_1}$ and we note $\frac{dI_1}{dz_1} = \frac{dX_1}{dz_1} + 1$. The formulations of $\tilde{\delta}_1$ and $\tilde{\pi}$ imply $\frac{d\tilde{\delta}_1}{dz_1} = \alpha$ and $\frac{d\tilde{\pi}}{dz_1} = \beta$. The change in profit function $\tilde{\pi}$ due to z_1 also affects I_1 and X_1 by $\frac{dI_1}{dz_1} = \frac{\beta}{\tilde{\pi}_I}$ and $\frac{dX_1}{dz_1} = \frac{\beta}{\tilde{\pi}_I} - 1$, respectively.¹¹ $\gamma = \frac{d\tilde{\delta}/dz_1}{dX_1/dz_1} = \frac{\alpha \tilde{\pi}_I}{\beta - \tilde{\pi}_I}$ is a measure of the correlation between external finance cost and external capital needs resulting from the effects of z_1 on $\tilde{\delta}$ and $\tilde{\pi}$.¹² Normally, γ is

¹¹Using the [Rubinstein \(1976\)](#) and [Froot et al. \(1993\)](#) result, we note $Cov(I_1, z_1) = E \left[\frac{dI_1}{dz} \right] \sigma^2$, which implies $\frac{dI_1}{dz} = \frac{Cov(\tilde{\pi}, z_1)}{\tilde{\pi}_I \sigma^2} = \frac{d\tilde{\pi}/dz_1}{\tilde{\pi}_I} = \frac{\beta}{\tilde{\pi}_I}$.

¹²The effect of z_1 on $\tilde{\pi}$ comes through β and $I_1 = X_1 + C_0 + z_1$.

expected to be positive: that is, firms face higher costs ($\tilde{\delta}$) when they need more external finance (X_1). Consequently, a higher γ imposes a higher cost on additional external financing when the firm faces a negative cash flow shock and greater external finance needs. Given the higher marginal cost of external finance and the convexity of the external finance cost function, the variability in cash flows becomes costly because it disturbs both investment and external finance. Thus, the hedging motive of cash saving arises as the firm wants to insulate the value of its intermediate asset position, $V_1(W_1)$, from fluctuations in X_1 due to z_1 .

The first-best level of investment (I_1^* , satisfying $\tilde{\pi}_I(I_1^*) = 1$) can be achieved if the firm has sufficient cash at $t = 1$ ($I_1^* \leq W_1$) after realizing z_1 . If W_1 cannot cover the investment, the firm must rely on external finance, that is, $X_1 > 0$ and its investment will be determined to satisfy $\tilde{\pi}_I(I_1) = \mu_1 > 1$. Thus, the firm invests below the first-best level ($I_1 < I_1^*$) given the external finance costs.

Based on the above observations, we obtain the following:

$$V_1(W_1) = \int_{I_1^* - C_0}^{\infty} \{\tilde{\pi}(I_1^*) - I_1^* + W_1\} g(z) dz + \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^* - C_0} \left\{ \tilde{\pi}(I_1) - I_1 + W_1 - \gamma \tilde{\lambda}_{\delta}(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1) \right\} g(z) dz,$$

where $g(z)$ is the probability density function (PDF) of z_1 .

Moving back to the first period, the firm maximizes V_0 . In Internet Appendix [A.2](#), we derive the FOCs, which imply that optimal cash saving and investment decisions satisfy the following condition:

$$\pi_I(I_0) = G = 1 + \gamma \tilde{\lambda}(\delta_0, X_0), \tag{8}$$

where $G = 1 + \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^* - C_0} \left\{ \tilde{\pi}_I(I_1) - 1 + \gamma \tilde{\lambda}_{\delta}(\tilde{\delta}_1, X_1) \right\} g(z) dz$ is the marginal benefit of cash saving which

reflects the reduced external finance cost for future investment. There will be little benefit of cash saving if the firm does not expect any future investment. Thus, the expected marginal benefit of cash due to the cost of external finance for future investment at $t = 1$ is an important consideration for investment and cash saving decisions at $t = 0$. When the firm is currently unconstrained with sufficient initial endowment to make the first-best initial investment ($I_0^* \leq W_0$), it may currently make the optimal investment without incurring external finance costs and pay out the remaining to shareholders (negative X_0) if it does not consider future financing needs. However, when facing uncertainty in financing costs for future investment due to z_1 , the firm will not payout but increase X_0 to save cash until its marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost.

When the firm is constrained ($I_0^* > W_0$), it will choose the optimal cash saving by issuing excess external capital until the marginal benefit of cash saving, G , is equal to the marginal cost of external finance, $1 + \gamma\tilde{\lambda}(\delta_0, X_0)$. Thus, constrained firms' cash saving associated with the COC for the hedging motive comes from external capital.

In Internet Appendix A.2, we obtain the same results under uncertainty as in Result 1: the firm reduces (increases) external finance, cash saving, and investment when facing a higher (lower) cost of external capital. Given that the effect of uncertain external finance is greater for a higher γ , firms with high γ will have stronger incentives to save when the COC is relatively low. In Internet Appendix A.3, we formally show that the optimal decisions at $t = 0$ have the following properties with respect to γ :

Result 2 *The correlation between the external capital needs and external finance costs, γ , increases the sensitivities of optimal external finance, \hat{X}_0 , cash saving, \hat{C}_0 , and investment, \hat{I}_0 to the COC,*

δ_0 ;

$$\frac{\partial^2 \hat{X}_0}{\partial \delta_0 \partial \gamma} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial^2 \hat{C}_0}{\partial \delta_0 \partial \gamma} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 \hat{I}_0}{\partial \delta_0 \partial \gamma} < 0.$$

Proof: See Internet Appendix [A.3](#).

The above results show the direct effects of the correlation between external capital needs and external finance costs on the sensitivities of the optimal cash saving and external finance decisions to the COC. Firms with a high γ may have to reduce investment due to higher external finance costs when facing lower cash flows and hence have higher marginal value of cash saving (G). Accordingly, such firms can issue excess external capital ($X_0 - I_0$) and save for future investment, thereby reducing their overall cost of external finance. Consequently, the amount of cash saving and excess capital issuance in response to the COC at $t = 0$ should be greater when firms face a higher γ .

Given the above results, we propose the following hedging motive hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1a Both constrained and unconstrained firms save more from external finance when the COC is relatively low.

Hypothesis 1b Firms with high hedging motives will save more from external finance when the COC is relatively low.

Hypothesis 1c Firms with high hedging motives will issue more excess external capital when the COC is relatively low.

Hypothesis 1d Firms with high hedging motives have a higher cash saving sensitivity to the COC when they expect more future investment.

4. Data and Variables

4.1 Sample

The initial sample includes all U.S. firms from the annual Compustat files for the 1981–2019 period. We require that firms have asset value greater than \$5 million and positive values for equity, cash holdings and net sales. Financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6799) and regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are excluded from the sample. Stock price information is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Observations with missing net income and stock price are excluded.

To estimate the COE, we obtain analysts’ earnings and growth forecasts from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). We require non-missing data for the prior year’s book value, earnings, and dividends. When explicit forecasts are unavailable, we obtain forecasts by applying the long-term growth rate to the prior year’s earnings forecast.

4.2 Cost of Capital

It is challenging to estimate individual firms’ cost of capital because the cost of equity and the cost of debt are not directly observable. In light of the findings of [Frank and Shen \(2016\)](#) and [Hommel, Landier, and Thesmar \(2023\)](#), we measure the COE using the implied cost of capital (ICC) approach, which estimates the required rate of return implied by market prices.¹³ Specifically, the ICC is the discount rate that equates a stock’s present value of expected cash flows to its current

¹³[Frank and Shen \(2016\)](#) show that the ICC can better reflect the time-varying required return on capital than the CAPM as a proxy for the cost of capital. [Hommel et al. \(2023\)](#) show that expected returns models, including various versions of the CAPM and the multi-factor model, perform poorly in measuring the discount rate, whereas the ICC performs much better.

price. According to the discounted cash flow model, the stock price of a firm at time t is given by

$$P_t = \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \frac{E_t(FE_{t+k})}{(1 + ICC_t)^k}, \quad (9)$$

where P_t is the market value of the stock at time t , $E_t(FE_{t+k})$ is the expected free cash flow to equity at time $t + k$, and ICC_t is the implied cost of equity capital.

To estimate the cost of equity, we use three analyst forecast based models proposed by [Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan \(2001\)](#), [Claus and Thomas \(2001\)](#), and [Li, Ng, and Swaminathan \(2013\)](#) and one residual income model developed by [Li and Mohanram \(2014\)](#). The consensus analyst forecasts from the I/B/E/S are used to predict future earnings per share. Given that firms are required to file their financial statements within 90 days of the fiscal year end, we estimate the COE using the earliest forecasts available after three months of the prior fiscal year end. As these models rely on analyst forecasts to estimate future free cash flow to equity, the estimated ICC is only available for firms with both analyst coverage and positive earnings forecasts. To circumvent this disadvantage, we also use the approach developed in [Li and Mohanram \(2014\)](#) to forecast future earnings from cross-sectional residual income models. Since this approach does not use analyst forecasts, it helps mitigate the concerns about potential biases in analyst forecasts ([Hoberg and Philips \(2010\)](#)) and allows us to include firms with no analyst coverage and negative earnings. The specific estimation procedures are provided in Internet Appendix D. The reported results are based on the [Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan \(2001\)](#) approach. The results are robust to the alternative COE estimation methods (see Internet Appendix E).

We estimate the COC as follows:

$$COC_{i,t} = \frac{Debt_{i,t}}{MVA_{i,t}} COD_{i,t} (1 - TaxRate) + (1 - \frac{Debt_{i,t}}{MVA_{i,t}}) COE_{i,t}, \quad (10)$$

where $COC_{i,t}$ is the weighted average cost of capital of firm i in year t . $\frac{Debt_{i,t}}{MVA_{i,t}}$ is the market leverage ratio. $COD_{i,t}$ is the cost of debt of firm i in year t proxied by the actual yield on the debt carried

by the firm as used in [Frank and Shen \(2016\)](#).¹⁴ The COC of each firm is estimated for each year.

5. Empirical Analysis

5.1 Univariate Analysis

The summary statistics of the firm characteristic variables and the COC are reported in Panel A of Table 1. The average cash holding is 12.72% of total assets and the cash saving rate is approximately 1.57% of total assets. The average COC is 10.11%, with an average COE of 12.2% and an average COD of 6.78%.¹⁵ Panel B shows the decomposition of the standard deviation of the COC across firms and over time. As expected, the COD exhibits less variation than the COE across firms and over time. The COE varies much more over time than across firms.

Panel A of Figure 1 plots the average annual cash holdings relative to the average COC for all sample firms over the sample period. The striking symmetry of the two series suggests that firms increase (decrease) cash when the COC is low (high). The negative relationship between the annual average COC and cash holdings is also shown in the scatter plot (Panel B). The COC appears to be an important factor of corporate cash holding behavior over time. Notably, the COC declined significantly until the early 2000s, which may help explain the increase in cash holdings over the same period documented by [Bates et al. \(2009\)](#). Previous studies posit that an increasing number of firms in high-tech industries with significant intangible assets and negative cash flows since 1980s has driven an increase in average cash holdings ([Graham and Leary \(2018\)](#), [Begenau and Palazzo \(2021\)](#), and [Denis and McKeon \(2021\)](#)). To check whether the observed relationship is only limited

¹⁴Since we are interested in variation in the COD over time and firms do not issue bonds every year, using the yields of new bond issue as a proxy for the COD is not suitable for our analysis.

¹⁵The estimated COE is comparable to the estimates in the literature. For example, [Pastor et al. \(2008\)](#) report that the firm-level equal-weighted implied risk premia, measured by ICC minus yield on 10-year government bond, for US firms in 1981-2002 are 4.57%.

to a specific industry, we also present plots across Fama-French 5 industries in Panels A–E of Figure E.1. While the opposite movements of cash and COC are the most prominent in high-tech industries (Panel C), the negative association between cash and COC is observed across all industries.

To further examine how a relatively low COC relates to corporate cash saving, we obtain a firm’s COC minus its historical average for firms with a minimum of 3 years of data. Panel A of Figure 2 plots cash saving across deciles of the deviation of COC from the historical average for the sample period 1981-2019 and the subsample periods 1981-1999 and 2000-2019. The downward-sloping graphs indicate that firms save more when the COC is lower relative to the historical average. Panel B presents cash saving across deciles of the deviation of COC from the historical average separately for high and low hedging motive firms. The figure shows that cash saving of high hedging motive firms is particularly sensitive to the variation in the COC. The sensitivity of cash saving to the variation in the COC is weaker for firms with low hedging motives.

To examine whether firms’ cash saving is related to future investment, Figure 3 plots the current year cash saving across future investment (subsequent two-year average) deciles. The figure shows that firms with greater future investment save more cash in the current year, which is consistent with the hedging motive view that firms save cash for future investments.

5.2 Sensitivities of Cash Saving to Cash Sources

Firms may save cash from internal or external capital. To examine how cash saving is associated with cash sources in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following regression:

$$\Delta Cash_{it} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 ExCapital_{it} + \lambda_2 ICF_{it} + \lambda_3 X_{it-1} + f_i + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (11)$$

where $\Delta Cash_{it}$ is the change in cash and equivalents of firm i in year t ; ICF_{it} is internal cash flow; and $ExCapital_{it}$ is the sum of the net equity issue and net debt issue. Each variable is divided by

total assets at the beginning of the period. X_{it-1} is a vector of control variables and f_i denotes firm fixed effects. η_t represents year fixed effects which control for the macroeconomic effects. Following Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009), we include the following control variables: M/B_{it-1} , the market-to-book asset ratio that controls for investment opportunities; $Cash_{it-1}$, the lagged cash-to-asset ratio; Vol_{it} , cash flow volatility; $Leverage_{it-1}$, and the leverage ratio;¹⁶ $Size_{it-1}$, the logarithm of total assets; NWC_{it} , net working capital excluding cash and equivalents divided by total assets at $t - 1$; $CapEx_{it}$, capital expenditures divided by total assets at $t - 1$; $Acquisitions_{it}$, acquisitions divided by total assets at $t - 1$; and $Dividend_{it}$, cash dividend divided by total assets at $t - 1$. We winsorize all variables at the 2 and 98 percentiles to mitigate the effects of outliers.

We first estimate the model without firm and year fixed effects. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 2. The coefficient estimate of external capital (*ExCapital*) is 0.5385 and significant, whereas that of internal cash flows (*ICF*) is 0.4566 and significant (Column 1). To evaluate the relative importance of external capital to internal cash flows, we estimate the standardized beta coefficients. Column 5 of Table 2 shows that the standardized beta coefficient of external capital is much larger than that of internal cash flow (0.7702 versus 0.3718), indicating that external capital is a major source of firms' cash saving. When we include firm fixed effects (Column 2), year fixed effects (Column 3), and firm and year fixed effects (Column 4), the coefficient estimates of the cash sources remain positive and significant. The coefficients on M/B are positive, indicating that firms with more investment opportunities save more cash. The estimates also show that cash flow volatility positively affects cash saving, while lagged cash, dividend, leverage, firm size, net working capital, capital expenditures, and acquisitions have negative effects.

¹⁶Previous studies show that firms with more volatile cash flows tend to hold more cash (Bates et al. (2009) and McLean (2011)). The inclusion of cash flow volatility as an independent variable helps control for the effect of the precautionary motive of cash saving. We include leverage to control for the potential effects of capital structure. Although firms may hedge by altering their capital structure, this change will only enable firms to optimize debt and equity and cannot neutralize the common component of the COE and COD.

As equity and debt are the two main sources of external capital, we further investigate their relative importance for firms' cash saving. We perform a simple regression for each cash source and report the results in Panel B of Table 2. The coefficient estimate of net equity issues ($EIssue$) is 0.451 and significant, with an adjusted R^2 of 15.74%. The coefficient estimate of debt issues ($DIssue$) is a mere 0.0828, and the adjusted R^2 is 0.7%.¹⁷ The estimated coefficient of internal cash flows (ICF) is 0.277 and statistically significant, with an adjusted R^2 of 4.31%. When we include all cash sources along with the control variables and firm and year fixed effects (column 4), the coefficient estimates of all cash sources remain positive and significant. Overall, external equity is the most important source of cash saving.

5.3 Cost of Capital and Cash Saving

To test whether firms' cash saving is sensitive to the COC, we include the COC and its interaction with external capital ($ExCapital$) in equation (11). The estimation results are reported in Table 3. For brevity, we do not report the estimates of control variables. The negative and significant coefficient estimates of the COC suggest that firms save more when the COC is low. The economic magnitude of the impact is also significant. A one percent decrease in the COC is associated with an approximately 2.19% increase in cash saving. The negative and significant coefficient estimates of the interaction term between the COC and external capital ($ExCapital \times COC$) indicate that firms save significantly more from external capital when the COC is lower.

We next examine the relative importance of the COE and COD for firms' cash saving by including

¹⁷Although firms save 45 cents from every dollar of equity capital raised and approximately 8 cents from every dollar of debt issued, firms may issue debt more frequently. Following Denis and McKeon (2021), we define equity issuance and debt issuance if the annual issuance is more than 3% of lagged total assets. The average frequency of equity issuance and debt issuance is 11.85% and 28.78%, respectively, indicating a higher frequency of debt issuance. For firms that issue equity or debt, the average equity issues and debt issues scaled by lagged total assets are 17.75% and 14.71%, respectively.

the interaction terms between the COE (COD) and net equity issuance proceeds (net debt issuance proceeds) in our regression model. As shown in Table 3 Column 2, both the coefficient estimates of COE and COD are negative and significant. However, the coefficient estimate of $Eissue \times COE$ is negative and significant, whereas the coefficient estimate of $Dissue \times COD$ is insignificant. These results suggest that firms' cash saving from external capital is more sensitive to the COE than the COD.

5.4 Financial Constraints

The precautionary motive suggests that financially constrained firms can avoid external financing by saving cash from internal cash flows (Almeida et al. (2004) and Bates et al. (2009)). Acharya et al. (2007) suggests that financially constrained firms save cash to hedge against income shortfalls. Given the importance of financial constraints in firms' cash saving decisions, we investigate whether financial constraints explain the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC. Our theoretical model predicts that both financially constrained and unconstrained firms save when the COC is low to hedge against higher future COC (hypothesis 1a). To test this prediction, we follow previous studies to use credit ratings, the WW index (Whited and Wu (2006)), and the HP index (Hadlock and Pierce (2010)) to define financially constrained and unconstrained firms.¹⁸ Financially constrained (unconstrained) firms are defined as firms without (with) credit ratings or firms in the top (bottom) 30 percent of the WW or HP index.

The results presented in Table 4 show that the coefficients on the COC are all negative and significant, indicating that both financially constrained and unconstrained firms save more when the COC is relatively low. The estimated coefficients of $ExCapital \times COC$ are negative and significant

¹⁸Another financial constraint measure is that developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), which identifies constrained firms based on textual analysis of firms' annual reports. Since this measure is only available for 1997-2015, we do not use it as one of the main measures of financial constraints.

for both constrained and unconstrained firms. Firms' cash saving from external capital in response to the COC is also economically significant in both financially constrained and unconstrained firms. When $ExCapital \times COC$ decreases by one standard deviation, the cash saving of financially unconstrained (constrained) firms increases by 7.49% (10.73%) standard deviation based on the HP index. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1a and suggest that the time-varying COC is an important consideration for cash saving decisions of both constrained and unconstrained firms.

6. Shocks to the COC

An endogeneity concern may arise if firms' cash saving affects their COC or if other confounding factors drive the observed relationship. To ease this concern and buttress the causal effects of the COC on cash saving, we exploit two plausibly exogenous events that affect firms' COC.

6.1 Regulation Fair Disclosure

In the first quasi-experiment, we use Reg FD as a shock to the COC and investigate whether firms experiencing a greater reduction in their COC during the post-Reg FD period save more from external capital than firms experiencing a smaller reduction in their COC. Reg FD, which was implemented on October 23, 2000, prohibits the selective disclosure of material information to a subset of market participants, such as analysts and institutional investors, without simultaneously disclosing such information to the public. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) believed that Reg FD would encourage investor participation in capital markets by curtailing the practice of selective information disclosure, thereby lowering the COC ([Chen et al. \(2010\)](#)). Such reduction in the COC caused by Reg FD is considered exogenous to individual firm fundamentals.

Prior studies suggest that the effects of selective disclosure before Reg FD is more pronounced

for firms with high market-to-book ratio, since these firms face greater growth opportunities and are more difficult to value and more likely to disclose material information privately to selected investors (Gintschel and Markov (2004), and Hutton (2005)). Accordingly, we use the M/B ratio to classify firms into treated and control groups. Specifically, treatment and control firms are defined as the top and bottom 30% ranked by the M/B ratio in 1999, respectively. We set the *Post* dummy to one for 2000-2003 and zero for 1996-1999.

We first verify whether treatment firms experience a greater decrease in their COC than control firms following Reg FD. Panel A of Table 5 reports the results. The coefficient estimates of $Treated \times Post$ are negative and significant in all regressions, which confirms that treatment firms have a larger drop in the COE, COD, and COC after Reg FD. We next examine whether treatment firms save more from external capital than control firms in the post-Reg FD period as the consequence of reduced COC. Column 1 in Panel B of Table 5 shows that the coefficient estimate of triple interaction term $Treated \times ExCapital \times Post$ is positive and significant, indicating that cash saving from external capital increases significantly among treatment firms relative to control firms following Reg FD.¹⁹

We also conduct placebo tests based on the fictitious event years of 1992 and 2013. The sample period is 8 years surrounding the fictitious event year. The results of the placebo tests reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Panel B show that the coefficient estimates of $Treated \times ExCapital \times Post$ are insignificant. Thus, the results appear to be unique to Reg FD and are less likely due to other confounding factors. These findings increase our confidence that the COC has a causal impact on cash saving from external capital.

It is also possible that the above results simply capture pre-existing divergent trends or differ-

¹⁹Since Reg FD was implemented during the period of tech bubble, one may be concerned that the results might be driven by high-tech firms. To address this concern, we exclude firms in high-tech industries and find similar results.

ences between treatment and control groups that are unrelated to the shock to the COC. To explore this possibility, we investigate the dynamics of firms' cash saving from external capital surrounding the shock. If this alternative explanation holds true, we should observe more cash saving from external capital by the treatment firms prior to Reg FD. To test this possibility, we replace *Post* with year indicator variables associated with the years surrounding Reg FD. Figure 4 presents the coefficient estimates of the triple interaction term $Treated \times ExCapital \times Year$ with the 90% confidence interval. As shown in the figure, the differences in the sensitivities of cash saving to external capital between treatment and control groups are close to zero before Reg FD. However, treatment firms save significantly more cash from external capital than control firms after Reg FD. Therefore, it is less likely that our results are driven by pre-existing divergent trends in treatment and control firms or reverse causality.

6.2 Hedging Motive

Our model suggests that in the presence of the time-varying COC, firms with a high correlation between their COC and external financing needs (high hedging motive) have greater incentives to raise external capital and save cash at a relatively low COC. As noted in Figure 2 Panel B, firms with high hedging motives save more cash when their COC is lower relative to its historical mean, whereas such a downward-sloping relationship is much weaker for firms with low hedging motives. In this section, we formally test the hedging motive hypotheses 1b, 1c, and 1d of our theoretical model.

6.2.1 Hedging Motive Measures

We measure the hedging motive by the regression coefficient of external capital needs on the COC.²⁰ We follow [Shyam-Sunder and Myers \(1999\)](#), [Frank and Goyal \(2003\)](#), and [Byoun \(2008\)](#) to capture firms' needs for external capital as follows:

$$ExNeeds = (Div + Acq + Inv - ICF1)/TA, \quad (12)$$

where *Div* is the cash dividend; *Acq* is acquisitions; *Inv* is net investments; *ICF1* is income before extraordinary (ibc) items plus depreciation and amortization (dpc) and *TA* is total assets at the beginning of the period. To measure the hedging motive, we obtain annual external capital needs and compute their regression coefficients on individual firms' COC over the sample period. Based on the hedging motive measure, we define firms in the top 30 percent as high hedging motive firms and those in the bottom 30 percent as low hedging motive firms and remove the middle 40 percent. Our untabulated analysis shows that firms with high hedging motives have greater needs for external capital, higher COC, higher M/B ratios, and higher internal cash flows than firms with low hedging motives. The COC of firms with high hedging motives is more volatile than that of firms with low hedging motives.

6.2.2 Hedging Motive and Cash Saving

To test hypothesis 1b that firms with high hedging motives save more from external capital when the COC is relatively low, we examine whether the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC is more pronounced among firms with high hedging motives. We divide the sample into high and low hedging motive firms based on the hedging motive measure and report the results in Panel A of Table 6. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term between external finance and the COC ($ExCapital \times$

²⁰The hedging motive measured by the regression coefficient is consistent with γ in our model. In an earlier version of the paper, we also measure the hedging motive based on the correlation coefficient between the COC and external capital needs. The results are similar.

COC) is significant and negative only among high hedging motive firms, indicating that firms with greater hedging motives save more from external capital when the *COC* is relatively low. Since our regression estimations control for R&D expenditure, cash flow volatility, and dividends that have been used as proxies for the precautionary motive in the literature (McLean, 2011), these results also indicate that firms' cash saving decisions are influenced by the hedging motive, which goes beyond the precautionary purpose.

We further test the hypothesis 1b in the setting of Reg FD to establish the causal effects of the *COC* on firms' cash saving. We divide the Reg FD sample into high and low hedging motive firms based on the hedging motive measure. As shown in Table 6 Panel B, the coefficient estimate of $Treated \times ExCapital \times Post$ is only significant for firms with high hedging motives, indicating that firms with high hedging motive that experience a larger decline in the *COC* after Reg FD save more from external capital than control firms. These results provide support for hypothesis 1b that firms with high hedging motives save more when the *COC* is relatively low.

6.2.3 Hedging Motive and Excess Capital Issuance

According to hypothesis 1c, firms with greater hedging motives issue excess capital when the *COC* is relatively low. To test this prediction, we define excess capital issuance as net external capital issues minus financial deficit, which represents the portion of external capital saved as cash. We regress excess capital issuance on the *COC* while controlling for firm characteristics, firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the coefficient estimate of the *COC* is negative and significant only for firms with high hedging motives, which suggests that high hedging motive firms issue more external capital in excess of current financial needs when the *COC* is lower. We also use the Reg FD sample to test whether treated firms issue more excess capital than control

firms after Reg FD, conditional on hedging motives. In Panel B, the results show that the coefficient estimate of $Treated \times Post$ is only significant for firms with high hedging motives. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1c that firms with high hedging motives issue excess external capital to save when the COC is lower.

6.2.4 Future Investment and Cash Savings

Our hedging motive hypothesis suggests that firms save cash at the currently low COC to meet their future capital needs. To verify that firms with high hedging motives save cash from external capital to fund future investments, we estimate the following regression:

$$\Delta Cash_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 FInvestment_{it} + \alpha_2 COC_{it} + \alpha_3 FInvestment_{it} \times COC_{it} + \alpha_4 ICF_{it} + \alpha_5 X_{it-1} + f_i + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (13)$$

where $FInvestment_{it}$ is the future investment at time t of firm i , defined as the average of investment scaled by lagged total assets in the subsequent two years.²¹ The same set of control variables in equation (11) and ICF are included to control for the effects of other factors on cash saving. We estimate equation (13) separately for firms with high and low hedging motives. Since the incentive to save cash from external capital for future expected investment will be greater when facing a relatively low COC, we expect α_3 to have a negative sign, especially for firms with high hedging motives.

Table 8 Panel A reports the results for high and low hedging motive firms. The coefficient estimate of the interaction term between future investment and COC ($FInvestment \times COC$) is negative and significant only for high hedging motive firms, indicating that cash saving of firms with high hedging motives is more sensitive to the COC when they expect more future investment. We

²¹Realized future investment will be positively correlated with managers' ex ante expected investment. The use of realized future investment for expected investment is consistent with the use of future stock returns for expected stock returns in previous studies (Baker et al. (2003) and DeAngelo et al. (2010)).

also test whether future investment affects firms' current cash saving for firms with high hedging motives using the Reg FD sample. As shown in Panel B, the coefficient of $Treated \times Post \times FInvestment$ is positive and significant only for firms with high hedging motives. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1d that future investment affects high hedging motive firms' incentives to save more from external capital when the COC is lower.

6.3 Monetary Policy Shocks

To further strengthen the causal effect of the COC on cash saving, we adopt another identification strategy that explores monetary policy shocks as plausibly exogenous shocks to firms' COC. Particularly, we employ the unified measure of monetary policy shocks that effectively bridges periods of both conventional and unconventional policymaking developed by [Bu, Rogers, and Wu \(2021\)](#). The idea behind construction of this measurement is to apply [Fama and MacBeth \(1973\)](#) two-step regression method to estimate unobservable monetary policy shocks. In the first step, time-series regressions are performed to estimate the sensitivity (beta) of interest rate changes at maturities of one to thirty years to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements. In the second step, a cross-sectional regression of interest rate changes across different maturities against the corresponding estimated betas obtained from the first step is estimated for each year to recover the aligned monetary policy shock. The series of estimated coefficients obtained from the second-step regressions represents the monetary policy shock series. As demonstrated in [Bu et al. \(2021\)](#), this monetary policy shock series is not only largely unpredictable based on the available economic information, but also contains no significant central bank information effect even if the short rate and long rates are affected differently by the information effect as in [Hansen et al. \(2019\)](#).

Previous studies show that monetary policy shocks affect the COC by influencing equity premia,

term premia, and credit spreads (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Hanson and Stein, 2015). A more positive monetary policy shock reflects a tighter monetary policy, which should raise the overall financing costs. Using monetary policy shocks as exogenous shocks to the firm-level COC, we examine how these shocks affect cash saving from external capital across firms with different monetary policy exposures.

The literature suggests that the impacts of monetary policy shocks on firms' COC depend on firms' exposure to monetary policy, which goes beyond simple adjustments to the risk-free rate (Ippolito et al., 2018; Ozdagli and Velikov, 2020). Firms with different characteristics react differently to monetary policy. To capture firms' responses to monetary policy, Ozdagli and Velikov (2020) develop a monetary policy exposure (MPE) index based on observable firm characteristics that previous studies link to monetary policy. These firm characteristics capture the effects of various monetary policy transmission mechanisms documented in the literature, including the credit channel, balance sheet liquidity, the discount rate effect, and nominal rigidities. They show that this MPE index captures the multidimensional nature of the cross-sectional variation in policy sensitivity and outperforms other methods of estimating monetary policy exposure. Following their study, we construct the MPE index as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 MPE = & -1.60 \times WW - 0.87 \times Cash + 0.63 \times CFDuration \\
 & + 4.36 \times CFVolatility - 5.74 \times Operating Profitability,
 \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

where *WW* is the *WW* index. *Cash*, *CF Duration*, *CF Volatility*, and *Operating Profitability* capture a firm's liquid assets, expected duration of cash flows, cash flow volatility, and profitability, respectively. We define *Treated* as a dummy variable that equals one (zero) if a firm has an MPE index in the top (bottom) tercile.

We first investigate whether monetary policy shocks have differential effects on external financing costs of treated firms than on those of control firms. Table 9 Panel A shows that the coefficient estimates on $Treated \times Shock$ are positive and significant for both COD and COC, indicating that firms with more exposure to contractionary monetary policy shocks experience a greater increase in their external financing costs relative to those with less exposure.

We then examine the impacts of monetary policy shocks on firms' cash saving from external capital by estimating the following model:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta Cash_{it} = & \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 Treated_{it} + \lambda_2 Treated_{it} \times ExCapital_{it} + \lambda_4 Treated_{it} \times Shock_t \\
& + \lambda_5 ExCapital_{it} \times Shock_t + \lambda_6 Treated_{it} \times ExCapital_{it} \times Shock_t \\
& + \lambda_7 ExCapital_{it} + \lambda_8 ICF_{it} + \lambda_9 X_{it-1} + f_i + \eta_t + \varepsilon_{it}
\end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

where $Shock$ is a dummy variable that equals one if the average monetary policy shock over a year is above the mean and zero otherwise; X_{it-1} contains a set of control variables as defined previously; and f_i and η_t are firm and year fixed effects, respectively.

The estimation results are reported in Table 9 Panel B.²² In Column 1, the coefficient estimate of $Treated \times ExCapital$ is positive and significant, indicating that firms with more exposure to monetary policy save more from external capital than firms with less exposure. The variable of interest is $Treated \times ExCapital \times Shock$. The negative and significant coefficient estimate suggests that contractionary shocks to monetary policy, which increase the COC, cause less cash saving from external capital by firms with greater exposure to monetary policy relative to firms with less exposure.

²²Since the monetary policy shock measure of Bu et al. (2021) is available from 1994 when the Fed started releasing public statements about monetary policy decisions, the analysis in this section is restricted to this period.

To ease the concern that other confounding factors may drive the results, we conduct placebo tests by generating monetary policy shocks randomly from the standard normal distribution. If our results are due to other factors that are correlated with the COC, we expect similar results from placebo tests to those in Column 1. As shown in Columns 2 and 3, the coefficient estimates on $Treated \times ExCapital \times Shock$ are insignificant, which indicates that the observed difference in cash saving from external capital between treatment and control firms in Column 1 is due to monetary policy shocks that exogenously affects the COC. Overall, these results suggest that the COC has a causal impact on firms' cash saving decisions from external capital.

In Table 10, we also conduct tests for the effects of monetary policy shocks on cash saving, excess external capital issuance, and cash saving for future investment, conditional on hedging motives. In Panel A for cash saving, the coefficient estimate of $Treated \times ExCapital \times Shock$ is negative and significant only for high hedging motive firms, suggesting that more contractionary monetary policy, which increases the COC, causes less saving by firms with high hedging motives. However, we do not find similar effects for firms with low hedging motives, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient estimate of $Treated \times ExCapital \times Shock$. In Panel B for excess capital issuance, the coefficient estimate of $Treated \times Shock$ is negative and significant only for high hedging motive firms, suggesting that tighter monetary policy causes less excess external capital issuance by firms with high hedging motive. Thus, our results suggest that high hedging motive firms save less from external capital in response to increases in the COC stemming from monetary policy shocks. In Panel C for the cash saving for future investment, the coefficient estimates of $Treated \times Shock \times Finvestment$ is negative and significant only for high hedging motive firms, which is consistent with the view that future investment affects high hedging motive firms' incentives to save cash from external capital in response to shocks to the COC.

6.4 Robustness

Although we show that the COC has a significant impact on cash saving in the quasi-natural experiment settings, an endogeneity concern may still exist due to measurement errors in the COC. As a remedy for measurement errors in the COC, we estimate the model using high-order cumulants as suggested by [Erickson et al. \(2014\)](#). Table [E1](#) in Internet Appendix [E](#) reports the estimation results. The coefficient estimates of the interaction between external capital and the COC in Panel A are negative and significant for high hedging motive firms but insignificant for lower hedging motive firms (Columns 1 and 2). These results are consistent with those reported in previous tables.

[McKeon \(2015\)](#) shows that external equity issuance can be driven by employees' exercise of stock options, which is unlikely to reveal managers' motives to raise external capital. To control for the effects of such employee-initiated issuances, we restrict our sample to firms that raise at least 3% or 5% of external capital raised. Since the results are similar when using these two thresholds, we report the estimation results using 3% as the threshold. Columns 3 and 4 in Panel A of Table [E1](#) show that the coefficient estimates remain negative and significant for high hedging motive firms and insignificant for low hedging motive firms, indicating that our results are not driven by employee-initiated equity issuance.

As shown in Figure [E.1](#), the opposite movements of cash and the COC are the most pronounced in high-tech industries. To examine whether our results are driven by firms in high-tech industries, we exclude firms in the business equipment, telephone and television transmission sectors based on Fama-French 5 industry classifications. Columns 5 and 6 in Panel A of Table [E1](#) show that our results remain similar after excluding firms in high-tech industries.

We also examine whether our results are robust to alternative measures of the COC by using

the [Claus and Thomas \(2001\)](#) and [Li, Ng, and Swaminathan \(2013\)](#) approaches as specified in Internet Appendix D. There may still be concerns that these models rely on analyst forecasts for future earnings that are not available for all firms and that analyst forecasts may be biased. To mitigate these concerns, we adopt an alternative approach to forecast future earnings without relying on analyst forecasts. [Li and Mohanram \(2014\)](#) propose the use of two cross-sectional models to estimate future earnings: the earning persistence (EP) and residual income (RI) models. They show that the RI model outperforms the cross-sectional model developed by [Hou et al. \(2012\)](#) and EP models in forecasting future EPS. Therefore, we use the [Li and Mohanram \(2014\)](#) RI model approach to forecast future EPS and estimate the implied cost of equity using the [Gebhardt et al. \(2001\)](#) model. The results shown in Table E1 Panel B demonstrate that our findings are robust to these alternative COC measures.

Additionally, we investigate the robustness of our results to different time periods. To this end, we partition our sample into two subperiods: 1981-1999 and 2000-2019 and perform the tests. We observe about 60 per cent of high (low) hedging motive firms in the first subperiod remain high (low) hedging motive firms in the second subperiod. As shown in Panels C of Table E1, the coefficients on $ExCapital \times COC$ remain significant and negative for firms with high hedging motives, but insignificant for firms with low hedging motives. These results indicate that our main findings are not specific to a particular sample period.

To further check the robustness of our results, we construct two additional hedging motive measures. For the first alternative hedging motive measure (Hedging Motive 1), we measure external finance following [Rajan and Zingales \(1998\)](#) as $External = (CapEx - OCF) / CapEx$, where $CapEx$ is capital expenditures; and OCF is the operating income before depreciation and amortization. The industry median $External$ based on the 2-digit SIC code is used as the proxy for external

capital needs. To construct the second alternative hedging motive measure (Hedging Motive 2), we follow [Baker, Stein, and Wurgler \(2003\)](#) and use the revised KZ index to measure external finance dependence as follows $KZ = -1.002CF - 39.368DIV - 1.315CASH + 3.139LEV$, where CF is the operating income before depreciation and amortization divided by net property, plant and equipment at the beginning of the period (PPE); DIV is cash dividend divided by PPE; $CASH$ is cash and equivalents divided by PPE; and LEV is long-term debt divided by long-term debt plus total equity. To measure hedging motive, we obtain annual external capital needs and compute their regression coefficients on individual firms' COC over the sample period. Table [E1](#) Panel D shows that the coefficient estimates of $ExCapital \times COC$ remain significant and negative for firms with high hedging motives, but insignificant for firms with low hedging motives. Thus, our results are robust to alternative hedging motive measures.

Finally, in Internet Appendix Section [C](#), we also consider whether alternative theories explain our findings. The results in Table [E2](#) of Internet Appendix [E](#) indicate that the sensitivity of cash saving to the time-varying COC cannot be fully explained by alternative theories such as the [Acharya et al. \(2007\)](#) hedging perspective (Panel A), the market timing (Panel B), the precautionary motive (Panel C), or the market timing and precautionary motives ([Bolton et al. \(2013\)](#)) (Panels D and E). These results suggest that our findings cannot be explained by simply intersecting the market timing and precautionary motives. Moreover, the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC is particularly pronounced for high hedging motive firms regardless of credit risk (Panel F) and agency risk (Panel G).

7. Conclusions and Discussions

We develop a theoretical model showing that in the presence of a time-varying cost of capital, firms channel funds into future states with a high COC by saving cash from external capital when the current COC is relatively low. Such intertemporal smoothing of the COC matters because a higher future COC could impose financial constraints, even if firms face no immediate constraints. When a firm expects a higher COC for future investments, it will increase cash saving from external capital at a low cost to lower the *overall* COC. The time-varying COC induces firms to hedge future investments against higher COC. Accordingly, cash saving and excess external financing should show a greater sensitivity to the COC for firms with greater hedging needs.

Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that both financially constrained and unconstrained firms save more cash from external capital when the COC is relatively low. The cash saving of firms with greater hedging needs is particularly sensitive to the COC. Firms with greater hedging needs tend to issue excess external capital to save when the COC is relatively low. Firms expecting greater future investment and having greater hedging needs save more when they face a lower COC. Furthermore, the impact of the COE on firms' cash saving from equity issues is stronger than the impact of the COD on cash saving from debt issues. Moreover, the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC cannot be fully explained by other alternative motives.

In summary, our study illustrates that firms' hedging motive to transfer funds from a low COC state to a higher COC state through cash saving is an important consideration for corporate cash saving policies. This novel hedging motive for cash saving goes beyond integrating the precautionary and market timing motives in that expected capital needs for future investments (as distinct from precautionary needs) are the main driver of the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC. Previous studies show that credit lines also play an important role in firms' liquidity and risk management

([Sufi \(2009\)](#) and [Acharya et al. \(2014\)](#)). How the time-varying COC affects firms' choice between cash and credit lines is an interesting issue. Extending our theoretical framework and empirical results to answer this question seems a fruitful area for future research.

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Figure 1: Cash Holdings versus Cost of Capital

Panel A plots firms' average cash holdings relative to the level of the cost of capital for all firms from 1981 to 2019 and Panel B shows the scatter plot between annual average cash holdings and the COC. Cash is cash and equivalents divided by total assets.




Figure 2: Cost of Capital and Cash Saving

The figure presents firms' cash saving across deciles of the deviation of the cost of capital from its historical average for firms with a minimum of three years of observations for the 1981-2019 sample period and the 1981-1999 and 2000-2019 subsample periods (Panel A), firms with high hedging motives and firms with low hedging motives (Panel B). Cash saving denotes the changes in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year.





Figure 3: Cash Saving versus Future Investment

This figure plots firms' cash saving relative to future investment deciles. Future investment is defined as the two subsequent year average of net investment. Cash saving is the current year change in cash and equivalents divided by lagged total assets.




Figure 4: Dynamics of the Effects

This figure plots the differences in the sensitivities of cash saving to external capital around the adoption of Reg FD in October 2000 between the treated and control firms. The treatment control firms are classified based on the top and bottom 30% of M/B ratio in 1999.




Table 1: Summary Statistics

This table reports the summary statistics of firm characteristics (Panel A) and standard deviation of the cost of capital cross firms and over time (Panel B). $\Delta Cash$ is the change in cash and equivalents (*Cash*) divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. *ExCapital* and *ICF* are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively. *NWC* is net working capital excluding cash and equivalents. *M/B* is the market-to-book asset ratio. *Vol* is cash flow volatility. *CapEx* denotes capital expenditures. *COE* denotes cost of equity. *COD* denotes cost of debt. *COC* is the weighted average of cost of capital. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix.

| Panel A: Summary Statistics | | | |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------|--------------------|
| | Mean | Median | Standard Deviation |
| $\Delta Cash$ | 0.0157 | 0.0020 | 0.1105 |
| Cash | 0.1272 | 0.0664 | 0.1507 |
| ExCapital | 0.0381 | 0.0019 | 0.1513 |
| ICF | 0.1088 | 0.1009 | 0.0829 |
| Size | 6.8655 | 6.7158 | 1.9377 |
| M/B | 1.7446 | 1.3929 | 1.0033 |
| Vol | 0.0200 | 0.0170 | 0.0151 |
| Dividend | 0.0143 | 0.0052 | 0.0201 |
| Leverage | 0.2268 | 0.2143 | 0.1729 |
| NWC | 0.0748 | 0.0489 | 0.1697 |
| CapEx | 0.1183 | 0.0796 | 0.1393 |
| Acquisitions | 0.0395 | 0.0000 | 0.1550 |
| R&D | 0.0271 | 0.0000 | 0.0528 |
| COE | 0.1220 | 0.0986 | 0.0858 |
| COD | 0.0678 | 0.0670 | 0.0343 |
| COC | 0.1011 | 0.0871 | 0.0549 |

| Panel B: Decomposition of Standard Deviation | | |
|--|---------------|-------------|
| | Cross-section | Time-series |
| COE | 0.0486 | 0.0691 |
| COD | 0.0272 | 0.0246 |
| COC | 0.0316 | 0.0435 |

Table 2: Sensitivities of Cash Saving to Cash Sources

This table reports cash saving from external capital and internal cash flows (Panel A), and cash saving from equity issues and debt issues (Panel B). The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. *ExCapital* and *ICF* are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively. Control variables include *Leverage*, the leverage ratio; *Size*; *NWC*, net working capital excluding cash and equivalents; *M/B*, the market-to-book asset ratio; *Vol*, cash flow volatility, *CapEx*, capital expenditures; *Acquisitions*; *Dividend*; and *lagged Cash*. In Panel A, firm fixed effects are included in Column 2. Year fixed effects are included in Column 3. Firm and year fixed effects are included in Column 4. Standardized beta coefficients are reported in Column 5. In Panel B, *Eissue* and *Dissue* are equity issues and debt issues, respectively. The specific variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| Panel A: External Capital vs Internal Cash Flows | | | | | |
|--|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| ExCapital | 0.5385*** [0.0136] | 0.5584*** [0.0141] | 0.5413*** [0.0136] | 0.5557*** [0.0140] | 0.7702 |
| ICF | 0.4566*** [0.0102] | 0.4628*** [0.0117] | 0.4608*** [0.0104] | 0.4583*** [0.0117] | 0.3718 |
| Cash | -0.0535*** [0.0041] | -0.1770*** [0.0076] | -0.0564*** [0.0042] | -0.1844*** [0.0077] | -0.0775 |
| M/B | 0.0080*** [0.0006] | 0.0072*** [0.0009] | 0.0087*** [0.0007] | 0.0081*** [0.0009] | 0.0821 |
| Vol | -0.0288 [0.0222] | 0.1588*** [0.0382] | -0.0197 [0.0234] | 0.0810** [0.0402] | -0.0043 |
| Dividend | -0.7700*** [0.0221] | -0.7629*** [0.0403] | -0.7764*** [0.0226] | -0.7478*** [0.0412] | -0.1546 |
| Leverage | -0.0273*** [0.0021] | -0.0115** [0.0050] | -0.0254*** [0.0022] | -0.004 [0.0051] | -0.0465 |
| Size | -0.0007*** [0.0002] | -0.0052*** [0.0007] | -0.0011*** [0.0002] | -0.0141*** [0.0012] | -0.014 |
| NWC | -0.0403*** [0.0026] | 0.0567*** [0.0069] | -0.0392*** [0.0026] | 0.0642*** [0.0070] | -0.0639 |
| CapEx | -0.5042*** [0.0109] | -0.5511*** [0.0118] | -0.5037*** [0.0109] | -0.5466*** [0.0117] | -0.6762 |
| Acquisitions | -0.0608*** [0.0078] | -0.0478*** [0.0082] | -0.0611*** [0.0078] | -0.0496*** [0.0081] | -0.0909 |
| R&D | 0.1177*** [0.0097] | -0.0201 [0.0408] | 0.1155*** [0.0096] | -0.0353 [0.0401] | 0.0621 |
| Firm FEs | No | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Year FEs | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| Observations | 76,821 | 76,821 | 76,821 | 76,821 | 76,821 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.3552 | 0.411 | 0.3625 | 0.4197 | 0.3552 |

| Panel B: Equity vs Debt | | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Eissue | 0.4510*** [0.0149] | | | 0.6622*** [0.0185] |
| Dissue | | 0.0828*** [0.0074] | | 0.4522*** [0.0131] |
| ICF | | | 0.2770*** [0.0079] | 0.4361*** [0.0112] |
| Controls | No | No | No | Yes |
| Firm FEs | No | No | No | Yes |
| Year FEs | No | No | No | Yes |
| Observations | 82,565 | 82,565 | 82,565 | 76,821 |
| <i>Adj. R</i> ² | 0.1574 | 0.007 | 0.0431 | 0.4355 |

Table 3: The Cost of Capital and Cash Saving

This table reports the sensitivities of cash saving to the cost of capital, the cost of equity, the cost of debt and sources of cash. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. *COC* is the weighted average cost of capital. *ExCapital* and *ICF* are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. *COE* is the cost of equity. *COD* is the cost of debt. *Eissue* and *Dissue* are equity issues and debt issues, respectively. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| | (1) | (2) |
|---------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| COC | -0.0219** [0.0111] | |
| ExCapital | 0.6101*** [0.0260] | |
| ExCapital×COC | -0.7984*** [0.2163] | |
| COE | | -0.0171*** [0.0055] |
| COD | | -0.0934*** [0.0177] |
| Eissue | | 0.7072*** [0.0361] |
| Dissue | | 0.4407*** [0.0158] |
| Eissue×COE | | -0.6546* [0.3423] |
| Dissue×COD | | 0.0123 [0.1374] |
| ICF | 0.4546*** [0.0116] | 0.4355*** [0.0111] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 76,821 | 76,821 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.4210 | 0.4296 |

Table 4: Constrained versus Unconstrained Firms

This table compares the sensitivities of cash saving to the cost of capital and sources of cash between financially constrained and unconstrained firms (hypothesis 1a). Constrained and unconstrained firms are defined as firms that do not have a credit rating and firms that have a credit rating (Columns 1 and 2), firms at the top and bottom 30% of the WW index (Whited and Wu (2006)) (Columns 3 and 4), and firms at the top and bottom 30% of the HP index (Hadlock and Pierce (2010)) (Columns 5 and 6), respectively. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. *ExCapital* and *ICF* are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled for. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| | Rating | | WW Index | | HP Index | |
|---------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | Unconstrained | Constrained | Unconstrained | Constrained | Unconstrained | Constrained |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| COC | -0.0341** [0.0165] | -0.0411** [0.0187] | -0.0224* [0.0125] | -0.0338* [0.0197] | -0.0294** [0.0122] | -0.034 [0.0220] |
| ExCapital | 0.5412*** [0.0494] | 0.6461*** [0.0357] | 0.5099*** [0.0358] | 0.7060*** [0.0387] | 0.5107*** [0.0280] | 0.6840*** [0.0424] |
| ICF | 0.2955*** [0.0168] | 0.5158*** [0.0156] | 0.3569*** [0.0173] | 0.4762*** [0.0136] | 0.3574*** [0.0157] | 0.5007*** [0.0160] |
| ExCapital×COC | -0.8427** [0.3486] | -0.7143** [0.3215] | -0.6503*** [0.2451] | -1.3026*** [0.3532] | -0.5638*** [0.2075] | -1.1054*** [0.3893] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 28,885 | 38,808 | 38,670 | 37,213 | 39,284 | 36,847 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.3941 | 0.4573 | 0.3998 | 0.4633 | 0.3951 | 0.4638 |

Table 5: The Effect of Shocks to the Cost of Capital on Cash Saving

This table reports the effects of shocks to the firm-level cost of capital on cash saving. We use Regulation Fair Disclosure of 2000 as a shock to the cost of capital. The dependent variable is the cost of equity, the cost of debt, and the weighted average cost of capital, respectively in Panel A and the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year in Panel B. We set the *Post* dummy to zero for 1996-1999 and one for 2000-2003. The treated and control firms are classified based on the top and bottom 30% of M/B ratio in 1999. Panel B Columns 2 and 3 report the results of placebo tests based on fictitious event years 1992 and 2013, respectively. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled for. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| Panel A: The Impact on the COC | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | COE | COD | COC |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Treated×Post | -0.0362*** [0.0027] | -0.0063*** [0.0014] | -0.0238*** [0.0017] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 11,970 | 11,970 | 11,970 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.6579 | 0.4676 | 0.6873 |

| Panel B: The Impact on Cash Saving | | | |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Reg FD | Placebo 1 | Placebo 2 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Treated×Post | 0.0102* [0.0052] | 0.0071** [0.0035] | -0.0075* [0.0038] |
| ExCapital×Post | 0.0408 [0.0420] | 0.0804*** [0.0300] | -0.0227 [0.0306] |
| Treated×ExCapital×Post | 0.3093*** [0.1149] | -0.0984 [0.0610] | -0.0559 [0.0578] |
| Treated×ExCapital | -0.0657 [0.0615] | 0.0641 [0.0408] | 0.1159** [0.0487] |
| ExCapital | 0.6155*** [0.0431] | 0.4152*** [0.0279] | 0.6863*** [0.0306] |
| ICF | 0.4109*** [0.0336] | 0.4540*** [0.0261] | 0.4163*** [0.0242] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 11,970 | 8,730 | 10,914 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.3652 | 0.4339 | 0.5647 |

Table 6: Hedging Motive

This table compares the impacts of the cost of capital on the sensitivities of cash saving to external capital between firms with high and low hedging motives (hypothesis 1b). The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. *ExCapital* and *ICF* are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. High and low hedging motive firms are defined as those in the top 30 percent and those in the bottom 30 percent based on the hedging motive measure. In Panel A, the full sample is partitioned into high and low hedging motive firms. In Panel B, the Reg FD sample is partitioned into high and low hedging motive firms. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled for. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| Panel A: Full Sample | | |
|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) |
| COC | -0.0929*** [0.0197] | 0.0692*** [0.0163] |
| ExCapital | 0.7189*** [0.0592] | 0.4103*** [0.0341] |
| ICF | 0.4549*** [0.0217] | 0.3071*** [0.0196] |
| ExCapital×COC | -2.0920*** [0.4246] | -0.2225 [0.2700] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 23,202 | 23,194 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.4217 | 0.2919 |
| Panel B: Reg FD Sample | | |
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Treated×Post | 0.0318* [0.0180] | -0.0027 [0.0072] |
| ExCapital×Post | -0.0087 [0.1552] | 0.0023 [0.0564] |
| Treated×ExCapital×Post | 0.7251** [0.3415] | 0.2354 [0.2008] |
| Treated×ExCapital | -0.2746 [0.1670] | 0.0179 [0.1039] |
| ExCapital | 0.5966*** [0.1059] | 0.4229*** [0.0643] |
| ICF | 0.4713*** [0.0864] | 0.2739*** [0.0395] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3,565 | 3,455 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.3186 | 0.3010 |

Table 7: Excess Capital Issuance and Cash Saving

This table compares the sensitivities of excess capital issuance to the cost of capital among firms with high and low hedging motives (hypothesis 1c) for the full sample (Panel A) and the Reg FD sample (Panel B). The dependent variable is excess capital issues. The COC is the weighted average cost of capital. High and low hedging motive firms are defined as those in the top 30 percent and those in the bottom 30 percent based on the hedging motive measure. In Panel A, the full sample is partitioned into high and low hedging motive firms. In Panel B, the Reg FD sample is partitioned into high and low hedging motive firms. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled for. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| Panel A: Full Sample | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) |
| COC | -0.9977*** [0.1169] | 0.0456 [0.0699] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 23,202 | 23,194 |
| <i>Adj. R</i> ² | 0.1401 | 0.1063 |
| Panel B: Reg FD Sample | | |
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Treated×Post | 0.0558*** [0.0126] | 0.0179 [0.0113] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3,565 | 3,455 |
| <i>Adj. R</i> ² | 0.3454 | 0.3334 |

Table 8: Cash Saving and Future Investment

This table compares the sensitivities of cash saving to future investment between firms with high and low hedging motives (hypothesis 1d) for the full sample (Panel A) and the Reg FD sample (Panel B). The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. *FInvestment* is future investment defined as the average of subsequent two years of capital expenditures plus acquisitions plus R&D divided by lagged total assets. High and low hedging motive firms are defined as those in the top 30 percent and those in the bottom 30 percent based on the hedging motive measure. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled for. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| Panel A: Full Sample | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) |
| FInvestment | 0.1499*** [0.0476] | 0.0477 [0.0295] |
| FInvestment \times COC | -1.0971*** [0.3011] | -0.0372 [0.2684] |
| COC | -0.1521*** [0.0341] | 0.0027 [0.0324] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 23,202 | 23,194 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.1969 | 0.1264 |

| Panel B: Reg FD Sample | | |
|--|----------------------|---------------------|
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) |
| FInvestment | 0.0012 [0.2342] | -0.0240 [0.1099] |
| FInvestment \times Post | 0.2298 [0.3613] | 0.0279 [0.0721] |
| Treated \times Post \times FInvestment | 0.4443** [0.2227] | 0.0236 [0.0969] |
| Treated \times Post | -0.0171 [0.0214] | -0.0022 [0.0136] |
| Treated \times Finvestment | -0.1625 [0.1803] | -0.1252 [0.1348] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 3,565 | 3,455 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.2223 | 0.1100 |

Table 9: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks on Cash Saving

This table reports the effects of plausible exogenous monetary policy shocks to the firm-level cost of capital on cash saving. Monetary policy shocks are captured using the unified measure developed by [Bu et al. \(2021\)](#). The dependent variable is the cost of equity, the cost of debt, and the weighted average cost of capital, respectively in Panel A and the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year in Panel B. The *Shock* dummy equals one if the average monetary policy shocks over a year is above the mean and zero otherwise. *Treated* is a dummy equal to one (zero) if a firm has the monetary policy exposure (MPE) index in the top (bottom) tertile, where the MPE index is constructed following [Ozdagli and Velikov \(2020\)](#). Panel B Columns 2 and 3 report the results of placebo tests based on randomly generated shocks from the standard normal distribution. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled for. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| Panel A: The Impact on the COC | | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | COE | COD | COC |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Treated×Shock | 0.0008 [0.0012] | 0.0023*** [0.0006] | 0.0011* [0.0006] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 24,949 | 24,949 | 24,949 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.4802 | 0.5210 | 0.5629 |
| Panel B: The Impact on Cash Saving | | | |
| | Monetary Policy Shocks | Placebo 1 | Placebo 2 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Treated | 0.0175*** [0.0037] | 0.0151*** [0.0037] | 0.0169*** [0.0037] |
| Treated×ExCapital | 0.1799*** [0.0344] | 0.1360*** [0.0291] | 0.1390*** [0.0336] |
| Treated×ExCapital×Shock | -0.0926** [0.0413] | -0.0229 [0.0379] | -0.0263 [0.0415] |
| Treated×Shock | -0.0014 [0.0018] | 0.0025 [0.0017] | -0.0002 [0.0017] |
| ExCapital×Shock | 0.0827*** [0.0236] | -0.0657*** [0.0223] | -0.0088 [0.0236] |
| ExCapital | 0.4724*** [0.0242] | 0.5617*** [0.0201] | 0.5264*** [0.0250] |
| ICF | 0.4475*** [0.0190] | 0.4477*** [0.0190] | 0.4466*** [0.0190] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 24,949 | 24,949 | 24,949 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.4684 | 0.4709 | 0.4681 |

Table 10: The Effect of Monetary Policy Shocks: High versus Low Hedging Motives

This table compares the effects of monetary shocks on cash saving (Panel A), excess issuance (Panel B), future investment (Panel C) between firms with high hedging motives and firms low hedging motives. The *Shock* dummy equals one if the average monetary policy shocks over a year is above the mean and zero otherwise. *Treated* is a dummy equal to one (zero) if a firm has the monetary policy exposure (MPE) index in the top (bottom) tercile and zero, where the MPE index is constructed following [Ozdagli and Velikov \(2020\)](#). Firm and year fixed effects are controlled for. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| Panel A: Cash Saving | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Treated | 0.0308*** [0.0073] | -0.0001 [0.0053] |
| Treated×ExCapital | 0.2689*** [0.0573] | 0.1058*** [0.0358] |
| Treated×ExCapital×Shock | -0.1840** [0.0770] | -0.0273 [0.0503] |
| Treated×Shock | -0.0049 [0.0031] | 0.002 [0.0028] |
| ExCapital×Shock | 0.0823* [0.0487] | 0.0715*** [0.0261] |
| ExCapital | 0.4852*** [0.0427] | 0.3133*** [0.0327] |
| ICF | 0.4601*** [0.0312] | 0.2987*** [0.0308] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7,509 | 6,921 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.4991 | 0.3245 |

| Panel B: Excess Issuance | | |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Treated | 0.1543*** [0.0311] | 0.0092 [0.0659] |
| Treated×Shock | -0.0334** [0.0160] | 0.0181 [0.0260] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 8,468 | 7,692 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.0895 | 0.0419 |

| Panel C: Future Investment | | |
|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Treated | 0.0164 [0.0127] | 0.0007 [0.0077] |
| Treated×Finvestment | 0.3337*** [0.1017] | 0.0732 [0.0499] |
| Treated×Shock×Finvestment | -0.1509* [0.0898] | 0.1064* [0.0597] |
| Treated×Shock | 0.0030 [0.0084] | -0.0068 [0.0054] |
| Shock×Finvestment | 0.1323** [0.0620] | -0.0391 [0.0453] |
| Finvestment | -0.3375*** [0.0768] | -0.1367*** [0.0530] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 7,509 | 6,921 |
| <i>Adj. R²</i> | 0.1718 | 0.1046 |

Internet Appendix

The Sensitivity of Cash Savings to the Cost of Capital

A. Model Proofs

A.1 Proof of Result 1 (Comparative Statistics)

To prove Result 1 on how the optimal cash saving, \hat{C}_0 and external finance \hat{X}_0 are affected by the COC, we differentiate the FOCs with respect to δ_0 in equations (2) to (4) as follows:

$$[\pi_{II}(I_0) - \delta_0] \frac{dX_0}{d\delta_0} - \pi_{II}(I_0) \frac{dC_0}{d\delta_0} = X_0 \quad (\text{A.1})$$

$$[\pi_{II}(I_1) - \delta_1] \frac{dX_1}{d\delta_0} + \pi_{II}(I_1) \frac{dC_0}{d\delta_0} = 0; \quad (\text{A.2})$$

$$-\pi_{II}(I_0) \frac{dX_0}{d\delta_0} + \pi_{II}(I_1) \frac{dX_1}{d\delta_0} + [\pi_{II}(I_0) + \pi_{II}(I_1)] \frac{dC_0}{d\delta_0} = 0. \quad (\text{A.3})$$

The determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the derivatives is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} D &= \begin{vmatrix} \pi_{II}(I_0) - \delta_0 & 0 & -\pi_{II}(I_0) \\ 0 & \pi_{II}(I_1) - \delta_1 & \pi_{II}(I_1) \\ -\pi_{II}(I_0) & \pi_{II}(I_1) & \pi_{II}(I_0) + \pi_{II}(I_1) \end{vmatrix} \\ &= \delta_0 \pi_{II}(I_0) [\delta_1 - \pi_{II}(I_1)] + \delta_1 \pi_{II}(I_1) [\delta_0 - \pi_{II}(I_0)] < 0. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.4})$$

By the implicit function theorem and Cramer's rule, we obtain the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial X_0}{\partial \delta_0} &= \frac{\begin{vmatrix} X_0 & 0 & -\pi_{II}(I_0) \\ 0 & \pi_{II}(I_1) - \delta_1 & \pi_{II}(I_1) \\ 0 & \pi_{II}(I_1) & \pi_{II}(I_0) + \pi_{II}(I_1) \end{vmatrix}}{D} \\ &= \frac{X_0 \{ \pi_{II}(I_0) \pi_{II}(I_1) - \delta_1 [\pi_{II}(I_0) + \pi_{II}(I_1)] \}}{D} < 0; \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.5})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial X_1}{\partial \delta_0} &= \frac{\begin{vmatrix} \pi_{II}(I_0) - \delta_0 & X_0 & -\pi_{II}(I_0) \\ 0 & 0 & \pi_{II}(I_1) \\ -\pi_{II}(I_0) & 0 & \pi_{II}(I_0) + \pi_{II}(I_1) \end{vmatrix}}{D} \\ &= \frac{-X_0 \pi_{II}(I_0) \pi_{II}(I_1)}{D} > 0; \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.6})$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial C_0}{\partial \delta_0} &= \frac{\begin{vmatrix} \pi_{II}(I_0) - \delta_0 & 0 & X_0 \\ 0 & \pi_{II}(I_1) - \delta_1 & 0 \\ -\pi_{II}(I_0) & \pi_{II}(I_1) & 0 \end{vmatrix}}{D} \\
&= \frac{X_0 \pi_{II}(I_0) [\pi_{II}(I_1) - \delta_1]}{D} < 0;
\end{aligned} \tag{A.7}$$

$$\frac{\partial I_0}{\partial \delta_0} = \frac{\partial X_0}{\partial \delta_0} - \frac{\partial C_0}{\partial \delta_0} = \frac{-X_0 \delta_1 \pi_{II}(I_1)}{D} < 0. \tag{A.8}$$

These results suggest that the firm decreases external finance and cash saving, while increasing future external finance, when facing a higher external finance cost currently.

A.2 First-order conditions

The Lagrangian for the maximization problem at $t = 0$ can be written as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
L &= \max_{(X_0, I_0, C_0)} \pi(I_0) - X_0 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma \delta_0 X_0^2 + \mu [W_0 + X_0 - C_0 - I_0] \\
&\quad + \int_{I_1^* - C_0}^{\infty} \{ \tilde{\pi}(I_1^*) - I_1^* + W_1 \} g(z) dz + \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^* - C_0} \left\{ \tilde{\pi}(I_1) - I_1 + W_1 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma \tilde{\delta}_1 X_1^2 \right\} g(z) dz,
\end{aligned}$$

where μ is a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint. Applying the Leibnitz integral rule, the FOCs are as follows:

$$\frac{\partial L_0}{\partial I_0} = \pi_I(I_0) - \mu = 0; \tag{A.9}$$

$$\frac{\partial L_0}{\partial X_0} = -1 - \gamma \delta_0 X_0 + \mu = 0; \tag{A.10}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\partial L_0}{\partial C_0} &= -\mu + 1 + [\tilde{\pi}(I_1^*) - I_1^*] g(I_1^* - C_0) \\
&\quad + \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^* - C_0} \left\{ \tilde{\pi}_I(I_1) - 1 + \gamma \tilde{\delta}_1 X_1 \right\} g(z) dz \\
&\quad - [\tilde{\pi}(I_1^*) - I_1^*] g(I_1^* - C_0) \\
&= -\mu + G = 0;
\end{aligned} \tag{A.11}$$

$$\frac{\partial L_0}{\partial \mu} = W_0 + X_0 - C_0 - I_0 = 0, \tag{A.12}$$

where

$$G = 1 + \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^* - C_0} \left\{ \tilde{\pi}_I(I_1) - 1 + \gamma \tilde{\delta}_1 X_1 \right\} g(z) dz > 0.$$

To satisfy the second order conditions, we assume that $\pi_{II} + \gamma\delta_0 < 0$ which is required for the Hessian matrix to be negative definite. Here, we consider the normal case of $\gamma > 0$.²³

Therefore, the FOCs imply

$$\pi_I(I_0) - 1 - \gamma\delta_0 X_0 = 0; \quad (\text{A.13})$$

$$G - 1 - \gamma\delta_0 X_0 = 0; \quad (\text{A.14})$$

$$W_0 + X_0 - C_0 - I_0 = 0. \quad (\text{A.15})$$

We now differentiate the FOCs with respect to δ_0 to obtain the comparative statics.

$$\pi_{II} \frac{d\hat{I}_0}{d\delta_0} + 0 \frac{d\hat{C}_0}{d\delta_0} - \gamma\delta_0 \frac{d\hat{X}_0}{d\delta_0} - \gamma\hat{X}_0 = 0, \quad (\text{A.16})$$

$$0 \frac{d\hat{I}_0}{d\delta_0} + G_C \frac{d\hat{C}_0}{d\delta_0} - \gamma\delta_0 \frac{d\hat{X}_0}{d\delta_0} - \gamma\hat{X}_0 = 0, \quad (\text{A.17})$$

$$-\frac{d\hat{I}_0}{d\delta_0} - \frac{d\hat{C}_0}{d\delta_0} + \frac{d\hat{X}_0}{d\delta_0} = 0, \quad (\text{A.18})$$

where

$$G_C = \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^* - C_0} \left\{ \tilde{\pi}_{II}(X_1 + C_0 + z_1) - \gamma\tilde{\delta}_1 X_1 \right\} g(z) dz < 0.$$

G_C represents the rates of change in the marginal benefit of cash due to an increase in cash at $t = 0$.

The determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the derivatives is given by²⁴

$$\begin{aligned} D &= \begin{vmatrix} \pi_{II} & 0 & -\gamma\delta_0 \\ 0 & G_C & -\gamma\delta_0 \\ -1 & -1 & 1 \end{vmatrix} \\ &= \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0)[G_C - \gamma\delta_0] - \gamma\delta_0 G_C > 0. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.19})$$

By the implicit function theorem and Cramer's rule, we obtain the following:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{I}_0}{\partial \delta_0} = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} \gamma\hat{X}_0 & 0 & -\gamma\delta_0 \\ \gamma\hat{X}_0 & G_C & -\gamma\delta_0 \\ 0 & -1 & 1 \end{vmatrix}}{D} = \frac{\gamma\hat{X}_0 G_C}{D} < 0, \quad (\text{A.20})$$

²³The case of $\gamma < 0$ implies that firms can lower the external finance cost by increasing it when they face a negative cash flow shock.

²⁴Here D takes the same form as the Hessian matrix of the FOCs. Since D is negative definite, the second-order conditions are also satisfied.

$$\frac{\partial \hat{C}_0}{\partial \delta_0} = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} \pi_{II} & \gamma \hat{X}_0 & -\gamma \delta_0 \\ 0 & \gamma \hat{X}_0 & -\gamma \delta_0 \\ -1 & 0 & 1 \end{vmatrix}}{D} = \frac{\gamma \hat{X}_0 \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0)}{D} < 0, \quad (\text{A.21})$$

$$\frac{\partial \hat{X}_0}{\partial \delta_0} = \frac{\begin{vmatrix} \pi_{II} & 0 & \gamma \hat{X}_0 \\ 0 & G_C & \gamma \hat{X}_0 \\ -1 & -1 & 0 \end{vmatrix}}{D} = \frac{\gamma \hat{X}_0 [\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) + G_C]}{D} < 0. \quad (\text{A.22})$$

These results suggest that the optimal investment, cash saving, and external finance at $t = 0$ decrease when facing a higher COC.

A.3 Hedging Motive(the effect of γ)

To see how γ affects optimal decisions at $t = 0$, we differentiate equations (A.20)-(A.22) w.r.t. γ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial^2 \hat{I}_0}{\partial \delta_0 d\gamma} &= \frac{[\hat{X}_0 G_C + \gamma \hat{X}_0 G_{C\gamma}] D - \gamma \hat{X}_0 G_C D'}{D^2} \\ &= \frac{\hat{X}_0 G_C D + \gamma \hat{X}_0 (G_{C\gamma} D - G_C D')}{D^2} = \frac{\hat{X}_0 \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) [G_C^2 - \gamma^2 \delta_0 G_{C\gamma}]}{D^2} < 0, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.23})$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} D &= \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) [G_C - \gamma \delta_0] - \gamma \delta_0 G_C, \\ D' &= \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) [G_{C\gamma} - \delta_0] - \delta_0 G_C - \gamma \delta_0 G_{C\gamma}, \\ G_{C\gamma} &= - \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^* - C_0} \tilde{\delta}_1 g(z) dz < 0, \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{\partial^2 \hat{C}_0}{\partial \delta_0 d\gamma} = \frac{\hat{X}_0 \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) D - \gamma \hat{X}_0 \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) D'}{D^2} = \frac{\hat{X}_0 \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) [D - \gamma D']}{D^2} < 0, \quad (\text{A.24})$$

by noting

$$\begin{aligned} [D - (1 + \gamma) D'] &= \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) [G_C - \gamma G_{C\gamma}] + \gamma^2 \delta_0 G_{C\gamma} \\ &= \pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^* - C_0} \tilde{\pi}_{II}(I_1) g(z) dz - \gamma \delta_0 \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^* - C_0} \gamma \tilde{\delta}_1 g(z) dz > 0, \end{aligned}$$

given $G_C - \gamma G_{C\gamma} = \int_{-\infty}^{I_1^o - C_0} \tilde{\pi}_{II}(I_1)g(z)dz < 0$, $\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) + \gamma\delta_0 < 0$, and $\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_1) + \gamma\tilde{\delta}_1 < 0$ by the second order conditions, and

$$\frac{\partial^2 \hat{X}_0}{\partial \delta_0 \partial \gamma} = \frac{\hat{X}_0 \left\{ \left[\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) + G_C \right] + \gamma G_{C\gamma} \right\} D - \gamma \hat{X}_0 \left[\pi_{II}(\hat{I}_0) + G_C \right] D'}{D^2} < 0, \quad (\text{A.25})$$

which follows from (A.23) and (A.24). These results suggest that the sensitivities of investment, cash saving and external finance to external finance cost are greater for higher γ .

B. Definitions of Variables

The following are variable definitions used in this study. Items in parentheses are variable names as used in the Compustat annual database. To account for the change in accounting rule regarding operating leases in 2019, we subtract rouant from at and ppent, subtract llc from dlc, and subtract llt from dltd after firms adopted the new rule.

Acquisitions = acquisitions (aqc) / lagged total assets (at)

Altman Z-score = 1.2working capital (wcap) / total assets (at) + 1.4retained earnings (re) / total assets (at) + 3.3earnings before interest and taxes (ebit) /total assets (at)+ 0.6market value of equity (prcc.f×csho) /total liabilities (lt) + 0.999sales (sale)/total assets (at)

Cash = cash and cash Equivalents (che) / total assets (at)

Cost of Capital (COC) = weighted average cost of capital

ΔCash = change in cash and cash equivalents (check) / lagged total assets (at)

Cost of Debt (COD) = whichever is the greater: interest expense (xint) divided by the average of total debt at the beginning and the end of the year ; or AAA-rated bond yield (also winsorized at 6 and 94 percent)

Cost of Equity (COE) = Implied Cost of capital

Dividend = cash dividend (dv) / lagged total assets (at)

External Capital (ExCapital) = Net Equity Issuance (EIssue) + Net Debt Issuance (DIssue)

External Finance (External) = [Capital expenditures (capx) - Operating cash flow (oibdp)]/capx

External Finance Dependence (KZ) = $-1.002CF - 39.368DIV - 1.315CASH + 3.139LEV$,
where CF = operating cash flow (oibdp)/ lagged plant and equipment (ppent)

Excess Capital Issuance = Net Equity Issuance (EIssue) + Net Debt Issuance (DIssue) – Financial Deficit (Deficit)

External Capital Needs ($ExNeeds$) = [dividends + acquisitions + net investment - internal cash flow] / lagged total assets (at)

Free Cash Flow = Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (ebitda) - total income taxes paid (txpd) - total interest and related expenses (xint) - dividends paid on common stock(dvc) - dividends paid on preferred stock (dvp) / book value of equity (seq)

Future Investment ($FInvest$) = the average of two subsequent years of [capital expenditures (capx) + R&D] / lagged total assets (at)

HP index = $-0.737Size + 0.043Size^2 - 0.04Age$, where $Size$ is the natural logarithm of total assets capped by \$4.65 billion and Age is the number of years since the firm's initial offering capped by 37

Internal Cash Flow (ICF) = [income before extraordinary items (ibc) + depreciation and amortization (dpc)] / lagged total assets (at)

Leverage = [short-term debt (dlc) + long-term debt (dltt)] / total assets (at)

M/B = market value of assets / total assets (at), where market value of assets is given by total assets (at) - common equity (ceq) + market value of common equity (common shares outstanding (csho) \times share price (prcc))

MPE = Monetary policy exposure as defined in [Ozdagli and Velikov \(2020\)](#). $MPE = -1.60 \times WW - 0.87 \times Cash + 0.63 \times CFDuration + 4.36 \times CFVolatility - 5.74 \times OP$, where WW is the financial constraint measure of [Whited and Wu \(2006\)](#); $Cash$ is defined as cash and short-term investments (CHE) scaled by market capitalization; $CFDuration$ is the cash flow duration measure estimated following [Dechow et al. \(2004\)](#). $CFVolatility$ is calculated as standard deviation over the last 6 years of operating cash flows, measured by sales (sale) - cost of goods sold (cogs) - selling, general and administrative expense (xsga) - change in working capital (wcap) scaled by total assets; and OP is defined as sales (sale) - cost of goods sold (cogs), scaled by total assets. Following [Ozdagli and Velikov \(2020\)](#), the percentile ranks of WW index and $CFDuration$ within each fiscal year cross-section are used

Net Debt Issuance ($DIssue$) = [long-term debt issues (dltis) - long-term debt reduction (dltr) + change in current debt (dlcch)] / lagged total assets (at)

Net Equity Issuance ($EIssue$) = [sale of common and preferred stock (sstk) - purchase of common and preferred stock (prstk)] / lagged total assets (at)

Net Investment (INV) = [increase in investment (invch) + capital expenditures (capx) + other use of funds (fuseo) - sales of property and plants (sppe) - sales of investment (siv) - short-term investment change (ivstch) - other investment activities (ivaco)] / lagged total assets (at)

Net Working Capital NWC = [current assets (act) - Current Liabilities (lct) - Cash (che)] / total assets

Precaution = the first principal component of firm-level R&D and 2-digit industry cash flow volatility ($CFRisk$).

R&D = research and development expense (xrdq) / Sales

Size = logarithm of total assets (at)

Tax Rate ($Taxr$) = whichever is the lower: tax payment (txt) divided by pretax income (pi) or the statutory maximum tax rate

Timing 1 = $c\hat{o}v(ExCapital, M/B)$

Timing 2 = $\overline{M/B} * \overline{ExCapital}$

Timing 3 = mispricing proxy based on the average of a stock's ranking percentiles for each of 11 anomaly variables

Vol (Cash Flow Volatility) = standard deviation of 2-digit SIC industry average cash flow (ICF) for the prior ten years

WW index = $-0.091ICF - 0.062 Div + 0.021LTD - 0.044Size + 0.102ISG - 0.035SG$, where Div is an indicator for dividend; LTD is long-term debt ratio; ISG is industry sales growth rate; and SG is the firm's sales growth rate

C. Alternative Explanations

C.1 [Acharya, Almeida, and Campello \(2007\)](#) Hedging Measure

[Acharya et al. \(2007\)](#) (AAC, henceforth) suggest that financially constrained firms save cash to hedge investment opportunities against income shortfalls, while unconstrained firms do not have a propensity to save cash out of cash flows. They measure a firm's hedging needs by the correlation between the firm's cash flows from current operations and its industry-level median R&D expenditures. We investigate whether their hedging needs measure explains the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC.

We conduct tests based on our hedging motive and AAC hedging needs measures for financially constrained and unconstrained firms. We report the results of high hedging motive firms based on these measures in Panel A of Table [E2](#). The coefficient estimates of $ExCapital \times COC$ are negative and significant for both constrained and unconstrained firms when our hedging motive measure is used. These results are consistent with the finding shown in Table [4](#) Panel A that both financially constrained and unconstrained firms save from external capital when the COC is relatively low. When the AAC measure is used, however, the coefficient estimate of $ExCapital \times COC$ is insignificant among financially unconstrained firms, whereas the coefficient is negative and significant among constrained firms. These results are consistent with the finding reported by [Acharya et al. \(2007\)](#) that financially constrained firms save when they have high hedging needs against a cash flow shortage. However, the AAC hedging measure does not fully capture firms' cash saving from external capital in response to a lower COC.

C.2 Market Timing Motive

The market timing hypothesis suggests that firms may time the market and issue equity when it is overvalued. Mispricing in the stock market may be driven by nonfundamental components of the stock price, such as investor sentiment, which directly affects the COC but not cash flows (Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho, 2010). When such mispricing drives the current COC below the expected COC, the firm may see an opportunity to issue external capital and save. Such cash saving, however, is not motivated by future investments. If market timing drives firms' cash saving behavior, the sensitivity of excess capital to the COC should be greater among firms with a stronger market timing motive. These arguments lead to the following market timing hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a Firms with higher market timing motives save more from external capital when the COC is relatively low than firms with lower market timing motives.

Hypothesis 2b Firms with higher market timing motives issue more excess external capital when the COC is relatively low than firms with lower market timing motives.

Using three market timing measures, we conduct a series of tests to investigate whether the market timing motive can explain our results. The first market timing measure is yearly timing (Timing 1) constructed by Kayhan and Titman (2007), which is the sample covariance between external financing and the M/B ratio over a five-year period. This market timing measure captures the idea that a firm raises more external capital by taking advantage of short-term overvaluation determined by the firm's current M/B ratio relative to its M/B in surrounding years. The second market timing measure is long-term timing (Timing 2) as defined in Kayhan and Titman (2007), which is the product of the average M/B ratio and the average external financing over a five-year period. This measure captures a firm's market timing incentive by its M/B ratio relative to all firms in general. The third market timing measure (Timing 3) is the mispricing proxy developed by Stambaugh et al. (2015). This measure is constructed as the average of a stock's ranking percentiles for each of 11 anomaly variables, and a higher rank is associated with a greater relative degree of overpricing based on the given anomaly variable. The most overpriced stocks have the highest composite rankings. For each measure of market timing, we define firms in the top 30 percent as firms with high market timing motives and those in the bottom 30 percent as firms with low market timing motives.

To test market timing hypothesis 2a, we estimate regression models for firms with high or low market timing motives based on the three market timing measures. As shown in Table E2 Panel B, the coefficient estimates of $ExCapital \times COC$ are insignificant for firms with high market timing motives (Columns 1, 3, 5), while negative and significant for firms with low market timing motives when Timing 1 and Timing 2 measures are used (Columns 2 and 4). These results are inconsistent with market timing hypothesis 2a that firms with greater market timing motives save more from external capital when the COC is relatively low.

In Panel E, we test market timing hypothesis 2b regarding excess external capital. The results show that the coefficient estimates of the COC are negative and significant for both low and high market timing motive firms, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis that excess capital issues are mainly driven by the market timing motive. Both low and high market timing motive firms issue excess external capital to save when the COC is lower. These results indicate that market timing motive cannot fully explain our results.

C.3 Precautionary Motive

According to the precautionary motive, firms can avoid external financing by saving cash from internal cash flows (Fazzari et al. (1998), Almeida et al. (2004), Opler et al. (1999), and Bates et al. (2009)). Taking advantage of a relatively low COC to save cash from external capital is not considered the main reason for precautionary cash saving. In particular, Keynes (1936) argues that the quantity of cash demanded for precautionary purposes is not sensitive to changes in the COC because it is mainly determined by the general activity of the economic system and the level of income. Nevertheless, given the recent finding that the precautionary motive drives firms to save from equity issuance (McLean (2011)), we examine whether the cash saving of firms with stronger precautionary motives is more sensitive to the COC. Specifically, we test the following precautionary motive hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3a Firms with higher precautionary motives save more from external capital when the COC is relatively low than firms with lower precautionary motives.

Hypothesis 3b Firms with higher precautionary motives issue more excess external capital when the COC is relatively low than firms with lower precautionary motives.

To test these hypotheses, we follow previous studies and use R&D spending, cash flow volatility, and no-dividend as measures of precautionary motives that represent unforeseen opportunities and contingencies requiring sudden expenditures. Cash flow volatility is the 10-year standard deviation of the average industry cash flow based on the 2-digit SIC code. We pay particular attention to the precautionary measure used by McLean (2011) based on the first principal component of R&D spending and cash flow volatility. For R&D spending, cash flow volatility and their first principal component, we define the top 30% of firms as high precautionary firms and the bottom 30% as low precautionary firms. We also treat nondividend-paying firms as high precautionary firms and dividend-paying firms as low precautionary firms.

Table E2 Panel C shows that the estimated coefficients of $ExCapital \times COC$ are negative and significant for both low and high precautionary firms when no-dividend and R&D spending are used to measure precautionary motive (Columns 1-4). The coefficients of $ExCapital \times COC$ are insignificant for both low and high precautionary firms using cash flow volatility as the proxy for precautionary motive (Columns 5 and 6). When the precautionary measure of McLean (2011) is used, the coefficient of $ExCapital \times COC$ is insignificant for high precautionary firms and significant for low hedging motive firms (Columns 7 and 8). These results are not consistent with precautionary hypothesis 3a, which states that firms with greater precautionary motives save more at a lower COC.²⁵

In Panel E, we test precautionary hypothesis 3b regarding excess external capital and find that the coefficient estimates of the COC are negative and significant for both low and high precautionary motive firms. These results are inconsistent with hypothesis 3b, which states that firms with higher precautionary motives issue more capital in excess of the current financial needs than firms with lower precautionary motives when the COC is relatively low. Additionally, we include the precautionary motive measure to our baseline estimations and find that our results in Table 6 still

²⁵The reasons that our results differ from McLean (2011)'s finding that increases in precautionary motives lead to large increases in share issuance saving rates when issuance costs are low might be because we focus on cash saving from external capital rather than equity issuances and the sample period is different.

hold after controlling for the precautionary motive effect.²⁶ These results reinforce our conclusion that firms' cash saving from external capital in response to the time-varying COC cannot be fully explained by precautionary motive.

C.4 Market Timing and Precautionary Motives

Bolton et al. (2013) develop a dynamic model in which firms have both a precautionary-saving motive and a market timing motive for external financing. Under stochastic financing conditions, the dynamics of cash and financing decisions depend on the relative importance of the market timing and precautionary saving motives, which vary with the firm's cash holdings. They show that firms with a considerable amount of cash do not time the market because the market timing option is out of the money. In contrast, firms with low cash holdings have incentives to raise external capital when relatively inexpensive financing opportunities are available. Firms time favorable market conditions to shield against crises through precautionary cash holdings. Accordingly, we test the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4a Firms with low cash holdings save more from external capital when the COC is relatively low than firms with high cash holdings.

Hypothesis 4b Firms with low cash holdings issue more excess external capital when the COC is relatively low than firms with high cash holdings.

To test these hypotheses, we define firms with high (low) cash holdings as firms in the top (bottom) 30 percent based on their lagged cash ratio or cash balance. As shown in Table E2 Panel D, the coefficients of $ExCapital \times COC$ are negative and insignificant among firms with high cash ratios and firms with low cash ratios (Columns 1 and 2). The coefficients of $ExCapital \times COC$ are negative and significant among firms with high cash balance and firms with low cash balance (Columns 3 and 4). These results are inconsistent with hypothesis 4a, which states that firms with low cash holdings tend to time favorable market conditions to save cash more than firms with high cash holdings. These results indicate that our finding that firms with high hedging motives save more from external capital when the COC is relatively low cannot be fully explained by the model developed by Bolton et al. (2013).

We test hypothesis 4b by investigating excess capital issuance in response to the varying COC among firms with high cash holdings and firms with low cash holding. Since the results based on the cash ratio and cash balance are similar, Panel E presents the estimations based on the cash ratio. As shown in Columns 5 and 6), both cash-rich and cash-poor firms issue more excess capital when the COC is relatively low. The results provide no support for hypothesis 4b and indicate that raising excess capital at a low cost to save as cash is not driven by the dominant market timing motive among cash-poor firms as predicted by the model developed in Bolton et al. (2013).

C.5 Credit Risk

As shown by Acharya et al. (2012), cash reserves are positively related to credit risk. Riskier firms choose to hold more cash as a buffer against a possible cash flow shortfall in the future. Accordingly,

²⁶The table is available upon request.

firms' cash saving decisions might be driven by their credit risk. We explore this possibility by investigating whether high-risk and low-risk firms behave differently in their cash saving decisions. We use two measures to capture a firm's credit risk: the Altman Z-score and leverage. Since the results are similar when using these two approaches, we report the results based on the Altman Z-score. Firms with the Altman Z-score above (below) the industry median value are classified as low (high) risk firms. Table E2 Panel F show that the coefficients on $ExCapital \times COC$ are negative and significant for firms with high hedging motives (Columns 1 and 3) and insignificant for firms with low hedging motives (Columns 2 and 4). Such difference in cash saving exists among firms with high credit risk and firms with low credit risk. These results indicate that credit risk does not fully explain the sensitivity of cash saving to the COC.

C.6 Agency Risk

Jensen (1986) develops the agency costs of free cash flow hypothesis, which suggests that entrenched managers prefer to retain cash. This hypothesis is supported by studies showing that firms with greater agency problems hold more cash in both within-country and cross-country analyses (Dittmar et al. (2003), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford et al. (2008)). To investigate whether agency problems of free cash flow may explain the observed cash saving behavior, we examine the differences in the impacts of the COC on firms' cash saving from external capital between firms with high free cash flows and firms with low free cash flows. We measure free cash flow following Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and classify firms with high (low) free cash flows as those with free cash flows above (below) the median level. As shown in Table E2 Panel G, the coefficients on $ExCapital \times COC$ are negative and significant for firms with high hedging motives (Columns 1 and 3) and insignificant for firms with low hedging motives (Columns 2 and 4) for both high and low agency risk firms. Regardless of the level of free cash flows, high hedging motive firms are more likely to save from external capital as the COC declines. These results indicate that agency risk cannot fully explain firms' cash saving behavior.

D. Estimation procedure for the COE

The model developed in Li, Ng, and Swaminathan (2013) is as follows:

$$P_t = \sum_{k=1}^{15} \frac{FE_{t+k} \times [1 - b_{t+1} + \frac{(b_{t+1} - \frac{g_t}{ICC_t})}{15} \times (k-1)]}{(1 + ICC_t)^k} + \frac{FE_{t+15} \times (1 - b_t)}{(ICC_t - g_t)(1 + ICC_t)^{15}}. \quad (A.1)$$

The model has the following two aspects: 1) the present value of cash flows up to year $(t + 15)$; and 2) the present value of cash flows beyond year $t + 15$. For the first two years' earnings, we use the median forecasts made by analysts and forecast earnings FE_{t+k} from year $t + 3$ to year $t + T + 1$ as $FE_{t+k} = FE_{t+2} \times (1 + g_{t+3} \exp\{g_t^g \times (k-2)\})$. We assume that earnings growth rate g_{t+3} will mean-revert exponentially to steady-state values by year $t + T + 2$. The assumption implies that $g_{t+3} \exp\{g_t^g \times 15\} = g_t$ with g_t^g being the growth rate of growth rate g_{t+2} , which yields

$g_t^g = \ln\left(\frac{g_t}{g_{t+3}}\right)/15$. For g_{t+3} , we use the median long-term growth rate forecast by analysts. If the long-term growth rate forecast is not available, we estimate it using the first two years' forecast earnings as follows: $g_{t+3} = \frac{FE_{t+2}}{FE_{t+1}} - 1$. The steady-state earning growth rate (g_t) is assumed to be a rolling average of the annual GDP growth rate.

We construct the stream of dividends as $D_{t+k} = FE_{t+k} \times (1 - b_{t+k})$ for $1 \leq k \leq 15$. The initial retention ratio is estimated as $b_{t+1} = [1 - \text{Cash Dividend}_t / \text{Net Income}_t]$. For years $t+2$ to $t+T+1$, we estimate the retention rate as $b_{t+k} = b_{t+1} - \frac{(b_{t+1} - \frac{g_t}{ICC_t})}{15} \times (k-1)$. The retention rate is assumed to revert linearly to a steady-state rate $b_t = \frac{g_t}{ICC_t}$ by year $t+T+1$. After the terminal year, we estimate the terminal value of the remaining cash flows using the Gordon growth model as follows: $FE_{t+15} \times (1 - b_t) / (ICC_t - g_t)$.

The model developed by [Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan \(2001\)](#) is based on the following equation:

$$P_t = BE_t + \sum_{k=1}^{12} \frac{(ROE_{t+k} - ICC_t)BE_{t+k-1}}{(1 + ICC_t)^k} + \frac{(ROE_{t+12} - ICC_t)BE_{t+11}}{ICC_t(1 + ICC_t)^{12}} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

where ROE_{t+k} is the return on equity at $t+k$ which is assumed to revert linearly to the median industry ROE by year $t+12$ starting with ROE_{t+3} . The industry median ROE is the past 10-year average of the industry median based on the 2-digit SIC code after excluding firms with losses. For the first three years' earnings, we use the median forecasts by analysts FE_{t+k} and the book value of equity is estimated by $BE_{t+k} = BE_{t+k-1} + FE_{t+k} \times b_{t+1}$, where b_{t+1} is the retention ratio at $t+1$. Beyond the third year, we use the linear interpolation to the industry median ROE to forecast the firm ROE. We assume that economic profits ($ROE - ICC$) after year 12 are zero.

The [Claus and Thomas \(2001\)](#) model is based on the economic profit of shareholders as expressed in the following equation:

$$P_t = BE_t + \sum_{k=1}^5 \frac{FE_{t+k} - ICC_t \times BE_{t+k-1}}{(1 + ICC_t)^k} + \frac{(FE_{t+5} - ICC_t \times BE_{t+4})(1 + g_t)}{(ICC_t - g_t)(1 + ICC_t)^5} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

where P_t is the current stock price and the growth rate after 5 years, g_t , is estimated by the inflation rate. We obtain the initial forecast value of equity as $BE_{t+1} = BE_t + FE_{t+1} \times b_{t+1}$, where BE_t is the book equity value per share at t ; FE_{t+1} is the forecast earnings per share at $t+1$; and b_{t+1} is the retention ratio as defined above.

Motivated by the residual income models in [Ohlson \(1995\)](#) and [Feltham and Ohlson \(1995, 1996\)](#), [Li and Mohanram \(2014\)](#) develop the following RI model:

$$E_{t+n} = \delta_0 + \delta_1 NegE_t + \delta_2 E_t + \delta_3 NegE_t \times E_t + \delta_r B_t + \delta_5 TACC_t + \varepsilon, \quad (A.4)$$

where E_{t+n} is the EPS in year $t + n$ ($n = 1$ to 5). $NegE_t$ is an indicator variable that equals 1 for negative earnings, and 0 otherwise. B_t is the book value of equity divided by the number of outstanding shares. $TACC$ is the total accruals defined as the sum of the change in non-cash working capital, in net non-current operating accruals, and in net financial assets divided by the number of outstanding shares. The change in non-cash working capital is the change in current assets net of cash and short-term investments minus that in current liabilities net of short-term debt. The change in non-current operating accruals is measured as the change in non-current assets net of long-term non-equity investments and advances minus the change in non-current liabilities net of long-term debt. The change in net financial assets is measured as the change in short- and long-term investments minus the change in short-term debt, long-term debt, and preferred stock. The missing values of total accruals are set to zero.

The model is estimated cross-sectionally using the previous ten years of data to ensure no look-ahead bias. Specifically, one-year-ahead earnings in year t (E_{t+1}) are estimated using data from year $t - 10$ to $t - 1$, two-year-ahead earnings (E_{t+2}) are estimated using data from year $t - 11$ to $t - 2$, and so forth. The model is estimated for firms with non-missing independent variables in year t . For each firm in year t , the forecasted EPS for years $(t + 1) - (t + 5)$ ($FE_{t+1} - FE_{t+5}$) is estimated by using the estimated coefficients from regression (A.4) and variables at t . Using the forecasted EPS, we estimate the implied cost of equity from the model developed by [Gebhardt et al. \(2001\)](#).

E. Additional Results

Table E1: Hedging Motive: Robustness

This table reports the robustness of the impacts of the cost of capital on the sensitivity of cash saving to external capital between firms with high and low hedging motives. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. *ExCapital* and *ICF* are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. High and low hedging need firms are defined as those in the top and bottom 30 percent based on the hedging motive measure. In Panel A Columns (1) and (2), we use high-order cumulants (Erickson et al. (2014)) to account for measurement errors in the cost of capital measure. Columns (3) and (4) present the results for firms raising a minimum of 3% excess capital. In Columns (5) and (6), firms in Business Equipment, Telephone and Television Transmission sectors are excluded. Panel B presents the results when using Li et al. (2013) (Columns 1 and 2), Claus and Thomas (2001) (Columns 3 and 4), and Li and Mohanram (2014) (Columns 5 and 6) as alternative COE measures. Panels C reports the results for subperiods 1981-1999 and 2000-2019. Panel D reports the results using the alternative hedging motive measures: the correlation between industry-level external finance and the COC (Hedging Motive 1) and the correlation between the *KZ* index and the COC (Hedging Motive 2). The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| Panel A: Robustness | | | | | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Measurement Errors | | Active Issuances | | Exclude High-tech Industries | |
| | High Hedging | Low Hedging | High Hedging | Low Hedging | High Hedging | Low Hedging |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| COC | -0.0116 [0.0295] | 0.1146*** [0.0312] | -0.0763*** [0.0284] | 0.1106*** [0.0261] | -0.1119*** [0.0203] | 0.0589*** [0.0130] |
| ExCapital | 0.6243*** [0.0324] | 0.3798*** [0.0277] | 0.6896*** [0.0626] | 0.3800*** [0.0376] | 0.5951*** [0.0587] | 0.3121*** [0.0259] |
| ICF | 0.4789*** [0.0218] | 0.3092*** [0.0190] | 0.4186*** [0.0289] | 0.2847*** [0.0262] | 0.4059*** [0.0264] | 0.2644*** [0.0200] |
| ExCapital×COC | -0.6968*** [0.1703] | 0.2162 [0.1928] | -2.0428*** [0.4295] | -0.1574 [0.2770] | -1.5639*** [0.4044] | -0.0744 [0.2370] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 23,218 | 23,242 | 12,692 | 12,725 | 18,647 | 19,810 |
| Adj. R^2 | | | 0.4578 | 0.2878 | 0.3675 | 0.2656 |

| Panel B: Alternative COC Measures | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Li et al. (2013) | | Claus and Thomas (2001) | | Li and Mohanram (2014) | |
| | High Hedging | Low Hedging | High Hedging | Low Hedging | High Hedging | Low Hedging |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| COC | -0.5884*** [0.0443] | 0.3735*** [0.0361] | -0.4737*** [0.0454] | 0.3354*** [0.0396] | -0.6491*** [0.0526] | 0.4938*** [0.0390] |
| ExCapital | 0.5659*** [0.0340] | 0.3262*** [0.0307] | 0.4575*** [0.0420] | 0.4519*** [0.0441] | 0.4215*** [0.0356] | 0.2107*** [0.0282] |
| ICF | 0.3948*** [0.0173] | 0.3380*** [0.0151] | 0.2955*** [0.0165] | 0.3297*** [0.0184] | 0.3142*** [0.0141] | 0.2546*** [0.0114] |
| ExCapital×COC | -2.2147*** [0.3816] | -0.5234 [0.3393] | -1.3825*** [0.4012] | -0.6647 [0.4565] | -1.4226*** [0.5075] | 0.2363 [0.3851] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 19,746 | 19,738 | 15,258 | 15,388 | 19,623 | 19,579 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.4392 | 0.3362 | 0.3770 | 0.4006 | 0.3208 | 0.2635 |

| Panel C: Subperiods | | | | |
|---------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | 1981-1999 | | 2000-2019 | |
| | High Hedging | Low Hedging | High Hedging | Low Hedging |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| COC | -0.1588*** [0.0247] | 0.0947*** [0.0212] | -0.3140*** [0.0441] | 0.1724*** [0.0346] |
| ExCapital | 0.6206*** [0.0490] | 0.2909*** [0.0349] | 0.7067*** [0.0384] | 0.4047*** [0.0385] |
| ICF | 0.2458*** [0.0548] | 0.2617*** [0.0275] | 0.1913*** [0.0596] | 0.1706*** [0.0316] |
| ExCapital×COC | -1.2632*** [0.2726] | 0.2464 [0.2209] | -1.0022** [0.3897] | -0.0436 [0.4139] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 10,263 | 10,450 | 12,698 | 12,697 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.4349 | 0.3117 | 0.4861 | 0.3469 |

| Panel D: Alternative Hedging Measures | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Hedging Motive 1 | | Hedging Motive 2 | |
| | High Hedging | Low Hedging | High Hedging | Low Hedging |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| COC | -0.0139 [0.0184] | -0.0227 [0.0221] | -0.0592*** [0.0165] | 0.0382** [0.0166] |
| ExCapital | 0.6414*** [0.0468] | 0.5143*** [0.0460] | 0.5208*** [0.0337] | 0.3945*** [0.0283] |
| ICF | 0.4760*** [0.0201] | 0.4289*** [0.0217] | 0.3555*** [0.0187] | 0.3739*** [0.0180] |
| ExCapital×COC | -0.6775** [0.2928] | -0.2316 [0.4105] | -0.6482*** [0.2180] | 0.0488 [0.2115] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 23,586 | 22,721 | 23,273 | 23,403 |
| <i>Adj. R</i> ² | 0.4373 | 0.4039 | 0.3894 | 0.3836 |

Table E2: Alternative Motives

This table reports the test results of the alternative motives for cash saving. The dependent variable is the change in cash and equivalents divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Panel A compares cash saving from external capital and internal capital for financially constrained and unconstrained firms with a high hedging motive using our hedging measure and using the measure described in [Acharya et al. \(2007\)](#). The reported results are based on the WW index. Panel B compares the impacts of the cost of capital on the sensitivities of cash saving to external capital between firms with high and low market timing motives. We measure market timing by the yearly timing (Timing 1), long-term timing (Timing 2) following [Kayhan and Titman \(2007\)](#), and mispricing proxy (Timing 3) developed by [Stambaugh et al. \(2015\)](#). For each measure, we define firms in the top 30 percent as firms with high market timing motive and those in the bottom 30 percent as firms with a low market timing motive while removing the middle 40 percent. Panel C compares the impacts of the cost of capital on the sensitivities of cash saving to external capital issues between firms with high and low precautionary motives. Firms with high (low) precautionary motives are defined as firms without (with) dividend payments, firms in the top 30 percent (bottom 30 percent) based on R&D expenditures, the industry-level median cash flow volatility (*CF Risk*), and a precautionary motive measure (*Precaution*), respectively. In Panel D, we test the predictions of model developed by [Bolton et al. \(2013\)](#) that considers both the market timing and precautionary motives. We compare the impacts of the cost of capital on the sensitivity of cash saving to external capital sources between firms with high and low cash holdings. Firms with high (low) cash holdings are classified as those in the top 30 percent (bottom 30 percent) based on the past two-year average cash ratios or the cash balance. *ExCapital* and *ICF* are external capital and internal cash flow, respectively, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. Panel E test whether the market timing or precautionary motive explains the sensitivities of excess capital issuance to the cost of capital. For brevity, the results based on the Timing 1 measure, *Precaution*, and cash balance are reported. Panel F reports differences between firms with high hedging motives (Columns 1 and 3) and firms with low hedging motives (Columns 2 and 4) for high credit risk firms and low credit risk firms. Panel G reports differences between firms with high hedging motives (Columns 1 and 3) and firms with low hedging motives (Columns 2 and 4) for high agency risk firms and low agency risk firms. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled. The detailed variable definitions are provided in Internet Appendix. The coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

| Panel A: Compare with AAC Measure | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| | High Hedging Motive | | High AAC Measure | |
| | Unconstrained | Constrained | Unconstrained | Constrained |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| COC | -0.0526** [0.0215] | -0.1958*** [0.0362] | -0.0685* [0.0363] | 0.0018 [0.0472] |
| ExCapital | 0.6052*** [0.0940] | 0.7617*** [0.0718] | 0.5428*** [0.0515] | 0.8958*** [0.0986] |
| ICF | 0.3810*** [0.0312] | 0.4332*** [0.0251] | 0.4116*** [0.0378] | 0.4869*** [0.0316] |
| ExCapital×COC | -1.3965*** [0.5305] | -2.2862*** [0.6030] | -0.3170 [0.3645] | -2.8989*** [0.8630] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 13,290 | 9,664 | 4,859 | 6,164 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.3948 | 0.4621 | 0.4971 | 0.5182 |

| Panel B: Market Timing Motive | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| | Timing 1 | | Timing 2 | | Timing 3 | |
| | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| COC | -0.0176 [0.0272] | -0.0380* [0.0220] | -0.0636** [0.0318] | -0.0751*** [0.0209] | 0.0116 [0.0259] | -0.0853*** [0.0207] |
| ExCapital | 0.6038*** [0.0435] | 0.5579*** [0.0378] | 0.5605*** [0.0407] | 0.5168*** [0.0344] | 0.4393*** [0.0438] | 0.6615*** [0.0591] |
| ICF | 0.4603*** [0.0210] | 0.4215*** [0.0202] | 0.4204*** [0.0216] | 0.4146*** [0.0208] | 0.2786*** [0.0245] | 0.5573*** [0.0251] |
| ExCapital×COC | -0.4889 [0.3638] | -0.5223* [0.3022] | -0.0710 [0.3724] | -0.5619** [0.2610] | -0.6269 [0.4163] | -0.6083 [0.4192] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 15,640 | 15,766 | 15,811 | 15,976 | 17,147 | 17,547 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.4431 | 0.4383 | 0.4502 | 0.3802 | 0.3544 | 0.4691 |

| Panel C: Precautionary Motive | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| | Dividend | | R&D | | CFSD | | Precaution | |
| | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| COC | -0.0185* [0.0107] | -0.0796*** [0.0308] | -0.0141 [0.0183] | -0.0325** [0.0140] | -0.0660** [0.0260] | -0.0223 [0.0313] | -0.0114 [0.0274] | -0.0543*** [0.0200] |
| ExCapital | 0.4204*** [0.0234] | 0.7185*** [0.0434] | 0.8037*** [0.0442] | 0.4279*** [0.0273] | 0.5372*** [0.0405] | 0.6298*** [0.0565] | 0.6467*** [0.0509] | 0.5391*** [0.0342] |
| ICF | 0.3366*** [0.0144] | 0.5071*** [0.0158] | 0.5309*** [0.0167] | 0.3722*** [0.0156] | 0.4447*** [0.0177] | 0.4290*** [0.0265] | 0.4673*** [0.0258] | 0.4440*** [0.0166] |
| ExCapital×COC | -0.4517*** [0.1685] | -0.8105* [0.4409] | -1.3856*** [0.3903] | -0.3685 [0.2249] | -0.0332 [0.3664] | -0.3556 [0.5236] | -0.5376 [0.4544] | -0.5748** [0.2752] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 46,057 | 29,997 | 31,754 | 44,888 | 19,571 | 19,588 | 22,256 | 24,153 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.3337 | 0.4694 | 0.5003 | 0.3387 | 0.4243 | 0.4614 | 0.4448 | 0.4084 |

| Panel D: Market Timing and Precautionary Motives | | | | |
|--|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Cash Ratio | | Cash Balance | |
| | High | Low | High | Low |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| COC | -0.1247*** [0.0303] | 0.0047 [0.0094] | -0.0478*** [0.0145] | -0.0144 [0.0227] |
| ExCapital | 0.8486*** [0.0515] | 0.1264*** [0.0175] | 0.6711*** [0.0374] | 0.4106*** [0.0388] |
| ICF | 0.6577*** [0.0192] | 0.1157*** [0.0136] | 0.4251*** [0.0188] | 0.3207*** [0.0200] |
| ExCapital×COC | -0.7493 [0.5199] | 0.0268 [0.1345] | -1.1242*** [0.2618] | -0.5483* [0.3277] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 21,948 | 22,660 | 23,475 | 21,786 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.5496 | 0.2314 | 0.4420 | 0.3529 |

| Panel E: Excess Issuance | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|
| | Market Timing | | Precautionary | | Market Timing and Precautionary | |
| | High | Low | High | Low | High | Low |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| COC | -0.9747*** [0.2025] | -0.4816*** [0.0624] | -0.7709*** [0.1095] | -0.5723*** [0.0919] | -0.3529*** [0.0825] | -0.7278*** [0.1325] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 15,811 | 15,976 | 22,256 | 24,153 | 23,475 | 21,786 |
| Adj. R^2 | 0.0806 | 0.2595 | 0.1412 | 0.1513 | 0.1249 | 0.2278 |

| Panel E: Credit Risk | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | High Risk | | Low Risk | |
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| COC | -0.0913*** [0.0267] | 0.0353 [0.0267] | -0.1034*** [0.0274] | 0.0976*** [0.0182] |
| ExCapital | 0.8665*** [0.0841] | 0.4679*** [0.0544] | 0.4645*** [0.0496] | 0.3464*** [0.0388] |
| ICF | 0.5335*** [0.0276] | 0.3717*** [0.0303] | 0.3188*** [0.0319] | 0.2237*** [0.0214] |
| ExCapital×COC | -2.8721*** [0.6052] | -0.1942 [0.4132] | -0.8534** [0.3856] | -0.3478 [0.3219] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 13,355 | 12,578 | 9,847 | 10,616 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.4787 | 0.3160 | 0.3158 | 0.2676 |

| Panel F: Agency Risk | | | | |
|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| | High Agency Risk | | Low Agency Risk | |
| | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive | High Hedging Motive | Low Hedging Motive |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| COC | -0.0738*** [0.0223] | 0.0400* [0.0229] | -0.1405*** [0.0394] | 0.1137*** [0.0230] |
| ExCapital | 0.5998*** [0.0877] | 0.4275*** [0.0533] | 0.8567*** [0.0870] | 0.4024*** [0.0446] |
| ICF | 0.4336*** [0.0272] | 0.3216*** [0.0247] | 0.4608*** [0.0321] | 0.3025*** [0.0313] |
| ExCapital×COC | -1.2381** [0.5274] | -0.2832 [0.3477] | -3.3823*** [0.7918] | -0.2656 [0.4600] |
| Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Firm FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 12,770 | 11,776 | 10,432 | 11,418 |
| Adj. R ² | 0.3809 | 0.2930 | 0.4600 | 0.2983 |

Figure E.1: Cash Holdings versus Cost of Capital

This figure plots firms' average cash holdings relative to the level of the cost of capital for firms in Fama-French 5 industries from 1981 to 2019. Cash is cash and equivalents divided by total assets.

