NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

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Working Paper 27191
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27191

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
May 2020

We would like to thank former CBRT governor Süreyya Serdengeçti as well as Fatih Özatay, Cevdet Akçay, and Serkan Özcan for their valuable feedback. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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NBER Working Paper No. 27191
May 2020
JEL No. E01,F23,F41

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 crisis has the potential to turn into the biggest emerging market (EM) crisis since 1980s. We quantify the macroeconomic effects of COVID-19 for a small open economy by calibrating a SIR-multi-sector-macro model to Turkey. We measure sectoral supply shocks utilizing teleworking and physical job proximity, and sectoral demand shocks with credit card purchases. Both shocks are also affected from changing infection rates under different lockdown scenarios. Our results show that the optimal policy, which yields the lowest economic cost and saves the maximum number of lives, can be achieved under a full lockdown. Being an open economy amplifies the economic costs through two main channels. First, the demand shock has domestic and external components. Second, the initial shock is magnified due to domestic and international input-output linkages. The policy options are limited given the low fiscal space to fight the pandemic and urgent external finance needs to rollover the foreign currency debt. We draw parallels between the policies employed during 2001 crisis in Turkey and discuss pros and cons of policy options to deal with the economic fallout from COVID-19.

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"Best safety lies in fear."
– William Shakespeare

1 Introduction

Following the COVID-19 shock, emerging markets (EMs) observe a collapse in domestic and external demand, record capital outflows, higher external borrowing costs and depreciating currencies. At the same time, EM governments increase domestic borrowing via unconventional policies to assemble enough fiscal resources to fight the pandemic. This puts further pressure on external finance premium, reducing capital inflows. In this paper, we focus on this complex embrace between domestic fiscal needs and external financing needs by developing an epidemiologocal (SIR)- multi-sector-macro model for a small open economy and calibrate it to Turkey. [1]

The key characteristics of several large EMs are that they are part of global supply chains and they have low foreign currency (FX) reserves in spite of high private sector FX debt. In addition, they generally have lower central bank credibility relative to advanced economies and most are heavily dependent on capital inflows to run their economies. EMs learned their lessons from the crises of 1990s and early 2000s in the sense that they have low fiscal deficits and better capitalized banking systems as they face the COVID-19 crisis. Nevertheless, they will still operate with low fiscal space during their response to the COVID-19 shock given the size of the shock and capital flow reversals they are currently experiencing. We argue that Turkey fits the bill to represent this group of EMs. Due to their strong connection to the rest of the world, an SIR-Macro model for these EMs should account for the domestic and international input-output linkages as well as sectoral heterogeneity given the role of sector specific domestic and external demand shocks.

The existing and rapidly growing COVID-19 literature focuses on closed economies, mostly advanced countries.[2] Most of this literature, as in Eichenbaum et al. (2020), develop a joint model of economic dynamics together with the SIR model , capturing demand and supply shocks at the

[1]See Cakmakli et al. (2020) for the earlier version of our work.

[2]See Anderson et al. (2020), Atkeson (2020b), Berger et al. (2020), Eichenbaum et al. (2020), Ferguson et al. (2020), and Stock (2020), Atkeson (2020a), Neumeyer (2020); Hall et al. (2020); Dewatripont et al. (2020); Piguillem et al. (2020); Jones et al. (2020), Alvarez et al. (2020) for SIR and/or short-run closed economy models and Barro et al. (2020) and Jorda et al. (2020) on medium- and long-run economic effects.

aggregate level through number of infections, loss of labor and changes in the preferences. Recent work by Acemoglu et al. (2020) considers structural differences in infections for distinct age groups that affect lockdown policies and economic costs. The work by Guerrieri et al. (2020), does not include a SIR model but underlines the importance of a multi-sector economy, where supply shocks can turn into larger demand shocks. When shocks are concentrated in certain sectors, as they are during a shutdown in response to a pandemic, total demand and spending goes down given sectoral linkages. Baqaee and Farhi (2020a,b) show a large amplification of demand and supply shocks in a network economy with input-output linkages and Keynesian frictions, absent a SIR model.

For an open economy SIR-macro model, multi-sector structure is important given the key role of domestic and international input-output linkages in transmitting sectoral demand and supply shocks. In addition, financing of these vertical production chains are linked to capital flows and external debt.[3] We develop a SIR-multi-sector-macro model for an open economy and apply it to Turkey with a calibration exercise that is well grounded in real time data. We incorporate sectoral demand and supply shocks and their amplification through domestic and international input-output linkages using 36 sectors and 65 countries.

We show that the total cost of containing the pandemic immediately, with a Chinese style full lockdown is about 4.5 percent of the GDP (at an annualized rate), which is less than delayed and/or partial lockdowns. This implies that output declines by 12 percent during the quarter in which the lockdown is imposed, compared to the previous quarter. After the lockdown ends, the economy returns to normal during the rest of the year. Hence, the shock is smoothed out, leading to a decline of 4.5 percent of annual GDP. Contrary to the popular belief that no lockdown policies would minimize economic costs, we show that such policies are actually costlier than an effective full lockdown. In fact, under no lockdown, the economic cost increases to 11 percent of GDP annually. Even though businesses remain open, there are still interruptions in supply as people get infected and demand declines due to lower spending, which additionally interacts with the number of people infected. Full lockdown, on the other hand, is optimal since it is able to contain the pandemic more quickly, within approximately one month. Hence it yields the minimum economic cost which saves the maximum number of lives.[4] Our results suggest that economic costs of alternative lockdown policies range

[3]See, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2014).

[4]Gonzalez-Eiras et al. (2020) and Acemoglu et al. (2020) on optimal lockdown choice and Farboodi et al. (2020) on

between 4.5 percent to 11 percent for Turkey if they are implemented effectively. Turkish experience can be considered as an "enhanced partial lockdown" which is a mixture of full lockdown and partial lockdown periods. To the extent that full lockdown periods dominate, the duration as well as the economic costs of the lockdown should be minimized and the economic costs should be closer to the lower bound of the range that we estimated. These findings are consistent with the early experiences of New Zealand or Denmark. Both of these countries implemented full lockdown before the number of patients reached critical levels and contained the virus rather rapidly. Consequently, they gradually began to lift lockdown restrictions before the end of April.

Figure 1: The effects of COVID-19 in a multi-sector open economy: A Schematic of the Model



NOTES: We implement two main lockdown scenarios: *partial* and *full*. Under partial lockdown, all industries remain open while the teleworkable portion of the employees work from home. The restrictive measures result in a low infection rate for the teleworkables and the general public, but the infection rate remains high for the on-site workers. Under full lockdown, only the essential industries remain open and the workers in the non-essential sectors stay at home. With these extreme measures, the infection rates are lowered for almost everyone. The lockdowns affect the supply channel directly via workers and the demand channel by mitigating the number of infected individuals, which in turn change the consumption profiles.

Figure 1 summarizes the logic of our theoretical framework, which illustrates both supply and demand channels through which COVID-19 affects an open economy. We ponder the figure for a given industry. As shown in the lower half of this figure, we capture supply shocks by quantifying how susceptible each industry is to the transmission of the virus among its employees. The tasks

optimal social distancing measures.

required for production in an industry are fulfilled by the employees under a variety of occupational titles. Some professions can fulfill their tasks remotely while others need to be conducted on-site.[5] The transmission dynamics of the virus would differ depending on whether the workers are on-site or at a remote location like home. We use Dingel and Neiman (2020)'s list of teleworkable occupations to capture the proportion of employment that can be fulfilled at remote locations in each industry.[6] Among the professions that need to be carried out on the work site, we assume that the viral transmission depends on the physical proximity between the workers or between the workers and the customers. The physical proximity measure at the occupational level is readily available in the O*NET database. Using the teleworkable share of an industry and the physical proximity measure as part of the SIR model, we estimate the proportion of the work force in each industry that would be impaired during the time of the pandemic. Through this fraction, we obtain the supply shock. At this point, it should be noted that the viral transmission dynamics will be affected by the implementation of different lockdown policies. Here, we mainly focus on two types of lockdown policies: partial and full. Under partial lockdown scenario, we assume that all businesses are open, but the teleworkable share of the employees remain home. The viral transmission is lower among the teleworkable employees and the general public, but the transmission rate is still high among the on-site workers. Under full lockdown scenario, we assume that all businesses except the essential ones are closed and all employees working in the closed sectors remain home. The viral transmission rates drop to a lower level for all the workers in the non-essential sectors.

The pandemic affects the demand side as well. The economics profession unanimously agrees that the prerequisite for economic recovery is the elimination of the virus so that demand normalizes.[7] Former Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke noted in late March that "Nothing will work if health issues aren't resolved," sending a clear message to governments.[8] Unless we contain the virus, economic confidence will not return, businesses will not open and people will not return to their normal lives or maintain their usual patterns of consumption. As a result, demand shocks will play a key role in this crisis, where standard short-run policies to stimulate demand will not work

[5]The occupational composition of the industries are provided at a detailed-level (close to a thousand occupations) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) through the Occupation Employment Statistics (OES) tables.

[6]Dingel and Neiman (2020) use O*NET to characterize whether the occupations teleworkable or not.

[7]See IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2020. Also contributions in Baldwin and di Mauro (2020).

[8]The transcript of Bernanke's interview on March 25 is available at this link: https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/25/cnbc-transcript-former-fed-chairman-ben-bernanke-speaks-with-cnbcs-andrew-ross-sorkin-on-squawk-box-today.html

so long as people stay fearful.

We have a disproportionate role of demand in our model as we focus on both domestic and external demand shocks where the initial shocks are propagated through domestic and international input-output linkages. In the upper half of Figure 1, we illustrate the changes in demand due to the pandemic that ultimately affect the equilibrium output. We convert the changes in the final demand to industry output. We consider two scenarios for demand: one for the normal times and one during the brunt of the pandemic. To proxy for demand shocks during the peak of the pandemic, we use data on credit card purchases provided by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT).[9] For the sectors where the credit card data is missing, we use other proxies for demand from the literature on COVID-19.[10] During the course of the pandemic, we expect demand to fluctuate between these two extremes as a function of the number of infected individuals. We use a reduced form function to accommodate the role of the pandemic in inducing behavioral changes in consumption patterns. Hence, the demand profile changes depending on the infection levels in the population, which, in turn, is mitigated by the lockdown decisions. The sooner the infection numbers decline, the sooner demand normalizes. Under no lockdown and partial lockdown scenarios, the pandemic cannot be controlled effectively and the number of infections remain elevated. Hence demand shocks play a bigger role than supply shocks in these scenarios. Implicit in this discussion is the role of global coordination. If the lockdown can be implemented with global synchronization, demand returns to pre-pandemic levels faster and the economic costs of the pandemic can be kept at a minimum level. The last stage in Figure 1 combines demand and supply sides together to reach market equilibrium, where the minimum of both sides determines the equilibrium level of production for a given industry.

After determining the economic costs of COVID-19 under alternative scenarios, we investigate how to finance the economic costs of the lockdown and the contraction in GDP. Turkey is an important EM from a global perspective given its size and the composition of its external debt. A large part of Turkey's external debt is in the form of domestic bank borrowing from global banks. As a result, the potential threat to global financial stability from elevated stress in EMs like Turkey is non-trivial.

[9] Similarly, Andersen et al. (2020) use transaction-level customer data from the largest bank in Denmark to estimate consumer responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and the partial shutdown of the economy.

[10] The list of demand changes and the resources that we used to arrive at the observed numbers are provided in Table A.3 of the Appendix.

In addition, as we show, the hardest hit sectors during COVID-19 are the ones with high levels of FX debt. Thus, both external and domestic finance will be needed.

The risk of a deep recession could be reduced under a targeted and transparent asset purchase program by the central bank, accompanied by external funding granted by an international institution in the absence of any financing from international capital markets. Asset purchase programs require policy credibility to keep inflation expectations under control so that such programs do not turn into long term monetary financing of government debt. With rising country risk premia, the role of an international institution is critical, not only as a "lender of last resort", but also to provide the needed credibility. Enhancements in credibility change the risk sentiment of foreign investors, which in turn allows the external finance premium to go down and revert back the capital flows. We provide a historical example of a combination of these policies from the triple crisis of Turkey in 2001, where the Turkish Central Bank engaged in sizable purchases of government debt together with a disinflation program, obtaining external finance at the same time.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly go over the environment in which Turkey entered the COVID-19 crisis and the policies adopted by Turkey to deal with the pandemic so far and compare size of fiscal packages in G20 countries. Section 3 describes the model that allows us to estimate the costs of alternative lockdown policies for the Turkish economy. Our quantitative findings are summarized in Section 4, where we find that each day that the lockdown is delayed, economic costs increase by about 0.2 percent of the GDP. Section 5 considers the policy alternatives to finance the economic costs of the pandemic related crisis with their pros and cons. Section 6 describes the historical experience of monetary financing of government debt under an external anchor. Section 7 concludes.

2 The Initial Conditions, External Financing Needs and the COVID-19 Response

2.1 Background

Turkey was caught with the pandemic at a bad time. The populist policies implemented in the period after 2017 led to an overheating economy. The inflation rate had been on the rise while Turkish Lira (TL) depreciated. Triggered by the political tension between Turkey and US, August 2018 marked the beginning of an exchange rate crisis, where rapidly depreciating TL brought many companies with FX debt to the edge of bankruptcy. Accommodative monetary and fiscal policies were implemented to support the economy, together with FX interventions and targeted capital controls on domestic banks' swap operations in the period after August 2018.

Capital outflows by non-residents during COVID-19 led to another wave of depreciation in TL, which required another round of FX interventions and brought FX reserves to dangerously low levels. As of the first week of April 2020, net reserves of CBRT stood at merely $26 billion, of which $25 billion was borrowed from domestic banks as part of reserve requirements. Meanwhile, the budget deficit stands close to 5 percent of GDP and current account deficit is around 2.5 percent of GDP, as an average over the last 5 years.

Figure 2: External Debt and its Decomposition

(a) Decomposition in terms of Ownership

(b) Currency Decomposition



NOTES: (a) This panel plots external debt (right x-axis) alongside with its public-private composition (left x-axis) for Turkey. Debt values are expressed as percentage of GDP. (b) This panel shows the currency composition of total external debt as of December 2019. Source: Turkey Data Monitor

Turkey relies heavily on capital flows to finance its external debt, which stood at 60 percent of GDP at the end of 2019. Figure 2a shows the changes in the composition of external debt over time. In 2001, total external debt was 57 percent of GDP. Of this, public sector debt was 24 percent, while the private sector debt was 22 percent. Macroprudential measures that were implemented in the aftermath of the crisis led to a substantial reduction in total external debt in the years immediately after the crisis. Nevertheless, the abundant liquidity provided by the major advanced country central banks in the post-2010 period changed the borrowing patterns in Turkey. The external debt gradually increased with the composition tilting towards private sector borrowing. By the time we reached 2019, total external debt was once again comparable to 2001 levels with 56 percent of the GDP. Different from 2001, however, this time the lion's share was held by the private sector debt which was 36 percent of the GDP while the public debt was 21 percent of GDP. As of December 2019, almost 60 percent of total external debt is denominated in USD (see Figure 2b).

As of December 2019, out of a total external debt of $437 billion, $124 billion was short-term (17 percent of GDP), and $93 billion of this was held by the private sector. Meanwhile, the external debt that needs to be rolled over in 2020 is $169 billion, which is approximately 23 percent of GDP.[11] If the rollover ratios stay at the current levels, then Turkey needs around $30 billion, however, if they go down to the level observed during GFC, then Turkey might need around $90 billion in 2020, a number that is much larger than any existing swap line and international arrangement available for EMs.[12]

Since the beginning of 2020, Turkey experienced capital outflows triggered by the geopolitical risks in the South East border. The outflows accelerated as COVID-19 spread globally and Turkey's risk premium, as measured by five-year CDS premium increased sharply as shown in Figure 3. From the beginning of the year until the week of April 24, 2020, $2.7 billion of equity and $5.5 billion of government bonds held by foreign investors were sold-off to domestic investors in the secondary market.[13] If we annualize these numbers, equity flows amount to 1 percent of GDP and government bond outflows amount to 2 percent of GDP. Notice that these are local currency government bonds that were held by foreign investors. As local currency bonds become riskier with the ongoing depreciation of TL, foreigners load-off these bonds first.

In addition to bonds and equities held by nonresidents, more than 1/3 of total external funding is obtained through bank loans in Turkey, which is almost all in FX. These loans finance the foreign currency debt in the non-tradeables sector. Half of the entire corporate sector debt is in FX and most of it is borrowed from domestic banks.[14] To dig deeper into the short-term risks, and considering the market dynamics in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis for EMs, we also need to look at cross-border loans. As shown in Figure 4, Turkish banks had been net payers in the external long-term loans for a while.

[11] We use the annual GDP of 2019 to express the January 2020 values as a percentage of GDP in this section.

[12] In a recent report, Bürümçekçi (2020) notes that the current rollover ratio for the banking system is around 73 percent, which receded to 45 percent during 2007-2009 crisis, and 35 percent during 2001 crisis.

[13] As for corporate bonds, the sell off started in the last week of February but the total volume of these transactions are rather negligible with a total of $86.5 million outflow from January 3 to April 24, 2020. This is due to the low share of corporate bonds relative to bank loans and government bonds in external debt. See di Giovanni et al. (2019).

[14] See di Giovanni et al. (2019).

Figure 3: The Risk Premium as Measured by CDS Spread

NOTES: This figure plots risk premimum for Turkey, which is measured by the 5-year CDS rate (World Government bonds) for Turkey. Source: Turkey Data Monitor.

Figure 4: Rollovers of External Loans by Turkish Banks



NOTES: This figure plots rollovers of external loans belonging to Turkish Banks. Loan rollovers refer to monthly-net values expressed in terms of millions of USD. Source: Turkey Data Monitor.

In January 2020, Turkish banks paid to foreign financial institutions a net of \$0.8 billion over what they borrowed in short-term loans and \$0.7 billion in long-term loans, which amount to 1 percent of annual GDP. This suggests that they need to borrow 1 percent of GDP each month to prevent any interruptions in their domestic lending at home. The net decline in rollovers were smaller in February.

Figure 5: Sectoral Relation between FX Exposure and Economic Cost of the COVID-19 Shock



NOTES: This figure plots 2016 values for sectoral FX exposure (measured as the ratio of foreign currency debt in total debt) against the economic cost of the COVID-19 shock that we estimate under no lockdown scenario in which no policy action is taken against the pandemic. We measure the sector-level economic cost as the percentage change in GDP for a given sector during pandemic relative to its pre-pandemic level. The information on currency composition of debt is obtained from the "Company Accounts" data that has been compiled by the Central Bank of Turkey.

Overall, these numbers suggest that, there is quite a bit of foreign investment still in the country given the extent of external debt. Thus, although there are still many horses in the barn, it is important not to scare the horses given the extent of FX debt in the corporate sector, which can lead to massive bankruptcies with a spiraling depreciation of TL. In fact, while most sectors are adversely affected from COVID-19, those sectors with higher levels of FX exposure are hit harder because of the increase in their debt burden during the COVID-19 shock. In Figure 5, we plot the sectoral FX debt against the GDP loss under the scenario in which no action is taken against the pandemic. While we elaborate on how we calculate the economic costs in the next section, we present the GDP loss variable somewhat prematurely in this section to illustrate that the exchange rate depreciation works as an amplification mechanism during the pandemic. In fact, those sectors that rely more heavily on FX funding experience sharper declines in their output during the crisis.

2.2 Policy Response to COVID-19

In terms of monetary and financial policies, Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) cut rates by 100 basis points immediately during their emergency meeting on March 18, 2020 and again on April 22. The announcement that came on March 31 eased collateral requirements to borrow from the CBRT and opened the door for unlimited bond purchases where it was stated that "...limits might be revised depending on market conditions."[15] CBRT and BSRA (Banking Supervisory and Regulatory Authority) introduced several financial repression measures in the following days that increase the risk exposure of the banking system, encouraging banks to lend at low rates or buy government bonds.[16] They have also introduced certain capital flow management measures that reduced domestic banks' reserve requirements for foreign currency deposits and put limits on the daily amounts of domestic banks' swap transactions.[17]

In terms of fiscal policy, the stimulus package announced by the government on March 17 is consistent with the general framework adopted by other countries. There is postponement of tax obligations, social security premiums and credit payments of the companies in the services sector. The limits of the Credit Guarantee Fund have been increased to make bank loans more accessible. Temporary income support is provided to those workers whose companies have ceased production due to the pandemic. The overall size of the package is only about 2 percent of GDP. [18] To put this

[15] https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Announcements/Press+Releases/2020/ANO2020-22

[16] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-18/turkey-announces-new-regulation-to-boost-lending-bond-purchase and https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-turkey-banks/turkeys-banking-watchdog-sets-deposit-ratio-to-boost-loans-idUSL8N2C607I

[17] https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-turkey-banks/turkish-regulator-slashes-limits-on-banks-fx-transactions-idUSL5N2C00OI

https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/turkish-lira-falls-as-regulator-limits-bank-forex-swap-deals

[18] Although the original relief package that was announced on March 18 was expressed to be 100 billion TL, the Minister of Finance and Treasury announced on May 13 that the pandemic related government expenditure has already reached 240 billion TL. Even with the revised numbers, the package still remains to be less than 5 percent of GDP, however.

number into perspective, Figure 6 shows a comparison of the fiscal measures undertaken by the G20 countries, where the average size of the fiscal stimulus is about 10 percent with Germany leading the pack with 32 percent. It is clear that the Turkish package is small, lagging behind 16 of the G20 countries.

Figure 6: Fiscal Measures announced by the G20 countries



NOTES: This figure plots the COVID-19 relief packages adopted by the countries as a percentage of their GDPs. The fiscal policy measures that are shown in this figure are obtained from the IMF Policy Tracker (https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19) except for South Africa and the United Kingdom, for which the values of the stimulus packages are not explicitly stated. For these countries, we gathered the necessary information from alternative resources. A detailed comparison of the fiscal measures as well as the data sources are presented in Table A.1 of the Appendix.

One of the main components that is missing in the package is the absence of direct transfer payments to those who have lost their jobs or experienced interruptions in their income streams due to the pandemic, especially to SMEs who constitute the back-bone of the Turkish economy. If the lost income and salaries are not replaced by the government, it is impossible to keep the wheels of the economy turning. Should the transfer payments cover only those who lost their income or should they be in the form of "helicopter money" in the Turkish context, which has a sizeable informal economy? Answering all these questions depends on the extent of funding that is necessary to support the economy. In the next section, we provide a model that estimates these costs.

3 Estimating the Economic Costs of the Crisis Under Different Lockdown Scenarios

In this section, we develop a model that illustrates how COVID-19 affects the economy. We illustrate that despite the increasing costs due to business closures, a full lockdown contains the virus in the fastest way. As we compare the recovery paths with and without the lockdown, we observe that a full lockdown lasts for approximately 40 days while partial lockdown cannot contain the virus within a year. Because the duration of the lockdown increases substantially, the economic costs of a partial lockdown are significantly higher than full lockdown. The mortality numbers present a stark contrast across alternative scenarios as well. Full lockdown, which has the lowest economic costs also stands out as the best option that minimizes the number of deaths. Only 0.002 percent of the population dies in a well implemented full lockdown whereas the numbers range between 0.32 to 0.96 percent in the case of partial lockdown.

3.1 The SIR Model for Pandemic

We start with introducing the model of the pandemic, which is the main workhorse in many epidemiological studies, see for example Allen (2017) among others. Let's take a population of size N. At any given time, we can split the population into three classes of people: Susceptible (S_t), Infected (I_t) and Recovered (R_t) as of time t. The susceptible group does not yet have immunity to disease, and the individuals in this group have the possibility of getting infected. The recovered group, on the other hand, consists of individuals who are immune to the disease.[19] The Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model builds on the simple principle that a fraction of the infected individuals in the population, $\frac{I_{t-1}}{N}$, can transmit the disease to susceptible ones S_{t-1} with an (structural) infection rate of β. Therefore, the number of newly infected individuals in the current period is $\beta S_{t-1} \frac{I_{t-1}}{N}$. The newly infected individuals should be deducted from the susceptible individuals in the current period. Meanwhile, in each period, a fraction γ of the infected people recovers from the disease, which

[19] Immunity can be developed either because the individual goes through the infection or because she gets vaccinated.

in turn reduces the number of actively infected individuals.[20] To track any changes in the number of individuals in the above-mentioned three groups, the following set of equations is used:

$$\Delta S_t = -\beta S_{t-1}\frac{I_{t-1}}{N} \quad (1)$$

$$\Delta R_t = \gamma I_{t-1} \quad (2)$$

$$\Delta I_t = \beta S_{t-1}\frac{I_{t-1}}{N} - \gamma I_{t-1} \quad (3)$$

The law of motion for the number of infected individuals shows the trajectory of the pandemic at the aggregate level. Note that, $\Delta S_t + \Delta R_t + \Delta I_t = 0$ holds at any given time, assuming that the size of the population remains constant.

We modify the conventional SIR model to allow for sectoral heterogeneity in terms of the size and working conditions that can lead to distinct infection trajectories in each sector. The transmission of the virus requires close physical proximity. Hence, employees working in the industries with higher physical proximity are infected with a higher probability.[21]

We assume that the economy is composed of K sectors. We denote the industries by subscript $i = 1, \ldots, K$. Each industry has L_i workers and there is also the non-working population which we denote by N_{NW}. Each industry has two types of workers: (i) employees who can perform their jobs remotely (i.e., teleworkable) and (ii) employees who need to be on-site to fulfill their jobs. In each industry, we denote the number of employees in the first group with TW_i and the second group with N_i. Hence:

$$L_i = TW_i + N_i. \quad (4)$$

For the disease propagation, we lump the non-working population and the employees in the teleworkable jobs together, and call them the at-home group. We denote the at-home group with index $i = 0$. The total number of individuals in this group is:

$$N_0 = N_{NW} + \sum_{i=1}^{K} TW_i. \quad (5)$$

[20]See also Atkeson (2020a), Bendavid and Bhattacharya (2020), Dewatripont et al. (2020), Fauci et al. (2020), Li et al. (2020), Linton et al. (2020), and Vogel (2020) on different mortality estimates.

[21]A report by DISK labor union in Turkey claims a three-fold increase in infection rates among workers: http://disk.org.tr/2020/04/rate-of-covid-19-cases-among-workers-at-least-3-times-higher-than-average/

Suppose that the infection rate in the at-home group is β_0. In order to account for heterogeneous physical proximities across industries, we compute the rate of infection for each industry i, denoted by β_i, as:

$$\beta_i = \beta_0 \text{Prox}_i \qquad \text{for} \quad i = 1, \ldots, K \tag{6}$$

where Prox_i is the proximity index for industry i.[22]

Here, $S_{i,t}$, $I_{i,t}$ and $R_{i,t}$ denote the number of susceptible, infected and recovered individuals, respectively, with $N_i = S_{i,t} + I_{i,t} + R_{i,t}$ denoting the total number of on-site individuals in industry i and the at-home group ($i = 0$). Susceptible individuals in the at-home group can get infected from the infected individuals in the entire society:

$$\Delta S_{0,t} = -\beta_0 S_{0,t-1} \frac{I_{t-1}}{N} \tag{7}$$

where $I_t = \sum_{i=1}^{K} I_{i,t} + I_{0,t}$ captures the total number of infected individuals. An on-site worker in sector i, however, could be exposed to infection either at work, at the rate of $\beta_i S_{i,t-1} \frac{I_{i,t-1}}{N_i}$, or outside work, that involves all the remaining activities including family life, shopping and commuting at the rate $\beta_0 S_{i,t-1} \frac{I_{t-1}}{N}$. Hence, the number of susceptible individuals among the on-site workers in industry i changes as:

$$\Delta S_{i,t} = -\beta_i S_{i,t-1} \frac{I_{i,t-1}}{N_i} - \beta_0 S_{i,t-1} \frac{I_{t-1}}{N} \tag{8}$$

The recovery rate is the same for all types of infected individuals:

$$\Delta R_{i,t} = \gamma I_{i,t-1} \tag{9}$$

The number of infected individuals changes as the susceptible individuals get infected and some

[22] We obtain the physical proximity values at the occupation level from O*NET datase. O*NET collects the physical proximity information through surveys with following categories: (1) I don't work near other people (beyond 100 ft.); (2) I work with others but not closely (e.g., private office); (3) Slightly close (e.g., shared office); (4) Moderately close (at arm's length); (5) Very close (near touching). We divide the category values by 3 to make category (3) our benchmark. Specifically, a proximity value larger than 1 indicates a closer proximity than the 'shared office' level and smaller than 1 corresponds a less-dense working conditions. We create a single physical proximity value for each occupation by doing a weighted average of the normalized category values. We calculate the proximity values at the industry level after removing the teleworkable portion from the employees. We use Dingel and Neiman (2020)'s list of teleworkable occupations to capture the proportion of employment that can be fulfilled at remote locations in each industry.

infected individuals recover from the disease:

$$\Delta I_{i,t} = -\left(\Delta R_{i,t} + \Delta S_{i,t}\right) \tag{10}$$

According the initial report by the World Health Organization (WHO),[23] the median recovery time for the mild cases is reported to be approximately 2 weeks. The mean recovery time could be longer when we include the severe cases. In this paper, we err on the optimistic side and set $\gamma = 1/14 \approx 0.07$ to establish a mean recovery time of 14 days. In the same report, the $R_0 \equiv \beta/\gamma$ of the disease, which captures the average number of individuals infected by a person carrying the disease, was estimated to be 2 to 2.5. Here, we use the lower end. In the absence of industrial heterogeneity, $R_0 = 2$ and $\gamma = 0.07$ implies $\beta = 0.14$.

With industrial heterogeneity, we match the employment size weighted average β_i's of the infected individuals to β. For an on-site worker in industry i, the implied β parameter can be approximated by $(\beta_0 + \beta_i)$.[24] For a non-working individual, this parameter is only β_0. Using Equation (6), we impose:

$$\beta_0 \frac{N_0}{N} + \sum_{i=1}^{K} (\beta_0 + \beta_i) \frac{N_i}{N} = \beta_0 + \beta_0 \sum_{i=1}^{K} \text{Prox}_i \frac{N_i}{N} = \beta \tag{11}$$

Hence, we solve for β_0 in terms of β, industry size, and the proximity levels as:

$$\beta_0 = \beta \left(1 + \sum_{i=1}^{K} \frac{\text{Prox}_i N_i}{N}\right)^{-1} \tag{12}$$

with $\beta = 0.14$ based on the WHO report.

3.2 Production

We specify a simplified version of the production function where output is a linear function of labor. This treatment emphasizes the impact of the pandemic on production through changes in labor supply. Here, we implicitly assume that the amount of the capital stock remains the same, and

[23]https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-on-covid-19-final-report.pdf

[24]According to the DISK report cited in Footnote 21, the infection rate is 3 times higher for workers compared to the non-working population. Here, we take a moderate stance and set the rate to be 2 times higher on average for the workers.

therefore, can be omitted during normal times as well as the pandemic period. We model production as a function of the number of workers in industry i as:

$$Y_{i,t} = Z_i L_{i,t} \tag{13}$$

where Z_i denotes the productivity of workers in sector i.

During the pandemic period, the level of production decreases because the infected individuals cannot work until they recover from the disease. We have two groups of workers, at-home and on-site. Hence, the total number of available workers at time t will be:

$$\tilde{L}_{i,t} = (N_{i,t} - I_{i,t}) + TW_i \left(1 - \frac{I_{0,t}}{N_0}\right) \tag{14}$$

where $N_{i,t}$ is the number of on-site workers, $I_{i,t}$ is the number of infected workers among on-site workers, and TW_i is the number of at-home workers (i.e. those who can work remotely) in industry i. The ratio $I_{0,t}/N_0$ captures the fraction of individuals who are infected in the at-home group, which includes the non-working population as well as all at-home workers (i.e. teleworkers) in the economy. Therefore, the production in industry i changes to:

$$Y^S_{i,t} = Z_i \tilde{L}_{i,t} \tag{15}$$

3.3 Demand

During the pandemic period, consumer priorities and preferences change dramatically due to many reasons. First, there is fear of infection. In order to minimize the risks of getting infected, individuals alter their behavior and change their consumption patterns, such as refraining from public events or malls. The fear of infection is related to the number of infected individuals in the society. Second, there is fear of transmitting the disease to others. Individuals may choose to minimize their social interactions with a precautionary motive, in order to avoid infecting others inadvertently. The risk of transmission is particularly high for asymptomatic cases. Third, there is uncertainty about the duration of the pandemic and the related economic outlook. Aggregate expenditure typically declines during times of elevated uncertainty. Fourth, there is a direct income effect. Individuals lose their income stream either when they get laid-off or when they experience a sharp decline in demand for their output.

In order to capture the change in demand patterns during the pandemic, we consider two demand profiles, one corresponding to normal times and the other one corresponding to the brunt of the pandemic. We determine the demand for each industry during normal times from the national accounts. As for the crisis period, we estimate changes in the expenditure levels for the pandemic using credit card spending data, industry reports, previous literature and expert opinions.[25] The progression of the pandemic and the normalization of demand as the pandemic fades is a gradual process. In order to capture this steady adjustment, we assume that the individuals move between these two profiles smoothly, as a function of the number of infected individuals in the country. After determining demand, we use the input-output framework and map the final good consumption back to output in each industry.

In modeling the demand side, we first express the utility function of a representative agent who maximizes her utility by optimally allocating her income on the expenditure of different final goods. Following the literature on input-output analysis (see e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2012), among others), we assume that the representative agent has a Cobb-Douglass utility function:

$$U(e_1, \ldots, e_n) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} e_i^{\alpha_i}, \tag{16}$$

with e_i denoting the level of expenditure in industry i, and α_i representing the share of industry i in total expenditure with $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i = 1$ and $0 < \alpha_i < 1$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, n$. The utility function in (16) incorporates a budget restriction which implies that the total income (w) equals total expenditure, i.e., $w = \sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i$. With the Cobb-Douglass utility function, α_i determines the share of industry i in the expenditure so that $e_i = \alpha_i w$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$.

During times of the pandemic, demand patterns change. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that changes in demand come from two channels. First, the pandemic changes preferences and

[25]Expected final demand changes and the resources we use in this estimation are presented in Table A.3 of the Appendix.

priorities, which implies an adjustment in sectoral weights. The utility function transforms into:

$$\tilde{U}(e_1, \ldots, e_n, I) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} e_i^{\tilde{\alpha}_i(I)}, \tag{17}$$

with the Cobb-Douglas exponents depending on the number of infections and $\tilde{\alpha}_i(I) = \alpha_i$ for a small number of infections, i.e., $I \leq 0.1\bar{I}$, where $\bar{I}$ is a scaling parameter for infections. In the Turkish context, we set $\bar{I} = 50,000$ to capture a relevant range for the number of of infections (see below for our simulations). This limit implies that the utility function returns to normal times if the number of infections remain below 5,000. For large i, the limit level is defined as $\lim_{I\to\infty} \tilde{\alpha}_i(I) \equiv \bar{\alpha}_i$ with $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \bar{\alpha}_i = 1$ and $0 < \bar{\alpha}_i < 1$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, n$.

In addition to the changes in preferences during the pandemic, demand also changes due to the income effect. We assume that the available income for expenditure decreases by a ratio of $1 - \eta(I)$ compared to normal times. We assume that $\eta(I)$ is a decreasing function of the number of infections and satisfies $\eta(I) = 1$ for $I \leq 0.1\bar{I}$. For large I, i.e., $\lim_{I\to\infty} \eta(I) = \bar{\eta}$ with $0 < \bar{\eta} \leq 1$. In this set up, the minimum level of income that is necessary for survival at the brunt of the pandemic is given by $\bar{\eta} \times w$, which can be achieved through transfer payments.

To determine the level of output implied by the changes in demand during the pandemic, we first express the expenditure in each industry as a function of the number of infections. Next, we construct a ratio, $\delta_i(I)$, which shows the expenditure in industry i when the infection level is I relative to the expenditure during normal times. The numerator in this ratio is dependent on both the income channel and changes in priorities. By combining both channels, we can write $\delta_i(I)$ as:

$$\delta_i(I) = \frac{\tilde{\alpha}_i(I)\eta(I)}{\alpha_i}. \tag{18}$$

As the demand ratio approaches 1, it signals that the number of infections decline and demand normalizes. As the demand ratio approaches 0, it reflects that the number of infections increase and demand shrinks due to the pandemic. Using this ratio, we write the limiting cases for $\delta_i(I)$. For small I (i.e., $I \leq 0.1\bar{I}$), $\delta_i(I) = 1$. Thus, for a small number of infections, demand remains intact such that the ratio of demand during normal times equals demand during the pandemic.[26]

[26]We use the number of infected patients in Turkey as the determinant of global demand change in a particular in-

For large I, which corresponds to the peak of the pandemic, $\lim_{I\to\infty} \tilde{\alpha}_i(I) \equiv \bar{\delta}_i = \frac{\tilde{\alpha}_i \bar{\eta}}{\alpha_i}$. If the demand for an industry i completely collapses during the pandemic (e.g., the airline industry), then $\bar{\delta}_i = 0$. If there is no change in demand during the pandemic (e.g. food industry), then, $\bar{\delta}_i = 1$. We assume that $\bar{\delta}_i$ is the utmost demand change in a particular sector that is globally valid under a fully developing pandemic.

Changes in demand at any given time is a function of the number of infected individuals in the population. In this framework, we assume that the ratio of demand, $\delta_i(I)$, smoothly fluctuates between 1 when nobody is infected and $\bar{\delta}_i$ when a very large number individuals get infected using the functional form [27] as:

$$\delta_i(I) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if} \quad I \leq 0.1\bar{I} \\ \bar{\delta}_i \frac{1+(I/\bar{I}-0.1)}{\bar{\delta}_i+(I/\bar{I}-0.1)} & \text{if} \quad I > 0.1\bar{I} \end{cases} \tag{20}$$

It is important to note that the overwhelming uncertainty about the course of the virus may suppress economic confidence for a longer period of time. To the extent that the actual normalization is slower than what is implied by Equation (20), we err on the conservative side by assuming a faster recovery.

Given the smooth transition function, we now model the changes in the final demand levels using δ values. Let's illustrate the final demand of country c in industry i with $F_{c,i}$. Accordingly, the new level of final demand in industry i in country c during the pandemic becomes:

$$\tilde{F}_{c,i}(I) = F_{c,i}\delta_i(I) \tag{21}$$

dustry. While it is possible for a given country to handle the pandemic better or worse than Turkey, we argue that the number of infections and the consequent demand shifts in Turkey would not be that far off from the global course of the pandemic. In fact, a recent report by the ECB (Chapter 3, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 3 / 2020) highlights the striking resemblance between the timing of demand collapse in Turkey and the Euro Area: (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/ecbu/eb202003.en.pdf on Economic Activity.

[27] This inverse hyperbolic functional form provides a smooth transition between the two limiting cases, for small and large I, where the marginal impact of the number of infections changes at a rate that is inversely proportional to the number of infections. The specification flexibly allows for changes across sectors as $\bar{I}$ and δ_i are the tuning parameters that determine the limits and the speed of the convergence.

The smooth transition in Equation 20 between the limiting cases can be achieved with the following functional forms for $\eta(I)$ and $\tilde{\alpha}_i(I)$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$:

$$\begin{aligned} \eta(I) = 1 \quad &\text{and} \quad \tilde{\alpha}_i(I) = \alpha_i \qquad \text{if } I \leq 0.1\bar{I} \\ \eta(I) = \bar{\eta}\frac{1+(I/\bar{I}-0.1)}{\bar{\eta}+(I/\bar{I}-0.1)} \quad &\text{and} \quad \tilde{\alpha}_i(I) = \frac{\tilde{\alpha}_i}{\alpha_i}\frac{\bar{\eta}+(I/\bar{I}-0.1)}{\bar{\delta}_i+(I/\bar{I}-0.1)} \quad \text{if } I > 0.1\bar{I} \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

where $\tilde{F}_{c,i}(I)$ represents the revised demand during the pandemic when the number of infections is I.

In order to map the changes in the final demand for each sector to the output level in each industry, we use the input-output framework. Using a closed-economy version of the input-output relations would neglect the impact of foreign trade on aggregate expenditure. Turkey is an open economy with a trade-to-GDP ratio of almost 63% as of 2019 (See Figure 7).

Figure 7: Trade Volume (% of GDP)



NOTES: This figure plots trade volume for Turkey, which is measured as the share of imports of goods & services and exports of goods & services in GDP. Source: World Development Indicators.

In order to account for the international linkages to fully capture the impact of final demand on production, we utilize OECD Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Tables.[28] ICIO provides us with input usages of industry i in country c from any industry in any country. As shown in Figure A.1, we have 36 industries and 69 entities (corresponding to 65 countries), giving us a matrix of 2484×2484 entries. The final demand vector has 2484 entries and we index the entries of this vector by j, corresponding to each country-industry combination. By dividing the rows of ICIO matrix with the

[28]https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/inter-country-input-output-tables.htm

total output of industry j, we obtain the direct requirements matrix $\mathbf{A}$. This matrix summarizes the usage of each intermediate input to generate \$1 worth of output. Output of each industry is either used as an intermediate input or consumed as final demand. Using matrix notation, we decompose the total output into intermediate and final usage as:

$$Y = \mathbf{A}Y + F \tag{22}$$

Here, Y denotes the output vector and F denotes the final demand vector whose entries are Y_j and F_j respectively, while$j$ is an index over all (c, i) combinations.[29] Therefore, we can solve for the output to satisfy the final demand as:

$$Y = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}F \tag{23}$$

From this equation, we write the total output of country c as:

$$Y_c = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Y_{c,i} \tag{24}$$

Using the demand change from Equation (21) during the infection, the demand channel changes the output as:

$$Y_t^D = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}\tilde{F}(I_t). \tag{25}$$

where Y_t^D represents the output and $\tilde{F}(I_t)$ represents the vector of demand at time t as a function of the number of infections, I_t. Therefore, the output also changes with the dynamics of the pandemic.

3.4 Equilibrium

We have two channels in the economy. On the supply side, as the workers get infected and cannot work until they are fully recovered, production decreases due to a reduction in labor supply during the pandemic period. The output changes to Y^S in Equation (15). On the demand side, consumer preferences and income change following the COVID-19 outbreak, which alter the demand patterns. The output, in this case, is denoted by Y^D in Equation (25). In equilibrium, production declines by

[29]With a slight abuse of the notation, we drop the subscript to refer to vectors or matrices of the variables. For simplicity, we often use (c, i) to refer to an entry instead of j when we refer to vector entries

the largest magnitude that is implied by either supply or demand side. In other words, during the pandemic, we expect the output vector to be:

$$Y_t^{EQ} = \min(Y_t^S, Y_t^D) \tag{26}$$

where min represents element by element minimum function for two vectors, namely Y_t^S and Y_t^D.

The value-added of the output in industry i in country c is calculated from the shares of value added in each industry during normal times as:

$$VA_{t,c,i}^{EQ} = Y_{t,c,i}^{EQ} \frac{VA_{c,i}}{Y_{c,i}} \tag{27}$$

Therefore, GDP of the country c at time t can be obtained through:

$$GDP_{t,c}^{EQ} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} VA_{t,c,i}^{EQ} \tag{28}$$

3.5 Data

In our analysis, we use OECD ICIO Tables for 2015. As industrial classification, OECD uses an aggregation of 2-digit ISIC Rev 4 codes to 36 sectors. Throughout our analysis, we will make use of this classification labeled as OECD ISIC Codes.

To calculate the industry level teleworkable share and the physical proximity measures, we use the occupational composition of the industries. We use the list provided by Dingel and Neiman (2020) for the occupations which can fulfill their tasks remotely. For the workers that continue to do their jobs on-site, we assume that the infection rate depends on the physical proximity that is required in their workplace. To calculate the proximity requirements for the occupations, we use the self-reported Physical Proximity values available in the Work Context section of the O*NET database.[30] We divide the O*NET categories into 3 to have values larger than 1 if the reported category for the physical proximity is 3 (Slightly close (e.g., shared office)) or higher. We create a

[30]"O*NET OnLine Help: Find Occupations." O*NET OnLine, National Center for O*NET Development, www.onetonline.org/help/online/find_occ. Accessed 1 April 2020. Dingel and Neiman (2020) also use several measures from O*NET to identify which occupations are teleworkable.

single proximity value for each occupation by weighting the normalized score with the percentage of answers in each category. To obtain industry-level teleworkable share and proximity values, we calculate the weighted average of the values corresponding to the occupations in each industry using the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). OES data follows four-digit NAICS codes to classify industries. In order to convert proximity data to OECD ISIC codes, we make use of the correspondence table between 2017 NAICS and ISIC Revision 4 Industry Codes, provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. We provide the teleworkable share and the proximity index for the industries in Table A.2 of the Appendix.

We obtain employment data from the Turkish Social Security (SGK) Agency. SGK follows four-digit NACE Revision 2 codes to classify industries. In order to aggregate employment data to 36 OECD ISIC codes, we make use of the Eurostat correspondence table between NACE Revision 2 and ISIC Revision 4 Industry Codes. SGK lacks the data on the number of employees working in the "Public Administration Sector," so we fill this information using the relevant data provided by the President's office.

We use publicly available credit card spending data from the CBRT to calculate the estimated demand changes during the pandemic in each industry. The list of OECD ISIC industries, and the expected changes are listed in Table A.3 of the Appendix along with explanations. In Table A.5 of the Appendix, we provide the matching we used with CBRT spending data and OECD ISIC industries.

Under full lockdown, only a few industries are active. We use the decree issued by Turkish Ministry of Interior on April 10, 2020 to identify these industries. Turkish full lockdowns are typically on weekends and holidays and thus the list did not include some critical sectors. We supplemented the list with the food sector as well as household and sanitary goods. The list of these sectors is given in Table A.4 of the Appendix. From these industries and using the employment data at 4 digits, we calculated the share of each OECD ISIC industry that would remain active during the lockdown. Finally, we calculated the share of public employees that are not affected by the lockdown using the publicly available information, which is listed in Table A.6 of the Appendix.

4 Quantitative Findings from the Calibration Exercise

4.1 Economic Costs under Alternative Lockdown Scenarios

In this section, we illustrate the consequences of alternative lockdown scenarios within our framework. In these scenarios, we impose changes on β_0 (i.e., the infection rate of the non-working population) and possibly on β_i for (i.e., the infection rate of the working population in industry i) and simulate the course of the pandemic. Furthermore, we assume that the pandemic is successfully contained if the number of total infections declines to 5000 after observing the peak. These simulations allow us to calculate the economic costs of alternative lockdown scenarios. [31]

We start with the no lockdown scenario and compare it to partial lockdown where certain restrictions are imposed on daily life to incorporate social distancing rules while businesses remain open. This implies that under partial lockdown β_0 is diminished compared to the case where no action is taken, but β_i for $i = 1, \ldots, n$ remain unchanged. We consider three cases of partial lockdown where the infection rate, β_0 is reduced by the proportion of 0.5, 0.25 and 0.10 compared to the reference setting. Figure 8 displays the evolution of the number of infected patients under these four scenarios when a hypothetical lockdown is implemented for 240 days, starting early on the 10$^{\text{th}}$ day and remains active until the 250$^{\text{th}}$ day.

As can be seen from the figure, in case no action is taken against the COVID-19 pandemic, which is shown with the blue line, the pandemic advances at a rate implied by the benchmark reproduction rate of $R_0 = 2$. This implies that the pandemic reaches its peak around the 150$^{\text{th}}$ day with a total toll of around 14 million infections. Following this state of "herd immunity", the number of infections starts to decline. After approximately 300 days, the virus is taken under control. Under the no lockdown scenario, 1.13 percent of the population dies if we assume a 1.5 percent mortality rate. The GDP declines 11.0% in this case. We should remind the readers that the economic costs that are expressed in terms of GDP should not be misinterpreted as annual growth forecasts. We merely

[31] We note that the 5000 threshold that is assigned for the containment of the pandemic differs from the notion of Critical Community Size (CCS) (Bartlett, 1960). CCS is the threshold for the number of susceptible individuals to die out by itself. Instead, the 5000 threshold that we set in the model represents the number of infectious individuals who can be feasibly tested, traced, and eventually quarantined so that the pandemic can be contained successfully. We assume that for each infected individual, we need to test ten additional people on average. Thus, if there are 5000 patients, tracing the infection requires about 50,000 tests, which is close to the current testing capacity in Turkey.

Figure 8: No lockdown versus Partial Lockdown Scenarios



express the cost of the lockdown in terms of the GDP.

Under partial lockdown scenarios, the reproduction number declines below 2 due to lower infection rates but remains above 1 in all three scenarios. Specifically, we assume that the lower infection rate dampens the rate at which the pandemic evolves, nevertheless it is not sufficient to contain it altogether. This is due to the fact that businesses remain open, which feeds the virus within the industries and affects the overall course of the pandemic. If the infection rate is relatively high ($0.5 \times \beta_0$), which is shown with the red line, the GDP declines 11.6 percent. If the infection rate is moderate ($0.25 \times \beta_0$), shown with the green line, the GDP declines by 10.9 percent. If the infection rate is relatively low ($0.1 \times \beta_0$), shown with the black line, the GDP declines by 10.5 percent.

None of the 240-day partial lockdown scenarios that we considered in Figure 8 were successful in containing the pandemic. When the lockdown is removed on day 250, all three partial lockdown scenarios have approximately the same number of infections. Once the lockdown is removed, however, the virus follows a different course in each scenario. For the low infection rate scenarios (green and black lines) the number of new cases increase rapidly, leading to peak levels within 50 days after the lockdown. Meanwhile the high infection rate and no lockdown scenarios show a steady decline (the blue and red lines). This is because less people get infected during partial lockdown (and get immunity) under the low infection rate scenarios, shown by the area under the black and green lines. Hence, by the time the lockdown is removed, the number of susceptible people are significantly higher under the low infection rate scenarios, increasing the effective R_0 ($= \beta/\gamma$). Thus, in the absence of an efficient drug or vaccination, a partial lockdown may need to continue indefinitely, until the number of cases decline to 5000. Figure 9 shows the simulation results if partial lockdown lasts for a full year. As in Figure 8, we assume that the industries are operating as usual and thus β_i's (for $i = 1, \ldots, K$) remain unaffected.

Figure 9: Alternative Scenarios under Partial Lockdown for Full Year



Compared to Figure 8, we observe that the main advantage of an extended partial lockdown is that it flattens the curve by spreading the number of infections over time and allowing for a larger recovery rate. In terms of the economic costs, the additional economic costs of the longer partial lockdown hover around 0.5 percent of the GDP. The added costs despite the extended duration of the lockdown are limited. This is due to the fact that the decline in demand already reaches a maximum level at the earlier stages of the lockdown and successive reductions in production only reflect the decline in supply due to increased number of infections.

Figure 10 illustrates the implications of our model under full lockdown. If the lockdown is put into practice when the number of infections is around 80,000, a fully effective procedure lowers the reproduction rate to zero ($R_0 = 0$), which is shown by the blue line, and contains the pandemic within 39 days (the gray shaded area). The consequent decline in GDP is about 4.5 percent. If the lockdown is not very effective and the infection continues to spread with some minimal reproduction number ($R_0 = 0.02$), then the duration of the lockdown increases by 15 days (yellow shaded area) to 54 days and the GDP declines by 5.6 percent.

Figure 10: Alternative Scenarios under Full Lockdown



The costs of delaying full lockdown are shown in Figure 11. The benchmark scenario that is illustrated in Figure 10 is shown with the blue line. If the lockdown is delayed by only one day, the number of infections increases by more than 10,000. In the model, we assume that the number of infections increases faster than the official statistics, which report only the tested patients. Under these circumstances, a 39-day lockdown is no longer sufficient to control the pandemic. Thus, in exchange for a one-day delay, the lockdown needs to be extended by two more days (the red line), which increases the costs of the lockdown to 4.7 percent of the GDP. If there is a two-day delay (the green line), this time the duration of the lockdown increases to 43 days and the decline in GDP is 4.9 percent. If the lockdown is delayed by one week (the black line), the decline in GDP is 5.8 percent. After 100 days, the virus starts to spread again and hence prematurely ending the lockdown is rather ineffective.

As we compare the economic costs under full lockdown (Figures 10 and 11) with those of partial lockdown (Figures 8 and 9), we note that the costs of full lockdown are lower than any of partial lockdown scenarios.

As we compare the the number of deaths under alternative scenarios, we observe that 0.001 percent of the population dies under an effective full lockdown, compared to 1 percent of the population under no lockdown and about 0.8 percent of the population under partial lockdown scenarios that

Figure 11: Costs of Delay in Implementing Full Lockdown



last for 250 days. If partial lockdown is extended to a full year, then the number of deaths decline to about 0.5 percent of the population.

4.2 Sectoral Breakdown of Economic Costs

In this section, we illustrate how the economic costs related to the COVID-19 shock differ across industries under the alternative lockdown scenarios. Figure 12 shows how hard each sector is hit from the pandemic under alternative lockdown scenarios. Consistent with our earlier findings, we observe that the full lockdown has the lowest economic costs compared to the alternatives. In terms of sectoral heterogeneity, we note that teleworkable or essential sectors are less severely effected because they continue functioning for all lockdown scenarios (such as education, IT, public administration). Meanwhile, non-essential sectors or those that require on-site work are more severely affected (such as accommodation and food services, arts, entertainment, and recreation, construction).

After documenting the heterogenous economic costs of the pandemic for different sectors, we investigate whether these costs are accrued from demand or supply pressures. Figures 13–15 count the days in which output implied by the demand channel or supply channel prevails to bring about the equilibrium output in a given industry. Among the 35 industries,[32] we focus on the top ten

[32] We use OECD ISIC Codes to categorize the economy into 35 different industries, which are listed in the first column of Table A.2

Figure 12: Sectoral Heterogeneity in terms of Economic Cost of COVID-19 Shock

(a) **Scenario 1:** No Lockdown, $\beta = 0.14$



(b) **Scenario 2:** Full Lockdown, 91-131, $R_0 = 0$



(c) **Scenario 3:** Partial Lockdown, 10-250, $0.25 \times \beta_0$



NOTES: This figure shows how the economic cost of COVID-19 shock differs across sectors in a particular lockdown scenario. The panels show three alternative scenarios: (a) No action is taken against the COVID-19 pandemic; (b) A lockdown is put into practice between the 91^{st} and 131^{st} days of the pandemic and is fully effective with zero reproduction number; (c) A partial lockdown is put into practice between 10^{th}-250^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a moderate infection rate ($0.25 \times \beta_0$). For each scenario, we measure the sector-level economic cost as the percentage change in GDP for a given sector during pandemic relative to its pre-pandemic level. Economic costs are aggregated from the 2-digit OECD ISIC codes to the 1-digit NACE code using 2-digit sector value added values that we obtain from the OECD ICIO Tables. NACE 1-digit sectors are A, B C, D&E, F, G, H, I, J, L, M&N, P, Q, R&S. In each panel, the sectors are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic cost under the corresponding scenario.

industries that are most adversely affected from the pandemic.

To interpret the findings present in these figures, we consider several scenarios: Figure 13 compares the no lockdown (blue line in Figure 8) scenario against full and effective lockdown (blue line in Figure 10), and full and less effective lockdown (red line in Figure 10). Panel (a) suggests that under the no lockdown scenario, the demand channel, shown by the red bars, drives output in almost all days until the virus is fully contained. The supply channel, presented by the blue bars, prevails only in the early days of the pandemic (not shown). Among the 35 industries, "Accommodation and food services," "Arts, entertainment, recreation and other service activities," and "Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products" are those that result in the highest economic costs of 36 %, 33 %, and 27% of the GDP, respectively. This is not only because goods produced in those categories (which are mostly in the services sector) cannot be consumed from home, but also because people prefer delaying their consumption until the uncertainty regarding the containment of the pandemic resolves.

Under full lockdown scenario, the supply channel drives output due to the closure of all non-essential industries, whereas the demand channel prevails approximately 30 days before the restric-

Figure 13: Supply and Demand Pressures under Lockdown Scenarios

(a) **Scenario 1:** No Lockdown, $\beta = 0.14$

(b) **Scenario 2:** Full Lockdown, 91-131, $R_0 = 0$

(c) **Scenario 3:** Full Lockdown, 91-145, $R_0 = 0.02$



NOTES: In this figure, each bar shows the number days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars) prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels show three alternative scenarios: (a) No action is taken against the COVID-19 pandemic; (b) A lockdown is put into practice between the 91^{st} and 131^{st} days of the pandemic and is fully effective with zero reproduction number; (c) A lockdown is put into practice with some minimal reproduction number (R_0 =0.02) between the 91^{st} and 145^{th} days of the pandemic. In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP) under the corresponding scenario.

tions are implemented (Figure 13 Panel (b)). Among the 35 industries, "Accommodation and food services," "Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products" and "Mining and non-quarrying of non-energy producing products" are those that result in the highest economic costs of 12%, 10%, and 9.9% of the GDP, respectively. Panel (c) shows the less effective full lockdown scenario where the infection continues to spread at a low rate. We note that the sectoral composition is very similar to Panel (b).

Figure 14 considers the three partial lockdown scenarios that were illustrated in Figure 9. Panel (b) shows that under partial lockdown that is put into practice between 10^{th}-250^{th} days of the pandemic and evolves with a moderate infection rate ($0.25 \times \beta_0$), the supply channel dominates in the first 100 days of pandemic. On the other hand, demand drives output for the rest of the year, including the days in which new peak levels are reached after the partial lockdown is prematurely removed. This is because of the fact that businesses remain open, which feeds the virus within the industries and increases the uncertainty about the containment of the pandemic. Among the 35 industries, "Ac-

Figure 14: Supply and Demand Pressures under Lockdown Scenarios

(a) **Scenario 4:** Partial Lockdown, 10-250, 0.1 $\times \beta_0$

(b) **Scenario 5:** Partial Lockdown, 10-250, 0.25 $\times \beta_0$

(c) **Scenario 6:** Partial Lockdown, 10-250, 0.5 $\times \beta_0$



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the number of days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars) prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for three alternative scenarios: (a) A partial lockdown is put into practice between 10^{th}-250^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a relatively low infection rate ($0.1 \times \beta_0$); (b) A partial lockdown is put into practice between 10^{th}-250^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a moderate infection rate ($0.25 \times \beta_0$); (c) A partial lockdown is put into practice between 10^{th}-250^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a relatively high infection rate ($0.5 \times \beta_0$) In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP) under the corresponding scenario.

commodation and food services," "Arts, entertainment, recreation and other service activities," and "Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products" are those that result in highest economic costs of 36%, 34%, and 27% of the GDP, respectively. The sectoral compositions are comparable for alternative rates of infection as shown in Panels (a) and (c).

Figure 15 presents the analogous analysis if partial lockdown is extended for a year. Compared to Figure 14 we note that the additional economic costs of the extended partial lockdown are limited. Specifically, among the 35 industries, "Accommodation and food services," "Arts, entertainment, recreation and other service activities," and "Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products" are those that result in the highest economic costs of about 35%, 33%, and 26% of the GDP, respectively.

Figure 15: Supply and Demand Pressures under Lockdown Scenarios

(a) **Scenario 7:** Partial Lockdown, 10-365, $0.1 \times \beta_0$



(b) **Scenario 8:** Partial Lockdown, 10-365, $0.25 \times \beta_0$



(c) **Scenario 9:** Partial Lockdown, 10-365, $0.5 \times \beta_0$



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for three alternative scenarios: (a) An "extended" partial lockdown is put into practice between 10^{th}-365^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a relatively low infection rate ($0.1 \times \beta_0$); (b) A "extended" partial lockdown is put into practice between 10^{th}-365^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a moderate infection rate ($0.25 \times \beta_0$); (c) A "extended" partial lockdown is put into practice between 10^{th}-365^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a relatively high infection rate ($0.5 \times \beta_0$) In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP) under the corresponding scenario.

4.3 Propagation of External Demand Shocks

In section 4.1, we ran our simulations under the assumption that there is a global pandemic which affects supply and demand channels within Turkey as well as abroad. In those baseline specifications, it was not possible to distinguish the role of international linkages on total economic costs. In order to better illustrate these international linkages for the Turkish economy, we consider two alternative scenarios in this section.

The final demand of country c in industry i is met by domestic production and imports of final goods. Formally, we write the final demand as:

$$F_{c,i} = \sum_{c'} F_{c,c',i} \tag{29}$$

where $F_{c,c',i}$ denotes goods or services produced by industry i in country c' and consumed in country

c. Following Equation 21, we write the final demand in country c in industry i at the peak of the pandemic as:

$$\bar{F}_{c,i} = F_{c,i}\bar{\delta}_{c,i} \tag{30}$$

Different than Equation 21, in this section we allow for country specific demand shocks. The corresponding output to satisfy this final demand level is obtained by:

$$\bar{Y} = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}\bar{F} \tag{31}$$

From this equation, we write the total output of country c as:

$$\bar{Y}_c = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \bar{Y}_{c,i} \tag{32}$$

The value-added portion of the output is calculated from the shares of value added in each industry during normal times. The total value-added (GDP) in country c can thus be written as:

$$\overline{GDP}_c = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \bar{Y}_{c,i} \frac{VA_{c,i}}{Y_{c,i}}. \tag{33}$$

The matrix for intermediate goods is obtained from the direct requirements matrix and the output vector:

$$\overline{INT} = \mathbf{A}\bar{Y}. \tag{34}$$

Each entry of the matrix INT corresponds to the usage of intermediate goods by industry i in country c from industry i' in country c'. Combining imports of intermediate goods and final goods, we write the total imports for country c as:

$$\overline{\text{imports}}_c = \sum_{c' \neq c} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\bar{F}_{c,c',i} + \sum_{i'=1}^{n} \overline{INT}_{c,i,c',i'} \right) \tag{35}$$

Similarly the total exports by country c is:

$$\overline{\text{exports}}_c = \sum_{c' \neq c} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\bar{F}_{c',c,i} + \sum_{i'=1}^{n} \overline{INT}_{c',i',c,i} \right) \tag{36}$$

Scenario 1 maintains the assumptions from section 4.1 where we assume the same proportionate demand shock in Equation 30 for the whole world. For example, if we estimate that the demand for automobiles decline by 60 percent based on Turkish data, we assume that the demand for automobiles declines by 60 percent throughout the world. Figure 16 shows how much total output, GDP (i.e., total value-added), exports and imports change at the brunt of the pandemic relative to normal times for alternative scenarios. In the baseline scenario, the declines in terms of total output and GDP are 19.8 and 19.6 percent, respectively (Scenario 1 in Figure 16) . Interestingly, imports decline less (17.9 percent) compared to exports (23.4 percent) . On the exports side, the decline in terms of final goods (27.4%) is higher than the decline in intermediate goods (18.8%). On the imports side, the decline is higher in intermediate goods (19.7%) relative to final goods (16.1%). These findings are consistent with the nature of the Turkish economy which is highly dependent on imports of intermediate goods.

Under scenario 2, we assume that the demand in Turkey declines but the international demand for final goods is back to its normal. Using the automobile example above, this implies that the demand for automobiles shrinks to 60% of normal levels but the international demand is at its normal levels. In this setting, the declines in terms of total output and GDP are 14.6 and 14.9 percent, respectively, at the brunt of the pandemic. The decline in imports is 14.7% but the decline in exports is only 0.1%. Under scenario 2, since the demand in the international markets is intact, the decline in imports is mostly driven by the final goods (16.1%) compared to the intermediate goods (13.4%) (see Scenario 2 in Figure 16).

When we run our simulations to capture the effects of different lockdown policies in this scenario, the cost of a full lockdown is rather similar to our baseline results (not shown). This is primarily because the supply side dominates in the case of a full lockdown and even though demand for exports does not change, Turkish production is restricted by the infected patients who drop out of the labor force. Once we consider partial lockdown or no lockdown scenarios, the number of infections increase drastically which brings forward the dominance of the demand side. Thus, the role of export demand becomes more visible where the economic costs generally increase by about 2.5 percent of GDP.

Lastly, in scenario 3, we model the setting where the demand in Turkey is intact but the demand

Figure 16: Differential Demand Shocks for an Open Economy with I-O Links



NOTES: This graph illustrates the impact of three different scenarios for demand shocks. In the first scenario, all the countries are assumed to experience the same demand shifter during the pandemic. In the second scenario, only Turkey experiences a demand shock but the international demand levels are intact. In the final scenario, the international demand levels are down but the demand in Turkey is at pre-pandemic levels. The number written on each bar corresponds to the percentage change in the relevant variable in the underlying scenario relative to its pre-pandemic level.

in international markets has plummeted. Under this scenario, the decline in output is 5.2% and the decline in GDP is 4.7% because of international linkages. As expected, the exports are hit the hardest with a decline of 23.3% and imports decline by 3.2%. The decline in imports is due to intermediate inputs in the production of final goods that the Turkish economy exports declines by 6.3% (see Scenario 2 in Figure 16).

Scenario 3 aims to disentangle the role of the demand channel in total economic costs. When we run our simulations with different lockdown policies, once again, the overall costs of full lockdown, where the supply side dominates, is similar to the results of lockdown under the baseline scenario. In the case of partial lockdown or no lockdown, we note that the total costs decline by about 7 percent of the GDP compared to the baseline scenarios. This difference highlights the overwhelming influence of demand (not shown). These findings justify the eagerness of the political leaders in easing lockdown restrictions in an attempt to revive demand.

4.4 Taking Stock

When we take a look at the experiences of the countries over the course of the pandemic, we note that there are several paths adopted by different countries:

(i) **Full lockdown:** Greece, New Zealand and Denmark provide good examples for an effective full lockdown. Our analysis indicates that this is the policy that minimizes economic costs by containing the pandemic in the most effective way.

(ii) **No lockdown:** Sweden adopted a hands off approach and considered no lockdown since the beginning of the pandemic to develop ”herd immunity.” Compared to a partial lockdown that ends pre-maturely and triggers a second wave, the no lockdown approach yields lower economic costs but the death toll is significantly higher.

(iii) **No lockdown followed by a full lockdown:** At the beginning of the crisis, UK adopted a no lockdown approach. However, this approach was abandoned later on due to public pressure as the death toll rose. UK then adopted a full lockdown policy to contain the pandemic. Our analysis indicates that if the lockdown was not delayed, there would be less mortality and the economic costs would be lower because the lockdown would begin with a smaller number of infections.

(iv) **Partial lockdown followed by full lockdown:** Many countries followed this route including Italy, France, Germany, Spain, Iran, Russia among others. Several of these counties recently announced that they will gradually lift restrictions. Similar to (ii), the duration of full lockdown is longer than it could have been, had it been implemented earlier. In Italy, for example, a full lockdown went into effect on March 10, and the restrictions are announced to be removed by May 4, after approximately two months under full lockdown.

(v) **Enhanced Partial lockdown:** Turkey started with immediate partial lockdown measures which were enhanced over the course of the pandemic. Schools were closed on March 16 and the businesses were encouraged to work remotely where possible. On March 21, a curfew was imposed for people above the age of 65 and those with chronic diseases. The curfew was extended to those younger than 20 on April 5, effectively putting close to 40% of the population under full lockdown. Furthermore, a full lockdown was implemented on weekends and national holidays starting on April 9 in 31 largest cities which constitute approximately 87% of the population.[33] After about 45 days since the beginning of enhanced partial lockdown measures, R_0 is reduced below 1 and the number of new patients is lower than the number of recovered patients as of the last week of April.

Where does this take us? Our analysis, which is confirmed by the early international experience, indicates that a full lockdown at the early stages of the crisis brings the pandemic under control relatively quickly. This policy yields the lowest economic costs. If an enhanced partial lockdown is already in place, which is successful in lowering R_0 below 1, then the need for full lockdown may not be imminent. However, our results reflect that the duration of the lockdown would have been shorter if more restrictive measures were adopted right away.

An emerging question at this stage is the removal of restrictions once the pandemic is taken under control. As the duration of lockdown increases, policy makers get anxious about opening up their economies. In this paper, we model demand as a function of the number of infections and combine this with actual spending decline during COVID-19, measured in the data with credit card purchases. Thus, our framework implies that demand would not normalize by the mere attempt of removing the restrictions, so long as the number of infections are sizable. What is worse is that the number of infections would increase again as businesses open. In the model, we do not explicitly incorporate expectations about infections and implicitly assume that the two are highly correlated. Meanwhile, one can imagine a forward looking demand curve, which could be a function of infection expectations rather than the actual number of infections. In this case, leaders might be able to affect expectations about the number of infections and revive demand by removing the restrictions. To the extent that leaders can successfully convey a more optimistic outlook, the negative demand

[33]These cities include the 30 metropolitan municipalities and Zonguldak, which constitute close to 79% of the population. On top of these, the age-based restrictions are intact in the rest of Turkey, which increases the number close to 87%.

effect that we model in this paper may weaken and the economic costs of prematurely ending a lockdown might decline.

Another imminent issue is the potential second wave once the restrictions are removed. This is particularly a problem for those countries that adopted a full lockdown at the early stages of the crisis and controlled the pandemic in their own countries. If they open their borders, there is the risk of a second wave. If they do not open their borders, then they cannot fully normalize and suffer from an extended partial lockdown given the importance of the amplification effects for open economies. The takeaway at this stage is that if a second wave of the COVID-19 virus hits, then an immediate and potentially *global* lockdown would work in the most effective way.

5 What are the policy options?

The previous sections illustrate the economic costs of the pandemic due to a fall in the GDP given the large supply and demand shocks for a small open economy. A lockdown increases the short-term costs but increases the long-term gains by leading the way to a faster recovery. One of the shortcomings of the model is that it does not incorporate the damage to the productive capacity that are caused by company closures. We simply assume that the productive capacity remains intact and the companies jump back to production once the pandemic is over. This is an overly optimistic assumption and in the absence of a comprehensive support program, the liquidity issues would turn into solvency issues. This could lead to unnecessary bankruptcies, a deeper recession and a sluggish recovery.[34] Indeed, this is exactly why our estimates in the previous section should be interpreted as the lower bound costs of a domestic stimulus package that is necessary to offset the damages of the COVID-19 crisis and keep the economic units alive.

A quickly implemented stimulus package that compensates the income loss due to the lockdown and enables a faster recovery would minimize the long term damage in the production capacity. If the stimulus packages are delayed, on the other hand, more companies would fail, more workers would be laid-off, and demand would decline further. This would then feed into more bankruptcies and elevate the economic costs that quickly become unmanageable. In fact, just as a drowning

[34] See Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2018), Gourinchas et al. (2020), and https://voxeu.org/article/proposal-negative-sme-tax

person needs immediate help or else her organs start to fail, the economy needs immediate help before the companies start to fail. Fiscal transfers can help to ensure that the supply chains are not destroyed, the economic units are functional and ready to go back to production once the pandemic is contained and demand returns. We next discuss the possible ways to finance the fiscal response.

5.1 Quantitative Easing or Debt Monetization? What is the difference?

Our estimates in the previous section highlight that the current 240 bn TL stimulus package which is about 4.5 percent of the GDP is insufficient given the costs of the pandemic that ranges between 4.5 percent of the GDP under the most cost effective full lockdown scenario and around 11 percent under partial lockdown scenarios. The true cost probably lies somewhere in between, given that the lockdown policy adopted by Turkey is a mix of full lockdown and partial lockdown policies. On top of domestic financing needs, the toll of the COVID-19 crisis increases with escalated costs of external finance. As we have shown earlier, among the G20 countries Turkey has one of the smallest relief packages. Clearly, policy accommodation should be expanded substantially in Turkey. But, where will the funding come from?

The buzz-word in advanced countries for the funding needed to deal with the crisis is ”helicopter money.” In economists' jargon, this is called monetary financing where the central bank prints money and transfers resources to firms and households either directly, as in the Federal Reserve's recent policy of purchasing commercial paper and corporate debt, or indirectly by purchasing bonds and enabling the government to use the proceeds to deal with the crisis.

In the process of monetary financing of the debt, the central bank's balance sheet will enlarge, either through direct loans to institutions or through large scale asset purchases (i.e. the so called "quantitative easing" (QE) programs). In a QE, the central bank prints money and buys sizeable amounts of government bonds. In the recent history, this was observed after the Great Recession both in the US and in Europe. The advantage of money printing through direct loans is that it is drained more easily when the loans are paid back.

How is debt monetization different? A central bank typically purchases securities through open market operations to meet the liquidity needs, consistent with its goal of price stability. The technical difference between money printing through an open market purchase and monetizing the debt is slim (Mishkin, 2007). Thus, one might argue that QE policies are effectively debt monetization (Orphanides, 2017). The Federal Reserve begs to differ and argues that debt monetization refers to a "permanent" source of funding for the government by the central bank and separates QE policies from debt monetization.[35, 36] So as long as the central bank commits to inflation targeting and normalizes its balance sheet when inflationary pressures kick in, asset purchases in the form of QE are not considered debt monetization (Andolfatto and Li, 2013). Based on this nuance, one can argue that QE and debt monetization are "observationally equivalent" in the short run, and the difference becomes apparent in the long run, with the central bank's ability to shrink its balance sheets to counteract inflationary pressures. Hence, using the Federal Reserve's usage of the term, the criterion for bond purchases to be considered debt monetization is whether the central bank fails to drain the money effectively later on and the money remains in the system permanently such that it leads to inflationary pressures.

In advanced economies, the distinction between QE and debt monetization can be easier to ascertain where the inflation rate is well-anchored and central bank credibility is well established. In fact, the inflation rate has not exceeded the 2 percent target in the US or Europe in the aftermath of large scale quantitative easing policies after the Great Recession. The distinction between QE and debt monetization gets blurry in the context of an emerging market like Turkey, however. Even though Turkey adopted implicit inflation targeting as early as 2003 and explicit inflation targeting in 2006, central bank credibility is shaky and price stability is not well established.

The above discussion suggests that in order for QE to be a viable policy alternative in Turkey, it should be distinguished from debt monetization that leads to an increase in inflation. The key to successful monetary financing is policy credibility. Unfortunately, Turkey scores low on this front. A badly managed QE would erode whatever credibility the monetary policy making has left in Turkey and de-anchor inflation expectations further. This would only escalate the existing crisis by pushing the inflation rate on a higher trajectory and causing sharp depreciations in TL. Hence, if it

[35] In the FAQs prepared by the Federal Reserve Board (https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12853.htm), it is noted that "The term "printing money" often refers to a situation in which the central bank is effectively financing the deficit of the federal government on a permanent basis by issuing large amounts of currency. This situation does not exist in the United States."

[36] In response to a question from the lawmakers on June 3, 2009, then-chairman Bernanke had noted that the "Federal Reserve will not monetize the debt": https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4546512/user-clip-bernanke-debt-monetization

is not executed properly and the money is not drained from the system at the right time, QE can turn into inflationary debt monetization. The rapid increase in CBRT's bond holdings (Figure 17) is concerning in this regard, because it reflects sizable bond purchases in the absence of a well defined and transparent QE program.

Figure 17: CBRT's Holdings of Government Bonds



NOTES: This figure plots the holdings government bonds of the CBRT. Source: Turkey Data Monitor

If you face a 1.5 percent inflation rate as in the US, and a deep recession is on its way, inflationary consequences of QE may not be imminent. This is because the public does not expect inflation to get out of control despite these excessive measures. There is still belief that the Fed will drain the money from the system at the right time and establish price control. Furthermore, because market participants do not expect the US government to default on its debt, there will not be a sharp decline in demand for US government bonds, which will keep interest rates under control.

Things are different in Turkey. Turkey could hardly reach its 5 percent inflation target even at the most favorable times and gave into populist policies. Central Bank credibility eroded substantially over the course of years (see Cakmakli and Demiralp (2020)). Thus, a mismanaged asset purchase program can lead Turkey all the way to hyperinflation. The way to prevent inflation is to drain the money effectively just as demand starts to pick up. The past inflation performance suggests that this is a rather challenging task for the CBRT. Without policy credibility, the increase in inflation expectations and the associated risk premium can end badly.

The ultimate goal is to convince the market participants that QE will not turn into inflationary debt monetization. That is, CBRT will not effectively finance the government deficit on a permanent basis and the money will be injected and drained from the system in a very transparent way. An opaque QE that merely inflates the monetary base without explaining the calendar through which government bonds are purchased and where the money is spent would most likely backfire and risk inflationary pressures and excessive currency depreciation. Instead, a QE program that determines priorities accurately to channel limited resources, and signal the correct messages going forward would be preferable. A detailed bond purchase calendar can be communicated with spending targets and the conditions under which the money will be drained from the system. One way to increase the transparency of QE could be through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). An SPV would allow CBRT to buy government bonds through this entity and separate these COVID-19 related bond purchases from the daily maintenance of monetary policy. The extent of monetary expansion that is solely due to COVID-19 crisis could be easily trackable in this manner. In turn, the money that is generated through this program should be spent in targeted sectors and announced by the government.

While a transparent and well executed QE could provide immediate funding that is necessary to deal with COVID-19 crisis, it would likely be insufficient. Increasing the domestic money supply, even for a short period of time, could lead to significant depreciation of the Turkish Lira in the absence of capital inflows and trigger the inflation rate. The case of Turkey, as several other EMs, requires a joint thinking of fiscal needs and capital flows given foreign financing needs with low foreign currency reserves. If external funding were available through international arrangements, this would improve policy credibility, which in turn would help to keep inflation expectations well anchored. In the next section, we discuss the magnitude of external funding needs in Turkey to highlight the importance of an external anchor.

5.2 External Funding Needs, Capital Controls, and the Role of External Anchor

Considering the facts that (i) the total amount of external debt that needs to be paid or rolled-over in 2020 is 23 percent of GDP and (ii) the current open FX position of the entire corporate sector as of January 2020 (which is -$175 billion) is almost 25 percent of GDP, it looks very unlikely that Turkey can meet its external funding needs in the risk-off environment of COVID-19 crisis. The rapid increase in the risk premium (Figure 3) raises the cost of external borrowing despite the decline in global interest rates. Even if Turkey offers higher rates to foreigners to compensate for the risk premium , this policy may not be fully effective under a large risk-off shock, such as COVID-19, where exchange rate deprecation might be the optimal response to higher risk premium as shown by Kalemli-Özcan (2019). During risk-off shocks, raising policy rates to defend the currency and to bring back the capital flows do not work in general, especially in countries with low credibility and high risk premia. A swap agreement with the Federal Reserve or another international institution[37] can help to address the liquidity needs arising from COVID-19 crisis, but this will not be enough on its own given the size of the domestic fiscal needs and external financing needs.[38]

Yet another alternative is to introduce capital controls to trap both residents' and non-residents' foreign currency assets in Turkey, which in turn will limit the TL depreciation. Notice that, while capital controls on inflows during a boom might reduce the future probability of a sudden stop, capital controls on outflows during a large risk-off shock might have unintended consequences. The trade-off with capital controls during COVID-19 crisis is that such controls might further erode the policy credibility and scare foreign capital during the recovery phase when it will be most needed, especially for a country who is already heavily dependent on external funding. Hence, going back to our previous analogy, one might try to keep horses in the barn but needs to be also careful about not scaring the horses that can scar them for a longer time.

Since the beginning of COVID-19 outbreak, Turkey took certain steps that can be interpreted as mild forms of capital control. Such steps took the form of limiting TL supply in international swap markets, notifying the government regarding sizable FX transfers abroad, or restricting the TL

[37] The average emergency swap agreement granted by the IMF is about $11bn, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/04/07/sp040920-SMs2020-Curtain-Raiser, and the total outstanding amount granted by the Federal Reserve's international swap lines is $18.9 bn as of April 14, https://apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/fxswap

[38] https://blogs.imf.org/2020/03/16/policy-action-for-a-healthy-global-economy/#.Xm9rH3Oc-7A.twitter

transactions of large custodian banks. These measures deter foreign investors not only because they limit their ability to move their capital around but also because they give the impression of random changes in the legislation. Unpredictable changes in regulations that are viewed as interventions to the free market mechanism have the potential to discourage future capital inflows and damage policy credibility.[39] Thus, capital controls can tilt the balance between quantitative easing and inflationary debt monetization towards the latter if policy credibility is eroded. Such controls can hinder external finance that will be needed throughout the entire recovery period. If the global recovery takes longer than a few years, interest rates would remain low in advanced countries and foreign investors would likely be willing to invest in riskier EM assets driven by search for yield motives similar to the period after 2007-2009 crisis. In that case, too early capital controls might backfire. In terms of their benefits, it could be argued that capital controls would prevent further dollarization that might be triggered by the TL liquidity injected through the QE program. Nevertheless, dollarization can also be prevented without capital controls if there is enough policy credibility to keep inflation expectations anchored.

One final alternative is a debt moratorium on foreign lenders. However, since foreign lenders are private creditors (and not official creditors), this would involve complicated debt default and debt restructuring. Unless private creditors offer the moratorium in a synchronized way as suggested by Rogoff and Reinhart (2020), a disorderly one would again hamper the medium to long-term credibility.

Although EMs did not observe a crisis similar to COVID-19, their history is full of crises, where different stabilization policies were employed. Turkey's own historical experience involves a transparent QE program to meet the immediate liquidity needs combined with guaranteed external finance through an international institution in the aftermath of 2001 crisis. This was a combination of banking crisis, sovereign debt crisis and a balance of payments crisis. During that time, Turkey employed a sizable asset purchase program under an IMF agreement, keeping inflation expectations in check with an inflation targeting framework. We lay out the details of this episode in the next section.

[39] Hakan Avci provides a nice summary of restrictions during COVID-19 period in his piece on May 14: https://yetkinreport.com/en/2020/05/14/will-turkey-attract-foreign-investments-after-covid-19/

6 Lessons from History: Bond Purchases under IMF program: Turkey, 2001-2002

When the financial crisis hit in February 2001, Turkey already had a standby agreement with the IMF, ongoing since December 1999.[40] State banks and Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) experienced significant losses during the 2001 crisis, which elevated their liquidity needs. In order to meet their liquidity needs and recapitalize these institutions, government securities were transferred to these institutions. The securities were then sold to the CBRT to receive cash to cover their liquidity needs. The size of securities purchases reached approximately 8 percent of GDP during that time. In turn, the CBRT drained the excess liquidity gradually through conventional methods (i.e., either through reverse repos or through its overnight borrowing facility) in order to prevent an unintended decline in market rates (see Statement of Intent, 2001).[41] When the ongoing 1999 program was deemed to be insufficient, a new and more comprehensive standby agreement was signed in 2002 which particularly aimed at lowering inflation expectations by strengthening policy credibility.[42]

The asset purchases that were undertaken in the post-2001 period took place at the same time Turkey started a new regime to take inflation under control. An amendment to the Central Bank Law (no: 1211) in 2001 granted operational independence. In the same amendment, it was stated that direct bond purchases from the government would continue until November 2001. The bond purchase program (debt monetization) was acknowledged in the 2002 agreement as well.[43] Figure 18 displays the overall size of CBRT's total assets in real terms. We observe that CBRT's total assets increased about 122 percent, from January 2000 to November 2011. To provide perspective, the

[40] The history of lending arrangements with the IMF are available at the following link: https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberKey1=980&date1key=2008-03-31

[41] https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2001/tur/02/index.htm

[42] As stated in Statement of Intent, 2001: "This program is a continuation of the one initiated in late 1999, with the support of a stand-by arrangement with the International Monetary Fund. It shares the same strategy: disinflate the Turkish economy, strengthen the fiscal accounts, and reform the structure of the Turkish economy as a condition for setting economic growth on a sustainable basis and moving Turkey closer to its goal of joining the European Union. However, the program's policies have been significantly strengthened, in response to the recent crisis that led to the float of the Turkish lira on February 22, 2001, including through increased emphasis on transparency, accountability, and good governance in both the private and public sectors. In support of our strengthened program, we request that the arrangement be augmented by the equivalent of SDR 6.3624 billion and that the purchases scheduled through end-2001 be rephased and would consequently be subject to reviews which are expected to be completed during May, June, July, September, and November 2001."

[43] https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/30/Turkey-2002-Article-IV-Consultation-and-First-Review-Under-the-Stand-By-Arrangement-Staff-15925

Federal Reserve's balance sheet increased 100 percent after four rounds of QEs from December 2008 through October 2014.

Figure 18: Total Assets of CBRT



NOTES: This figure plots total assets of CBRT in real terms, normalized by CPI. The figure ends prior to 2007-2009 global crisis. After this date, CBRT's balance sheet expanded again thanks to capital inflows in the post-crisis environment. Source: Turkey Data Monitor.

The 2002 standby agreement with the IMF not only met the external funding needs but it also provided the much needed credibility to boost confidence in the program and prevent excessive depreciation in the local currency. Furthermore, it limited domestic funding needs and hence restricted the volume of asset purchases, taking the pressure off inflation expectations. Once the liquidity needs subsided, the liquidity was drained from the system promptly and transparently. As a result of these coordinate efforts, there was a successful disinflation performance as shown below in the absence of volatility in the exchange rate (Figures 19a and 19b).

An essential part of disinflationary policies in the post crisis period involved lowering inflation expectations. The program anchored inflation expectations by ensuring that large scale bond purchases would not turn into debt monetization. In order to prevent bond purchases from causing a substantive increase in inflation expectations and restore investor confidence in the program, public finance and debt management laws were introduced to improve fiscal transparency and accountability. Furthermore, the budgetary impact of the additional funds needed to restructure the banking system was offset by increasing public savings in other areas to keep the overall budget under control. This step limited the extent of public borrowing and prevented market interest rates from rising further.

Figure 19: Inflation Rate and Exchange Rate

(a) Inflation Rate



(b) USD/TL Exchange Rate

NOTES: (a) This figure plots inflation rate for Turkey, which measured as year-on-year change of CPI. (b) This figure plots USD/TL nominal exchange rate for Turkey. Source: Turkey Data Monitor

7 Conclusion

Containing the pandemic as soon as possible is an urgent obligation to save human lives. Nevertheless, we have to act now also to deal with the economic fallout from the pandemic as the economic costs will be substantial. As put by the IMF (2020), this is "a crisis like no other" with potentially far more disastrous implications for emerging markets and developing economies relative to advanced economies.

We develop a small open economy SIR-multi-sector-macro model and calibrate it to Turkey using real time data. The annual cost of the COVID-19 crisis that we estimated ranges between 4.5 percent and 11 percent of the Turkish GDP depending on the effectiveness and the duration of the lockdown.

We estimate that the most cost effective full lockdown scenario implies a quarterly GDP contraction of 12 percent. Delays in full lockdown, prematurely ending the lockdown, or a combination of full lockdown with partial lockdown increases the toll. While the numbers are rather scary and unforgiving, we take comfort in our prologue that ”Best safety lies in fear” and urge caution in removing the lockdown restrictions, not only to save more lives but also to minimize the economic toll.

Turkey has large external financing needs, with an upcoming external debt payment in 2020 as large as 23 percent of the GDP ($169 bn). Given these numbers, it seems rather challenging for Turkey to rollover its foreign currency debt and finance its domestic debt solely through a QE-type program without triggering a significant increase in inflation expectations and a depreciation in the Turkish Lira. If monetary policy is transparent and communicated clearly similar to the QE policies of advanced countries, then the risks can be partly reduced. Risks would be further reduced with improved policy credibility. Funding from international institutions would also improve policy credibility and lower the external finance premium.

There are still substantial uncertainties ahead of us regarding the course of the pandemic.[44] In the absence of global coordination, countries that successfully contain the virus struggle about how to enable international trade and travel with the fear of a second wave. In this paper, we highlight that the role of global coordination is essential for open economies with international I-O linkages. If the lockdown could be implemented with global synchronization, demand would return to pre-pandemic levels faster and the economic costs of the pandemic could be kept at a minimum level. As this is not done so far, all the policy options should be on the table for EMs given the dynamic nature of this crisis with new information arriving every day. Looking ahead, should a second wave hit, a globally coordinated full lockdown would allow for the fastest global recovery.

[44]See Baker et al. (2020) and Ludvigson et al. (2015) on the role of uncertainty shock linked to COVID-19.

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A APPENDIX

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Figure A.1: The Structure of OECD Inter-Country Input-Output Table

	Intermediate use country 1 x industry 1 [...] country 69 x industry 36	**Final Demand** country 1 x fd 1 [...] country 69 x fd 7	**Output**
country 1 x industry 1 country 1 x industry 2 ... ... country 69 x industry 1 ... country 69 x industry 36	**(Z)**	**(F)**	**(Y)**
Value added + taxes - subsidies on intermediate products	**(VA)**		
Output	**(Y)**		

NOTES: This table illustrates the structure of OECD Inter-Country Input-Output Table (ICIO), which represents the breakdown of output corresponding to 36 industries and 69 countries, giving us a matrix of 2484×2484 entries. In any industry-country combination, the output (Y) equals intermediate use (Z) plus final demand (F) of 36 industries in 69 countries. Industry list can be found in Table A.2. Further, in any industry-country combination, final demand sums the following components of expenditures over 69 countries. fd1: Households Final Consumption Expenditure (HFCE); fd2: Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households (NPISH); fd3: General Government Final Consumption (GGFC); fd4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF); fd5: Change in Inventories and Valuables (INVNT); fd6: Direct purchases by non-residents (NONRES); fd7: Statistical Discrepancy (DISC).

Figure A.2: Scenario 1: No Lockdown, $\beta = 0.14$

(a) **Industries ranked 11-20** (b) **Industries ranked 21-30** (c) **Industries ranked 31-35**



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for no lockdown scenario in which no action is taken against the COVID-19 pandemic. In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP). (b) A lockdown is put into practice between the 91^{th} and 131^{st} days of the pandemic and is fully effective with zero reproduction number; (c) A lockdown is put into practice with some minimal reproduction number (R_0 =0.02) between the 91^{th} and 145^{th} days of the pandemic.

Figure A.3: Scenario 2: Full Lockdown, 91-131, $R_0 = 0$

(a) **Industries ranked 11-20**



(b) **Industries ranked 21-30**



(c) **Industries ranked 31-35**



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for the scenario in which a lockdown is put into practice between the 91^{st} and 131^{st} days of the pandemic and is fully effective with zero reproduction number. In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP).

Figure A.4: Scenario 3: Full Lockdown, 91-145, $R_0 = 0.02$

(a) **Industries ranked 11-20** (b) **Industries ranked 21-30** (c) **Industries ranked 31-35**



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for the scenario in which a lockdown is put into practice with some minimal reproduction number ($R_0 = 0.02$) between the 91^{st} and 145^{th} days of the pandemic. In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP).

Figure A.5: Scenario 4: Partial Lockdown, 10-250, $0.1 \times \beta_0$

(a) **Industries ranked 11-20** (b) **Industries ranked 21-30** (c) **Industries ranked 31-35**



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for partial lockdown scenario which is put into practice between 10^{th}-250^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a relatively low infection rate ($0.1 \times \beta_0$). In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP).

Figure A.6: Scenario 5: Partial Lockdown, 10-250, $0.25 \times \beta_0$

(a) **Industries ranked 11-20** (b) **Industries ranked 21-30** (c) **Industries ranked 31-35**



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for partial lockdown scenario which is put into practice between 10^{th}-250^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a moderate infection rate ($0.25 \times \beta_0$). In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP).

Figure A.7: Scenario 6: Partial Lockdown, 10-250, $0.5 \times \beta_0$

(a) **Industries ranked 11-20** (b) **Industries ranked 21-30** (c) **Industries ranked 31-35**



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for partial lockdown scenario which is put into practice between 10^{th}-250^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a relatively high infection rate ($0.5 \times \beta_0$). In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP).

Figure A.8: Scenario 4: Partial Lockdown, 10-365, $0.1 \times \beta_0$

(a) **Industries ranked 11-20** (b) **Industries ranked 21-30** (c) **Industries ranked 31-35**



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for an "extended" partial lockdown scenario which is put into practice between 10^{th}-365^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a relatively low infection rate ($0.1 \times \beta_0$). In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP).

Figure A.9: Scenario 5: Partial Lockdown, 10-365, $0.25 \times \beta_0$

(a) **Industries ranked 11-20** (b) **Industries ranked 21-30** (c) **Industries ranked 31-35**



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for "extended" partial lockdown scenario which is put into practice between 10^{th}-365^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a moderate infection rate ($0.25 \times \beta_0$). In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP).

Figure A.10: Scenario 6: Partial Lockdown, 10-250, $0.5 \times \beta_0$

(a) **Industries ranked 11-20**



(b) **Industries ranked 21-30**



(c) **Industries ranked 31-35**



NOTES: In this figure, each bar counts the days in which the supply channel (shown by the blue bars) or the demand channel (shown by the red bars), prevails to bring the economy into equilibrium in a given industry. The panels stand for "extended" partial lockdown scenario which is put into practice between 10^{th}-365^{th} days of the pandemic that evolves with a relatively high infection rate ($0.5 \times \beta_0$). In each sub-figure, the industries are ranked in a descending order according to the magnitude of economic costs (in terms of GDP).

Table A.1: Fiscal Responses to the COVID-19 Shock in the G20 Countries

Country	% GDP	Explanation
Argentina	3	Adopted measures (totaling about 3.0 percent of GDP, 1.2 percent in the budget and 1.8 percent off-budget, based on authorities' estimates)
Australia	10.8	Total expenditure and revenue measures of A$194 billion (9.9 percent of GDP). The Commonwealth government has committed to spend almost an extra A$5 billion (0.3 percent of GDP). State and Territory governments also announced fiscal stimulus packages, together amounting to A$11.5 billion (0.6 percent of GDP)
Brazil	6.5	The authorities announced a series of fiscal measures adding up to 6.5 percent of GDP. Public banks are expanding credit lines for businesses and households, with a focus on supporting working capital (credit lines add up to over 3 percent of GDP), and the government will back a 0.5 percent of GDP credit line to cover payroll costs.
Canada	8.4	Key tax and spending measures (8.4 percent of GDP, $193 billion CAD).
China	3.8	An estimated RMB 2.6 trillion (or 2.5 percent of GDP) of fiscal measures or financing plans have been announced. The overall fiscal expansion is expected to be significantly higher, reflecting the effect of already announced additional measures such as an increase in the ceiling for special local government bonds of 1.3 percent of GDP.
France	19	The authorities have announced an increase in the fiscal envelope devoted to addressing the crisis to €110 billion (nearly 5 percent of GDP, including liquidity measures), from an initial €45 billion included in an amending budget law introduced in March. A new draft amending budget law has been introduced on April 16. This adds to an existing package of bank loan guarantees and credit reinsurance schemes of €315 billion (close to 14 percent of GDP).
Germany	31.6	The federal government adopted a supplementary budget of €156 billion (4.9 percent of GDP). The government is expanding the volume and access to public loan guarantees for firms of different sizes and credit insurers increasing the total volume by at least €757 billion (23 percent of GDP). In addition to the federal government's fiscal package, many state governments (Länder) have announced own measures to support their economies, amounting to €48 billion in direct support and €73bn in state-level loan guarantees (Authors: Another 3.7% of GDP).
India	1.1	Finance Minister Sitharaman on March 26 announced a stimulus package valued at approximately 0.8 percent of GDP. These measures are in addition to a previous commitment by Prime Minister Modi that an additional 150 billion rupees (about 0.1 percent of GDP). Numerous state governments have also announced measures thus far amount to approximately 0.2 percent of India's GDP.
Indonesia	2.8	In addition to the first two fiscal packages amounting to IDR 33.2 trillion (0.2 percent of GDP), the government announced a major stimulus package of IDR 405 trillion (2.6 percent of GDP) on March 31, 2020.
Italy	26.4	On March 17, the government adopted a €25 billion (1.4 percent of GDP) 'Cura Italia' emergency package. On April 6, the Liquidity Decree allowed for additional state guarantees of up to €400 billion (25 percent of GDP).
Japan	21.1	On April 7 (partly revised on April 20), the Government of Japan adopted the Emergency Economic Package Against COVID-19 of ¥117.1 trillion (21.1 percent of GDP)
Mexico	0.7	to request additional resources from Congress, that could reach up to 180 billion pesos (0.7 percent of 2019 GDP). AND The week of April 19 the President further announced an austerity program for public expenditures including wage reductions and a hiring in order to free up 2.5 percent of GDP to finance additional health expenditures and priority investment.
Republic of Korea	10	Direct measures amount to 0.8 percent of GDP (approximately KRW 16 trillion. On March 24, President Moon announced a financial stabilization plan of KRW 100 trillion (5.3 percent of GDP). This was augmented by a further KRW 35 trillion (1.8 percent of GDP) on April 22 through additional measures. On April 22, President Moon announced a key industry stabilization fund would be established for KRW 40 trillion (2.1 percent of GDP)
Russian Federation	2.1	The total cost of the fiscal package is currently estimated at 2.1 percent of GDP.
Saudi Arabia	5	A SAR 70 billion ($18.7 billion or 2.8 percent of GDP) private sector support package was announced on March 20. they will reduce spending in non-priority areas of the 2020 budget by SAR 50 billion (2.0 percent of GDP) to accommodate some of these new initiatives within the budget envelope. on April 3, the government authorized the use of the unemployment insurance fund (SANED) to provide support for wage benefits, within certain limits, to private sector companies who retain their Saudi staff (SAR 9 billion, 0.4 percent of GDP). On April 15, additional measures to mitigate the impact on the private sector were announced, including temporary electricity subsidies to commercial, industrial, and agricultural sectors (SAR 0.9 billion) and resource support to the health sector was increased to SAR 47 billion.
South Africa	0.2	https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2020/04/south-africas-economic-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic/
Spain	11.7	Key measures (about 1.6 percent of GDP, €18 billion; depending on the usage and duration of the measures the amount could be higher). In addition, the government of Spain has extended up to €100 billion government guarantees for firms and self-employed. Other measures include additional funding for the Instituto de Credito Oficial (ICO) credit lines (€10 billion); introduction of a special credit line for the tourism sector through the ICO (€400 million);
Turkey	2	A TL100 billion package was announced. This consists of TL75 billion ($11.6 billion or 1.5 percent of GDP) in fiscal measures, as well as TL 25 billion ($3.8 billion or 0.5 percent of GDP) for the doubling the credit guarantee fund.
United Kingdom	18.8	Policy measures adding £86 billion in 2020-21. Coronavirus business interruption loan scheme and the Covid Corporate Financing Facility: the business interruption loan scheme was announced as up to £330 billion of support for businesses. Source: https://obr.uk/coronavirus-reference-scenario/
United States of America	13.6	US$484 billion Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act . An estimated US$2.3 trillion (around 11% of GDP) Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economy Security Act ("CARES Act"). US$8.3 billion Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act and US$192 billion Families First Coronavirus Response Act . They together provide around 1% of GDP.

NOTES: This table reports the COVID-19 relief packages (as percent of GDP) by the G20 countries along with the details of the fiscal packages. Source: IMF Policy Tracker unless otherwise noted. Access Date: April 29, 2020.

Table A.2: PROXIMITY INDEX AND TELEWORKABLE SHARE ACROSS INDUSTRIES

OECD ISIC Code	Definition	Proximity Index	Teleworkable Share
01T03	Agriculture, forestry and fishing	0.86	0.06
05T06	Mining and extraction of energy producing products	1.08	0.32
07T08	Mining and quarrying of non-energy producing products	1.06	0.14
9	Mining support service activities	1.21	0.20
10T12	Food products, beverages and tobacco	1.12	0.13
13T15	Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products	1.09	0.20
16	Wood and products of wood and cork	1.03	0.15
17T18	Paper products and printing	1.08	0.22
19	Coke and refined petroleum products	1.11	0.22
20T21	Chemicals and pharmaceutical products	1.06	0.25
22	Rubber and plastic products	1.10	0.18
23	Other non-metallic mineral products	1.08	0.18
24	Basic metals	1.09	0.14
25	Fabricated metal products	1.08	0.21
26	Computer, electronic and optical products	1.03	0.54
27	Electrical equipment	1.07	0.29
28	Machinery and equipment, nec	1.06	0.29
29	Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers	1.09	0.19
30	Other transport equipment	1.06	0.31
31T33	Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment	1.07	0.32
35T39	Electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage, waste and remediation services	1.08	0.29
41T43	Construction	1.21	0.19
45T47	Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles	1.13	0.37
49T53	Transportation and storage	1.18	0.21
55T56	Accomodation and food services	1.26	0.10
58T60	Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities	1.11	0.69
61	Telecommunications	1.07	0.58
62T63	IT and other information services	1.01	0.88
64T66	Financial and insurance activities	1.02	0.79
68	Real estate activities	1.10	0.54
69T82	Other business sector services	1.09	0.46
84	Public admin. and defence; compulsory social security	1.16	0.39
85	Education	1.22	0.86
86T88	Human health and social work	1.28	0.35
90T96	Arts, entertainment, recreation and other service activities	1.18	0.34

NOTES: This table provides the physical proximity index along with the share of those who can work remotely for the industries. To obtain these two industry-level values, we calculate the weighted average of the values corresponding to the occupations in each industry using the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) provided by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). OES data follows four-digit NAICS codes to classify the industries. In order to convert the proximity data to OECD ISIC codes, we make use of the correspondence table between 2017 NAICS and ISIC Revision 4 Industry Codes, provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. We obtain the physical proximity values at the occupation level from the O*NET datase. O*NET collects the physical proximity information through surveys with the following categories: (1) I don't work near other people (beyond 100 ft.); (2) I work with others but not closely (e.g., private office); (3) Slightly close (e.g., shared office); (4) Moderately close (at arm's length); (5) Very close (near touching). We divide the category values by 3 to make category (3) our benchmark. Specifically, a proximity value that is larger than 1 indicates a closer proximity than the "shared office" level, and a proximity value that is smaller than 1 corresponds to sparse working conditions. We create a single physical proximity value for each occupation by taking the weighted average of the normalized category values. We calculate the proximity values at the industry level after removing the teleworkable portion of the employees. We use Dingel and Neiman (2020)'s list of teleworkable occupations to capture the proportion of employment that can be fulfilled at remote locations in each industry.

Table A.3: DEMAND CHANGES ACROSS INDUSTRIES

OECD ISIC	Definition	Change	Explanation
01T03	Agriculture, forestry and fishing	100%	Effects of COVID-19 will be seen through intermediate linkages.
05T06	Mining and extraction of energy producing products	100%	Effects of COVID-19 will be seen through intermediate linkages.
07T08	Mining and quarrying of non-energy producing products	100%	Effects of COVID-19 will be seen through intermediate linkages.
9	Mining support service activities	100%	Effects of COVID-19 will be seen through intermediate linkages.
10T12	Food products, beverages and tobacco	100%	Effects of COVID-19 will be seen through intermediate linkages.
13T15	Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products	50%	Extreme declines in credit-card spending. We expect it to be higher due to non-credit card and transition of seasons. CBRT sector 9 (27%) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/11/business/economy/coronavirus-us-economy-spending.html
16	Wood and products of wood and cork	90%	We will assume that the decline in manufacturing to be 90% if we cannot find a reliable resource.
17T18	Paper products and printing	90%	We will assume that the decline in manufacturing to be 90% if we cannot find a reliable resource.
19	Coke and refined petroleum products	75%	Average of CBRT sector 4 (59%) and 90% (Average manufacturing decline).
20T21	Chemicals and pharmaceutical products	90%	Push and pull factors present. No reliable number. We will assume 90% inline with manufacturing. CBRT sector 19 (%60) https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/11/business/economy/coronavirus-us-economy-spending.html
22	Rubber and plastic products	90%	We will assume that the decline in manufacturing to be 90% if we cannot find a reliable resource. https://www.plasticsnews.com/news/materials-firms-work-fortify-supply-chains-despite-coronavirus
23	Other non-metallic mineral products	90%	We will assume that the decline in manufacturing to be 90% if we cannot find a reliable resource.
24	Basic metals	90%	https://tr.steelorbis.com/celik-haberleri/guncel-haberler/abd-ham-celik-uretimi-haftalik-181-dustu-1141735.htm
25	Fabricated metal products	90%	We will assume that the decline in manufacturing to be 90% if we cannot find a reliable resource to estimate.
26	Computer, electronic and optical products	100%	From CBRT sector 8.
27	Electrical equipment	90%	We will assume that the decline in manufacturing to be 90% if we cannot find a reliable resource to estimate. https://www.ibisworld.com/industry-insider/media/4637/covid-19-special-report.pdf
28	Machinery and equipment, nec	90%	We will assume that the decline in manufacturing to be 90% if we cannot find a reliable resource to estimate. See Maliszewska et al. (2020), Thailand 0.95
29	Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers	70%	A decline of 30-40% in many countries. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/04/01/business/car-sales-coronavirus/index.html https://econsultancy.com/how-coronavirus-is-impacting-sales-marketing-in-the-automotive-industry/
30	Other transport equipment	70%	Same as automobiles.
31T33	Other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment	90%	See Maliszewska et al. (2020), Thailand 0.95
35T39	Electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage, waste and remediation services	100%	See Maliszewska et al. (2020). Thailand 0.95
41T43	Construction	75%	https://www.ft.com/content/3c27d23e-befe-4a53-be52-325adacdb929
45T47	Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles	110%	Weighted average of CBRT sectors 3, 6, 7 & 16
49T53	Transportation and storage	80%	International Decline, Domestic Increase. Airline demand close to 0. Thailand 0.95 https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/Risk/Our%20Insight/COVID%2019%20Implications%20for%20business/COVID%2019%20March%2030/COVID-19-Facts-and-Insights-April-3-v2.ashx
55T56	Accomodation and food services	25%	Weighted average of CBRT sectors 12, 13, 14 & 24
58T60	Publishing, audiovisual and broadcasting activities	85%	CBRT sector 11
61	Telecommunications	100%	Push and pull factors present. No reliable number. We will assume it does not change. CBRT sector 22 (79%)
62T63	IT and other information services	100%	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-heatlh-coronavirus-technology/coronavirus-may-cut-global-corporate-tech-spending-4-1-in-2020-survey-idUSKBN21I38C https://www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/coronavirus-flushes-it-spending-to-a-2-7-decline-idc
64T66	Financial and insurance activities	100%	Weighted average of CBRT sectors 21 & 26
68	Real estate activities	60%	Average of CBRT sector 11 (83%) https://www.mansionglobal.com/articles/coronavirus-halting-real-estate-activity-in-the-u-k-213298
69T82	Other business sector services	85%	CBRT sector 11 (83%)
84	Public admin. and defence; compulsory social security	125%	Median Package size 5%. Public spending is close to %20 of GDP.
85	Education	85%	In line with other business services.
86T88	Human health and social work	100%	1 trillion dollars extra healthcare spending for Covid-19 out of close to 4 trillion dollars yearly healthcare spending. https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical https://www.fairhealth.org/publications/briefs
90T96	Arts, entertainment, recreation and other service activities	25%	https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/11/business/economy/coronavirus-us-economy-spending.html

NOTES: This table provides the demand changes at the sectoral level along with the explanations. We use publicly available data and the credit card spending data from the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) to calculate the estimated demand change during the pandemic in each industry, which is categorized based on OECD ISIC Codes.

Table A.4: LIST OF THE LOCKDOWN SECTORS

Panel A: Lockdown Sectors

NACE Rev. 2	Definition
01	Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities
1071	Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes
1811	Printing of newspapers
1920	Manufacture of refined petroleum products
21	Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
35	Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
36	Water collection, treatment and supply
4646	Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods
4730	Retail sale of automotive fuel in specialised stores
4773	Dispensing chemist in specialised stores
4774	Retail sale of medical and orthopaedic goods in specialised stores
4920	Freight rail transport
4941	Freight transport by road
5224	Cargo handling
53	Postal and courier activities
60	Programming and broadcasting activities
61	Telecommunications
639	Other information service activities
75	Veterinary activities
86	Human health activities
87	Residential care activities

Panel B: Additional Sectors

NACE Rev. 2	Definition
10	Manufacture of food products
1722	Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of toilet requisites
463	Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco
4711	Retail sale in non-specialised stores with food, beverages or tobacco predominating
472	Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialised stores
4781	Retail sale via stalls and markets of food, beverages and tobacco products

NOTES: This table provides the list of the lockdown sectors. We use the decree issued by the Turkish Ministry of Interior on April 10, 2020 to identify these industries. This lockdown was effective for only two days and cover those given in Panel A. We supplement the list with those available in Panel B.

Table A.5: CBRT CREDIT CARD SPENDING TITLES CORRESPONDING TO OECD ISIC SECTORS

CBRT	Definition	OECD ISIC Code
1	Total	
2	Car Rental	69T82
3	Car Rental-Sales/Service/Parts	45T47
4	Petrol Stations	19
5	Various Food	10T12
6	Direct Marketing	45T47
7	Education/Stationary	45T47
8	Electric & Electronic Goods, Computers	26
9	Clothing and Accessory	13T15
10	Airlines	49T53
11	Service	58T60 & 68 & 69T82
12	Accomodation	55T56
13	Club/Association/ Social Services	55T56
14	Casino	55T56
15	Jewellery	45T47
16	Marketing and Shopping Centers	45T47
17	Furnishing and Decoration	31T33
18	Contractor Services	41T43
19	Health/Health Products/Cosmetics	20T21
20	Travel Agencies/Forwarding	69T82
21	Insurance	64T66
22	Telecommunication	61
23	Building Supplies, Hardware, Hard Goods	25
24	Food	55T56
25	Government/Tax Payments	84
26	Private Pensions	64T66
27	Others	
28	E-commerce Transactions	62T63
29	Mail or Phone Shopping	
30	Customs Payments	84

NOTES: This table provides the concordance that we use to match the titles used in the CBRT's credit card spending data with the OECD ISIC Codes.

Table A.6: LIST OF THE ACTIVE SECTORS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DURING FULL LOCKDOWN

Type	Size	Source
Public (All)	2820095	http://www.sbb.gov.tr/kamu-istihdami/
Security	273000	https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emniyet_Genel_M%C3%BCd%C3%BCrl%C3%BC%C4%9F%C3%BC
Gendarmerie	150000	https://www.jandarma.gov.tr/jandarma-genel-komutanligi-2019-yili-faaliyet-raporu
Health	642184	https://www.saglik.gov.tr/TR,11588/istatistik-yilliklari.html
Share	37.77%	

NOTES: This table provides the list of occupations in Public Administration that work during full lockdown, together with the number of people within those occupations. The data sources are provided as well. The share of the active sub-sectors in the entire sector is 37%.