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THE IMPACT OF BENEFIT GENEROSITY ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS:  
EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS

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### **ABSTRACT**

Optimal insurance benefit design requires understanding how coverage generosity impacts individual behavior, insured costs, and welfare. Using unique administrative data, we leverage a sharp increase in the maximum weekly wage replacement benefit in a difference-in-differences research design to identify the impact of workers' compensation wage replacement benefit generosity on individual behavior and program costs. We find that increasing the generosity of wage replacement benefits does not impact the number of claims but has a large impact on claimant behavior, leading to longer income benefit durations and increased medical spending. Our estimates indicate that behavioral responses to increased benefit generosity raised insured costs 1.4 times as much as the mechanical effect of the benefit increase. Drawing on these estimates along with an estimate of the consumption drop experienced by injured workers, we calibrate a model that suggests that increasing benefit generosity would not improve welfare.

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# 1 Introduction

Social insurance programs are ubiquitous and cover some of the largest risks individuals face. Policymakers are responsible for designing the generosity of benefits within these programs. While these programs provide individuals valuable protection from risk exposure, the welfare benefits generated by this risk protection may be partially offset when individuals change their behavior in response to program incentives. The optimal design of social insurance involves balancing the value gained from risk protection against the costs associated with behavioral responses to this coverage. Thus, it is important to characterize how the generosity of coverage impacts individual behavior in these programs. In this paper, we analyze how coverage generosity impacts claims within the setting of workers' compensation insurance, and we explore the welfare implications of the estimated behavioral responses for workers' compensation benefit design.

Workers' compensation insurance is among the first examples of large-scale social insurance in the United States (U.S.), with the establishment of state workers' compensation programs dating back to the 1910s. Workers' compensation insurance is a large, state-regulated program that is the primary source of insurance for lost wages and medical expenses associated with workplace injuries in the U.S.<sup>1</sup> While there is some variation in the details across state workers' compensation programs, the basic structure of benefits is common across states: workers' compensation insurance provides complete coverage of medical expenses associated with an injury, partial wage replacement for the duration of time out-of-work due to an injury, and additional cash indemnity benefits in specified circumstances such as permanent impairments or workplace fatalities. Among U.S. private sector workers, nearly 3 million workplace injuries occur nationally each year, where roughly 1 million of these injuries result in at least one day of missed work (BLS, 2019). In 2016, workers' compensation insurance paid \$62 billion of benefits in the U.S., which was nearly twice the \$32 billion paid in benefits for unemployment insurance that year and was equivalent in size to the Earned Income Tax Credit program and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.<sup>2</sup> Despite the considerable size of workers' compensation insurance, there has been comparatively little research on the impact of incentive design in this setting and the implications for public policy.

The generosity of wage replacement benefits is a source of perpetual policy debate within the setting of workers' compensation insurance. Proponents of increasing benefit generosity argue that injured workers do not have adequate resources to buffer themselves against lost wages due to workplace injuries, while opponents cite concerns about blunting workers' incentives to recover from their injuries and return to work. Workers' compensation wage replacement benefit schedules are set by the state, where the weekly benefit amount paid is a linear function of pre-injury average weekly earnings, up to a maximum weekly benefit. Much of the recent policy debate centers around the appropriate level of the maximum weekly benefit, which implicitly defines the generosity of wage replacement benefits for high-income workers. There is tremendous variation across states in their legislated maximum benefit, with maximum weekly benefit levels ranging from \$494 in Mississippi to \$1,819 in Iowa in 2019. Recently, several states have moved to increase or decrease their maximum weekly benefit level. For instance, at least three states—Maine, Kentucky, and Georgia—have enacted reforms increasing their maximum benefit levels by up to 25% in the last two years. Despite the importance of workers' compensation insurance and the centrality of wage replacement benefits in current policy debates, there is very limited evidence on the impact of

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<sup>1</sup>Workers' compensation insurance covers both on-the-job injuries and illnesses related to occupational exposure.

<sup>2</sup>The federal Earned Income Tax Credit paid out \$66.7 billion of benefits in 2016 (IRS, 2020). The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program paid out \$66.5 billion in benefits in 2016 (USDA, 2020). Workers' compensation insurance paid out \$61.9 billion of benefits in 2016 (Weiss, Murphy and Boden, 2019). Unemployment Insurance paid out \$31.7 billion of benefits in 2016 (DOL, 2019).

workers' compensation wage replacement benefits on claimant behavior and program costs.

In this paper, we utilize unique administrative claims data and sharp legislative variation to study the impact of workers' compensation wage replacement benefit generosity on claimant behavior and to explore the implications of these behavioral responses for benefit design. Specifically, we estimate the impact of a recent, large-scale reform in the state of Texas which sharply increased the generosity of wage replacement benefits for high-income workers through increasing the maximum weekly benefit. The Texas Legislature passed House Bill 7 which increased the weekly benefit cap by 25% from \$540 to \$674 for workers injured on or after October 1, 2006. This policy had the effect of increasing the wage replacement weekly benefit amount by approximately 16% on average among injured workers with prior earnings above the initial cap, while leaving benefits unaffected for workers with prior earnings below the initial cap. To identify the effect of the benefit rate on claims, we leverage this sharp increase in the maximum benefit cap by injury date in a difference-in-differences research design by comparing outcomes for workers differentially exposed to the initial maximum benefit cap who were injured either just before or after the reform was implemented.

We first illustrate that the increase in benefit generosity did not impact the number of claims with income benefits. We also demonstrate that the composition of claimants based on observable characteristics (e.g., demographic, industry, and injury characteristics) was not affected by the reform. Given this evidence, we focus throughout on the effects of the increase in benefit generosity on the behavior of claimants conditional on filing a workers' compensation claim for income and medical benefits. Specifically, we focus on two primary outcomes: the income benefit duration and insurers' medical spending for claimants. An important feature of workers' compensation insurance links these two outcomes—income benefits and medical spending: workers' compensation claimants have a “treating doctor” who acts as the gatekeeper for both medical care and income benefits received by the injured worker. While the change in benefit generosity did not directly affect the price of medical care (which is provided to claimants at no out-of-pocket cost), there are several channels through which medical spending may be affected by income benefit generosity. For instance, claimants motivated to stay on income benefits longer when the generosity of income benefits increases may report more severe symptoms to their treating doctor, which may lead the doctor to approve of the claimant staying out of work longer but also to recommend increased medical care to help the claimant heal to the point of returning to work. Further, longer induced out-of-work durations may reduce the claimant's opportunity cost of engaging in medical care during normal work hours and thereby increase the claimant's compliance with recommended follow-up care. We discuss these and other possible mechanisms at length in Section 2. While our research design does not allow us to decompose the extent to which any particular mechanism drives our overall estimated effects, we find a large impact on medical spending overall and provide suggestive evidence on the relevance of some of these mechanisms through exploring heterogeneity across types of medical care that are more or less impacted by the increase in income benefit generosity.

Our estimates indicate that workers' compensation claimant behavior is responsive to the replacement rate paid for income benefits. The reform caused a roughly 11% increase in the income benefit duration of workers' compensation claims among affected claimants, or about 2 weeks relative to the pre-policy mean of 17.8 weeks. Given the 16% average increase in the weekly benefit rate induced by the reform, this implies a benefit duration elasticity of 0.68 with a 95% confidence interval spanning 0.40 to 0.95. We find that medical utilization increased substantially when the generosity of income benefits increased. The reform caused a roughly 10% increase in the medical spending (within the first five years post injury) associated with workers' compensation claims among affected claimants, or \$1,219 increase relative to the pre-policy

mean of \$12,443. These estimates imply that the elasticity of medical spending with respect to the income benefit rate is 0.63 with a 95% confidence interval spanning 0.38 to 0.88. Heterogeneity analysis suggests that some types of medical services were particularly responsive—including office visits, physical therapy visits, and case management services—while there is no evidence of a response for surgeries or emergency visits.

To interpret the magnitude of our main estimates, we calculate the effects of an increase in the weekly benefit rate on program costs incorporating both the direct effect (holding behavior constant) and indirect effects due to behavioral responses (in both the income benefit duration and medical spending). This calculation reveals three key facts. First, based on our estimates, behavioral responses along these two margins for responses—income benefit duration and medical spending—are equally important drivers of increased program costs. Second, collectively these behavioral responses predict increases in insurer costs that are 1.4 times the magnitude of the direct, mechanical effect of an increase in benefit generosity. Third, the impact of behavioral responses on program costs is roughly four times the effect that would have been predicted based on some commonly cited estimates from older studies on workers' compensation insurance, where nearly two-thirds of this difference is due to the previously unexplored impact of income benefit generosity on medical spending.<sup>3</sup>

Beyond our primary estimates, we also present several pieces of supplemental evidence suggesting a connection between the estimated responses on income benefit durations and medical spending. First, we present difference-in-differences estimates for medical spending and income benefit receipt by two-week increment since injury; this analysis reveals that the timing of the effects on both outcomes aligns. Second, our analysis of heterogeneity by claimant characteristics reveals that magnitudes of the effects on income benefit duration and medical spending tend to move together when comparing estimates across subgroups. Lastly, we present correlational evidence indicating that medical spending drops sharply upon the termination of income benefit receipt.

While our estimates indicate that there are large behavioral responses to benefit generosity, individuals likely value the consumption-smoothing benefits afforded by more generous coverage and thus these estimates alone are not sufficient to conclude whether increasing the generosity of benefits would improve or harm welfare. To explore the potential welfare implications of our estimates, we extend the classic Baily-Chetty framework of optimal benefit design for the application to workers' compensation insurance.<sup>4</sup> In extending this framework, we model individuals as having utility in each period over both non-medical consumption and medical consumption, where these components are additively separable. In each period, an individual maximizes his/her expected utility going forward by selecting: the assets to consume this period (implicitly defining non-medical consumption), medical care to consume this period (subject to constraints), and effort to expend to recover from the injury (if the worker has not yet returned to work). The social planner's problem is to maximize the individual's ex ante utility subject to a budget constraint and worker optimization. We derive a simple formula for the marginal welfare impact of increasing the generosity of benefits based on sufficient statistics. This formula illustrates that the marginal welfare impact crucially depends on how the benefit level impacts both the income benefit duration and the medical

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<sup>3</sup>While our study is the first study to investigate medical spending as a margin for adjustment (to the best of our knowledge), a few prior papers have investigated the impact of income benefit generosity on the duration of workers' compensation income claims, largely using data and variation from the 1970s and 1980s. As we discuss further below, there is substantial variation in prior estimates of the duration elasticity. While most of the commonly cited estimates imply duration elasticities in the range of 0.3 to 0.4 (e.g., Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995), Neuhauser and Raphael (2004)), Krueger (1990b) estimates duration elasticities that range from 1.2 to 3.7. It is worth noting that much of the prior literature analyzed smaller samples or smaller scale changes in benefits, giving these studies limited statistical power to rule out large ranges of duration elasticities.

<sup>4</sup>For more background on this framework, see Baily (1978), Chetty (2006), and Chetty and Finkelstein (2013).

spending of injured workers. We then calibrate the marginal welfare impact of increasing the generosity of benefits using our estimates of the impact of benefits on the income benefit duration and medical spending along with an estimate of the drop in consumption experienced by injured workers upon workplace injury. The results of this calibration suggest that a marginal increase in the generosity of benefits reduces welfare. To place our estimates within a broader context, we calculate the implied Marginal Value of Public Funds (MVPF). Based on our estimates, the implied MVPF is 0.46, which is lower than the average MVPF estimates calculated in some other social insurance settings such as unemployment insurance and disability insurance (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020). We conclude by exploring the robustness of the normative analysis and discussing the interpretation of our findings.

This paper contributes to the broader literature quantifying behavioral responses to coverage generosity in various insurance settings and evaluating the welfare implications for benefit design. Most of the recent studies in this literature have focused on investigating these topics within the settings of health insurance (e.g., Cabral and Mahoney (2019), Brot-Goldberg et al. (2017), Einav et al. (2013), Chandra, Gruber and McKnight (2010), Powell and Goldman (2016)), unemployment insurance (e.g., Chetty (2008), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016), Landaís (2015), Landaís and Spinnewijn (2019), Card et al. (2015), Schmieder, von Wachter and Bender (2012), Johnston and Mas (2018)), and disability insurance (e.g., Maestas, Mullen and Strand (2013), Autor, Duggan and Gruber (2014), Autor et al. (2019), Deshpande and Lockwood (2020)).<sup>5</sup> Within the context of workers' compensation insurance, there are a few older studies investigating the impacts of wage replacement benefit generosity on the number of income claims (e.g., Krueger (1990a)) and income benefit duration (e.g., Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995), Krueger (1990b), Neuhauser and Raphael (2004)), largely using data and variation from the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>6</sup> Though this literature provides evidence on an important policy parameter, these older studies often focused on smaller samples or smaller scale reforms and tended to have insufficient statistical power to rule out a wide range of elasticities. As a result, this older work collectively provides unclear guidance on the impact of workers' compensation income benefit generosity on claim incidence and income benefit duration—with estimates ranging from no detectable impact to very large implied elasticities.<sup>7</sup>

Our paper makes several contributions to this literature. First, we leverage recent quasi-experimental variation and unique administrative data to provide the first estimates of the comprehensive impact of workers' compensation income benefit generosity on individual behavior and program costs. The reform we analyze is large in scale—both in terms of the magnitude of the change and the population affected—which allows us to provide precise estimates of the impacts of workers' compensation wage replacement benefits and to provide evidence on heterogeneity and mechanisms. Further, this study leverages administrative data and an event study difference-in-differences research design, which allows us to provide transparent evidence supporting the parallel trends identification assumption. We find that increasing the generosity of wage replacement benefits does not impact the number of claims but has a large impact on claimant behavior, leading to substantial increases in income benefit durations and increased medical

<sup>5</sup>In addition to research on common insurance in the United States, other studies have investigated the impact of the generosity of mandated sick pay for illnesses *unrelated* to work in European countries. For example, see Ziebarth and Karlsson (2014).

<sup>6</sup>See Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a review of this literature.

<sup>7</sup>For example, within the most closely related of these older studies (Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995) and Krueger (1990b)), benefit duration elasticity estimates and implied confidence intervals span a wide range in the natural experiments analyzed: 0.35 [95% C.I.: -0.32 to 1.01] (Michigan's 1982 reform), 0.37 [95% C.I.: 0.14 to 0.60] (Kentucky's 1980 reform), 1.67 [95% C.I.: 0.03 to 3.31] (Minnesota's 1986 reform). It may not be surprising that studies analyzing these natural experiments had limited statistical power, given either small samples or the small-scale of some of these reforms: Michigan's 1982 reform caused a 56% increase in mean benefits among 219 analyzed affected claimants; Kentucky's 1980 reform caused a 47% increase in mean benefits among 1,161 analyzed affected claimants; Minnesota's 1986 reform caused a 5% increase in mean benefits among roughly 5,550 analyzed affected claimants. In contrast, the reform we study caused a 16% increase in mean benefits among the 12,686 affected claimants in our sample.



spending. We find that behavioral responses in claimant medical spending—a previously unexplored margin of adjustment—are equally important as the income benefit duration responses in terms of their impact on program costs. Collectively, across these two margins for adjustment, our estimates predict behavioral responses increase program costs 1.4 times as much as the mechanical impact of benefit generosity on program costs and roughly four times the effect that would have been predicted based on the most commonly cited evidence from an older literature.

Second, this paper fills an important gap in the literature by providing recent evidence on the impact of workers' compensation benefit generosity. While many classic papers on workers' compensation insurance rely on data from the 1970s and 1980s, there have been large changes since that period in the labor market, workers' compensation insurance, and workplace safety. The labor market has seen dramatic shifts since the 1970s, with a decline in unionization, a rise in female labor force participation, and shifts in industry composition from the manufacturing sector towards the service sector. Moreover, workers' compensation programs and the nature of workplace injuries have changed significantly over the last several decades, highlighting the need for recent evidence on the impacts of benefit design. The composition of injuries covered by workers' compensation has changed dramatically over time, given shifts in industry composition and increasing workplace safety (Conway and Svenson, 1998). A few waves of state legislative activity spanning the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have transformed workers' compensation insurance, moving state programs toward standardization and tightening the criteria for eligible injuries. Over the last four decades, medical spending has become a much larger part of the workers' compensation program, with the composition of benefits shifting from 29% medical benefits (71% cash benefits) in 1980 to 50% medical benefits (50% cash benefits) in 2008 and onward (McLaren, Baldwin and Boden, 2018). With the dramatic growth in medical spending as a share of program costs, many recent workers' compensation policy discussions have centered on the determinants of medical spending and the impact of program design on medical spending. Our estimates indicate that the generosity of wage replacement benefits is an important determinant of both cash benefits and medical spending. Further, our findings have direct relevance for current policy discussions, as the level of the maximum weekly wage replacement benefit—the policy instrument providing the identifying variation in this study—is the subject of contentious, ongoing policy debates in many states. More broadly, given the major changes in workers' compensation insurance and workplace injuries over the last several decades, our study provides important recent evidence on the impacts of workers' compensation benefit design to inform current policy debates.

Finally, beyond estimating the impacts of workers' compensation income benefit generosity, we discuss the welfare implications of these behavioral responses for workers' compensation insurance benefit design. To do this, we extend the classic Baily-Chetty framework to the setting of workers' compensation insurance, where we incorporate multiple dimensions on which individuals may alter their behavior and thereby affect program costs. We document new evidence on the consumption drop experienced by injured workers upon injury, adding to related evidence in Bronchetti (2012). We calibrate the marginal welfare impact of increasing benefits by combining the evidence on the consumption drop experienced by injured workers with the primary estimates of the behavioral responses to benefit generosity. These calibrations suggest that a marginal increase in the generosity of income benefits reduces welfare.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides details on the institutional setting and the data. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy, and Section 4 presents the estimates. Section 5 considers the implications for benefit design, outlining a welfare framework and presenting welfare calibrations. Lastly, Section 6 concludes.

## 2 Background and Data

This section begins by providing background information on workers' compensation systems more broadly, the structure of workers' compensation benefits, and the Texas workers' compensation system. We then describe the policy change we leverage, describe the data sources utilized in this study, and present descriptive statistics.

### 2.1 Background

#### 2.1.1 Workers' Compensation Insurance

Workers' compensation is a state-regulated insurance system that provides covered employees with cash and medical benefits for work-related injuries or illnesses. Workers' compensation insurance provides coverage regardless of whether the employer or employee is at fault for the workplace injury, and it serves as the exclusive legal recourse for covered workers for workplace injuries, meaning that injured workers cannot sue their employers for negligence. Each state has its own workers' compensation program. In contrast to unemployment insurance or disability insurance, workers' compensation is entirely designed and regulated by states, with no significant federal involvement. Employers purchase workers' compensation insurance from private insurers or directly from a public insurer. Typically, states allow very large employers the option to become a certified self-insured entity to directly provide this insurance to employees. States standardize the structure of benefits and regulate the pricing of policies, and there is extensive risk adjustment in this market through regulated industry-occupation rating and experience rating. According to the National Academy of Social Insurance, workers' compensation insurance costs accounted for approximately 1.3% of covered payroll in 2016 down from 1.7% in 2005 (McLaren, Baldwin and Boden, 2018). The costs of workers' compensation insurance vary substantially across industry-occupational groups. For instance, data from Texas reveals that workers' compensation costs comprise only 0.9% of covered payroll for college professional employees and 14.5% of covered payroll for oil and gas well employees (Cabral, Cui and Dworsky, 2019).

There have been substantial changes in workers' compensation insurance over the past several decades. First, the release of the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws report in 1972 spurred a wave of state legislative action which led to significant increases in coverage generosity and standardization of workers' compensation systems across states in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Howard, 2002).<sup>8</sup> Second, more recent state legislation in the 1990s tightened the criteria for eligible injuries (Boden and Ruser (2003)).<sup>9</sup> Third, medical costs have dramatically risen as a share of total workers' compensation costs over the past several decades. While medical benefits made up less than 30 percent of benefits paid by workers' compensation insurance in 1980, they made up around half of benefits paid by workers' com-

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<sup>8</sup>The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 created the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. The Commission was charged with reviewing state workers' compensation laws and recommending a set of national standards for state workers' compensation programs. The Commission's final 1972 report (National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, 1972) outlined "nineteen essential elements" of a good workers' compensation system. Further, the Commission recommended that states be given three years to comply with the nineteen essential elements, with Congressional action guaranteeing compliance if necessary. While Congress never passed legislation requiring that states meet the recommended standards, the release of the report and the threat of such legislation in the subsequent years may have contributed to significant increase in state activity expanding coverage and increasing benefit generosity in the wake of the report's release. According to Howard (2002), the average share of recommended essential elements met by state workers' compensation programs was 6.9 out of 19 in 1972, and average state compliance increased to 9.4 out of 19 by 1975 and to 12.1 out of 19 by 1980. See Howard (2002) for more background on the report and subsequent state legislation.

<sup>9</sup>For example, several states restricted the criteria of an eligible impairment to exclude workplace disability that resulted from aggravating pre-existing conditions or exacerbating the aging process. Further, some states narrowed eligible impairments to be only those provable with objective medical evidence, narrowing the scope of allowable musculoskeletal injuries.



pensation insurance by the mid-2000s (McLaren, Baldwin and Boden, 2018). This trend may reflect several factors including the more general increase in health care costs nationally, changes in medical technology available to address workplace injuries, and changes in the composition of workplace injuries over time. These changes in workers' compensation insurance and the nature of workplace injuries mean that current estimates of the impact of income benefits are important for informing policy.

### **2.1.2 Structure of Workers' Compensation Benefits**

While there is some variation across states in the details of the workers' compensation insurance systems, there are many commonalities across states in the basic structure of workers' compensation insurance. All covered employees are guaranteed standardized, state-defined benefits in the case of workplace injury. In all states, these benefits include full coverage of medical expenditures associated with the work-related injury, temporary income benefits that provide partial wage replacement for lost time out of work, and additional unconditional cash benefits for permanent impairments and workplace fatalities. Below, we provide more detail on the structure of workers' compensation insurance in Texas—the setting of our analysis—and discuss how this compares to the basic structure of workers' compensation systems more broadly.

Workers' compensation insurance provides complete coverage of injury-related medical expenditures at no out-of-pocket cost to the claimant, and workers' compensation is the first payer for any injury-related medical expenses. Workers' compensation insurance covers all injury-related medical spending indefinitely, regardless of a claimant's work status or receipt of cash benefits. In Texas, as in many states, the delivery of medical care in workers' compensation insurance follows a "gatekeeper" model. Workers' compensation claimants choose a "treating doctor", and this treating doctor serves as the gatekeeper for all the medical care and cash benefits received by the injured worker. The treating doctor is responsible for overseeing the claimant's medical care, evaluating the claimant's medical improvement, assessing the claimant's work capacity, and evaluating the claimant's eligibility for continued receipt of cash benefits. In addition to receiving reimbursement for typical procedures billed by physicians, physicians treating workers' compensation claimants receive payments for additional "case management services" that pertain to their particular role in overseeing the medical care and income benefit eligibility of injured workers. Prior studies have documented that physician payments for services provided to workers' compensation claimants exceed those for the same services provided to other patients (Baker and Krueger (1995), Johnson, Baldwin and Burton (1996)).

Workers' compensation insurance also provides temporary income benefits which follow a very similar structure across states. After a waiting period of three to seven days, an injured worker is eligible to receive income benefits which provide partial wage replacement during a temporary absence from work. A claimant's treating doctor is charged with assessing the claimant's work capacity and determining eligibility for temporary income benefits throughout the worker's temporary income benefit spell. Temporary income benefits are terminated when the earliest of the following three conditions are met: (i) the worker decides to return to work and the treating doctor certifies the worker is ready to return to work, (ii) the treating doctor has certified that the worker has reached his "maximum medical improvement", and (iii) the income benefit maximum duration is met. In Texas, the temporary income maximum benefit duration is two years (104 weeks) and the waiting period is seven days. While the statutory maximum duration in Texas is two years, temporary income benefits are typically terminated well in advance of two years of receiving these benefits through either condition (i) or (ii) above, highlighting the importance of the treating doctor as a gatekeeper of cash benefits (in addition to medical care) in this setting.<sup>10</sup> An injured employee

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<sup>10</sup>Among claims with positive temporary income benefits in our sample, 97.5% of temporary income benefit spells were terminated

receives partial wage replacement during his temporary income benefit spell, where the weekly benefit amount is a linear function of a claimant's prior average weekly wage, subject to a maximum and minimum weekly benefit level. The maximum and minimum benefit levels vary across states, and we use a large update to the maximum benefit level in Texas in this paper to identify the impact of benefit levels on outcomes.

After the completion of temporary income benefits, injured workers with permanent impairments are eligible for additional cash indemnity benefits. While the details of compensation for these permanent impairment benefits depend on the state, the most common model is used in Texas. In this model, a worker's permanent impairment is rated upon completion of temporary income benefits, and the worker is provided unconditional cash benefits that are a function of the severity rating of his permanent impairment and his prior average weekly wage. Permanent impairment benefits are not contingent on the injured worker's subsequent work status or earnings, and most compensated permanent impairments represent relatively minor impairments.<sup>11</sup> Workers' compensation insurance also provides death and burial benefits to surviving family members in the case of workplace fatalities.

### **2.1.3 Description of Policy Variation and Setting**

The most discussed policy parameter in the setting of workers' compensation insurance is the replacement rate for temporary income benefits. There are many reasons this parameter has been the primary focus of both policy discussions and academic work.<sup>12</sup> First, the temporary income benefit replacement rate is the only parameter governing the generosity of benefits that has direct incentive effects, and thus is the most likely parameter to affect claimant behavior. Receipt of temporary income benefits is contingent on being out-of-work, while medical care is always provided at no out-of-pocket cost and other workers' compensation cash benefits are not contingent on behavior going forward (e.g., permanent impairment benefits, death benefits, burial benefits). Thus, the temporary income benefit replacement rate is the policy-relevant parameter that is *ex ante* most likely to affect claimant behavior. Second, temporary income benefits are by far the most common type of workers' compensation cash benefit, with 90% of workers' compensation claimants with cash benefits receiving temporary income benefits.

In this paper, we focus on estimating the impacts of changing the generosity of temporary income benefits, which we will refer to hereafter as simply income benefits. To do this, we take advantage of a sharp change in the generosity of income benefits within the Texas workers' compensation insurance system. Workers' compensation income benefit schedules are set by the state, where the weekly income benefit amount is a linear function of an injured worker's prior average weekly wage, up to a maximum weekly benefit cap. In 2005, the Texas Legislature passed House Bill 7 which increased the maximum weekly income benefit from \$540 for workers injured prior to October 1, 2006 to \$674 for workers injured on or after October 1, 2006. Since the benefit schedule is determined by the injury date and applies for the entire duration of the spell, this reform induced sharp differences in benefit eligibility for those injured

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before the maximum duration of 104 weeks was met.

<sup>11</sup>While the receipt of permanent impairment benefits subsequent to income benefit termination is relatively common, these permanent impairments are typically minor, with the mean claimant rated as 6.29% impaired within our sample among those with some permanent impairment benefits. More generally, nearly all workers' compensation claimants receiving income benefits return to work within a few years, regardless of whether they have some degree of permanent impairment. TDI (2015) analyzes linked Texas workers' compensation insurance data and unemployment insurance earnings records, documenting that 76% of workers' compensation income benefit recipients returned to work within six months of injury and 95% returned to work within three years of injury among those injured in 2011.

<sup>12</sup>For examples of prior papers that study the impact of temporary income benefit rates on income benefit duration, see Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995), Krueger (1990b), and Neuhauser and Raphael (2004). See Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a review of this literature.

before versus after October 1, 2006. Figure 1 displays the maximum benefit by injury date over time. Prior to the implementation of House Bill 7, the maximum weekly income benefit was set statutorily and had been approximately \$540 for several years. The passage of House Bill 7 changed how the maximum weekly income benefit is set, requiring that the maximum weekly benefit going forward: (i) would be a specified function of the state average weekly wage and (ii) would be updated annually by the Texas Workforce Commission for injuries on or after October 1 of each calendar year. In effect, this reform induced a sharp, large increase in the generosity of benefits for higher earner claimants injured on or after October 1, 2006, with smaller increases on October 1 of subsequent years as benefits are annually re-calibrated for inflation in the state average weekly wage.

We use the large, sharp increase in benefit generosity for high earner claimants by injury date around the implementation of new benefit cap (October 1, 2006) to analyze the effect of benefit generosity on outcomes of interest. Our baseline analysis will focus on claimants with injury dates spanning January 2005 (the start of our data) to September 2007, as this is the period where the variation is the cleanest.<sup>13</sup> Appendix Figures A4 and A5 illustrate the results are very similar in alternative specifications using an expanded sample that includes claimants injured up to three years after the reform is implemented.

Figure 1 plots the weekly benefit amount as a function of the average weekly wage, where the solid line depicts the “old schedule” applicable to individuals injured before October 1, 2006 and the dashed line depicts the “new schedule” applicable to claimants injured on or after October 1, 2006 (and before October 1, 2007). Further, this figure displays a histogram of the average weekly wage for workers’ compensation claimants in Texas. Among the highest earners (those with prior earnings above the new schedule maximum), the reform causes an almost 25% increase in the weekly benefit rate. On average, the reform increased the weekly benefit rate by approximately 16% among affected claimants (those with prior earnings above the old schedule maximum).

In Section 3, we discuss the identifying variation in more detail and present evidence illustrating there is no change in the number of claims or the composition of claimants based on observable characteristics in response to the reform. Based on this evidence, our primary analysis focuses on changes in claimant behavior conditional on making a claim. Specifically, we investigate the impact of wage replacement generosity on two primary outcomes: income benefit duration and medical utilization. While no prior research to our knowledge has estimated the impact of wage replacement benefits on medical spending, higher replacement rates have the potential to affect workers’ compensation medical spending through multiple mechanisms.<sup>14</sup> Increased generosity of income benefits could lead claimants to report more severe symptoms to their treating doctors in an effort to stay on income benefits longer, causing treating doctors to approve additional time on income benefits and also to recommend more medical care to treat the worker’s symptoms and help the worker heal to the point of returning to work. More generally, if time away from work and

<sup>13</sup>Another advantage of focusing on claimants injured up to one year after the policy change is that it avoids overlap with the Great Recession. Though we know of no prior work on the impacts of recessions on workers’ compensation claims, Boone and van Ours (2006) conduct cross-country analysis with data from the European Union and find that the rate of reported workplace injuries declines in recessions. Further, extensive prior and ongoing research points to important impacts of recessions on the number and composition of disability insurance claims (e.g., Autor and Duggan (2003, 2006), Carey, Miller and Molitor (2020)).

<sup>14</sup>While our study is the first study to investigate medical spending as a margin for adjustment (to the best of our knowledge), we note one prior study aimed at estimating duration elasticities showed related evidence in a covariate balance test. Specifically, Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995) interpret medical spending as a proxy for injury severity and investigate patterns in medical spending in a covariate balance test looking at mean differences in medical spending over time and across more and less treated workers. Given limited statistical power, their differences in means estimates do not allow one to rule out large associated changes in medical spending coincident with increases in income benefit generosity, with 95% confidence intervals on implied elasticities spanning -2.9 to 1.0 across specifications. The lack of statistical power to investigate patterns in medical spending in the Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995) study may have been due to the study’s limited sample size (e.g., the numbers of treated claimants are 219 and 1,161 for the two state samples the study investigates) and the large variance in medical spending.

medical care are complements, higher wage replacement rates could increase medical spending. One reason that medical care could be a complement to time away from work is that having additional time outside of work lowers claimants' opportunity cost of time during normal work hours, which could lead to better claimant compliance with recommended follow-up care (e.g., physical or occupational therapy). Additionally, increases in wage replacement benefits may lead to larger reimbursements at normally scheduled visits due to insurer-requested continued physician monitoring of claimant work capacity during longer income benefit durations.<sup>15</sup> Finally, in principle, more generous wage replacement benefits could lower medical spending if additional recovery time can substitute for medical care or if the additional money has a direct and positive effect on health.

This setting provides a uniquely good opportunity to study the impact of benefit generosity on workers' compensation insurance claims for several reasons. First, the reform in Texas provides sharp and substantial variation in the generosity of benefits. While many states have previously adopted policies to index their maximum weekly income benefit to inflation, this recent reform which induced a sharp, large change in the weekly maximum benefit in Texas represents very useful variation to study the impacts of income benefit generosity. Second, Texas collects uniquely detailed data on workers' compensation claims, and we have been able to obtain this data through a series of open records requests under the Texas Public Information Act. While prior research on workers' compensation insurance generosity has been limited to using claimant-level data on aggregate outcomes (e.g., total received benefits), the uniquely detailed linked income and medical benefit administrative data from Texas allows us to estimate the comprehensive effects of income benefit generosity and explore mechanisms. Third, Texas is a large state and the structure of workers' compensation insurance benefits in Texas is fairly representative of workers' compensation systems more broadly. Because the workers' compensation insurance data and policy details vary state-to-state, studying the impact of workers' compensation insurance generosity requires focusing on a particular state. Among states, Texas has the advantage of being the second most populous state, with an estimated population of more than 28 million.<sup>16</sup> Further, the structure of income and medical benefits in Texas resembles other workers' compensation programs nationwide.

It is important to note that while many of the regulations governing the state workers' compensation market (e.g., benefit structure, insurer participation, pricing regulations) are very similar in Texas and other states, there is one notable exception: workers' compensation insurance coverage is voluntary in Texas while it is effectively mandatory in other states. While coverage mandates in 15 other states have exemptions for very small businesses and many states have additional exemptions for specific classes of workers such as agricultural or domestic workers, Texas is the only state where any employer can decide to opt out of the workers' compensation insurance system in favor of tort liability for workplace injuries. Though workers' compensation insurance is voluntary in Texas, coverage rates are high: roughly 87% of Texas workers statewide are covered compared to 97.5% of workers nationwide in 2016.<sup>17</sup> Though the Texas workers'

<sup>15</sup>Treating doctors are required to submit (and are reimbursed to complete) a work status report form upon the initial evaluation of the claimant and whenever there is a substantial change in the work activity limitations of the claimant. Beyond these program-wide requirements, regularly scheduled time-frames can be specified by insurance carriers for treating doctors to continue to submit reports. However, the regulator places restrictions on insurer reporting requests, specifying that: (1) insurers cannot request more than one report every two weeks, and (2) insurers cannot request reports more often than the normally scheduled medical appointments with the employee.

<sup>16</sup>According to the United States Census in April 2010, the population of Texas was 25,145,561. As of July 2018, the Census estimates the population in Texas to be 28,701,845.

<sup>17</sup>According to a study conducted by the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI, 2019), 82% of private sector workers were covered by workers' compensation insurance in 2016. Further, all public sector workers are mandated to have workers' compensation insurance. The authors calculate the fraction of workers covered by workers' compensation insurance in Texas is roughly 87% based on combining these statistics with the fraction of Texas workers in private sector employment relative to the Texas aggregate average annual

compensation system has the peculiar voluntary coverage feature, institutional details and supplementary evidence suggest that this feature is not likely to affect the internal validity of our results. We find no change in the number of claimants or the composition of claimants based on observables with respect to our identifying variation and no change in firm coverage decisions among firms employing workers differentially exposed to the reform. This latter finding, which is discussed in Appendix Section A, is in line with our expectations, as we would not expect coverage decisions to adjust in the short-run because annual policy renewal dates are staggered throughout the calendar year and there are lags in the premium rating windows, preventing regulated premiums from adjusting to reflect higher claim costs in the short-run.<sup>18,19</sup>

More generally, differences in the composition of workers' compensation claimants in Texas relative to broader populations—whether driven by institutional features or otherwise—may limit the external applicability of our findings beyond Texas. Table 1 provides some context by comparing individuals receiving workers' compensation benefits in Texas and nationwide using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2002-2011 (representing years 2001-2010). Columns 1 and 2 describe all workers' compensation claimants in Texas and all states, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the subset of claimants who had inflation-adjusted earnings in the prior year that exceeded \$771 per week ( $=\$540/0.7$ ) and thus would have been marginal to the initial maximum benefit cap if they had been in our sample. Claimants in Texas and the broader U.S. look similar to one another on demographic characteristics and earnings, both in the overall claimant population and the subset of high earner claimants. Differences in industry composition between Texas and the broader U.S. are reflected in industry composition among workers' compensation claimants, with fewer Texans working in education and health care services and more Texans working in mining, utilities, and construction. Overall, it is important to emphasize that neither the population of workers' compensation claimants in Texas nor the high earner subset of these claimants is representative of claimants in the U.S. as a whole, so one should exercise appropriate caution in extrapolating from our estimates. That being said, along the lines of observable attributes, high earner claimants in Texas look broadly similar to high earner claimants nationwide. Industry composition is one observable dimension on which these claimants look somewhat dissimilar. As discussed in Section 4, we find no meaningful heterogeneity in our estimated elasticities across industries, and our results are very similar when re-weighting our sample of Texas workers' compensation claimants on demographic and industry characteristics to resemble claimants nationwide.

Another relevant change in the Texas workers' compensation system that occurred concurrently with the increase to the maximum temporary income benefit rate was an increase in the maximum permanent impairment benefit rate paid for each percentage point of permanent impairment after the completion of temporary income benefits. In principle, unconditional cash transfers received after the completion of the temporary income benefit spell could potentially affect the duration claiming income benefits and medical

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workforce in 2016 using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The nationwide average coverage rate is obtained from McLaren, Baldwin and Boden (2018).

<sup>18</sup>The state regulates all the relative premiums in this market through industry-occupational rating and experience rating. Any differential increase in the costliness of claims for employers with high earning employees would only be reflected in a differential change in premiums with a lag due to the lags built into the rating update algorithms. In setting industry-occupational rates, the state regulator uses historical claims from a five-year window lagged by three years. In determining employer experience rating multipliers, the regulator mandates the use of a three-year window with a 21 month lag.

<sup>19</sup>Though we find no evidence of a change in coverage, it is not ex ante obvious that a change in coverage rates would be problematic from the standpoint of internal validity. While there are not many studies analyzing employer participation decisions and potential selection in the Texas workers' compensation system, there are two notable exceptions: Cabral, Cui and Dworsky (2019) and Butler (1996). Leveraging plausibly exogenous premium variation, Cabral, Cui and Dworsky (2019) analyze selection within the Texas workers' compensation insurance market and find no evidence of adverse or advantageous selection. In an older study, Butler (1996) finds there is no correlation between workplace fatality rates and workers' compensation insurance provision, leading him to conclude that safety levels are likely similar among firms within and outside the Texas workers' compensation system.



spending, if individuals are forward-looking and informed of their later eligibility for these unconditional cash benefits. Further, if individuals are sufficiently forward-looking and informed, knowing the effect of an increase in unconditional cash benefits could potentially aid in understanding whether the increase in the income benefit rates affects claimants' behavior by providing claimants increased access to liquidity rather than through distortions in the marginal incentives to return to work. Since permanent impairment benefit rates are capped at lower levels of pre-injury earnings than income benefits in the Texas workers' compensation system, our setting allows for separate identification of the effects of both policy parameters because the maximums bind for different parts of the pre-injury income distribution. In Appendix Section B, we present difference-in-differences estimates which indicate that increased permanent impairment benefit generosity does not appear to affect either the duration of income benefit receipt or medical spending, and we verify that the increase in permanent impairment benefit generosity does not confound the identification of the effect of income benefits.

## 2.2 Data

We have compiled a unique administrative dataset for this project through a series of open records requests submitted to the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI). The data consist of detailed information on workers' compensation claimants, including all medical and cash benefit information for claims with injury dates from 2005 to 2009. The medical benefit data include information on each workers' compensation insurance medical bill, including information on: procedure type (CPT codes), amount paid, amount charged, diagnoses (ICD-9 codes), date, place of service, and provider information. The medical data cover all medical utilization including physician care, outpatient care, inpatient care, and prescription drugs. For claimants who receive cash benefits, we have information on: type of cash benefits received, prior average weekly wage, total benefits received, replacement rate for income benefits, and benefit start and end dates. The data also include rich demographic and injury information about the claimant including: sex, birth date (month-year), zip code, injury date (month-year), and industry.

We define the injury date to be the month-year of the injury as specified by the insurer. Our main sample consists of claimants with injury dates from the start of our data (January 2005) until one year after the maximum weekly income benefit increase was implemented (September 2007). Robustness analysis in the appendix considers an expanded sample that includes claimants injured up to three years post implementation of the new benefit schedule. From January 2005 to September 2007, Texas had nearly 700,000 claims, roughly 20 percent of whom received income benefits for missed work.<sup>20</sup> We adjust claimants' average pre-injury weekly wages for inflation and restrict the sample to claimants receiving income benefits with real average pre-injury weekly wages of \$540 to \$2,000 as of the first month of the benefit increase. From January 2005 to September 2007, 67,127 claims occurred that meet these criteria. To arrive at the analysis sample, we then drop observations with missing gender or age or with age calculated to be greater than 80 (2.0 percent), observations with non-positive medical spending (0.5 percent), observations with implausibly high income benefit amounts relative to the duration of benefits (3.4 percent), and observations with contradictory injury dates (less than 0.1 percent). The final analysis sample consists of 63,154 claims from January 2005 to September 2007.

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the baseline sample. In addition to showing descriptive statis-

<sup>20</sup>In Texas, as in all state workers' compensation programs, most workers' compensation claims do not involve lost work time that exceeds the waiting period for temporary income benefits. While these "medical only" claims are the most common types of claims, they represent a small share of spending. For instance, medical only claims made up roughly 75% of all workers' compensation claims in 2015, though they accounted for roughly 7% of benefits paid (Weiss, Murphy and Boden, 2019).



tics for the full sample, Table 2 also shows statistics separately for high earner claimants and middle earner claimants. High earners are claimants in the sample with earnings high enough such that they would have received higher income benefits under the revised benefit schedule than under the original benefit schedule, which means that their weekly earnings at the time of injury exceeded \$771 ( $=\$540/0.7$ ). Middle earners are the claimants in the sample with weekly earnings at the time of injury such that their income benefits would have been the same under either schedule. The mean age in the baseline sample is 42.6 years, and 78% of claimants are men. Thirty-one percent of claimants' initial medical bill is for an emergency department (ED) visit or for an emergency admission into a facility. We refer to these claims as "ED claims" throughout. For some analyses, we concentrate on ED claims under the assumption that these claims are less discretionary than the average workers' compensation claim and the exact injury date is known with greater accuracy for these claims. We note that high earner and middle earner claimants look broadly similar to one another in terms of the observed demographic and injury characteristics.

One key outcome we investigate is the income benefit duration, which we throughout simply refer to as "benefit duration" for brevity. The mean benefit duration in our sample is 18.0 weeks.<sup>21</sup> The mean weekly benefit amount is \$524, and the mean replacement rate relative to prior earnings is 63%. Another key outcome we investigate is the medical spending associated with the claim. To minimize the influence of outliers in medical spending, we winsorize bill-level medical paid amounts at the 99th percentile for each year of the data before computing the aggregate measures of medical spending for each claimant and then also winsorize the claimant-level medical spending at the 99th percentile of the sample. The mean medical spending over the five years subsequent to injury is \$12,484.<sup>22</sup>

### 3 Empirical Strategy

Next, we outline the empirical strategy. Below, we describe the econometric model underlying our empirical analysis and the identifying variation.

#### 3.1 Econometric Model

We examine the effect of the change in the weekly benefit amount using a difference-in-differences approach that compares outcomes for claimants differentially exposed to the update in the benefit schedule. Let  $i$  denote claimant and  $t$  month of injury. We measure exposure to the schedule change with a change-in-benefit variable,  $\Delta b_{it}$ , which isolates the increase in the weekly benefit level due to the change in the

<sup>21</sup>We compute this variable as the number of weeks from the day income benefits begin until the day that they end. The Texas legal code caps income benefit duration at 104 weeks with the only exception being for claimants who have spinal surgery after having received benefits for 101 weeks. The number of weeks between benefits starting and ending could also be greater than 104 weeks if claimants start a second spell of benefits after their first spell ends, though repeat spells of income benefits are rare in Texas workers' compensation (occurring in less than 0.1 percent of claims), or because of errors in the spell dates in insurers' records. For the less than 1 percent of claimants with more than 104 weeks between income benefits starting and ending, we set benefits to be 104 weeks, though the estimates are very similar if we do not adjust the variable in this way.

<sup>22</sup>By law, workers' compensation insurance is the first payer for medical spending related to workplace injuries for covered workers, regardless of income benefit receipt. Thus, in principle, our measure of medical spending should capture all medical spending that results from the workplace injury. In practice, however, it may be possible that some of the medical costs of treating a workplace injury could be shifted onto other payers. If higher income benefits reduce the amount of workers' compensation medical costs being shifted onto other payers, the reform could lead to workers' compensation medical spending rising even if the reform had no effect on total medical spending. In Appendix Section D, we look for evidence of any such spillovers. Specifically, we test whether the reform reduced the likelihood that workers' compensation insurers successfully deny payments to providers and whether the reform had smaller effects on spending for procedures that are typically subject to heightened monitoring by health insurers, both of which would be consistent with the reform increasing workers' compensation medical spending by reducing the prevalence of cost shifting onto other payers rather than by leading to increases in total medical spending. As discussed in more detail in Section 5 and Appendix Section D, we find no evidence that the reform affected cost shifting to other payers, and the key findings of welfare analysis would still hold even if there are substantial spillovers on external healthcare payers.

maximum benefit:

$$\Delta b_{it} \equiv b^{new}(w_{it}) - b^{old}(w_{it}), \quad (1)$$

where  $b^{new}(w)$  is the weekly benefit for an individual with prior wage  $w$  under the new benefit schedule,  $b^{old}(w)$  is the weekly benefit for an individual with prior wage  $w$  under the old benefit schedule, and  $w_{it}$  is the pre-injury average weekly wage of individual  $i$  injured in month  $t$ . To contextualize the scale of the reform we examine, we often focus on reporting the overall effect of the schedule change on the affected claimants by scaling this exposure measure by the mean value among affected claimants:

$$\Delta b_{it\_scaled} = \frac{\Delta b_{it}}{\frac{1}{|\mathcal{J}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} \Delta b_{it}}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\mathcal{J}$  represents the set of claimants with non-zero change-in-benefit in the baseline sample ( $\mathcal{J} \equiv \{i : \Delta b_{it} > 0\}$ ). This time-invariant scaling is applied to all claimants, and the coefficient on the interaction of this scaled measure and a post-reform indicator variable can be interpreted as the effect of the mean increase in benefits experienced by claimants whose benefits were affected by the schedule change. While we obtain very similar estimates if we replace the scaled change-in-benefit variable with a simple indicator for treated ( $\mathbb{1}\{\Delta b_{it} > 0\}$ )<sup>23</sup>, our preferred approach is to focus on the scaled change-in-benefit measure of treatment because it accounts for variation in the degree to which claimants are treated while still illustrating the scale of the reform.

We estimate a difference-in-differences specification that allows the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable,  $\Delta b_{it\_scaled}$ , to vary flexibly by three-month bins on injury month. Let  $y_{it}$  be the outcome variable for claimant  $i$  with injury month  $t$ . Our baseline regression can be represented as follows:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_t + \theta \Delta b_{it\_scaled} + \left[ \sum_{t \notin k_0} \beta_k \times \mathbb{1}(t \in k) \times \Delta b_{it\_scaled} \right] + f(X_{it}) + \epsilon_{it}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\alpha_t$  is an injury year-month fixed effect,  $\Delta b_{it\_scaled}$  is scaled change-in-benefit, and  $f(X_{it})$  represents additional flexible controls. Our baseline specification includes the following controls: age, gender, county by injury year-month fixed effects, ED claim indicator, and injury day-of-the-week fixed effects. We also report specifications with only age, gender, and county by injury year-month fixed effects. The coefficients of interest are the  $\beta_k$ 's, where we use summation notation to make explicit that we allow these estimates to vary with three-month bins on the injury date. We normalize the coefficient on the bin just prior to the reform implementation to zero ( $\beta_{k_0} = 0$ ), so that the estimates can be interpreted as the change in the outcomes relative to the months directly preceding the implementation. In addition to estimating this flexible specification, we will also report the mean effect among all claimants subject to the benefit change,  $\pi$ , by estimating the following specification grouping injury months into either pre- or post-reform:

$$y_{it} = \rho_t + \delta \Delta b_{it\_scaled} + [\pi \times \mathbb{1}(t \geq t_0) \times \Delta b_{it\_scaled}] + f(X_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (4)$$

where  $t_0$  represents the threshold injury date (October 1, 2006) such that claimants injured on or after this date were subject to the new benefit schedule. While we present reduced form estimates of the effect of the reform on the outcomes of interest, we also estimate analogous instrumental variables specifications to measure the effect of the weekly potential benefit on the outcomes of interest.

<sup>23</sup>See Table 9 and Appendix Figure A2 for estimates from this alternative specification.

The identification assumption for this difference-in-differences specification is the parallel trends assumption: in the absence of the maximum benefit change, the outcomes of interest would have evolved in parallel for claimants differentially exposed to the reform. While we cannot directly test this assumption, we use several approaches to assess the validity of this assumption. Our first approach is to plot the  $\beta_k$  coefficients by injury date, allowing us to visually assess whether there are spurious pre-existing trends correlated with exposure to the policy. Our second approach is to demonstrate that there are no correlated changes in claimant characteristics based on observable attributes. Our final approach is to illustrate that our results are robust to alternative specifications which vary the set of included controls or the sample of included claimants.

### 3.2 Identifying Variation

**Variation in Weekly Benefit Amount** Table 3 investigates the impact of the reform on the weekly benefit rate claimants are paid using the difference-in-differences specification outlined in Equation (4). Panel A relates the level of the potential weekly benefit to the unscaled change-in-benefit measure, while Panel B relates the natural logarithm of the potential weekly benefit to the scaled change-in-benefit measure. The remaining columns investigate alternative specifications: a specification with fewer controls (column 2), a specification with additional controls for injury type and insurer fixed effects (column 3), an analogous specification in logs or levels (column 4), and a specification using the subset of claims initiated in the ED (column 5).

Figure 2 plots the coefficients on the change-in-benefit by injury month bin interactions from the difference-in-differences specification outlined in Equation (3). Panel A displays estimates corresponding to the flexible version of the specification in Table 3 Panel A column 1. Panel B displays estimates corresponding to the flexible version of the specification in Table 3 Panel B column 1.

Figure 2 shows there is a sharp change in the weekly benefit amount when the new benefit schedule is implemented. Figure 2 Panel A illustrates that the change-in-benefit measure of exposure to the reform causes a one-for-one change in the potential weekly benefit by comparing claimants injured just before and after the implementation. Over the entire baseline sample, Table 3 Panel A column 1 indicates that a \$1 increase in the change-in-benefit variable translates to an average increase of \$0.93 in the weekly benefit rate paid. The coefficients are similar across alternative specifications and are precisely estimated with coefficients ranging from \$0.92 to \$0.94 and standard errors no larger than \$0.01. We note that the coefficient is slightly less than one averaging over the sample period because the maximum weekly benefit is set in nominal terms. This means that in a given period with a fixed maximum weekly benefit, the weekly benefit of the high earners (at the maximum benefit) depreciates in real terms relative to the weekly benefit of the control group (below the maximum benefit) which increases over time with wage inflation.

To estimate the mean increase in the potential weekly benefit among exposed claimants, Table 3 Panel B and Figure 2 Panel B display the regression results relating the natural logarithm of the weekly benefit to the scaled change-in-benefit measure. Table 3 Panel B column 1 indicates the reform increased the mean weekly benefit rate by 15.9% for the exposed claimants, representing an average increase of \$94.78 in the weekly benefit level. The estimated coefficients are similar across specifications and samples, ranging from 15.8% to 16.1%, with an associated standard error never exceeding 0.2%. In the remainder of the paper, we often focus on the scaled change-in-benefit to measure exposure to the reform, which provides estimates of the mean effect of the change in the benefit schedule. While we often report reduced form estimates for our main outcomes of interest, we obtain elasticities with respect to the potential weekly benefit by estimating

analogous instrumental variables specifications which effectively scale these reduced form estimates by the first stage estimates in Table 3. These instrumental variables estimates are reported in Table 6.

**Claim Rates and Claimant Characteristics** Figure 3 displays the number of income benefit claims by injury month relative to the number of income benefit claims in the month just prior to implementation. This series is displayed separately for “High Earners,” those marginal to the initial maximum benefit (for whom  $\Delta b_{it} > 0$ ), and for “Middle Earners,” those not marginal to the initial maximum benefit (for whom  $\Delta b_{it} = 0$ ). If the increase in benefit generosity caused an increase in claims, we would expect to see the High Earner and Middle Earner lines diverge following the implementation of the reform with the High Earner line lying consistently above the Middle Earner line. Instead, we see no such pattern, as the lines appear to track each other equally well before and after the new benefit schedule was implemented. This suggests that the increase in benefits did not affect the likelihood of claiming income benefits.

Table 4 explores whether the identifying variation is related to observable claimant characteristics. Each row of this table reports estimates from our baseline difference-in-differences specification excluding controls, replacing the dependent variable with a range of demographic characteristics (e.g., age, male, married) and claim characteristics (e.g., ED claim, impairment type, industry).<sup>24</sup> In addition, we investigate two composite measures, “Predicted Log(Benefit Duration)” and “Predicted Log(Five Year Medical Spending)”. To calculate these composite measures, we first fit lasso models of the natural logarithm of benefit duration and five year medical spending on demographic and claim characteristics for the set of claimants eligible for the original benefit schedule and then use the coefficient estimates from the lasso models to predict benefit duration and medical spending for all claimants in the baseline sample.<sup>25</sup> In Table 4, we see the estimated coefficients relating these observable characteristics to the identifying variation are economically small and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Appendix Figure A3 displays the analogous event study estimates for these claimant characteristics, and this figure similarly indicates there is no relationship between the identifying variation and claimant characteristics. Overall, these estimates indicate there is no relationship between the identifying variation and the composition of claimants on observable attributes. Further, we illustrate that our main results are robust to including or omitting controls for a rich set of claim characteristics.

Collectively, this evidence indicates that the increase in benefit generosity did not impact the number of claims or the composition of claimants based on observable characteristics. Given this evidence, we focus throughout on the effects of the increase in benefit generosity on the behavior of claimants conditional on filing a workers’ compensation claim for income benefits and medical care.

## 4 Results

### 4.1 Main Estimates

**Benefit Duration** We turn to our difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of income benefit generosity on income benefit duration. Table 5 displays the results from estimating Equation (4) with benefit duration as the dependent variable. Column 1 reports the baseline specification, where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of benefit duration. The remaining columns investigate alternative specifications: a specification with fewer controls (column 2), a specification with additional controls for injury

<sup>24</sup>For this analysis and for subsequent analyses, we create a *Dangerous Industry* indicator variable equal to one for claimants working in agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, or warehousing.

<sup>25</sup>For the lasso models, we include age as indicator variables for ten-year age bins. We also include indicator variables for each day of the week of first medical treatment and indicator variables for wage deciles.

type and insurer fixed effects (column 3), an analogous specification in levels (column 4), and a specification using the subset of claims initiated in the ED (column 5). Table 6 displays the analogous instrumental variables elasticity estimates for the main outcome variables using the baseline controls.

Figure 4 displays event study figures with injury-period-specific coefficients on the key exposure measure as outlined in Equation (3).<sup>26</sup> Panel A displays a figure corresponding to a flexible version of the specification in Table 5 column 1. The plot shows no evidence of a trend for injuries initiated in the period prior to the reform, providing support for our parallel trends identifying assumption. For claimants injured following implementation, the income benefit durations sharply increase relative to prior claimants.

Based on the baseline specification reported in Table 5 column 1, the reform caused a 10.7% increase in the income benefit duration of workers' compensation claims among affected claimants, or 2.0 weeks relative to the pre-policy mean of 17.8 weeks. Given the 16% average increase in the replacement rate induced by the reform, the analogous instrumental variables estimates reported in Table 6 indicate a benefit duration elasticity of 0.68 with a 95% confidence interval spanning 0.40 to 0.95. Comparing across the specifications in Table 5, we see the estimates are similar when we vary the set of controls or focus on the subset of claims initiated with an ED visit.

**Medical Spending** Next, we investigate the effect of the income benefit generosity on claimant medical spending. Table 7 displays the results from estimating Equation (4) where the dependent variable is either medical spending during the first five years after the injury (Panel A) or number of positive medical bills during the first five years after injury (Panel B). Like Table 5, column 1 reports the baseline specification, and the remaining columns investigate alternative specifications, as indicated within the table.

Figure 4 displays the event study figures corresponding to Equation (3). Panels B and C contain the results from more flexible versions of the specifications in Table 7 column 1. The figures show no evidence of a trend in medical spending or number of medical bills for injuries initiated in the period prior to the implementation, in line with the identification assumption. In contrast, medical spending and number of bills sharply increase for exposed claimants injured after the reform was implemented relative to the analogous prior claimants.

The baseline estimates in Table 7 column 1 indicate that the reform caused a 10.0% increase in the medical spending (within the first five years post injury) among affected claimants, or a \$1,219 increase relative to the pre-policy mean of \$12,443. The analogous instrumental variables estimates reported in Table 6 indicate the elasticity of medical spending with respect to the income benefit rate is 0.63 with a 95% confidence interval spanning 0.38 to 0.88. The estimates are similar in alternative specifications with fewer or additional controls and with only claims initiated with an ED visit.

Table 8 presents results from difference-in-differences specifications investigating subcategories of medical utilization. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A display the baseline aggregate utilization results for reference. The remaining columns investigate various subcategories of medical care: office visits, case management services, physical therapy, prescription drugs, surgeries, emergency visits, and diagnostic radiology. Some categories of care appear more responsive than others, and the estimated heterogeneity largely aligns with ex ante predictions. The reform had no detectable effects on less discretionary types of care, such as emergency visits and surgeries. In contrast, the reform is associated with particularly large effects on physical therapy services (22.1% increase in spending) and case management services (18.2% increase in spending). Ex ante, we would have expected to see larger effects on categories of care that are time-intensive during

<sup>26</sup>While the regressions for Figure 4 control for the basic claim characteristics described in Section 3, the coefficient estimates are similar if only the scaled change-in-benefit measure and year-month fixed effects are included as controls. Refer to Appendix Figure A7 for the corresponding event study figures that exclude controls for basic claim characteristics.



business hours (such as physical therapy, office visits, case management services) to the extent that the opportunity cost mechanism is driving the effects. Further, we would have predicted that case management services would be particularly responsive, as doctors may bill for more case management services as the doctor continues to monitor a claimant's work capacity if he/she is on income benefits longer.

**Summary** The estimates above suggest that claimants substantially change their behavior—with respect to duration claiming income benefits and medical spending—when the generosity of income benefits increases. Next we discuss the effect of each margin for adjustment on insurer costs. The cost to the insurer for covering a workers' compensation claimant can be represented by:

$$Cost = D_B b + M, \quad (5)$$

where  $D_B$  is the benefit duration,  $b$  is the weekly benefit rate, and  $M$  is total claimant medical spending. The impact of a change in the benefit level on insurer costs is then:

$$\frac{dCost}{db} = D_B \left( 1 + \epsilon_{D_B, b} + \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} \right). \quad (6)$$

The expression above depicting the total impact on insurer costs is the sum of three components. The first component is the mechanical effect: a \$1 increase in the weekly benefit will increase costs by the duration claiming income benefits ( $D_B$ ). The second component is the behavioral effect due to induced changes in the duration of claiming income benefits. The third component is the behavioral effect due to induced changes in claimant medical spending.

Based on the instrumental variables estimates in Table 6, the second component within the parenthetical expression ( $\epsilon_{D_B, b}$ ) is 0.68, and the third component within the parenthetical expression ( $\frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B}$ ) is 0.72.<sup>27</sup> There are several points worth highlighting. First, our estimates suggest that behavioral responses along the two margins of income benefit duration and medical spending are roughly equally important drivers of increased insurer costs. The point estimates for these behavioral response terms are very similar (0.68 and 0.72) and are statistically indistinguishable from one another.<sup>28</sup> This suggests that behavioral responses in medical spending are as important of an explanation for increased insurer costs as behavioral responses in the duration of income benefit receipt. Second, collectively across these two margins for adjustment, the magnitude of the effect of behavioral responses to benefit generosity on insurer costs is 1.4 times the magnitude of the mechanical effect of benefit generosity on insurer costs. Finally, our estimates indicate that the impact of behavioral responses on insurer costs is roughly four times the effect that would have been predicted based on most of the older work on workers' compensation insurance, which found duration elasticity estimates in the range of 0.3 to 0.4 and has ignored any effects on medical spending.<sup>29</sup> Section 5 explores the potential implications of these estimates of behavioral responses for benefit design.

**Additional Robustness** While Table 5 and Table 7 present our primary robustness analysis, we present further analysis probing the robustness of our findings in Table 9. Each row in Table 9 displays the key co-

<sup>27</sup>We obtain estimates for  $\epsilon_{D_B, b}$  and  $\frac{dM}{db}$  through the corresponding instrumental variables specifications reported in Table 6. We then obtain an estimate for  $\frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B}$  by scaling our IV estimate of  $\frac{dM}{db}$  ( $= 12.86$ ) by the mean duration of benefit receipt ( $= 17.81$ ).

<sup>28</sup>We draw 1,000 bootstrap samples with replacement and estimate the IV specifications for each of these behavioral response terms. A t-test based on these bootstrap estimates does not allow us to reject that these terms are equal (t-stat=0.156).

<sup>29</sup>To the best of our knowledge, no prior study has analyzed the effect of income benefit generosity on medical spending. A few prior papers have investigated the impact of income benefit generosity on the duration of workers' compensation income claims, largely using data and variation from the 1970s and 1980s. See Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a review of this literature. While there is some variation in prior estimates of the duration elasticity, the most commonly cited estimates imply duration elasticities in the range of 0.3 to 0.4 (e.g., Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995), Neuhauser and Raphael (2004)).



efficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable—along with the associated standard error and p-value—from separate specifications, where the first column indicates the specification and dependent variable. For reference, the estimates from the baseline specifications for benefit duration and medical spending are reported in rows (1) and (2), respectively. In all specifications, we continue to scale the measure of exposure to the benefit change by the mean in the overall baseline population, so it is possible to compare estimates across specifications. The baseline specification focuses on workers with inflation-adjusted pre-injury weekly earnings between \$540 and \$2,000. Rows (3) through (10) investigate the stability of the results when we narrow or widen the range of included workers. Specifically, rows (3) through (6) demonstrate that the results are very similar when we restrict the sample of high earner workers to concentrate on those with more similar pre-injury wages to those in the middle earner category. In addition, rows (7) through (10) demonstrate that we obtain similar estimates when moving the lower threshold for inclusion in the sample, restricting or expanding the sample of included middle earner workers. Rows (11) and (12) show that the estimates are similar when we replace our scaled continuous change-in-benefit exposure measure with a dummy variable indicating any exposure,  $\mathbb{1}(\Delta b_{it} > 0)$ . We repeat our primary regressions re-weighting observations to be representative of workers' compensation claimants nationally along observable characteristics such as age, gender, and industry. We do this re-weighting based on propensity scores estimated using CPS data on workers' compensation claimants in Texas and nationally (described in Table 1 in the paper). The results of these re-weighted regressions—displayed in rows (13) and (14)—are very similar to the baseline estimates. Finally, rows (15) and (16) show we obtain similar results when including insurer  $\times$  time fixed effects as additional controls. The stability of the estimates when including these additional controls alleviates concerns that correlated exposure to changes in insurer practices (concerning, for example, medical networks or return-to-work programs) confounds our estimates.

To complement the event study analysis, Appendix Figure A6 displays raw trends in our key outcome variables over the analysis period separately for claimants in the treatment and control groups. For each outcome, the trends appear similar in the treatment and control groups prior to the benefit change. However, upon the implementation of the new benefit schedule, we see a divergence in these trends, with the treatment group, on average, having higher benefit durations, medical spending, and medical bills. The observed divergence persists in the months following the reform. These patterns in the raw data line up with the results from the regression analysis above and confirm the robustness of these estimates.

## 4.2 Supplemental Evidence

Below, we present supplemental evidence. First, we present evidence investigating the timing of the effects on income benefit receipt and medical care relative to injury date. Second, we investigate heterogeneity in the estimated effects on benefit duration and medical spending across claimants. Third, we present correlational evidence illustrating how medical spending evolves around the termination of income benefits. Collectively, this supplemental evidence suggests there is a link between the observed effects on income benefit duration and medical spending, in line with many of the potential mechanisms behind behavioral responses in this setting.

**Timing of Effects** Let  $w$  index two-week bin relative to the injury date. Because the exact date of injury is not observed in the data (only injury month and year are included), we use date of first medical treatment as a proxy for injury date. We estimate regressions of the following form for each two-week bin,  $w$ :

$$y_{iw} = \beta_w \text{Post}_i \times \Delta b_i \text{-scaled} + \delta_w \Delta b_i \text{-scaled} + \theta_w \text{Post}_i + \alpha_w + \lambda_w^H Z_{iw} + \epsilon_{iw}, \quad (7)$$

where  $Z_{iw}$  is the vector of additional controls included in the main analysis and the vector of  $\beta_w$ 's from these regressions represents the coefficients of interest. We investigate two dependent variables: (i) indicator for income benefit receipt in  $w$  and (ii) indicator for positive medical spending in  $w$ . Figure 5 plots these coefficients by two-week bin since injury (date of first treatment), where a vertical reference line at 104 weeks depicts the maximum potential duration of income benefits.

Figure 5 illustrates that the timing of the effects aligns with incentives in this environment. There is little effect on income benefit receipt during the first two weeks after the date of first treatment, as for most individuals this will correspond to the waiting period for income benefits. Putting aside the first two weeks after the date of first treatment, we see that the effects on income benefit duration are relatively front loaded, with the largest effects roughly 10 to 36 weeks after the date of first treatment, with the effects declining thereafter and sharply dropping around the 104th week after the date of first treatment.

Further, Figure 5 illustrates that the timing of the effects on income benefit duration and medical spending generally aligns with one another. The periods with the largest effects on medical spending are also periods with the largest effects on income benefit receipt. Appendix Table A4 displays additional evidence on the impact of the reform on the timing of medical care receipt by estimating the effect of the reform on the inverse hyperbolic sine of total medical spending for more aggregated time horizons. Interestingly, the point estimates for the effects on medical spending in the long-run (more than two years post injury) are small but remain positive and statistically distinguishable from zero until four years after the injury. This suggests that the extra induced medical spending and time out-of-work in the short-run after an injury do not, on average, lead to less medical spending in the long-run.

**Heterogeneity in Effects** We investigate heterogeneity in the main effects by claimant characteristics. Table 10 reports the specifications where we split the sample on various claimant characteristics: age, impairment type, industry riskiness, and sex. In this subgroup analysis, we continue to scale the measure of exposure to the benefit change by the mean in the overall population, so it is possible to compare estimates across subgroups. There are a few patterns worth noting. First, while the subgroup estimates are often not statistically distinguishable from one another, the pattern of the point estimates suggests that the effects are more concentrated among older workers (over age 40), claimants with harder-to-diagnose injuries like sprains, and workers in less dangerous industries. Second, when comparing across subgroups, the impacts on income benefit duration and the impacts on medical spending tend to move together. That is, subgroups with larger estimated impacts on the benefit duration also tend to have larger estimated medical spending effects. The one exception is the comparison by sex, where women and men have similar income benefit duration effects but women have larger medical spending effects.

The heterogeneity analysis suggests that claimant responses along these two margins—income benefit duration and medical spending—are positively correlated. Many of the potential mechanisms behind behavioral responses in this setting predict that claimants who are responsive to benefit generosity would change behavior along both margins. Thus, the findings from the heterogeneity analysis align with intuition and generally support the main findings.

**Income Benefit Termination and Medical Spending** Next, we provide supplemental evidence documenting patterns in medical spending around the termination of income benefits. Let  $s$  index time relative to the last week of income benefit receipt, where  $s = 0$  during the week before the income benefit spell is complete. Let  $y_{is}$  represent the normalized utilization measure in week  $s$  for claimant  $i$ , where this measure is the claimant's utilization in week  $s$  scaled by the mean utilization across claimants during the week just

prior to income benefit completion. We estimate the following regression:

$$y_{is} = \sum_s \beta_s \mathbb{1}(s) + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{is}, \quad (8)$$

where  $\gamma_i$  is a claimant fixed effect. We normalize  $\beta_0 = 0$ . The coefficients of interest are the vector  $\beta_s$ , which depicts the relationship between medical utilization and the week that income benefits are terminated. Figure 6 plots these estimates along with the associated 95% confidence intervals, where Panel A focuses on medical spending and Panel B focuses on the number of bills. Medical spending sharply drops at the termination of income benefits, where medical spending falls by roughly 60% (relative to the baseline week) by two weeks after income benefit completion. A similar pattern is observed with the number of medical bills. It is important to emphasize that these estimates represent a correlation and do not have a causal interpretation. Nevertheless, these patterns suggest a possible link between income benefit receipt and medical spending, providing further motivation for the primary analysis investigating the causal impact of income benefit generosity on medical spending.

## 5 Welfare Implications and Discussion

Though our estimates indicate that there are large behavioral responses to benefit generosity, individuals likely value the consumption-smoothing benefits provided by more generous coverage and thus the estimates of behavioral responses alone are not sufficient to conclude whether increasing the generosity of benefits would improve or harm welfare. Below, we explore the potential normative implications of our estimates using the elasticities presented in the prior section along with additional evidence on the consumption drop experienced by workers upon workplace injury. Motivated by the near ubiquity of workers' compensation insurance coverage, the analysis and discussion below consider the impact of increasing the generosity of workers' compensation income benefits within a compulsory workers' compensation system—which is analogous to a social insurance program financed by taxes on employers.<sup>30</sup>

We extend and apply the classic Baily-Chetty framework to characterize the marginal welfare impact of increasing benefit generosity, where we adapt models typically applied in the setting of unemployment insurance (e.g., Chetty (2006), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016)) to the setting of workers' compensation insurance in which there are multiple dimensions for behavioral adjustments. Additionally, we calculate the implied Marginal Value of Public Funds (MVPF) (as in Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020)) associated with an increase in the generosity of workers' compensation insurance income benefits. We then provide more context through a discussion of these estimates and the implications from our findings.

### 5.1 Welfare Framework

#### 5.1.1 Marginal Welfare Impact of Increase in Benefit Generosity

**Model Setup** Consider a single worker who lives for  $T$  periods,  $\{0, \dots, T-1\}$ . The worker becomes injured at time 0 with exogenous assets  $A_0$ . When the worker is out of work, the worker receives workers' compensation benefits  $b$  in each period for a maximum of  $B$  periods. If the worker is working in period  $t$ , the worker earns wage  $w$ , pays a lump-sum tax (or equivalently a premium)  $\tau$ , and will continue working for  $T - t$  periods. Let  $c_t^N$  denote consumption in period  $t$  if the worker is not working, and let  $c_t^W$  denote the

<sup>30</sup>Similar to social insurance programs funded through employer taxes (e.g., unemployment insurance), compulsory workers' compensation insurance is funded by employers, as employers purchase coverage at government regulated prices. The discussion below treats workers' compensation insurance as analogous to other social insurance programs funded through government revenues raised through taxation.

consumption of the worker in period  $t$  if working. Let the interest rate and the agent's discount rate be zero, and we take as exogenous liquidity constraints by assuming the agent cannot deplete assets below  $L < 0$  in any period.

In each period  $t$ , the individual chooses effort  $e_t$  he/she will expend to recover from the injury and return to work. While the treating doctor of an injured worker must clear the claimant to return to work, the probability that the treating doctor will assess the individual as ready to return to work depends on the effort an employee dedicates to appearing ready to return to work to his/her treating doctor, to doing prescribed gym and home exercises, and to working with his/her employer to accommodate any work limitations. The cost of expending effort is represented by the convex function  $\psi(e_t)$ . The individual also chooses the amount of injury-related medical spending  $m_t$  in each period, subject to constraints that depend on whether the individual is working or not working. These constraints may represent a variety of potential constraints a claimant faces including constraints imposed by the claimant's treating doctor and/or employer.

Let  $V_t(A_t)$  denote the value function for the individual when working in period  $t$ :

$$V_t(A_t) = \max_{A_{t+1} \geq L; \underline{m}_t^W \leq m_t \leq \bar{m}_t^W} u(A_t - A_{t+1} + w - \tau) + h_t^W(m_t) + V_{t+1}(A_{t+1}). \quad (9)$$

Let  $U_t(A_t)$  denote the value function for the worker who has not returned to work in period  $t$ :

$$U_t(A_t) = \max_{A_{t+1} \geq L; \underline{m}_t^N \leq m_t \leq \bar{m}_t^N} u(A_t - A_{t+1} + b) + h_t^N(m_t) + J_{t+1}(A_{t+1}), \quad (10)$$

where

$$J_t(A_t) = \max_{e_t} e_t V_t(A_t) + (1 - e_t) U_t(A_t) - \psi(e_t) \quad (11)$$

is the value of entering period  $t$  having not yet returned to work with assets  $A_t$ . Note that in the dynamic problem outlined above the worker's valuation of medical spending (and any associated health benefits) is represented by the function  $h_t^W(m)$  if working and  $h_t^N(m)$  if not working, which is additively separable from the utility over non-medical consumption.<sup>31</sup> It is straightforward to show that the optimal effort decision solves the following first order condition:

$$\psi'(e_t) = V_t(A_t) - U_t(A_t) \quad (12)$$

which equates the marginal cost of effort to the marginal benefit of effort.

We define several objects to ease notation below. Let  $S_t \equiv \prod_{i=0}^t (1 - e_i)$  represent the survival function for being out-of-work on injury at least  $t + 1$  periods. Let  $f_t \equiv \prod_{i=0}^{t-1} (1 - e_i) e_t = S_{t-1} e_t$  represent the probability that the non-working spell lasts for exactly  $t > 0$  periods, where  $f_0 = e_0$ . Let  $D \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} S_t$  be the individual's expected non-working duration, and let  $D_B \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} S_t$  be the individual's expected

<sup>31</sup>The inclusion of these terms makes explicit that the dynamic optimization problem allows for the possibility that increased medical spending could increase the worker's health, which could have a positive impact on the worker's utility. Similarly, while the worker's valuation of leisure is not included in the dynamic problem above (as is typical in the unemployment insurance literature), the resulting sufficient statistics welfare formulas would be the same if we had a richer model of utility that included the worker's utility of leisure as additively separable from the worker's utility over non-medical consumption. If there is complementarity between utility over non-medical consumption and medical consumption (or utility over non-medical consumption and leisure), the welfare formulas in Equations (14) and (15) would need to be modified to account for the degree of complementarity.

duration of collecting workers' compensation income benefits. Define the elasticity of the non-working duration with respect to the benefit level as  $\epsilon_{D,b} \equiv \frac{d \log D}{d \log b}$  and the elasticity of benefit duration with respect to the benefit level as  $\epsilon_{D_B,b} \equiv \frac{d \log D_B}{d \log b}$ . Let  $\theta \equiv \frac{D}{T}$  be the rate of non-working due to injury. Let  $M = \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} m_t$ .

Below, we consider the marginal welfare gain from a change in the benefit level  $b$ , taking the maximum duration of workers' compensation benefits as given. The social planner's problem is to maximize the worker's expected utility at time 0 subject to agent optimization and balanced budget constraints. Agent optimization requires that the values of  $e_t$ ,  $m_t$ , and  $A_t$  correspond to the agent's optimal choices based on the dynamic optimization problem outlined above. Let  $J_0$  represent the individual's indirect utility at time 0 as a function of  $b$  and  $\tau$ . Then, the planner solves:

$$\max J_0(b, \tau) \quad s.t. \quad D_B b + M = (T - D)\tau. \quad (13)$$

**Marginal Welfare Impact of Increase in Generosity** Let us define a money-metric measure of welfare as  $\frac{dW}{db} \equiv \frac{dJ_0}{db} / \frac{dJ_0}{dw}$ . Define  $\mu_t^N \equiv \frac{S_t}{D_B}$  and  $\mu_t^W \equiv \frac{f_t(T-t)}{T-D}$ . Under some additional assumptions, we can derive the exact marginal welfare gain and a feasible approximation:

**Exact Formula** Suppose the borrowing constraint is not binding at time  $B$ . The money-metric welfare gain from raising the benefit level,  $b$ , is given by the following expression:

$$\frac{dW}{db} = \frac{D_B}{D} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \mu_t^N u'(c_t^N) - \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \mu_t^W u'(c_t^W)}{\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \mu_t^W u'(c_t^W)} - \left( \epsilon_{D_B,b} + \epsilon_{D,b} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B b} \right) + \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} \right) \right). \quad (14)$$

**Approximation** Suppose that: (i) the coefficient of relative prudence is zero ( $\frac{-u'''(c)}{u''(c)} c = 0$ ) and (ii) the duration elasticities are equal ( $\epsilon_{D_B,b} = \epsilon_{D,b}$ ). Then, the expression above is approximated by:

$$\frac{dW}{db} \approx \frac{D_B}{D} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c} - \epsilon_{D_B,b} - \epsilon_{D_B,b} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B b} \right) - \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} \right), \quad (15)$$

where  $\gamma = -\frac{u''(c)}{u'(c)} c$  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion,  $\frac{\Delta c}{c} = \frac{\bar{c}_W - \bar{c}_N}{\bar{c}_W}$  is the consumption drop upon workplace injury, and  $\bar{c}_W \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \mu_t^W c_t^W$  and  $\bar{c}_N \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \mu_t^N c_t^N$  are the weighted-average consumption of the working and not working, respectively.

See Appendix Section E for a detailed derivation of these expressions.<sup>32</sup>

### 5.1.2 Marginal Value of Public Funds

In the model based on Baily-Chetty outlined above, the sign of the marginal welfare impact of increasing benefit generosity is determined by whether workers themselves are willing to pay the net cost of an extension of income benefits. In other words, the welfare formula above indicates a welfare gain associated with a marginal increase in income benefits if and only if the willingness to pay for a \$1 incremental extension (approximated by  $1 + \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c}$ ) exceeds the cost of this extension ( $1 +$  fiscal externalities on the workers' compensation program). In practice, workers' compensation insurance is not necessarily funded by the workers that benefit from the program, and there may be broader fiscal externalities on the government's budget beyond workers' compensation insurance (e.g., labor supply distortions may lead to losses in income tax

<sup>32</sup>In Appendix Section E, we also derive an approximate welfare formula allowing for non-zero relative prudence.

revenues). We can place our findings in a broader context relative to other programs with distributional impacts and account for broader externalities on government finances by calculating the implied Marginal Value of Public Funds (MVPF) based on our estimates following Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020).

We calculate the MVPF implied by our estimates assuming that behavior is privately optimal. In line with the model above, we approximate the willingness-to-pay for a \$1 incremental extension as  $1 + \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c}$ . We calculate the fiscal externality associated with such an extension as the sum of the impact on workers' compensation claim costs ( $\epsilon_{DB,b} + \frac{1}{D_B} \frac{dM}{db}$ ) and the impact of labor supply distortions on government revenue ( $\epsilon_{D,b} \frac{D}{D_B} \frac{\tau}{b}$ ). Under the assumption that there are no other external effects of the benefit extension, the MVPF can be expressed as,

$$MVPF = \frac{1 + \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c}}{1 + \epsilon_{DB,b} + \frac{1}{D_B} \frac{dM}{db} + \epsilon_{D,b} \frac{D}{D_B} \frac{\tau}{b}}, \quad (16)$$

where  $\tau$  is the total tax rate paid when working and  $b$  is the income benefits replacement rate for workers' compensation insurance. Suppose the duration elasticities are equal ( $\epsilon_{D,b} \approx \epsilon_{DB,b}$ ). Then, the MVPF can be approximated by,

$$MVPF \approx \frac{1 + \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c}}{1 + \epsilon_{DB,b} (1 + \frac{D}{D_B} \frac{\tau}{b}) + \frac{1}{D_B} \frac{dM}{db}}. \quad (17)$$

## 5.2 Calibration

Next, we use the approximate formulas described above in combination with our key estimated elasticities characterizing behavioral responses to benefit generosity and a few additional data moments to calibrate the marginal welfare impact of increasing the generosity of coverage for workers' compensation wage replacement benefits and to calculate the implied MVPF. The instrumental variables estimates in Table 6 indicate that  $\epsilon_{DB,b}$  is 0.68 and  $\frac{dM}{db}$  is 12.86. For the calibrations presented below, we approximate the out-of-work duration by the income benefit duration,  $D \approx D_B$ .<sup>33</sup> We calculate that the fraction of the covered workforce that is out-of-work due to workplace injury ( $\theta$ ) is approximately 0.24%, where this estimate is the product of the annual fraction of covered workers filing income-benefit eligible workers' compensation claims (0.7%, Cabral, Cui and Dworsky (2019)) and the mean duration of income benefit receipt (0.34 years). For the MVPF calibration, we set the replacement rate equal to mean replacement rate in our sample (63%) and the tax rate equal to the mean tax-and-transfer rate among workers' compensation recipients nationally (17.9%).<sup>34</sup>

There are two additional inputs needed in the approximations described above: the coefficient of relative risk aversion and a measure of the drop in consumption experienced by workers upon workplace injury. Our approach to the former is to consider a range of plausible relative risk aversion values. For the latter, we estimate the mean drop in consumption experienced by injured workers nationally using Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data—the only dataset with information on both consumption and location of injury. We estimate that workers experience a mean drop in food consumption of 10.1% after a work-

<sup>33</sup>Some approximation for the out-of-work duration is necessary, as our administrative data on the workers' compensation system is not linked to subsequent labor market outcomes. We think this is a reasonable first-order approximation in this setting. TDI (2015) analyzes linked Texas workers' compensation insurance data and unemployment insurance earnings records, documenting that 76% of workers' compensation income benefit recipients returned to work within six months of injury and 95% returned to work within three years of injury among those injured in 2011.

<sup>34</sup>The mean tax-and-transfer rate is calculated by associating the rates reported in Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) by income relative to the federal poverty line with each workers' compensation insurance recipient in the CPS data summarized in Table 1. For this calculation, we apply the federal poverty line for households with two children to each recipient's household earnings. The rates reported in Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) exclude payroll taxes, as payroll taxes collected for an individual's earnings may translate to future benefits for that individual.



limiting workplace injury. While we focus on consumption within a single category of expenditure (food), this focus is without loss of generality if the analogous risk aversion parameter (curvature of utility over food) is used in the application of the welfare formula (Chetty, 2006). See Appendix Section F for a detailed description of the estimation of the mean consumption drop among injured workers.<sup>35</sup>

**Marginal Welfare Impact of Increase in Generosity** Table 11 reports the calibrated marginal welfare gain from a 5% increase in the weekly benefit rate on a base of \$540 weekly benefit rate (the initial benefit cap prior to the reform). Each cell in this table represents a separate calibration, where the row indicates the coefficient of relative risk aversion used in the calibration ranging from one to five. Column 1 presents our baseline calibrations using our estimated elasticities. For comparison, columns 2 and 3 present some additional calibrations. Column 2 reports the analogous welfare calibrations using our estimated duration elasticity but ignoring medical spending effects—contrary to the evidence. Column 3 reports the analogous welfare calibrations using our estimated medical spending elasticity but ignoring impacts on the duration claiming income benefits—again, contrary to the evidence.

Across the range of risk aversion values considered, calibrations based on the estimated elasticities indicate that extending the generosity of income benefits generates welfare losses. Consider the case when the coefficient of relative risk aversion equals two. The baseline calibration using our estimated elasticities reported in column 1 indicates that a 5% balanced-budget increase in the weekly benefit rate would reduce per capita ex ante utility by the equivalent of a \$0.078 weekly wage reduction. The cost associated with providing this incremental increase in benefits is approximately \$0.155 per capita, per week. Using this as a benchmark, the welfare loss associated with a 5% increase in the weekly benefit rate (in terms of an equivalent wage reduction) is 50% of the per capita cost of the extension. Comparing columns 1 and 2, we can see that ignoring the impact on medical spending leads one to underestimate the predicted welfare loss by 60%. To further benchmark magnitudes, the change in the predicted welfare estimates from ignoring the impacts on medical spending is more than twice the change in the welfare estimates that would result from a three unit decrease in the coefficient of relative risk aversion, moving from  $\gamma = 5$  to  $\gamma = 2$ .

Comparing columns 2 and 3, we see that the two margins for adjustment—income benefit duration and medical spending—are roughly equally important contributors to the predicted welfare loss from a marginal expansion of income benefits. For instance, if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is two, considering the impact on benefit duration and ignoring the impact on medical spending (as in column 2) would underestimate the predicted welfare loss by 60%, while considering the impact on medical spending and ignoring the impact on benefit duration (as in column 3) would underestimate the predicted welfare loss by 57%.<sup>36</sup> Further, the estimates in columns 2 and 3 indicate that the key qualitative finding— that a

<sup>35</sup>Following Bronchetti (2012), we identify injured workers using a survey question “Do you have any impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of work that you can do?”, focusing on workers who report a work-limiting injury in period  $t$  but not in period  $t - 1$ . We concentrate on impairments that are reported to have been “caused by the nature of [the respondent’s] work” and limit the sample to individuals employed in period  $t - 1$ . We quantify the total change in food consumption between survey periods  $t - 1$  and  $t$  for respondents who experience the onset of a work-related injury or illness between survey periods  $t - 1$  and  $t$ . The Health and Retirement Study is conducted once every two years, and thus the consumption drop represents the mean consumption drop among workers injured sometime in the last two years who are still impaired. Conceptually, this is very close to the consumption drop term in the marginal welfare impact in Equation (15) which indicates that the survival function should be used to create the weighted-average consumption drop upon workplace injury. Given that the Health and Retirement Study surveys respondents once every two years, it does not allow for differentiating between workers with relatively short or long out-of-work durations to create a re-weighted mean of the consumption drop experienced by injured workers. In the baseline welfare analysis, we report welfare calculations based on the mean consumption drop among injured workers nationally. In Appendix Table A6 and Appendix Table A7, we show the mean consumption drop and implied welfare estimates are similar if we instead restrict attention to workers whose prior earnings and benefit levels are in the same range as the workers marginal to the maximum benefit reform we analyze.

<sup>36</sup>Appendix Table A8 illustrates the robustness of the marginal welfare analysis to allowing for a non-zero coefficient of relative prudence. In particular, this table shows that we obtain very similar marginal welfare estimates if we set the coefficient of relative prudence to  $\gamma + 1$ , as would be implied by Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility.

marginal increase in benefits does not improve welfare—is robust to considering responses along only one of the two margins of adjustment observed in practice.

**MVPF** Table 12 reports the calibrated values of the MVPF based on our estimates. Each cell reports a separate calibration, where the row indicates the corresponding coefficient of relative risk aversion. Column 1 presents calibrations using our estimated elasticities. For comparison, columns 2 and 3 report the implied MVPF values in hypothetical scenarios in which—contrary to the evidence—only one margin responds to income benefit generosity: income benefit duration (column 2) or medical spending (column 3).

For this discussion, we focus on the case when the value of relative risk aversion equals two. The MVPF based on our estimates is 0.46, indicating that \$1 of additional public spending generates 46 cents for beneficiaries. If we use our estimated duration elasticity but ignore effects on medical spending, we would mistakenly conclude the MVPF is 0.64. If we instead ignore effects on income benefit duration and only considered the effect on medical spending, the implied MVPF would be 0.70. Thus, ignoring either the effect on income benefit duration or medical spending would significantly overstate the MVPF.

To provide some context, we can compare the implied MVPF in this setting to that of other social insurance programs. Using estimates from the prior literature, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) report the category average of MVPF estimates for unemployment insurance policies is 0.61 and for disability insurance expansions is 0.85. Our estimated MVPF of 0.46 in the context of workers' compensation income benefits is lower than these reported average MVPF estimates for unemployment insurance or disability insurance—the other key social insurance programs that insure lost earnings. It is important to note that the MVPF calculations for unemployment insurance and disability insurance focus on the fiscal externalities associated with labor supply effects of these programs. If we ignored effects of workers' compensation income benefits on medical spending and only considered effects on labor supply (through income benefit durations), we would obtain an implied MVPF for workers' compensation income benefits of 0.64 (from column 2), which is close to the average MVPF estimate for unemployment insurance policies (0.61) though still substantially below the average MVPF for disability insurance expansions (0.85). In other words, the additional margin of behavioral adjustment in the setting of workers' compensation insurance is one explanation for why the MVPF is lower in this setting than often estimated based on unemployment insurance expansions.

### 5.3 Discussion

The welfare calibration above suggests that a marginal increase in income benefits would not lead to welfare improvements in this setting. Further, the implied Marginal Value of Public Funds (MVPF) calculated above suggests that each dollar of public spending results in just 46 cents for beneficiaries. Under the assumptions employed in the analysis above, these results follow from the fact that there are large behavioral responses to coverage—generating large fiscal externalities—in this setting and there are moderate consumption losses associated with workplace injuries. Behavioral responses to benefit generosity are large in this setting: a \$1 increase in benefits leads to a \$1.40 increase in the costs of workers' compensation insurance through behavioral changes. At the same time, the consumption losses due to workplace injuries that are insured through income benefits are moderate—at approximately 10% based on our analysis with the HRS data. Given this is a setting with large behavioral responses and moderate consumption losses, it is certainly plausible that workers' compensation benefits are more generous than would be optimal.

An important caveat is that the assumptions behind the welfare analysis may not hold. If the model does not apply, there may be other channels through which increasing benefit generosity leads to welfare

improvements. The model outlined above makes several assumptions. For instance, the model assumes utility is not state-dependent, there is no complementarity between non-medical consumption and either leisure or medical consumption, agents make privately optimal decisions, and there are no externalities on other parties. While making assumptions along these lines is common in applications of the Baily-Chetty framework, these assumptions are not innocuous and may not hold. Under the assumptions within the model, the envelope theorem implies that any increases in leisure and medical spending resulting from increased benefit generosity do not have a first order effect on the agent's utility. In this way, any impacts of induced additional leisure or medical spending on agent utility (for example, through health) are accounted for in the model through assuming that agents appropriately value these impacts and make privately optimal decisions. Below, we discuss two of the key assumptions behind the welfare analysis and evidence related to the plausibility of these assumptions.

First, consider the assumption that agents make privately optimal decisions. We maintain this assumption throughout the normative analysis. While this is a standard assumption in revealed preference welfare analysis, it is not without loss of generality as it rules out internalities due to behavioral biases or information frictions. We know of no research investigating internalities in the setting of workers' compensation claimant decisions, and we note this is an important area for future work. Suppose, for instance, there is a violation of this assumption and agents under-consumed leisure or medical services prior to benefits being increased. Then, induced increases in leisure and medical spending due to increased benefit generosity may work to alleviate these distortions and could lead to unmodeled improvements in utility. It is not possible to test whether agents make privately optimal decisions. However, we can look for indirect evidence on the plausibility of this assumption. To do this, we investigate whether increased benefit generosity leads to improvements in health (and thus plausibly utility). If increased benefit generosity leads to large impacts on health, one might question the reasonableness of the assumption that agents are optimizing. Moreover, if the model is not applicable because agents do not make privately optimal decisions, quantifying the effect of benefit generosity on health may help us value the impact of increasing benefit generosity.

We look for evidence related to the effect of benefit generosity on health in two ways. First, we estimate the effect of the reform on claimants' permanent impairment ratings. If induced increases in leisure or medical utilization led to health improvements, we might expect fewer individuals to be assessed as permanently impaired after the completion of their temporary income benefits or we might expect that permanent impairment severity ratings would decline. Appendix Table A3 presents results examining the effects of the reform on permanent impairment ratings. The reform-induced increase in benefit generosity had no detectable impact on the share of claimants assessed as permanently impaired or assigned impairment severity ratings. Second, we examine the impact of the reform on claimants' long-run utilization of medical services. If induced increases in leisure or medical utilization concurrent with temporary income benefits improved health, we might expect claimants to have fewer complications and less medical utilization in the long-run, after income benefit eligibility has lapsed. We present related evidence in Appendix Table A4, where we estimate the effect of the reform on medical spending at various time horizons since injury. While the increases in medical spending are largest during periods coincident with income benefit eligibility, the point estimates for the effect on medical spending in the long-run (more than two years post injury) are small but remain positive and statistically distinguishable from zero until four years after the injury. These findings suggest that the reform-induced additional medical spending and time out-of-work in the short-run after an injury do not, on average, lead to less medical spending in the long-run. Taken together, these analyses suggest there is no evidence that increased income benefit generosity impacted

health, consistent with the notion that individuals make privately optimal decisions.

Second, consider the assumption that there are no other external effects of workers' compensation insurance income benefit generosity. There is almost no prior work analyzing external effects of workers' compensation insurance income benefits. A notable exception is McNerney and Simon (2012) who find no relationship between workers' compensation insurance income benefit generosity and public disability insurance claims. It is perhaps not surprising that they find no evidence of externalities on disability insurance. Because workers' compensation wage replacement benefits provide temporary coverage while disability insurance covers longer spells after a waiting period, there is very limited overlap in the types of spells covered by these insurance programs and the direction of any such externality is *ex ante* theoretically ambiguous.<sup>37</sup>

Another external group that may potentially be affected by workers' compensation income benefit generosity is formal or informal health insurers. Though workers' compensation insurance is legally the first payer for medical spending related to workplace injuries, it may be that medical spending within workers' compensation may substitute for (or complement) medical spending outside of workers' compensation insurance. To our knowledge, there is no work analyzing the impact of workers' compensation insurance benefit generosity on health care spending outside of workers' compensation insurance.<sup>38</sup> While we do not have data on medical spending outside of workers' compensation insurance to directly quantify any impacts of benefit generosity, we conduct additional analysis reported in Appendix Section D that leverages our administrative data on workers' compensation medical spending to investigate the possibility of spillovers on other health care spending in two ways. First, we investigate whether there is a change in the bill denial rate when the reform is implemented. One potential mechanism for costs to be shifted from workers' compensation to other payers would be for workers' compensation insurers to deny a submitted medical bill, leaving a standard health insurer, patient, or other third party left paying the bill. Our data contains both bills that are paid and unpaid, so we can investigate whether the rate of bill denial changes with the reform. Estimates reported in Appendix Table A5 illustrate the reform had no impact on the bill denial rate. Second, we investigate whether our results are the same for diagnostic radiology as for other care. Diagnostic radiology procedures—including costly advanced imaging such as MRIs, CT scans, and PET scans—are subject to strict utilization review by health insurers for outside sources of liability. Health insurers often require prior authorization for non-emergency diagnostic imaging. Further, upon receiving a claim for diagnostic imaging, it is common for health insurers to request further information from the patient about whether the imaging was due to an injury/accident, the location of the injury, and other potential liable parties/insurers. Collectively, these strategies may successfully limit cost-shifting for diagnostic radiology procedures relative to other types of procedures. If the reform increased medical spending for workers' compensation insurers merely because workers' compensation insurers are less aggressive about cost shifting when injured workers delay returning to work, we would not expect to see effects of the reform on the types of procedures that health insurers strictly monitor to combat cost-shifting, since workers' compensation insurers would have been unlikely to have been able to shift costs for these procedures onto health insurers prior to the reform. In contrast, estimates reported in Appendix Table A5 illustrate

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<sup>37</sup>The average workers' compensation income benefit spell is approximately 18 weeks, and analysis by TDI reveals that 76% of workers' compensation income benefit recipients return to work within six months of injury and 95% return to work within three years of injury.

<sup>38</sup>There is some prior work investigating externalities in the opposite direction: the impact of health insurance generosity on workers' compensation medical spending. Specifically, a few prior studies have shown that having any health insurance or having more generous health insurance is associated with a decline in workers' compensation medical spending (e.g., Dillender (2015), Bronchetti and McNerney (2021), Fomenko and Gruber (2019)).

that diagnostic radiology spending and bills react to the same degree as spending and bills overall. Taken together, these analyses suggest no evidence of spillovers on other health care spending. While we cannot definitively rule out (either positive or negative) spillovers on other health spending, we view these analyses as broadly reassuring that the estimated change in workers' compensation medical spending based on the identifying variation likely reflects changes in aggregate medical utilization among injured workers.

The baseline welfare calculations presented in this section abstract from impacts on external parties because we are unaware of prior evidence showing that workers' compensation benefit generosity affects other payers and our own analysis does not point to any evidence of external effects of increased benefit generosity. However, for completeness, we now discuss how incorporating potential externalities on other health care payers would impact the welfare analysis. The main finding from the model based on Baily-Chetty—that increasing the generosity of coverage would not improve welfare—is not sensitive to the assumption that there are no external impacts on other health care payers. To see this, consider the most extreme case where all of the increase in workers' compensation medical spending is driven by cost-shifting from standard health insurance. Note that ignoring the effect of benefit generosity on medical spending (as in Table 11 column 2) is equivalent to thinking about this extreme case where the increase in workers' compensation medical spending is entirely explained by cost-shifting from health insurance with health insurance costs financed similarly to workers' compensation insurance—through lump sum taxation on workers. Across the range of plausible risk aversion values, we consistently obtain a negative value for the marginal welfare impact from increasing benefit generosity even in this extreme case of full cost-shifting (see Table 11 column 2). Similarly, the estimates in Table 12 column 2 can be interpreted as the implied MVPF in the extreme case where all of the increase in workers' compensation medical spending represents cost-shifting from health insurance with the financing of health insurance borne by the government (in which case the increase in medical spending represents a budget neutral shift in resources). If we suppose a relative risk aversion parameter of two, then incorporating external impacts on other health care payers in this extreme scenario would increase the MVPF from 0.46 to 0.64 (comparing columns 1 and 2 of Table 12). While full cost-shifting is a very extreme—and in our view unrealistic—scenario, Appendix Section D analyzes the sensitivity of the implied MVPF to incorporating more moderate potential externalities on other health care payers. In this exercise, we hold relative risk aversion fixed at two and vary the percent of the induced increase in workers' compensation medical spending assumed to be driven by cost-shifting from 0% to 50%. We consider scenarios in which the incidence of these outside health care costs either falls on the government or falls on other individuals. Across the potential externalities considered, the implied MVPF ranges from 0.46 to 0.56. In summary, the key qualitative take-aways from the normative analysis would still hold even if there were moderate to large externalities on other health care payers.

## 6 Conclusion

Workers' compensation is one of the largest social insurance programs in the United States, but relative to other insurance programs, little research has explored the effects and implications of benefit design in the program. This paper provides recent, transparent evidence on the impact of the generosity of workers' compensation wage replacement benefits on the key components of workers' compensation program costs: income benefits and medical spending. While there are many reasons why the generosity of wage replacement benefits may affect both the duration receiving income benefits and medical spending, one key feature of this social insurance program—the role of doctors as gatekeepers for both cash benefits and medical spending—may suggest a fundamental link in responses along these two margins. For instance,



claimants aiming to collect income benefits longer when benefit generosity increases may report more severe symptoms to their doctors, who may in turn approve a longer duration receiving income benefits and recommend additional medical care to help the claimant heal and return to work.

We leverage a legislated increase in the maximum weekly benefit level in the Texas workers' compensation insurance system, which induces a large, sharp increase in the generosity of wage replacement benefits for a subset of claimants. Using comprehensive administrative data and a difference-in-differences research design, we estimate the effect of the increase in income benefit generosity on program costs. Our estimates indicate an income benefit duration elasticity of 0.68, which is roughly twice as large as the most commonly cited prior estimates would have suggested. Further, we find the effect of the generosity of wage replacement benefits on medical spending is as important of a driver of increased insurer cost as is the effect of benefit generosity on income benefit duration. Aggregating across these two margins of adjustment, our estimates indicate that the magnitude of the effect of behavioral responses to benefit generosity on insurer costs is 1.4 times the magnitude of the mechanical effect of benefit generosity on insurer costs. We explore the potential welfare consequences of these behavioral responses by extending the Baily-Chetty model to the setting of workers' compensation insurance, where claimants maximize their utility over medical and non-medical consumption by choosing the amount of medical care to engage in (subject to constraints), the effort put into returning to work, and the assets to consume each period. Using our estimated elasticities along with an estimate of the drop in consumption experienced by injured workers, this model suggests that increasing the generosity of workers' compensation wage replacement benefits would reduce welfare. The implied Marginal Value of Public Funds (MVPF) based on our estimates is 0.46, which is lower than the average MVPF estimated in some other social insurance settings such as unemployment insurance and disability insurance (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020).

The evidence presented in this paper is relevant for ongoing policy debates over the generosity of workers' compensation wage replacement benefits and for understanding the determinants of workers' compensation costs more broadly. Despite the fact that medical spending has continued to grow as a share of total workers' compensation costs and now represents half of all workers' compensation benefits paid, little is known about what factors influence workers' compensation medical spending. Our findings indicate that the replacement rate for income benefits is an important determinant of both workers' compensation income benefits and medical spending. Further, the results in this paper are directly relevant to ongoing policy debates, as the maximum weekly benefit level—the source of the variation in this study—is arguably the most frequently debated (and revised) policy parameter in workers' compensation insurance. More broadly, the findings from this paper highlight the importance of considering the impact of social insurance benefit generosity on measures of insurer and social costs that go beyond directly incentivized dimensions. As documented in this paper, behavioral responses along margins that are not directly incentivized can have important implications for program costs.

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


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
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Figure 1: Weekly Benefit Rate Schedule Before and After Reform



Notes: The above figure displays the benefit schedule—the mapping from pre-injury weekly earnings to potential weekly benefit— before and after the reform, along with a histogram that shows the distribution of pre-injury weekly average earnings for claimants injured from January 2005 to September 2007. The solid black line displays the benefit schedule applicable to claimants injured prior to October 2006. The dashed blue line displays the benefit schedule for claimants injured on or after October 2006.


Figure 2: Impact of Benefit Change on Benefit Rate



Notes: Each graph in the figure above displays coefficients on the change-in-benefit or the scaled change-in-benefit measure (as indicated above) interacted with time bins that indicate the number of months that the injury occurred relative to the implementation of the reform from separate regressions of Equation (3) along with 95-percent confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors. The interaction for the time period immediately prior to the reform is omitted. The sample contains 63,154 claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's (scaled) change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables.




Figure 3: Impact of Benefit Change on Claim Rates




Notes: The figure above displays monthly claim rates from January 2005 to September 2009 for claimants with weekly earnings of \$540 to \$771 (those not exposed to the reform) and for claimants with weekly earnings of \$772 to \$2,000 (those exposed to the reform, for whom  $\Delta b_{it} > 0$ ) in September 2006 dollars. Each line shows the percent difference in claims for the income group relative to the number of claims for that income group that occurred in September 2006, the month before the reform was implemented.

Figure 4: Impact of Benefit Change on Benefit Duration and Medical Utilization




Notes: Each graph in the figure above displays coefficients on the scaled change-in-benefit measure interacted with time bins that indicate the number of months that the injury occurred relative to the implementation of the reform from separate regressions of Equation (3) along with 95-percent confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors. The interaction for the time period immediately prior to the reform is omitted. The sample contains 63,154 claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's (scaled) change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables.

Figure 5: Timing of Effects on Receipt of Benefits and Medical Care



Notes: The above figure displays the effect of the reform on claimants' receipt of income benefits and medical care for each two-week period since the injury occurred. We estimate separate regressions of the effect of the reform on the receipt of income benefits and medical care for each two-week period relative to the start of the injury. To calculate time since injury, we use the first day of medical treatment as a measure of the injury date because only injury month and year are reported in the income benefit data. The graphs above plot each estimate of the coefficient on the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit measure interacted with a post-reform indicator variable. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's (scaled) change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, a full vector of age indicator variables, and fixed effects for the calendar date of the two-week bin. Each regression has 63,154 observations, one for each claim that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007.

Figure 6: Medical Utilization and Income Benefit Termination



Notes: The above figure illustrates the relationship between the end of income benefits and the amount of medical care claimants receive. The data set consists of separate observations for each claimant for each week relative to the end of income benefits for 6 weeks before income benefits end until 26 weeks after income benefits end. The sample contains 2,067,851 observations from the 63,154 claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. The dependent variables are normalized utilization measures for a claimant in a given week, where this measure is the claimant's utilization in the indicated week scaled by the mean utilization across claimants during the week just prior to income benefit completion (week 0). Each regression includes claim fixed effects. Each graph displays coefficients on indicator variables for the number of weeks relative to when the claimant stopped receiving income benefits along with 95-percent confidence intervals calculated using standard errors clustered at the individual level.

Table 1: Comparison of Injured Workers in Texas and All States

	Texas	All States	Texas High Earners	All States High Earners
Age	44.2	45.4	45.2	44.6
% Male	64.5%	61.3%	73.9%	71.1%
% White	81.3%	81.5%	82.5%	84.1%
% Married	58.2%	58.4%	62.8%	67.3%
% Worked last year	73.2%	68.3%	100.0%	100.0%
% Worked full time last year	65.7%	59.0%	97.9%	95.4%
Family income	\$53,957	\$60,919	\$85,475	\$91,827
Individual earnings	\$20,933	\$20,280	\$55,438	\$51,124
Weekly earnings (for weeks worked last year)	\$747	\$755	\$1,512	\$1,338
Industry Last Year (%)				
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing/Hunting	1.3%	2.0%	2.3%	1.2%
Arts/Entertainment/Accommodation/Food Services	3.7%	6.4%	0.7%	3.1%
Finance/Real Estate/Professional Services	14.0%	11.4%	10.2%	9.6%
Health Care/Educational Services	14.8%	17.2%	4.8%	15.6%
Manufacturing	12.9%	17.6%	18.6%	18.1%
Mining/Utilities/Construction	18.5%	14.3%	28.6%	19.3%
Public Administration/Other Services	6.8%	6.2%	9.0%	9.9%
Wholesale Trade/Retail Trade/Transportation	28.1%	25.0%	25.7%	23.1%

Notes: This table compares the population of workers' compensation claimants in Texas and the entire United States using data from the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2002-2011 (representing years 2001-2010). The table displays summary statistics for all workers' compensation claimants in Texas (column 1) and in all states (column 2). Columns 3 and 4 display summary statistics focusing on relatively high earners based on prior earnings in Texas and all states, respectively. In this table, high earners are defined as workers who had earnings last year that exceeded \$771 per week (= \$540/0.7) and thus would have been marginal to the initial benefit cap in Texas had they been in our sample. All dollar values are CPI-U adjusted to 2006 dollars.



Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

	All		High Earners		Middle Earners	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Benefit duration	17.96	24.19	17.85	23.99	18.07	24.42
Medical spending (5 years)	12,484	18,464	12,730	18,788	12,213	18,097
Weekly benefit amount	524	83	587	50	455	50
Pre-injury weekly average earnings	863	284	1,065	251	640	69
Replacement rate	0.63	0.10	0.57	0.11	0.70	0.00
$\Delta$ WeeklyBenefit	54.26	60.99	103.57	44.65	0.00	0.00
Age	42.60	11.13	43.62	10.71	41.46	11.48
1{Male}	0.78	0.42	0.80	0.40	0.75	0.43
1{Married}	0.61	0.49	0.63	0.48	0.57	0.49
Impairment Type:						
1{Contusion}	0.05	0.23	0.05	0.22	0.06	0.24
1{Fracture}	0.11	0.31	0.11	0.32	0.11	0.31
1{Laceration}	0.04	0.21	0.04	0.20	0.05	0.22
1{Sprain or Muscle Issue}	0.58	0.49	0.58	0.49	0.57	0.49
1{Other}	0.21	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.21	0.41
1{ED Claim}	0.31	0.46	0.32	0.47	0.30	0.46
1{Permanent Impairment}	0.44	0.50	0.45	0.50	0.42	0.49
Permanent impairment rating (if > 0)	6.29	7.15	6.32	7.43	6.25	6.81

Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics for the 63,154 claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 that meet the sample restrictions described in Section 2. Descriptive stats are shown for baseline sample (“All”) which includes injured workers with prior earnings between \$540 to \$2,000. These statistics are also shown by subgroup for those with prior weekly earnings above or below the point where the initial cap binds (at a weekly wage of \$771), denoted above as “High Earners” and “Middle Earners” respectively.

Table 3: Impact of Benefit Change on Weekly Benefit Rate

Panel A: Weekly Benefit Rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta \text{wkBenefit} \times \text{Post}$	0.925 (0.006) [<0.001]	0.927 (0.005) [<0.001]	0.922 (0.006) [<0.001]	0.002 (0.000) [<0.001]	0.938 (0.011) [<0.001]
Sample Restriction					ED Claims
Controls					
Time and $\Delta \text{wkBenefit}$ Controls	x	x	x	x	x
Basic Controls	x		x	x	x
Expanded Controls			x		
Dep Var	Level	Level	Level	Nat. Log	Level
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	554	554	554	554	553
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	19,765
Panel B: Weekly Benefit Rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta \text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$	0.159 (0.001) [<0.001]	0.159 (0.001) [<0.001]	0.158 (0.001) [<0.001]	94.784 (0.620) [<0.001]	0.161 (0.002) [<0.001]
Sample Restriction					ED Claims
Controls					
Time and $\Delta \text{wkBenefit}$ Controls	x	x	x	x	x
Basic Controls	x		x	x	x
Expanded Controls			x		
Dep Var	Nat. Log	Nat. Log	Nat. Log	Level	Nat. Log
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	554	554	554	554	553
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	19,765

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the change-in-benefit or the scaled change-in-benefit measure (as indicated above) interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) with the weekly benefit rate as the dependent variable. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. All regressions include injury year-month fixed effects and the claimant's (scaled) change-in-benefit. In addition to these controls, regressions in columns 1 and 3-5 also include the following controls: county by injury year-month fixed effects, a male indicator variable, a full vector of age indicator variables, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, and fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care. The regressions in column 3 also include insurer fixed effects and controls for injury type. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table 4: Claimant Composition: Balance on Observable Characteristics

	$\Delta \text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$			Mean Dep Var (4)
	Coef (1)	Std Err (2)	P-value (3)	
Age	-0.233	(0.162)	[0.151]	43.57
Male	0.003	(0.006)	[0.585]	0.80
ED Claim	-0.008	(0.007)	[0.230]	0.30
Married	0.010	(0.008)	[0.200]	0.63
Impairment Type:				
Contusion	0.003	(0.003)	[0.380]	0.049
Fracture	-0.004	(0.005)	[0.375]	0.104
Laceration	-0.002	(0.003)	[0.492]	0.038
Muscle Issue	-0.002	(0.007)	[0.791]	0.343
Sprain	0.010	(0.007)	[0.124]	0.249
Log(First Day Medical Spending)	-0.002	(0.019)	[0.928]	5.930
Industry: More Dangerous	0.009	(0.007)	[0.198]	0.583
Predicted Log(Benefit Duration)	0.002	(0.002)	[0.321]	1.997
Predicted Log(Five Year Medical Spending)	0.005	(0.005)	[0.274]	8.591

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit measure interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) that control for county by injury year-month fixed effects and the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit. Each row represents a separate regression with the dependent variable as indicated in the table. Column 1 displays the coefficient estimates, column 2 displays robust standard errors, column 3 displays p-values, and column 4 displays the mean of the dependent variable. In each specification, the sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 that have non-missing values for the given dependent variable.

Table 5: Impact of Benefit Change on Benefit Duration

	Benefit Duration				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta \text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$	0.107 (0.022) [<0.001]	0.096 (0.021) [<0.001]	0.098 (0.021) [<0.001]	1.961 (0.356) [<0.001]	0.122 (0.042) [0.003]
Sample Restriction					ED Claims
Controls					
Time and $\Delta \text{wkBenefit}$ Controls	x	x	x	x	x
Basic Controls	x		x	x	x
Expanded Controls			x		
Dep Var	Nat. Log	Nat. Log	Nat. Log	Level	Nat. Log
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	17.81	17.81	17.81	17.81	17.92
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	19,765

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) with the income benefit duration as the dependent variable. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. All regressions include injury year-month fixed effects and the claimant's (scaled) change-in-benefit. In addition to these controls, regressions in columns 1 and 3-5 also include the following controls: county by injury year-month fixed effects, a male indicator variable, a full vector of age indicator variables, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, and fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care. The regression in column 3 also includes insurer fixed effects and controls for injury type. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table 6: Instrumental Variables Specifications for Primary Outcomes

	ln(Ben Duration) (1)	ln(Med Spending) (2)	ln(Num Med Bills) (3)	Ben Duration (4)	Med Spending (5)	Num of Med Bills (6)
ln(Weekly Benefit)	0.675 (0.139) [<0.001]	0.627 (0.129) [<0.001]	0.504 (0.109) [<0.001]			
Weekly Benefit				0.021 (0.004) [<0.001]	12.857 (2.865) [<0.001]	0.035 (0.009) [<0.001]
Controls						
Time and ΔwkBenefit Controls	x	x	x	x	x	x
Basic Controls	x	x	x	x	x	x
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	17.81	12,443	44.17	17.81	12,443	44.17
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154

Notes: This table displays estimates from instrumental variables (IV) specifications for the primary outcomes, using the baseline sample and baseline set of controls. The instrument for the weekly benefit rate (in logs and levels) is the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule. The IV estimates in columns 1 through 3 display elasticities for the primary outcomes with respect to the weekly benefit rate; IV estimates in columns 4 through 6 display the derivative for the primary outcomes with respect to the weekly benefit rate. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.



Table 7: Impact of Benefit Change on Medical Spending

Panel A: Medical Spending (cumulative in five years since injury)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta\text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$	0.100 (0.020) [<0.001]	0.077 (0.020) [<0.001]	0.099 (0.020) [<0.001]	1218.666 (271.419) [<0.001]	0.092 (0.036) [0.011]
Sample Restriction					ED Claims
Controls					
Time and $\Delta\text{wkBenefit}$ Controls	x	x	x	x	x
Basic Controls	x		x	x	x
Expanded Controls			x		
Dep Var	Nat. Log	Nat. Log	Nat. Log	Level	Nat. Log
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	12,443	12,443	12,443	12,443	14,439
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	19,765
Panel B: Number of Bills (cumulative in five years since injury)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\Delta\text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$	0.080 (0.017) [<0.001]	0.066 (0.016) [<0.001]	0.081 (0.017) [<0.001]	3.335 (0.900) [<0.001]	0.071 (0.031) [0.021]
Sample Restriction					ED Claims
Controls					
Time and $\Delta\text{wkBenefit}$ Controls	x	x	x	x	x
Basic Controls	x		x	x	x
Expanded Controls			x		
Dep Var	Nat. Log	Nat. Log	Nat. Log	Level	Nat. Log
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	44.17	44.17	44.17	44.17	45.67
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	19,765

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) with the five-year medical spending or five-year paid medical bills as the dependent variable. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. All regressions include injury year-month fixed effects and the claimant's (scaled) change-in-benefit. In addition to these controls, regressions in columns 1 and 3-5 also include the following controls: county by injury year-month fixed effects, a male indicator variable, a full vector of age indicator variables, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, and fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care. The regressions in column 3 also include insurer fixed effects and controls for injury type. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table 8: Impact of Benefit Change on Categories of Medical Spending

	Panel A: Dependent Variable: Inv Hyp Sine (Measure)							
	Total	Office Visits		Case Management		Physical Therapy		
	Spending (\$)	Bills (#)	Spending (\$)	Bills (#)	Spending (\$)	Bills (#)	Spending (\$)	Bills (#)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta$ wkBenefit_scaled x Post	0.100 (0.020) [<0.001]	0.080 (0.017) [<0.001]	0.118 (0.029) [<0.001]	0.081 (0.017) [<0.001]	0.182 (0.039) [<0.001]	0.095 (0.018) [<0.001]	0.221 (0.054) [<0.001]	0.144 (0.029) [<0.001]
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	12,443	44.17	788	10.66	1,136	9.62	1,390	28.03
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154
	Panel B: Dependent Variable: Inv Hyp Sine (Measure)							
	Prescription Drugs	Surgeries		Emergency Visits		Diagnostic Radiology		
	Spending (\$)	Bills (#)	Spending (\$)	Bills (#)	Spending (\$)	Bills (#)	Spending (\$)	Bills (#)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta$ wkBenefit_scaled x Post	0.170 (0.048) [<0.001]	0.076 (0.024) [0.001]	0.060 (0.052) [0.245]	0.019 (0.010) [0.069]	0.030 (0.036) [0.398]	0.010 (0.008) [0.208]	0.111 (0.040) [0.005]	0.048 (0.016) [0.003]
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	1,036	12.91	354	0.83	1,141.00	1.06	763.70	6.28
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) for different categories of medical care. In odd columns, dependent variables are the inverse hyperbolic sine of five-year medical spending for the indicated category. In even columns, dependent variables are the inverse hyperbolic sine of five-year number of bills for the indicated category. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table 9: Additional Robustness

	$\Delta \text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$			Pre-mean	N
	coef	std error	p-value	dep var	
Baseline					
Benefit Duration	0.107	(0.022)	[<0.001]	17.81	63,154
Medical Spending	0.100	(0.020)	[<0.001]	12,443	63,154
Restrict Sample to Prior Wage in [540, 1500]					
Benefit Duration	0.096	(0.023)	[<0.001]	17.80	60,544
Medical Spending	0.089	(0.021)	[<0.001]	12,410	60,544
Restrict Sample to Prior Wage in [540, 1000]					
Benefit Duration	0.103	(0.038)	[0.007]	18.36	45,994
Medical Spending	0.098	(0.035)	[0.005]	12,589	45,994
Restrict Sample to Prior Wage in [675, 2000]					
Benefit Duration	0.078	(0.028)	[0.005]	17.81	44,155
Medical Spending	0.060	(0.026)	[0.020]	12,413	44,155
Restrict Sample to Prior Wage in [400, 2000]					
Benefit Duration	0.089	(0.020)	[<0.001]	17.81	89,613
Medical Spending	0.103	(0.018)	[<0.001]	12,413	89,613
Indicator Variable for Treatment					
Benefit Duration	0.118	(0.026)	[<0.001]	17.81	63,154
Medical Spending	0.107	(0.024)	[<0.001]	12,443	63,154
Re-Weighting Based on Demographics					
Benefit Duration	0.109	(0.022)	[<0.001]	17.68	63,154
Medical Spending	0.105	(0.021)	[<0.001]	12,321	63,154
Additional Controls: Insurer X Time Fixed Effect					
Benefit Duration	0.092	(0.024)	[<0.001]	17.81	63,154
Medical Spending	0.092	(0.022)	[<0.001]	12,443	63,154

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) with the natural logarithm of benefit duration or five-year medical spending as the dependent variable. Column 1 displays the dependent variable, column 2 displays the coefficient estimates, column 3 displays robust standard errors, column 4 displays p-values, and column 5 displays the mean of the dependent variable. The baseline sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables.

Table 10: Heterogeneity in Impacts by Claimant Characteristics

	Panel A: Dependent Variable: Ln (Measure)							
	Age				Impairment Type			
	Age ≥ 40		Age < 40		Sprains and Muscle Issues		Other Injuries	
	Ben Duration (1)	Med Spending (2)	Ben Duration (3)	Med Spending (4)	Ben Duration (5)	Med Spending (6)	Ben Duration (7)	Med Spending (8)
ΔwkBenefit_scaled x Post	0.117 (0.029) [<0.001]	0.111 (0.026) [<0.001]	0.089 (0.038) [0.018]	0.087 (0.035) [0.013]	0.107 (0.028) [<0.001]	0.118 (0.026) [<0.001]	0.072 (0.039) [0.067]	0.031 (0.037) [0.404]
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	18.35	13,167	16.86	11,184	18.83	12,641	15.86	12,114
N	37,671	37,671	25,483	25,483	40,763	40,763	21,417	21,417
	Panel B: Dependent Variable: Ln (Measure)							
	Industry				Sex			
	More Dangerous		Less Dangerous		Male		Female	
	Ben Duration (1)	Med Spending (2)	Ben Duration (3)	Med Spending (4)	Ben Duration (5)	Med Spending (6)	Ben Duration (7)	Med Spending (8)
ΔwkBenefit_scaled x Post	0.105 (0.031) [0.001]	0.093 (0.029) [0.002]	0.137 (0.034) [<0.001]	0.132 (0.031) [<0.001]	0.111 (0.025) [<0.001]	0.083 (0.024) [<0.001]	0.100 (0.051) [0.051]	0.163 (0.046) [<0.001]
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	19.19	12,555	15.88	12,264	17.90	12,537	17.43	12,068
N	33,500	33,500	28,550	28,550	49,164	49,164	13,990	13,990

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) for different categories of claims. In odd columns, dependent variables are the natural log of benefit duration. In even columns, dependent variables are the natural log of five-year medical spending. Each sample includes claims in the indicated category that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables. Claims with missing values for industry and impairment type are not included in either sample when assessing heterogeneity along the respective dimension. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table 11: Marginal Welfare Impact of Increase in Benefit Rate

Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion ( $\gamma$ )	Marginal Welfare Impact of Increase in Benefits, $dW/db \times 0.05b$		
	Baseline Estimates	Baseline Duration Elasticity (ignoring impact on medical spending)	Baseline Medical Spending Elasticity (ignoring impact on income benefit duration)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
1	-\$0.084	-\$0.037	-\$0.040
2	-\$0.078	-\$0.031	-\$0.034
3	-\$0.071	-\$0.024	-\$0.027
4	-\$0.065	-\$0.018	-\$0.021
5	-\$0.058	-\$0.011	-\$0.014
Model Includes Medical Spending	x	x	
Duration Elasticity, $\epsilon_{D,B,b}$	0.68	0.68	0.00
Medical Spending Derivative, $dM/db$	12.86	0.00	12.86

Notes: This table displays the calibrated marginal welfare impact of a balanced budget increase in the weekly benefit level by 5% of the pre-reform level of \$540 per week, representing a \$27 increase in the weekly benefit. The table displays quantities in terms of weekly dollars per capita. As discussed in Section 5, this calibration is based on the approximation in Equation (15) and relies on the relevant behavioral elasticity estimates, additional moments from our data, and an estimate of the mean consumption drop experienced by workers nationally after a work-limiting workplace injury. Each cell represents the calibrated marginal welfare impact in a separate counterfactual. The row indicates the assumed value for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and each column indicates the relevant duration elasticity and medical spending derivative included in the calibration. Column 1 reports calibrations based on our baseline duration and medical spending elasticities. Column 2 reports calibrations based on our duration elasticity estimate but assuming no effect on medical spending. Column 3 reports calibrations based on our medical spending estimate but assuming no effect on the income benefit duration.



Table 12: Marginal Value of Public Funds

Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion ( $\gamma$ )	MVPF		
	Baseline Estimates	Baseline Duration Elasticity (ignoring impact on medical spending)	Baseline Medical Spending Elasticity (ignoring impact on income benefit duration)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
1	0.43	0.59	0.64
2	0.46	0.64	0.70
3	0.50	0.70	0.76
4	0.54	0.75	0.82
5	0.58	0.81	0.87
Duration Elasticity, $\epsilon_{D,B,b}$	0.68	0.68	0.00
Medical Spending Derivative, $dM/db$	12.86	0.00	12.86

Notes: This table displays the calibrated marginal value of public funds. This calibration is based on the approximation in Equation (17) and relies on the relevant behavioral elasticity estimates, additional moments from our data, an estimate of the mean tax-and-transfer rate, and an estimate of the mean consumption drop experienced by workers nationally after a work-limiting workplace injury. Each cell represents the calibrated MVPF in a separate scenario. The row indicates the assumed value for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and each column indicates the relevant duration elasticity and medical spending derivative included in the calibration. Column 1 reports calibrations based on our baseline duration and medical spending elasticities. Column 2 reports calibrations based on our duration elasticity estimate but assuming no effect on medical spending. Column 3 reports calibrations based on our medical spending estimate but assuming no effect on the income benefit duration.

## APPENDIX

### A Coverage Rates

As discussed in Section 2, workers' compensation coverage is optional for Texas employers, while it is mandatory for most employers in other states. Nevertheless, coverage rates in Texas are high: roughly 87% of Texas workers statewide are covered compared to 97.5% of workers nationwide in 2016. Though the Texas workers' compensation system has the peculiar voluntary coverage feature, institutional details and supplementary evidence suggest that this feature is not likely to affect the internal validity of our results. We find no change in the number of claimants or the composition of claimants based on observables with respect to our identifying variation, as discussed in Section 3. Further, we investigate whether there is evidence of a differential change in firm coverage rates for firms employing workers differentially exposed to the reform. For each workers' compensation industry-occupation classification, we calculate the fraction of claimants who are "high earners", those whose pre-injury weekly earnings exceeded the initial maximum benefit, among all workers' compensation claimants. To assess whether more exposed classifications saw a differential change in coverage, we estimate a flexible difference-in-differences specification regressing the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of workers' compensation insurance policies initiated in a given month within a classification on interactions of month relative to implementation and an indicator for the top quartile of the fraction high earner distribution of classifications. Figure A1 displays the resulting coefficients with the associated 95% confidence intervals. The figure suggests there is no evidence of a differential change in coverage rates for more exposed classifications. This lack of evidence of a correlated change in coverage rates is in line with our expectations, as we would not expect coverage decisions to adjust in the short-run because policy renewal dates are staggered throughout the calendar year and there are lags in the premium rating windows preventing regulated premiums from adjusting to higher claim costs in the short-run.<sup>1</sup>

### B Permanent Impairment Benefits

As discussed in Section 2, another relevant change in the Texas workers' compensation system that occurred concurrently with the increase to the maximum temporary income benefit rate was an increase in the maximum permanent impairment benefit rate paid for each percentage point of permanent impairment after the completion of temporary income benefits. In principle, unconditional cash transfers received after the completion of the temporary income benefit spell could potentially affect the duration claiming income benefits and medical spending, if individuals are forward-looking and informed of their later eligibility for these unconditional cash benefits. Further, if individuals are sufficiently forward-looking and informed, knowing the effect of an increase in unconditional cash benefits could potentially aid in understanding whether the increase in the income benefit rates affects claimants' behavior by providing claimants increased access to cash (and hence a liquidity effect) rather than through distortions in the marginal incentives to return to work. Since permanent impairment benefit rates are capped at lower levels of pre-injury earnings than income benefits in Texas workers' compensation, our setting allows for separate identification of the effects of both policy parameters because the maximums bind for different parts of the pre-injury income distribution. Below, we provide more background on the change in permanent impairment benefit generosity and present estimates illustrating this change did not appear to impact income benefit duration and medical spending. In addition, we present additional evidence verifying that the increase in permanent impairment benefit generosity does not confound the identification of the effect of income benefits.

Permanent impairment benefits are linear in the severity of the claimant's permanent impairment. The total unconditional cash benefits paid are a function of the claimant's pre-injury earnings ( $w_i$ ) and the percentage point permanently impaired ( $s_i$ ), such that:

$$\text{permanent impairment benefit} = \text{Rate}(w_i) \times s_i. \quad (18)$$

<sup>1</sup>The state regulates all the relative premiums in this market through industry-occupational rating and experience rating. Any differential increase in the costliness of claims for employers with high earning employees would only be reflected in a differential change in premiums with a lag due to the lags built into the rating update algorithms. In setting industry-occupational rates, the state regulator uses historical claims from a five-year window lagged by three years. In determining employer experience rating multipliers, the regulator mandates the use of a three-year window with a 21 month lag.

The rate at which each percentage point of permanent impairment severity is compensated,  $Rate(w_i)$ , is 210% of the claimant's pre-injury weekly average earnings up to a maximum benefit rate. Recall that the main focus of the paper is an increase in the maximum wage replacement benefit rate from \$540 to \$674, a reform impacting workers with pre-injury earnings exceeding \$771 (for whom the initial maximum benefit would have been binding). Coincident with this change in the maximum income benefit rate, there was a change in the maximum permanent impairment benefit rate at a lower level of the pre-injury earnings distribution: the rate increased from \$1,134 to \$1,416, meaning that permanently impaired claimants with pre-injury earnings above \$540 experienced some increase in unconditional cash impairment benefits while claimants with pre-injury earnings above \$675 experienced the full increase in unconditional cash impairment benefits.

Because permanent impairment benefit rates are capped at lower levels of pre-injury earnings than income benefits, our setting allows for separate identification of the effects of both policy parameters. We estimate difference-in-differences specifications investigating the impact of the impairment benefit change focusing on workers with some income benefits and pre-injury earnings between \$375 and \$750, meaning that none of these workers were affected by the increase in the maximum income benefit. We define exposure to the impairment benefit change in a parallel manner as we defined exposure to the income benefit change studied in the main text. In particular, we define the scaled change-in-impairment-benefit variable as:

$$\Delta \text{ImpairmentBenefit}_{it\_scaled} = \frac{\text{Rate}^{new}(w_{it}) - \text{Rate}^{old}(w_{it})}{\frac{1}{|\mathcal{J}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{J}} [\text{Rate}^{new}(w_{it}) - \text{Rate}^{old}(w_{it})]}, \quad (19)$$

where  $\text{Rate}^{new}(w)$  is the impairment rate for an individual with prior wage  $w$  under the new benefit schedule,  $\text{Rate}^{old}(w)$  is the impairment rate for an individual with prior wage  $w$  under the old benefit schedule,  $w_{it}$  is the pre-injury average weekly wage of individual  $i$  injured in month  $t$ , and  $\mathcal{J}$  represents the set of claimants exposed to the impairment rate reform ( $\mathcal{J} \equiv \{i : \text{Rate}^{new}(w_{it}) - \text{Rate}^{old}(w_{it}) > 0\}$ ). Using this exposure measure, we estimate difference-in-differences specifications of the following form:

$$y_{it} = \rho_t + \delta \Delta \text{ImpairmentBenefit}_{it\_scaled} + [\pi \times I_{t \geq t_0} \times \Delta \text{ImpairmentBenefit}_{it\_scaled}] + f(X_{it}) + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (20)$$

Table A1 displays these estimates. Panel A focuses on all claimants with income benefits and pre-injury earnings between \$375 and \$750. For comparison, Panel B focuses on the subset of these claimants who *ex post* had positive impairment benefits and in these specifications we scale the exposure measure by the *ex post* permanent impairment severity rating. Specifications reported in columns 1 and 2 investigate the first stage of this reform, describing the mean effect of the reform on permanent impairment benefits paid in both percent and level terms. Columns 3 through 5 report estimates for specifications investigating whether the impairment benefit reform impacted our outcomes of interest in the main text: income benefit duration, medical spending, and number of medical bills. These estimates suggest there is no detectable impact of the reform on the outcomes of interest in our main analysis. Finally, columns 6 and 7 investigate the impact of the reform on impairment benefit claims, and there is no evidence that the reform affected the incidence or rated severity of permanent impairments.

We note that under some strong (and perhaps unrealistic) assumptions, the results in columns 3 through 5 may be viewed as a test of the importance of liquidity in this setting. To interpret this as a test of liquidity, we would need to assume that claimants anticipate upon injury whether they will be evaluated to have a permanent impairment, claimants can foresee the severity rating that will be assigned to them, and are aware of the payment rate for permanent impairments upon injury (though these benefits will not be paid for quite some time). In practice, permanent impairment severity is not assessed until the income benefit spell is complete, upon a final doctor's evaluation of the claimant's degree of permanent impairment, and there is a reasonable amount of *ex ante* uncertainty in these assessments. To interpret these results as a test of the importance of liquidity, one would also need to assume borrowing constraints are not binding until the completion of income benefit receipt.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, under these fairly strong assumptions, the unconditional cash benefit natural experiment could be informative about liquidity effects.

The results in Table A1 indicate that increasing the unconditional cash payment has no detectable effect

<sup>2</sup>We note that this final assumption is employed within the derivation of the marginal welfare formulas, so this is not an extra assumption from the perspective of the welfare analysis.

on the duration claiming income benefits or medical spending. We note there are a couple of possible ways to interpret these findings. First, it could be that this is a reasonable test of liquidity effects, with these findings suggesting that liquidity effects are not quantitatively important in this setting. In principle, we could use estimates of the liquidity effect as an alternative way to characterize the welfare impact of increasing income benefit generosity following the Chetty (2008) approach. In this context with no detectable liquidity effects, the Chetty (2008) approach would predict there is no consumption-smoothing benefit of additional coverage on the margin. While the implementation of the Chetty (2008) approach with no liquidity effects is somewhat degenerative, intuitively evidence of little or no liquidity effects suggests that the welfare analysis we employ using the “consumption drop” approach in Section 5 may be conservative with respect to the main finding: expanding the generosity of workers’ compensation income benefits would reduce welfare. Second, it could be that the impairment benefit reform is not a reasonable test of liquidity effects because one or more of the required assumptions is not satisfied. We don’t have a strong prior on which of these is a more reasonable interpretation.<sup>3</sup> Our preferred approach to analyze welfare is to use the consumption drop approach, which does not rely on additional strong assumptions needed to interpret the impact of permanent impairment benefits as the impact of liquidity but may be conservative with respect to the main finding in the case that these assumptions are satisfied.

Table A2 presents additional robustness analysis verifying that the increase in permanent impairment benefit generosity does not confound the identification of the main estimates of interest: the effect of income benefits on income benefit duration and medical spending. The first two rows display our baseline estimates for reference. The remaining rows contain alternative specifications which consider different ways to account for the increase in permanent partial impairment benefit rates that permanently impaired claimants in the lower parts of the pre-injury wage distribution receive at the end of their spell of income benefits. First, we restrict the sample to claimants with a prior weekly wage above \$675, which focuses on a sample who received the same increase in the permanent impairment benefit rate. Next, we supplement Equation (4) with a control for the amount of the impairment benefit rate increase that claimants would be eligible for if they have permanent impairments, as well as with a control for this amount interacted with an indicator for the claim occurring on or after October 1, 2006. The next specification excludes anyone from the sample with a permanent impairment. The final specification in Table A2 supplements Equation (4) with a control for the amount of additional benefits that claimants with permanent impairments would receive because of the increase in impairment benefits, as well as a control for this amount interacted with an indicator for the claim occurring on or after October 1, 2006. Regardless of how we treat permanently impaired claimants, our estimates of the effect of income benefits are similar to the baseline estimates.

## C Impact of Income Benefits on Permanent Impairment Benefits

Appendix Table A3 displays estimates of the effect of the temporary income benefit increase on claimants’ permanent impairment severity ratings. For this analysis, we limit the sample to claimants with pre-injury weekly average earnings of at least \$675 so that all claimants in the sample experience the same changes in permanent impairment benefit rates over time from the change in the maximum permanent impairment benefit rate discussed in Section 2 and in Appendix Section B. In column 1 of Appendix Table A3, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one for claimants assessed as having a permanent impairment. In column 2, the dependent variable is claimants’ permanent impairment ratings, which range from 0 for claimants with no permanent impairment to 100 for claimants assessed as being completely unable to work again because of the injury. The estimated impact of the increase in temporary income benefits is statistically indistinguishable from zero across all specifications. Thus, this analysis provides no evidence that the reform-induced increase in income benefit generosity affected the share of claimants assessed as being permanently impaired or claimants’ permanent impairment severity ratings.

<sup>3</sup>We note that the former interpretation—that liquidity effects are not quantitatively important in our setting—is consistent with results from Rennane (2016), who finds no detectable liquidity effects among workers with weekly earnings exceeding \$615 (in 2006 dollars) in the context of small lump-sum payments among Oregon workers’ compensation claimants with short spells lasting two to three weeks. We note that the sample and setting of the Rennane (2016) study have some important differences with our analysis of impairment benefit generosity, as that study focuses on very short duration claims, excludes claimants with any degree of permanent impairment, and interprets estimates under the assumption that borrowing is infeasible.

## D Role of Alternative Sources of Medical Coverage

The primary estimates in the text indicate that the benefit change had a large impact on the medical spending covered under workers' compensation insurance. In this section, we explore whether these estimated effects represent changes in total medical spending or whether there may be complementary changes in medical expenditures paid through other sources (e.g., standard health insurance, self-pay, charity care). Workers' compensation insurance is the first payer for medical spending related to workplace injuries, regardless of income benefit receipt. Thus, all work-related medical spending should be reflected in the workers' compensation claims regardless of other sources of health insurance coverage. Still, some prior studies have documented a relationship between health insurance and workers' compensation coverage, illustrating some cost-shifting of health insurance expenditures towards workers' compensation insurance depending on the generosity in health insurance coverage (e.g., Dillender (2015), Bronchetti and McInerney (2021), Fomenko and Gruber (2019)).<sup>4</sup> We are not aware of any evidence pertaining to the opposite direction of causation—investigating whether workers' compensation coverage generosity impacts standard health insurer expenditures.

It is *ex ante* possible that the increased costs we observe from the reform could be partially offset or exacerbated by costs covered by standard health insurance, if the excess spending within workers' compensation insurance is a complement or substitute for medical spending covered by health insurance. We cannot quantify any such spillovers directly, as there is no comprehensive source of health insurer expenditure data for workers' compensation claimants. However, we explore the plausibility of spillovers with a number of empirical tests described below. Overall, we do not find any evidence for such spillovers, suggesting that the estimated change in workers' compensation medical spending likely reflects changes in aggregate medical utilization among injured workers.

### D.1 Evidence from Unpaid Medical Bills

One potential mechanism for costs to be shifted from workers' compensation to other payers would be for workers' compensation insurers to deny a submitted medical bill, leaving a standard health insurer, patient, or other third party left paying the bill. A common reason for a denial would be if the bill was deemed to be unrelated to the workplace injury, but there are several other possible reasons for a denial (e.g., required documentation was missing, charge exceeded negotiated rate). Our data contain all bills, including both paid and unpaid medical bills. Some unpaid medical bills may represent medical utilization that took place but for which coverage was denied.

If the estimated effects represent a shifting of medical spending to workers' compensation insurance through a change in the bill denial rate, which could occur if workers' compensation insurers are more likely to deny payments for treatment once injured workers have returned to work, we would expect the reform to decrease the share of bills and the share of charges for which workers' compensation insurers deny payment. Table A5 repeats the baseline specification replacing the dependent variable with the inverse hyperbolic sine of the share of bills not paid and the share of charges not paid. The point estimates are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero, indicating that the reform did not lead to a change in the bill denial rate.

### D.2 Evidence from Medical Procedures with Differential Monitoring

Health insurers have several tools to combat cost-shifting among procedures that are likely to involve liability from third parties, including workers' compensation insurance. One type of medical procedure subject to strict utilization review for outside sources of liability is diagnostic radiology, including costly advanced imaging such as MRIs, CT scans, and PET scans. Health insurers often require prior authorization for non-emergency diagnostic imaging. Further, upon receiving a claim for diagnostic imaging, it is common for health insurers to request further information from the patient about whether the imaging was due to an injury/accident, the location of the injury, and other potential liable parties/insurers. Collectively, these strategies to combat cost-shifting for diagnostic radiology suggest that cost-shifting among diagnostic radiology procedures may be more limited than among other types of procedures.

<sup>4</sup>Many have speculated that the increase in workers' compensation claims on Mondays reflects a shifting of uninsured medical expenses for off-the-job injuries to workers' compensation insurance. However, Card and McCall (1996) analyze the "first reports" of injuries filed with the Minnesota Department of Labor and find that employees with a low probability of medical coverage are no more likely to report Monday injuries than others.



If the reform increased medical spending for workers' compensation insurers merely because workers' compensation insurers are less aggressive about cost shifting when injured workers delay returning to work, we would not expect to see effects of the reform on types of procedures that health insurers strictly monitor to combat cost-shifting, since workers' compensation insurers would have been unlikely to have been able to shift the costs of these procedures onto health insurers prior to the reform. Table A5 displays the results for the baseline specification replacing the dependent variable with the number of diagnostic radiology claims or spending on diagnostic radiology, as well as the baseline results for the overall number of claims and overall spending. The estimated impact of the reform is similar for procedures differentially subject to monitoring by health insurers to combat cost-shifting.

### D.3 Robustness of MVPF when Accounting for Potential Externalities on Other Health Care Payers

Because we have no evidence of external impacts of benefit generosity, the baseline normative analysis assumes there are no other external impacts of workers' compensation income benefit generosity. Here, we consider the robustness of the normative findings to relaxing this assumption and assuming that some (or all) of the increase in medical spending from workers' compensation insurance may represent a shifting of costs from other health care payers to workers' compensation insurance. The main finding from the model based on Baily-Chetty—that a marginal increase in generosity would not improve welfare—is not sensitive to the assumption that there are no external impacts associated with the changes in medical spending. Across the range of plausible risk aversion values, we consistently obtain a negative value for the marginal welfare impact when ignoring the effect of benefit generosity on medical spending (see column 2 of Table 11). Note that ignoring the effect of benefit generosity on medical spending is equivalent to thinking about a scenario where the increase in workers' compensation medical spending is entirely explained by cost-shifting from health insurance, where health insurance costs are financed similarly to workers' compensation insurance—through lump sum taxation on workers. Similarly, the estimates in Table 12 column 2 can be interpreted as the implied MVPF in the extreme case where all of the increase in workers' compensation medical spending represents cost-shifting from health insurance with the financing of health insurance borne by the government (in which case the increase in medical spending represents a budget neutral shift in resources). While full cost-shifting is a very extreme—and in our view unrealistic—scenario, we next turn to analyzing the sensitivity of the implied MVPF to incorporating more moderate potential externalities on other health care payers.

Specifically, we consider scenarios where we suppose  $X\%$  (where we vary  $X$ ) of the induced increases in workers' compensation medical spending represent medical utilization that would have occurred in the absence of the reform and that would have been eligible for coverage from other sources of health insurance, where the incidence of other sources of health insurance either falls on the government (e.g., government-reimbursed charity care, public health insurance programs) or falls on other individuals (e.g., other employees, other health care consumers, business owners or shareholders). In these calculations, we assume that health insurance provides coverage of 70% actuarial value (whereas workers' compensation insurance provides full coverage of medical expenses), and we assume other individuals have the same social welfare weights as individuals covered by workers' compensation insurance. When considering scenarios where the incidence of other health care costs falls on the government, we alter the MVPF approximation from Equation (17) as follows,

$$MVPF = \frac{1 + \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c}}{1 + \epsilon_{D_B, b} \left(1 + \frac{D}{D_B} \frac{\tau}{b}\right) + (1 - 0.7X) \frac{1}{D_B} \frac{dM}{db}}. \quad (21)$$

When we instead consider scenarios where the incidence of other health care costs falls on other individuals, we alter the MVPF approximation from Equation (17) as follows,

$$MVPF = \frac{1 + \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c} + 0.7X \frac{1}{D_B} \frac{dM}{db}}{1 + \epsilon_{D_B, b} \left(1 + \frac{D}{D_B} \frac{\tau}{b}\right) + \frac{1}{D_B} \frac{dM}{db}}. \quad (22)$$

Appendix Figure A8 presents robustness analysis. Recall the MVPF under the baseline assumption of no other external impacts is 0.46. In the scenario where 25% of the induced increase in workers' compen-

sation medical spending represents cost-shifting from health insurance, the implied MVPF is 0.51 if the incidence falls on other individuals and 0.49 if the incidence falls on the government. In the more extreme scenario where 50% of the induced increase in workers' compensation medical spending represents cost-shifting from health insurance, the implied MVPF is 0.56 if the incidence falls on other individuals and 0.51 if the incidence falls on the government. Across the range of potential external effects considered, the MVPF ranges from 0.46 to 0.56.

## E Welfare Formulas

### E.1 Derivation of Exact Formula

Below, we describe the derivation of the exact welfare formula. The general strategy and notation draw upon previous work by Chetty (2006) and Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016). First, consider the effect of an incremental increase in the weekly benefit level on the value at time 0 upon workplace injury:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dJ_0}{db} &= (1 - e_0) \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial b} + e_0 \frac{\partial V_0}{\partial b} - \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial b} \left( (1 - e_0) \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial w} + e_0 \frac{\partial V_0}{\partial w} \right) \\ &= (1 - e_0) \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial b} - \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial b} \frac{dJ_0}{dw}.\end{aligned}\quad (23)$$

As defined in text, let  $S_t \equiv \prod_{i=0}^t (1 - e_i)$  represent the probability of being out-of-work on injury at least  $t + 1$  periods, and let  $f_t \equiv \prod_{i=0}^{t-1} (1 - e_i) e_t = S_{t-1} e_t$  represent the probability of being out-of-work on injury for exactly  $t > 0$  periods, where  $f_0 = e_0$ .

Next, consider the effect of an incremental increase in the weekly wage upon return to work on the value at time 0 upon workplace injury:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dJ_0}{dw} &= (1 - e_0) \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial w} + e_0 \frac{\partial V_0}{\partial w} \\ &= \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} f_t (T - t) u'(c_t^W).\end{aligned}\quad (24)$$

The effect of an incremental increase in the weekly benefit level on the value of not returning to work at the beginning of period 0 can be characterized as:

$$\begin{aligned}(1 - e_0) \frac{dU_0}{db} &= \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \prod_{i=0}^t (1 - e_i) u'(c_t^N) \\ &= \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} S_t u'(c_t^N).\end{aligned}\quad (25)$$

Lastly, the effect of a marginal increase in the weekly benefit level on the tax rate can be represented as:

$$\frac{d\tau}{db} = \frac{D_B}{T - D} \left[ 1 + \epsilon_{D_B, b} + \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} + \epsilon_{D, b} \frac{D}{T - D} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B} \right) \right]. \quad (26)$$

Using expressions 23 through 26 above, we can derive the money-metric welfare gain of increasing the generosity of benefits as follows:



$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{dW}{db} &= \frac{\frac{dJ_0}{db}}{\frac{dJ_0}{dw}} \\
&= \frac{(1-e_0)\frac{\partial U_0}{\partial b}}{\frac{dJ_0}{dw}} - \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial b} \\
&= \frac{(1-e_0)\frac{\partial U_0}{\partial b}}{\frac{dJ_0}{dw}} - \frac{D_B}{T-D} \left[ 1 + \epsilon_{D_B,b} + \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} - \epsilon_{D,b} \frac{D}{T-D} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B} \right) \right] \\
&= \frac{D_B}{T-D} \left\{ \frac{\frac{(1-e_0)}{D_B} \frac{\partial U_0}{\partial b} - \frac{1}{T-D} \frac{dJ_0}{dw}}{\frac{1}{T-D} \frac{dJ_0}{dw}} - \left[ \epsilon_{D_B,b} + \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} + \epsilon_{D,b} \frac{D}{T-D} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B} \right) \right] \right\} \\
&= \frac{D_B}{T-D} \left\{ \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \frac{S_t}{D_B} u'(c_t^N) - \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \frac{f_t(T-t)}{T-D} u'(c_t^W)}{\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \frac{f_t(T-t)}{T-D} u'(c_t^W)} - \left[ \epsilon_{D_B,b} + \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} + \epsilon_{D,b} \frac{D}{T-D} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B} \right) \right] \right\} \\
&= \frac{D_B}{T-D} \left\{ \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \mu_t^N u'(c_t^N) - \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \mu_t^W u'(c_t^W)}{\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \mu_t^W u'(c_t^W)} - \left[ \epsilon_{D_B,b} + \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} + \epsilon_{D,b} \frac{D}{T-D} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B} \right) \right] \right\}.
\end{aligned}$$

## E.2 Derivation of Approximate Formula

We approximate the exact formula using approximations outlined in Chetty (2006) and Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016). For convenience, we describe these approximation strategies below in more detail.

To simplify the exact formula, we begin with the term  $\sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \mu_t^N u'(c_t^N)$  and take a second-order Taylor approximation of  $u'$  around  $\bar{c}_N \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \mu_t^N c_t^N$ :

$$u'(c_t^N) \approx u'(\bar{c}_N) + u''(\bar{c}_N)(c_t^N - \bar{c}_N) + \frac{1}{2}(c_t^N - \bar{c}_N)^2.$$

Plugging this into the expression above, we get:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \mu_t^N u'(c_t^N) &\approx u'(\bar{c}_N) \left( 1 + \frac{1}{2} \frac{u'''(\bar{c}_N)}{u''(\bar{c}_N)} \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \mu_t^N (c_t^N - \bar{c}_N)^2 \right) \\
&= u'(\bar{c}_N) \left( 1 + \frac{1}{2} \left( \bar{c}_N \frac{u''(\bar{c}_N)}{u'(\bar{c}_N)} \right) \left( \bar{c}_N \frac{u'''(\bar{c}_N)}{u''(\bar{c}_N)} \right) \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \frac{\mu_t^N (c_t^N - \bar{c}_N)^2}{\bar{c}_N^2} \right) \\
&= u'(\bar{c}_N) \left( 1 + \frac{1}{2} \gamma \rho \phi_N^2 \right),
\end{aligned}$$

where  $\gamma$  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion,  $\rho$  is the coefficient of relative prudence, and  $\phi_N^2 = \sum_{t=0}^{B-1} \frac{\mu_t^N (c_t^N - \bar{c}_N)^2}{\bar{c}_N^2}$  is a measure of the variation in consumption. We can perform analogous Taylor approximation for  $\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \mu_t^W u'(c_t^W)$  around  $\bar{c}_W \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \mu_t^W c_t^W$ .

If  $\rho = 0$ , the exact formula for the marginal welfare impact of a benefit increase is approximated by

$$\frac{dW}{db} \approx \frac{D_B}{T-D} \left[ \frac{u'(\bar{c}_N) - u'(\bar{c}_W)}{u'(\bar{c}_W)} - \left[ \epsilon_{D_B,b} + \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} + \epsilon_{D,b} \frac{D}{T-D} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B} \right) \right] \right].$$

Further, assuming that  $\epsilon_{D_B,b} = \epsilon_{D,b}$  and applying the first-order approximation in Chetty (2006), we obtain the approximate formula in the paper:

$$\frac{dW}{db} \approx \frac{D_B}{D} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c} - \epsilon_{D_B,b} - \epsilon_{D_B,b} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B b} \right) - \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} \right),$$

where  $\theta \equiv \frac{D}{c}$  and  $\frac{\Delta c}{c} \equiv \frac{c_W - c_N}{c_W}$ .

It is straightforward to generalize this formula to the case when  $\rho \neq 0$ . Following the approximation in Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016), we get the following approximate formula if  $\rho \neq 0$ :

$$\frac{dW}{db} \approx \frac{D_B}{D} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( \left[ \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{2} \rho \frac{\Delta c}{c} \right) + 1 \right] F - 1 - \epsilon_{D_B,b} - \epsilon_{D_B,b} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B b} \right) - \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} \right),$$

where  $F \equiv 1 + \frac{1}{2} \gamma \rho \phi_N^2$ . Under the assumption that the coefficient of variation in consumption when not working is zero ( $\phi_N = 0$ ), then we get the following approximation:

$$\frac{dW}{db} \approx \frac{D_B}{D} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( \left[ \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{2} \rho \frac{\Delta c}{c} \right) \right] - \epsilon_{D_B,b} - \epsilon_{D_B,b} \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} \left( 1 + \frac{M}{D_B b} \right) - \frac{dM}{db} \frac{1}{D_B} \right).$$

## F Estimation of the Consumption Drop Among Injured Workers

We estimate the consumption drop among workers who experience a workplace injury using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is the only dataset with information on both consumption and location of injury. This analysis pools data across years 1992 to 2016. In this analysis, all dollar values are adjusted to 2006 values using the CPI-U.

We follow Bronchetti (2012) in our approach to identifying injured workers and measuring food consumption in the HRS data.<sup>5</sup> To identify injured workers, we use a survey question “Do you have any impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of work that you can do?”, focusing on workers who report a work-limiting injury in period  $t$  but not in period  $t - 1$ . We concentrate on impairments that are reported to have been “caused by the nature of [the respondent’s] work” and limit the sample to individuals employed in period  $t - 1$ . Food consumption is measured as the sum of three components: (i) food consumption at home (excluding food stamps), (ii) food consumption away from home (including “take out” food), (iii) the value of food stamps used by the household.

Our strategy uses the change in total food consumption upon workplace injury as a proxy for the change in total consumption. Our focus on a single consumption category (e.g., food) is without loss of generality provided that we use the appropriate risk aversion parameter (e.g., curvature of utility over food) when applying the welfare formula (Chetty, 2006). We measure changes in total food consumption between survey period  $t$  and  $t - 1$  for respondents who experience the onset of work-related injuries and illnesses between survey period  $t$  and  $t - 1$ . We exclude the few observations for which respondents report an increase in food consumption of more than 300 percent.

The HRS is conducted once every two years, and thus the consumption drop will represent the mean consumption drop among workers injured sometime in the last two years who are still impaired. Conceptually, this is very close to the consumption drop term in the marginal welfare impact in Equation (15) which indicates that the survival function should be used to create the weighted-average consumption drop upon workplace injury. Given that the HRS surveys respondents once every two years, it does not allow one to differentiate between workers with relatively short or long out-of-work durations to create a re-weighted mean of the consumption drop experienced by injured workers.

An advantage of our approach to analyzing welfare is that it only requires estimating the mean consumption drop, which is possible to estimate precisely using HRS data. We estimate the following regres-

<sup>5</sup>To the best of our knowledge, Bronchetti (2012) is the only prior study to document the consumption drop experienced by injured workers. Bronchetti (2012) quantifies the drop in consumption experienced by injured workers upon workplace injury and investigates how this drop in consumption varies with the state workers’ compensation wage replacement benefit generosity. Due to data limitations and the low frequency of workplace injuries, the size of the sample used in Bronchetti (2012) is limited to 372 injured workers. Thus, the study provides a relatively precise estimate of the level of the drop in consumption upon workplace injury and a somewhat less precise estimate of the slope—the relationship between the magnitude of this consumption drop and benefit generosity. We estimate the mean level of the consumption drop using HRS data following Bronchetti (2012) in our definition of injured workers and food consumption, but we use a longer analysis period to maximize sample size. A strength of our approach to estimating the marginal welfare impact of increasing the generosity of benefits is that it only requires an estimate of the level of the drop in consumption upon workplace injury, for which we can obtain precise estimates using the HRS data. In contrast, Bronchetti (2012) uses both an estimate of the level of the consumption drop and the more imprecise estimate of the slope of the consumption drop with respect to benefit levels to extrapolate further from the identifying variation to calculate the optimal replacement rate for workers’ compensation benefits, following an approach analogous to that used by Gruber (1997) in the setting of unemployment insurance.

sion to estimate this mean consumption drop:

$$\Delta \log C_{ist} = \theta_0 + \theta_t + \theta_s + \mathbf{X}_{ist}\beta + e_{ist}, \quad (27)$$

where we include state fixed effects ( $\theta_s$ ), year fixed effects ( $\theta_t$ ), and a vector of control variables ( $\mathbf{X}_{ist}$ ) that includes age, household size, change in household size from previous interview, the log of the weekly wage in the previous interview, the log of the weekly workers' compensation benefits the injured worker would be entitled to (based on injury date, state, and prior weekly wage), indicators for the respondent being white, black, Hispanic, male, and married, and indicators for respondent education (having graduated from high school, having some college, and having graduated from college). We de-mean all the right-hand-side variables, so the estimate of  $\theta_0$  can be interpreted as the mean consumption drop among injured workers.

Appendix Table A6 reports the estimates. Each column reports the mean consumption drop from separate regressions, where sample restrictions are as indicated in the columns. Column 1 includes the full sample. Columns 2 and 4 include only respondents with a benefit level within 10 percent of Texas's pre-reform maximum benefit level. Columns 3 and 4 include only respondents whose pre-injury weekly wages are high enough such that they would receive higher benefits from the Texas Texas reform if they lived in Texas.

Table A1: Effect of Permanent Impairment Cash Benefits

	Panel A: Effect of Impairment Rate Increase						
	Impairment Benefit Rate (1)	Total Impairment Benefits (2)	Benefit Duration (3)	Medical Spending (4)	Number of Bills (5)	Impairment Rating (6)	Impairment Benefits > 0 (7)
$\Delta \text{ImpairmentBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$	0.126 (0.001) [<0.001]	411.369 (82.400) [<0.001]	-0.032 (0.022) [0.154]	0.019 (0.020) [0.338]	0.015 (0.017) [0.375]	0.001 (0.017) [0.953]	0.003 (0.007) [0.709]
Dep Var	nat. log	level	nat. log	nat. log	nat. log	inv. hyp. sine	indicator
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	377	3141	18.05	12642	47.06	2.778	0.439
N	61,167	61,167	61,167	61,167	61,167	61,167	61,167
	Panel B: Effect of Impairment Benefit Increase, Scaled by Impairment Severity among Permanently Impaired Claimants						
	Impairment Benefit Rate (1)	Total Impairment Benefits (2)	Benefit Duration (3)	Medical Spending (4)	Number of Bills (5)	Impairment Rating (6)	
$\Delta \text{ImpairmentBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{PIB rating} \times \text{Post}$	0.132 (0.003) [<0.001]	1,124.567 (213.856) [<0.001]	-0.032 (0.041) [0.445]	0.050 (0.031) [0.106]	0.042 (0.029) [0.154]	0.020 (0.031) [0.514]	
Dep Var	nat. log	level	nat. log	nat. log	nat. log	inv. hyp. sine	
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	376.9	7162	28.47	20068	72.98	6.333	
N	25,489	25,489	25,489	25,489	25,489	25,489	

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-impairment-benefit variable (as defined in the Appendix Section B) interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new impairment benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (20) for the indicated dependent variables. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 for claimants with pre-injury weekly wages of \$375 to \$750. Panel A displays the estimates for the full sample and constructs the change-in-impairment-benefit variable based on claimants' pre-injury weekly wages. Panel B displays the estimates for the sample with permanent impairments and constructs the change-in-impairment-benefit variable based on claimants' impairment ratings and pre-injury weekly wages. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's scaled change-in-impairment-benefit variable, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table A2: Further Robustness

	$\Delta \text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$			Pre-mean	N
	coef	std error	p-value	dep var	
Baseline					
Benefit Duration	0.107	(0.022)	[<0.001]	17.81	63,154
Medical Spending	0.100	(0.020)	[<0.001]	12,443	63,154
Additional Control for PIB Reform					
Benefit Duration	0.097	(0.025)	[<0.001]	17.81	63,154
Medical Spending	0.076	(0.024)	[0.001]	12,443	63,154
Restrict Sample to Those without Permanent Impairment					
Benefit Duration	0.080	(0.028)	[0.004]	9.991	35,554
Medical Spending	0.072	(0.027)	[0.007]	7,335	35,554
Additional Control for PIB Reform ( $\Delta \text{ImpairmentBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{PIB rating}$ )					
Benefit Duration	0.113	(0.021)	[<0.001]	17.81	63,154
Medical Spending	0.101	(0.019)	[<0.001]	12,443	63,154

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) with the natural logarithm of benefit duration or five-year medical spending as the dependent variable. Column 1 displays the coefficient estimates, column 2 displays robust standard errors, column 3 displays p-values, and column 4 displays the mean of the dependent variable. The baseline sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables.

Table A3: Effect of Income Benefit Change on Permanent Impairments

	I(Impairment benefits>0) (1)	Impairment Severity (2)	ln(Impairment Severity) (3)
$\Delta$ wkBenefit_scaled x Post	0.004 (0.009) [0.702]	0.039 (0.107) [0.718]	-0.023 (0.031) [0.454]
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	0.448	2.854	6.375
N	44,258	44,258	19,682

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) with permanent impairment measures as the dependent variables. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 with pre-injury weekly wages of \$675 to \$2,000 as discussed in Appendix Section C. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values in brackets.

Table A4: Effect of Benefit Change over Different Horizons

Panel A: Dependent Variable: Inv Hyp Sine (Weeks Receiving Income Benefits)								
	0-3 months (1)	4-6 months (2)	7-12 months (3)	13-18 months (4)	19-24 months (5)	25-36 months (6)	37-48 months (7)	49-60 months (8)
$\Delta \text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$	0.052 (0.017) [0.003]	0.075 (0.021) [<0.001]	0.100 (0.022) [<0.001]	0.066 (0.016) [<0.001]	0.043 (0.012) [<0.001]	0.010 (0.005) [0.038]	0.003 (0.002) [0.053]	0.000 (0.001) [0.633]
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	6.05	3.76	4.23	2.02	1.08	0.13	0.01	0.01
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Inv Hyp Sine (Number of Bills)								
	0-3 months (1)	4-6 months (2)	7-12 months (3)	13-18 months (4)	19-24 months (5)	25-36 months (6)	37-48 months (7)	49-60 months (8)
$\Delta \text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$	0.035 (0.013) [0.006]	0.098 (0.022) [<0.001]	0.099 (0.024) [<0.001]	0.077 (0.021) [<0.001]	0.064 (0.018) [<0.001]	0.037 (0.017) [0.035]	0.022 (0.014) [0.118]	0.009 (0.012) [0.455]
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	16.71	6.97	8.09	4.31	2.87	3.19	1.93	1.45
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154
Panel C: Dependent Variable: Inv Hyp Sine (Medical Spending)								
	0-3 months (1)	4-6 months (2)	7-12 months (3)	13-18 months (4)	19-24 months (5)	25-36 months (6)	37-48 months (7)	49-60 months (8)
$\Delta \text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$	0.052 (0.019) [0.007]	0.236 (0.057) [<0.001]	0.210 (0.061) [0.001]	0.172 (0.054) [0.001]	0.199 (0.047) [<0.001]	0.123 (0.043) [0.004]	0.065 (0.034) [0.055]	0.026 (0.029) [0.373]
Pre-Mean Dep Var, Levels	5285	1960	2264	1149	771	840	496	388
N	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154	63,154

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) for the indicated dependent variables. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.



Table A5: Alternative Sources of Medical Coverage

	$\Delta \text{wkBenefit\_scaled} \times \text{Post}$			Pre-mean dep	N
	coef	std error	p-value	var	
Unpaid Bills					
Share of Bills Not Paid	0.000	(0.002)	[0.873]	0.117	63,154
Share of Charges Not Paid	-0.002	(0.004)	[0.543]	0.480	63,153
Differential Monitoring of Procedures					
All Medical Care					
Number of Bills	0.080	(0.017)	[<0.001]	44.17	63,154
Spending	0.100	(0.020)	[<0.001]	12443	63,154
Diagnostic Radiology					
Number of Bills	0.048	(0.016)	[0.003]	6.279	63,154
Spending	0.111	(0.040)	[0.005]	763.7	63,154

Notes: This table displays estimates of the coefficient on the scaled change-in-benefit variable interacted with an indicator that the injury occurred after the implementation of the new benefit schedule from regressions of Equation (4) with the dependent variables being the natural logarithm or inverse hyperbolic sine of the indicated variables. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's scaled change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table A6: Estimated Change in Consumption after Workplace Injury

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mean annual consumption drop (in logs) upon workplace injury	-0.101 (0.001) [<0.001]	-0.072 (0.005) [<0.001]	-0.112 (0.002) [<0.001]	-0.080 (0.006) [<0.001]
Individual Controls	x	x	x	x
Year FE	x	x	x	x
State FE	x	x	x	x
Sample Restrictions				
Wages	None	None	High earners	High earners
Weekly Benefit Level (inflation-adjusted)	None	Within 10 Percent of TX baseline level	None	Within 10 Percent of TX baseline level
N	763	88	230	77

Notes: This table displays estimates of the mean change in food consumption after workplace injury from regressions of Equation (27). The baseline sample includes HRS respondents who report having had a workplace injury since their previous interview for the 1994 to 2016 waves of the HRS. Each regression includes the following demeaned controls: state fixed effects, year fixed effects, age, household size, change in household size from previous interview, the log of the weekly wage in the previous period, the log of the weekly workers' compensation benefits the injured worker would be entitled to based on injury date, state, and prior weekly wage, indicators for the respondent being white, black, Hispanic, male, and married, and indicators for the respondent having graduated from high school, having some college, and having graduated from college. Standard errors are clustered by state and reported in parentheses and p-values are reported in brackets.

Table A7: Marginal Welfare Impact of Increase in Benefit Rate - Alternative Consumption Drop Estimate

Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion ( $\gamma$ )	Marginal Welfare Impact of Increase in Benefits, $dW/db \times 0.05b$		
	Baseline Estimates	Baseline Duration Elasticity (ignoring impact on medical spending)	Baseline Medical Spending Elasticity (ignoring impact on income benefit duration)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
1	-\$0.084	-\$0.037	-\$0.040
2	-\$0.076	-\$0.030	-\$0.032
3	-\$0.069	-\$0.022	-\$0.025
4	-\$0.062	-\$0.015	-\$0.018
5	-\$0.055	-\$0.008	-\$0.011
Model Includes Medical Spending	x	x	
Duration Elasticity, $\epsilon_{D,B,b}$	0.68	0.68	0.00
Medical Spending Derivative, $dM/db$	12.86	0.00	12.86


Notes: This table displays the calibrated marginal welfare impact of a balanced budget increase in the weekly benefit level by 5% of the pre-reform level of \$540 per week, representing a \$27 increase in the weekly benefit. The table displays quantities in terms of weekly dollars per capita. As discussed in Section 5, this calibration is based on the approximation in Equation (15) and relies on the relevant behavioral elasticity estimates and additional moments from our data. In this calculation, we use an estimate of the mean consumption drop experienced by workers after a work-limiting workplace injury, where we restrict attention to workers in the HRS data that are more comparable to the marginal workers affected by the benefit change we analyze (from Appendix Table A6 column 3). Each cell represents the calibrated marginal welfare impact in a separate counterfactual. The row indicates the assumed value for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and each column indicates the relevant duration elasticity and medical spending derivative included in the calibration. Column 1 reports calibrations based on our baseline duration and medical spending elasticities. Column 2 reports calibrations based on our duration elasticity estimate but assuming no effect on medical spending. Column 3 reports calibrations based on our medical spending estimate but assuming no effect on the income benefit duration.

Table A8: Marginal Welfare Impact of Increase in Benefit Rate - Alternative Approximation with Coefficient of Relative Prudence Equal to  $\gamma + 1$

Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion ( $\gamma$ )	Marginal Welfare Impact of Increase in Benefits, $dW/db \times 0.05b$		
	Baseline Estimates	Baseline Duration Elasticity (ignoring impact on medical spending)	Baseline Medical Spending Elasticity (ignoring impact on income benefit duration)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
1	-\$0.084	-\$0.037	-\$0.040
2	-\$0.076	-\$0.029	-\$0.032
3	-\$0.067	-\$0.020	-\$0.023
4	-\$0.058	-\$0.011	-\$0.014
5	-\$0.048	-\$0.001	-\$0.004
Model Includes Medical Spending	x	x	x
Duration Elasticity, $e_{D,B,b}$	0.68	0.68	0.00
Medical Spending Derivative, $dM/db$	12.86	0.00	12.86


Notes: This table displays the calibrated marginal welfare impact of a balanced budget increase in the weekly benefit level by 5% of the pre-reform level of \$540 per week, representing a \$27 increase in the weekly benefit. The table displays quantities in terms of weekly dollars per capita. This calibration is based on the approximation derived in Appendix Section E where the coefficient of relative prudence is one plus the indicated coefficient of relative risk aversion. This calibration relies on the relevant behavioral elasticity estimates, additional moments from our data, and an estimate of the mean consumption drop experienced by workers nationally after a work-limiting workplace injury. Each cell represents the calibrated marginal welfare impact in a separate counterfactual. The row indicates the assumed value for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and each column indicates the relevant duration elasticity and medical spending derivative included in the calibration. Column 1 reports calibrations based on our baseline duration and medical spending elasticities. Column 2 reports calibrations based on our duration elasticity estimate but assuming no effect on medical spending. Column 3 reports calibrations based on our medical spending estimate but assuming no effect on the income benefit duration.

Figure A1: Exposure to Reform and Coverage Rates




Notes: This figure reports the resulting coefficients and associated 95% confidence intervals from a difference-in-differences specification regressing the number of insurance policies initiated within an industry-occupation classification in a given month on month indicators interacted with an indicator for the top quartile of the distribution of fraction high earners among classifications. In this regression, we normalize the coefficient to zero for the month of September 2006, the month prior to the implementation of the new benefit schedule. Observations are at the classification-month level, and the dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of new policies originated in that month. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry-occupation classification level.

Figure A2: Impact of Benefit Change on Benefit Duration and Medical Utilization, Alternative Instrument (Treatment Indicator,  $\mathbb{1}(\Delta b_{it} > 0)$ )



Notes: Each graph in the figure above displays coefficients on a treatment indicator variable interacted with time bins that indicate the number of months that the injury occurred relative to the implementation of the reform from separate regressions of Equation (3) along with 95-percent confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors. The interaction for the time period immediately prior to the reform is omitted. The sample contains 63,154 claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, an indicator variable for the claimant being a high earner, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables.


Figure A3: Balance on Observables



Notes: Each graph in the figure above displays coefficients on the scaled change-in-benefit measure interacted with time bins that indicate the number of months that the injury occurred relative to the implementation of the reform from separate regressions of Equation (3) along with 95-percent confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors. The interaction for the time period immediately prior to the reform is omitted. The sample includes claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 that have non-missing values for the given dependent variable.




Figure A4: Impact of Benefit Change on Benefit Rate [Expanded Sample]






Notes: Each graph in the figure above displays coefficients on the change-in-benefit or the scaled change-in-benefit measure (as indicated above) interacted with time bins that indicate the number of months that the injury occurred relative to the implementation of the reform from separate regressions of Equation (3) along with 95-percent confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors. The interaction for the time period immediately prior to the reform is omitted. The sample contains 108,859 claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2009 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's (scaled) change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables.

Figure A5: Impact of Benefit Change on Benefit Duration and Medical Utilization [Expanded Sample]




Notes: Each graph in the figure above displays coefficients on the scaled change-in-benefit measure interacted with time bins that indicate the number of months that the injury occurred relative to the implementation of the reform from separate regressions of Equation (3) along with 95-percent confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors. The interaction for the time period immediately prior to the reform is omitted. The sample contains 108,859 claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2009 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text. Each regression includes county by injury year-month fixed effects, an indicator variable equal to one if the claim began in the ED, fixed effects for the day of the week that the claimant first received medical care, the claimant's (scaled) change-in-benefit, a male indicator variable, and a full vector of age indicator variables.

Figure A6: Raw Trends in Benefit Duration and Medical Utilization over Time

(a)  $\ln(\text{Benefit Duration})$ (b)  $\ln(\text{Medical Spending})$ (c)  $\ln(\text{Number of Bills})$ 


Notes: Each graph in the figure above displays monthly means of the indicated variable separately for claimants with weekly earnings of \$540 to \$771 (those not exposed to the reform) and for claimants with weekly earnings of \$772 to \$2,000 (those exposed to the reform, for whom  $\Delta b_{it} > 0$ ) in September 2006 dollars. The sample contains 63,154 claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text.

Figure A7: Impact of Benefit Change on Benefit Duration and Medical Utilization [No Claim-Level Controls]



Notes: Each graph in the figure above displays coefficients on the scaled change-in-benefit measure interacted with time bins that indicate the number of months that the injury occurred relative to the implementation of the reform from separate regressions of Equation (3) along with 95-percent confidence intervals calculated using robust standard errors. The interaction for the time period immediately prior to the reform is omitted. The sample contains 63,154 claims that occurred from January 2005 to September 2007 that meet the sample restrictions described in the text. Each regression includes injury year-month fixed effects and the claimant's (scaled) change-in-benefit.

Figure A8: Marginal Value of Public Funds: Robustness to Accounting for Potential Impacts on External Payers for Health Care



Notes: This figure displays the implied MVPF based on our estimates under the indicated assumptions about the magnitude and incidence of impacts on external payers for health care. See Appendix Section D for details on these calculations. The first bar displays the baseline estimates for reference where we assume there are no external impacts. For reference the figure indicates the average implied MVPFs for unemployment insurance and disability insurance, as calculated in Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020).