ABSTRACT

A representative investor does not know which member of a set of well-defined parametric "structured models" is best. The investor also suspects that all of the structured models are misspecified. These uncertainties about probability distributions of risks give rise to components of equilibrium prices that differ from the risk prices widely used in asset pricing theory. A quantitative example highlights a representative investor's uncertainties about the size and persistence of macroeconomic growth rates. Our model of preferences under ambiguity puts nonlinearities into marginal valuations that induce time variations in market prices of uncertainty. These arise because the representative investor especially fears high persistence of low growth rate states and low persistence of high growth rate states.
1 Introduction

This paper describes prices of macroeconomic uncertainty that emerge from how investors evaluate consequences of alternative specifications of state dynamics. Movements in these uncertainty prices induce variations in asset values. We construct a quantitative example in which uncertainty about macroeconomic growth rates plays a central role. Adverse consequences for discounted expected utilities make a representative investor fear macroeconomic growth rate persistence in times of weak growth and absence of growth rate persistence in times of strong growth.

To construct uncertainty prices, we posit a stand-in investor who has a family of structured models with either fixed or time-varying parameters that we represent with a recursive structure suggested by Chen and Epstein (2002) for continuous time models with Brownian motion information flows. Because the investor distrusts all of his structured models, he adds unstructured nonparametric models that reside within statistical neighborhoods of them. To represent the investor’s concerns about such unstructured statistical models, we use preferences proposed by Hansen and Sargent (2019), a continuous-time version of the dynamic variational preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006a).

The representative investor in our quantitative example impersonates “the market” and is uncertain about prospective macroeconomic growth rates. Shadow prices that isolate aspects of model specifications that most concern a representative investor equal uncertainty prices that clear competitive security markets. Multiplying an endogenously determined vector of worst-case drift distortions by minus one gives a vector of local prices that are increments to expected returns associated with exposures to alternative shocks over an instant of time that compensate the representative investor for bearing model uncertainty.

The representative investor’s concerns about the persistence of macroeconomic growth rates make uncertainty prices depend on the state of the economy and therefore vary over time. These findings extend earlier quantitative results that had indicated that investors’ responses to modest amounts of model ambiguity can substitute for the implausibly large risk aversions during economic downturns that are required to explain observed market

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1 By “structured” we mean more or less tightly parameterized statistical models. Thus, “structured models” aren’t what econometricians working in the tradition either of the Cowles commission or of rational expectations econometrics would call “structural” models.


3 This object also played a central role in the analysis of Hansen and Sargent (2010).
prices of risk.

Section 2 specifies an investor’s baseline probability model and perturbations to it, both cast in continuous time for analytical convenience. To create a set of structured models, the representative investor uses a set of positive, mean one martingales as alterations to a baseline model. She uses other positive, mean one martingales as perturbations to those structured models to express her suspicion that all of her structured models are misspecified. Section 3 describes discounted relative entropy, a statistical measure of discrepancy between martingales, and uses it to construct a convex set of probability measures that interest the investor. A martingale representation proves to be a tractable way for us to formulate a robust decision problem in section 4.

Section 5 describes and compares relative entropy and Chernoff entropy, each of which measures statistical divergence from a set of martingales. We show how to use these measures 1) to assess plausibility of worst-case models as recommended by Good (1952), and 2) to calibrate a penalty parameter that we use to represent the investor’s preferences. By extending the approach of Hansen et al. (2008), section 6 calculates key objects in a quantitative version of a baseline model together with worst-case probabilities associated with a convex set of alternative models that concern both a robust investor and a robust planner. Section 7 constructs a recursive representation of a competitive equilibrium of an economy with a representative robust investor. Then it links worst-case probabilities that emerge from a robust planning problem to equilibrium uncertainty compensations that the representative investor receives in competitive equilibrium. Section 8 offers concluding remarks.

2 Martingales and probabilities

Martingales play an important role in a large literature on pricing derivative claims. They play a different role in this paper. This section describes convenient mathematical representations of nonnegative martingales that alter a baseline probability model. Following Hansen and Sargent (2019), section 3 constructs a set of martingales that determine a set of structured models that interest a decision maker. We describe additional martingales that generate statistically nearby unstructured models that concern a decision maker who fears that all of the structured models are misspecified.

For concreteness, we use the following baseline model of a stochastic process $Z = \{Z_t :
that governs the exogenous dynamics \[^4\]
\[
dZ_t = \hat{\mu}(Z_t)dt + \sigma(Z_t)dW_t, \tag{1}
\]
where \(W\) is a multivariate standard Brownian motion \[^4\] We will also have cause to introduce endogenous state dynamics that can be altered by the actions of a fictitious planner. With this in mind, a \textit{plan} is a \(\{C_t : t \geq 0\}\) that is a progressively measurable process with respect to the filtration \(\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_t : t \geq 0\}\) associated with the Brownian motion \(W\) augmented by information available at date zero. The date \(t\) component \(C_t\) is measurable with respect to \(\mathcal{F}_t\).

A decision maker who does not fully trust baseline model \(^{[1]}\) explores utility consequences of plans under alternative probability models that she obtains by multiplying probabilities associated with \(^{[1]}\) by likelihood ratios depicted as positive martingales with unit expectations. Following an extensive literature in probability theory, we represent a likelihood ratio by a positive martingale \(M^U\) with respect to the baseline Brownian motion specification

\[
dM^U_t = M^U_t U_t \cdot dW_t \tag{2}
\]

or

\[
d\log M^U_t = U_t \cdot dW_t - \frac{1}{2}|U_t|^2dt, \tag{3}
\]

where \(U\) is progressively measurable with respect to the filtration \(\mathcal{F}\). In the event that

\[
\int_0^t |U_\tau|^2d\tau < \infty \tag{4}
\]

with probability one, the stochastic integral \(\int_0^t U_\tau \cdot dW_\tau\) is an appropriate probability limit. Imposing the initial condition \(M_0^U = 1\), we express the solution of stochastic differential equation \(\tag{2}\) as the stochastic exponential

\[
M^U_t = \exp \left(\int_0^t U_\tau \cdot dW_\tau - \frac{1}{2} \int_0^t |U_\tau|^2d\tau\right). \tag{5}
\]

\[^4\] We let \(Z\) denote a stochastic process, \(Z_t\) the process at time \(t\), and \(z\) a realized value of the process.
\[^5\] Although applications typically use a Markov formulation, this restriction is not essential. Our formulation could be generalized to allow other stochastic processes constructed as functions of a Brownian motion information structure.
As specified so far, $M_t^U$ is a local martingale, but not necessarily a martingale.\footnote{It is inconvenient here to impose sufficient conditions for the stochastic exponential to be a martingale like Kazamaki’s or Novikov’s. Instead, we will verify that an extremum of a pertinent optimization problem does indeed result in a martingale.}

**Definition 2.1.** $\mathcal{M}$ denotes the set of all martingales $M^U$ constructed as stochastic exponentials via representation (5) with a $U$ that satisfies (4) and is progressively measurable with respect to $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_t : t \geq 0\}$.

Associated with $U$ are probabilities defined by the conditional mathematical expectations

$$E^U [B_t | \mathcal{F}_0] = E \left[ M_t^U B_t | \mathcal{F}_0 \right]$$

for any $t \geq 0$ and any bounded $\mathcal{F}_t$-measurable random variable $B_t$, so the positive random variable $M_t^U$ acts as a Radon-Nikodym derivative for the date $t$ conditional expectation operator $E^U [ \cdot | X_0 ]$.

Under baseline model (1), $W$ is a standard Brownian motion, but under the alternative $U$ model, it has increments

$$dW_t = U_t dt + dW_t^U,$$

where $W^U$ is now a standard Brownian motion. Furthermore, under the $M^U$ probability measure, $\int_0^t |U_\tau|^2 d\tau$ is finite with probability one for each $t$. In light of (6), we can write model (1) as:

$$dZ_t = \hat{\mu}(Z_t) dt + \sigma(Z_t) \cdot U_t dt + \sigma(Z_t) dW_t^U.$$

While (3) expresses the evolution of log $M^U$ in terms of increment $dW$, the evolution in terms of $dW^U$ is

$$d \log M_t^U = U_t \cdot dW_t^U - \frac{1}{2} |U_t|^2 dt.$$

## 3 Measuring statistical discrepancies

We use a log-likelihood ratio to construct entropy relative to a probability specification affiliated with a martingale $M^S$ generated by a drift distortion process $S$. Rather than using a log likelihood ratio $\log M_t^U$ with respect to the baseline model, we use a log likelihood ratio $\log M_t^U - \log M_t^S$ with respect to the structured $M_t^S$ model to arrive at:

$$E \left[ M_t^U \left( \log M_t^U - \log M_t^S \right) | \mathcal{F}_0 \right] = \frac{1}{2} E \left( \int_0^t |M_t^U U_\tau - S_\tau|^2 d\tau | \mathcal{F}_0 \right).$$
When the following limits exist, a notion of relative entropy appropriate for stochastic processes is:

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} E \left[ M_t^U \left( \log M_t^U - \log M_t^S \right) \mid \mathcal{F}_0 \right] = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{2t} E \left( \int_0^t M_t^U |U_\tau - S_\tau|^2 d\tau \mid \mathcal{F}_0 \right)$$

$$= \lim_{\delta \to 0} \frac{\delta}{2} E \left( \int_0^\infty \exp(-\delta \tau) M^U_t |U_\tau - S_\tau|^2 d\tau \mid \mathcal{F}_0 \right).$$

The second line is a limit of exponentially weighted averages (Abel averages), where scaling by the positive discount rate $\delta$ makes the weights $\delta \exp(-\delta \tau)$ integrate to one. To assess model misspecification, instead of undiscounted relative entropy, we shall use Abel averages with a discount rate equal to the subjective rate that the decision maker uses to discount future expected utility flows. We define a discrepancy between two martingales $M^U$ and $M^S$ as:

$$\Delta(M^U; M^S \mid \mathcal{F}_0) = \frac{\delta}{2} \int_0^\infty \exp(-\delta t) E \left( M_t^U \mid U_t - S_t \right)^2 \mid \mathcal{F}_0 \right) dt.$$ 

We start from a convex set of structured models that we represent as martingales $M^S \in \mathcal{M}^o$ with respect to a single structured baseline model. In subsection 3.1, we use undiscounted entropy relative to the baseline model to constrain the set $\mathcal{M}^o$. Structured models in $\mathcal{M}^o$ are well articulated alternatives to the baseline model that are of particular interest to a decision maker. The decision maker is also interested in poorly articulated unstructured models that are statistically similar to these structured models. For a real number $\theta > 0$, define a scaled discrepancy of martingale $M^U$ from a set of martingales $\mathcal{M}^o$ as:

$$\Theta(M^U \mid \mathcal{F}_0) = \theta \inf_{M^S \in \mathcal{M}^o} \Delta(M^U; M^S \mid \mathcal{F}_0).$$

Scaled discrepancy $\Theta(M^U \mid \mathcal{F}_0)$ equals zero for $M^U$ in $\mathcal{M}^o$ and is positive for $M^U$ not in $\mathcal{M}^o$. We use discrepancy $\Theta(M^U \mid \mathcal{F}_0)$ to define a set of unstructured models that are near the set $\mathcal{M}^o$; our decision maker wants to know utility consequences of these nearby models too. The scaling parameter $\theta$ measures how an expected utility maximizing decision maker penalizes an expected utility minimizing agent for distorting probabilities relative to models in $\mathcal{M}^o$. 

5
3.1 A family $M^o$ of structured models

We construct a family of structured probabilities by forming a set of martingales $M^S$ with respect to a baseline probability associated with model (1). Formally,

$$M^o = \{ M^S \in M \text{ such that } S_t \in \Xi_t \text{ for all } t \geq 0 \} \quad (9)$$

where $\Xi$ is a process of convex sets adapted to the filtration $\mathcal{F}$. [Chen and Epstein (2002)] also used an instant-by-instant constraint on $S_t$ like (9) to construct a set of probability models. A consequence of forming a set of structured models according to formula (9) is that the associated set of probabilities is rectangular in the sense of [Epstein and Schneider (2003)] so that a dynamic version of a [Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)] max-min decision maker using this as the set of probabilities would have preferences over plans that are dynamically consistent.

As we show below, in continuous time we can achieve a rectangular specification by restricting the time derivative of the conditional expectation of relative entropy. The key idea is to note that restricting a derivative of a function at every instant can be far more constraining than restricting the magnitude of the function obtained by integrating the derivative. For us, the pertinent function is conditional relative entropy. We find an instant-by-instant restriction on the derivative of conditional relative entropy to be an attractive way of constructing a set (9) of what we call structured models. But it is too constraining when we also want to consider potential misspecifications of those structured models. It is relative entropy itself (and not a local counterpart) that provides a statistical discrepancy measure suitable for exploring misspecifications of the structured models. But using relative entropy to restrict it causes us in the end to work with a set of unstructured models that is not rectangular. The reason is that, as [Hansen and Sargent (2019)] show formally, embedding relative entropy neighborhoods into a larger rectangular set of probabilities essentially compels a decision maker to entertain any alternative probability that is represented as a positive martingale with unit expectation. To avoid this extreme outcome, we move beyond max-min preference specifications of [Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)] and [Epstein and Schneider (2003)]. Instead we use a version of the more general dynamic variational preferences of [Maccheroni et al. (2006b)] that accommodate a recursive procedure that penalizes relative entropies of unstructured models.

[Anderson et al. (1998)] also explored consequences of a constraint like (9) but without the state dependence in $\Xi$. Allowing for state dependence is important in the applications featured in this paper.
We form a set of structured models by restricting the drift or local mean of relative entropy via a Feynman-Kac relation. The (undiscounted) entropy for a stochastic process \( M^S \) relative to the baseline model is:

\[
\varepsilon(M^S) = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{2t} \int_0^t E \left( \frac{M^S_r | S_r |^2}{\mathcal{F}_0} \right) d\tau.
\]

Notice that \( \varepsilon(M^S) \) is the limit as \( t \to +\infty \) of a process of mathematical expectations of time series averages

\[
\frac{1}{2t} \int_0^t | S_r |^2 d\tau
\]

under the probability measure implied by \( M^S \). Suppose that \( M^S \) is defined by the drift distortion process \( S = \eta(Z) \), where \( Z \) is an ergodic Markov process with transition probabilities that converge to a unique well-defined stationary distribution \( Q \) under the \( M^S \) probability. In this case, we can use \( Q \) to evaluate relative entropy by computing:

\[
\frac{1}{2} \int | \eta |^2 dQ.
\]

We represent the instantaneous counterpart to the one-period transition distribution for a Markov process in terms of an infinitesimal generator. A generator tells how conditional expectations of the Markov state evolve locally and can be derived informally by differentiating the family of conditional expectation operators with respect to the gap of elapsed time. For a diffusion, the infinitesimal generator \( A^\eta \) of transitions under the \( M^S \) probability is the second-order differential operator:

\[
A^\eta \rho = \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial z} \cdot (\hat{\mu} + \sigma \eta) + \frac{1}{2} \text{trace} \left( \sigma' \frac{\partial^2 \rho}{\partial z \partial z'} \sigma \right)
\]

\[
= A^0 \rho + \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial z} \cdot (\sigma \eta)
\]

for \( S_t = \eta(Z_t) \), where the test function \( \rho \) resides in an appropriately defined domain of the generator \( A \).

Given \( \eta \), to compute relative entropy associated with a process defined by generator \( A^0 \), we solve equation

\[
A^\eta \rho = \frac{q^2}{2} - \frac{|\eta|^2}{2}, \quad (10)
\]

simultaneously for \( q \) and the function \( \rho \). This equation is a special case of a resolvent or
Feynman-Kac equation. Relative entropy \( \varepsilon(M^S) = \frac{q^2}{2} \) and \( q \) is a mean-square measure of the magnitude of the corresponding drift distortion. The function \( \rho \) that satisfies (10) is a long-horizon refinement of relative entropy in the sense that

\[
\rho(z) - \int \rho dQ = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{2} \int_0^t E \left( M^S_t | S_r \right)^2 - q^2 | Z_0 = z, \]

where \( Q \) is the stationary distribution for the probability associated with the \( S_t = \eta(Z_t) \) probability model.

Having described how we compute relative entropy \( \frac{q^2}{2} \) and our refined measure of relative entropy \( \rho(z) \) for a Markov process that governs \( z \), we move on to tell how we restrict a family of potential structured models in terms of their relative entropies \( \varepsilon(M^S) \). In addition to specifying \( \frac{q^2}{2} \), we now also specify \( \rho \) a priori. For reasons discussed in Hansen and Sargent (2019), restricting \( q \) alone is insufficient to allow us to get a set of martingales expressible in the form (9). Therefore, we require that the \( S \) process belong to the sequence of sets that does bring us to a representation of the form (9):

\[
\Xi_t = \left\{ s : A^0 \rho(Z_t) + \hat{\rho} \frac{\partial \rho}{\partial z}(Z_t) \cdot [\sigma(Z_t)s] \leq \frac{q^2}{2} - \frac{|s|^2}{2} \right\} \quad (11)
\]

for a given choice of \((q, \rho)\). The boundary of a set \( \Xi_t \) defined in this way includes models having the same long-horizon relative entropy \( \frac{q^2}{2} \) as well as the same refinement \( \rho(z) - \int \rho dQ \) of relative entropy. However, for a given sequence of sets \( \Xi_t \) defined by (11), there exist many \( S \) processes that have relative entropy \( \varepsilon(M^S) \) less than or equal to \( q \) but that violate the inequality on the right side of definition (11). This is the sense in which, by using the sequence of sets \( \Xi \) defined by equation (11) to form the set of probabilities defined in (9), we are imposing a refinement of the relative entropy constraint: many processes satisfy the relative entropy constraint but violate the rectangularity constraint incorporated in definition (11).

When we solve a robust planner’s problem in section 4.2.2 it will turn out to be convenient that it is easy to characterize the set \( \Xi_t \) because it is a constructed by constraining a quadratic function of \( s \) given \( Z_t \). The set of possible \( s \)’s is a disc with state dependent center \(-\sigma [\frac{\partial \rho}{\partial z}] \) and radius \( \frac{q^2}{2} - A^0 \rho \). As mentioned above, if our decision maker were interested only in the set of models defined by (9) and (11), we could stop here and use a dynamic version of the min-max preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). That way of proceeding could

\( ^8 \)The function test function \( \rho \) stated here is evidently defined only up to translation by a constant.
Indeed lead to interesting applications and is worth pursuing. But the decision maker to be studied in this paper wants to investigate the utility consequences of models not in the set defined by (9).

### 3.2 Misspecification of structured models

Our decision maker wants to evaluate consequences of the structured models in $\mathcal{M}^o$ and also of unstructured models that statistically are difficult to distinguish from them. For that purpose, he employs the scaled statistical discrepancy measure $\Theta(M^U|\mathcal{F}_0)$ defined in (8) and uses relative entropy multiplied by parameter $\theta < \infty$ to calibrate a set of nearby unstructured models. The decision maker solves a minimization problem in which $\theta$ serves as a penalty parameter that deters considering unstructured probabilities that are statistically too far from the structured models. The minimization problem induces a preference ordering over consumption plans that belongs to a class of dynamic variational preferences that Maccheroni et al. (2006a) showed are dynamically consistent.

To understand how our formulation relates to dynamic variational preferences, notice how structured models represented in terms of their drift distortion processes $S_t$ appear separately from unstructured models represented in terms of drift distortion $U_t$ on the right side of the statistical discrepancy measure

$$
\Delta(M^U; M^S|\mathcal{F}_0) = \frac{\delta}{2} \int_0^\infty \exp(-\delta t) E \left( M^U_t | U_t - S_t |^2 | \mathcal{F}_0 \right) dt.
$$

Specification (8) leads to a conditional discrepancy

$$
\xi_t(U_t) = \inf_{S_t \in \xi} |U_t - S_t|^2
$$

and an associated scaled integrated discounted discrepancy

$$
\Theta(M^U|\mathcal{F}_0) = \frac{\theta \delta}{2} \int_0^\infty \exp(-\delta t) E \left[ M^U_t \xi_t(U_t) | \mathcal{F}_0 \right] dt. \tag{12}
$$

Our decision maker wants to know utility consequences of statistically close unstructured models that he describes with the discrepancy measure $\Theta(M^U|\mathcal{F}_0)$. Therefore, he ranks alternative hypothetical state-contingent and date-contingent consumption plans by the

Watson and Holmes (2016) and Hansen and Marinacci (2016) discuss several misspecification challenges confronted by statisticians and economists.
minimized value of a discounted sum of expected utilities plus a $\theta$-scaled relative entropy penalty $\Theta(M^U | F_0)$, where minimization is over the implied set of models.

4 Recursive Representations of Preferences and Decisions

This section prepares the way for the section 6 quantitative application by describing a set of structured models and a continuation value process over consumption plans. A scalar continuation value stochastic process ranks alternative consumption plans. Date $t$ continuation values tell a decision maker’s date $t$ ranking. Continuation value processes have a recursive structure that makes preferences be dynamically consistent. For Markovian decision problems, a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation describes the evolution of continuation values.

4.1 Continuation values

For a consumption plan $\{C_t\}$, the continuation value process $\{V_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ is

$$V_t = \min_{\{U_t: t \leq \tau < \infty\}} E \left( \int_0^\infty \exp(-\delta \tau) \left( \frac{M_t^U}{M_t^U} \right) \left[ \psi(C_{t+\tau}) + \left( \frac{\theta \delta}{2} \right) \xi_{t+\tau}(U_{t+\tau}) \right] d\tau \mid F_t \right)$$

(13)

where $\psi$ is an instantaneous utility function and $\xi_t(U_t) = \inf_{S_t \in \Xi_t} |U_t - S_t|^2$. We set $\psi = \log$ in computations that follow. Equation (13) builds in a recursive structure that can be expressed as

$$V_t = \min_{\{U_t: t \leq \tau < t+\epsilon\}} \left\{ E \left[ \int_0^\epsilon \exp(-\delta \tau) \left( \frac{M_t^U}{M_t^U} \right) \left[ \psi(C_{t+\tau}) + \left( \frac{\theta \delta}{2} \right) \xi_{t+\tau}(U_{t+\tau}) \right] d\tau \mid F_t \right] + \exp(-\delta \epsilon)E \left[ \left( \frac{M_{t+\epsilon}^U}{M_t^U} \right) V_{t+\epsilon} \mid F_t \right] \right\}$$

(14)

for $\epsilon > 0$. Heuristically, we can “differentiate” the right-hand side of (14) with respect to $\epsilon$ to obtain an instantaneous counterpart to a Bellman equation. Viewing the continuation value process $\{V_t\}$ as an Ito process, write:

$$dV_t = \nu_t dt + \zeta_t \cdot dW_t.$$
A local counterpart to (14) is
\[
0 = \min_{U_t} \left[ \psi(C_t) - \frac{\theta \delta}{2} \xi_t(U_t) - \delta V_t + U_t \cdot \varsigma_t + \nu_t \right],
\] (15)
where \( U_t \) is restricted to be \( \mathcal{F}_t \) measurable. The term \( U_t \cdot \varsigma_t \) comes from an Itô adjustment to the local covariance between \( \frac{dM^U_t}{M^U_t} \) and \( dV_t \). It is an adjustment to the drift \( \nu_t \) of \( dV_t \) that is induced by using martingale \( M^U \) to change the probability measure. Preferences ranked by continuation value processes \( V_t \) are continuous-time counterparts to the dynamic variational preferences of Maccheroni et al. (2006a).

### 4.2 Markovian decision problem

By ranking consumption processes with continuation value processes satisfying (15), a decision maker evaluates utility consequences of a set of models that includes unstructured models that our relative entropy measure asserts are difficult to distinguish from members of the set of structured models \( \mathcal{M}^o \). In particular, to construct a set of models, the decision maker:

1) Begins with a Markovian baseline model.

2) Creates from the baseline model a set \( \mathcal{M}^o \) of structured models by naming a sequence of closed convex sets \( \{ \Xi_t \} \) that satisfy (11) and associated drift distortion processes \( \{ S_t \} \) that satisfy structured model constraint (9).

3) Augments \( \mathcal{M}^o \) with additional unstructured models that violate (9) but according to discrepancy measure (8) are statistically close to models that do satisfy it.

We now describe how to implement some of these steps for the section 6 quantitative model. We begin by describing the baseline model used by a key decision maker in our application, a robust planner. For step 1, the planner uses a particular instance of the diffusion (1) as a Markovian baseline model. Step 2 adds other Markovian models. Step 3 includes statistically similar models that are not necessarily Markovian.

#### 4.2.1 Step 1

For the decision maker’s baseline model, we use a single capital version of an Eberly and Wang (2011) model with a long-term risk state \( z \). The decision maker is a robust planner.
who faces an AK model subject to adjustment costs with capital evolution:

\[ dK_t = K_t \left( \hat{\alpha}_k + \hat{\beta}_k Z_t + \frac{I_t}{K_t} - \phi \left( \frac{I_t}{K_t} \right) \right) dt + \sigma_k \cdot dW_t, \]

where \( \phi \) is convex with \( \phi(0) = 0 \), \( K_t \) is the capital stock, \( I_t \) is investment, and \( W \) is a 2 \( 
\times 1 \) Brownian motion. It is convenient to use \( \log K \) as the endogenous state variable process. By Ito’s formula it follows that

\[ d\log K_t = \left[ \hat{\alpha}_k + \hat{\beta}_k Z_t + \frac{I_t}{K_t} - \phi \left( \frac{I_t}{K_t} \right) - \frac{\sigma_k^2}{2} \right] dt + \sigma_k \cdot dW_t. \]

Consumption is restricted by

\[ C_t = \kappa K_t - I_t. \]

The process \( Z \) evolves according to

\[ dZ_t = \left( \hat{\alpha}_z - \hat{\beta}_z Z_t \right) dt + \sigma_z \cdot dW_t, \]

which implies that a stationary distribution for \( Z \) is normal with mean \( \bar{z} = \hat{\alpha}_z / \hat{\beta}_z \) and variance \( |\sigma_z|^2 / (2\hat{\beta}_z) \). Let

\[ X = \begin{bmatrix} \log K \\ Z \end{bmatrix} \]

and stack the two state evolution equations as follows:

\[ d\log K_t = \left[ \hat{\alpha}_k + \hat{\beta}_k Z_t + \frac{I_t}{K_t} - \phi \left( \frac{I_t}{K_t} \right) - \frac{\sigma_k^2}{2} \right] dt + \sigma_k \cdot dW_t \]

\[ dZ_t = \left( \hat{\alpha}_z - \hat{\beta}_z Z_t \right) dt + \sigma_z \cdot dW_t. \] (16)

### 4.2.2 Step 2

A planner forms the following collection of structured parametric models:

\[ d\log K_t = \left[ \alpha_k + \beta_k Z_t + \frac{I_t}{K_t} - \phi \left( \frac{I_t}{K_t} \right) - \frac{\sigma_k^2}{2} \right] dt + \sigma_k \cdot dW_t^S \]

\[ dZ_t = (\alpha_z - \beta_z Z_t) dt + \sigma_z \cdot dW_t^S. \] (17)
where parameters \((\alpha_k, \beta_k, \alpha_z, \beta_z)\) distinguish structured models \((17)\) from the baseline model, \((\sigma_k, \sigma_z)\) are parameters common to model \((16)\) and all models \((17)\), \(W^S\) is a \(2 \times 1\) Brownian motion, and the Brownian motions \(W\) and \(W^S\) are related by

\[
dW_t = S_t dt + dW_t^S, \tag{18}
\]

where \(S_t\) is the drift distortion implied by parameter values \((\alpha_k, \beta_k, \alpha_z, \beta_z)\). Collection \((17)\) nests baseline model \((16)\).

We represent members of a parametric class defined by \((17)\) in terms of our section 2 structure with drift distortions \(S\) of the form

\[
S_t = \eta(Z_t) \equiv \eta_0 + \eta_1(Z_t - \bar{z}),
\]

then use \((1)\), \((17)\), and \((18)\) to deduce the following restrictions on \(\eta_1\):

\[
\sigma \eta_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \beta_k - \hat{\beta}_k \\ \hat{\beta}_z - \beta_z \end{bmatrix},
\]

where

\[
\sigma = \begin{bmatrix} (\sigma_k)' \\ (\sigma_z)' \end{bmatrix}.
\]

To compute relative entropy \(\frac{q^2}{2}\) and the function \(\rho(z)\), we apply the method of undetermined coefficients to solve the following instance of differential equation \((10)\):

\[
\frac{d\rho}{dz}(z) [ - \hat{\beta}_z(z - \bar{z}) + \sigma_z \cdot \eta(z)] + \frac{|\sigma_z|^2}{2} \frac{d^2 \rho}{dz^2}(z) - \frac{q^2}{2} + \frac{|\eta(z)|^2}{2} = 0. \tag{19}
\]

Under parametric alternatives \((17)\), \(\rho\) is quadratic in \(z - \bar{z}\):

\[
\rho(z) = \rho_1(z - \bar{z}) + \frac{1}{2} \rho_2(z - \bar{z})^2.
\]

We first compute \(\rho_1\) and \(\rho_2\) by matching coefficients on the terms \((z - \bar{z})\) and \((z - \bar{z})^2\), respectively. Matching constant terms then implies \(\frac{q^2}{2}\).

We assume that the robust planner’s instantaneous utility function is logarithmic. Then guess that the value function takes the additively separable form \(\Psi(x) = \log k + \hat{\Psi}(z)\), where \((k, z)\) are potential realizations of the state vector \((K_t, Z_t)\). If misspecifications of
the structured models were not of concern, we would be led to solve the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:

\[
0 = \max_i \min_s \left\{ \delta \log (\kappa - i) - \delta \hat{\psi}(z) + \hat{\alpha}_k + \hat{\beta}_k z + i - \phi(i) + \sigma_k \cdot s \\
+ \left[ -\hat{\beta}_z(z - \bar{z}) + \sigma_z \cdot s \right] \frac{d\hat{\psi}}{dz}(z) + \frac{1}{2} |\sigma_z|^2 \frac{d^2\hat{\psi}}{dz^2}(z) \right\},
\]

(20)

where \( i \) is a potential choice of the investment-capital ratio and \( s \) is a potential choice of the structured drift distortion and where \( s \) satisfies restriction (11), which we rewrite as:

\[
[\rho_1 + \rho_2(z - \bar{z})] \left[ -\hat{\beta}_z(z - \bar{z}) + \sigma_z \cdot s \right] + \frac{|\sigma_z|^2}{2} \rho_2 - \frac{q^2}{2} + \frac{s}{2} \cdot \frac{s}{2} \leq 0,
\]

(21)

an inequality implied by our quadratic \( \rho(z) \) function.

By fixing \( (\rho_1, \rho_2, q) \), we can trace out a one-dimensional family of parametric models having the same relative entropy. For example, given \( (\rho_1, \rho_2, q) \), we can first solve equation (19) for \( \eta_0 \) and \( \eta_1 \). By matching a constant, a linear term, and a quadratic term in \( z - \bar{z} \), we obtain three equations in four unknowns that imply a one dimensional curve for \( \eta_0 \) and \( \eta_1 \) that imply nonlinear \( S_t \)'s as functions of \( z \). In this way, nonlinear structured models are included in the set of structured models near the baseline model as measured by relative entropy. These nonlinear models also have relative entropy \( \frac{q^2}{2} \). We can represent the resulting nonlinear model as a time-varying coefficient model by solving

\[
\tilde{r}(z) = \sigma [\eta_0 + \eta_1(z - \bar{z})]
\]

for \( \eta_0 \) and \( \eta_1 \), \( z \) by \( z \), along the one-dimensional curve in \( \eta_0 \) and \( \eta_1 \). We provide the following example upon which we shall base calculations to be discussed at length later in this paper.

**Illustration 4.1.** In order to focus structured uncertainty on how drifts for \( (K, Z) \) respond to the state variable \( Z \), suppose that the decision maker sets

\[
\eta(z) = \eta_1(z - \bar{z}),
\]

In this case, \( \rho_1 = 0 \) and inequality (21) becomes

\[
-\frac{q^2}{2} + \frac{|\sigma_z|^2}{2} \rho_2 = 0
\]
or equivalently,

$$\rho_2 = \frac{q^2}{|\sigma_z|^2}.$$  

Notice that restriction (21) implies that

$$s = 0$$

when \(z = \tilde{z}\). Also given \(|\sigma_z|^2\), the value of \(\rho_2\) is determined by \(q\). More generally, \(q\) and \(\rho\) cannot be specified independently.

To connect to a time-varying parameter specification, first construct the convex set of \(\eta_1\)’s that satisfy

$$\frac{1}{2} \beta_k \cdot \eta + \left( \frac{q^2}{|\sigma_z|^2} \right) \left( -\beta_z + \sigma_z \cdot \eta_1 \right) \leq 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

Next form the boundary of the convex set of alternative parameter configurations constrained by (22)

$$\sigma \eta_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \beta_k - \hat{\beta}_k \\ \hat{\beta}_z - \beta_z \end{bmatrix}$$

for \((\beta_k, \beta_z)\) associated with alternative choices of \(\eta_1\).

For a given \(\tilde{\Psi}\) and state realization \(z\), the component of the objective for the HJB equation (20) that depends on \(s\) is the inner product

$$\left[ 1 \hspace{0.5cm} \frac{d\tilde{\Psi}}{dz}(z) \right] \sigma s.$$  

It is pedagogically convenient to set \(r = \sigma s\). The two distinct entries of \(r = \sigma s\) alter evolution equations for the state variables \(k\) and \(z\), both of which appear in the objective function on the right side of equation HJB (20). Evidently, from HJB equation (20), the first entry, \(r_1\), shifts the log capital evolution equation and the second entry, \(r_2\), shifts the evolution equation for the exogenous state \(z\). The criterion appearing in HJB equation (20) remains linear in \(r\) with a translation; linearity pushes the minimizing \(r\) to an ellipsoid that is the boundary of the convex constraint set for each \(z\). Under calibrated parameters for the baseline model that we present in section 6, figure 1 shows ellipsoids associated with two alternative values of \(z\).

Notations for \(q\)’s: The caption of figure 1 indicates values for two versions of \(q\), a quantity \(q_{s,0}\) that indicates entropy of a structured model to the baseline model that we denote model
0; and a quantity $q_{u,s}$ that denotes entropy of an unstructured model relative to a structured model. Subsection 5.1 describes how we define and compute $q_{u,s}$. Later we also use $q_{u,0}$ to denote entropy of an unstructured model to the baseline model.

For every feasible choice of $r_2$, two choices of $r_1$ satisfy the implied quadratic equation for the ellipse mentioned above. Provided that $\frac{d\Psi}{dz}(z) > 0$, which is true in our calculations, we take the lower of the two solutions for $r_1$ because the objective has positive weights on the two entries of $r$. The minimizing solution occurs at a point on the lower left of the ellipse where $\frac{dr_1}{dr_2} = -\frac{d\Psi}{dz}(z)$ and depends on $z$, as Figure 1 indicates.

![Figure 1: An illustration for section 6, figure 3 configuration for $q_{s,0} = .1$ and $q_{u,s} = .2$. The figure displays parameter contours for $(r_1, r_2)$, holding relative entropies fixed. The upper right contour depicted in red is for $z$ equal to the .1 quantile of its stationary distribution under the baseline model and the lower left contour is for $z$ at the .9 quantile. The dot depicts the $(r_1, r_2) = (0, 0)$ point corresponding to the baseline model. Tangency points denote worst-case structured models.](image-url)
4.2.3 Step 3

We now alter the HJB equation in a way that acknowledges the decision maker’s fear that all of his structured models are misspecified. He does this by adding unstructured models via a penalized entropy term. This results in the modified version of HJB equation (20):

\[
0 = \max_i \min_{u,s} \left\{ \delta \log(\kappa - i) - \delta \hat{\Psi}(z) + \hat{\alpha}_k + \hat{\beta}_k z + \phi(i) + \sigma_k \cdot u \right. \\
+ \left. \left[ -\hat{\beta}_z(z - \bar{z}) + \sigma_z \cdot u \right] \frac{d\hat{\Psi}}{dz}(z) + \frac{1}{2} |\sigma_z|^2 \frac{d^2\hat{\Psi}}{dz^2}(z) + \frac{\theta}{2} |u - s|^2 \right\}
\]

where \( s \) is constrained by (21). Consider minimizing with respect to \( u \). First-order conditions imply that

\[
u = s - \frac{1}{\theta} \sigma' \left[ \frac{1}{\frac{d\hat{\Psi}}{dz}(z)} \right].
\]

Substituting this choice of \( u \) into HJB equation (23) leads us to

**Problem 4.2. Robust planning problem**

\[
0 = \max_i \min_{s} \left\{ \delta \log(\kappa - i) - \delta \hat{\Psi}(z) + \hat{\alpha}_k + \hat{\beta}_k z + \phi(i) + \sigma_k \cdot s \right. \\
+ \left. \left[ -\hat{\beta}_z(z - \bar{z}) + \sigma_z \cdot s \right] \frac{d\hat{\Psi}}{dz}(z) + \frac{1}{2} |\sigma_z|^2 \frac{d^2\hat{\Psi}}{dz^2}(z) - \frac{\theta}{2} \left[ 1 \frac{d\hat{\Psi}}{dz}(z) \right] \sigma \sigma' \left[ \frac{1}{\frac{d\hat{\Psi}}{dz}(z)} \right] \right\}
\]

where maximization and minimization are both subject to

\[
[rho_1 + rho_2(z - \bar{z})] \left[ -\hat{\beta}_z(z - \bar{z}) + \sigma_z \cdot s \right] + \frac{|\sigma_z|^2}{2} rho_2 - \frac{q^2}{2} + \frac{s \cdot s}{2} \leq 0.
\]

Notice that in the HJB equation in Problem 4.2 the objective is additively separable in \( i \) and \( s \). This implies that the order of extremization is inconsequential, confirming a Bellman-Isaacs condition. Moreover, for this particular economic environment, the maximizing solution \( i^* \) for \( i \) is state independent, since the first-order conditions are:

\[
1 - \phi'(i) = \frac{\delta}{\kappa - i}.
\]

Thus, the consumption-capital ratio is constant and logarithms of consumption and capital
share a common evolution equation under the baseline model, namely,

\[ d \log C_t = 0.01 \left[ \left( \hat{\alpha}_c + \hat{\beta}_c Z_t \right) dt + \sigma_c \cdot dW_t \right] \]

where the .01 scaling is used so that the implied parameters are represented as growth rates,

\[ 0.01 \hat{\alpha}_c = \hat{\alpha}_k + i^* - \phi(i^*) - \frac{|\sigma_k|^2}{2}, \]

\[ 0.01 \hat{\beta}_c = \hat{\beta}_k, \text{ and } 0.01 \sigma_c = \sigma_k. \]

This model illustrates again a finding of Hansen et al. (1999) and Tallarini (2000) for economies with a single capital stock, namely, that effects of concerns about robustness operate mostly on asset prices, not on allocations.\(^{10}\)

### 5 Alternative entropy measures

Preference orderings described in section 4 use the penalty parameter \( \theta \) in conjunction with relative entropy to restrict a set of unstructured models that express the decision maker’s fear that all of the structured models are misspecified. Good (1952) recommended that users of a max-min expected utility approach should verify that a worst-case model is plausible.\(^{11}\)

We implement Good’s suggestion here by characterizing both a worst-case structured model and a worst-case unstructured model and also exploring how the planner’s \( \theta \) in Problem 4.2 affects the implied relative entropy of the worst-case unstructured model. In calibrating \( \theta \) in actual decision problems, we find it enlightening also to measure the magnitude of a worst-case adjustment for misspecifications of the structured models. Finally, although we use relative entropy in formulating the decision problems, we find it helpful also to consult another measure of statistical discrepancy called Chernoff entropy.

Let logarithms of two martingales \( M^S_t \) and \( M^U_t \) evolve according to appropriate versions of (7), namely,

\[ d \log M^S_t = -\frac{1}{2} |S_t|^2 dt + S_t \cdot dW_t \]

\[ d \log M^U_t = -\frac{1}{2} |U_t|^2 dt + U_t \cdot dW_t. \]

\(^{10}\)This outcome does not occur in environments with multiple capital stocks having different exposures to uncertainty. For a multiple capital stock example with a different specification of model ambiguity, see Hansen et al. (2018).

\(^{11}\)See Berger (1994) and Chamberlain (2000) for related discussions.
Think of a pairwise model selection problem that statistically compares a structured model generated by a martingale $M^S$ with an unstructured model generated by a martingale $M^U$. For a given value of $\theta$ in HJB equation (23), we compute worst-case structured and unstructured models in terms of the drift distortions

$$S_t = \eta_s(Z_t)$$
$$U_t = \eta_u(Z_t)$$

implied for example by the minimization that appears in the problem on the right side of equation (23).

### 5.1 Relative entropy

A gauge of divergence between two probability distributions is the following expected log likelihood ratio called relative entropy:

$$\Lambda(M^U, M^S) = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \mathbb{E} \left[ M^U_t \left( \log M^U_t - \log M^S_t \right) | \mathcal{F}_0 \right].$$

Since the worst-case structured and unstructured probability models are both Markovian, we can compute $\Lambda(M^U, M^S)$ using the same procedures that we applied in section 3.1 to compute entropy relative to the baseline model. In particular, instead of solving equation (19), we now solve

$$\frac{d\rho}{dz}(z) \left( \alpha z - \beta z^2 + \sigma \eta_u \right) + \frac{1}{2} |\sigma|^2 \frac{d^2 \rho}{dz^2} + \frac{|\eta_u - \eta_s|^2}{2} \leq \frac{q^2}{2}$$

for $\frac{q^2}{2}$ and for $\rho$, up to a constant of translation. We denote the solution for $q$ as $q_{u,s}$ to emphasize that it is relative entropy of an unstructured model relative to a structured model. In the application below, we report

$$q_{u,s} = \sqrt{2\Lambda(M^U, M^S)}.$$

as a convenient measure of the magnitude of the drift distortion of a worst-case model $u$ relative to a worst-case model $s$.

Appendix A.2 describes our computational approach. Entropy concept $\Lambda(M^U, M^S)$ is typically independent of date zero conditioning information when the Markov process is
asymptotically stationary.

5.2 Chernoff entropy

A dynamic version of an idea of Chernoff (1952) provides an alternative concept of discrepancies between probability measures. Chernoff entropy emerges from studying how, by disguising distortions of a baseline probability model, Brownian motions make it challenging to distinguish models statistically. Although Chernoff entropy’s explicit connection to a statistical decision problem makes it attractive, it is less tractable than relative entropy. To address this intractability, Anderson et al. (2003) used Chernoff entropy measured as a local rate to make direct connections between magnitudes of market prices of uncertainty, on the one hand, and statistical discrimination between two models, on the other hand. That local rate is state-dependent and for diffusion models is proportional to the local drift in relative entropy. We follow Newman and Stuck (1979) and proceed to characterize a long-run version of Chernoff entropy and show how to compute it. There are important quantitative differences when we measure Chernoff entropy globally instead of locally as in the approach of Anderson et al. (2003).12

Think of a pairwise model selection problem that statistically compares a structured model generated by a martingale \( M^S \) with an unstructured model generated by a martingale \( M^U \). Consider a statistical model selection rule based on a data history of length \( t \) that checks whether \( \log M^U_t - \log M^S_t \geq h \). This selection rule sometimes incorrectly chooses the unstructured model when the structured model governs the data. We can bound the probability of this incorrect selection outcome by using an argument from large deviations theory based on the inequalities

\[
1 \{\log M^U_t - \log M^S_t \geq h\} = 1 \{-\gamma(h + \log M^U_t - \log M^S_t) \geq 0\} \\
= 1 \{\exp(-\gamma h)(M^U_t)^{\gamma}(M^S_t)^{-\gamma} \leq 1\} \\
\leq \exp(-\gamma h)(M^U_t)^{\gamma}(M^S_t)^{-\gamma},
\]

for \( 0 \leq \gamma \leq 1 \). Under the structured model, the mathematical expectation of the term on the left side multiplied by \( M^S_t \) equals the probability of mistakenly selecting the alternative model when data are a sample of size \( t \) generated under the structured model. We can

---

12The local measure is more closely aligned with local uncertainty prices, a connection that Anderson et al. (2003) feature.
bound this mistake probability for large $t$ by following Donsker and Varadhan (1976) and Newman and Stuck (1979) and studying

$$
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log E \left[ \exp(-\gamma h) \left( M_t^U \right)^\gamma \left( M_t^S \right)^{1-\gamma} | \mathcal{F}_0 \right] = \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log E \left[ \left( M_t^U \right)^\gamma \left( M_t^S \right)^{1-\gamma} | \mathcal{F}_0 \right]
$$

for alternative choices of $\gamma$. We apply these calculations for given specifications of $U$ and $S$, checking that the limits are well defined. The threshold $h$ does not affect the limit. Furthermore, the limit is often independent of the initial conditioning information. To get the best bound, we compute

$$
\inf_{0 \leq \gamma \leq 1} \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log E \left[ \left( M_t^U \right)^\gamma \left( M_t^S \right)^{1-\gamma} | \mathcal{F}_0 \right],
$$

which is typically negative because mistake probabilities decay with sample size. Chernoff entropy is then

$$
\Gamma(M^U, M^S) = -\inf_{0 \leq \gamma \leq 1} \lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log E \left[ \left( M_t^U \right)^\gamma \left( M_t^S \right)^{1-\gamma} | \mathcal{F}_0 \right].
$$

Setting $\Gamma(M^U, M^S) = 0$ would include only those alternative models $M^U$ that cannot be distinguished from $M^S$ on the basis of histories of infinite length. Because we want to include more possible alternative models than that, we entertain positive values of $\Gamma(M^U, M^S)$.

To interpret $\Gamma(M^U, M^S)$, note that if the decay rate of mistake probabilities were constant, say $d$, then mistake probabilities for two sample sizes $T_i, i = 1, 2$, would be

$$
\text{mistake probability}_i = \frac{1}{2} \exp(-T_i d_{u,s})
$$

for $d_{u,s} = \Gamma(M^U, M^S)$. We define a half-life as an increase in sample size $T_2 - T_1 > 0$ that multiplies a mistake probability by a factor of one half:

$$
\frac{1}{2} = \frac{\text{mistake probability}_2}{\text{mistake probability}_1} = \frac{\exp(-T_2 d)}{\exp(-T_1 d)}.
$$

---

13That is what is done in extensions of the rational expectations equilibrium concept to self-confirming equilibria that allow probability models to be wrong, but only off equilibrium paths, i.e., for events that in equilibrium do not occur infinitely often. See Fudenberg and Levine (1993, 2009) and Sargent (1999). Our decision theory differs from that used in most of the literature on self-confirming equilibria because our decision maker acknowledges model uncertainty and wants to adjust decisions accordingly. But see Battigalli et al. (2015).
so the half-life is approximately
\[ T_2 - T_1 = \frac{\log 2}{d}. \]

The bound on the decay rate should be interpreted cautiously because the actual decay rate is not constant. Furthermore, the pairwise comparison understates the challenge truly confronting the decision maker, which is statistically to discriminate among multiple models.

A symmetrical calculation reverses the roles of the two models and instead conditions on the perturbed model implied by martingale \( M^U \). The limiting rate remains the same. Thus, when we select a model by comparing a log likelihood ratio to a constant threshold, the two types of mistakes share the same asymptotic decay rate.

To implement Chernoff entropy, we follow an approach suggested by Newman and Stuck (1979). Because our worst-case models are Markovian, in appendix A.1 we can use Perron-Frobenius theory to characterize
\[
\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{1}{t} \log E \left[ (M^U_t)^\gamma (M^S_t)^{1-\gamma} | F_0 \right]
\]
for a given \( \gamma \in (0, 1) \) as a dominant eigenvalue of a semigroup of linear operators. This limit does not depend on the initial state \( x \) and is characterized as a dominant eigenvalue associated with an eigenfunction that is strictly positive.\(^{14}\)

6 Quantitative example

Our example builds on the physical technology and continuation value process described in section 4 and features a representative investor who wants to explore utility consequences of alternative models portrayed by sets of \( \{M^U_t\} \) and \( \{M^S_t\} \) processes. Some models included in these sets have troublesome but difficult to detect predictable components of consumption growth.\(^{15}\)

\(^{14}\)Appendix A describes how we evaluate both Chernoff entropy and relative entropy numerically for the nonlinear Markov specifications that we use in subsequent sections.

\(^{15}\)While we appreciate the value of a more comprehensive empirical investigation with multiple macroeconomic time series, here our aim is to illustrate a mechanism within the context of relatively simple time series models of predictable consumption growth.
6.1 Baseline model

We think of capital broadly and base our quantitative application on an empirical calibration of the consumption dynamics. Our example blends elements of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Hansen et al. (2008). Because we want to focus exclusively on fluctuations in uncertainty prices that are induced by a representative investor’s specification concerns, we assume no stochastic volatility, in contrast to Bansal and Yaron (2004). We use a vector autoregression (VAR) to construct a quantitative version of a baseline model like (16) that approximates responses of consumption to permanent shocks. Our VAR follows Hansen et al. (2008) in using several macroeconomic time series to infer information about long-term consumption growth. We deduce a calibration of our baseline model (16) from a trivariate VAR for the first difference of log consumption, the difference between logs of business income and consumption, and the difference between logs of personal dividend income and consumption. This specification makes levels of logarithms of consumption, business income, and personal dividend income be cointegrated additive functionals that share a single common martingale component that can be extracted using a method described by Hansen (2012). In Appendix B we describe our data and our method for estimating the discrete-time VAR that we use to deduce the following parameters for the baseline model (16):

\[
\hat{\alpha}_c = .484 \quad \hat{\beta}_c = 1 \\
\hat{\alpha}_z = 0 \quad \hat{\beta}_z = .014 \\
(\sigma_c)' = \begin{bmatrix} .477 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \\
(\sigma_z)' = \begin{bmatrix} .011 & .025 \end{bmatrix}
\] (24)

We suppose that \( \delta = .002 \). Under this model, the standard deviation of the \( Z \) process in the implied stationary distribution is .163.

6.2 Structured models and a robust plan

We solve HJB equation (20) for two different configurations of structured models. We describe our numerical implementation in Appendix C.

\textsuperscript{16}We remind the reader that we set \(.01\hat{\beta}_c = \hat{\beta}_k\), and \(.01\sigma_c = \sigma_k\).
6.2.1 Uncertain growth rate responses

We compute a solution by first focusing on an Illustration 4.1 specification in which \( \rho_1 = 0 \) and \( \rho_2 \) satisfies:

\[
\rho_2 = \frac{q^2}{|\sigma_z|^2}
\]

where here we use \( q \) as a synonym for \( q_{s,0} \). When \( \eta \) is restricted to be \( \eta_1(z - \bar{z}) \), a given value of \( q \) imposes a restriction on \( \eta_1 \) and implicitly on \( (\beta_c, \beta_k) \). Figure 2 plots iso-entropy contours for \( (\beta_c, \beta_k) \) associated with \( q_{s,0} = .1 \) and \( q_{s,0} = .05 \), respectively.

![Figure 2: Parameter contours for \((\beta_c, \beta_k)\) holding relative entropy \(q_{s,0}\) fixed. The outer curve depicts \(q_{s,0} = .1\) and the inner curve \(q_{s,0} = .05\). The small diamond depicts the baseline model.](image-url)
While Figure 2 displays contours of time-invariant parameters with the same relative entropy, the robust planner actually chooses a two-dimensional vector of drift distortions $r = \sigma s$ for a structured model in a more flexible way. As happens when there is uncertainty about $(\beta_c, \beta_z)$, sets of possible $r$’s differ depending on the state $z$. As we remarked earlier in subsection 4.2 when we discussed illustration 4.1, when $z = 0$ the only feasible $r$ is $r = 0$. Figure 1 also reported iso-entropy contours when $z$ is at the .1 and .9 quantile of the stationary distribution under the baseline model. The larger value of $z$ results in a downward shift of the contour relative to the smaller value of $z$. The points of tangency in Figure 1 are the worst-case structured models. A tangency point occurs at a lower drift distortion for the .9 quantile than for the .1 quantile.

Consider next the adjustment for model misspecification. Since

$$\sigma(u^* - s^*) = -\frac{1}{\theta} \sigma \sigma' \left[ \frac{1}{d\psi}{\psi_z} \right]$$

and entries of $\sigma \sigma'$ are positive, the adjustment for model misspecification is smaller in magnitude for larger values of the state $z$. Taken together, the vector of drift distortions is:

$$\sigma u^* = \sigma(u^* - s^*) + r^*.$$  

The first term on the right is smaller in magnitude for a larger $z$ and conversely, the second term is larger in magnitude for smaller $z$.

Under the restrictions on structured models that $\rho_1 = 0$, $\rho_2 = |\sigma z|^2$, and $\eta(z) = \eta_1(z - \bar{z})$, the first derivative of the value function is not differentiable at $z = \bar{z}$. We can compute the value function and the worst-case models by solving two coupled HJB equations, one for $z < \bar{z}$ and another for $z > \bar{z}$. We obtain two second-order differential equations in value functions and their derivatives; these value functions coincide at $z = 0$, as do their first derivatives.
Figure 3: Worst-case structured model growth rate drifts. Left panel: larger structured entropy \((q_{s,0} = .1)\). Right panel: smaller structured entropy \((q_{s,0} = .05)\). The penalty parameter \(\theta\) was reset to hit two different targeted values of \(q_{u,s}\). **Black**: baseline model; **red**: worst-case structured model; **blue**: \(q_{u,s} = .1\); and **green**: \(q_{u,s} = .2\).

Figure 3 shows adjustments of the drifts due to aversion to not knowing which structured model is best and to concerns about misspecifications of the structured models. Setting \(\theta = \infty\) silences concerns about misspecification of the structured models, all of which are expressed through minimization over \(s\). When we set \(\theta = \infty\), the implied worst-case structured model has state dynamics that take the form of a threshold autoregression with a kink at zero. The distorted drifts in \(z\) again show less persistence than does the baseline model for negative values of \(z\) and more persistence for larger values of \(z\). We activate a concern for misspecification of the structured models by setting \(\theta\) to attain targeted values of \(q_{u,s}\) computed using the structured and unstructured worst-case models. This adjustment shifts the implied worst-case drift as a function of the state downwards, more for negative values of \(z\) than for positive ones. The impact of the drift for \(\log k\) or equivalently \(\log c\) is much more modest.
Table 1 reports Chernoff and relative entropies implied by structured and unstructured worst-case models. The first two columns tell relative entropy magnitudes that we imposed by adjusting the value of $\theta$. The remaining columns report other measures of entropy as implied by these settings. Recall that the $q$’s measure magnitudes of the drift distortions under associated distorted measures. Thus, $q_{u,0}$ measures how large the drift distortion is relative to the baseline model. As expected, increasing the targeted values of $q_{s,0}$ and $q_{u,s}$ increases the implied values $q_{u,0}$. There is one peculiar finding. From Table 1, we see that $q_{u,s} \leq q_{s,0} \leq q_{u,0}$, which does not satisfy a Triangle Inequality. This happens because $q_{u,s}$ and $q_{u,0}$ are computed under the stationary probability measure implied by the worst-case unstructured model induced by $U$, while $q_{s,0}$ is computed under the measure implied by worst-case structured model.

Table 1 also reports Chernoff entropies and their implied half lives. These numbers indicate that statistical discrimination is challenging for all four ($q_{s,0}, q_{u,s}$) configurations. The half lives associated with the $q_{u,s}$’s that quantify potential model misspecification exceed 140 quarters. Even the smallest half-life associated with the $q_{u,0}$ that expresses the overall discrepancy from the benchmark model exceeds 60 quarters. Discrimination is especially challenging when we limit the extent of model misspecification by setting $q_{u,s} = .1$.

How are the entropy measures are related? We know no formula that transforms relative entropy into long-run Chernoff entropy, but a formula from [Anderson et al., 2003] is valid.
locally and leads us to expect that
\[
\frac{q^2}{2} \approx 4d,
\]
an approximation that becomes exact when relative drift distortions are constant. It is evidently a good approximation for computed \(q_{u,s}\) and \(d_{u,s}\), but not for \(q_{u,0}\) and \(d_{u,0}\). As we have seen, the composite drift distortions show substantial state dependence via the worst-case structured model.

Figure 4: Distribution of \(Y_t-Y_0\) under the baseline model and worst-case model for \(q_{u,0} = .1\) and \(q_{u,s} = .2\). The gray shaded area depicts the interval between the .1 and .9 deciles for every choice of the horizon under the baseline model. The red shaded area gives the region within the .1 and .9 deciles under the worst-case model.

Figure 4 portrays impacts of the drift distortion on distributions of future consumption growth over alternative horizons. It shows how the consumption growth distribution adjusted for not knowing the best structured model and for distrusting all of the structured models tilts down relative to the baseline distribution.
6.2.2 Altering the scope of uncertainty

Until now, we have imposed that the alternative structured models have no drift distortions for $Z$ at $Z_t = \bar{z}$ by setting
\[
\rho_2 = \frac{q}{|\sigma_z|^2}.
\]
We now alter this restriction by cutting the value of $\rho_2$ in half. Consequences of this change are depicted in the right panel of Figure 5. For sake of comparison, this figure includes the previous specification in the left panel. The worst-case structured drifts no longer coincide with the baseline drift at $z = \bar{z}$ and now vary smoothly in the vicinity of $z = \bar{z}$.

Figure 5: Distorted growth rate drift for $Z$. Relative entropy $q_{s,0} = .1$. Left panel: $\rho_2 = \frac{(0.01)}{|\sigma_z|^2}$. Right panel: $\rho_2 = \frac{(0.1)}{2|\sigma_z|^2}$. Black: baseline model; red: worst-case structured model; blue: $q_{u,s} = .1$; and green: $q_{u,s} = .2$.

Adding the restriction that $\rho_2 = 0$ makes the robust planner’s value function become linear and makes the minimizing $s$ and $u$ become constant and therefore independent of $z$. Specifically,
\[
\frac{d\Phi}{dz} = .01 - \frac{\hat{\beta}}{\delta + \beta_z},
\]
and
\[
s^* = \sigma' \begin{bmatrix} .01 \\ .01 \end{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\delta + \beta_z}.
\]
The constant of proportionality for $s^*$ is determined by the constraint $|s^*| = q$. So setting $\rho_1$ and $\rho_2$ to zero results in parallel downward shifts of worst-case drifts for both $Y$ and $Z$. This amounts to changing the coefficients $\alpha_y$ and $\alpha_z$ in ways that are time invariant and that leave $\beta_y = \hat{\beta}_y$ and $\beta_z = \hat{\beta}_z$.

7 Uncertainty prices

In this section, we construct equilibrium prices that a representative investor receives for bearing ill-understood risks. These equal shadow prices for the robust planning problem of section 4. We decompose equilibrium risk prices into distinct compensations for bearing risk and for bearing model uncertainty. Appendix D describes in detail how we use competitive markets to decentralize implementation of the allocation chosen by a robust planner.

7.1 Local uncertainty prices

The equilibrium stochastic discount factor process $Sdf$ for our robust representative investor economy is

$$d \log S_{df} = -\delta dt - .01 (\hat{\alpha}_c + \hat{\beta}_t Z_t) dt - .01 \sigma_c \cdot dW_t + U^*_t \cdot dW_t - \frac{1}{2} |U^*_t|^2 dt.$$  

Components of the vector $\omega^*(Z_t) = (.01)\sigma_c - \eta^*(Z_t)$ equal minus the local exposures to the Brownian shocks. While these are usually interpreted as local “risk prices,” the decomposition

\[
\text{minus stochastic discount factor exposure} = .01 \sigma_c \quad -U^*_t, \\
\text{risk price} \quad \text{uncertainty price}
\]

motivates us to think of $.01 \sigma_c$ as risk prices induced by the curvature of log utility and $-U^*_t$ as “uncertainty prices” induced by a representative investor’s doubts about the baseline

\footnote{We evaluate risk and uncertainty prices relative to the baseline model (1), which we regard as approximating the data well. The planner’s and the representative investor’s doubts about that model are reflected in the computed compensations.}

\footnote{Please see equation (35) for derivation of this formula for $\omega^*(z)$.}
model. Here $U_t^*$ is state dependent. Local prices are large in both good and bad macroeconomic growth states. Prices of uncertainty at longer horizons display more complicated responses to shocks to the macro growth state.

7.2 Uncertainty prices over alternative investment horizons

In the previous subsection, we interpreted $-U_t^*$ as a local price of uncertainty. In this subsection, we provide a corresponding family of conditional expectations:

$$-E \left( M_t^{U*} U_t^* \mid X_0 = x \right) = -E \left( M_t^{U*} S_t^* \mid X_0 = x \right) - E \left[ M_t^{U*} (U_t^* - S_t^*) \mid X_0 = x \right].$$

(25)

We interpret the first term on the right side as coming from not knowing the best structured model and the second term as coming from concerns that all of the structured models might be misspecified. We motivate these measures by constructing “shock price elasticities” for being exposed to future shocks.

We construct shock elasticities that fit within a framework proposed by Borovička et al. (2011). These are related to but distinct from objects computed by Borovička et al. (2014). Borovička et al. (2014) use a typical impulse response timing convention by reporting elasticities that tell how changing exposures to a shock next period affects the expected return today of an asset that pays off $\tau$ periods in the future. In contrast, here we shift the date of an asset’s exposure to a shock $\tau$ time periods in the future, the same time that the asset pays off. We then study how the expected return as of today varies as we alter $\tau > 0$. We express responses of expected rates of return as elasticities by normalizing a change in an exposure to a shock to be a unit standard deviation and by studying responses of logs of expected returns. Shock-price elasticities constructed in this way can enlighten us about how state dependence in exposures to future shocks affects expected returns today of payoffs that materialize across different $\tau$’s. Here we regard different $\tau$’s as different investment horizons. We shall show that in addition to being intrinsically interesting, elasticities defined in this way link uncertainty prices to relative entropy.

We let consumption be the hypothetical payoff of interest. The logarithm of the expected return from a consumption payoff at date $t$ is the sum of two terms:

$$\log E \left( \frac{C_t}{C_0} \mid X_0 = x \right) - \log E \left[ Sdf_t \left( \frac{C_t}{C_0} \right) \mid X_0 = x \right],$$

(26)
where \( \log C_t = Y_t \). The first term is an expected payoff and the second is the cost of purchasing that payoff. The unitary elasticity of substitution in our example implies via \( Sdf_t \left( \frac{C_t}{C_0} \right) = M_t^{U^*} \) that the second term features the martingale \( M_t^{U^*} \) contributed by the representative investor’s concern that he does not know which member of his set of structured models is correct and also his concern that all of the structured models are misspecified.

A shock-price elasticity tells the change in an expected return that results from a local change in the exposure of consumption to the underlying Brownian motion. Malliavin derivatives are important inputs into calculating a shock-price elasticity. These derivatives measure how a shock at a given date affects consumption and stochastic discount factor processes. The \( Sdf_t \) and \( C_t \) processes both depend on the same Brownian motion between dates zero and \( t \). We are particularly interested in the consequences at time 0 of being exposed to shock at date \( t \). Computing the derivative of the logarithm of the expected return given in (26) results in

\[
\frac{E \left[ D_t C_t | \mathcal{F}_0 \right]}{E \left[ C_t | \mathcal{F}_0 \right]} = \frac{E \left[ D_t M_t^{U^*} | \mathcal{F}_0 \right]}{E \left[ C_t | \mathcal{F}_0 \right] - E \left[ D_t M_t^{U^*} | \mathcal{F}_0 \right]},
\]

where \( D_t C_t \) and \( D_t M_t^{U^*} \) denote two-dimensional vectors of Malliavin derivatives with respect to the two-dimensional Brownian increment at date \( t \) for consumption and the worst-case martingale, respectively.

A formula familiar from other forms of differentiation implies

\[
D_t C_t = C_t (D_t \log C_t) .
\]

The Malliavin derivative of \( \log C_t = Y_t \) is the vector \(.01 \sigma_y\), which is the exposure vector of \( \log C_t \) to the Brownian increment \( dW_t \):

\[
D_t C_t = .01 C_t \sigma_c ,
\]

so

\[
\frac{E \left( D_t C_t | \mathcal{F}_0 \right)}{E \left( C_t | \mathcal{F}_0 \right)} = .01 \sigma_c .
\]

Similarly,

\[
D_t M_t^{U^*} = U_t^* .
\]
Therefore, the term structure of prices that interests us is
\[ .01 \sigma_c - E \left( M_t^{U*} U_t^* | \mathcal{F}_0 \right). \] (27)

The first term is the risk price familiar from consumption-based asset pricing. It is a (small) state independent-term that is independent of the horizon. In contrast, the equilibrium drift distortion in the second term contains a state-dependent component, namely, the conditional expectation of the worst-case drift distortion under the distorted probability measure.

**Proposition 7.1.** Including contributions from both worst-case structured and unstructured models, horizon-dependent uncertainty prices are:

\[ \nu_t(x) \equiv -E \left( M_t^{U*} U_t^* | X_0 = x \right), \]

which depend on the horizon \( t \) and the initial state \( x \). The limiting uncertainty price vector as \( t \to +\infty \) is the unconditional expectation of the composite drift distortion under the distorted probability distribution.
Figure 6: Shock price elasticities $\nu^t(x)$ for alternative horizons. The change in exposure occurs at the same future date as the consumption payoff. The figure reports the median and deciles for the section 6 specification with $(\beta_c, \beta_z)$ structured uncertainty. Black: median of the $Z$ stationary distribution red: .1 decile; and blue: .9 decile.
Figure 7: Structured and unstructured contributions to shock price elasticities for alternative horizons. The panels in the left-hand side column plot the ambiguity component in equation (25). The panels in the right-hand side column plot the misspecification component in equation (25). The change in exposure occurs at the same future date as the consumption payoff. The figure reports the median and deciles for the section 6 specification with $(\beta_c, \beta_z)$ structured uncertainty. **Black**: median of the $Z$ stationary distribution; **red**: .1 decile; and **blue**: .9 decile.

Figure 7 shows shock price elasticities for our section 6 economy. Figure 7 plots separate components of these elasticities given by the right-hand side of equation (25).
the case in which \( q_{u,s} = .1 \). Notice that although the price elasticity is initially smaller for the median specification of \( z \) than for the .9 quantile, this inequality is eventually reversed as the horizon increases. Figure 7 reveals a similar pattern for the instantaneous uncertainty prices: especially for the second shock, instantaneous uncertainty prices are high for the .1 and .9 quantiles of the \( z \) distribution relative to the median growth state. Over longer investment horizons, elasticities diminish for the .9 quantiles to magnitudes that are eventually lower than the median elasticities for the same investment horizons. (The blue and black curves cross.) Notice that the misspecification components plotted in Figure 7 are ordered according to quantile, with the lowest quantile have the highest contribution. In contrast, the contribution from ambiguity about the structured models is substantially higher for the .9 quantile than for the other two, with median contributions starting at zero. The misspecification contributions are thus important for understanding both the magnitudes and initial orderings as well as the subsequent reversals of the uncertainty price elasticities. The structured uncertainty components of the elasticities and hence the elasticities themselves diminish with horizon because the probability measure implied by the martingale \( M_t^{U*} \) has reduced persistence for positive growth states. Under the \( M_t^{U} \) probability, the growth rate state variable is expected to spend less time in the positive region. This is reflected in smaller ambiguity components of price elasticities at the .9 quantile than at the median over longer investment horizons. For longer investment horizons, but not necessarily for very short ones, an endogenous nonlinearity makes uncertainty prices larger for negative values than for positive values of \( z \). Horizon dependence of shock price elasticities is an important avenue through which concerns about misspecification and ambiguity aversion influence valuations of assets.

There is an intriguing connection between long-horizon prices and relative entropy. While the uncertainty price trajectories do not converge over the time span reported in Figure 6, well defined limiting uncertainty prices do emerge over longer time horizons. These limits equal \( E^{M_t^{U*}}(-U_t^*) \), i.e., the unconditional expectation of the corresponding drift distortion vector computed under the worst-case stationary probability measure. In Table 2, we compare these limit prices to the relative entropy divergence \( q_{u,0} \), which measures the overall magnitude of these distortions by \( \sqrt{2E^{M_t^{U*}}[|U_t^*|^2]} \), i.e., the square root of

\[ q_{u,0} \]

Hansen and Scheinkman (2012) study a limiting growth rate risk price that is based on a different conceptual experiment but leads to a similar characterization. Whereas formula (27) has an adjustment for current consumption’s exposure to shocks, the limiting Hansen and Scheinkman measure replaces this term by the proportionate exposure of the martingale component of consumption. Both adjustments are small in our quantitative example.
twice the expected square of the absolute value of the vector of drift distortions, also under worst-case stationary probability measures. Indeed, these mean contributions account for most of the relative entropy measures. This is evident by comparing the square of the number in the third column of Table 2 to the sum of the squares in the fourth and fifth columns. Thus, the square root of twice relative entropy provides a good approximation to the magnitude of long-run uncertainty prices.

\[
\frac{1}{2}q^2
\]

Table 2: Entropies and limit prices. The limiting long-horizon prices are the expectations of \(-U^*\) under the probability model implied by \(U^*\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(q_{s,0})</th>
<th>(q_{u,s})</th>
<th>(q_{u,0})</th>
<th>shock one price</th>
<th>shock 2 price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have designed our quantitative example to activate a particular mechanism that causes statistically plausible amounts of uncertainty to generate fluctuations in uncertainty prices. We inferred parameters of the baseline model for these examples solely from time series of macroeconomic quantities, thus completely ignoring asset prices during calibration. We intentionally did not impose the cross-equation and cross-frequency restrictions on the consumption process that our asset pricing theory implies. We proceeded in this way in order to respect concerns that Hansen (2007) and Chen et al. (2015) expressed about using asset market data to calibrate macro-finance models that assign a special role to investors’ beliefs about future asset prices.

8 Concluding remarks

This paper formulates and applies a tractable model of the effects of macroeconomic uncertainties on equilibrium prices. We quantify investors’ concerns about model misspecification in terms of the consequences of alternative statistically plausible models for discounted expected utilities. We characterize the effects of concerns about misspecification of a baseline

\[^{20}\text{Hansen (2007) and Chen et al. (2015) describe situations in which it is the behavior of expected rates of return on assets that, through the cross-equation restrictions, lead an econometrician to make inferences about the behavior of macroeconomic quantities like consumption that are much more confident than can be made from the quantity data alone. How could investors put those cross-equation restrictions from returns into quantity processes before they had observed returns?}\]
stochastic process for individual consumption as shadow prices for a planner’s problem that supports competitive equilibrium prices.

To illustrate our approach, we have focused on the growth rate uncertainty featured in the “long-run risk” literature initiated by Bansal and Yaron (2004). Further applications seem natural. For example, the tools developed here could shed light on a recent public debate between two groups of macroeconomists and economic historians, one prophesying secular stagnation because of technology growth slowdowns, the other discounting those pessimistic forecasts. The tools that we describe can be used, first, to quantify how challenging it is to infer persistent changes in growth rates, and, second, to guide macroeconomic policy in light of evidence.

Specifically, we have produced a model of a log stochastic discount factor whose uncertainty prices reflect a robust planner’s worst-case drift distortions $U^*$ and have shown that these distortions can be interpreted as prices of model uncertainty. The dependence of uncertainty prices $U^*$ on the growth state $z$ is shaped partly by how our robust investor responds to the presence of alternative parametric models among a huge set of unspecified alternative models that also concern him.

It is worthwhile comparing this paper’s way of inducing time-varying prices of risk with three other macro/finance models that also get them. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) proceed in the rational expectations tradition with its assumption of a single-known-probability-model and so exclude fears of model misspecification from the mind of their representative investor. Campbell and Cochrane construct a utility function in which the history of consumption expresses an externality. This history dependence makes the investor’s local risk aversion respond in a countercyclical way to the economy’s growth state. Ang and Piazzesi (2003) use an exponential-quadratic stochastic discount factor in a no-arbitrage statistical model as a vehicle for exploring links between the term structure of interest rates and other macroeconomic variables. Their approach allows movements in risk prices to be consistent with historical evidence without specifying all components of a general equilibrium model. A third approach introduces stochastic volatility into the macroeconomy by positing that the volatilities of shocks driving consumption growth are themselves stochastic processes. A stochastic volatility model induces time variation in risk prices via exogenous movements in the conditional volatilities of shocks that impinge on macroeconomic variables. A related approach is implemented by Ulrich (2013) and Ilut and Schneider (2014), who use exogenous stochastic fluctuations in ambiguity concerns to

\[^{21}\text{See Gordon and Mokyr (2016).}\]
induce additional macroeconomic fluctuations.

In Hansen and Sargent (2010), we used a representative investor’s robust model averaging to drive countercyclical uncertainty prices. The investor carries along two difficult-to-distinguish models of consumption growth, one with substantial growth rate persistence, the other with little such persistence. The investor uses observations on consumption growth to update a Bayesian posterior over these models and expresses his specification distrust by pessimistically exponentially twisting a posterior over alternative models. That leads the investor to act as if good news is temporary and bad news is persistent, an outcome that is qualitatively similar to what we have found here. Learning occurs in Hansen and Sargent’s analysis because the parameterized structured models are time invariant and hence learnable.

In this paper, we propose a different way to make uncertainty prices vary in a way that turns out to be qualitatively similar. We exclude learning by including alternative models with parameters whose prospective variations cannot be inferred from historical data. These time-varying parameter models differ from the decision maker’s baseline model, a fixed parameter model whose parameters can be well estimated from historical data. The alternative models include ones that allow parameters persistently to deviate from those of the baseline model in statistically subtle and time-varying ways. In addition to this parametric class of alternative models, a robust planner and a representative investor both worry about many other specifications. A robust planner’s worst-case model responds to these forms of model uncertainty partly by having more persistence in bad states and less persistence in good states.

Adverse shifts in a worst-case shock distribution that increase the absolute magnitudes of uncertainty prices were also present in some of our earlier work (for example, see Hansen et al. (1999) and Anderson et al. (2003)). But in this paper, we induce state dependence in uncertainty prices in a new way, namely, by specifying a set of alternative models in a way that captures concerns about the baseline model’s specification of persistence in consumption growth.

Our continuous-time formulation (15) exploits mathematically convenient properties of a Brownian information structure. There also exists a discrete-time version of our formulation that starts from a baseline model cast in terms of a nonlinear stochastic difference equation; counterparts to structured and unstructured models play the same roles here. Furthermore, preference orderings defined in terms of continuation values are dynamically consistent.
While our example used entropy measures to restrict the decision maker’s set of structured models, two other approaches could be explored instead. One would use a more direct implementation of a robust Bayesian approach; the other would refrain from imposing absolute continuity when constructing a family of structured models. We conclude by discussing these in turn.

We could start with a set of structured models with time-invariant parameters and a convex set of priors over those parameters. A model-by-model Bayesian approach might be tractable if the implied set of posteriors could be characterized and computed date-by-date, through the use of conjugate priors. However, after augmenting a set of probabilities to make the larger set rectangular as recommended by Epstein and Schneider (2003), the worst-case structured model coming from the rectangular set would typically not come from applying Bayes’ rule to a single prior. That would prevent applying Good’s way of assessing the plausibility of max-min choice theory. On the other hand, stopping at the first step and not surrounding an initial rectangular set of models could conceivably may place models on the table that are substantively interesting in their own right, including possibly the worst-case structured model. By incorporating a concern for misspecification of an initial prior as it does, this approach provides an alternative to the robust learning in Hansen and Sargent (2007).

Finally, we mention an approach that would abandon the absolute continuity that we have built in when we assumed that the structured model probabilities can be represented as martingales with respect to a baseline model. Peng (2004) uses a theory of stochastic differential equations under a broad notion of model ambiguity that is rich enough to allow uncertainty about the conditional volatility of Brownian increments. Alternative probability specifications here fail to be absolutely continuous and standard likelihood ratio analysis ceases to apply. If we could construct bounds on uncertainty under a non-degenerate rectangular embedding, we could extend the construction of worst-case structured models and still restrain relative entropy as a way to limit a decision maker’s set of unstructured models.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{22}See Epstein and Ji (2014) for an application of the Peng analysis to asset pricing that does not use relative entropy.
Appendices

A Computing Chernoff and relative entropy

We show how to compute Chernoff and relative entropies for Markov specifications where the associated $S$’s and $U$’s take the forms

\[ U_t = \eta_u(Z_t) \]
\[ S_t = \eta_s(Z_t). \]

A.1 Chernoff entropy

The Markov structure of both models allows us to compute Chernoff entropy by using an eigenvalue approach of Donsker and Varadhan (1976) and Newman and Stuck (1979). We start by computing the drift of $(M_t^U)^\gamma (M_t^S)^{1-\gamma} g(Z_t)$ for $0 \leq \gamma \leq 1$ at $t = 0$:

\[ \mathcal{G} (\gamma) g(z) = -\gamma \left( 1 - \gamma \right) \frac{1}{2} |\eta_u(z) - \eta_s(z)|^2 g(z) + g(z)' \sigma \cdot [\gamma \eta_u(z) + (1 - \gamma) \eta_s(z)] 
+ g'(z) \left( \hat{\alpha}_z - \hat{\beta}_z z \right) + \frac{g''(z)}{2} |\sigma_z|^2, \]

where $[\mathcal{G} (\gamma) g](z)$ is the drift given that $Z_0 = z$. Next we solve the eigenvalue problem

\[ [\mathcal{G} (\gamma)] e(z, \gamma) = -\lambda(\gamma) e(z, \gamma). \]

We seek the eigenvalue for which $\exp[-\lambda(\gamma)]$ is largest in magnitude; the associated eigenfunction is positive.

We compute Chernoff entropy by solving

\[ \Gamma(M^H, M^S) = \max_{\gamma \in [0,1]} \lambda(\gamma), \]

where we compute $\lambda(\gamma)$ numerically using a finite-difference approach. For a pre-specified $\gamma$, we evaluate $[\mathcal{G} (\gamma)] g$ at each of $n$ grid points and replace derivatives by two-sided symmetric differences except at the edges, where we use corresponding one-sided differences. This procedure yields a linear transformation of $g$ evaluated at the $n$ grid points. The outcome of this calculation is an $n$ by $n$ matrix applied to a vector containing the entries of $g$. 

41
evaluated at the $n$ grid points. The eigenvalue of the resulting matrix that has the largest exponential equals $-\eta(\gamma)$. We use a grid for $z$ over the interval $[-2.5, 2.5]$ with grid increments equal to .01, choices that imply that $n = 501$.

### A.2 Relative entropy

We solve

$$\frac{q^2}{2} - \frac{d}{dz}(\hat{\alpha}_z - \hat{\beta}_z z + \sigma_z \cdot \eta_u(z)) - \frac{|\sigma_z|^2}{2} \frac{d^2}{dz^2}(z) = \frac{|\eta_u(z) - \eta_u(z)|^2}{2}$$

for $q$ numerically using a finite difference approach like that described in section A.1. Notice that the left-hand side of (28) is linear in $(\rho, \frac{q^2}{2})$. We evaluate equation (28) at the $n$ grid points for $z$ and use a finite difference approximation for the derivatives. We write the resulting left-hand side equations as a matrix times a vector containing $|\eta_u(z) - \eta_u(z)|^2$. We write the right-hand side as a vector evaluated at the $n$ grid points and solve the resulting equation system via matrix inversion.

### B Statistical calibration

#### B.1 Calibrating the baseline model

We set $\hat{\alpha}_z = 0$ and $\hat{\beta}_c = 1$. For other parameters we:

i) Let

$$Y_{t+1} = \begin{bmatrix} \log C_{t+1} - \log C_t \\ \log G_{t+1} - \log C_{t+1} \\ \log D_{t+1} - \log C_{t+1} \end{bmatrix},$$

$$\hat{Y}_t = \begin{bmatrix} \log G_t \\ \log D_t \end{bmatrix}$$

where as described in the body of this paper, $C_t$ is consumption, $G_t$ is business income, and $D_t$ is personal dividend income. Business income is measured as proprietor’s income plus corporate profits per capita. Dividends are personal dividend income per
The time series are quarterly data from 1948 Q1 to 2018 Q3. Our consumption measure is nondurables plus services consumption per capita. The nominal consumption data come from BEA’s NIPA Table 1.1.5 and their deflators from BEA’s NIPA Table 1.1.4. The business income data with IVA and CCadj are from BEA’s NIPA Table 1.12. Personal dividend income data were obtained from FRED’s B703RC1Q027SBEA. Population data comes from FRED’s CNP16OV. By including proprietors’ income in addition to corporate profits, we use a broader measure of business income than Hansen et al. (2008) who used only corporate profits. Hansen et al. (2008) did not include personal dividends in their VAR analysis.

\[ X_t = \begin{bmatrix} Y_t \\ Y_{t-1} \\ Y_{t-2} \\ \hat{Y}_{t-3} \end{bmatrix} \]

Express a vector autoregression in the stacked form

\[ X_{t+1} = H + AX_t + BW_{t+1} \]

where \( A \) is a stable matrix (i.e., its eigenvalues are all bounded in modulus below unity) and \( BB' \) is the innovation covariance matrix. Let selector matrix \( J \) verify \( Y_{t+1} = JX_{t+1} \). The level variables \( \log C_t, \log G_t, \log D_t \) are cointegrated. Each of \( \log C_t, \log G_t, \log D_t \) is an additive functional in the sense of Hansen (2012). Each has an additive decomposition into trend, martingale, and stationary components that can be constructed using a method described in Hansen (2012). The martingale components of the three series are identical. The innovation to this martingale process is identified as the only shock having long-term consequences. We identify \( B \) by assuming that the square matrix \( JB \) is lower triangular.

iii) Compute the implied mean \( \mu \) of the stationary distribution for \( X \) from

\[ \mu = (I - A)^{-1}H \]

and the associated covariance matrix \( \Sigma \) that solves a discrete Lyapunov equation

\[ \Sigma = A\Sigma A' + BB' \]

that can be solved by a doubling algorithm.
iv) Compute the implied mean for $\log C_{t+1} - \log C_t = u'\mu$ and set it to $0.01\hat{\alpha}_c$; here $u'$ selects the consumption growth rate from the vector $X_{t+1}$.

v) Compute the state-dependent component of the expected long-term growth rate by evaluating:

$$Z^p_t = \lim_{j \to \infty} E \left( \log C_{t+j} - \log C_t - j\hat{\alpha}_c | \mathcal{F}_t \right) = u'(I - A)^{-1} \left[ X_t - (I - A)^{-1} H \right]$$

implied by the VAR estimates. The analogue to $Z^p_t$ for the continuous time version of the model is

$$Z^p_t = \lim_{j \to \infty} E \left( \log C_{t+j} - \log C_t - j\hat{\alpha}_c | Z_t \right) = \frac{0.01}{\beta_z} Z_t.$$

vi) Compute the implied autoregressive coefficient for the analogous limit $\log C_{t+1}^p$ in the discrete-time specification using the VAR parameter estimates and equate it to $1 - \hat{\beta}_z$:

$$1 - \hat{\beta}_z = \frac{u' A (I - A)^{-1} \Sigma (I - A')^{-1} A'u}{u' A (I - A)^{-1} \Sigma (I - A')^{-1} A'u}.$$

vii) Compute the VAR implied covariance matrix for the one-step-ahead forecast error for the limit $\log C_{t+1}^p$ and form the covariance matrix for the growth rate process for consumption and for $Z_{t+1}^p$.

$$\begin{bmatrix}
  u' B B' u & u' B B' (I - A')^{-1} A'u \\
  u' A (I - A)^{-1} B B' u & u' A (I - A)^{-1} B B' (I - A')^{-1} A'u
\end{bmatrix} = .0001 \begin{bmatrix}
  (\sigma_c)' \\
  \frac{1}{\beta_z} (\sigma_z)'
\end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix}
  (\sigma_c) & \frac{1}{\beta_z} (\sigma_z)
\end{bmatrix}.$$

We identify $\sigma_z$ and $\sigma_c$ by imposing a zero restriction on the second entry of $\sigma_c$ and positive signs on the first coefficient of $\sigma_c$ and on the second coefficient of $\sigma_z$.

**B.2 Estimation and inference**

Consider the VAR

$$X_{t+1} = H + AX_t + BW_{t+1},$$

where $A$ is a stable matrix, $W_{t+1}$ is a multivariate standard normal, and data are available for $X_0, X_1, \ldots, X_N$. We use importance sampling to construct medians and deciles for the parameters of interest by using formulas in appendix B.1.
i) Construct a “posterior” for the coefficients of the VAR by using a special case of a method described by Zha (1999). Following Zha, we exploit the lower triangularity of JB by first transforming the equation system to make the implied population residuals be uncorrelated. We impose conjugate priors on the transformed system and initialize them at a “non-informative” prior. This method conditions on $X_0$. We use Monte Carlo simulation to produce a sequence $\{\theta_j := 1, 2, ..., N\}$ where $N$ is the sample size of the simulated data. We use this simulation to form a synthetic empirical distribution that assigns probability $\frac{1}{N}$ to each $\theta_j$, rejecting all draws that do not imply a stationary VAR.

ii) Let $f(\cdot | \mu, \Sigma)$ be the multivariate normal density and assign weight

$$f(X_0 | \mu_j, \Sigma_j) \sum_{j=1}^N f(X_0 | \mu_j, \Sigma_j)$$

to outcome $\theta_j$ where $\mu_j$ and $\Sigma_j$ are the mean vector and covariance matrix for the stationary distribution implied by $\theta_j$. This weighting scheme adjusts the empirical distribution for the contribution to the likelihood function from the random initial state $X_0$. We construct medians and deciles from this discrete distribution.

In our computations, we set $N = 10,000,000$. The resulting medians and .1 and .9 deciles are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>10th percentile</th>
<th>50th percentile</th>
<th>90th percentile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_c$</td>
<td>.321</td>
<td>.484</td>
<td>.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_z$</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^1_c$</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>.477</td>
<td>.501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^1_1$</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2_2$</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We used medians in computations underlying figures and tables in the text.

User-friendly Python code can be found at https://github.com/lphansen/TenuousBeliefs.

C Solving the ODE’s

For large $|z|$, the value function and minimizing worst-case $r$ are approximately linear in the state variable. The linear approximations differ depending on whether $z$ is greater or
less than \( \bar{z} \). The linear approximations provide good Neumann boundary conditions to use in an approximation that restricts \( z \) to be in a compact interval that includes \( z = \bar{z} \).

Recall the constraint:

\[
\frac{1}{2} r'(\sigma^{-1})' \sigma^{-1} r + \left[ \rho_1 + \rho_2(z - \bar{z}) \right] \left[ -\hat{\beta}(z - \bar{z}) + r_2 \right] + \frac{|\sigma_2|^2}{2} \rho_2 - \frac{q^2}{2} \leq 0.
\]

where \( \Lambda = (\sigma^{-1})' \sigma^{-1} \). Let \( d \) denote a vector of approximate slopes for a minimizing \( r \). Since the quadratic terms in \( z \) dominate the constraint, impose the following restriction on \( d \):

\[
\frac{1}{2} d' \Lambda d - \rho_2 \hat{\beta}_z + \rho_2 d_2 = 0
\]

where \( d_2 \) is the second coordinate of \( d \). From the HJB equation:

\[
(-\delta - \hat{\beta}_z + d_2) \psi + .01(\hat{\beta}_k + d_1) = 0
\]

\[
\Lambda d + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\
\rho_2 
\end{bmatrix} \propto \begin{bmatrix} .01 \\
\psi 
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where \( \psi \) is the approximate slope of value function. The first equation in equation (30) is the derivative of the value function for constant coefficients, putting minimization aside. The second block in (30) consists of two equations derived as the large \( z \) approximation to the first-order conditions implied by (23). After taking ratios of these two latter equations we can cancel the constant of proportionality (the multiplier on the constraint) leaving us with one equation that emerges from the second block. Thus we are left solving three equations in the three unknowns \( d \) and \( \psi \).

Depending on which boundary we target, minimization will result in different choices of \( d \). We let \( d^- \) be the approximate solution for the left boundary with a corresponding value function derivative \( \psi^- \). We define \( d^+ \) and \( \psi^+ \) analogously. Combining equation (29) and the two equations that emerge from (30), we are left with three equations that determine \( (d_1^-, d_2^-, \psi^-) \) and \( (d_1^+, d_2^+, \psi^+) \), where \( \psi^- \) and \( \psi^+ \) are the two approximate boundary conditions for the derivative of the value function. We used \texttt{bvp4c} in Matlab to solve the ode’s over the two intervals \([-2.5, 0]\) and \([0, 2.5]\), where \( \bar{z} = 0 \).
D Decentralization

D.1 Robust investor portfolio problem

A representative investor solves a continuous-time Merton portfolio problem in which individual wealth $A$ evolves as

$$dA_t = -C_t dt + A_t \nu(Z_t) dt + A_t F_t \cdot dW_t + A_t \omega(Z_t) \cdot D_t dt,$$

(31)

where $F_t = f$ is a vector of chosen risk exposures, $\nu(z)$ is an instantaneous risk-free rate, and $\omega(z)$ is a vector of risk prices evaluated at state $Z_t = z$. Initial wealth is $A_0$. The investor discounts the logarithm of consumption and distrusts his probability model.

Key inputs to a representative investor’s robust portfolio problem are the baseline model (1), the wealth evolution equation (31), the vector of risk prices $\omega(z)$, and the quadratic function $\rho$ and relative entropy $q^2$ that define alternative structured models.

Under a guess that the value function takes the form $\tilde{\Psi}(z) + \log a + \log \delta$, the HJB equation for the robust portfolio allocation problem is

$$0 = \max_{c,f} \min_{u,s} -\delta \tilde{\Psi}(z) - \delta \log a - \delta \log \delta - \delta \log c - \frac{c}{\kappa} + \nu(z)$$

$$+ \omega(z) \cdot f + f \cdot u - \frac{|f|^2}{2} + \frac{d\tilde{\Psi}}{dz}(z) \left[ -\beta_z(z - \bar{z}) + \sigma_z \cdot s \right]$$

$$+ \frac{1}{2} |\sigma_z|^2 \frac{d^2 \tilde{\Psi}}{dz^2}(z) + \frac{\theta}{2} |u - s|^2$$

(32)

where extremization is subject to

$$\frac{|s|^2}{2} + \frac{d\rho}{dz}(z) \left[ -\beta_z(z - \bar{z}) + \sigma_z \cdot s \right] + \frac{1}{2} |\sigma_z|^2 \frac{d^2 \rho}{dz^2}(z) - \frac{q^2}{2} = 0.$$ 

(33)

The first-order condition for consumption is

$$\frac{\delta}{c^*} = \frac{1}{\bar{a}},$$

which implies that $c^* = \delta a$, an implication that follows from the unitary elasticity of intertemporal substitution associated with the logarithmic instantaneous utility function.
First-order conditions for $a$ and $u$ are

\[
\omega(z) + u^* - f^* = 0 \quad (34a)
\]

\[
f^* + \theta(u^* - s^*) + \frac{d\hat{\Psi}}{dz}(z)\sigma_z = 0. \quad (34b)
\]

These two equations determine $a^*$ and $u^* - s^*$ as functions of $\omega(z)$ and the value function $\hat{\Psi}$. We determine $s^*$ as a function of $u^*$ by solving

\[
\min_{s} \frac{\theta}{2}|u - s|^2
\]

subject to (33). Taken together, these determine $(f^*, u^*, s^*)$. We can appeal to arguments like those of Hansen and Sargent (2008, ch. 7) to justify stacking first-order conditions as a way to collect equilibrium conditions for the two-person zero-sum game that the robust portfolio problem solves.\footnote{An alternative timing protocol that allows the maximizing player to take account of the impact of its decisions on the minimizing agent implies the same equilibrium decision rules described in the text. See Hansen and Sargent (2008, ch. 5).}

### D.2 Competitive equilibrium prices

We show that the drift distortion $\eta^*$ that emerges from a robust planner’s problem determines prices that a competitive equilibrium awards for bearing model uncertainty. In particular, we compute a vector $\omega(x)$ of competitive equilibrium risk prices by finding a robust planner’s marginal valuations of exposures to the $W$ shocks. We decompose that price vector into separate compensations for bearing risk and for accepting model uncertainty.

We verify that the plan for $\log C$ that emerges from the robust planner’s problem coincides with the plan for consumption that solves the portfolio problem of a robust investor who takes those prices as given.

Noting from the robust planning problem that the shock exposure vectors for $\log A$ and $\log C$ must coincide implies

\[
f^* = (.01)\sigma_x.
\]

From (34b) and the solution for $s^*$

\[
u^* = \eta^*(z),
\]

where $\eta^*$ can be shown to be the worst-case drift from the robust planning problem if we
can show that $\hat{\Psi} = \hat{\Psi}$, where $\hat{\Psi}$ is the value function for the robust planning problem. Thus, from (34a), $\omega = \omega^*$, where

$$\omega^*(z) = (.01)\sigma_c - \eta^*(z).$$

(35)

Similarly, in the problem faced by a representative investor within a competitive equilibrium, the drifts for $\log A$ and $\log C$ coincide:

$$-\delta + \iota(z) + [(0.01)\sigma_c - \eta^*(z)] \cdot a^* - \frac{0.0011}{2} \sigma_c \cdot \sigma_c = (0.01)(\hat{\alpha}_c + \hat{\beta}_c z),$$

so that $\iota = \iota^*$, where

$$\iota^*(z) = \delta + 0.01(\hat{\alpha}_c + \hat{\beta}_c z) + 0.01\sigma_y \cdot \eta^*(z) - \frac{0.0001}{2} \sigma_c \cdot \sigma_c.$$  

(36)

By setting $\hat{\Psi} = \hat{\Psi}$, we use these formulas for equilibrium prices to construct a solution to the HJB equation of a representative investor in a competitive equilibrium.
References


