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ABSTRACT

We argue that a common practice of evaluating portfolio managers relative to a benchmark has real effects. Benchmarking generates additional, inelastic demand for assets inside the benchmark. This leads to a “benchmark inclusion subsidy:” a firm inside the benchmark values an investment project more than the one outside. The same wedge arises for valuing M&A, spinoffs, and IPOs. This overturns the standard corporate finance result that an investment’s value is independent of the entity considering it. We describe the characteristics that determine the subsidy, quantify its size (which could be large), and identify empirical work supporting our model’s predictions.
1 Introduction

The asset management industry is estimated to control more than $85 trillion worldwide. Most of this money is managed against benchmarks. For instance, S&P Global reports that in 2017, just under $10 trillion were managed against the S&P 500 alone.\footnote{As of November 2017, Morgan Stanley Capital International reports that $3.2 trillion was benchmarked against its All Country World Index and $1.9 trillion was managed against its Europe, Australasia and Far East index. Across various markets, FTSE-Russell reports that at the end of 2016 $8.6 trillion was benchmarked to its indices. CRSP reports that assets linked to its indices exceed $1.3 trillion as of September 2018.} Existing research related to benchmarking has largely focused on its asset pricing implications. Instead, we look at the implications of benchmarking for corporate decisions such as investments, M&A, spinoffs, and IPOs. We argue that firms included in a benchmark are effectively subsidized by asset managers and so should evaluate investment opportunities differently.

In standard corporate finance, the value of an investment is independent of the entity considering it. We show that this is generally not the case when some investors use portfolio (or fund) managers, whose performance is measured against a benchmark. Instead, the appropriate discount rate for an investment project differs across firms, depending on whether or not they are part of the benchmark. Specifically, when a firm adds risky cash flows, say, because of an acquisition or by investing in a new project, the increase in the stockholder value is larger if the firm is inside the benchmark rather than outside. We call this the “benchmark inclusion subsidy.” Because of this subsidy, a firm in the benchmark would accept cash flows with lower mean and/or larger variance than a non-benchmark firm would.

The reason for this result is that benchmarking induces portfolio managers to hold some shares of firms in their benchmarks regardless of those firms’ cash flows characteristics. So when a firm adds risky cash flows, the market demand for claims on these cash flows is higher if the firm is inside the benchmark rather than outside. The firm, therefore, should take this consideration into account in deciding on its investments, acquisitions and spinoffs.

Here is how the model works. We introduce portfolio managers into an otherwise standard setting. Some investors manage their own portfolios and others use managers. A portfolio manager’s compensation depends on performance relative to a benchmark portfolio. This assumption, critical for our argument, is in keeping with prevalent industry practices and evidence such as \textcite{Ma, Tang, and Gómez (2019)}. We show that portfolio managers optimally choose to hold a combination of the standard mean-variance portfolio and the benchmark portfolio—the latter appearing because of benchmarking in their com-
pensation. Specifically, managers hold a fixed part of their portfolio in benchmark firms regardless of their stock prices and cash-flow characteristics—most importantly, irrespective of cash-flow variance. As a result, the equilibrium stock price of a firm in the benchmark is less adversely affected by the same cash-flow risk than that of an otherwise identical firm that is outside the benchmark.

Within our production economy, we show that the same argument applies to risky investments. Specifically, for a firm in the benchmark risky investments are subsidized. The extra variance of its cash flows resulting from the project will be penalized less than that of an identical non-benchmark firm. This occurs because managers have an inelastic demand for a fixed number of shares of benchmark firms, regardless of their risk. This inelastic demand benefits riskier projects more. As cash-flow riskiness decreases, so does the benchmark inclusion subsidy, converging to zero for risk-free projects.

Because of the subsidy, a firm in the benchmark is more likely to invest. A benchmark firm would also accept projects with riskier cash flows. We review empirical evidence that confirms both of these implications.

To demonstrate these predictions in the most transparent way, we construct the simplest possible example. In it, there are three firms with uncorrelated cash flows. Absent portfolio managers, combining firms creates no value. With portfolio managers, a firm inside the benchmark creates value when it takes over a firm that is outside the benchmark.

We then turn to an extended model with many firms whose cash flows are correlated. Allowing for correlations brings out additional effects and predictions. In particular, we find that investments whose cash flows are positively correlated with those of the benchmark firms are valued more. As in the economy with uncorrelated cash flows, portfolio managers’ excess demand for benchmark stocks raises those stocks’ prices. Now, the stock prices of firms whose cash flows are positively correlated with those of the benchmark stocks also rise. This happens because, in seeking exposure to the benchmark’s cash-flow risk, investors substitute away from expensive benchmark stocks into stocks that are correlated with them. This same reasoning means that investment projects or acquisitions that are positively correlated with the benchmark are valued more by all firms (relative to an economy without portfolio managers).

We show that the main mechanism that delivered the benchmark inclusion subsidy in the example generalizes. The extended model also features an additional channel, owing to the correlation of a project’s cash flows with those of the firm’s assets-in-place. We demonstrate that if this correlation is positive, the value of the new asset to the benchmark
firm exceeds the asset’s value were it to join the benchmark as a standalone.

We derive a closed-form expression for the benchmark inclusion subsidy, which turns out to be very simple, and study the variables that influence its size. We show that the higher the cash-flow risk of an investment, the larger the benchmark inclusion subsidy. Furthermore, the benchmark inclusion subsidy is increasing in the correlation of a project’s cash flows with the existing assets; in particular, the subsidy is the largest for projects that are clones of a firm’s existing assets. Finally, the size of the subsidy rises with the size of the asset management sector.

The ability to characterize the exact determinants of the subsidy allows us to predict the situations when benchmarking is the most and least important. To the best of our knowledge, other theories do not deliver such cross-sectional predictions. We are able to tie the size of the subsidy to characteristics of firms, investment opportunities, or potential acquisitions or divestitures.

For M&A, we stress that a merger of a firm in the benchmark with a firm outside creates value for stockholders. There are no cash-flow synergies, but there is a financial synergy that comes from bringing the target into the benchmark. This contrasts with the standard corporate finance result that such a merger creates no value. For IPOs, we highlight the implication that an IPO would have a higher value if the stock joins the benchmark. For spinoffs, we demonstrate that if an asset divested by a benchmark firm lands outside the benchmark, it is stripped of the benchmark inclusion subsidy and hence its value drops.

Our analysis implies that a model for the cost of capital that does not account for the presence of portfolio managers is misspecified. With portfolio managers, the benchmark becomes a factor that influences expected returns. In our model, both the benchmark and the usual market portfolio matter for pricing assets. The right model for the cost of capital in our environment is, therefore, not the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) that is typically used in corporate finance, but its two-factor modification that accounts for the presence of portfolio managers.

It is worth noting that our model applies to both active and passive asset management. We show that the benchmark inclusion subsidy is larger when more managers are passive rather than active. While active managers in our model invest only a part of their portfolio in the benchmark, passive managers invest their entire portfolio in it, which amplifies the inelastic demand for stocks in the benchmark.

We review existing empirical work that relates to the model’s predictions. Past research confirms, to varying degrees, the predictions regarding the propensity to invest and engage
in acquisitions for benchmark vs. non-benchmark firms, the factor structure of returns, as well as the size of the benchmark inclusion subsidy increasing in assets under management.

Finally, we attempt to quantify the size of the subsidy. Doing so requires us to pin down a number of model parameters whose values are not obvious. However, the primary determinant of the subsidy’s size is the amount of the inelastic demand that the portfolio managers have for stocks inside the benchmark. According to the FactSet/LionShares database, in 2017, stocks belonging to the S&P 500 have institutional ownership of 83 percent, whereas institutional ownership for the overall market is 67 percent. We take this gap to be indicative of the inelastic demand for benchmark stocks. When we ask the model to account for this demand, as well as the relative size of firms inside and outside the benchmark, and of estimates of the spread in market beta’s observed in the data, the implied subsidy is 94 basis points. We explore how alternative parameter choices change this number and conclude that the subsidy could easily be large enough to be important for the kind of corporate decisions that we have analyzed.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we explain how our perspective compares to previous work. Section 3 presents the example, and Section 4 analyzes the general model. Section 5 reviews related empirical evidence. Section 6 describes how we quantify the size of the subsidy. Section 7 presents our conclusions and suggestions for future areas of promising research. Omitted proofs are in the appendix.

2 Related Literature

Our paper revisits one of the main tenets of corporate finance that the value of an investment is independent of the entity considering it. This point is emphasized in leading textbooks such as Berk and DeMarzo (2017) (chapter 19), Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2019) (chapter 19), and Grinblatt and Titman (2002) (chapter 13). There is a huge academic and applied literature on capital budgeting (see, e.g. Stulz, 1999, Jacobs and Shivdasani, 2012, Dessaint, Olivier, Otto, and Thesmar, 2018, for a range of representative studies). Finally, there is survey evidence (e.g. Graham and Harvey, 2001) on how managers make such decisions. In this approach, asset management plays no role.

Our analysis shows that the textbook approach’s failure to properly account for the effects of asset management has important consequences for real corporate decisions. The motivation for taking asset management seriously comes from the index additions and deletions literature. Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) were the first to document
that when stocks are added to the S&P 500 index, their prices rise. Subsequent papers have also shown that firms that are deleted experience a decline in price. The findings have been confirmed across many studies and for many markets, so that financial economists consider these patterns to be stylized facts.\(^2\) The estimated magnitudes of the index effect vary across studies, and typically most of the effect is permanent. For example, Chen, Noronha, and Singal (2004) find the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks added to the S&P 500 during 1989-2000, measured over two months post announcement, to be 6.2\%.\(^3\)

Several theories have been used to interpret the index effect. The first is the investor awareness theory of Merton (1987). Merton posits that some investors become aware of and invest in a stock only when it gets included in a popular index. It is unclear why investor awareness declines for index deletions, although there is evidence of a decrease in analyst coverage. The second theory posits that index inclusions convey information about a firm’s improved prospects. This theory has difficulty explaining the presence of index effects around mechanical index recompositions (see, e.g., Boyer, 2011, among others). The third theory is that index inclusion leads to improved liquidity, and this in turn boosts stock prices. This theory, however, does not explain increased correlations with other index stocks (documented in, e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler, 2005 and Boyer, 2011).

The final theory can be broadly described as the price pressure theory, proposed by Scholes (1972). Scholes’ prediction is that prices of included stocks should rise temporarily, to compensate liquidity providers, but should revert back as investors find substitutes for these stocks. Subsequent literature has argued that the price pressure effects could be (more) permanent, driven by changing compositions of investors. Our model is broadly consistent with the price pressure view. Our benchmarked managers put permanent upward pressure on prices of stocks as long as they are in the benchmark. Despite any overpricing, benchmarking creates a fixed demand for these stocks by a particular clientele, the portfolio managers. Holding a substitute stock is costly for a manager because this entails a (risky) deviation from her benchmark.

The index effect literature only considers the average effect of index inclusion. Our theory has a host of cross-sectional predictions that one could potentially test. For example, stocks with larger cash-flow variance should experience a larger index effect. We also stress


\(^3\)Calomiris, Larraín, Schmukler, and Williams (2019) find an index effect for emerging market corporate bonds. They trace the rise of the JP Morgan Corporate Emerging Market Bond Index and show how firms in countries that became eligible change issuance patterns (to qualify for index inclusion) and pay lower yields on qualifying bond issues.
that what matters for our channel is whether a stock is in the benchmark, not the index, and so our model can be used to separate competing theories by studying stocks that are in the index but not the benchmark (e.g., “sin” stocks, as analyzed in Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009).

Our work is also related to a theoretical literature in asset pricing that explores the effects of benchmarking on stock returns and their comovement. The first paper in this line of research is Brennan (1993), who, like us, derives a two-factor CAPM in an economy with portfolio managers. Cuoco and Kaniel (2011), Basak and Pavlova (2013), and Buffa, Vayanos, and Woolley (2014) show how benchmarking creates additional demand for stocks included in the benchmark index, generating an index effect. Basak and Pavlova also derive excess comovement of index stocks. Greenwood (2005) considers a model with passive indexers and arbitrageurs (who are like our direct investors) and shows that an index reconstitution not only lifts prices of stocks added to the index but also those of non-index stocks that are positively correlated with them. This literature considers pure exchange economies and focuses on asset prices, while ours is a production economy, in which we study the effects of benchmarking on investment and other corporate decisions.

Kashyap, Kovrijnykh, Li, and Pavlova (2020) study the design of optimal (linear) contracts for portfolio managers and the resulting welfare implications. In contrast, this paper takes the contracts as exogenous and looks at their implications for corporate decisions.

Our paper is perhaps most closely related to Stein (1996). He also studies capital budgeting in situations where the CAPM does not correctly describe expected stock returns. He assumes, however, that the deviations are temporary and arise because of investor irrationality. If market participants fail to appreciate risk and allow a firm to issue mispriced equity, he explains why rational managers may want to issue equity and invest, even if the CAPM-based valuation of a project is negative. In our case, the price differences are not due to irrationality; instead, they arise because of fundamental differences in demand from different types of investors. In Stein’s setup, the horizon that managers use for making decisions is critical, and those that are short-term oriented will potentially respond to mispricing if it is big enough. In our model, all managers of firms in the benchmark should account for the subsidy (for as long as the firm remains in the benchmark).

Stein’s paper led to a number of follow-on studies that look at other potential behavioral effects that could be associated with inclusion in a benchmark (see Baker and Wurgler, 2012).

van Binsbergen and Opp (2019) study the effects of other anomalies that are associated with mispricing on corporate decisions. However, they do not take a stand on the source of these anomalies.
These papers contain much of the empirical work that we cite in favor of our model. While we share several predictions with Stein (1996) there are some notable differences. For instance, Stein’s model connects managerial time horizons and financial constraints to capital budgeting decisions. Our model has nothing to say about these considerations. However, we also have many implications that are distinct from his. For instance, our closed-form expression for the benchmark inclusion subsidy generates a number of predictions about which factors should lead firms in the benchmark to make different decisions than ones outside. On the whole, we see the behavioral theories and ours complementing each other.

Finally, there is recent literature on mistakes that managers make in project valuation. For example, Krüger, Landier, and Thesmar (2015) document that diversified firms appear to make investment decisions in non-core businesses by using the discount rate from their core business. Interestingly, in our model, the benchmark inclusion subsidy applies to the entire firm so there is a basis for having part of the cost of capital depend on that firm-wide characteristic.

3 Example

To illustrate the main mechanism, we begin with a simple example with three firms with uncorrelated cashflows. We first consider an economy populated by identical investors in these firms who manage their own portfolios. We then modify the economy by introducing another group of investors who hire portfolio managers to run their portfolios. Portfolio managers’ performance is evaluated relative to a benchmark. We show that the presence of portfolio managers invalidates the standard approach to corporate valuation.

3.1 Baseline Economy

Consider the following environment. There are two periods, $t = 0, 1$. Investment opportunities are represented by three risky assets denoted by 1, 2, and $y$, and one risk-free bond. The risky assets are claims to cash flows $D_i$ realized at $t = 1$, where $D_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)$, $i = 1, 2, y$, and these cash flows are uncorrelated. We think of these assets as stocks of all equity firms. The risk-free bond pays an interest rate that is normalized to zero. Each of the risky assets is available in a fixed supply that is normalized to one. The bond is in infinite net supply. Let $S_i$ denote the price of asset $i = 1, 2, y$. 

2013 for a survey).
There is measure one of identical agents who invest their own funds. Each investor has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function over final wealth $W$, $U(W) = -e^{-\gamma W}$, where $\gamma > 0$ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. All investors are endowed with one share of each stock and no bonds. At $t = 0$, each investor chooses a portfolio of stocks $x = (x_1, x_2, x_y)\top$ and the bond holdings to maximize his utility, with $W(x) = \sum_{i=1,2,y} S_i + x_i(D_i - S_i)$.

As is well-known in this kind of setup, the demand $x_i$ for risky asset $i$ and the corresponding equilibrium price $S_i$ will be

$$x_i = \frac{\mu_i - S_i}{\gamma \sigma_i^2},$$
$$S_i = \mu_i - \gamma \sigma_i^2$$

for $i = 1, 2, y$, where the second equation follows from setting the number of shares demanded equal to the supply (which is 1).\footnote{We omit derivations for this simple example, but the analysis of our main model contains all proofs for the general case.}

When firms $i \in \{1, 2\}$ and $y$ merge into a single firm, the demand for the combined firm’s stock and the corresponding equilibrium stock price are

$$x_i' = \frac{\mu_i + \mu_y - S_i'}{\gamma (\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_y^2)},$$
$$S_i' = \mu_i + \mu_y - \gamma (\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_y^2) = S_i + S_y.$$

Notice that the combined value of either firm is exactly equal to the sum of its initial value plus the value of $y$. This is a standard corporate valuation result that says that the owner of a firm does not determine its value. Instead, the value arises from the cash flows (and risks) associated with the firm, which are the same regardless of who owns it.

### 3.2 Adding Portfolio Managers

Now we extend the example by assuming that some investors hire portfolio managers to manage their portfolios. There are now three types of agents in the economy, the same investors as before who manage their own portfolios and whom we refer to as “direct” investors from now on (constituting a fraction $\lambda_D$ of the population), portfolio (or fund)
managers (a fraction $\lambda_M$), and fund investors who hire those managers (a fraction $\lambda_F$). All agents have the same preferences (as in the example).

Fund investors can buy the bond directly, but cannot trade stocks; they delegate the selection of their portfolios to portfolio managers. The managers receive compensation $w$ from shareholders. This compensation has three parts: one is a linear payout based on absolute performance of the portfolio $x$, the second piece depends on the performance relative to the benchmark portfolio, and the third is independent of performance. For concreteness, suppose that the benchmark is simply the stock of firm 1. Then

$$w = ar_x + b(r_x - r_b) + c = (a + b)r_x - br_b + c,$$

(1)

where $a \geq 0$, $b > 0$ and $c$ are constants, $r_x = \sum_{i=1,2,y} x_i(D_i - S_i)$ and $r_b = D_1 - S_1$. For simplicity, we assume that $a$, $b$, and $c$ are set exogenously.

A direct investor’s demand for asset $i$ continues to be

$$x^D_i = \mu_i - S_i / \gamma \sigma^2_i, \quad i = 1, 2, y.$$ 

A portfolio manager’s demands for stocks inside and outside the benchmark are

$$x^M_1 = \frac{1}{a + b} \frac{\mu_1 - S_1}{\gamma \sigma^2_1} + \frac{b}{a + b},$$

$$x^M_i = \frac{1}{a + b} \frac{\mu_i - S_i}{\gamma \sigma^2_i}, \quad i = 2, y.$$

As usual, a direct investor’s portfolio is the mean-variance portfolio, scaled by his risk aversion $\gamma$. Managers’ portfolio choices differ from those of the direct investors in two ways. First, they hold a scaled version of the same mean-variance portfolio as the one held by the direct investors. The reason for the scaling is that, as we can see from the first term in (1), for each share that the manager holds, she gets a fraction $a + b$ of the total return. Thus the manager scales her asset holdings by $1/(a + b)$ relative to those of a direct investor.

Second, and more importantly, the portfolio managers are penalized by $b$ for underperforming the benchmark. Because of this penalty, the manager always holds $b/(a + b)$ shares

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6For simplicity, we assume that each fund investor employs one manager, so that $\lambda_M = \lambda_F$. (The generalization to $\lambda_M \neq \lambda_F$ is straightforward.) Furthermore, $\lambda_D + \lambda_M + \lambda_F = 1$.

7This part captures features such as a fee linked to initial assets under management.

8Kashyap, Kovrijnykh, Li, and Pavlova (2020) endogenize optimal linear contracts for portfolio managers and show that benchmarking emerges as part of the optimal contract.
of stock 1 (or more generally whatever is in the benchmark), regardless of its risk-return characteristics. This consideration explains the second term in (2). This inelastic demand for the benchmark will be critical for all of our results. In particular, the managers’ incentive to hold the benchmark portfolio (regardless of the risk characteristics of its constituents) creates an asymmetry between stocks in the benchmark and all other stocks.

The second implication is very general and extends beyond our model with CARA preferences. Having a relative performance component as part of her compensation exposes the manager to an additional source of risk—fluctuations in the benchmark—which she optimally decides to hedge. The manager would, therefore, hold a hedging portfolio that is (perfectly) correlated with the benchmark, i.e., the benchmark itself.

Given the demands, we can now solve for the equilibrium prices. Using the market-clearing condition for stocks, \(\lambda_M x_i^M + \lambda_D x_i^D = 1, \ i = 1, 2, y\), we find

\[
\begin{align*}
S_1 &= \mu_1 - \gamma \Lambda \sigma_1^2 \left(1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a+b}\right), \\
S_2 &= \mu_2 - \gamma \Lambda \sigma_2^2, \\
S_y &= \mu_y - \gamma \Lambda \sigma_y^2,
\end{align*}
\]

where \(\Lambda = \left[\lambda_M/(a+b) + \lambda_D\right]^{-1}\) modifies the market’s effective risk aversion.

For concreteness, suppose that \(\mu_1 = \mu_2\) and \(\sigma_1 = \sigma_2\) so that the return and risks of stocks 1 and 2 are identical. Our first noteworthy finding is that the share price of firm 1 that is inside the benchmark is higher than that of its twin that is not. This happens because portfolio managers automatically tilt their demand towards the benchmark, effectively reducing the supply of this stock by \(b/(b+a)\). The lower the supply of the stock (all else equal), the higher must be its equilibrium price. Another way to understand the result is that the managers’ inelastic demand for the benchmark means that the adverse effects of variance that typically reduce the demand for any stock, are less relevant for the assets in the benchmark.\(^9\)

Next, consider potential mergers. Suppose first that firm \(y\) is acquired by the non-

\(^9\)Notice that in this model the asymmetry between benchmark and non-benchmark stocks cannot be arbitrated away. The direct investors are unrestricted in their portfolio choice and therefore can engage in any arbitrage activity. However, as the managers permanently reduce the supply of the benchmark stock, direct investors simply reduce their holdings of the benchmark stock and hold more of the non-benchmark stock. These implications are similar to the effects of quantitative easing in bond markets, whereby a central bank buys a significant fraction of outstanding bonds. As long as managers represent a meaningful fraction of the market (i.e., \(\lambda_M\) is non-negligible), there are always differences in prices of stocks inside and outside the benchmark.
benchmark firm (firm 2). The new demands of direct investors and portfolio managers for the stock of firm 2 are

\[
x_2^D = \frac{\mu_2 + \mu_y - S'_2}{\gamma (\sigma_2^2 + \sigma_y^2)},
\]
\[
x_2^M = \frac{1}{a + b} \frac{\mu_2 + \mu_y - S'_2}{\gamma (\sigma_2^2 + \sigma_y^2)}.
\]

The new equilibrium price of firm 2’s stock is

\[
S'_2 = \mu_2 + \mu_y - \gamma \Lambda (\sigma_2^2 + \sigma_y^2) = S_2 + S_y.
\]

As before, the combined value of firm 2, continues to be the sum of the initial value plus the value of \( y \).

Suppose instead that \( y \) is acquired by firm 1, which is in the benchmark. Re-normalizing the combined number of shares of firm 1 to one, the demands for the stock of the combined firm are

\[
x_1^D = \frac{\mu_1 + \mu_y - S'_1}{\gamma (\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_y^2)},
\]
\[
x_1^M = \frac{1}{a + b} \frac{\mu_1 + \mu_y - S'_1}{\gamma (\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_y^2)} + \frac{b}{a + b}.
\]

Our next major finding is that there is a benchmark inclusion subsidy. Specifically, the new price of firm 1’s shares is

\[
S'_1 = \mu_1 + \mu_y - \gamma \Lambda (\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_y^2) \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \right) = S_1 + S_y + \gamma \Lambda \sigma_y^2 \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b},
\]

which is strictly larger than the sum of \( S_1 \) and \( S_y \). So when a firm inside the benchmark acquires \( y \) (which had been outside the benchmark), the combined value exceeds the sum of the initial value plus the value of \( y \).\(^{10}\) We refer to the increment as the benchmark inclusion subsidy. This subsidy exists because portfolio managers’ demand for the benchmark is partially divorced from the risk and return characteristics of the benchmark, and thus, this kind of acquisition raises the value of the target firm. You can see this by noting that the last term in (6) is proportional to the variance of \( y, \sigma_y^2 \). This is because when \( y \) is acquired

\(^{10}\)This result does not depend on the firm being entirely equity financed. We assume no debt financing here just for simplicity.
by firm 1, a portion of managers’ demand for \( y \) becomes inelastic and independent of its variance. Hence, the market penalizes the variance of \( y \)’s cash flows less when they are inside firm 1 rather than firm 2.

In contrast, notice that if firm \( y \) had started out inside the benchmark, then \( S'_1 \) would be exactly equal to the sum of prices of stocks 1 and \( y \). In that case, the inelastic demand for the stock would already have been embedded in its price before the merger. So, the extra value of acquisition that accrues to firm 1 relative to firm 2 arises from the increase in the price of \( y \) when it becomes part of the benchmark.

To put this more formally, let \( S'_y \) denote the price of \( y \) if it were inside the benchmark. Then \( S'_y - S_y = \gamma \Lambda \sigma^2_y \lambda_M b / (a + b) \), which is precisely the extra term in equation (6). Notice that this is directly related to the “index effect” estimated in the literature, which is the percentage change in a firm’s stock price when it joins the benchmark, and in our model is

\[
\frac{S'_y - S_y}{S_y} = \frac{\gamma \Lambda \sigma^2_y \lambda_M b}{S_y} \frac{1}{a + b},
\]

where \( S_y \) is given by (5).

Thus, in this simple example, the benchmark inclusion subsidy reduces to the index effect for the target firm. As we will show in the general model in Section 4, if we allow for any correlation between the acquirer’s and the target’s cash flows, the benchmark inclusion subsidy will have an additional term accounting for the correlation. When the correlation is positive, the subsidy exceeds the index effect for the target firm.

It is worth noting that our model predicts that the index effect is larger for firms with riskier cash flows. This can be seen from equation (7), where the index effect is increasing in \( \sigma^2_y \), even after controlling for the stock price before the inclusion. The literature so far has focused on estimating the average index effect. In contrast, our model makes cross-sectional implications about how the index effect varies with firms’ risk characteristics.

Finally, the impact of portfolio managers can also work in the other direction, reducing valuations of spinoffs and divestitures. If \( y \) had been part of a firm inside the benchmark and is sold to a non-benchmark firm, the value of \( y \) would drop when it is transferred.

In the next section, we consider a richer version of the setup that allows us to analyze several additional questions. Based just on this extremely simplified example, however, we already have seen two empirical predictions. First, consistent with the existing literature on index inclusions, we see that there should be an increase in a firm’s share price when it is added to the benchmark. We view this as a necessary condition for the existence of
the benchmark inclusion subsidy. In our framework, the stock price increase would remain present for as long as the firm is part of the benchmark.

The other prediction is related to acquisitions (and spinoffs) and is the one that is more novel. If a firm that has not previously been part of the benchmark is acquired by a benchmark firm, its value should go up purely from moving into the benchmark. This breaks the usual valuation result which presumes that an asset purchase that does not alter any cash flows (of either the target or acquirer) should not create any value. Alternatively, if a firm were spun-off so that it moves from being part of the benchmark to no longer belonging to the benchmark, its value should drop even though its cash flows are unchanged.

The results in this section, and all the ones in the following section, depend on the compensation contract having a non-zero value of \( b \). There is both direct empirical evidence and strong intuitive reasons for why this assumption should hold. For instance, since 2005 mutual funds in U.S. have been required to include a “Statement of Additional Information” in the prospectus that describes how portfolio managers are compensated. Ma, Tang, and Gómez (2019) hand collect this information for 4500 mutual funds and find more than three quarters of the funds explicitly base compensation on performance relative to a benchmark (that they are able to identify). Bank for International Settlements (2003) presents survey-based evidence for a sample of other asset managers including sovereign wealth funds and pension funds, and also finds that performance evaluation relative to benchmarks is pervasive. To see why these results are expected, consider any portfolio manager that runs multiple funds with different characteristics, for instance, a bond fund and an equity fund. To compensate the portfolio managers of each fund, the simple returns cannot be meaningfully compared because of the differences in risk. However, if each fund’s performance is adjusted for a benchmark for its type, then the relative performances can be compared. So, it is hardly surprising that the use of benchmarks is so pervasive and our assumption concerning \( b \) should not be controversial.

4 The General Model

We now generalize the example studied in Section 3 in several directions. All results from the previous section hold in this richer model. To analyze a new implication for investment, we will assume that \( y \) is not traded initially. So our economy becomes a production economy in which \( y \) is interpreted as a potential project.

We will only describe elements of the environment that differ from those described in the
previous section. There are \( n \) risky stocks, whose total cash flows \( D = (D_1, \ldots, D_n)\top \) are jointly normally distributed, \( D \sim N(\mu, \Sigma) \), where \( \mu = (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_n)\top \), \( \Sigma_{ii} = \text{Var}(D_i) = \sigma_i^2 \), and \( \Sigma_{ij} = \text{Cov}(D_i, D_j) = \rho_{ij} \sigma_i \sigma_j \). We assume that the matrix \( \Sigma \) is invertible. Stock prices are denoted by \( S = (S_1, \ldots, S_n)\top \). For simplicity of exposition and for easier comparison to Section 3, we normalize the total number of shares of each asset to one. However, for generality, all of our proofs in the appendix are written for the case when asset \( i \)'s total number of shares is \( \bar{x}_i \).

Some stocks are part of a benchmark. We order them so that all shares of the first \( k \) stocks are in the benchmark, and none of the remaining \( n - k \) stocks are included. Thus, the \( i \)th element of the benchmark portfolio equals the total number of shares of asset \( i \) times \( 1_i \), where \( 1_i = 1 \) if \( i \in \{1, \ldots, k\} \) and \( 1_i = 0 \) if \( i \in \{k + 1, \ldots, n\} \). Denote further \( 1_b = (1_1, \ldots, 1_n)\top = (1, \ldots, 1\underbrace{0, \ldots, 0}_{n-k})\top \).

We follow the convention in the literature (see, e.g., Buffa, Vayanos, and Woolley, 2014) by defining \( r_x = x\top(D - S) \) to be the performance of portfolio \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)\top \) and \( r_b = 1_b\top(D - S) \) to be the performance of the benchmark portfolio. Then the compensation of a portfolio manager with contract \((a, b, c)\) is \( w = ar_x + b(r_x - r_b) + c \).

Denote by \( x^D = (x^D_1, \ldots, x^D_n)\top \) and \( x^M = (x^M_1, \ldots, x^M_n)\top \) the optimal portfolio choices of a direct investor and a portfolio manager, respectively.

**Lemma 1 (Portfolio Choice).** Given asset prices \( S \), the demands of a direct investor and a portfolio manager are given by

\[
x^D = \Sigma^{-1} \frac{\mu - S}{\gamma},
\]

\[
x^M = \frac{1}{a + b} \Sigma^{-1} \frac{\mu - S}{\gamma} + \frac{b}{a + b} 1_b.
\]

The demands generalize those from the example exactly as would be expected. In particular, the direct investors opt for the mean-variance portfolio and the portfolio managers choose a linear combination of that portfolio and the benchmark. The fact that part of the managers’ portfolio is invested in the benchmark regardless of prices or other characteristics of these assets will again be crucial for our results below.

An extreme form of our manager is a passive manager—someone who faces a very high

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\(^{11}\)In Appendix B we repeat all of the analysis for the case where a portfolio manager’s compensation is tied to the per-dollar return on the benchmark rather than the per-share return (performance) and confirm that our key results continue to hold.
b, which incentivizes her to hold just the benchmark portfolio and severely punishes any deviations from it. We will discuss this special case further in subsection 4.5.

Using (8)–(9) and the market-clearing condition $\lambda_M x^M + \lambda_D x^D = 1 \equiv (1, \ldots, 1)^\top$, we have:

**Lemma 2 (Asset Prices).** The equilibrium asset prices are

$$S = \mu - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma \left(1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} 1_b\right).$$  \hfill (10)

Equation (10) is a generalization of equations (3) and (4). As before, the price of a benchmark firm is higher than it would be for an otherwise identical non-benchmark firm. The reason is that as Lemma 1 shows, managers demand a larger amount of the stock in the benchmark.

Importantly, as Lemma 3 below demonstrates, the standard CAPM does not hold in our environment. It applies only in the special case in which no managers are present ($\lambda_M = 0$ and $\lambda_D = 1$). Otherwise, the stocks’ expected returns depend on two factors, the usual market portfolio and the benchmark.\(^{12}\)

**Lemma 3 (Two-Factor CAPM).** Asset returns $R_i = D_i/S_i$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$, can be characterized by\(^{13}\)

$$E(R_i) - 1 = \beta_i^m \kappa_m - \beta_i^b \kappa_b, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n,$$

where

$$\beta_i^m = \frac{\text{Cov}(R_i, R_m)}{\text{Var}(R_m)}, \quad \beta_i^b = \frac{\text{Cov}(R_i, R_b)}{\text{Var}(R_b)}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n,$$

and $\kappa_m > 0$ and $\kappa_b > 0$ are the market and benchmark risk premia, and $R_m$ and $R_b$ are the market and benchmark returns, respectively, reported in Appendix A.

The benchmark portfolio emerges as a factor because portfolio managers are evaluated relative to it. Stocks that load positively on this factor have lower expected returns because managers overinvest in the benchmark, which drives down the expected returns of its constituents. Stocks outside the benchmark that covary positively with the benchmark also have lower expected returns because direct investors (as well as managers through their

\(^{12}\)This result has been obtained in Brennan (1993).

\(^{13}\)The left-hand side of equation (11) contains the return in excess of the (gross) return on the risk-free bond, where the latter is normalized to one in our model.
mean-variance portfolio) who desire exposure to the benchmark buy these cheaper, non-benchmark stocks instead, pushing up their prices. Lemma 3 demonstrates this formally.

The two-factor CAPM is not intended to be a fully credible asset pricing model. Our model certainly has its limitations because it does not account for the fact that in practice managers are evaluated relative to heterogeneous benchmarks, representing different investment objectives (large cap, value, growth, etc.). Instead, we emphasize that the prevailing corporate finance approach to valuation based on the “asset beta” coupled with the standard CAPM does not apply in our economy. Lemma 3 implies that the cost of capital for firms inside the benchmark is lower than for their identical twins that are outside. Therefore, the usual conclusion that the value of a project is independent of which firm adopts it does not hold.

4.1 Investment

Suppose there is a project with cash flows $D_y \sim N(\mu_y, \sigma^2_y)$, and Corr($D_i, D_y$) = $\rho_{iy}$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n$. Investing in this project requires spending $I$. If firm $i$ (whose cash flows are $D_i$) invests, its cash flows in period 1 become $D_i + D_y$. Let $S^{(i)} = \left(S^{(i)}_1, \ldots, S^{(i)}_n\right)\top$ denote the stock prices if firm $i$ invests in the project. The firm finances investment by issuing equity. That is, we assume that if firm $i$ invests in the project, it issues $\delta_i$ additional shares to finance it, where $\delta_i S^{(i)}_i = I$. If firm $i$ is in the benchmark, then the additional shares enter the benchmark.

To proceed, suppose firm $i$ (and only firm $i$) invests in the project. Then the new cash flows are $D^{(i)} = D + (0, \ldots, 0, D_y, 0, \ldots, 0)\top$, distributed according to $N \left(\mu^{(i)}, \Sigma^{(i)}\right)$, where

$$\mu^{(i)} = \mu + (0, \ldots, 0, \mu_y, 0, \ldots, 0)\top$$

and

$$\Sigma^{(i)} = \Sigma + \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \rho_{1y}\sigma_1\sigma_y & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \sigma^2_y + 2\rho_{iy}\sigma_i\sigma_y & \cdots & \rho_{ny}\sigma_n\sigma_y \\ 0 & \vdots & \ddots & 0 \\ \rho_{ny}\sigma_n\sigma_y & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$
Denote $I^{(i)} = (0, \ldots, 0, I, 0, \ldots, 0)^\top$.

**Lemma 4 (Post-Investment Asset Prices).** The equilibrium stock prices when firm $i$ invests in the project are given by

$$S^{(i)} = \mu^{(i)} - I^{(i)} - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma^{(i)} \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a+b} \mathbf{1}_b \right). \tag{12}$$

The change in the stockholder value of the investing firm $i$, $\Delta S_i \equiv S^{(i)}_i - S_i$, is

$$\Delta S_i = \mu_y - I - \gamma \Lambda \left( \sigma_y^2 + \rho_{iy} \sigma_y \sigma_y \right) \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a+b} \mathbf{1}_i \right) - \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^n \rho_{jy} \sigma_j \sigma_y \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a+b} \mathbf{1}_j \right). \tag{13}$$

The first two terms in the first line of (13) are the expected cash flows of the project net of the cost of investment, and the remaining terms reflect the penalty for risk. It is evident from (13) that this penalty differs if $i$ is part of the benchmark, so it will turn out to be subject to the benchmark inclusion subsidy that we have already seen in the example in Section 3.

Notice that the terms on second line of (13) are the same regardless of the identity of the investing firm. When any firm invests in a project positively correlated with the benchmark, this firm’s cash flows become more correlated with the benchmark. As we have seen from the two-factor CAPM, the presence of managers makes stocks that covary positively with the benchmark more expensive relative to what they would have been in the economy with only direct investors. This happens because the investors substitute from the expensive stocks in the benchmark to stocks that are correlated with it. A similar logic applies to new investment projects that are correlated with the benchmark: relative to the economy without portfolio managers, firms have a higher valuation for projects whose cash flows are positively correlated with cash flows of benchmark firms. This force, not present in Section 3, applies to all firms contemplating investment, including the non-benchmark ones. We comment further on how it affects firms’ investment incentives at the end of this subsection.

We are now ready to derive the benchmark inclusion subsidy in this generalized setting. Consider incentives of firm $i$ to invest in a project. It will do so if its stockholder value goes up as a result of the investment, that is, if $\Delta S_i > 0$. Consider two firms, $i_{ns}$ and
out, one in the benchmark and the other is not (i.e., \( i_{\text{in}} \leq k \) and \( i_{\text{out}} > k \)). Suppose that their cash flows with and without the project are identical; specifically, \( \sigma_{i_{\text{in}}} = \sigma_{i_{\text{out}}} = \sigma \) and \( \rho_{i_{\text{in}}y} = \rho_{i_{\text{out}}y} = \rho_y \). The difference in the incremental stockholder value created by the investment for the two firms is

\[
\Delta S_{i_{\text{in}}} - \Delta S_{i_{\text{out}}} = \gamma \Lambda (\sigma_y^2 + \rho_y \sigma_y \rho_{y\sigma_y} \lambda_M b) \frac{b}{a + b}.
\]  

(14)

The right hand side of (14) is the analytical expression for the benchmark inclusion subsidy.

**Assumption 1.** \( \sigma_y^2 + \rho_y \sigma_y > 0 \).

So long as Assumption 1 holds, the benchmark inclusion subsidy is positive, and the increase in the stockholder value for the firm in the benchmark is larger than that for the firm outside the benchmark.

In practice one would expect Assumption 1 to hold for most investments. A typical project that a firm undertakes is similar to its existing activities. Even if a project is diversifying, it is still typically positively correlated with the firm’s original cash flows.

The more general structure that we consider in this section allows us to fully characterize the benchmark inclusion subsidy in (14) and to derive additional implications relative to Section 3. Notice that the subsidy is the sum of two terms. The first term, \( \gamma \Lambda (\sigma_y^2 + \rho_y \sigma_y \rho_{y\sigma_y} \lambda_M b) / (a + b) \), is the one that we have already seen in Section 3. It essentially captures the “index effect” for project \( y \), since the investment effectively moves \( y \)’s cash flows in the benchmark.\textsuperscript{16} The second term, \( \gamma \Lambda \rho_y \sigma_y \rho_{y\sigma_y} \lambda_M b / (a + b) \), is new. It is proportional to the covariance between the existing and new cash flows, \( \rho_y \sigma_y \rho_{y\sigma_y} \), and so we refer to this term as the “covariance subsidy.” Intuitively, when the existing and new cash flows are positively correlated, the covariance increases the overall variance of post-investment cash flows. And because the cash-flow variance is penalized less for firms that are inside the benchmark, the subsidy increases in the covariance. If \( \rho_y \) is positive, the covariance subsidy is positive and hence, the benchmark inclusion subsidy exceeds the index effect. The covariance subsidy is the largest when \( \rho_y = 1 \), so that \( y \) is a clone of the existing assets. Moreover, assuming that the correlation \( \rho_y \) is large enough and the variance of existing cash flows exceeds that of the

\textsuperscript{16}Technically speaking, if firm \( y \) were to join the index as a standalone firm and firm \( k \) gets pushed out from the index as a result, then the index effect (in absolute terms) for firm \( y \) would be \( S_y' - S_y = \gamma \Lambda (\sigma_y^2 - \rho_{ky} \sigma_k \sigma_y \lambda_M b) / (a + b) \). (We discuss this in more detail in the context of IPOs in subsection 4.3.) Since in our setup the effective “index inclusion” of \( y \) happens as a result of investment or merger, no other firm is removed from the index, and hence the expression for the benchmark inclusion subsidy does not include the \( (-\rho_{ky} \sigma_k \sigma_y) \) term.
new cash flows, i.e., $\sigma > \sigma_y$ (both are empirically reasonable assumptions), the covariance subsidy exceeds the index effect.

Keeping in mind that the benchmark inclusion subsidy arises from taking a difference-in-differences, we can further explain the terms that comprise it. The managers subsidize the variance of a benchmark firm’s post-investment cash flow, which is $\sigma_i^2 + \sigma_y^2 + 2\rho_{iy}\sigma_i\sigma_y$. The first term, $\sigma_i^2$, washes out of the first difference given by equation (13) because it is present for the benchmark firm pre- and post-investment. Furthermore, the subsidy includes only one covariance term $\rho_{iy}\sigma_i\sigma_y$, not two. This is because any firm, either inside the benchmark or not, receives a subsidy for the covariance with the benchmark (one can see this from the second line of (13), which is the same for all firms). That is, projects with a positive covariance with the benchmark are more valuable, even if a non-benchmark firm undertakes them. The reason is that since prices of benchmark stocks are inflated due to the inelastic demand from portfolio managers, direct investors (and managers through their mean-variance portfolios) substitute into assets that provide exposure to the benchmark without being in the benchmark itself. Consequently, of the two covariances that enter the extra variance, one is subsidized regardless of which firm invests and the other is subsidized only when the investing firm is a benchmark firm. Hence, one of the two covariances drops out from the difference-in-differences.

The presence of the benchmark inclusion subsidy translates into different investment rules for firms inside and outside the benchmark. We formalize this result in Proposition 1.

**Proposition 1 (Project Valuation).** A firm in the benchmark is more likely to invest in a project than a firm outside the benchmark if and only if Assumption 1 holds. More precisely, all else equal, a firm in the benchmark accepts projects with a lower mean $\mu_y$, larger variance $\sigma_y^2$, and/or larger correlation $\rho_y$ than an otherwise identical firm outside the benchmark if and only if Assumption 1 holds.

Proposition 1 is at odds with the textbook treatment of investment taught in basic corporate finance courses. The usual rule states that a project’s value is independent of which firm undertakes it, and is simply given by the project’s cash flows discounted at the project-specific (not firm-specific) cost of capital. The usual rule presumes that the correct way to evaluate the riskiness of a project is to use the CAPM. That is not true in our model. In our model, the compensation for risk is described by a two-factor CAPM (Lemma 3), which accounts for the incentives of managers.

\[\text{17See for example Jacobs and Shivdasani (2012) or Berk and DeMarzo (2017), chapter 19.}\]
The reason why a project is worth more to a firm in the benchmark than to one outside it is because when the project is adopted by the benchmark firm, it is incrementally financed by portfolio managers regardless of its variance. So, the additional overall cash-flow variance that the project generates is penalized less for a firm inside the benchmark. To further understand the importance of the variance, consider a special case where the project is risk free, i.e., \( \sigma^2_y = 0 \). Then Assumption 1 fails and we can see that the project would be priced identically by all firms.

**Remark 1 (Risk-Free Projects).** If \( \sigma^2_y = 0 \), then a firm’s valuation of project \( y \) is independent of whether this firm is included in the benchmark or not.

We can build further intuition about the model by considering what happens when the inequality in Assumption 1 is reversed. This happens if the project is sufficiently negatively correlated with the cash flows of assets in place, that is, if \( \rho_y \leq -\sigma_y / \sigma \). In this case, a project is a hedge because it reduces the variance of a firm’s cash flow. Firms inside the benchmark benefit less from this reduction because their cash-flow variance is subsidized by managers and they lose some of that subsidy.\(^{18}\) Consequently, a benchmark firm will value such a project less than a non-benchmark firm would.

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\(^{18}\)Notice that when \(-\sigma_y / \sigma \leq \rho_y \leq -\sigma_y / (2\sigma)\), although the investment reduces the firm’s cash-flow variance, the benchmark inclusion subsidy is positive.

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Figure 1: **Investment regions.**

Parameter values: \( n = 5, k = 3, \sigma_i = 0.15, \rho_{ij} = 0, j \neq i, i = 1, \ldots, n, \rho_{jy} = 0 \) for \( j \neq i_{IN}, i_{OUT}, \gamma = 2, \lambda_M = 0.3, a = 0.008, b = 0.042 \). On the left panel, \( \rho_y \equiv \rho_{i_{IN}y} = \rho_{i_{OUT}y} = 0.75 \). On the right panel, \( \sigma_y = 0.1 \).
Figure 1 uses a numerical example to display the investment regions for a benchmark- and a non-benchmark firm as a function of $\mu_y$, $\sigma_y$, and $\rho_y$ (for a fixed $\sigma$). In the left panel, $\rho_y$ is held constant, and $\sigma_y$ and $\mu_y$ vary along the axes. On the right panel, $\sigma_y$ is kept constant, and $\rho_y$ and $\mu_y$ vary along the axes.

From the left panel we can see that holding everything else fixed, a benchmark firm will invest in projects with a lower mean, $\mu_y$, and/or higher variance, $\sigma_y^2$, than a non-benchmark firm. The right panel illustrates that compared to a non-benchmark firm, a benchmark firm prefers to invest in projects that are more correlated with its existing cash flows.

Finally, as we mentioned earlier, our model also implies that projects correlated with assets inside and outside the benchmark are valued differently (by firms both inside and outside the benchmark). Projects that are positively correlated with the benchmark provide alternative cheaper exposure to the benchmark firms’ cash flows. This is reflected in equation (13), which shows that for any firm, investing in a project that is positively correlated with a component of the benchmark is more beneficial than if the project has the same degree of correlation with an asset outside of the benchmark.

To illustrate this insight graphically, Figure 2 plots the change in the stockholder value $\Delta S_i$ given by (13) as a function of $\rho_{jy}$, where the solid line corresponds to some asset $j$ inside the benchmark, and the dashed line to some $j$ outside the benchmark. In the figure, for concreteness, the investing firm $i$ is in the benchmark. If $i$ were outside the benchmark, these lines would shift down in parallel. The figure shows that the change in stockholder value, $\Delta S_i$, is decreasing in the correlation coefficient $\rho_{jy}$. If $j$ is in the benchmark, then the downward sloping line is flatter. Moreover, the solid line is above the dashed line for positive correlations and below for negative correlations. This is because positive (negative) correlation of the project with an asset in the benchmark is penalized (rewarded) less than the same correlation with an asset outside the benchmark.

Discussions about benchmarking often revolve around the possibility that it leads to more correlation in risk exposures for the people hiring portfolio managers. Our model points to an additional source of potential correlation generated by benchmarking. Because benchmarking leads to higher valuations of stocks that are correlated with the benchmark, it induces firms—both inside and outside the benchmark—to take on more fundamental risk that is correlated with the benchmark (relative to the economy without benchmarking). Thus, our model predicts that cash flows in the economy with managers endogenously become more homogeneous/correlated with each other.
Figure 2: Change in the stockholder value, $\Delta S_i$, as a function of correlations of project $y$'s cash flows with cash flows of assets inside and outside the benchmark, $\rho_{jy}$ for some $j \leq k$ and some $j > k$.

Parameter values: $n = 5$, $k = 3$, $\mu_y = 1.2$, $I = 1$, $\sigma_j = 0.15$, $\sigma_y = 0.1$, $\rho_{jy} = 0$ unless it is plotted on the horizontal axis, $\rho_{j\ell} = 0$, $\ell \neq j$, $j = 1, \ldots, n$, $\gamma = 2$, $\lambda_M = 0.3$, $a = 0.008$, $b = 0.042$. Investing firm: $i = 1$. Solid line: $j = 2$. Dashed line: $j = 4$.

4.1.1 Cost of Capital

Finally notice that the benchmark inclusion subsidy is directly related to the cost of capital for valuing an investment project. Define firm $i$’s cost of capital, applied to the investment project $y$, $r_i$, by $\Delta S_i = -I + \mu_y/(1 + r_i)$, where $\Delta S_i$, defined in (13), measures the increase in stockholder value from adopting the project. Then the difference in the cost of capital for firms outside and inside the benchmark is

$$r_{out} - r_{in} = \frac{\mu_y}{\Delta S_{out} + I} - \frac{\mu_y}{\Delta S_{in} + I} = \frac{\mu_y(\Delta S_{in} - \Delta S_{out})}{(\Delta S_{in} + I)(\Delta S_{out} + I)}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

Notice that unlike (14), which is measured in dollars, (15) is unit-free (or can be expressed in percent). For that reason, we will use expression (15) for the quantitative analysis in Section 6.

4.2 Mergers and Acquisitions

As we have seen in the example considered in Section 3, the model can also be used to think about mergers and acquisitions.
Proposition 2 (Mergers and Acquisitions). Suppose firm $i$ considers acquiring firm $y$ that is outside the benchmark, and $\sigma_y^2 + \rho_{iy}\sigma_i\sigma_y > 0$. Then firm $i$ is more likely to acquire $y$ if firm $i$ is inside the benchmark than if it is outside.

The logic behind this statement is identical to the reasoning that leads to the bias in investment. If a benchmark firm acquires $y$, it gets the benchmark inclusion subsidy. Again, this result is in contrast to the direct wisdom about the role of financing synergies in the evaluation of potential acquisitions. For example, if a firm has unused debt capacity, it might choose to use more debt financing than otherwise to buy another firm. The usual view is that the discount rate used to value the cash flows of the target firm should not be altered by the availability of the extra debt funding. The case for not adjusting the discount rate is that the same additional debt funding could have been used for any other potential acquisition. So, it would be a mistake to say that any particular target company is a more attractive firm to acquire just because some low-risk debt could be issued to finance the purchase.

In our setup, there is a more fundamental synergy that is responsible for lower financing costs. Because the managers will want to purchase part of any stock that is issued to undertake the transaction, those savings should be accounted for. The size of the subsidy will depend on the parameters that appear in Assumption 1. Thus, for example, all else equal, the higher is a correlation of the cash flows of the target firm with the acquiring benchmark firm, the larger will be the financing advantage associated with that acquisition. Conversely, a hedging acquisition by a firm in the benchmark, where the target firm’s cash flows are negatively correlated with acquirer’s, always comes with a lower subsidy.

Proposition 2 works in reverse for spinoffs and divestitures. Specifically, assuming that the condition $\sigma_y^2 + \rho_{iy}\sigma_i\sigma_y > 0$ is satisfied, a division $y$ is worth more if it is part of a firm inside the benchmark than if it is spun off and trades as a separate entity outside the benchmark or is sold to a firm outside the benchmark.

4.3 IPOs and Incentives to Join the Benchmark

Suppose $y$ is now a standalone firm, which is held privately by direct investors and is considering an IPO. We demonstrate that $y$’s incentive to go public depends on whether it will be included in the benchmark.

We consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, when firm $y$ becomes public and gets included in the benchmark, no other firm leaves the benchmark. Most of the best known
stock indicies in the world have a fixed number of firms. In the second scenario, if \( y \) joins
the benchmark, then firm \( k \) is removed, so that the number of firms in the benchmark
remains constant.

**Proposition 3 (IPOs and Benchmarks).** Consider a privately-held firm \( y \) considering
an IPO.

(i) Firm \( y \) is always more likely to proceed with an IPO if it gets included in the benchmark
and no other firm leaves the benchmark.

(ii) Firm \( y \) is more likely to proceed with an IPO if it gets included in the benchmark and
firm \( k \) is removed from the benchmark, if and only if \( \sigma_y^2 - \rho_{ky} \sigma_k \sigma_y > 0 \).

The argument for the result in part (i) is the same as for other results in the paper—firm
\( y \) gets the benchmark inclusion subsidy if it joins the benchmark. In part (ii) where \( y \) pushes
another firm out of the benchmark, there is an additional consideration, as firm \( y \) loses part
of the benchmark subsidy coming from its correlation with that firm. In other words, when
firm \( y \) is included in the benchmark and firm \( k \) is pushed out, firm \( y \)'s correlation with
the benchmark increases by \( \sigma_y^2 \) because firm \( y \) is correlated with itself (and it enters the
benchmark), and is reduced by \( \rho_{ky} \sigma_k \sigma_y \) because firm \( k \) drops out of the benchmark. The
net subsidy is therefore proportional to \( \sigma_y^2 - \rho_{ky} \sigma_k \sigma_y \).

One could apply the above argument to any firm, not just a newly listed one. A firm
is worth more inside the benchmark rather than outside. So, there is an added benefit to
any corporate action that results in the firm’s benchmark inclusion—for example, aimed at
increasing the firm’s size or meeting other criteria for benchmark inclusion. The costs of
taking such action of course have to be outweighed by the benchmark inclusion subsidy, but
a clear empirical prediction emerging from this discussion is that firms with good prospects
of benchmark inclusion have an incentive to alter their behavior in order to gain membership
in the benchmark. Similarly, benchmark firms that are close to the threshold for exclusion,
have incentives to engage in potentially costly corporate actions that ensure that they retain
their benchmark membership.

4.4 Comparative Statics with respect to \( \lambda_M \)

In this subsection we analyze the benchmark inclusion subsidy as a function of the size
of the asset management sector. Consider (14), and rewrite it recognizing that \( \Lambda = \)
\[ \frac{\lambda_M}{(a + b) + \lambda_D} \] and \( \lambda_D = 1 - 2\lambda_M \):

\[ \Delta S_{i_{\text{in}}} - \Delta S_{i_{\text{out}}} = \gamma \left[ 1 + \frac{1 - 2\lambda_M}{\lambda_M}(a + b) \right]^{-1} b(\sigma_y^2 + \rho_y \sigma_y). \] (16)

Notice that this expression is strictly increasing in \( \lambda_M \). This means that the effects described in this paper related to the difference in valuations by a firm inside the benchmark relative to a firm outside the benchmark become larger as the size of the asset management sector increases.

If the contract parameters \( a \) and \( b \) were endogenous, chosen optimally by fund managers, then \( a \) and \( b \) in (16) would implicitly depend on \( \lambda_M \). In a companion paper (Kashyap, Kovrijnykh, Li, and Pavlova, 2020), we analyze optimal contracts chosen by fund managers in a similar environment. Deriving analytical results for the contract parameters as a function of \( \lambda_M \) is difficult in general, so we study the relationship numerically, and show that the benchmark inclusion subsidy is increasing in \( \lambda_M \) even if \( a \) and \( b \) are endogenously determined.

4.5 Passive Asset Management

As we mentioned earlier, in a limiting case of our setup when \( b \to \infty \) corresponds to having passive asset management. In this case, it is easy to see that managers hold only the benchmark portfolio, i.e, \( x^M = 1_b \). A generalization of our model would be to include both active and passive managers. If we denote the fractions of them in the economy by \( \lambda_M^A \) and \( \lambda_M^P \), then the equilibrium stock prices would be

\[ S = \mu - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma \left( 1 - \frac{b}{1 + \frac{\lambda_M^A b}{a + b} + \lambda_M^P} \right) 1_b, \]

where \( \Lambda = \left[ \frac{\lambda_M^A}{(a + b) + \lambda_D} \right]^{-1} \).

All of our results extend to this case. Passive managers hold benchmark stocks irrespective of their characteristics, and they invest nothing in the mean-variance portfolio. Therefore, with passive managers the benchmark inclusion subsidy becomes even larger. For example, the additional value from investing for a firm in the benchmark is given by \( \gamma \Lambda (\sigma_y^2 + \rho_y \sigma_y) \left[ \frac{\lambda_M^A b}{(a + b) + \lambda_M^P} \right] \), which is a generalization of (14). The following proposition shows that this value is increasing if more managers are passive.
Proposition 4 (Passive Asset Management). The benchmark inclusion subsidy is larger when $\lambda^P_M/\lambda^A_M$ is larger, holding $\lambda^P_M + \lambda^A_M$ constant.

As in the previous subsection, we show that the result continues to hold even if the contract parameters $a$ and $b$ are determined endogenously.

5 Related Empirical Evidence

We now turn to the empirical evidence that is related to the predictions of our model. In keeping with the presentation in the last section, we organize the discussion around four predictions of the model. The first implication of our model is that upon inclusion in a benchmark, there should be an increase in a firm’s share price. This prediction is not original, but our theory does imply that there is an important distinction between a benchmark and an index. The second one is that firms inside the benchmark should be more prone to invest and to engage in mergers. Third, the subsidy should be higher when there are more assets under management. Finally, there should be a two-factor CAPM that accounts for the fact that correlation with the benchmark should affects stock returns.

5.1 Benchmark Effect

Consistent with the empirical evidence, our model generates an index effect. Stock price changes are symmetric for index additions and deletions and the effect persists for as long as the stock is in the index. We also have a more subtle prediction: the share price response should depend on becoming part of a benchmark and not just because of being added to an index. In most cases, separating the effect of being in the index and benchmark is challenging. One exception arises for firms that operate in so-called “sin” industries, such as alcohol, tobacco and gaming. Large firms in these industries would be included in indices such as the S&P 500, Russell 1000 or FTSE 100, but are deemed odious by some investors. Hence, there are benchmarks that keep almost all of the firms in the index but exclude these firms.

According to the U.S. Social Investment Forum, as of the beginning of 2018, $12$ trillion of assets were managed according to some sort of social screen, and $2.89$ trillion were in funds that specifically avoid investing in tobacco. Hence, these kinds of exclusion are common enough to be detectable.
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) study the returns of these so-called sin firms. Their motivation is behavioral, but the empirical results can also be interpreted as a test of our model. Their headline result is that sin firms earn higher expected returns than comparable firms by about 26 basis points per month—i.e. roughly 3% per year. Their matching process controls for four factors commonly thought to determine expected returns—the market portfolio, firm size, the book to market ratio, and a momentum proxy. They also find similar results for a set of sin stocks in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In the international sample, the sin stocks outperform their peers by about 21 basis points per month.

In addition to these estimates for returns, they also estimate the differences in the levels of stock prices for sin stocks and others. These regressions control for a number of firm characteristics including current and future return on equity, research and development (relative to sales) and membership in the S&P 500. They find differences of between 15 and 20 percent depending on the valuation ratio. They also present a Gordon growth style calculation showing that the return and valuation estimates are mutually consistent. Hong and Kacperczyk’s results about sin stocks have also subsequently been confirmed in several studies.19

Our model also suggests another subtle implication of Hong and Kacperczyk’s results. When firms are dropped from a benchmark, our model predicts that this raises their cost of capital since they are denied the benchmark inclusion subsidy. Part of the benchmark inclusion subsidy is the covariance subsidy that affects how benchmark firms should evaluate alternative additional projects. On the margin, when sin stocks are excluded from a benchmark, their incentives to invest in their own sinful industries are also reduced.

5.2 Changes in Corporate Actions Following Benchmark Inclusion

There are some papers that attempt to assess whether the model predictions regarding investment and mergers hold for benchmark firms versus non-benchmark firms. This is challenging because ideally one wants to control for both the selection into the benchmark and all the other factors that influence these kinds of expenditures.20

19See Fabozzi, Ma, and Oliphant (2008), Statman and Glushkov (2009), and Kim and Venkatachalam (2011) for evidence of superior performance of sin stocks, as well as Blitz and Fabozzi (2017) who caution that the performance of sin stocks can be explained by two new quality factors.

20For example, consider the evidence in Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017). They document that higher institutional ownership accompanies lower investment. They stress, however, that it is difficult to establish causality without any plausibly exogenous movement in ownership. Their preferred interpretation is that
There are three papers that we are aware of that attempt to measure these effects and all find some evidence in favor of our model’s predictions. Massa, Peyer, and Tong (2005) compare 222 firms that were added to the S&P 500 with a control set of firms who prior to the addition were similar with respect to size, market-to-book, the number of analysts following them, and the percentage of stock owned by institutional investors. They treat the benchmark inclusion as an exogenous factor that can be used as an instrument for the firms’ cost of capital. They then test for effects of the (instrumented) cost of capital on investment and equity issuance. They find that inclusion is associated with higher levels of equity issuance and more investment, with a substantial portion of the investment coming via increased mergers.

Vijh and Yang (2008) attempt to directly test the idea that firms included in the S&P 500 are more prone to undertake acquisitions than firms outside the index. They study all the acquisitions of firms that are tracked by the Center for Research on Securities Prices between 1980 and 2004. They are motivated to test the hypothesis that benchmark inclusion brings more analyst and news coverage and hence, could lead to better governance and decision-making. Nevertheless, the basic statistical analysis can also be used to test the predictions from our model. The main challenge for this type of exercise is that S&P 500 firms are very different than non-index firms, and they also acquire different firms. For instance, the median acquiring firm in the S&P 500 index is about 15 times larger (measured by assets) than the non-index acquirers and has significantly higher levels of cash flows to assets, return on assets, and Tobin’s Q. The index firms also tend to acquire larger firms, those with higher value of Tobin’s Q, and more profitability. They find that firms in the S&P500 do undertake significantly more acquisitions, in line with our model’s predictions. These findings hold after they account (as much as they can) for observable differences in target and acquirer characteristics, though it is hard to know whether the controls are truly adequate.

The third and perhaps most convincing piece of evidence comes from Bena, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires (2017). They study differences in investment and employment for firms across 30 countries between 2001 and 2010. Their basic regression relates capital expenditures relative to assets (or the number of employees) to institutional ownership by foreign investment is crowded out by higher payouts, though they admit this could be due to a preference by institutional firms to find firms with high payouts. In Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018) they attempt to isolate variation in payout variation that can be ascribed to ownership structure. They find that controlling for cash flow (and other firm specific variables), the higher ownership induced payouts are associated with lower investment. Of course, the sources and uses of funds accounting identity may also lead to this kind of pattern in the data.
investors and a host of firm-level controls (including sales, Tobin’s $Q$, and cash holdings). Importantly, they instrument for the ownership variable using additions to the MSCI ACWI index. They find a large, statistically significant effect of the benchmark additions on both investment and employment. The results are also present when they restrict the analysis to firms that are close to the cutoff for inclusion in the index and when they estimate the effects of inclusion using a difference-in-difference experimental design.

Bena, Ferreira, Matos, and Pires (2017) also analyze patenting patterns to study how research and development is affected by benchmark inclusion. It is common to use research and development indicators as a proxy for corporate risk-taking (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006 and Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn, 2013). They show that research and development increases significantly with benchmark inclusion and this finding is robust to controlling for a number of factors and is confirmed in their difference-in-differences tests. This evidence is consistent with the model prediction that a firm inside the benchmark would accept riskier projects than an otherwise identical firm outside the benchmark would.

5.3 Variation in the Subsidy Size

The comparative-statics prediction regarding the effect of $\lambda_M$ on the subsidy can be inferred from re-interpreting previous work on index inclusion. Our model makes predictions about how $\lambda_M$ affects both the index effect and the covariance subsidy, although existing studies only inform us about the former. Past research contains two types of relevant evidence.

One type involves the time-series prediction that the size of the index inclusion effect should rise as the asset management sector grows. There are some practical challenges that arise in carrying out this kind of test. It is relatively straightforward to calculate the announcement return (computed over one or two days) associated with the news that a stock will be added or subtracted from an index—typically the S&P 500. However, to infer the permanent effect of that change, a subsequent return must be computed to account for any reversal, and that requires a decision on how long the window should be. See Patel and Welch (2017) for a good discussion of this issue.

Our reading of the evidence is that the announcement effects associated with inclusions and exclusion from the 1980s through the early 2000s were becoming larger, see, e.g., Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002). Since the early 2000s there are fewer studies on the S&P 500. Patel and Welch (2017) argue that the announcement effect is smaller and the post-announcement reversal is larger since 2005.
Another confounding problem is that as the inclusion effect has become better known, sophisticated investors (e.g., hedge funds, and, more recently, some ETF and index funds) have started buying a portfolio of stocks shortlisted for index inclusion prior to the announcement day. Such front-running creates a pre-announcement drift in stock prices. For example, Patel and Welch (2017) document that deleted stocks lose 12% of their value in 42 days preceding the announcement. The front-running that precedes additions and deletions also creates a hidden cost of indexing to passive investors who only make substitutions when the additions and deletions go into effect. For example, Petajisto (2011) estimates the hidden costs of rebalancing for index funds as 21–28 bps annually for the S&P 500 and 38–77 bps annually for the Russell 2000. He stresses that these estimates are lower bounds because his measurement window does not fully account for front-running, which is especially relevant in the later part of his sample.

An alternative test that we find quite compelling is a cross-sectional test that becomes possible when a stock moves from being part of one index to another. Studying this kind of change has two advantages relative to the time-series tests. First, this kind of movement is typically not triggered because a corporate action occurred (such as a recent merger), so the index switch is not necessarily associated with changes in the firm’s cash-flow properties. Second, these events are not subject to the alternative interpretation offered by Merton (1987), that addition to an index brings increased analyst coverage and other forms of attention. If a stock is already part of one index, then that type of attention should already be at least partially present.

Perhaps the cleanest of these studies uses changes that move a stock around the boundary of being above and below the 1000th largest stock in the U.S. Historically, for firms that move from just below rank 1000 to just above, they move out of the Russell 2000 benchmark and into the Russell 1000 (and vice versa). Chang, Hong, and Liskovich (2015) study these transitions. As they note, when a firm’s fortunes improve, the company will move from the Russell 2000 to the Russell 1000, but when this happens, the institutional demand for the stock will drop (because more managers are benchmarked against Russell 2000). The authors find that despite the improved fundamentals, their share price drops by about 5% from the rebalancing. Conversely, firms that fall into the Russell 2000 see price increases by about 5%. 
5.4 Asset Pricing Tests

Finally, an alternative way to assess the existence of the benchmark effect is to see whether inclusion in a benchmark shows up as a factor that helps explain the cross section of stock returns. Two direct tests of the specification equivalent to our two-factor CAPM in Lemma 3 are presented in Gómez and Zapatero (2003) and Brennan, Cheng, and Li (2012). They arrive at conflicting conclusions.

Gómez and Zapatero (2003) use the S&P 500 index as a proxy for the index factor. They test the model on the universe of stocks that were included in the S&P 500 for the entire duration of their sample. They find that the index factor is priced and that the risk premium for the factor is sizeable and of the correct sign. Moreover, the size of the risk premium for the index factor is rising over the sample period, and so is the associated statistical significance. Gómez and Zapatero argue that this trend is consistent with the growth of the asset management industry (growth in $\lambda_M$ in our model).

Brennan, Cheng, and Li (2012) also use the S&P 500 index as a proxy for the index factor, but expand the universe of risky assets to all CRSP stocks and include size (market cap) as a control in their tests. These two changes to the test end up significantly reducing the risk premium on the index factor, making it very small and virtually undetectable. The index factor comes out both economically and statistically significant only for a subsample of large stocks, consistent with the results of Gómez and Zapatero (2003). Furthermore, when they allow for the possibility of multiple indexes, with the remaining indexes representing value and size indexes and proxied for by the Fama and French (1992) HML and SMB factors, the index factor loses significance even for large stocks.

One challenge for both papers (and any other attempt) to identify an index factor is the presence of multiple benchmarks. The critical consideration governing relative returns in our model is the relative demand for different stocks by all portfolio managers. So in either of these papers the presence of additional benchmarks (e.g. the FTSE Russell 1000 or 2000) will confound the tests. Cremers, Petajisto, and Zitzewitz (2012) show that a multi-benchmark model fits a cross-section of mutual fund returns well.

6 Quantitative Analysis

One obvious question is how large is the benchmark inclusion subsidy? While the CARA-normal framework is widely used because of the tractable formulas that it delivers, it is well-understood that using it for quantitative analysis is challenging. Recognizing these
issues, here is an indicative calculation of the potential effect of the subsidy on the cost of capital.

We intend to measure the difference in the cost of capital for a project undertaken by a firm in the benchmark and a firm outside the benchmark, as computed in equation (15). In practice, criteria for benchmark inclusion are typically based on market capitalization, and we will construct our benchmark that way too. From Ken French’s website, we obtain 10 portfolios formed on size, which consist of U.S. stocks sorted into the NYSE size deciles. We set \( n = 10 \), with each asset representing a corresponding size portfolio. In what follows, the properties of each of the 10 assets are computed using equal weights for the constituent stocks that the asset represents. We assume the benchmark is the S&P 500, which includes only a subset of U.S. stocks. The three largest NYSE deciles contain about 500 stocks, and we therefore set \( k = 3 \), i.e., the first three assets are in the benchmark and the remaining ones are outside. The ten assets differ not only in terms of their market capitalization, but also in terms of their market betas. We therefore specify the cash flow process so that it will generate both types of heterogeneity. In particular, we assume that

\[
D_i = \alpha_0^i [\bar{\mu} + \alpha_1^i Z + (1 - \alpha_1^i) \varepsilon_i], \quad i = 1, \ldots, 10, \tag{17}
\]

where \( Z \sim N(0, \sigma_z^2) \) is a common factor and \( \varepsilon_i \sim N(0, \sigma^2) \) is an idiosyncratic shock. The parameter \( \alpha_0^i \) captures asset \( i \)'s size and \( \alpha_1^i \) governs its exposure to systematic vs. idiosyncratic risk. We define \( \alpha^0 = (\alpha_0^1, \ldots, \alpha_0^{10}) \) and \( \alpha^1 = (\alpha_1^1, \ldots, \alpha_1^{10}) \). Table 1 reports the parameter values that we use along with the intuition for how they were chosen. Of course, all the parameters interact to determine the model outcomes, so the rationale listed in the table for how each is chosen is subject to that caveat.

The size of the subsidy depends only on the relative sizes of the various assets. So we normalize the size of the market capitalization of the smallest asset to be 1, i.e. \( \alpha_0^1 = 1 \). We then calibrate the remaining \( \alpha_0^i, i = 2, \ldots, 10 \), so that the relative market capitalizations of the other nine assets (compared to the first asset) match the December 2018 data on their relative market capitalizations.

To infer the relative importance of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk we proceed as follows. We set \( \alpha_1^1 = 0.1^{21} \) We then calibrate the remaining \( \alpha_1^i, i = 2, \ldots, 10 \), so that the market betas of assets 2-10 in the model match the estimated market betas of the nine portfolios (based on monthly data from 1926-2018). The regressions that are used to estimate the

\[\text{Footnote 21: For the calculations, choosing any number between 0 and 1 would be make no difference. This normalization simply pins down the level of } \sigma_z^2.\]
betas also give us estimates of each asset’s idiosyncratic risk, which on average is 3.5%. We use this average to choose the variance of the idiosyncratic risk in (17).

Table 1: Parameter Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^0$</td>
<td>(1, 0.1936, 0.1024, 0.0605, 0.0382, 0.0251, 0.0165, 0.0104, 0.0053, 0.0011)</td>
<td>For the largest asset, $\alpha^0_1$ is normalized to be 1; the other 9 are chosen to match data for estimates of size ratios of deciles 2-10 relative to decile 1: (0.1914, 0.1008, 0.0594, 0.0373, 0.0245, 0.0161, 0.0101, 0.0051, 0.0011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^1$</td>
<td>(0.1, 0.1174, 0.1224, 0.1269, 0.1317, 0.1342, 0.1386, 0.1442, 0.1510, 0.1504)</td>
<td>$\alpha^1_1$ is set to be 0.1; the other 9 are chosen to match estimates of market betas for deciles 2-10: (1.0914, 1.1407, 1.1852, 1.2339, 1.2600, 1.3047, 1.3634, 1.4344, 1.4280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma\Lambda$</td>
<td>0.2789</td>
<td>Chosen to match the market risk premium of 7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_z^2$</td>
<td>316.33</td>
<td>Chosen to match the standard deviation of return on the market of 19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^2_\varepsilon$</td>
<td>0.0957</td>
<td>Chosen to match the average idiosyncratic risk of the average asset (across the size portfolios), 3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_M/(a+b)$</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>Chosen to match the equally-weighted institutional ownership of all stocks in the market, 67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b\zeta$</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Chosen to match the equally-weighted institutional ownership of benchmark stocks, 83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We infer the market’s effective risk aversion, $\gamma\Lambda$, and the standard deviation of common factor, $\sigma_z$, in (17), by choosing values that will match the market risk premium and the volatility of returns on the market portfolio of 7.7% and 19.7%, respectively that are reported by Brealey, Myers, and Allen 2019, Chapter 7 (for the period 1900-2017). In the CARA-normal setup, the level of the cash-flow mean $\bar{\mu}$ in (17) does not make a difference for the estimated cost of capital.

A critical determinant of the subsidy is the level of inelastic demand from the portfolio managers. To quantify this we turn to data on institutional ownership from the Fact-
Set/LionShares database, available from WRDS for 2000-2017. Consistent with our model, in the data the institutional ownership of stocks in the benchmark (the S&P 500) exceeds that of stocks outside the benchmark. The (equally-weighted) ownership of the stocks in the benchmark (deciles 1-3) as of December 2017 is 83% while that of the whole market is 67%. In the model, these two quantities correspond to $\frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} x_i^M$ and $\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i^M$, respectively (recall that we normalized the total supply of each stock to one).

A well-known issue with the CARA utility is that it implies that there are no wealth effects. The standard solution to this problem in this kind of exercise is to adjust the risk aversion of agents so that an agent with higher wealth (e.g., a large fund manager) has a lower risk aversion and therefore buys more risky assets. This approach appropriately adjusts the first term in the manager’s demand for risky assets in (9), the mean-variance portfolio, but not the second term, the inelastic demand due to benchmarking. The latter does not scale with wealth (or assets under management) simply because, as is standard in CARA models, we define relative performance as a per-share measure. In Appendix B, we define relative performance as a per-dollar return and show that it implies that the inelastic demand does scale with assets under management, as it would in practice. We introduce this type of wealth effect by multiplying the inelastic demand by a parameter $\zeta$. Then the manager’s demand and the asset prices become

$$x^M = \frac{1}{a + b} \sum_{i}^{1} \frac{\mu_i - S_i}{\gamma} + \frac{b\zeta}{a + b} \mathbf{1}_b,$$

$$S = \mu - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b\zeta}{a + b} \mathbf{1}_b \right).$$

In light of this, we set $b\zeta$ and $\lambda_M/(a + b)$ so that we match the data on institutional ownership.

To compute the difference in the cost of capital for a firm in the benchmark relative to one outside, we use equation (15). We imagine a hypothetical firm, which does not belong to the benchmark, but has the same characteristics (size and beta) as firms represented by asset 3, i.e., the bottom of S&P 500. We think of this experiment as contrasting similar firms, where one is in the S&P 500 and its twin is not.

We assume that the investment project under consideration is a clone of the investing firm, $\rho_y = 1$, as would be the case if a firm opened a new plant, and that the size of the project $\mu_y/\sigma_y$ is 1% of the firm’s expected cash flows. Under these assumptions, the

---

22 The parameter $\zeta$ corresponds to $W_0^M / \sum_i^1 \mathbf{1}_i x_i S_i$ in Appendix B—see, e.g., equation (27)—which is the value of assets under management divided by the benchmark market capitalization.
Table 2: **The benchmark inclusion subsidy and institutional ownership.** This table presents a sensitivity analysis of the difference in the cost of capital (in basis points) for identical firms outside vs. inside the benchmark, as institutional ownership varies. Each of the identical firms has the characteristics of asset 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional ownership of the market</th>
<th>59%</th>
<th>67%</th>
<th>75%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional ownership of the benchmark</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83%</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91%</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference in the cost of capital for the hypothetical outside firm and the one inside the benchmark as measured by (15) is 94 basis points.\(^{23}\)

Our model implies that if the asset management sector is larger (the institutional ownership of stocks in the benchmark is higher), the subsidy will be larger. In the data, we see a steady increase in the institutional ownership of U.S. stocks over the past three decades. Table 2 explores how our differences in the cost of capital estimates vary with the institutional ownership of the benchmark and the market. Our baseline estimate is at the center of the table. One limiting case is when the institutional ownership of the benchmark and the market are the same, in which case the subsidy is zero. This can happen in our model if the benchmark and the market portfolios coincide or if the manager’s contract does not include a relative performance component \((b = 0)\). The subsidy increases with the institutional ownership of the benchmark. It is the highest when the difference between the institutional ownership of the benchmark and the market is the highest. This difference in our model is directly related to the magnitude of the fund manager’s inelastic demand for the benchmark portfolio, which is the key driver of the benchmark inclusion subsidy.

In unreported analysis, we perform similar experiments assuming that the hypothetical firm is a twin of asset 1 or asset 2 instead of asset 3. In those experiments, the difference in the cost of capital is higher than our baseline estimate, and it is larger for bigger firms. This is because bigger firms have larger cash flow volatility, and from the previous analysis, we know that larger volatility firms enjoy a higher benchmark inclusion subsidy. Conversely, if the project under consideration is not a clone of the investing firm’s assets, then the subsidy will be smaller. This follows from the earlier discussion in Section 4.1 about the magnitude

\(^{23}\)This number is in line with Calomiris, Larrain, Schmukler, and Williams (2019), who estimate the yield discount for emerging markets investment grade corporate issues eligible for index inclusion to be between 76 to 99 basis points in recent data.
of the covariance subsidy.

We recognize that there is a fair bit of uncertainty about many of the objects that we would need to know in order to accurately estimate the subsidy. We consider this quantification to merely be indicative and to show that it is reasonable to think the subsidy could be quantitatively relevant for corporate decisions.

7 Concluding Remarks

We have seen that for firms that are part of a benchmark, the inelastic demand for their shares by portfolio managers lowers their cost of capital for investments, mergers, and IPO decisions. We have specific cross-sectional predictions for the size of this effect. While there is empirical evidence that speaks to some of these predictions, there are others that have yet to be tested. One obvious direction for future work would be to fill in these gaps.

For instance, there are many claims by practitioners (e.g. McKinsey on Finance, 2004) that a strong motive for undertaking an IPO is to become part of a benchmark. We believe no one has tested this hypothesis. Despite the practitioner attention, this implication is not part of the very long list of commonly cited reasons by economists that are usually considered.24 So there would be some novelty value to confirming the model prediction.

More importantly, international differences create variation in IPO incentives that would make it possible to cleanly uncover the predicted effect. Specifically, not only do different exchanges have different requirements about how many shares have to be floated, but the relevance of benchmarks also varies across markets. So, the ease of qualifying for a public listing across markets will differ from the size of the subsidy implied by our theory. This should make it feasible to test the theory.

Our model also predicts that the index effect is larger for firms with riskier cash flows. This can be seen from equation (7), where the index effect is increasing in \( \sigma_y^2 \), even after controlling for the stock price before the inclusion. The literature so far has focused on estimating the average index effect. It would be interesting to see if the index effect varies with firms’ risk characteristics, though finding a suitable empirical analog to cash-flow volatility would be tricky.

24For example, Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2010) observe that “in theory, an IPO creates liquidity for the firm’s shares, provides an infusion of capital to fund growth, allows insiders to cash out, provides cheaper and ongoing access to capital, facilitates the sale of the company, gives founders the ability to diversify their risk, allows venture capitalists and other early stage investors to exit their investment, and increases the transparency of the firm by subjecting it to capital market discipline.”
It would also be interesting to test the model’s predictions about how the presence of benchmarks can alter the incentives regarding mergers. We saw that the benchmark inclusion subsidy is larger (smaller) for targets whose cash flows are more positively (negatively) correlated with the acquiring firm. While there is a large literature studying merger patterns, we believe this somewhat unusual prediction of our theory has not been investigated. Furthermore, our model may suggest an alternative explanation for the rise in the industry concentration (“monopolization”) in the U.S. over the past 15 years.\textsuperscript{25} A significant driving force behind this phenomenon is mergers. According to our model, firms in prominent benchmarks (e.g., the S&P 500) value targets outside the benchmark above their standalone values, and the valuation gap increases with the size of the asset management sector. Perhaps the rapid growth of the asset management industry over the last 15 years has contributed to the increased merger activity.

Another model prediction is that firms—both inside and outside the benchmark—are rewarded for taking on more fundamental risk that is correlated with the benchmark (relative to the economy without benchmarking). Thus, our model predicts that cash flows in the economy with portfolio managers endogenously become more homogeneous/correlated with each other. This force could eventually subtly change business-cycle dynamics. However, this effect will take time to play out, so finding an empirical strategy to identify it will be challenging.

References


Appendix A

In the main text, for simplicity of exposition we normalize the total supply of shares of each asset to one. Here, to show that this is innocuous, we suppose that stock \( i \) has a total supply of \( \bar{x}_i \) shares. The per-share cash flow of asset \( i \) is then \( D_i / \bar{x}_i \).

**Proof of Lemma 1.** Denote by \( \hat{x}_i^\ell \) the fraction of shares of asset \( i \) that agent \( \ell \in \{D, M\} \) holds, i.e., \( \hat{x}_i^\ell = x_i^\ell / \bar{x}_i \). Let \( \hat{x}^\ell = (\hat{x}_1^\ell, \ldots, \hat{x}_n^\ell)^\top \), \( \ell \in \{D, M\} \), and \( \bar{x} = (\bar{x}_1, \ldots, \bar{x}_n)^\top \). Then the maximization problem of a direct investor with \( \hat{x}_D \) is the same as that of a portfolio manager with \( (a + b)\hat{x}_M - b1_b = z \) and can be written as

\[
\max_z z - \frac{\gamma}{2} z^\top \Sigma z.
\]

This gives us (10) when \( \bar{x} = 1 \). □

**Proof of Lemma 2.** Using the market-clearing condition \( \lambda_M \hat{x}_M + \lambda_D \hat{x}_D = 1 \), we have the vector of the total share value of the firms

\[
\bar{x} \cdot S = \mu - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} 1_b \right),
\]

This gives us (10) when \( \bar{x} = 1 \). □

**Proof of Lemma 3.** Let \( \omega_i^m = \bar{x}_i S_i / \sum_{j=1}^n \bar{x}_j S_j \), \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), denote the market portfolio weights and let \( \omega_i^b = 1_i \bar{x}_i S_i / \sum_{j=1}^n 1_j \bar{x}_j S_j \), \( i = 1, \ldots, n \), denote the benchmark portfolio...
weights. We have the market and benchmark returns equal to

\[ R_m = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \omega_j^m \frac{D_j}{\bar{x}_j S_j} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n} D_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} \bar{x}_j S_j}, \]

\[ R_b = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \omega_j^b \frac{D_j}{\bar{x}_j S_j} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{k} D_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{k} \bar{x}_j S_j}. \]

To show (11), recall that \( E(R_i) = \mu_i / (\bar{x}_i S_i) \). Take the \( i \)th row of (10), divide both sides by \( \bar{x}_i S_i \) and rearrange terms to get

\[ E(R_i) - 1 = \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^{n} \bar{x}_j S_j \text{Cov}(R_i, R_m) - \gamma \Lambda \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \sum_{j=1}^{k} \bar{x}_j S_j \text{Cov}(R_i, R_b) \]

\[ = \frac{\text{Cov}(R_i, R_m)}{\text{Var}(R_m)} \text{Var}(R_m) \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^{n} \bar{x}_j S_j - \frac{\text{Cov}(R_i, R_b)}{\text{Var}(R_b)} \text{Var}(R_b) \gamma \Lambda \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \sum_{j=1}^{k} \bar{x}_j S_j \]

\[ = \beta_j^m \kappa_m - \beta_j^b \kappa_b, \]

where \( \kappa_m = \text{Var}(R_m) \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^{n} \bar{x}_j S_j \), and \( \kappa_b = \text{Var}(R_b) \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^{k} \bar{x}_j S_j \lambda_M b / (a + b) \). \( \square \)

**Proof of Lemma 4.** Suppose firm \( i \) adopts the project. Then the total number of shares of asset \( i \) becomes \( \bar{x}_i = \bar{x}_i + \delta_i \), where \( \delta_i S_i = I \), and \( \bar{x}_j = \bar{x}_j \) for \( j \neq i \).

From (20) we know that

\[ \bar{x}^{(i)} \cdot S^{(i)} = \mu^{(i)} - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma^{(i)} \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \mathbf{1}_b \right). \]

Finally, using the definition of \( \bar{x}^{(i)} \), we have

\[ \bar{x} \cdot S^{(i)} = \mu^{(i)} - I^{(i)} - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma^{(i)} \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \mathbf{1}_b \right), \]

which simplifies to (12) when \( \bar{x} = 1 \).

The \( i \)th element of \( \bar{x} \cdot S \) is

\[ \bar{x}_i S_i = \mu_i - \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^{n} \rho_{ij} \sigma_i \sigma_j \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \mathbf{1}_j \right), \]
and the $i$th element of $\bar{x} \cdot S^{(i)}$ is
\[
\bar{x}_i S^{(i)} = \mu_i + \mu_y - I - \gamma \Lambda \left( \sigma_y^2 + \rho_{iy} \sigma_i \sigma_y \right) \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \right) \\
- \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^{n} [\rho_{ij} \sigma_i \sigma_j + \rho_{jy} \sigma_j \sigma_y] \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \right) .
\]

(23)

Subtracting (22) from (23) yields
\[
\bar{x}_i \Delta S_i = \mu_y - I - \gamma \Lambda \left( \sigma_y^2 + \rho_{iy} \sigma_i \sigma_y \right) \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \right) \\
- \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^{n} \rho_{jy} \sigma_j \sigma_y \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \right) ,
\]

(24)

which is (13) when $\bar{x}_i = 1$. For $i_{in} \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$ and $i_{out} \in \{k + 1, \ldots, n\}$ we have
\[
\bar{x}_{i_{in}} \Delta S_{i_{in}} - \bar{x}_{i_{out}} \Delta S_{i_{out}} = \gamma \Lambda (\sigma_y^2 + \rho \sigma \sigma_y) \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} .
\]

(25)

□

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Follows immediately from (14) (or its analog (25)). □

**Proof of Proposition 2.** The only essential difference with the proof of Lemma 4 that implies Proposition 1 is that when firm $y$ is traded before the merger, then (22) becomes
\[
\bar{x}_i S_i = \mu_i - \gamma \Lambda \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{n} \rho_{ij} \sigma_i \sigma_j \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \right) + \rho_{iy} \sigma_i \sigma_y \right] .
\]

Subtracting this from (23) (and removing the explicit cost of investment), obtain
\[
\bar{x}_i \Delta S_i = \mu_y - \gamma \Lambda \left[ (\sigma_y^2 + \rho_{iy} \sigma_i \sigma_y) \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \right) - \rho_{iy} \sigma_i \sigma_y \right] \\
- \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^{n} \rho_{jy} \sigma_j \sigma_y \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \right) \\
= \mu_y - \gamma \Lambda \sigma_y^2 + \gamma \Lambda (\sigma_y^2 + \rho_{iy} \sigma_i \sigma_y) \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \\
- \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^{n} \rho_{jy} \sigma_j \sigma_y \left( 1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \right) .
\]
Thus (25) in this case is
\[ \bar{x}_{\text{in}} \Delta S_{\text{in}} - \bar{x}_{\text{out}} \Delta S_{\text{out}} = \gamma \Lambda \left( \sigma_y^2 + \rho y \sigma_y \sigma_y \right) \lambda M \frac{b}{a+b}, \]
and \[ \bar{x}_{\text{in}} \Delta S_{\text{in}} > \bar{x}_{\text{out}} \Delta S_{\text{out}} \iff \sigma_y^2 + \rho y \sigma_y \sigma_y > 0. \] Notice that unlike in Proposition 1, we do not need to assume that \( \sigma_{\text{in}} = \sigma_{\text{out}} \) and \( \rho_{\text{in}y} = \rho_{\text{out}y} \). □

**Proof of Proposition 3.**

(i) Suppose firm \( y \) issues \( \bar{x}_y \) shares when it goes public (in the main text we normalized \( \bar{x}_y \) to one). The stock price of firm \( y \) if it does not get is not included in the benchmark is
\[ \bar{x}_y S_{\text{out}}^y = \mu_y - \gamma \Lambda \left( \sigma_y^2 \right) \left( b \right). \]
The price of firm \( y \) if it enters the benchmark and no other firm leaves it, is
\[ \bar{x}_y S_{\text{in}}^y = \mu_y - \gamma \Lambda \left( \sigma_y^2 \right) \left( 1 - \lambda M \frac{b}{a+b} \right). \]
Taking the difference,
\[ \bar{x}_y \left( S_{\text{in}}^y - S_{\text{out}}^y \right) = \gamma \Lambda \sigma_y^2 \lambda M \frac{b}{a+b} > 0. \]

(ii) The price of firm \( y \) if it replaces firm \( k \) in the benchmark is
\[ \bar{x}_y S_{\text{in}}^y = \mu_y - \gamma \Lambda \left( \sigma_y^2 \right) \left( 1 - \lambda M \frac{b}{a+b} \right). \]
Taking the difference,
\[ \bar{x}_y \left( S_{\text{in}}^y - S_{\text{out}}^y \right) = \gamma \Lambda \left( \sigma_y^2 \right) \left( 1 - \rho_{ky} \sigma_k \sigma_y \right) \lambda M \frac{b}{a+b} > 0. \]
Thus \( S_{\text{in}}^y > S_{\text{out}}^y \iff \sigma_y^2 - \rho_{ky} \sigma_k \sigma_y > 0. \) □

**Proof of Proposition 4.** The subsidy is
\[ \Delta S_{\text{in}} - \Delta S_{\text{out}} = \gamma \Lambda \left( \sigma_y^2 + \rho y \sigma_y \sigma_y \right) \left( \lambda M \frac{b}{a+b} + \lambda M \right). \]
Using $\Lambda = \left[ \frac{\lambda^A_M}{a + b} + \lambda_D \right]^{-1}$ and expressing $\lambda^A_M = (1 - \lambda_D) / 2 - \lambda^P_M$, the subsidy becomes

$$\Delta S_{in} - \Delta S_{out} = \gamma (\sigma_y^2 + \rho_y \sigma_y) \frac{b}{a+b} \left( \frac{(1 - \lambda_D)/2 - \lambda^P_M}{(1 - \lambda_D)/2 - \lambda^M} + \lambda_D \right)$$

$$= \gamma (\sigma_y^2 + \rho_y \sigma_y) \frac{b}{a+b} \left( \frac{1 - \lambda_D}{2} + \frac{1 - b}{a+b} \lambda^P_M \right).$$

The numerator is increasing and the denominator is decreasing in $\lambda^P_M$ while holding $\lambda_D$ constant. □

**Appendix B**

In this appendix we explore the robustness of our model to an alternative specification where a manager’s compensation is tied to the per-dollar returns on the fund and on the benchmark portfolio as opposed to the performance measure used in the main text.

Define $R_i = D_i / (\bar{x}_i S_i)$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$, and let $R = (R_1, \ldots, R_n)^\top$ be the vector of (per- dollar) returns. It is distributed normally with mean $\mu_R = (\mu_1 / (\bar{x}_1 S_1), \ldots, \mu_n / (\bar{x}_n S_n))$ and variance $\Sigma_R$, where

$$(\Sigma_R)_{ij} = \frac{\rho_{ij} \sigma_i \sigma_j}{\bar{x}_i S_i \bar{x}_j S_j}, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n, \quad j = 1, \ldots, n.$$ 

It is now more convenient to specify investors’ portfolio optimization problem in terms of fractions $\varphi_i$ of wealth under management invested in stock $i$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$, with the remaining fraction $1 - \sum_{i=1}^n \varphi_i$ invested in the bond. Denote $\varphi = (\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_n)^\top$.

Let us start by considering the problem of a direct investor. Let $W^D_0$ denote the initial wealth of each direct investor. Let $1 = (1, \ldots, 1)^\top$ be a vector of ones. As in main model, CARA preferences with normal returns are equivalent to mean-variance preferences. Then the direct investor’s problem can be written as

$$\max_{\varphi} \left( \varphi^\top \mu_R + 1 - 1^\top \varphi \right) W^D_0 - \gamma \frac{\varphi^\top \Sigma_R \varphi (W^D_0)^2}{2}. $$

The optimal solution is

$$\varphi^D W^D_0 = \Sigma^{-1}_R \mu_R - \frac{1}{\gamma}.$$
Now consider fund managers. Suppose each manager is given $W^M_0$ amount of money to manage, which is all or part of the fund investor’s initial wealth. The manager’s compensation is

$$w = [aR_\varphi + b(R_\varphi - R_b)]W^M_0 + c,$$

where $R_\varphi = \varphi^\top R + 1 - 1^\top \varphi$ is the return on the manager’s portfolio, and $R_b = \omega^\top R$ is the benchmark return. The benchmark weights (defined as in the proof of Lemma 3) are

$$\omega_i = \frac{1_i \bar{x}_i S_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n 1_j \bar{x}_j S_j},$$

and $\omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n)^\top$. Then the manager’s compensation can be written as

$$w = [(a + b)(\varphi^\top R + 1 - 1^\top \varphi) - b\omega^\top R] W^M_0 + c,$$

and the manager’s problem is

$$\max_{\varphi} [(a + b)(\varphi^\top \mu_R + 1 - 1^\top \varphi) - b\omega^\top \mu_R] W^M_0 - \frac{\gamma}{2}[(a + b)\varphi - b\omega]^\top \Sigma_R[(a + b)\varphi - b\omega] (W^M_0)^2.$$

The optimal solution is

$$[(a + b)\varphi^M - b\omega] W^M_0 = \Sigma^{-1}_R \mu_R - \frac{1}{\gamma}.$$

Equating total demand with total supply, $\lambda_M \varphi^M W^M_0 + \lambda_D \varphi^D W^D_0 = \bar{x} \cdot S$, and rearranging terms, we arrive at the following representation of the stocks’ expected returns:

$$\left(\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\mu_1}{\bar{x}_1 S_1} - 1 \\
\vdots \\
\frac{\mu_n}{\bar{x}_n S_n} - 1
\end{array}\right) = \gamma \Lambda \left(\begin{array}{ccc}
\frac{\sigma_1^2}{\bar{x}_1 S_1^2} & \cdots & \frac{\rho_{1n} \sigma_1 \sigma_n}{\bar{x}_1 S_1 \bar{x}_n S_n} \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\frac{\rho_{1n} \sigma_1 \sigma_n}{\bar{x}_1 S_1 \bar{x}_n S_n} & \cdots & \frac{\sigma_n^2}{\bar{x}_n S_n^2}
\end{array}\right) \left(\begin{array}{c}
\bar{x}_1 S_1 \\
\vdots \\
\bar{x}_n S_n
\end{array}\right) - \lambda_M W^M_0 \frac{b}{a + b} \omega. \quad (26)$$

Simplifying further, we have

$$\left(\begin{array}{c}
\mu_1 - \bar{x}_1 S_1 \\
\vdots \\
\mu_n - \bar{x}_n S_n
\end{array}\right) = \gamma \Lambda \left(\begin{array}{ccc}
\frac{\sigma_1^2}{\bar{x}_1 S_1^2} & \cdots & \frac{\rho_{1n} \sigma_1 \sigma_n}{\bar{x}_1 S_1 \bar{x}_n S_n} \\
\vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\frac{\rho_{1n} \sigma_1 \sigma_n}{\bar{x}_1 S_1 \bar{x}_n S_n} & \cdots & \frac{\sigma_n^2}{\bar{x}_n S_n^2}
\end{array}\right) \left(\begin{array}{c}
\bar{x}_1 S_1 \\
\vdots \\
\bar{x}_n S_n
\end{array}\right) - \lambda_M W^M_0 \frac{b}{a + b} \omega,$$
which after plugging in
\[
\omega = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} 1_{i} \bar{x}_{i} S_{i}} \begin{pmatrix} 1_{1} \bar{x}_{1} S_{1} \\ \vdots \\ 1_{n} \bar{x}_{n} S_{n} \end{pmatrix}
\]
gives us an implicit expression for share values:
\[
\bar{x} \cdot S = \mu - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma \left( I - \lambda M \frac{b}{a + b \sum_{i} 1_{i} \bar{x}_{i} S_{i}} 1_{b} \right).
\] (27)

Notice that (27) is identical to our expression for share values (20) in the main model with \(1_{b} W_{0}^{M} / \sum_{i} 1_{i} \bar{x}_{i} S_{i}\) instead of \(1_{b}\).

Here, the value of assets under management, \(W_{0}^{M}\), depends on asset prices. In general, (27) cannot be solved in closed form. Consider a special case when \(W_{0}^{M}\) consists only of the benchmark stocks, i.e., \(W_{0}^{M} = \sum_{i} 1_{i} \bar{x}_{i} S_{i}\). Then (27) becomes exactly (20).

Lemmas 1–3 from the main text extend straightforwardly. The extension of Lemma 4 is a bit more tricky in general, so we consider two special cases.

In the first case we assume that \(W_{0}^{M} = \sum_{i} 1_{i} \bar{x}_{i} S_{i}\) as discussed above. In this case, if firm \(i\) invests, then \(\bar{x} \cdot S^{(i)}\) and \(\bar{x}_{i} \Delta S_{i}\) are given exactly by (21) and (24), respectively. So Lemma 4 extends to this case. Performing the same analysis as in the main text, we get Proposition 1. The results about M&A and IPOs extend in the same way.

In the second case we assume that the value of asset under management is independent of equilibrium stock prices, which happens, e.g., when the endowment of fund investors is in terms of bonds only. Finally, for simplicity we assume that investment is financed by internal funds (or, equivalently, with the risk-free bond). Then the cost of investment to any firm is \(I\) (which is also true in our original model). We discuss briefly at the end what happens if investment is financed by equity instead.

Denote by \(T = \sum_{i} 1_{i} \bar{x}_{i} S_{i}\) the total value of firms that are in the benchmark. Multiplying both sides of (27) by \(1_{b}^{\top}\) implies
\[
T = \mu^{\top} 1_{b} - \gamma \Lambda 1_{b}^{\top} \Sigma I + \gamma \Lambda 1_{b}^{\top} \Sigma 1_{b} \lambda M \frac{b W_{0}^{M}}{(a + b) T}.
\]
Taking the positive root of the resulting quadratic equation gives

\[
T = \frac{\mu^\top \mathbf{1}_b - \gamma \Lambda \mathbf{1}_b^\top \Sigma \mathbf{1} + \sqrt{(\mu^\top \mathbf{1}_b - \gamma \Lambda \mathbf{1}_b^\top \Sigma \mathbf{1})^2 + 4\gamma \Lambda \mathbf{1}_b^\top \Sigma \mathbf{1}_b \lambda_M W_0^M b / (a + b)}}{2}.
\]

This delivers an explicit expression for asset prices given by

\[
\bar{x} \cdot S = \mu - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma \left(1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \frac{W_0^M}{T} \mathbf{1}_b\right).
\]

If firm \(i\) invests,

\[
\bar{x} \cdot S^{(i)} = \mu^{(i)} - I^{(i)} - \gamma \Lambda \Sigma^{(i)} \left(1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \frac{W_0^M}{T^{(i)}} \mathbf{1}_b\right).
\]

where \(T^{(i)} = \sum_j 1_j \bar{x}_j S_j^{(i)}\) is given by the positive root of

\[
T^{(i)} = \left(\mu^{(i)} - I^{(i)}\right)^\top \mathbf{1}_b - \gamma \Lambda \mathbf{1}_b^\top \Sigma^{(i)} \mathbf{1} + \gamma \Lambda \mathbf{1}_b^\top \Sigma^{(i)} \mathbf{1}_b \lambda_M \frac{b W_0^M}{(a + b) T^{(i)}}. \tag{28}
\]

The corresponding change in firm \(i\)'s value is

\[
\bar{x}_i \Delta S_i = \mu_y - I - \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^n \left[\rho_{jy} \sigma_j \sigma_y + (\sigma_y^2 + \rho_{iy} \sigma_i \sigma_y) \mathcal{I}_{j=i}\right] \left(1 - \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \frac{W_0^M}{T} \mathbf{1}_j\right)
\]

\[ - \gamma \Lambda \sum_{j=1}^n \left[\rho_{jy} \sigma_j \sigma_y + (\sigma_y^2 + \rho_{iy} \sigma_i \sigma_y) \mathcal{I}_{j=i} + \rho_{ij} \sigma_i \sigma_j\right] \lambda_M \frac{b}{a + b} \frac{W_0^M}{T} \mathbf{1}_j \left(\frac{1}{T} - \frac{1}{T^{(i)}}\right),
\]

where \(\mathcal{I}_{j=i} = 1\) if \(j = i\) and \(\mathcal{I}_{j=i} = 0\) otherwise.

Suppose we have two firms \(i_{\text{in}}\) and \(i_{\text{out}}, i_{\text{in}} \in \mathcal{B}, i_{\text{out}} \notin \mathcal{B}\) that are otherwise symmetric, i.e., \(\sigma_{i_{\text{in}}} = \sigma_{i_{\text{out}}} = \sigma, \rho_{i_{\text{in}}y} = \rho_{i_{\text{out}}y} = \rho\) and \(\rho_{i_{\text{in}}j} = \rho_{i_{\text{out}}j} = \rho\) for all \(j \neq i_{\text{in}}, i_{\text{out}}\). Then the analog of (14) in the main text is

\[
\bar{x}_i \Delta S_{i_{\text{in}}} - \bar{x}_i \Delta S_{i_{\text{out}}} = \left[\sigma_y^2 + \rho \sigma \sigma_y\right] \gamma \Lambda \frac{b}{a + b} \lambda_M \frac{W_0^M}{T(i_{\text{in}})}
\]

\[ - \frac{T(i_{\text{in}}) - T(i_{\text{out}})}{T(i_{\text{out}})} \gamma \Lambda \frac{b}{a + b} \lambda_M \frac{W_0^M}{T(i_{\text{in}})} \sum_{j=1}^n \left(\rho_{jy} \sigma_j \sigma_y + \rho_{j} \sigma_{j}\right) \mathbf{1}_j. \tag{29}
\]

The first term is positive by Assumption 1. The second term comes from the fact that the sum of benchmark weights is different depending on whether the investing firm is inside or
outside the benchmark. It captures the fact that by investing, the firm grows and effectively reduces importance of other firms in the benchmark. Notice that $T^{(i_{in})} - T^{(i_{out})} = o(T)$ when project $y$ is small relative to $T$ ($T^{(i_{in})}$, $T^{(i_{out})}$, and $T$ are all of the same order). So the term $(T^{(i_{in})} - T^{(i_{out})})/T^{(i_{out})}$ is $O(1/T)$ and $o(1)$. The rest of the second term, $\gamma \Lambda (b/a + b) \lambda_M (W_0^M/T^{(i_{in})}) \sum_{j=1}^n (\rho_{jy} \sigma_j \sigma_y + \rho_j \sigma \sigma_j) 1_j$, is of the same order as $\bar{x} S^{(i_{in})}$. So the second term is $O(\bar{x} S^{(i_{in})}/T^{(i_{in})})$, i.e., of the order of the benchmark weight $\omega^{(i_{in})}$.

Consider a special case when project $y$ is risk free, i.e., $\sigma_y = 0$. It is easy to show that $T^{(i_{out})} = T$ for $i_{out} \in \{k+1, \ldots, n\}$. Moreover, suppose that $I = \mu_y$ so that there are no arbitrage opportunities. Then $\mu^{(i_{in})} - I^{(i_{in})} = \mu$ and $\Sigma^{(i_{in})} = \Sigma$, and thus $T^{(i_{in})} = T$ for $i_{in} \in \{1, \ldots, k\}$. As a result, for the risk-free project with $\mu_y = I$ we have $\Delta S^{(i_{in})} - \Delta S^{(i_{out})} = 0$, i.e., both firms evaluate it equally.

Finally, if $I$ is financed by issuing $\delta_i = I/S_i^{(i)}$ additional shares, then instead of $T^{(i)} = \sum_i 1_j x_j S_j^{(i)}$ we have $T^{(i)'} = \sum_{j \neq i} 1_j \bar{x}_j S_j^{(i)} + 1_i S_i^{(i)} (\bar{x}_i + \delta_i) = \sum_j 1_j \bar{x}_j S_j^{(i)} + 1_i I$. Then $T^{(i)'}$ is the positive root of

$$T^{(i)'} = \mu^{(i)'} 1_b - \gamma \Lambda 1_b \Sigma^{(i)} 1 + \gamma \Lambda 1_b \Sigma^{(i)} 1_b \lambda_M \frac{bW_0^M}{(a + b)T^{(i)'}}.$$

Comparing this equation to (28), one can see that $T^{(i)'} = T^{(i)}$ if $i$ is outside the benchmark, and $T^{(i)'} > T^{(i)}$ if $i$ is inside the benchmark. Hence, the additional effect coming from the change in the total index value that we have seen in (29) is stronger when the investment is financed by equity.