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RARE DISASTERS, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND SOVEREIGN DEBT

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ABSTRACT

We propose a model of sovereign debt where countries vary in their level of financial development, defined as the extent to which countries can hedge rare disasters in international capital markets. We show that low levels of financial development generate the "debt intolerance" phenomenon that plagues emerging markets: it reduces debt capacity, increases credit spreads, and limits the ability to smooth consumption.

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1 Introduction

One intriguing fact about sovereign debt markets is that emerging economies pay high credit spreads on their sovereign debt, despite generally having much lower debt-output ratios than developed countries. Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) call this phenomenon "debt intolerance."

Debt intolerance is at odds with the predictions of the classic Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) model of sovereign debt.¹ A key cost of defaulting in this model is the loss of access to capital markets. Since real output growth is generally more volatile in emerging markets than in developed countries, the loss of market access is more costly for emerging markets. So, other things equal, emerging markets should be less likely to default, pay lower credit spreads on their sovereign debt, and have higher debt capacity.

The prediction that high output volatility in emerging markets makes their default cost high and their probability of default low contradicts another finding stressed by Reinhart et al (2003): emerging markets tend to be serial defaulters.

In this paper, we propose a model of sovereign debt where countries vary in their level of financial development. By financial development, we mean the extent to which countries can hedge shocks to their economies in international capital markets.² We show that low levels of financial development generate debt intolerance.

We write our sovereign-debt model in continuous time. This approach has several significant advantages. First, our model can be solved in closed form for both the value function and the policy rules up to an ordinary differential equation (ODE) for certainty-equivalent wealth with intuitive boundary conditions. Second, the analytical expressions for optimal consumption, hedging, and default policies yield valuable insights into the key mechanisms at work in our model. Third, we obtain a sharp characterization of the properties of our model as the country approaches its debt capacity: the diffusion volatility of the debt-output ratio approaches zero and the country's endogenous risk aversion approaches infinity.

Our approach to characterizing global nonlinear dynamics is similar to the one used in the dynamic optimal contracting and macro-finance diffusion-based models, e.g., DeMarzo

 $^{^1 {\}rm See}$ Aguiar and Amador (2014) and Aguiar, Chatterjee, Cole, and Stangebye (2016) for recent surveys of the sovereign-debt literature.

²Another aspect of financial development might reflect the country's access to commitment mechanisms such as posting collateral or depositing money in escrow accounts that can be seized by creditors. We do not consider these mechanisms because sovereign debt is in practice generally unsecured.

and Sannikov (2006), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Williams (2015), and Bolton, Wang, and Yang (2019). As our model features uninsurable jump shocks and equilibrium credit risk pricing, we generalize the numerical solution methodology used in these papers to take jumps into account.

The representative agent has the continuous-time version of the Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences proposed by Duffie and Epstein (1992a). These preferences allow our model to generate empirically plausible average debt-to-output ratios without resorting to the very high discount rates used in the literature. Our calibration combines a conventional value of the discount rate (5.2 percent per year) with a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and a commonly-used value for relative risk aversion ($\gamma = 2$). We interpret the low EIS as reflecting expenditure commitments that are difficult to change, as in Bocola and Dovis (2016). Recursive preferences are key to making this calibration work. With standard expected utility, a low EIS implies a high risk aversion that creates an incentive to avoid the debt region, generating a low average debt-to-output ratio.

Output follows the jump-diffusion process considered by Barro and Jin (2011) in which the size distribution of jumps is governed by a power law.³ This process is consistent with the evidence presented in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) which suggests that permanent shocks are the primary source of fluctuations in emerging markets.

Following Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008), we assume that upon default the country suffers a decline in output and loses access to international capital markets. It then regains access to these markets with constant probability. Outside of the default state, the country can invest in a risk-free international bond, hedge diffusion and some rare-disaster shocks, and issue non-contingent debt that can be defaulted upon.

As emphasized by Bulow and Rogoff (1989), autarky might be difficult to sustain because the rest of the world cannot commit ex-ante to exclude the defaulting borrower from ex-post risk-sharing arrangements. In our model, the permanent output loss that occurs upon default is sufficient to sustain the existence of sovereign debt. In this sense, our model is immune to the Bulow-Rogoff critique.

One virtue of our model is that it does not require the nonlinear default costs commonly used in the literature to generate plausible debt-output ratios. Our linear specification of

³Rare disasters have proved useful in modeling many other asset pricing phenomena. Examples include the equity premium (Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Barro and Jin (2011), and Gabaix (2012)), the predictability of excess returns (Wachter (2013)), the corporate bond spread (Bhamra and Strebulaev (2011)), and the returns to the carry trade (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011) and Farhi and Gabaix (2015)).

default costs is consistent with the recent evidence by Hébert and Schreger (2016).

Our model includes two frictions that make markets incomplete: limited commitment and limited spanning.⁴ To isolate the impact of limited commitment, suppose there is full spanning so that all shocks can be hedged. The jump insurance contracts in our model are the same as the state-contingent contracts considered by Bulow and Rogoff (1989) and referred to by them as "cash-in-advance" contracts. For our full-spanning case, the country's debt capacity is reduced to a level such that in equilibrium the country weakly prefers repaying its outstanding debt over defaulting on it, as in Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996).⁵ Since hedging is more cost effective than defaulting in terms of managing the country's risk, the country never defaults and the credit spread on sovereign debt is zero. Therefore, in order to generate default, we need a second form of market incompleteness, which is limited spanning.

We model limited spanning as the country's limited access to financial securities that can be used to hedge rare disasters. This modeling approach is consistent with the evidence presented by Upper and Valli (2016) using data from the Bank of International Settlements. These authors summarize their findings as follows: "The economies and financial markets of emerging market economies (EMEs) tend (with some exceptions) to be more volatile than those of advanced economies. This is true whether one looks at output growth, exchange rates, interest rates or capital flows. Given this volatility, one would expect hedging markets in EMEs to be well developed. But this does not seem to be the case. EMEs make up about one third of the global economy when measured at market exchange rates and just under one half when measured at purchasing power parity. Their share in global trade is 36 percent. Still, derivatives referencing their currencies or interest rates account for only 10 percent of the global turnover of such contracts, despite notable growth in some cases in recent years." Our approach is also consistent with a recent World Bank (2018) report. This report discusses how emerging markets can hedge some rare events with instruments such as catastrophe bonds, while there are large, rare events that cannot be hedged. Other manifestations of limited spanning include a country's inability to issue debt with long maturities or debt

 $^{{}^{4}}$ Bai and Zhang (2010) combine these two forms of market incompleteness to explain the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. They consider a limited-enforcement model in the spirit of Kehoe and Levine (1993, 2001), so in their model default does not occur in equilibrium.

⁵Other work that emphasize the importance of limited commitment includes Alvarez and Jermann (2000, 2001), Kehoe and Perri (2002), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004), Krueger and Perri (2006), and Krueger and Uhlig (2019).

denominated in local currency.

Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), we assume that the degree of financial spanning is exogenous. This exogeneity assumption is consistent with the key finding of the literature on the original-sin hypothesis: the degree of market incompleteness is more closely related to the size of the economy than to the soundness of fiscal and monetary policy or other fundamentals (Hausmann and Panizza (2003) and Bordo, Meissner, and Redish (2004)).

Diffusion shocks do not generate default in our model because these shocks are hedgeable and our debt is short term. Nuño and Thomas (2015), Tourre (2017), and DeMarzo, He, and Tourre (2018) generate default in models with diffusion shocks by working with term debt. For tractability reasons, they assume that debt maturity is exogenous and debt issuance is locally deterministic. Bornstein (2017) generates default by assuming that output follows a Poisson process in a continuous-time version of Arellano (2008).

In our model, only uninsurable jump shocks that cause sufficiently large losses generate default. The reason is two-fold. First, for insurable output shocks, it is more efficient to hedge than to default. Second, for uninsurable downward jump shocks of moderate sizes, it is more efficient to preserve the option to default in the future against larger losses than to default.

One key result is that the more limited is the spanning of assets at a country's disposal, the more severe is its debt intolerance. When spanning is limited, it is not optimal to fully hedge risks that can be hedged. The country uses the available hedging instruments to increase its debt capacity by ensuring that default is not triggered by shocks that can be hedged. So, countries with more limited spanning hedge less and endure more volatility in consumption. These countries are also more likely to default, so lenders charge them a higher credit spread to cover the expected default losses. Low levels of financial development reduce debt capacity, increase credit spreads, and limit the ability to smooth consumption. In other words, low financial development causes debt intolerance.

The importance of financial development in driving underinsurance in emerging markets is also emphasized by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003). Their analysis builds on the work of Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). Maggiori (2017) develops a continuous-time model to analyze the equilibrium risk sharing between countries with varying degrees of financial development. Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) also emphasize the importance of financial development, which they interpret as a country's ability to enforce domestic financial contracts to hedge idiosyncratic risks. Our model suggests that Shiller's (1993) proposed creation of a market for perpetual claims on countries' Gross Domestic Produce (GDP) could significantly improve welfare in emerging markets. By increasing a country's ability to hedge its risks, GDP-linked bonds would lower credit spreads, increase debt capacity and reduce consumption volatility.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 discusses the solution method. Sections 4 and 5 summarize the solution for the first-best and the limited-commitment case, respectively. Section 6 calibrates our model and explores its quantitative properties. Section 7 performs sensitivity analysis with respect to key parameters of the model. Section 8 discusses an expected-utility version of our calibration. Section 9 concludes.

2 Model Setup

We consider a continuous-time model where the country's infinitely-lived representative agent receives a perpetual stochastic stream of output. As we show in Section 3, default occurs in equilibrium. Upon default, the country endures distress costs that take the form of a fall in output and temporary exclusion from capital markets. We call the regime in which the country does not have access to financial markets autarky and the regime in which it has access to financial markets the normal regime. Below, we describe the output processes in the two regimes and the transition between regimes.

2.1 Output Processes

Output Process in the Normal Regime. We model output in this regime, Y_t , as a jump-diffusion process. Both diffusion and jump shocks are important in generating our model's main predictions.

The law of motion for output, Y_t , is given by:

$$\frac{dY_t}{Y_{t-}} = \mu dt + \sigma d\mathcal{B}_t - (1-Z)d\mathcal{J}_t, \quad Y_0 > 0, \qquad (1)$$

where μ is the drift parameter, σ is the diffusion-volatility parameter, \mathcal{B} is a standard Brownian motion process, and \mathcal{J} is a pure jump process with a constant arrival rate, λ . Let $\tau^{\mathcal{J}}$ denote the jump arrival time. Since Brownian motion is continuous, if a jump does not occur at t ($d\mathcal{J}_t = 0$), we have $Y_t = Y_{t-}$, where $Y_{t-} \equiv \lim_{s \uparrow t} Y_s$ denotes the left limit of output. If a jump occurs at t ($d\mathcal{J}_t = 1$), output falls from Y_{t-} to $Y_t = ZY_{t-}$. We call $Z \in [0, 1]$ the fraction of output recovered after a jump arrival. We assume that Z follows a well-behaved cumulative distribution function, G(Z).

Since the expected percentage output loss upon the arrival of a jump is $(1 - \mathbb{E}(Z))$, the expected growth rate of output in levels is given by:

$$g = \mu - \lambda (1 - \mathbb{E}(Z)) .$$
⁽²⁾

Here, the term $\lambda(1 - \mathbb{E}(Z))$ represents the reduction in the expected growth rate associated with jumps.

We can write the dynamics for logarithmic output, $\ln Y_t$, in discrete time as follows:

$$\ln Y_{t+\Delta} - \ln Y_t = \left(\mu - \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\right)\Delta + \sigma\sqrt{\Delta}\,\epsilon_{t+\Delta} - (1-Z)\nu_{t+\Delta}\,,\tag{3}$$

where the time-t conditional distribution of $\epsilon_{t+\Delta}$ is a standard normal and $\nu_{t+\Delta} = 1$ with probability $\lambda\Delta$ and zero with probability $(1 - \lambda\Delta)$. Equation (3) implies that the expected change of $\ln Y$ over a time interval Δ is $(\mu - \sigma^2/2) \Delta - \lambda(1 - \mathbb{E}(Z))\Delta$. The term $\sigma^2/2$ is the Jensen-inequality correction associated with the diffusion shock.

Output Process under Autarky. Let $\tau^{\mathcal{D}}$ denote the endogenous time of default. Upon default, the country enters autarky. There are two costs of defaulting. The first cost is the loss of access to financial markets, so consumption equals output in autarky.

The second cost is an output loss that proxies for the disruptions of economic activity associated with default. We assume that upon default output drops permanently from $Y_{\tau^{\mathcal{D}_{-}}} \equiv \lim_{s\uparrow\tau^{\mathcal{D}}} Y_s$, the output in the normal regime just prior to default, to $\alpha Y_{\tau^{\mathcal{D}_{-}}}$, where $(1 - \alpha)$ is the percentage default cost.

We denote the output process in autarky by \hat{Y}_t . This process starts at time $\tau^{\mathcal{D}}$ with the value of $\hat{Y}_{\tau^{\mathcal{D}}} = \alpha Y_{\tau^{\mathcal{D}}}$ and follows the same output process as that for the normal regime:

$$\frac{d\widehat{Y}_t}{\widehat{Y}_{t-}} = \mu dt + \sigma d\mathcal{B}_t - (1-Z)d\mathcal{J}_t \ . \tag{4}$$

While in autarky, the country re-gains its access to financial markets with probability ξ per unit of time. Let $\tau^{\mathcal{E}}$ denote the stochastic exogenous exit time from autarky. The duration of autarky is $\tau^{\mathcal{D}} \leq t < \tau^{\mathcal{E}}$. Upon randomly exiting from autarky at time $\tau^{\mathcal{E}}$, the country starts afresh with no debt and regains access to international markets. Then, output follows the process given by equation (1) starting with $Y_{\tau^{\mathcal{E}}}$, which is equal to $\widehat{Y}_{\tau^{\mathcal{E}}-}$, the pre-exit output level under autarky: $Y_{\tau^{\mathcal{E}}} = \widehat{Y}_{\tau^{\mathcal{E}}-}$.

2.2 Preferences

We assume that the lifetime utility of the representative agent, V_t , has the recursive form proposed by Kreps and Porteous (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989), and Weil (1990). We use the continuous-time version of these preferences developed by Duffie and Epstein (1992a):

$$V_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\int_t^\infty f(C_u, V_u) du \right], \tag{5}$$

where f(C, V) is the normalized aggregator for consumption C and utility V. This aggregator is given by:

$$f(C,V) = \frac{\rho}{1-\psi^{-1}} \frac{C^{1-\psi^{-1}} - ((1-\gamma)V)^{\chi}}{((1-\gamma)V)^{\chi-1}}.$$
(6)

Here, ρ is the subjective discount rate and

$$\chi = \frac{1 - \psi^{-1}}{1 - \gamma} \,. \tag{7}$$

This recursive, non-expected utility formulation allows us to separate the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ , from the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), ψ . This separation plays an important role in our quantitative analysis. The time-additive separable CRRA utility is a special case of recursive utility where the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ , equals the inverse of the EIS, $\gamma = \psi^{-1}$, implying $\chi = 1$. In this case, $f(C, V) = U(C) - \rho V$, which is additively separable in C and V, with $U(C) = \rho C^{1-\gamma}/(1-\gamma)$.

2.3 Financial Assets and Market Structure

If the country could trade in a complete set of contingent assets, a setting which we refer to as full spanning, default would not occur in equilibrium. As discussed in the introduction, our model includes two sources of market incompleteness. The first is limited commitment: the country cannot commit to repaying its debt. The second is limited spanning: markets for certain shocks are incomplete. To capture the notion that some shocks are harder to hedge than others, we assume that large jump shocks might not be insurable.

We denote the country's financial wealth by W_t . Under normal circumstances, the country has four investment and financing opportunities: (1) it can save at the risk-free rate, r; (2) it can insure its diffusion risk through hedging contracts; (3) it can buy insurance against certain jumps; and (4) it can borrow in the sovereign debt market at an interest rate that is the sum of r and an endogenous credit spread, π_t . Upon default on its sovereign debt,

the country enters autarky and loses access to all four investment and financing opportunities. While in autarky, it regains access to these investment opportunities with a constant probability, ξ .

Diffusion Risk Hedging Contracts. We assume that diffusive shocks are idiosyncratic and that markets for contracts that hedge these shocks are perfectly competitive. An investor who holds one unit of the hedging contract at time t receives no upfront payment, since there is no risk premium for bearing idiosyncratic risk, and receives a gain or loss equal to $\sigma d\mathcal{B}_t = \sigma \left(\mathcal{B}_{t+dt} - \mathcal{B}_t\right)$ at time t + dt. We normalize the volatility of this hedging contract so that it is equal to the output volatility parameter, σ . This hedging contract is analogous to a futures contract in standard no-arbitrage models, see e.g., Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1981). We denote the country's holdings of diffusion risk contracts at time t by Θ_t .

Jump Insurance Contracts and Insurance Premium Payments. We assume that jump shocks are idiosyncratic and that markets for contracts that hedge these shocks are perfectly competitive. Bulow and Rogoff (1989) define a "cash-in-advance" contract as a "conventional insurance contract under which a country makes a payment up front in return for a state-contingent, nonnegative future payment." Following Bulow and Rogoff (1989), we consider an insurance contract initiated at time t that covers the following jump event: the first stochastic arrival of a downward jump in output with a recovery fraction in the interval (Z, Z + dZ) at jump time $\tau^{\mathcal{J}} > t$ for $Z \ge Z^*$. Here, Z^* is a parameter that describes the level of financial development. The higher is the value of Z^* , the less developed are financial markets and the fewer are the jump insurance opportunities.

The buyer of a unit of this insurance contract makes continuous insurance premium payments. Once the jump event occurs at time $\tau^{\mathcal{J}}$, the buyer stops making payments and receives a one-time *unit* lump-sum payoff. The insurance premium payment is equal to $\lambda dG(Z)$, the product of the jump intensity, λ , and the probability dG(Z) that the recovery fraction falls inside the interval (Z, Z+dZ) for $Z \geq Z^*$. Conceptually, this insurance contract is analogous to one-step-ahead Arrow securities in discrete-time models. In practice, this insurance contract is similar to a credit default swap.⁶

We denote the country's holdings of jump-risk insurance contracts at time t contingent

 $^{^{6}}$ Pindyck and Wang (2013) discuss a similar insurance contract in a general equilibrium setting with economic catastrophes.

on a recovery fraction Z by $X_t(Z)$. The country pays an insurance premium to hedge jump risk at a rate $X_t(Z)\lambda dG(Z)$ before the *first* jump with recovery fraction Z arrives at time $\tau^{\mathcal{J}}$. At this time, the country receives a lump-sum payment $X_t(Z)$ if the recovery fraction is in the interval (Z, Z + dZ). Since the country can purchase insurance for all possible values of $Z \ge Z^*$, the total jump insurance premium payment per unit of time is given by:

$$\Phi_t = \lambda \int_{Z^*}^1 X_t(Z) dG(Z) \equiv \lambda \mathbb{E} \left[X_t(Z) \mathcal{I}_{Z \ge Z^*} \right], \qquad (8)$$

where the expectation, $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$, is calculated with respect to the cumulative distribution function, G(Z) and $\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is an indicator function that equals one if the event \mathcal{A} occurs and zero otherwise. The indicator function in equation (8) imposes the restriction that jump insurance is available only for $Z \geq Z^*$.

Sovereign Debt, Default, and Credit Spread. As in discrete-time settings, sovereign debt is borrower-specific, non-contingent, unsecured, and short term.⁷ Sovereign debt is continuously repaid and reissued at the interest rate $r + \pi_{t-}$, where π_{t-} is the endogenous credit spread. The borrowing process continues until the country defaults and resumes once the borrower re-enters the sovereign-debt market. Sovereign debt is held and priced in competitive markets by well-diversified foreign investors. The maximal amount of debt that the country can issue is stochastic and endogenously determined in equilibrium by the creditors' break-even condition and the borrower's optimal default decisions.

The country has the option to default at any time on its sovereign debt. As emphasized by Zame (1993) and Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005), the possibility of default provides a partial hedge against risks that cannot be insured because of limited financial spanning.⁸

Optimality. The country chooses its consumption, diffusion and jump risk hedging demands, sovereign debt issue, and default timing to maximize the agent's utility defined by equations (5)-(6), given the output processes specified in equations (1) and (4), and equilibrium pricing of sovereign debt and insurance contracts for diffusion and jump shocks.

⁷Auclert and Rognlie (2016) show that sovereign debt models with short-term debt have a unique Markov perfect equilibrium. Sovereign-debt models with long-maturity debt include Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012).

⁸For simplicity, we consider only the possibility of complete default. Our model can be easily generalized to allow for partial default. See Yue (2010) and Asonuma, Niepelt, and Ranciere (2017) for models with partial default.

3 Model Solution

We solve our model using dynamic programming. We denote by $V(W_t, Y_t)$ the representative agent's value function for the normal regime and by $\widehat{V}(\widehat{Y}_t)$ the value function for the autarky regime. The autarky value function depends only on contemporaneous output because financial wealth is always zero in autarky.

3.1 Normal Regime

Financial wealth, W_t , evolves according to:

$$dW_t = [(r + \pi_{t-})W_{t-} + Y_{t-} - C_{t-} - \Phi_{t-}]dt + \sigma\Theta_{t-}d\mathcal{B}_t + X_{t-}(Z)\,d\mathcal{J}_t\,.$$
(9)

The first term on the right side of equation (9) is interest income/expenses, $(r + \pi_{t-})W_{t-} dt$ plus output, $Y_{t-} dt$, minus consumption, $C_{t-} dt$, and minus the jump-insurance premium, $\Phi_{t-} dt$. When $W_{t-} > 0$, the country has no debt outstanding and accumulates its financial wealth at the rate of r as $\pi_{t-} = 0$. When $W_{t-} < 0$, the country pays interest at a rate $(r + \pi_{t-})$, where π_{t-} is the equilibrium credit spread.

The second term on the right side of equation (9), $\sigma \Theta_{t-} d\mathcal{B}_t$, is the realized gain or loss from diffusion risk hedging contracts. Since diffusion shocks are idiosyncratic with zero mean, the country incurs no up-front payment. The third term represents the lump-sum payment, $X_{t-}(Z)$, from the jump insurance contract when a jump arrives $(d\mathcal{J}_t = 1)$ and the realized Z is hedgeable, i.e., $Z \in [Z^*, 1]$.

Diffusion models with term debt often assume that debt issuance is locally deterministic of order dt, see e.g., Nuño and Thomas (2015), Tourre (2017), and DeMarzo, He, and Tourre (2018). In contrast, debt issuance in our model is stochastic and depends on the country's consumption and hedging strategies. **Dynamic Programming.** The value function V(W, Y) in the normal regime satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:⁹

$$0 = \max_{C,\Theta,X} f(C, V(W,Y)) + [(r+\pi)W + Y - C - \Phi] V_W(W,Y)$$
(10)
+ $\frac{\Theta^2 \sigma^2}{2} V_{WW}(W,Y) + \mu Y V_Y(W,Y) + \frac{\sigma^2 Y^2}{2} V_{YY}(W,Y) + \Theta \sigma^2 Y V_{WY}(W,Y)$
+ $\lambda \mathbb{E} \left[(V(W+X,ZY) \mathcal{I}_{Z \ge Z^*} + V(W,ZY) \mathcal{I}_{\underline{Z} \le Z < Z^*} + V(W,ZY) \mathcal{I}_{Z < \underline{Z}}) - V(W,Y) \right],$

where the expectation $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$ is evaluated with respect to the cumulative distribution function, G(Z). The HJB equation states that at the optimum, the sum of the country's normalized aggregator, f(C, V), and the expected change in the value function V(W, Y) (the sum of all the other terms on the right side of equation (10)) must equal zero.

The second and third terms of equation (10), describe the drift and diffusion volatility effects of wealth W on V(W, Y). The fourth and fifth terms reflect the drift and volatility effects of output Y on V(W, Y). The sixth term, $\Theta\sigma^2 Y V_{WY}(W, Y)$, captures the effect of the country's intertemporal diffusive shock hedging demand on V(W, Y).

The last term, which appears in the third line of equation (10), represents the effect of jumps. Diffusion shocks do not cause default because it is always more efficient to hedge diffusion shocks using actuarially fair insurance. Only jump shocks can potentially trigger default. When a jump arrives at time t ($d\mathcal{J}_t = 1$), the country decides whether to default on its debt after observing the realized recovery fraction, Z. The default decision is characterized by an endogenous, stochastic threshold rule, \underline{Z} .

If $Z \ge Z^*$, the country receives a jump-insurance payment, $X_{t-}(Z)$, and does not default, so its value function at t is $V(W_{t-} + X_{t-}(Z), ZY_{t-})$.

If $Z < \underline{Z}$, the country defaults, enters autarky, and its output falls to $\widehat{Y}_t = \alpha Y_t$, where $Y_t = ZY_{t-}$, so the value function at $t = \tau^{\mathcal{D}}$ is $V(W_t, ZY_{t-}) = \widehat{V}(\widehat{Y}_t) = \widehat{V}(\alpha ZY_{t-})$.

Finally, if $Z \in [\underline{Z}, Z^*)$, the jump is not insurable and the country does not default, so its value function at t is $V(W_{t-}, ZY_{t-})$.

First-Order Conditions. As in Duffie and Epstein (1992a, 1992b), the first-order condition (FOC) for C is:

$$f_C(C,V) = V_W(W,Y).$$
(11)

⁹Duffie and Epstein (1992b) generalize the standard HJB equation for the expected-utility case to allow for non-expected recursive utility such as the Epstein-Weil-Zin utility used here.

This condition equates the marginal benefit of consumption, $f_C(C, V)$, to the marginal utility of savings, $V_W(W, Y)$. With expected utility, $f_C(C, V) = U'(C)$, we recover the standard FOC for consumption: $U'(C) = V_W(W, Y)$.

The FOC for the diffusion-risk hedging demand is:

$$\Theta = -\frac{YV_{WY}(W,Y)}{V_{WW}(W,Y)}.$$
(12)

Equation (12) is similar to the intertemporal hedging demand in Merton (1969) for expected utility and in Duffie and Epstein (1992b) for recursive preferences. Since the country is endowed with a long position in domestic output, its hedging demand should be negative.

The optimal jump risk hedging demand, X(Z; W, Y), solves the following problem:

$$\max_{X} \quad \lambda \mathbb{E}\left[\left(V(W+X, ZY) - XV_{W}(W, Y)\right)\mathcal{I}_{Z \ge Z^{*}}\right].$$
(13)

This problem boils down to maximize $(V(W + X, ZY) - XV_W(W, Y))$ by choosing X(Z; W, Y)for each value of Z that can be insured $(Z \ge Z^*)$. The FOC for X(Z; W, Y) is:

$$V_W(W + X(Z; W, Y), ZY) = V_W(W, Y).$$
(14)

The intuition for this condition is that it is optimal to choose X to equate the pre- and post-jump marginal utility of wealth. Since output falls upon a jump arrival, without jump insurance, $V_W(W, Y) < V_W(W, ZY)$. The country chooses X(Z; W, Y) > 0 to equate the pre- and post-jump marginal utility of wealth.

Value Function. The value function, V(W, Y), is given by:

$$V(W,Y) = \frac{(bP(W,Y))^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma},$$
(15)

where b is given by

$$b = \rho \left[\frac{r + \psi(\rho - r)}{\rho} \right]^{\frac{1}{1 - \psi}}.$$
(16)

To ensure that utility is finite, we require the following regularity condition:

$$\rho > (1 - \psi^{-1}) r \,. \tag{17}$$

We can interpret P(W, Y) as the certainty equivalent wealth, which is the time-t total wealth that makes the agent indifferent between the status quo (with financial wealth W and output process Y) and having a wealth level P(W, Y) and permanently no output:

$$V(W,Y) = V(P(W,Y),0).$$
(18)

Next, we turn to the autarky regime.

3.2 Autarky Regime

In the autarky regime, wealth is zero and the country cannot borrow or lend, so consumption equals output and wealth is not an argument of the value function. This function, $\widehat{V}(\widehat{Y})$, satisfies the following differential equation:

$$0 = f(\widehat{Y}, \widehat{V}) + \mu \widehat{Y} \widehat{V}'(\widehat{Y}) + \frac{\sigma^2 \widehat{Y}^2}{2} \widehat{V}''(\widehat{Y}) + \lambda \mathbb{E} \left[\widehat{V}(Z\widehat{Y}) - \widehat{V}(\widehat{Y}) \right] + \xi \left[V(0, \widehat{Y}) - \widehat{V}(\widehat{Y}) \right] .$$
(19)

The first term on the right side of equation (19) is the net utility flow. The second and third terms represent the impact of the output drift and diffusion volatility, respectively. The fourth term describes the possibility of output jumping from Y_t to ZY_{t-} while the country is in autarky. The last term reflects the possibility of exiting from autarky, which occurs at an exogenous rate, ξ . Upon exiting from autarky at time $\tau^{\mathcal{E}}$ and entering the normal regime, the country's value function is $V(0, Y_{\tau^{\mathcal{E}}})$, where $Y_{\tau^{\mathcal{E}}} = \hat{Y}_{\tau^{\mathcal{E}}-}$.

We show that the value function in the autarky regime, $\widehat{V}(\widehat{Y})$, is:

$$\widehat{V}(\widehat{Y}) = \frac{(b\,\widehat{p}\,\widehat{Y})^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma},\tag{20}$$

where the coefficient b is given by equation (16) and \hat{p} is the endogenous (scaled) certainty equivalent wealth in the autarky regime.

3.3 Connecting the Normal Regime with Autarky

The value functions V(W, Y) and $\widehat{V}(\widehat{Y})$ are connected by recurrent transitions between the normal and autarky regimes (see the two HJB equations, (10) and (19)).

If the country defaults at time t, output drops to αY_t . Therefore, the value of W_t that makes the country indifferent between repaying its debt and defaulting, which we denote by W_t , satisfies the following value-matching condition:

$$V(\underline{W}_t, Y_t) = \widehat{V}(\alpha Y_t).$$
⁽²¹⁾

Condition (21) implicitly defines the default boundary W_t :

$$W_t = \underline{W}(Y_t) \,. \tag{22}$$

We refer to $-\underline{W_t}$ as the country's debt capacity, since it is the maximum level of debt that the country can issue without triggering default in equilibrium. Whenever the country's sovereign debt exceeds its endogenous debt capacity, i.e., when $W_t < \underline{W_t}$, the country defaults and enters autarky. Its value function in this region satisfies

$$V(W_t, Y_t) = \widehat{V}(\alpha Y_t), \quad \text{when} \quad W_t < \underline{W_t}.$$
(23)

We need one more condition to pin down $\underline{W_t}$, as it is a free boundary. We present this condition after we simplify our model's solution.

3.4 Simplifying the Model Solution

It is useful to define scaled financial wealth:

$$w_t = \frac{W_t}{Y_t},\tag{24}$$

which is the model's scaled state variable. Similarly, we define scaled versions of the control variables: scaled consumption $c_t = C_t/Y_t$, scaled diffusion hedging demand $\theta_t = \Theta_t/Y_t$, scaled jump hedging demand $x_t = X_t/Y_t$, scaled jump insurance premium payment $\phi_t = \Phi_t/Y_t$, and scaled debt capacity $w_t = W_t/Y_t$.

The jump insurance premium pricing equation, (8), can be simplified as follows:

$$\phi(w_{t-}) = \lambda \mathbb{E}[x(w_{t-}, Z) \mathcal{I}_{Z \ge Z^*}].$$
(25)

The scaled certainty-equivalent wealth, $p(w_t)$, is equal to $P(W_t, Y_t)/Y_t$. Euler's theorem implies that $P_W(W_t, Y_t) = p'(w_t)$. The value of p'(w) plays a crucial role in our analysis.

As debt is issued before jump arrival, the equilibrium credit spread, π_{t-} , depends only on the pre-jump information. We can express π_{t-} as a function of pre-jump scaled wealth, $\pi(w_{t-})$, which we characterize below. To calculate $\pi(w_{t-})$, it is useful to characterize the default policy in terms of a threshold rule for the recovery fraction, $\underline{Z}(w_{t-})$.

Optimal Default Thresholds: \underline{w} and $\underline{Z}(w_{t-})$. We show that the country defaults whenever an output jump causes $-w_t$ to exceed $-\underline{w}$. That is, the post-jump optimal default strategy is time invariant and characterized by the cutoff threshold, \underline{w} .

We can also characterize the optimal default strategy via a threshold value for the recovery fraction at t, \underline{Z}_t . First, because it is not optimal for the country to default against hedgeable jump shocks, $Z \in [Z^*, 1], \underline{Z}_t \leq Z^*$ has to hold. Second, when an unhedgeable jump shock, $Z \in [0, Z^*)$, arrives, the country is indifferent between defaulting or not if and only if $w_t = w_{t-}/Z = \underline{w}$. Solving this equation and setting $Z = \underline{Z}_t$, we obtain $\underline{Z}_t = w_{t-}/\underline{w} < Z^*$. So, \underline{Z}_t can be written as a function of the pre-jump value of w_{t-} :

$$\underline{Z_t} = \underline{Z}(w_{t-}) = \min\{w_{t-}/\underline{w}, Z^*\} , \qquad (26)$$

for $0 \leq w_{t-}/\underline{w} \leq 1$, i.e., the indebted country is in the normal regime.



Figure 1: The optimal default threshold $\underline{Z}(w_{t-})$ and the three mutually exclusive regions: the "jump insurance and no default" (the top rectangular) region, the "no jump insurance and no default" (the triangular) region, and the default (the trapezoid) region. The horizontal axis is w_{t-}/\underline{w} . The vertical axis is the recovery fraction Z upon the arrival of a jump.

Figure 1 summarizes this result by plotting the default threshold $\underline{Z}(w_{t-})$ given by equation (26) as a function of w_{t-}/\underline{w} over the internal [0, 1]. This figure shows the three mutually exclusive regions: (i) the region where the country purchases jump insurance and does not default $(Z \ge Z^*)$; (ii) the region where the country purchases no jump insurance and does not default $(\underline{Z}(w_{t-}) \le Z < Z^*)$; and (iii) the default region where $Z < \underline{Z}(w_{t-})$.

Equilibrium Credit Spread. When the country issues debt ($W_{t-} < 0$), the competitivemarket zero-profit condition for diversified sovereign debt investors implies that the credit spread, π_{t-} , satisfies:

$$-W_{t-}(1+rdt) = -W_{t-}(1+(r+\pi_{t-})dt)\left[1-\lambda G(\underline{Z}(w_{t-}))dt\right] + \lambda G(\underline{Z}(w_{t-}))dt \times 0.$$
(27)

The first term on the right side of equation (27), is the expected total payment to investors, which is the product of the probability of repayment, $[1 - \lambda G(\underline{Z}(w_{t-}))dt]$, and the cuminterest value of debt repayment, $-W_{t-}(1 + (r + \pi_{t-})dt)$. The second term on the right side of equation (27) corresponds to the zero payment that occurs upon default. The left side of equation (27) is the investors' expected rate of return, r.

Equation (27) shows that jumps are necessary to generate default in our model. To see this result, suppose that there are no jumps. Then equation (27) implies that the credit spread π_t must be zero, which means that diffusion shocks have to be hedged so that they do not trigger default.

Moreover, creditors cannot break even for any *defaultable* short-term debt in pure diffusion models. The intuition is as follows. For a small time increment dt, diffusions shocks can cause losses of order \sqrt{dt} with strictly positive probability.¹⁰ These losses cannot be compensated with any finite credit spread π_t , as this compensation is only of order $\pi_t dt$, which is much lower than \sqrt{dt} . For this reason, other diffusion-based sovereign-debt models work with term debt in order to generate default, see e.g., Nuño and Thomas (2015), Tourre (2017), and DeMarzo, He, and Tourre (2018).

Simplifying equation (27), we obtain the following expression for $\pi_{t-} = \pi(w_{t-})$, where

$$\pi(w_{t-}) = \lambda G(\underline{Z}(w_{t-})).$$
(28)

This equation ties the equilibrium credit spread to the country's default strategy. For a unit of debt per unit of time, the left side of (28) is the compensation for bearing credit risk and the right side is the expected loss given default. Both terms are of order *dt*. Because there is zero recovery upon default and investors are risk neutral, the credit spread is equal to the probability of default.¹¹ Finally, we can generalize our model by incorporating a stochastic discount factor with jump risk premium to price sovereign debt. This generalization produces higher and more volatile credit spreads.

Dynamics for Scaled Financial Wealth, w_t . Using Ito's Lemma, we obtain the following law of motion for w_t in the normal regime:

$$dw_{t} = \mu_{w}(w_{t-}) dt + \sigma_{w}(w_{t-}) d\mathcal{B}_{t} + (w_{t}^{\mathcal{J}} - w_{t-}) d\mathcal{J}_{t}, \qquad (29)$$

¹⁰This random component dominates the predictable (drift) component, which is of order dt.

¹¹When scaled wealth is positive, there is no debt outstanding so the probability of default is zero.

The first term in equation (29) is

$$\mu_w(w_{t-}) = \left(r + \pi(w_{t-}) - \mu + \sigma^2\right) w_{t-} - \sigma^2 \theta(w_{t-}) + 1 - \phi(w_{t-}) - c(w_{t-}), \quad (30)$$

where $\pi(w_{t-})$ is the equilibrium credit spread, given in equation (28) and $\phi(w_{t-})$ is the scaled jump insurance premium payment given by equation (25). The second term in equation (29) is the volatility function, $\sigma_w(w_{t-})$, given by:

$$\sigma_w(w_{t-}) = (\theta(w_{t-}) - w_{t-})\sigma.$$
(31)

The third term in equation (29) captures the effect of jumps on w, where the post-jump scaled financial wealth, $w_t^{\mathcal{J}}$, is given by

$$w_t^{\mathcal{J}} = \frac{w_{t-} + x_{t-}}{Z} \mathcal{I}_{Z \ge Z^*} + \frac{w_{t-}}{Z} \mathcal{I}_{\underline{Z}(w_{t-}) \le Z < Z^*} + \frac{w_{t-}}{Z} \mathcal{I}_{Z < \underline{Z}(w_{t-})} \,. \tag{32}$$

Scaled Debt Capacity \underline{w} . In order to maximize the country's debt capacity, shocks that can be insured at actuarially fair prices should be hedged and therefore diffusion shocks should not trigger default. Technically speaking, the country optimally sets the volatility of w to zero at its endogenous debt capacity:¹²

$$\sigma_w(\underline{w}) = 0. \tag{33}$$

The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose that the diffusion volatility $\sigma_w(w_t)$ evaluated at debt capacity $w_t = \underline{w}$ is not zero. Then, over a small interval dt, the realized value of w_{t+dt} can cross the default boundary \underline{w} with strictly positive probability in response to a small diffusive shock, triggering default. Such default is clearly inefficient, since diffusive shocks can be hedged at an actuarially fair price. So, optimality implies $\sigma_w(\underline{w}) = 0$.

Substituting the zero-volatility condition (33) into equation (31), we obtain $\theta(\underline{w}) = \underline{w}$, which is the diffusion-hedging demand at \underline{w} . While this hedging strategy eliminates the volatility of w at \underline{w} , it does not in general eliminate the idiosyncratic volatility of *unscaled* consumption and *unscaled* certainty-equivalent wealth. In this sense, hedging is incomplete. We provide intuition for this incomplete-hedging result in Section 5 after describing the first-best and the limited-commitment solutions.

 $^{^{12}}$ Bolton, Wang, and Yang (2019) derive a similar boundary condition in a corporate-finance continuoustime diffusion model where the entrepreneur has inalienable human capital.

Finally, to ensure that w weakly moves towards zero and away from \underline{w} in the absence of jumps, it is necessary for us to also verify that $\mu_w(\underline{w}) \ge 0$. Substituting equation (33) into equation (30), we show that $\mu_w(\underline{w}) \ge 0$ is equivalent to the following constraint at $\underline{w} < 0$:

$$c(\underline{w}) \le 1 + \mu \cdot (-\underline{w}) - \left[(r + \pi(\underline{w})) \cdot (-\underline{w}) + \phi(\underline{w}) \right].$$
(34)

The intuition for this equation is as follows. Consumption has to be bounded by the country's interest and jump-insurance premium payments.

Endogenous Relative Risk Aversion $\tilde{\gamma}$. To better understand our results, it is useful to introduce the following measure of endogenous relative risk aversion, denoted by $\tilde{\gamma}$:

$$\widetilde{\gamma}(w) \equiv -\frac{V_{WW}}{V_W} \times P(W,Y) = \gamma p'(w) - \frac{p(w)p''(w)}{p'(w)}.$$
(35)

The first part of equation (35) defines $\tilde{\gamma}(w)$. The second part follows from the homogeneity property.

The economic interpretation of $\tilde{\gamma}$ is as follows. Because limited commitment results in endogenous market incompleteness, the country's endogenous risk aversion is given by the curvature of the value function V(W, Y) rather than by the risk aversion parameter, γ . We use the value function to characterize the coefficient of endogenous absolute risk aversion: $-V_{WW}(W, Y)/V_W(W, Y)$.

We can build a measure of relative risk aversion by multiplying $-V_{WW}(W, Y)/V_W(W, Y)$, with "total wealth." There is no well-defined market measure of the total wealth under incomplete markets. However, the certainty equivalent wealth P(W, Y) is a natural measure, so we use it in our definition of $\tilde{\gamma}$ in equation (35).

Limited commitment and/or limited spanning causes the marginal certainty equivalent wealth of financial wealth to exceed one, i.e., $P_W(W, Y) = p'(w) \ge 1$. Also, in our model, p''(w) < 0, which implies that $\tilde{\gamma}(w) > \gamma$ (see equation (35)). That is, limited commitment causes the representative agent to be endogenously more risk averse. In contrast, in the first-best solution that we describe below, the country fully hedges against diffusion and jump shocks and $\tilde{\gamma}(w) = \gamma$.

4 First-Best Solution: Full Commitment and Spanning

Before discussing our results under limited commitment and limited spanning, we summarize the first-best (FB) Arrow-Debreu solution that obtains when there is full commitment and full spanning. Full commitment means that the country has to honor all its contractual agreements, so the country never defaults. Full spanning means that $Z^* = 0$, which represent the highest level of financial development. We use the superscript FB to denote the variables that pertain to the FB solution.

As in Friedman (1957) and Hall (1978), we define non-financial wealth, H_t , for the case where $Z^* = 0$, as the present value of output, discounted at the constant risk-free rate, r:

$$H_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left(\int_t^\infty e^{-r(u-t)} Y_u du \right) \,. \tag{36}$$

Because Y is a geometric jump-diffusion process, we have $H_t = hY_t$, where h is scaled non-financial wealth given by

$$h = \frac{1}{r - g},\tag{37}$$

and g is given by equation (2). To ensure that non-financial wealth is finite, we require that r > g. This convergence condition is standard in asset pricing and valuation models.

Let $P_t^{FB} \equiv P^{FB}(W_t, Y_t)$ denote the country's certainty-equivalent wealth, defined in equation (15), for the FB case. We show below that P_t^{FB} is equal to:

$$P_t^{FB} \equiv P^{FB}(W_t, Y_t) = W_t + hY_t.$$
(38)

In other words, in the FB case, certainty-equivalent wealth coincides with total wealth, defined as the sum of financial wealth W_t and non-financial wealth H_t .

Next, we summarize the properties of the FB solution.

Proposition 1 Scaled total wealth, $p^{FB}(w) = P^{FB}(W, Y)/Y = (W + H)/Y$, is

$$p^{FB}(w) = w + h$$
, (39)

where h is given by equation (37) and $w_t \geq \underline{w}^{FB}$. The scaled endogenous debt capacity is $-\underline{w}^{FB} = h$. The optimal consumption-output ratio, $c_t = c^{FB}(w)$, is given by:

$$c^{FB}(w) = m p^{FB}(w) = m(w+h),$$
(40)

where m is the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) in the FB:

$$m = r + \psi \left(\rho - r \right) \,. \tag{41}$$

The optimal scaled hedging demand for diffusive shocks, $\theta^{FB}(w)$, is constant:

$$\theta^{FB}(w) = -h. \tag{42}$$

The optimal scaled hedging demand for jump risk, $x^{FB}(w, Z)$, is given by:

$$x^{FB}(w,Z) = (1-Z)h. (43)$$

The implied scaled jump insurance premium is constant: $\phi^{FB}(w) = \lambda(1 - \mathbb{E}(Z))h$. There is no default, meaning $\underline{Z}(w) = Z^* = 0$. The endogenous relative risk aversion defined in equation (35), $\tilde{\gamma}(w)$, is equal to γ .

Complete Hedging of Total Wealth and Consumption. Equation (42) shows that the country fully hedges its diffusive risk by taking a short position of h units in the diffusion hedging contract so that the net exposure of its total wealth, P_t^{FB} , to diffusive shocks is zero. Similarly, equation (43) shows that the country fully hedges the jump risk by buying (1-Z)hunits of the jump insurance contract for each possible value of Z, so that the net exposure of P_t^{FB} to jump shocks is zero. As a result, total wealth, P_t^{FB} , and consumption, C_t^{FB} , are fully insulated from both idiosyncratic diffusion and jump shocks. Both variables grow deterministically at rate $\psi (r - \rho)$:

$$P_t^{FB} = e^{\psi(r-\rho)t} P_0^{FB} \tag{44}$$

$$C_t^{FB} = e^{\psi(r-\rho)t} C_0^{FB} \tag{45}$$

where $C_0^{FB} = mP_0^{FB}$ and $P_0^{FB} = W_0 + hY_0$. For the case where $\rho = r$, $P_t = P_0$ and $C_t = C_0 = r(W_0 + hY_0)$ for all t.

By complete hedging, we mean that the country's *unscaled* total wealth and consumption are fully insulated from all idiosyncratic shocks. This property holds in the FB solution. We next show that with limited commitment and/or limited spanning, complete hedging is no longer optimal. Instead, it is optimal for the country to expose its certainty-equivalent wealth and its unscaled consumption to idiosyncratic risk.

5 Limited-Commitment Solution

In this section, we discuss the solution of our model when there is limited commitment. The following proposition summarizes the main properties of the solution.

Proposition 2 The scaled certainty equivalent wealth p(w) when $w > \underline{w}$ in the normal regime and \hat{p} in the autarky regime satisfy the following two interconnected ODEs:

$$0 = \left(\frac{m(p'(w))^{1-\psi} - \psi\rho}{\psi - 1} + \mu - \frac{\gamma\sigma^2}{2}\right)p(w) + \left[(r + \pi(w) - \mu)w + 1 - \phi(w)\right]p'(w) + \frac{\gamma^2\sigma^2p(w)p'(w)}{2\,\widetilde{\gamma}(w)} + \frac{\lambda}{1-\gamma}\mathbb{E}\left[\left(\frac{Zp(w^{\mathcal{J}})}{p(w)}\right)^{1-\gamma} - 1\right]p(w),$$
(46)

$$0 = \frac{\rho \left[(b\,\widehat{p}\,)^{-(1-\psi^{-1})} - 1 \right]}{1 - \psi^{-1}} + \mu + \frac{\lambda (\mathbb{E}(Z^{1-\gamma}) - 1)}{1 - \gamma} - \frac{\gamma \sigma^2}{2} + \frac{\xi}{1 - \gamma} \left[\left(\frac{p(0)}{\widehat{p}} \right)^{1-\gamma} - 1 \right], \quad (47)$$

where $w^{\mathcal{J}}$ is given by equation (32). When $w < \underline{w}$, the country defaults and hence

$$p(w) = \alpha \,\widehat{p} \,. \tag{48}$$

In addition, we have the following boundary conditions:

$$p(\underline{w}) = \alpha \, \widehat{p} \,\,, \tag{49}$$

$$p''(\underline{w}) = -\infty, \qquad (50)$$

$$\lim_{w \to \infty} p(w) = w + h, \qquad (51)$$

where h is given by equation (37).

The equilibrium credit spread is $\pi(w_{t-}) = \lambda G(\underline{Z}(w_{t-}))$. The scaled jump insurance premium, $\phi(w_{t-})$, is given by equation (25). The country defaults when $\tau^{\mathcal{D}} = \inf\{t : w_t < \underline{w}\}$.

In the no-default region where $w \ge w$, the following policy rules apply. The optimal consumption-output ratio, c(w), is:

$$c(w) = mp(w)(p'(w))^{-\psi},$$
(52)

where m is given by equation (41). The scaled diffusion risk hedging demand, $\theta(w)$, is:

$$\theta(w) = w - \frac{\gamma p(w) p'(w)}{\gamma (p'(w))^2 - p(w) p''(w)} = w - \frac{\gamma p(w)}{\widetilde{\gamma}(w)},$$
(53)

where $\tilde{\gamma}(w)$ is the endogenous relative risk aversion given by equation (35). For $Z^* \leq Z \leq 1$, the optimal scaled hedging demand for jump risk, x(w, Z), solves:

$$p'(w) = \left(\frac{Zp((w+x(w,Z))/Z)}{p(w)}\right)^{-\gamma} p'((w+x(w,Z))/Z).$$
(54)

Equation (49) follows from the value-matching condition, (21). Equation (50) follows from the zero volatility condition, (33) for w at \underline{w} , and $p(\underline{w}) > 0$. Equations (49) and (50) jointly characterize the left boundary, \underline{w} . Equation (51) states that, as $w \to \infty$, the effect of limited commitment disappears and p(w) converges to $p^{FB}(w) = w + h$.

Equation (52) shows that consumption is a nonlinear function of w, depending on both the certainty equivalent wealth, p(w), and its derivative, p'(w). Later we show that $p'(w) \ge 1$ and p'(w) decreases with w. These properties imply that c(w) is lower than the product of certainty-equivalent wealth p(w) and the MPC under FB, m, i.e., c(w) < mp(w), and c(w)increases with w.

Equation (53) determines the hedging demand with respect to diffusive shocks. As discussed above, the country hedges to avoid default triggered by diffusive shocks and preserve the option to default in response to rare disasters. Without hedging diffusive shocks, a country that has exhausted its debt capacity ($W_t = \underline{W}_t$) would default in response to even very small shocks.

Substituting equation (53) into equation (31), we obtain:

$$\sigma_w(w) = (\theta(w) - w)\sigma = -\sigma \frac{\gamma p(w)}{\widetilde{\gamma}(w)} < 0.$$
(55)

In absolute value, the volatility for w is proportional to the ratio between p(w) and endogenous risk aversion, $\tilde{\gamma}(w)$. Evaluating equation (55) at \underline{w} and using $\sigma_w(\underline{w}) = 0$ and $p(\underline{w}) = \alpha \, \widehat{p} > 0$, we conclude that endogenous relative risk aversion, $\tilde{\gamma}(w)$, approaches infinity, as $w \to \underline{w}$.

Equation (54) determines the country's scaled hedging demand with respect to jump shocks, x(w, Z). As discussed above, for insurable jump shocks ($Z \ge Z^*$) the country hedges its jump risk exposures to equate its pre- and post-jump marginal utility of wealth. The homogeneity property allows us to express this condition in terms of the certainty equivalent wealth, p(w), and the marginal certainty equivalent value of financial wealth, p'(w).

Next, we turn to the special case where there is full spanning and hence all jump risks can be hedged $(Z^* = 0)$.

Full Spanning and Limited Commitment. As in Kehoe and Levine (1993), when all shocks are insurable at actuarially fair terms, the country never defaults in equilibrium. The country is better off honoring its debt and preserving its debt capacity. Doing so allows the country to borrow at the risk-free rate r. The country's temptation to default is an

off-equilibrium threat that determines the country's debt capacity. This maximal amount of sustainable debt makes the country indifferent between defaulting or not.

For this full-spanning and limited-commitment case, equations (49) and (50) are the continuous-time equivalent of the limited-enforcement conditions in Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), and Alvarez and Jermann (2000).

It is worth emphasizing that even though there is full spanning, optimal hedging is incomplete in the sense that the country hedges less than in the FB, i.e., $|\theta(w)| < |\theta^{FB}(w)| = h$. This inequality follows from Equation (53), $\tilde{\gamma}(w) > \gamma$, and $p(w) < p^{FB}(w) = w + h$. To explore the intuition for this result, we sketch a proof by contradiction.

Suppose that the country completely hedges its idiosyncratic risk. Then, consumption is given by $C_t^{FB} = e^{\psi(r-\rho)t}C_0^{FB}$ and certainty equivalent wealth is equal to $P_t^{FB} = e^{\psi(r-\rho)t}P_0^{FB}$ (see equation (44)). However, the country finds it optimal to default as long as its certaintyequivalent wealth under autarky, which is equal to $\alpha \hat{p} Y_t$ (see equation (48)), exceeds P_t^{FB} . Because output follows a jump-diffusion process, $\hat{p} Y_t > P_t^{FB}$ occurs with strictly positive probability, triggering default. Since default is inefficient, this complete-hedging strategy is not optimal.

6 Calibration and Quantitative Results

To explore the quantitative properties of our model, we calibrate it with the eleven parameter values summarized in Table 1. We divide these parameters into two groups. The seven parameters in the first group are set to values that are standard in the literature. The four parameters in the second group are calibrated to match key features of data for Argentina.

6.1 Baseline Calibration

We first describe the parameters drawn from the literature.

Parameters from the Literature. Following Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ) to 2, the annual risk-free rate (r) to 4 percent, and the rate at which the country exits autarky (ξ) to 0.25 per annum. This choice of ξ implies that that the country stays on average in autarky for four years, which is consistent with the estimates in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006).

Following Barro (2009), we set the annual subjective discount rate (ρ) to 5.2 percent. Since $\rho > r$, the country wants to borrow to front-load consumption, holding everything else constant. This ability to front-load consumption is lost when the country defaults and enters autarky.

Parameters	Symbol	Value
risk aversion	γ	2
elasticity of intertemporal substitution	ψ	0.047
subjective discount rate	ho	5.2%
risk-free rate	r	4%
financial development parameter	Z^*	0.9
output drift (in the absence of jumps)	μ	2.7%
output diffusion volatility	σ	4.5%
jump arrival rate	λ	0.073
power law parameter	β	6.3
default distress cost	α	97.5%
autarky exit rate	ξ	0.25
Townstad observables		
Targeted observables		-
average output growth rate	g	1.7%
output growth volatility		6.66%
average debt-output ratio		15.4%
unconditional default probability		3%

 Table 1: PARAMETER VALUES

All parameter values, whenever applicable, are continuously compounded and annualized.

As in the rare-disasters literature, we assume that the cumulative distribution function of the recovery fraction, G(Z), is governed by a power law:

$$G(Z) = Z^{\beta} \,. \tag{56}$$

Following Barro and Jin (2011), we refer to jump shocks that create realized output losses greater than 10 percent (Z < 1 - 0.1 = 0.9) as disasters. In our baseline calibration, we assume that disaster shocks cannot be hedged so we set the level of financial development, Z^* , equal to 0.9.

We choose $\beta = 6.3$ and the annual jump arrival rate, $\lambda = 0.073$, so that the annual disaster probability is $\lambda G(0.9) = 0.073 \times G(0.9) = 3.8$ percent, which is the value estimated

by Barro and Jin (2011). Since large disasters are rare, Barro and Jin (2011) obtain these estimates by pooling long time series for different countries.

Calibrated Parameters from Argentinean Data. We choose the parameters that control the drift in the absence of jumps (μ), the diffusion volatility (σ), the default distress cost (1 – α), and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (ψ), to target the following four moments estimated using Argentinean data: an average growth rate of output of 1.7 percent per annum, a standard deviation of the growth rate of output of 6.7 percent, an average debt-to-GDP ratio of 15.4 percent, and an unconditional default probability of 3 percent. Our empirical estimates of the average and standard deviation of the annual growth rate of real GDP for Argentina are obtained using Barro and Ursua's (2008) data for the period 1876-2009.

Our model consolidates the expenditure and borrowing decisions of the private sector and the government. For this reason, we calibrate it to match the ratio of net debt to GDP. In Argentina, as in most countries, a significant fraction of government debt is owned by the domestic private sector. We compute our target for the debt-to-output ratio by calculating the difference between Argentina's debt liabilities and debt assets using the data compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) for the period from 1970 to 2011. The average net debtto-GDP ratio during this period is 15.4 percent.¹³ Since defaults are rare, it is helpful to use as much data as possible to estimate the probability of default. Argentina defaulted six times in roughly 200 years, so we target an annual default probability of 3 percent.¹⁴

We obtain the following parameter values: the EIS $\psi = 0.047$, $\mu = 2.7$ percent per annum, $\sigma = 4.5$ percent per annum, and $\alpha = 0.975$. The calibrated value of α implies that the direct costs of defaulting on sovereign debt are equal to 2.5 percent of output. This cost of default is conservative relative to the estimates reported by Hébert and Schreger (2017) for Argentina.

In this calibration, the value of the EIS ($\psi = 0.047$) is low so the representative agent has a strong preference for smooth consumption paths.¹⁵ We can interpret the low value of

¹³Table 4 shows that the model can be easily calibrated to generate higher average debt-output ratios by increasing $(1 - \alpha)$, the distress cost associated with default.

¹⁴Argentina defaulted in 1830, 1890, 1915, 1930, 1982, and 2001. See Sturzenegger and Zettlemeyer (2006) for a discussion.

¹⁵There is currently no consensus on what are empirically plausible values for the EIS (see Attanasio and Weber (2010) for a discussion). Our choice is consistent with Hall (1988) who argues that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is close to zero. It is also consistent with the recent estimates by Best, Cloyne,

the EIS as resulting from rigidities in spending patterns and expenditure commitments that are difficult to change.

6.2 Debt Intolerance

Table 2 shows the impact of different levels of financial development $(Z^* = 0, 0.5, 0.9, 1)$ on debt intolerance. We set all other parameters to the values used in our benchmark calibration and summarized in Table 1. To better understand the intuition, we proceed in three steps.

Table 2: PARTIAL SPANNING AND DEBT INTOLERANCE
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Z^*	Average debt-output ratio	Default probability	Debt capacity $ \underline{w} $
1 (No jump hedging) 0.9 0.5	14.7% $15.4%$ $20.7%$ $10.0%$	4.0% 3.1% 0.1%	20.5% 20.7% 24%
0 (Full Spanning)	18.9%	0	25%

All parameter values other than Z^* are summarized in Table 1.

First, recall that in the FB case the country fully uses its debt capacity, which is the present discounted value of output, h = 1/(r-g), and never defaults. For our calibration, the country borrows 4,348 percent of current output, an implication that is clearly unrealistic.

Second, we isolate the impact of limited commitment by comparing the full-spanning limited-commitment case $(Z^* = 0)$ to the FB case. When $Z^* = 0$, the country never defaults in equilibrium because with full spanning it is cheaper to manage risk by hedging than by defaulting on sovereign debt. However, debt capacity is much lower under limited commitment, $|\underline{w}| = 25$ percent, versus $|\underline{w}| = 4,348$ percent in the FB case. As a result, the country's average debt-to-output ratio is only 19 percent under limited commitment despite full spanning rather than 4,348 percent in the FB case.

Third, we study the impact of financial development. Eliminating entirely the ability to use insurance contracts to hedge jump risk ($Z^* = 1$) results in a large rise in the probability of default relative to the benchmark case (from 3.1 to 4 percent), even though the declines in

Ilzetzki, and Kleven (2017) which are based on mortgage data.

debt capacity and the average debt-output ratio are small. The large rise in the probability of default occurs because when $Z^* = 1$, the only way to manage large jump risk is to default on sovereign debt.

Improving financial development by decreasing Z^* from 0.9 to 0.5 has a dramatic impact on the debt capacity, average debt-output ratio, and default probability: debt capacity rises from 20.7 to 24 percent of output, the average debt-output ratio increases from 15.4 to 20.7 percent, and the probability of default drops to close to zero, from 3.1 to 0.1 percent.

Further improving financial development by decreasing Z^* from 0.5 to zero has a small impact on the debt capacity, average debt-output ratio, and default probability. The reason for this small impact is that the additional risks that can be hedged, $Z \in (0, 0.5)$, are very rare, their probability, $\lambda G(0.5)$, is only about 0.09 percent.

Finally, note the subtle non-monotonicity of the average debt-output ratio. This variable falls from 20.7 percent to 18.9 percent as Z^* falls from 0.5 to zero. The intuition for this result is that once financial development is sufficiently high, the country resorts less to using debt to smooth consumption as it has other risk management instruments at its disposal.

In sum, Table 2 shows that low financial development causes debt intolerance. This table also shows that improving financial development from a low level has a large positive impact on the country's ability to borrow and the credit spread of its sovereign debt.

6.3 Economic Mechanisms and Quantitative Implications

In this subsection, we use our calibration to explore the properties of our model. These properties are illustrated in Figures 2, 3, and 4 for different levels of financial development.

Certainty equivalent wealth, marginal value of wealth, consumption, and the MPC. Panels A and B of Figure 2 display the scaled certainty-equivalent wealth, p(w), and the marginal certainty-equivalent value of wealth, $P_W(W, Y) = p'(w)$, respectively. The function p(w) is increasing and concave, which implies that p'(w) is decreasing in w and p'(w) is greater than one.¹⁶ Panels C and D display the consumption-output ratio, c(w), and the MPC out of wealth, c'(w), respectively. The function c(w) is increasing and concave, which implies that c'(w) is decreasing in w. As w goes to infinity, p(w) approaches $p^{FB}(w) = w + h$,

¹⁶Wang, Wang, and Yang (2016) derive similar properties in a self-insurance model where labor-income shocks are uninsurable and the agent can only save via a risk-free asset.



Figure 2: Scaled certainty equivalent wealth p(w), marginal certainty equivalent value of wealth p'(w), consumption-output ratio c(w), and c'(w) for two levels of financial development: $Z^* = 0.5$ and $Z^* = 0.9$. Debt capacity is equal to $-\underline{w} = 20.7$ percent and $-\underline{w} = 24.0$ percent for $Z^* = 0.9$ and 0.5, respectively.

p'(w) approaches one, c(w) approaches $c^{FB}(w) = m(w+h)$, and c'(w) approaches the MPC obtained in the FB, m = 0.041.

Next, we discuss the impact of financial development under limited commitment. We compare our baseline case where $Z^* = 0.9$ (our proxy for the status quo in emerging markets) with an economy where $Z^* = 0.5$, which corresponds to a high level of financial development since the country can hedge jumps that generate output losses smaller than 50 percent.

The higher is financial development (lower Z^*), the higher is p(w) because more risks are hedged and the representative agent faces less uncertainty. As a result, the marginal value of wealth, p'(w), is lower. Consumption is higher because both a higher p(w) and a lower p'(w) cause c(w) to be higher (see equation (52)).

To compare the two economies, consider w = -15 percent, which is the average debt-to-



Figure 3: Scaled jump-hedging demand x(w, Z) at w = -0.15, jump-insurance premium payment $\phi(w)$, scaled jump-hedging demand x(w, Z) at Z = 0.9, and the equilibrium credit spread $\pi(w)$ for two levels of financial development: $Z^* = 0.5$ and $Z^* = 0.9$. Debt capacity is equal to $-\underline{w} = 20.7$ percent and $-\underline{w} = 24.0$ percent for $Z^* = 0.9$ and 0.5, respectively.

output ratio in the baseline calibration. The marginal value of wealth, p'(-0.15), is equal to 5.31 in the economy with $Z^* = 0.9$, which is 18 percent higher than in the economy with $Z^* = 0.5$. Both values are much higher than one, the value of p'(w) in the FB case. The MPC out of wealth, c'(-0.15), is equal to 0.47 in the economy with $Z^* = 0.9$, which is 52 percent higher than in the economy with $Z^* = 0.5$. Both values are much higher than m, which is equal to 0.041, the value of the MPC in the FB case.

Jump-risk hedging demand, jump-insurance premium payment, and credit spreads.

Panel A of Figure 3 plots x(w, Z) as a function of Z for w = -15 percent, the average debtoutput ratio targeted in our calibration. This panel shows that for a given Z^* and w, the hedging demand x(w, Z) is decreasing in the recovery fraction Z, which means that the country insures more against bigger losses in order to smooth consumption.

Panel B plots the scaled jump-insurance premium payment, $\phi(w)$, which integrates the hedging demand x(w, Z), displayed in Panel A, over the admissible range of $Z \ge Z^*$ for each value of w. This panel shows that the scaled jump-insurance premium payment, $\phi(w)$, increases with w, which means that a less indebted country hedges more.

Panel C plots the demand for jump insurance, x(w, Z), against a 10 percent permanent loss in output (Z = 0.9). This panel shows that x(w, Z) increases with w, which means that a less indebted country hedges more. That is, hedging and financial wealth are complements.

Panels A, B, and C together show that as the country's financial development improves (i.e., as Z^* decreases), its risk-sharing opportunities expand, causing its hedging demand x(w, Z) and insurance premium payment $\phi(w)$ to increase in absolute value. This increase leads to a rise in debt capacity, $-\underline{w}$.

Panel D plots the equilibrium credit spread, $\pi(w)$, which declines with both the level of financial development and financial wealth w. The credit spread, $\pi(w_{t-})$, is constant and equal to $\lambda G(Z^*)$ in the region where $w_{t-} \leq Z^* \underline{w}$, because the default threshold of Z, $\underline{Z}(w_{t-}) = \min\{w_{t-}/\underline{w}, Z^*\} = Z^*$. That is, in this flat region, all unhedgeable jump shocks trigger default, i.e., the value of preserving the option to default in the future is zero.

When financial development is high, the country uses jump insurance contracts to hedge most jump shocks and only uses costly default to manage rare disasters. As a result, the likelihood of default and the credit spread are low. For the case where $Z^* = 0.5$, the equilibrium credit spread is very close to zero for all values of w. In contrast, when financial development is low, the option to default is used to manage most jump shocks and hence default is likely, resulting in a high credit spread. When $Z^* = 0.9$, the equilibrium credit spread is high for debt levels above 15 percent of output.

Diffusion risk hedging demand, drift, volatility, and the distribution of w. Panel A of Figure 4 shows that the scaled diffusion hedging demand, $\theta(w)$, is negative, and that its absolute value increases with w. That is, a less indebted country hedges more diffusive risk. As with the case of jump risk, hedging and financial wealth are complements. Even though the country incurs no upfront cost to hedge diffusion shocks, it is not optimal to fully hedge the diffusion risk of w.

Panel B plots the volatility function, $\sigma_w(w)$. Because a less indebted country has a higher p(w) and a lower endogenous relative risk aversion, $\tilde{\gamma}(w)$, the absolute value of $\sigma_w(w)$



Figure 4: Scaled diffusion-hedging demand $\theta(w)$, volatility $\sigma_w(w)$, drift $\mu_w(w)$, and the density function for the stationary distribution of w in the normal regime, $\ell(w)$, for two levels of financial development: $Z^* = 0.5$ and $Z^* = 0.9$. Debt capacity is equal to $-\underline{w} = 20.7$ percent and $-\underline{w} = 24.0$ percent for $Z^* = 0.9$ and 0.5, respectively.

increases with w, as one can see from equation (55). In the limit as $w \to \underline{w}$, the absolute value of σ_w reaches the minimal value, $\sigma_w(\underline{w}) = 0$. The intuition for this property, which is visible in Panel B, is that it is inefficient for the country to use default to manage continuous diffusive shocks. Since diffusion shocks do not trigger default, $\sigma_w(\underline{w}) = 0$.

Panel C shows the drift function for w, $\mu_w(w)$, which is negative for most values of w. This result follows from the observations that: (a) the country's consumption is often larger than output (see Figure 2); and (b) interest and jump insurance premium payments drain the country's financial wealth. All these forces move the country further into debt in expectation. However, as the country's debt approaches its capacity, $-\underline{w}$, the country voluntarily adjusts its consumption, insurance demand, and debt level so that $\mu_w(\underline{w}) \ge 0$. The property $\mu_w(w) \ge 0$ together with $\sigma_w(\underline{w}) = 0$ discussed above are necessary to ensure

that the country does not default in response to continuous diffusion shocks.

Panel D displays the probability density function for the stationary distribution of w, $\ell(w)$, in the normal regime. This panel is consistent with the empirical observation that countries with lower levels of financial development on average have lower debt-to-output ratios. In other words, these countries are debt intolerant.

7 Sensitivity Analysis

We now discuss how a country's average debt-output ratio, average default probability, and debt capacity vary with some key parameters. We change one parameter at a time and fix all other parameters at the values reported in Table 1.

ψ	debt-output ratio	default probability	debt capacity $ \underline{w} $
0	15.3%	3.3%	19.8%
0.047	15.4%	3.1%	20.7%
0.25	17.9%	1.1%	34.2%
0.5	5.5%	0.7%	42.2%

Table 3: The effect of the EIS, ψ

All parameter values other than ψ are summarized in Table 1.

The effect of the EIS, ψ . Table 3 shows the impact of varying the EIS. Debt capacity increases monotonically with ψ . For example, raising the EIS from 0.047 to 0.5 more than doubles the country's debt capacity, from 20.7 percent to 42.2 percent. Capital markets are more willing to lend to countries with higher intertemporal substitution, since it is less costly (in terms of utility) for these countries to cut consumption in response to adverse shocks to service their debt.

The average debt-output ratio is non-monotonic in ψ . When ψ is low when the country is close debt capacity it is costly to move away. So for low values of ψ the average debt-output ratio inherits the positive relation between debt capacity and ψ . For sufficiently high values of ψ , as ψ rises the average debt-output ratio falls even though debt capacity is expanding. In this case the country has strong incentives to save away from the debt region where credit spreads are relatively high. This behavior results in a low average debt-output ratio.

The effect of the distress cost, $1-\alpha$. Table 4 illustrates the impact of distress costs and shows that these costs play a key role in allowing the model to generate empirically plausible average debt-output ratios. Increasing the distress cost, $(1 - \alpha)$, from 2.5 percent to 5 percent more than doubles debt capacity from 20.7 percent to 49 percent, significantly raises the debt-output ratio from 15.4 percent to 36.9 percent, and decreases the annual default probability from 3.1 percent to 3.0 percent. When default is more costly, debt capacity is higher. At the same time, the country defaults less often despite borrowing more on average.

$(1-\alpha)$	debt-output ratio	default probability	debt capacity $ \underline{w} $
5%	36.9%	3.0%	49%
2.5%	15.4%	3.1%	20.7%
1%	5.5%	3.2%	7.2%
0%	0.1%	3.6%	0.2%

Table 4: The effect of distress cost, $(1 - \alpha)$

All parameter values other than α are summarized in Table 1.

When the distress cost is zero, the only cost of default is that under autarky the country loses its ability to smooth and front-load consumption. In our calibration, this utility cost is small, so that debt capacity is essentially zero (see the last row of Table 4.) This result shows that the key reason why sovereign debt can be sustained in our model is the permanent output loss that occurs upon default.

The effect of the probability of exiting autarky, ξ . Table 5 shows the impact of varying ξ . Increasing ξ reduces the expected duration of the autarky regime, $1/\xi$, lowering the cost of defaulting. Since default is less costly, the country defaults more often. In equilibrium, debt capacity falls and the country borrows less.

Decreasing the average duration of the autarky regime from four years ($\xi = 0.25$) to one year lowers the debt-output ratio from 15.4 percent to 13.2 percent, increases the annual

ξ	debt-output ratio	default probability	debt capacity $ \underline{w} $
0	15.8%	3.1%	21.0%
0.25	15.4%	3.1%	20.7%
0.5	14.7%	3.1%	18.2%
1	13.2%	3.2%	16.0%
5	12.9%	3.2%	14.6%

Table 5: The effect of the probability of exiting autarky, ξ

All parameter values other than ξ are summarized in Table 1.

default probability from 3.1 percent to 3.2 percent, and reduces debt capacity from 20.7 percent to 16 percent. Further reducing the average duration of the autarky regime from one year ($\xi = 1$) to 0.2 year ($\xi = 5$) has a limited quantitative effect: the debt-output ratio decreases from 13.2 percent to 12.9 percent and the default probability is effectively unchanged. When autarky is permanent ($\xi = 0$), as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), debt capacity is 21 percent and the average debt-output ratio is 15.8 percent.

As we see from Table 5, the quantitative properties of our model are robust to assuming that access to international capital markets is retained upon default. In this sense, our model is immune to the Bulow-Rogoff critique.

The effect of risk aversion, γ . Table 6 shows that the effect of risk aversion. Increasing γ raises the cost of default since it is more costly to bear consumption volatility in the autarky regime. With default more costly, the country defaults less often and debt capacity is higher. Increasing γ from one to three increases debt capacity from 19.6 percent to 23 percent and lowers the annual default probability from 3.3 percent to 2.5 percent. The effect of γ on the average debt-output ratio is quite small.

8 An Expected-utility Calibration

In this section, we restrict recursive utility to the expected-utility case generally used in the sovereign-debt literature. We explain why the calibrations traditionally used in this literature rely on a very high discount rate. Then, we show that our key result-low levels of financial

γ	debt-output ratio	default probability	debt capacity $ \underline{w} $
1	15.6%	3.3%	19.6%
2	15.4%	3.1%	20.7%
3	15.4%	2.5%	23%

Table 6: The effect of risk aversion, γ

All parameter values other than γ are summarized in Table 1.

development cause debt intolerance–continues to hold for expected-utility preferences.

Recall that our calibration uses a low value of the EIS. Why hasn't this type of calibration been used in the literature? One likely reason is that the literature typically works with an expected-utility specification, where a low EIS implies a high level of risk aversion ($\gamma = \psi^{-1}$). A high γ generates a large debt capacity because the utility cost of defaulting and bearing the consumption volatility associated with autarky is high. This high default cost induces the country to avoid borrowing, so the average debt-output ratio is low or even negative.

In an expected-utility setting, we need a moderate value of risk aversion to generate a realistic average debt-output ratio. We next consider an expected-utility-based calibration with $\psi = 1/\gamma = 0.5$. If we use the annual discount rate proposed by Barro and Jin (2011) and used in our calibration ($\rho = 0.052$), the model does not generate a plausible debt-output ratio for a wide range of distress costs.

To understand the intuition for this result, consider two scenarios. In the first scenario, distress costs, $(1 - \alpha)$, are high, so debt capacity is also high. But a country in debt has a strong incentive to save to avoid the possibility of incurring high default costs. As a consequence, the default likelihood, credit spread, and average debt-to-output ratio are low. In the second scenario, distress costs are low, so the country is willing to borrow and the likelihood of default is high. As a consequence, credit spreads are high and debt capacity is low, resulting in a counterfactually low average debt-to-output ratio.

One approach widely used in the literature is to assume high distress costs so that debt capacity is high and also assume a very high discount rate. This configuration can generate plausible debt-output ratios because high discount rates create incentives to borrow, even when default costs are high (see Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2006)).¹⁷ Generating the average debt-output ratio targeted in our calibration (15.4 percent) requires a value of ρ equal to 21 percent.

We next show that low financial development also generates debt intolerance in an expected-utility setting. Table 7 uses our expected-utility calibration ($\gamma = 2$ and $\rho = 21\%$) to compare economies with different levels of financial development. The same debt-intolerance phenomenon that emerges in our baseline recursive-utility calibration ($\gamma = 2$, $\psi = 0.047$, and $\rho = 5.2\%$) is also present in this expected-utility setting.

In our expected-utility calibration, the probability of default is high and debt capacity is low when financial development is low: 5.7 per annum and 18.8 percent, respectively, for the case where $Z^* = 1$ versus 0.1 per annum and 24.8 percent, respectively, for the case where $Z^* = 0.5$. Countries with low financial development (e.g., $Z^* = 1$) use default on sovereign debt to manage their rare-disaster risks.

Z^*	Debt-output ratio	Default probability	Debt capacity $ \underline{w} $
1 (No jump hedging)	13.7%	5.7%	18.8%
0.9	14.5%	3.0%	19.0 %
0.5	21.0%	0.1%	24.8%

Table 7: Partial Spanning and Debt Intolerance with Expected Utility

In this table, $\gamma = \psi^{-1} = 2$ and $\rho = 0.21$. Other parameter values excluding Z^* are summarized in Table 1.

9 Conclusion

We present a tractable model of sovereign debt that features a jump-diffusion process for output used in the rare-disasters literature, recursive preferences that separate the role of intertemporal substitution and risk aversion, and partial insurance against jump risk. We show that low levels of financial development generate debt intolerance, i.e., low debt levels that are associated with high credit spreads.

¹⁷Alvarez and Jermann (2001) also find that a low risk aversion and a high discount rate are necessary to match key asset-pricing moments in a general equilibrium asset-pricing model with limited commitment.

In order to focus on the impact of financial development on sovereign debt, we abstracted from three forces that could influence demand and supply of sovereign debt. The first is the risk premium demanded by foreign investors to compensate their exposures to the systematic components of sovereign default risk (see, e.g. Pan and Singleton (2008), Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011), Borri and Verdelhan (2015), and Hébert and Schreger (2017).) The second is the moral hazard problem that is associated with insurance. The third is the impact of sudden stops (Calvo (1998) and Mendoza (2010)) and debt roll-over risk. We plan to address these issues in future research.

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A Appendix: Technical Details

A.1 Derivation of Proposition 2

We show that the value function in the normal regime, V(W, Y), is given by equation (15) and the value function in the autarky regime, $\hat{V}(\hat{Y})$, is given by equation (20).

Substituting equation (15) and the first and second derivatives of V(W, Y) into the HJB equation (10) and using the homogeneity property of the value function, we obtain:

$$0 = \max_{c,\theta,x} \frac{\left(\frac{c(w)}{bp(w)}\right)^{1-\psi} - 1}{1-\psi^{-1}} \rho p(w) + \left[\left(r + \pi(w) - \mu\right)w + 1 - c(w) - \phi(w)\right]p'(w)$$
(A.1)
+ $\frac{(\theta(w)\sigma)^2}{2} \left(p''(w) - \frac{\gamma(p'(w))^2}{p(w)}\right) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} \left(w^2 p''(w) - \frac{\gamma(p(w) - wp'(w))^2}{p(w)}\right)$
+ $\theta(w)\sigma^2 \left(-wp''(w) - \frac{\gamma p'(w)(p(w) - wp'(w))}{p(w)}\right) + \frac{\lambda}{1-\gamma} \mathbb{E}\left[\left(\frac{Zp(w^{\mathcal{J}})}{p(w)}\right)^{1-\gamma} - 1\right]p(w),$

where $w^{\mathcal{J}}$ is given by equation (32) and $\phi(w) = \lambda \mathbb{E}[x(w, Z) \mathcal{I}_{Z \ge Z^*}].$

We can simplify the first-order conditions for consumption (equation (11)) and diffusionrisk hedging demand (equation (12)) to obtain equations (52) and (53).

Simplifying the FOC for the jump risk hedging demand, given by equation (14), we obtain the following condition for the optimal scaled hedging demand for jump risk, x(w, Z):

$$p'(w) = \left(\frac{Zp((w+x(w,Z))/Z)}{p(w)}\right)^{-\gamma} p'((w+x(w,Z))/Z).$$
(A.2)

Substituting equations (52) and (53) into equation (A.1), we obtain ODE (46) for p(w). Similarly, substituting the value functions (15) and (20) into the HJB equation (19), we obtain equation (47) for \hat{p} . The value-matching condition that equates the cost of repaying debt and defaulting, given by equation (21), implies the boundary condition (49). Substituting equation (53) into (33), we obtain the boundary condition (50).

Next, we provides some technical details for the FB case. The conjectured certainty equivalent wealth is given by p(w) = w + h. Substituting this value into equations (52), (53), and (A.2), respectively, we obtain the following optimal consumption, diffusion-risk hedging demand and jump risk hedging demand rules:

$$c^{FB}(w) = m(w+h),$$
 (A.3)

$$\theta^{FB}(w) = -h, \qquad (A.4)$$

$$x^{FB}(w,Z) = (1-Z)h.$$
 (A.5)

Substituting p(w) = w + h and equation (A.5) into the ODE (46), and using the fact that $Z^* = 0$ in the FB case, we obtain:

$$0 = \left(\frac{m - \psi\rho}{\psi - 1} + \mu\right)(w + h) + [(r - \mu)w + 1] + \lambda(\mathbb{E}(Z) - 1)h$$
(A.6)

$$= \left(\frac{m-\psi\rho}{\psi-1}+r\right)w + \left(\frac{m-\psi\rho}{\psi-1}+\mu-\lambda(1-\mathbb{E}(Z))\right)h+1.$$
(A.7)

As equation (A.7) must hold for all p(w) = w + h, we must have $\frac{m-\psi\rho}{\psi-1} + r = 0$ which implies that $m = r + \psi(\rho - r)$ as stated in equation (41). Using the fact that $m = \rho^{\psi}b^{1-\psi}$, we obtain formula (16) for the coefficient *b*. Finally, substituting $m = r + \psi(\rho - r)$ into equation (A.7), we obtain the value of *h*:

$$h = \frac{1}{r - [\mu - \lambda(1 - \mathbb{E}(Z))]} = \frac{1}{r - g}.$$
 (A.8)

A.2 Solution Algorithm

We solve the ODE in Proposition 2 using the following algorithm.

- 1. Start with a sufficiently large region $(\underline{w}, \overline{w})$ by setting $\underline{w} = -h$ and a sufficiently large \overline{w} , e.g., $\overline{w} = 10^4$. We use the superscript (i) to denote the *i*-th iteration value for p(w), $x(w, Z), w^{\mathcal{J}}$, and \hat{p} , i.e., $p^{(i)}(w), x^{(i)}(w, Z), w^{\mathcal{J}(i)}$, and $\hat{p}^{(i)}$.
- 2. Assign an initial value for the scaled certainty equivalent wealth p(w), which we denote by $p^{(1)}(w)$. For example, we start with the following initial linear function for p(w): $p^{(1)}(\underline{w}) = \alpha h, \ p^{(1)}(\overline{w}) = \overline{w} + h, \ \text{and} \ p^{(1)}(w) = p^{(1)}(\underline{w}) + \frac{w-w}{\overline{w}-w}(p^{(1)}(\overline{w}) - p^{(1)}(\underline{w})) \ \text{for} \ \underline{w} < w < \overline{w}.$
- 3. For a given $p^{(i)}(w)$ where $i = 1, 2, \dots$, compute $x^{(i)}(w, Z)$, $w^{\mathcal{J}(i)}$ and $\hat{p}^{(i)}$ by using equation (54), equation (32), and equation (47), respectively.
- 4. Substitute the policy rules, x⁽ⁱ⁾(w, Z), w^{J(i)}, and p̂⁽ⁱ⁾ obtained in step 3 into ODE (46). Use the Matlab function ode45 (or other finite-difference method) to solve for p⁽ⁱ⁺¹⁾(w) given by ODE (46).
- 5. Repeat step 3 and step 4 until $|p^{(i+1)}(w) p^{(i)}(w)|$ is sufficiently low, e.g., $|p^{(i+1)}(w) p^{(i)}(w)| < 10^{-10}$.

6. Compute $p''(\underline{w})$ until $p''(\underline{w})$ becomes sufficiently low (e.g., $p''(\underline{w}) < -10^{10}$), i.e. until the program converges. Otherwise, go back to step 1 and increase \underline{w} with a new guess and iterate until the program converges.