IMMIGRATION AND REDISTRIBUTION

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NBER Working Paper No. 24733
June 2018, Revised August 2021
JEL No. D71,D72,H2

ABSTRACT

We design and conduct large-scale surveys and experiments in six countries to investigate how natives perceive immigrants and how these perceptions influence their support for redistribution. We find strikingly large misperceptions about the number and characteristics of immigrants. In all countries, respondents greatly overestimate the total number of immigrants, think immigrants are culturally and religiously more distant from them, and are economically weaker – less educated, more unemployed, and more reliant on and favored by government transfers – than is the case. Respondents who support less redistribution are also more likely to think that immigrants are economically weaker and more likely to free-ride on and take advantage of the welfare system. The perceived cultural distance or the perceived share of immigrants are not as strongly predictive of support for redistribution. Simply making respondents think about immigration before asking questions about redistribution, in a randomized manner, makes them support less redistribution, including actual donations to charities. Information about the true shares and origins of immigrants is ineffective, and mainly acts as a prime that makes people think about immigrants and reduces their support for redistribution. An anecdote about a "hard working" immigrant is somewhat more effective. Our results suggest that salience and narratives shape people's views on immigration more deeply than hard facts.

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1 Introduction

The current vitriolic debate about immigration may appear light-years away from the poem

"Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free"

on the Statue of Liberty. *The Economist* called immigration "the defining issue of the 2016 election" in the U.S. It has also been an incandescent campaign topic in many recent European elections and a key concern during *Brexit*. Faced with immigration, many European countries have experienced intensifying social and political conflicts over how to design their welfare state. It has often been pointed out that private and public generosity travels less well across ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious lines.[1]

In this paper, we measure perceptions of and attitudes towards immigration and study how these relate to support for redistribution. To that end, we design and run original, large-scale online surveys on a representative sample of about 24,000 respondents from six countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S.). These countries have different welfare states and social attitudes toward redistribution but have had the immigration issue at the center of their political arenas. The questions elicit respondents' detailed perceptions about immigrants, such as their number, origin, or economic circumstances. We also experimentally document a significant link between natives' attitudes towards and perceptions of immigration and lower support for redistribution policies.

The survey begins with detailed background information questions about respondents' income, sector of work, family status, zip code, whether they have immigrant parents, political orientation, and voting. We then ask respondents about their perceptions of immigrants along many dimensions, which is one of our key contributions. Some perceptions can be verified using actual statistics and data: the number, the origin, the education, the employment, the poverty of immigrants, and the transfers they receive. Others are more subjective perceptions about how hard immigrants work or whether they free-ride on the welfare system. We define an "immigrant" as somebody legally living in the country of the respondent but born abroad, in accordance with the official OECD definition (OECD, 2015).[2] We are very careful in the elicitation of perceptions and employ several survey techniques (described below) to ensure that these misperceptions about immigrants are not simply driven by lack of attention. We then survey respondents about their views on their country's immigration policies. The sets of questions on perceptions of immigration and views on immigration policy are referred to as the "immigration block."

The questions in the "redistribution block" explore respondents' views about redistributive policies, such as how to allocate the government's budget or how much of the total tax burden people with different incomes should bear. To also take into account private (non-government based) redistribution, as well as to test for a real effect of the treatments, we tell respondents that they are enrolled in a lottery to win $1,000, but that before knowing whether they have won, they have to commit a share (zero or positive) of their gain to one or two charities that help low-income people.

We find that natives have striking misperceptions about the number and composition of immigrants. In all the countries in our sample, the average and median respondents vastly overestimate the number

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[1] See Alesina and Glaeser (2004) for a comparison of U.S. versus Europe and Alesina and Giuliano (2011) for a survey.

[2] We focus on legal immigrants because we want to abstract from issues of law enforcement and border control. In Europe, illegal immigrants represent a very small share of total immigrants; for the U.S., where they represent a larger share, we also provide a variation of our treatment using total immigrants.

of immigrants. For instance, in the U.S., the actual number of legal immigrants as defined above is 10%, but the average perception is 36%; in Italy, the true share of immigrants is 10%, but the perceived share is 26%. The misperception about the size of the immigrant population is widespread among all groups of respondents, including left and right-wing ones. Respondents also systematically misperceive the composition of immigrants. They believe immigrants are more culturally distant from natives. For instance, they starkly overestimate the share of Muslim immigrants and underestimate the share of Christian immigrants. Misperceptions are pervasive also about the level of education and income of immigrants and about how much they rely on the receiving country's welfare state. Respondents who have the largest misperceptions are those with low levels of education and who work in sectors with more immigrant workers, the non college-educated, women, and right-wing respondents. While left and right-wing respondents misperceive the share of immigrants to the same extent, they have very different views about the composition of immigrants and their contribution to the receiving country.

A major challenge that we overcome is to ensure that these misperceptions about immigrants are not driven by lack of attention and to properly benchmark them against other misperceptions. Thus, we ask respondents also to provide their perceptions about natives (e.g., natives' education, unemployment, or poverty levels). Respondents are, on average, more inaccurate about immigrants than about natives. We also offer randomized, sizable, and varying monetary incentives for accurate answers to a subsample of respondents. Misperceptions are unaffected by monetary incentives, suggesting that respondents truly do not know the correct answers or that they hold on to their views very strongly. Furthermore, we measure respondents' "willingness to pay" for information about immigrants by giving them the option to pay a randomized amount of money at the end of the survey in exchange for the correct answers to all the questions about immigrants' characteristics. Just around 49% of respondents who receive this option are willing to pay at least 50 cents for the correct information. However, those who have larger misperceptions are also less willing to pay to get the correct information, conditional on the full set of respondent-level controls that include income and political affiliation, as well as on the price of the information. This could be because respondents with more inaccurate views are more confident in their views or in general less open to learning – which could also explain why they have larger misperception in the first place. This phenomenon may be one of the possible mechanisms through which misinformation persists. Right-wing respondents, who are in general more inaccurate about and averse to immigration, are also less willing to pay for the information, even conditional on a given level of misperceptions.

We also study where misperceptions about immigrants come from. We make use of our fine-grained location data for respondents to show that misperceptions are shaped by the actual number and characteristics of immigrants and by their differences relative to natives in the respondent's local area and country. The patterns we find imply that exposure to immigrants matters, that respondents do extrapolate to some extent from natives' characteristics, and that they tend to exaggerate differences between immigrants and natives (i.e., to stereotype).

In the second part of the paper, we examine the link between immigration perceptions and redistribution. We start by analyzing the effects of a priming or salience treatment, which consists in randomizing the order in which respondents see the "redistribution block" and the "immigration block." Thus, this treatment tests whether simply making the immigration issue more salient to respondents – without any information – affects their answers to the questions on redistribution. We find that making respondents think about the immigration topic makes them significantly more averse to redistribution: they express a lower concern for

inequality, a reduced wish for progressive taxes and redistributive spending, as well as a decline in (real) donations to charity.[3]

We then investigate the mechanisms through which this salience effect could be occurring. When we correlate respondents' support for redistribution with their underlying perceptions, we find that the most important predictor of lower support for redistribution is the belief that immigrants free-ride on and take advantage of the welfare state, followed closely by the perception that immigrants are economically weak, i.e., have low education and high unemployment and poverty rates. The perceived cultural distance of immigrants plays a more minor role and the perceived share of immigrants *per se* is not correlated with redistribution support at all.

These findings are bolstered by our experimental results. During the survey, respondents are randomized into one of three branches in which they see different short videos. The first two videos provide respondents with information on, respectively, the actual shares and countries of origins of immigrants in their country. The third video tells the story of a hard-working immigrant. This treatment does not provide any factual data *per se*, but rather aims to provide a narrative that counters the story that immigrants free-ride and make little economic contribution.

Perhaps surprising at first glance, the two information treatments on the shares and origins of immigrants have negative, mostly insignificant effects on support for redistribution. However, this makes sense in light of the finding that making the immigration issue more salient to respondents generates a reduction in support for redistribution. The video treatments unavoidably make the immigration topic more salient, and the factual information content does not have much power in shifting either perceptions of immigrants or attitudes towards redistribution. The anecdotal hard work treatment, aimed at changing the narrative about immigrants' work ethic and free-riding, seems to move people more than factual information, especially when it comes to improving support for immigration. Although it is more effective at canceling out the negative priming effect on support for redistribution, it is still unable to fully overturn it.[4] These findings are consistent with the result that the perceived lack economic contributions and free-riding may be stronger drivers of reduced support for redistribution than either the perceived share of immigrants or their perceived cultural diversity. In summary, while simple facts have no effect, a story about the hard work of immigrants that opposes the existing free-riding narrative is somewhat more effective. However, because the narratives about and misperceptions of immigrants are deep-seated and hard to shift, salience and priming have stronger effects.[5]

Related Literature: Our paper is mainly related to three strands of the literature. The first studies the relationship between cultural and social fragmentation and the welfare state. Many papers, mostly in economics, are reviewed in Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and in Stichnoth and Van der Straeten (2013). A common result is that public and private generosities travel less well across racial, ethnic, religious, and nationality groups than within these groups. Earlier empirical papers about immigrants use pre-existing surveys such as the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the World Value Survey (WVS), or the European Value Survey (Senik, Stichnoth, and Van der Straeten, 2009; Mayda, 2006; Alesina, Murard, and

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[3]Although these results are noisier, groups which have more inaccurate baseline priors (the non college-educated, especially if they also work in immigration intensive sectors, and the right-wing) are more sensitive to this priming treatment and react more negatively to the immigration issue being made more salient to them.

[4]We also conducted a follow-up survey in the U.S. to show whether the effects on perceptions of the treatments persist after one to three weeks.

[5] Other areas in which salience may play a bigger role than actual facts are climate change (Demski et al., 2017; Konisky et al., 2016) and taxation (Chetty et al., 2009; Taubinsky and Rees-Jones, 2018).

Rapoport, 2021). Our newly designed cross-country surveys plus experiments allow us to consider a much broader and comprehensive set of perceptions about immigrants in a standardized, quantitative, and causal manner.

Natural experiments such as waves of migration have been exploited in several papers: Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist (2012) identify a negative impact of refugees on reduced redistribution support in Swedish localities; Chevalier et al. (2018) consider the effects of the inflow of poor immigrants with voting rights in West Germany post WWII on redistribution; Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012) show that compositional concerns about local amenities and public goods are important in explaining support for immigration; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm (2019) estimate the causal impact of refugee migration on electoral outcomes in Denmark, exploiting a policy that assigned refugees quasi-randomly to different municipalities; Tabellini (2020) shows that there has been political backlash against immigrants, even if the latter economically benefit the host community, by exploiting exogenous variation in European immigration to U.S. cities in the first half of the 20th century.

The second related literature is the growing work on stereotypes and group identity (Bordalo et al., 2016; Bonomi, Gennaioli, and Tabellini, 2020; Grossman and Helpman, 2021). Our results strongly support the predictions and implications of this work. When it comes to stereotypes, the misperceptions about immigrants which we document are examples of them. As the stereotype theory in Bordalo et al. (2016) predicts, the differences between some characteristics of immigrants and natives are exaggerated. For instance, in places where immigrants are more unemployed than natives, respondents tend to overestimate the unemployment of immigrants by more.

Bonomi, Gennaioli, and Tabellini (2020) also offer important insights into our survey and experimental results. Group identity in terms of "immigrant" and "non-immigrant" will cause respondents to rely on group stereotypes and polarize their beliefs along the distinguishing features of their groups. Shocks that make immigrants more salient – as is done in our case by our experimental treatments – cause changes in beliefs and policies – here, redistribution policies.

Methodologically, we are contributing to a growing literature on online information experiments. The most recent and closest works are by Kuziemko et al. (2015), Kuziemko et al. (2014), Charité, Fisman, and Kuziemko (2015), Karadja, Mollerstrom, and Seim (2017), Cruces, Perez-Truglia, and Tetaz (2013), Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018), Weinzierl (2017), Weinzierl (2018), and Fisman, Kuziemko, and Vannutelli (2020).

Two recent papers consider information experiments related to immigration. Barrera Rodriguez, Guriev, Henry, and Zhuravskaya (2020) randomly allocate French voters into a control group and three treatment groups: the first receives "alternative" facts on immigration from the far-right presidential candidate's campaign (Marine Le Pen or MLP); the second receives true facts on the same issues; the third group receives the alternative facts, followed by fact-checking. Voters do update their knowledge based on true facts and fact-checking; exposing respondents to MLP's messages increases support for her, with or without fact-checking. This paper does not focus on redistribution and is about one specific populist party's message in one country. In a US-based survey, Grigorieff, Roth, and Ubfal (2020) study how giving correct information about five characteristics of immigrants improves support for immigration among Republicans only; they do not consider redistribution policies. Our results on immigration support are consistent with theirs.

Our result that priming on immigration lowers support for redistribution is consistent with existing evidence that support for redistribution is influenced by the particular factors made salient. Support for

redistributive policies seems to be influenced by information on the groups that benefit or loose from them. For instance, Kuziemko et al. (2015) find that providing information on the small share of (large) estates subject to the estate tax increases respondents' support for the tax, as they realize that it is only the very wealthy that pay it. On the contrary, priming respondents to think negatively about the government reduces their support for redistribution policies that require direct government intervention. Similarly, Stantcheva (2021) shows that giving respondents information about the distributional impacts of taxes increases their support for progressive taxation. Respondents are, however, less sensitive to primes about the efficiency costs of taxes. Support for redistribution can also be modified by emphasizing intergenerational mobility (or lack thereof) (Alesina et al., 2018). Other studies have shown that support for redistribution can be influenced by priming respondents to think about their social position and income relative to others (Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017).

Our survey relies on explicit questions. Other studies have instead relied on the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to measure biases against immigrants. They aim to overcome social desirability bias, which may push respondents to answer in a way that is swayed by societal pressure and does not reflect their true views. Pérez (2010) shows that the IAT effectively captures implicit attitudes towards Latino immigrants in a representative web survey of adults in the U.S.. However, while implicit attitudes may have an effect that is not captured entirely by explicit ones, the latter are nevertheless quite predictive of policy views as well (see also Knoll, 2013 and Malhotra et al., 2013 for a comparison of attitudes towards Indian and European high-skilled H-1B visa holders).

In political science, a few papers have studied the link between immigration and demand for redistribution exploiting questions in various waves of the European Social Survey. For instance, Finseraas (2008) points out that theoretically perceptions of immigration may have two competing effects on support for redistribution: the "anti-solidarity hypothesis," whereby people dislike redistributing towards immigrants, and the "compensation hypothesis," whereby people may increase their preferred level of redistribution if they fear losing income as a consequence of more immigration. He finds empirical support for both effects. Burgoon et al. (2012) furthermore show that these two effects can co-exist at different levels. At the national level, exposure to foreign-born people has little effect on support for redistribution, but occupational-level exposure increases demand for redistribution. Emmenegger and Klemmensen (2013) argue that the interplay between attitudes towards immigration and support for redistribution depends on individual motivations. Self-interested individuals who feel threatened by immigrants and strongly reciprocal individuals who perceive immigrants as having worse moral values experience a tension between immigration and redistribution. Egalitarians and humanitarian individuals do not experience this tension.[6]

Our contributions are, first, to provide new, detailed, and standardized international surveys that combine questions on the perceptions of and attitudes towards immigration, and a range of different policies. Second, we investigate much more detailed and quantitative perceptions, about not only the number of immigrants, but also their origins, religion, education, work effort, unemployment, and transfers receipts. This is crucial because, contrary to findings from less detailed questionnaires, it is not perceptions of the share of immigrants *per se* that differentiate respondents, but rather their perceived characteristics. We also study where these misperceptions stem from. Third, our new treatments allow us to evaluate the causal relation between

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[6]In the same field, a long-standing debate focuses on whether anti-immigration sentiments arise purely from economic considerations or rather from worries about cultural dilution and there is support for both views (Sides and Citrin, 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2010; Hanson et al., 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Bansak et al., 2016). These papers focus on openness to *immigration*, not redistribution policies.

perceptions of immigration and support for redistributive policies.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Our data collection, survey construction, and experimental design are explained in detail in Section 2. The full survey text is in the Online Appendix. Section 3 describes the perceptions about immigrants, across countries and respondent characteristics. Section 4 studies where these misperceptions come from. The findings from the experimental part of our study are discussed in Section 5. The last section concludes.

2 The Survey, the Experiments, and Data Sources on Immigration

2.1 Data Collection and Sample

We conducted large-scale surveys between January and March 2018 in six countries: Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S..[7] The sample sizes are 4500 for the U.S., 4001 for the U.K., 4001 for Germany, 4000 for France, 4000 for Italy, and 2004 for Sweden, for a total of 22506 respondents.[8] Only natives (non-immigrants) between 18 and 70 years of age were allowed to take the survey. We designed the surveys using an online platform; the survey links are then diffused by commercial survey companies in each country. For the U.S., the respondents were reached through C&T Marketing (http://www.ctmarketinggroup.com); in the European countries by *Respondi* (https://www.respondi.com/EN/). These companies partner with panels of respondents to which they email survey links. Respondents who click on the link are first channeled through some screening questions that ensure that the final sample is nationally representative along the gender, age, and income dimensions. Respondents are paid only if they fully complete the survey. The pay per survey completed was around $3. The average time for completion of the survey was 27 minutes and the median time was 21 minutes.[9] In the U.S., we implemented a follow-up survey for each respondent, one week after they took the initial one. This allows us to test for the persistence of the treatment effects. We also conducted and additional survey in the U.S. in February 2019 on 1650 respondents to check responsiveness to monetary incentives and measure willingness to pay for correct information.

The final sample is close to representative in each country. Table 1 shows the characteristics of our main analysis sample relative to the population in each country.[10] Population statistics are from the Census Bureau and the Current Population Survey for the U.S. and from Eurostat and various national statistical offices for European Countries, as described in the table notes. By construction, we are almost perfectly representative along the dimensions of age, gender, and income (binned into four brackets, to mimic the way the quotas are imposed during the survey). In addition, our sample is also representative on non-targeted dimensions such as the share of respondents who are married. Our respondents are slightly less likely to be employed (either part-time or full-time), but not more likely to be unemployed (except to a small extent in the U.S.). In some countries, such as the U.S., France, and Italy, respondents in our sample are more likely to be college-educated than the general population. To address these two small imbalances, in Appendix A-13.3, we show that all our results are robust to re-weighting the sample so that it is representative along

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[7]The main survey was fielded between mid-January and mid-February in the U.S., from February to mid-March in European countries.

[8]We chose this set of Western countries to be diverse in terms of their shares and characteristics of immigrants and their welfare states. We discuss the choice of sample sizes in Appendix Section A-12.

[9]The full distribution of survey duration for the main analysis sample is provided in Figure A-8.

[10]Appendix Table A-6 reports the characteristics of the additional U.S. sample.

the employment and education dimensions as well.

2.2 The Survey: An Overview

The full survey in English is available in Appendix A-4.3. The questionnaires in German, Italian, French, and Swedish can be seen by following the links in the Appendix, which lead to the web interface of the survey. We enrolled the help of several native speakers for each language to ensure that the translation was suited to the local culture and understanding. Below, text in italic represents actual survey text. Italic text in square brackets represents the answer options provided to the respondents, if any. For the exposition here, we provide the text as it is in the U.S. survey.

There are two possible definitions of legal immigrants: i) by citizenship, (i.e., all people legally living in the country who do not have citizenship), and ii) by country of birth (i.e., all people who legally live in the country but were born in another country). We use the second one, which is the one most frequently used by the OECD (OECD, 2015) because it is more comparable across countries, i.e., is not affected by countries' citizenship policies, which are very heterogeneous. Thus we give the following definition of an immigrant:

"In what follows, we refer to immigrants as people who were not born in the U.S. and legally moved here at a certain point of their life. We are NOT considering illegal immigrants."

We focus on legal immigrants for two reasons. First, illegal immigration may pose very different challenges and thus generate different reactions among respondents than legal immigration. Second, it seems conceptually useful to separate the issue of support for immigration (how many immigrants respondents think there should be and how receptive their home country should be to them) from the issue of enforcement of immigration laws. We thus decided not to mix the issues of legal immigration and illegal entry. This distinction is most relevant in the U.S., where close to 3.5% of the population are illegal immigrants; in the European countries, the share of illegal immigrants is very small and does not make any substantive difference to any of the statistics about immigration that we compute. For the U.S., we explain below how we construct all statistics for legal immigrants. For completeness, we compute the full set of statistics for total and illegal immigrants as well in Appendix Section A-2.

Background Socioeconomic Questions

We collect information on respondents' gender, age, income, education, sector of occupation, employment status, marital status, number of children, place of residence, and political orientation. The latter is investigated in two ways. First, we ask respondents to classify themselves in terms of their views on economic policy, along a spectrum ranging from "very conservative" to "very liberal." The wording of the question is adapted to the common political terminology in each country.[11] Second, we ask them for which party or candidate they voted or would have voted (in case they did not vote) in the last presidential (or chancellor) election.[12] If an election was impending at the time of the survey (as it was the case for Italy and Sweden),

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[11] *"On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?"* With options *[Very liberal, Liberal, Center, Conservative, Very Conservative]* in the U.S. and the U.K., and *[Far left, Left, Center, Right, Far right]* in the other countries.

[12] More precisely, we first ask respondents whether they voted in the last elections or not. If they did, we ask them to select the candidate or party they voted for; if they did not, we ask them to select the candidate or party they would have most likely supported if they had voted. In some countries, the electoral system is such that people vote for parties. In others, they vote for candidates. In the U.S. and in France we provide a list of all the presidential candidates. In the other countries we list all the major parties that together attract more than 95% of the vote and also add an empty field for "Other" where respondents

we also ask which party or candidate they planned to vote for. We also include a question on whether one or both parents of the respondent were immigrants. Since we collect information on the respondent's sector of employment (and, if they are currently unemployed, on the sector in which they last worked), we are thus able to classify respondents into "high immigration sectors," which we define as sectors in which the share of immigrants is above the national average. The full sector classification is summarized in Appendix A-3.[13]

The Video Treatments

The randomly chosen treated respondents see one of three treatment videos, which are available on YouTube.[14] We describe these treatments and their effects in Section 5.

Immigration Block

First, the respondent is asked about what share of the population are immigrants using a slider and a pie chart as illustrated in Figure 1. When the respondent lands on this page, the pie chart appears fully gray and the slider is at zero. As respondents move the slider, the pie chart interactively appears in two colors, one representing the share of U.S. born people, the other the share of foreign born ones. The slider and pie chart design serves three purposes. First, it is much less tempting to enter round numbers: indeed, as the histograms in Figure A-11 show, there are relatively few round numbers reported. Second, the interactive and colored display that reacts in real-time to a respondent's movements captures his attention. Third, the pie chart naturally benchmarks the question: respondents are forced to see that, whatever the share of immigrants they enter, the share of non-immigrants is then 100% minus that.

We then ask respondents what share of the total immigrants in their country come from each of nine regions of origin – Canada, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle-East, Asia, Australia/New Zealand. Again, we use a slider plus a pie chart display shown in Figure A-7. There is one slider per region of origin and the pie chart adapts in real-time with different colors for each region. A sticky map at the top shows the boundaries of each region, with matching colors.

We also ask about the religions of immigrants before turning to questions about the economic circumstances of immigrants, namely, their unemployment level, their likelihood of having a college education or of not having completed high school, the share living below the official poverty line, and the government transfers they get relative to the average native. Importantly, we always also ask about the same statistic for natives in order to have a comparison point and be able to benchmark the misperceptions.

To give an example, the question about poverty (for the U.S.) reads as follows:

"Out of every 100 people born in the U.S., how many live below the poverty line? The poverty line is the estimated minimum level of income needed to secure the necessities of life."

"Let's compare this to poverty among legal immigrants. Out of every 100 legal immigrants in the U.S. today, how many do you think live below the poverty line?"

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can write the party that they voted for. Afterwards we classify candidates and parties into Far left, Left, Center, Right and Far right.

[13]For instance, in the U.S., immigration intensive sectors are: Farming, fishing, and forestry; Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance; Construction and extraction; Computer and mathematical occupations; Production occupations; Life, physical, and social science; Food preparation and serving related occupations; Occupations related to transportation and material moving; Occupations related to personal care, childcare and leisure; Healthcare support occupations.

[14]The links are: https://youtu.be/2bVzfv0a-fE; https://youtu.be/-603kdm_GkA; https://youtu.be/_1SoLYX8OyE.

The pie chart below represents all the people currently living in the U.S. Out of all these people currently living in the U.S., how many do you think are legal immigrants? Move the slider to indicate how many out of every 100 people you think are legal immigrants.

We then ask about perceptions of the work effort of immigrants:

"Which has more to do with why an immigrant living in the U.S. is poor?" [Lack of effort on his or her own part; Circumstances beyond his or her control.]

"Which has more to do with why an immigrant living in the U.S. is rich?" [Because she or he worked harder than others; Because she or he had more advantages than others.]

Our next question describes two people, "John" and "Mohammed," who are identical along all dimensions, except that Mohammed is a legal immigrant. The exact names used are adapted to each country to feature one native-sounding and one immigrant-sounding name. Respondents are asked whether Mohammed pays more or less taxes than John and whether he receives more or less transfers. This complements the question above on unconditional transfers, by holding everything relevant fixed – thus, if respondents respond anything other than "the same" they are expressing some bias in favor or against the immigrant.

The next set of questions asks about views on immigration policy and cover four areas: 1) the number of immigrants the respondent believes should be allowed to enter the country and whether or not the current number is problematic; 2) when immigrants should be eligible for transfers such as welfare payments; 3) when immigrants should be allowed to apply for citizenship and vote in U.S. elections; 4) when the respondent would consider an immigrant to be "truly American."

Redistribution Block

This block of questions is about general redistribution towards low income individuals. It never makes any reference to immigrants. The questions also refer to the "government" in general, not specifically to the

incumbent government. For the U.S. and Germany (the two federal countries in our sample), we explicitly state that we refer to total spending and taxes at the "federal, state, and local levels." Our questions are designed to address two aspects on government intervention, holding the other one fixed: 1) how to raise the funds needed for government policies and 2) how to spend a given level of funds. We first explain to respondents that we will ask them separately about how to raise a given tax burden (aspect 1) and then how to allocate it to the different major spending categories (aspect 2): *"For the purpose of these questions, suppose that the level of government spending is fixed at its current level and cannot be changed."*.

Taxes: To provide more details about aspect 1), respondents are asked to select average income tax rates for four income groups using sliders: the top 1%, the next 9%, the next 40% and the bottom 50%. The taxes they select are constrained to raise the current level of revenue in their country. This is illustrated in Figure A-5.[15]

Spending: On aspect 2), we ask respondents to allocate 100% of the budget to seven spending categories: 1) Defense and National Security, 2) Public Infrastructure, 3) Spending on Schooling and Higher Education, 4) Social Security, Medicare, Disability Insurance, and Supplementary Security Income, 5) Social Insurance and Income Support Programs, 6) Public Spending on Health, and 7) Affordable Housing (see Appendix Figure A-6). Some of these spending categories are redistributive (in particular, 3), 4), 5), 6), and 7)) while others are not (i.e., 1) and 2)).

Views of government: We also ask respondents several detailed questions about their views on the role and scope of government.

Donation to charity: To end the redistribution block and to provide an outcome that is not self-reported, we tell respondents that they have been automatically enrolled in a lottery to win $1,000. Before they know whether they have won or not, they need to commit to donating none of it, part of it, or all of it to one or two charities. We selected two charities in each country to be 1) targeted towards low income adults or children in general and not concerned with immigrants particularly; 2) popular and well-perceived in each country. They are listed in Appendix A-4.4. For instance, for the U.S. we chose "Feeding America" and "The Salvation Army."[16]

Layers of Randomization

The order in which the "redistribution block" and "immigration block" are shown to respondents is randomized. Combined with the randomization layer that shows people one of the three videos or no video, this creates eight treatment or control groups, summarized in Table A-1 in the Appendix. Table A-13 shows that each randomization is balanced along observable respondent characteristics. One exception is that the young and those with a college degree are slightly under-represented in the Hard work treatment.

Based on these many and detailed survey questions, we define several variables and indices used in our analysis. We define them as we go and refer to them throughout the text and in the tables and figures. The reader can refer to their detailed definitions collected in Appendix A-1.

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[15]While respondents select tax rates on each of the four groups, a fifth slider at the bottom moves and depicts the fraction of the revenue target that has been raised. When the revenue target has been met, the slider turns green and a message alerts the respondent.

[16]We also tried to pick charities without a religious connotation whenever possible.

Additional Survey with Monetary Incentives

To ensure that our results are not driven by respondents' lack of attention or careless answers, we provide monetary incentives for accurate answers in a sizable additional sample of U.S. respondents. We randomize whether respondents receive any monetary incentives, as well as the amount received. We also measure their willingness to pay for accurate information about immigrants. More precisely, at the end of the survey we ask participants whether they are willing to forfeit part of their potential prize from the lottery in the redistribution block, in exchange for the correct answers to all the questions about immigrants. We randomize among different "prices" of information ranging from $0.5 to $10. Only those respondents who agree to give up part of their potential prize are shown the correct answers; we highlight that this information is difficult to find online. Respondents are then asked whether they are surprised by the correct answers.

2.3 Data on Immigration Across Countries

Many of our perception questions can be checked against actual data. We construct the empirical counterparts of all the variables for which we elicit perceptions using U.S. and European data both at the national and at the local level (commuting zone in the U.S., NUTS1 in Germany and the U.K., NUTS2 in Italy, France and Sweden). Appendix Section A-2 lists all the data sources and details all the steps in the construction of these statistics.[17] For the U.S., we construct all the statistics for legal immigrants, as well as for illegal and total immigrants.[18] The former two are not as readily available and, because there is some uncertainty surrounding the characteristics of illegal immigrants, we provide bounds for each statistic, using several different data sources. These calculations may prove useful for future researchers as well. In the paper, all statistics at the national level regarding U.S. and European immigrants refer to legal immigrants only. At the local level in the U.S. we use data from the American Community Survey (ACS), which includes both legal and illegal immigrants. Local data on immigrants in European countries are constructed using estimates by Eurostat and national statistical offices.[19]

2.4 Ensuring High Quality Responses

In addition to providing monetary incentives for accurate answers and to benchmarking views about immigrants to views about natives, we employ several more techniques to ensure high quality responses. In the survey's landing page – the consent page, depicted in Appendix Figure A-1 – we warn respondents that *"responding without adequate effort may result in [their] responses being flagged for low quality"* and that their pay for the survey may be withheld. We also attempt to make them feel involved and socially responsible by emphasizing that we are non-partisan researchers seeking to advance social studies. We highlight that it is *"very important for the success of our research that you answer honestly and read the questions very carefully before answering."*

Questions are designed so as to prevent as much as possible careless answers: for instance, percentages are constrained to add up to 100% and respondents cannot move to the next page before they satisfy this constraint; whenever possible, we let respondents move sliders, the values of which are shown in real-time

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[17]The raw data and all our calculations for the national statistics are available in the excel spreadsheet at `https://www.dropbox.com/s/136otycl3tnkdsd/Database_US.xlsx?dl=0` for the U.S. and `https://www.dropbox.com/s/ggg3vvsy70gb49o/Database_EU.xlsx?dl=0` for European countries.

[18]In European countries the estimated number of illegal immigrants is very small.

[19]The raw data and calculations are available in the excel spreadsheet at `https://www.dropbox.com/s/h0pbyym0t0yoqva/Database_local_EU.xlsx?dl=0`.

on pie charts. Questions are initialized in a neutral way, with sliders at zero and the pie charts fully gray (i.e., not showing any of the answer categories). We keep track of the time spent by the respondent on the survey as a whole, as well as on individual questions. Thus, we can flag respondents who spend too little time on either the full survey or on one of the questions about immigrant perceptions. For instance, only 1% of our respondents completed the survey in less than 6 minutes or spent less than 11 seconds on the question about immigrants origins. We also have the number of clicks on each page. For the main analysis sample, we drop respondents in the top 2% and bottom 2% of the survey time distribution, as well as respondents who spent too much time (top 2%) on one of the treatment videos. This is to avoid people who either rushed through the survey or who were clearly inattentive and getting distracted by other contemporaneous tasks (without watching the videos and not noticing the videos had ended). We checked that none of our results are affected by trimming these outliers, as discussed in the robustness checks in Section 5.5. The distribution of survey duration is depicted in Figure A-8. Furthermore, we can test for survey fatigue by exploiting the randomization of the survey blocks in Appendix Section A-6.4.

Just before the questions on immigrant perceptions, we strategically place an attention check question. We ask respondents whether they have paid careful attention to the preceding questions and whether they honestly believe that we should count their responses in our analysis. Almost all respondents (99.5%) answer that yes. This type of questions is used to prompt the respondents to pay attention to the subsequent questions of the survey. Its purpose is fulfilled regardless of whether the respondents answer honestly (Meade and Craig, 2012).

In addition, we ask respondents whether they thought that our survey was biased towards either left-wing or right-wing opinions. Only 16.8% of respondents say they felt some bias, out of which 10.6% thought it was left-wing biased and 6.2% thought it was right-wing biased. Dropping respondents who felt the survey is biased strengthens our treatment effects somewhat. Finally, we implement a number of ex-post checks based on suspicious answer patterns that are indicative of carelessness, which we detail in Section 5.5.

3 Perceptions of Immigration

We now describe all the perceptions about immigrants, focusing on some key results. For a more comprehensive overview, Table A-2 reports average perceived values and actual values for each country and for all perception-related variables, as well as the corresponding medians and interquartile ranges. Table A-3 provides the same information, but by respondent groups.[20] All these descriptive statistics are based on the control group, namely the respondents who did not see any of the video treatments.

3.1 Misperceptions: Share, Origins, Economic Circumstances

The Share of Immigrants

The left panel of Figure 2 shows the average perception of respondents in each country of the share of immigrants (red squares), as well as the actual share (blue diamonds). The shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals around the average perceptions.

The discrepancy between perceptions and reality is striking. With the exception of Sweden, the average respondent in all countries thinks the share of immigrants is at least twice as high as it is in reality. In the

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[20]Appendix A-13.3 re-weights the sample to make it fully representative also along the non-targeted dimensions of employment and education.

U.S., respondents believe that there are on average 36.1% immigrants, when the actual share of immigrants is 10%. In Italy, the share of immigrants is 10%, but respondents believe it is 26.4%. Swedish respondents are the most accurate, but still substantially inaccurate: the actual number of immigrants is 17.6% (the highest among the countries sampled), but the average perception is 27%. The median respondent perceives a lower share than the average respondent, indicating some right-skewness in the distribution of perceptions. However, even the median respondent starkly overestimates the share of immigrants. In fact, it is only respondents at the 25th percentile of the perception distribution that are somewhat closer to reality.

The complete distribution of misperceptions on the share of immigrants is in Figure A-11. Misperceptions are defined as the perceived value minus the actual value. There is a share of respondents who believe the share of immigrants is very high. However, even if we exclude respondents whose misperception is in the top 20%, we still get very substantial misperceptions, as was already clear by looking at the median respondent: the average perceived share of immigrants excluding the top 20% is 27% in the U.S., 23% in the U.K., 22% in France, 19% in Italy, 22% in Germany, and 20% in Sweden. We also get very substantial misperceptions even if we exclude respondents who spent too little time on the this question.[21]

The right panel of Figure 2 shows the average misperceptions of respondents grouped according to several personal characteristics (all countries pooled), listed on the y axis.[22] The shaded areas represent the 95% confidence intervals around the average perceptions. The groups are: those who work in high immigration sectors and have a college degree; those who work in high immigration sectors, but have no college degree; the college-educated; the non college-educated; high-income respondents; low-income respondents; those who have an immigrant parent; those who do not have an immigrant parent; the young; the older ones; male vs. female; and left-wing vs. right-wing. While most of these characteristics are self-explanatory, we provide more detail on two of them. First, as explained above, we classify respondents into high immigration sectors based on whether their current sector of employment (or their last sector, if they are currently unemployed), has an immigrant share higher than the national average. Within high immigration sectors, we distinguish between respondents with college education and those without. Left-wing and right-wing respondents are classified based on their voting in the last election. Our classification of all parties into left, right, and center is shown in Appendix A-1. The results are robust to classifying respondents based on their views on economic policy issues (ranging from very conservative to very liberal).

There are three key findings. First, respondents in all groups think there are substantially more immigrants than there actually are – in no group is the average misperception lower than 15 percentage points. Second, some groups of respondents have substantially higher misperceptions than others. These are respondents who are low educated in high immigration sectors, the non college-educated, those with an immigrant parent, the young, and women. Third, there is no difference in the average perception of the share of immigrants for left and right-wing respondents. However, as we will see below, the misperceptions about the characteristics of immigrants are very correlated with the political orientation of the respondents.

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[21]The average perceived share of immigrants excluding those who spent less than 12 seconds on this question is 35% in the U.S., 30% in the U.K., 28% in France, 24% in Italy, 30% in Germany, and 26% in Sweden.

[22]This and the subsequent figures show unconditional means by group. For the full regression results with perceptions and attitudes as dependent variables and the full array of respondent characteristics as covariates, see Appendix Table A-4.

The Origins and Religions of Immigrants

Respondents misperceive not only the total share of immigrants in their country, but also their origins and religions, as shown in Figure 3.[23] Respondents in all countries think that immigrants come disproportionately from non-Western countries, such as the Middle East, Subsaharan Africa, or North Africa, often branded as "problematic" in the public debate. They underestimate the share of immigrants coming from countries that are culturally closer to theirs. In particular, U.S. respondents very sharply overestimate North African and Middle Eastern immigrants, as do Italian, U.K., and Swedish respondents. France overestimates Middle Eastern immigrants by a factor of two, but slightly underestimates North African immigrants (of which there are substantially more than in all other countries in our sample). In Germany, respondents overestimate the share of North African immigrants by a factor of eight, but are exceptionally accurate on the share of Middle Eastern immigrants, perhaps because they are very aware that the large Turkish minority, to which they are accustomed, are not immigrants.

In all countries except France, respondents also very significantly overestimate the share of Muslim immigrants. The largest misperceptions along this dimension are in the U.S. – where respondents believe that the share of immigrants who are Muslim is 23%, while the reality is closer to 10% – and in Sweden — where the perceived share of Muslims is 45%, while the reality is 27%. The U.K., Italy, and Germany overestimate the share of Muslim immigrants by between 10 and 14 percentage points. In all countries, without exception, respondents strongly underestimate the share of Christian immigrants (the religion of the majority of people living in our sample countries), by at least 20 percentage points and often by much more.

These misperceptions are systematic: there is no group of respondents that does not overestimate the share of Muslim immigrants and underestimate the share of Christian immigrants. Those who have the largest misperceptions are the non college-educated, especially if they also work in an immigration-intensive sector, older respondents, women, and right-wing respondents.

Unemployment and Education of Immigrants

We now turn to the misperceptions of economic circumstances of immigrants relative to natives. Panel A of Figure 4 compares the perceived share of highly-educated immigrants and that of highly-educated non-immigrants, where highly-educated is defined as having at least a college degree. The misperception about natives is always more positive than that about immigrants, whether it is due to respondents overestimating the share of highly-educated natives (as is the case in Sweden, Italy, Germany, and France) or underestimating the share of highly-educated immigrants (as is the case in the U.S. and the U.K.). Panel B shows that left and right-wing respondents have similar misperceptions about natives, but right-wing respondents have significantly larger misperceptions about immigrants.

Panel B of Figure 4 considers perceptions about unemployment and highlights the importance of benchmarking. In all countries, respondents vastly overestimate the share of immigrants and natives that are unemployed. It seems likely that respondents do not understand the distinction between unemployed and out of the labor force, although we do state it clearly.[24] This is not surprising given that the difference between a discouraged individual who is not searching for a job and the officially unemployed person is subtle.

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[23]The complete set of perceptions about the fraction of immigrants that come from each possible origin region and their religion are shown in detail in Table A-2 (by country) and Table A-3 (by respondent characteristics).

[24]*"By unemployed we mean people who are currently not working, but searching for a job (and maybe unable to find one)"*

But although respondents vastly overestimate both immigrants' and natives' unemployment, they always perceive a larger unemployment rate for immigrants. In Germany, the misperception of unemployment is 30 percentage points for immigrants and 15 percentage points for natives; in Italy it is 27 percentage points for immigrants and 24 for natives; in Sweden, it is 21 percentage points for immigrants and 10 percentage points for natives. In addition, while left and right-wing respondents overestimate the unemployment rates of natives by the same amount, right-wing respondents overestimate the unemployment rate of immigrants significantly more.

Work Effort of Immigrants

Panel A of Figure 5 plots the share of respondents who say that immigrants are poor because of a lack of effort rather than due to circumstances beyond their control in each country (the red squares). We compare this to the share of respondents who believe that poverty is due to lack of effort for everyone, immigrant or not, which is elicited in Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso (2018) (the blue diamonds) for all the same countries, except Germany.[25] In France and Italy people have a more negative attitude towards poor immigrants than they do towards poor people in general. In the U.K. and Sweden, there is no difference in views about immigrants and natives. In the U.S., views are slightly more positive towards immigrants. Even for natives, U.S. respondents put much more weight on individual responsibility in shaping outcomes and, perhaps because of that, assess better the hurdles stacked against immigrants when they have to make it out of poverty. Right-wing respondents are much more likely to believe that immigrants are poor because of lack of effort. These patterns fit well with earlier findings (see our literature review in Section 1) that U.S. respondents are much more likely to associate poverty with lack of effort than European respondents (especially those from France and Italy) and that right-wing respondents are more inclined to blame poor people for their own fate. Despite these variations in views on the merits of poor immigrants, views on the merits of rich immigrants are strikingly consistent across countries.

Panel B of Figure 5 show the perceptions related to immigrants and natives for being rich because of one's own effort (as opposed to exogenous advantages) by country and by core respondent characteristic. In all countries, respondents agree that, if an immigrant is rich, it must be mostly because of their own effort. Respondents also agree that this is more true for immigrants than it is for natives. In Italy, the gap is particularly large: while Italians believe that only 17% of the rich people are rich because of their own effort, they think that 70% of rich immigrants are rich due to their own merit. The U.K. and France have less extreme, but still similar patterns. This may reflect the beliefs of Italians especially, but also French and English respondents, that the system is penetrated by family connections and social advantages, which maintain rich dynasties at the top even though they are not the ones who worked hardest. Consequently, because immigrants by construction lack these inherited advantages and sticky social classes, the (possibly very few) rich immigrants must have put in a lot of effort to become rich.

Immigrants and the Welfare State

An important consideration respondents may have is whether immigrants benefit more from redistribution than natives. Figure 6 addresses this question in two ways. First, Panel A shows that in all countries, a

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[25]To give a sense of attitudes in Germany for comparison, the Appendix Section A-11 describes German respondents' answers to a question from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS/GGSS, 2014), inquiring about the importance of several factors, including luck and hard work, for one's success.

significant proportion of respondents believe that an average immigrant receives more than twice as much in government transfers as an average native; the share of respondents who believe this is 15% in the U.S., Italy, and Sweden, and close to 25% in France. Those who think immigrants benefit more on average from government transfers are the non college-educated, women, lower income respondents, and right-wing respondents. There are two potential explanations for this result. On the one hand, people may think that immigrants legitimately receive more transfers because they are on average poorer than natives. On the other hand, they may have a bias towards immigrants and believe that they receive more from the government not because they are poorer but because they are favored by the welfare system and/or take advantage of it. To disentangle these two factors, Panel B plots the share of respondents who say that "Mohammed" gets more transfers or pays more taxes than "John." John and Mohammed are described to be exactly the same except for the fact that one of them is an immigrant. In all countries except Sweden, a substantial share of respondents say that Mohammad receives more transfers and/or pays less taxes, especially in France, Italy, and the U.S.. The right panel shows that, again, it is low-educated respondents in high immigration sectors, those without college education, those who do not have immigrant parents, the old, and especially right-wing respondents that are significantly more likely to say Mohammed gets more on net from the government. In a smaller pilot, we randomized the name of the immigrant that was given in this question between a name that sounded i) North American ("Jack") in the U.S. and Western European for the European countries; ii) Hispanic in the U.S. and France ("Miguel" and "José") and Eastern European in the other European countries; iii) Muslim ("Mohammed" or "Ibrahim"). The bias against immigrants was apparent with all the name variations used.

Summing up: Perceptions of immigrants' conditions and redistribution

Figure 7 shows the perception of poverty of natives and immigrants. Poverty is defined relative to disposable income after government taxes and transfers. Respondents in all countries except Sweden overestimate the level of poverty of both natives and immigrants. This seems consistent with the idea spread by recent "populist" parties, which is grounded in very pessimistic views about the conditions of the "common person" relative to the elites. Furthermore, respondents overestimate the share of natives that live in poverty to a greater extent than they do for immigrants, although they overestimate both shares. Combining all previous results, respondents think that immigrants are less educated than they are, work less than is the case (are more "unemployed"), and are poorer than they are. But although they are generally more inaccurate about immigrants than about natives, the fact that they overestimate the poverty rate of natives (after tax and transfers) by more may be at least in part because they believe that immigrants are, conditional on unemployment and education, favored by the welfare system and benefit more from government redistribution. Consistent with this, it is the same groups that hold more inaccurate misperceptions about immigrants that also overestimate the poverty rate of natives more relative to the one of immigrants.

3.2 Monetary Incentives and Willingness to Pay for Information

The monetary incentives provided for accurate answers to a randomly chosen subsample of respondents do not reduce misperceptions (see Appendix A-6.5). Furthermore, recall that at the end of the additional U.S. survey we ask participants whether they are willing to forfeit part of their potential prize from the lottery in order to receive the correct answers to all the questions about immigrants. We randomize the price of that information between the options $0.5, $1,$2, $5, and $10. 49% of respondents are willing to pay at

least 50 cents to receive the correct information about immigrants; the share willing to pay $10 is 45%. Column (1) of Table A-12 shows the characteristics that correlate with willingness to pay for information. Respondents with higher misperceptions are less willing to pay for the true information, conditional on its price, on income, and other respondent characteristics. Possible explanations for this are that respondents with more extreme views are more confident in their views or less interested in seeking out information and learning, which could also explain their more inaccurate views in the first place. Even conditional on the level of misperceptions, right-wing respondents, women, non college-educated, and younger respondents are less willing to pay for correct information. To some extent, these results could provide some explanation for why stereotypes about immigrants persist. Respondents with more incorrect views, i.e., with more stereotypes, are the least interested in learning the truth, whatever the reason for this may be.

For those respondents who are willing to pay and receive the accurate information, 51% say they are surprised by it. As is natural, participants with a higher misperception index are more likely to be surprised. In the open-ended feedback box, respondents declare to be particularly surprised by the share of Christian immigrants and the share of highly-educated immigrants.

3.3 Attitudes Towards Immigration Policies

Figure 9 depicts the share of respondents by country (Panel A) or group (Panel B) who agree with the following statements (from bottom to top): i) Immigration is not a problem; ii) Immigrants should be eligible for benefits at most three years after arrival; iii) Immigrants should be allowed to apply for citizenship at most five years after arrival; iv) The respondent would consider an immigrant to be truly "American" as soon as they get citizenship; v) The government should care equally about everyone living in the country whether born there or not. There are varied patterns of attitudes towards immigration in different countries. In the U.S., people believe strongly that immigrants should be considered "truly American" as soon as they become citizens, and that they should get citizenship relatively soon. They are also most likely to say immigration is not a problem and relatively likely to say that the government should care equally about everyone in the country. However, and consistent with their generally lower support for benefits, they are the least likely to say that immigrants should be eligible for benefits soon. In contrast, in European countries, especially in France, Italy, Germany, and, to a lesser extent in the U.K., respondents are less likely to say the government should care equally about everyone, that immigrants should be allowed to apply for citizenship soon, or that they will be considered as truly part of the country upon citizenship. Very few respondents (around a fifth) say that immigration is not a problem in their country. Overall, the U.S. is the country that is most supportive of immigration and France, Italy, and Germany are the least supportive ones.

The groups with more inaccurate perceptions of immigrants also hold the more negative attitudes towards immigration policies, as shown in Panel B. Left-wing respondents are the most favorable to immigration, right-wing respondents the least favorable. The non college-educated are consistently less supportive than the college-educated, across all dimensions. Those without college in immigration-intensive sectors are more averse to immigration than either people in high immigration sectors in general, or the non college-educated in general. On the other hand, those with college in high immigration sectors are weakly more supportive than those with college. This large heterogeneity even within immigration intensive sectors is clear in the public debate too; recall in the U.S. the outcry in Silicon Valley (an example of a highly-skilled, immigrant-intensive area) during President Trump's travel bans.

4 Where Do Misperceptions Come from?

Where do people's incorrect perceptions of immigrants come from? We can test several possible channels.

Confusing immigrants with other groups

First, starting with the misperception of the share of immigrants, respondents may be confused about who is an immigrant. They may, for instance, mistakenly include in their estimates illegal immigrants. However, if this were the main reason for the large misperceptions, respondents would have to be overestimating the number of illegal immigrants by a factor of 7 in the U.S. or even more in the European countries. In the U.S., the actual share of illegal immigrants is 3.5%, and in the European countries, it is generally less than 0.5% of the population. Second, it could be that people conflate first generation immigrants with second generation immigrants and minorities which have been in the country for several generations. This may signal genuine lack of knowledge, or, alternatively an attitude that all minorities are "foreigners," despite having been in the country for many generations. To check whether this is the case, Figure 8 compares respondents' perceptions of the share of immigrants to the actual number of first plus second generation immigrants. In no country, with the exception of Sweden, is this addition enough to close the gap between perceptions and reality. For instance, in the U.S. the share of first plus second generation immigrants is 25.4%, still below the average perceived share of 36%. In Italy, immigration is a more recent phenomenon, so the number of second generation immigrants is very small. However, the average perceived share of immigrants is similar to the average of France and Germany, which have a higher share of second generations. Furthermore, in the U.S., respondents' perceptions of the share of immigrants are not significantly correlated with the local share of African American or Hispanic minorities, as reported in Appendix Table A-15.[26] Finally, respondents may be disagreeing with our definition of what an immigrant is and trying to make a statement about how many people in their country are immigrants according to their own definition. However, respondents' misperception of the share of immigrants is not significantly correlated with their answers to our question *"When would you consider an immigrant to be truly [American]?."*

Exploiting local and national variation in the share and characteristics of immigrants

We now turn to perceptions of both the share of immigrants and their characteristics. One mechanism driving misperceptions may be exposure or availability, whereby when people are more exposed to a given phenomenon, they start exaggerating its actual frequency and importance (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). To test for this, we exploit the cross-country and within-country geographic heterogeneities in our sample. We correlate the perceptions of the share and characteristics of immigrants with their actual number and characteristics at the national level and at the finer local level, equivalent to commuting zones in the U.S., NUTS1 regions in Germany and the U.K., and NUTS2 regions in Italy, France, and Sweden.

Another explanation for misperceptions may be that respondents extrapolate from natives' characteristics to those of immigrants or that natives' characteristics serve to "anchor" people's perceptions of immigrants. These patterns could be driven by respondents using the "least possible effort" to get at conclusions (Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). Or, respondents may instead over-emphasize the differences between natives and immigrants and "stereotype" immigrants (Bordalo et al., 2016). To provide a test for possible extrapolation from natives' characteristics and amplification of the immigrant-native differences (stereotyping), we regress

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[26]We do not have data on racial or ethnic minorities at the local level for European Countries.

respondents' perceptions of immigrants on the characteristics of natives locally and nationally, as well as on the difference between immigrants' and natives' characteristics.

We start by grouping perceptions and actual characteristics into indices for clarity. Each index, constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007), is the unweighted average of the z-scores of its component variables, where the z-score is obtained by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation in the control group (i.e., the group that saw no treatment videos). In table Table 2, the dependent variables are: the misperception of the immigrant share (column 1); the perceived cultural distance index that summarizes views on the origins of immigrants and their religion, and is increasing the more culturally distant from their home country immigrants are perceived to be (column 2); the perceived economic weakness index that summarizes the perceptions on the education level, unemployment, and poverty rates of immigrants (column 3); and the perceived free riding index that captures whether respondents think that immigrants are more likely to take advantage of and "free ride" on the welfare system, which is higher if respondents believe that immigrants are poor due to lack of effort rather than adverse circumstances; that "Mohammad" receives more on net than "John;" and that immigrants receive more transfers than natives. For the first two of these indices we can construct an actual counterpart based on the data available at the local level; we cannot construct an actual counterpart for perceived free-riding. Detailed definitions are in Appendix A-1.

In Table 2, we regress each of these perceptions on their actual value at the local level, controlling for a full array of individual characteristics, as well as country fixed effects. Since respondents are asked about their perceptions about the value of variables at the national level and since we are controlling for country fixed effects, which absorb the true value of each dependent variable at the country level, the correlations are the same regardless of whether we consider perceptions in levels or misperceptions (equal to perceptions minus actual value) as outcome variables. Consistent with the graphical evidence in Section 3, right-wing respondents perceive more economic weakness and potential free riding among immigrants.

We then consider perceptions individually in Table 3. Panel A reports the correlation between perceptions of the share and characteristics of immigrants and their actual values at the national and local levels. The correlations are estimated in separate linear regressions which each include the same personal controls listed in Table 2 (local level regressions also include country fixed effects). Panel B shows the correlation between perceptions of immigrants' economic characteristics and their actual equivalents for natives.[27] In Panel C we regress perceptions of immigrants' economic characteristics on actual immigrants-natives differences in the same characteristics. Finally, in Panel D, we benchmark these correlations by showing the relation between perceived and actual native characteristics. Note again that, at the local level, since we control for country fixed effects and perceptions elicited are about the national statistics, the correlation is the same whether we consider perceptions or misperceptions.

Misperceptions of the share of immigrants

The misperception of the share of immigrants is positively correlated with its actual local equivalent. Specifically, the misperception of the national share of immigrants is 0.2 percentage points higher in locations where the actual local share of immigrants is 1 percentage point higher, controlling for the national share of immigrants. Respondents that are personally more exposed to immigrants in their daily lives – those who work in a high immigration sector and those who have at least one parent born abroad – tend to exaggerate

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[27] For natives, the only relevant dimensions are economic characteristics, as the origins questions are meaningless.

the share of immigrants by more than other respondents. All of these are consistent with the exposure and availability hypotheses.[28] As Panel A of Table 3 shows, however, the perception of the share of immigrants is negatively correlated with the national share of immigrants. Recall that respondents in all countries overestimate the share of immigrants and countries with the largest actual share also have the smallest perceptions errors on average (e.g., Sweden).[29]

Misperceptions of the cultural and economic characteristics of immigrants

The perceived cultural and economic characteristics of immigrants are significantly positively correlated with their actual local and national equivalents. First, in Table 2, one standard deviation increase in the local cultural distance index increases the perceived cultural distance by 0.03 s.d.; a one s.d. increase in the economic weakness index increases the perceived economic weakness by 0.06 s.d. Thus, in places where immigrants are particularly culturally distant or economically weaker (relative to the national average), respondents tend to perceive them as such.

Second, considering more detailed perceptions, Table 3 shows that the correlations between perceptions and corresponding local immigrant characteristics are all positive and statistically significant. An exception is the education level of immigrants, which may be particularly hard to actually observe. The strongest correlation is between perceived and actual local unemployment rate – 1 p.p. higher local unemployment rate of immigrants is associated with a higher perceived unemployment of about 0.5 p.p. The correlations between perceptions and actual statistics are also positive and statistically significant at the national level. The correlation between perceived and actual unemployment at the national level is again one of the strongest and above 1, suggesting that perceptions amplify differences in actual unemployment rates between the local and national levels. As a comparison, Panel D shows that perceptions of natives' unemployment, education, and poverty are generally also positively and significantly correlated with both their local and national actual equivalents. There are also significant cross-correlations between natives' characteristics and perceptions of immigrants at both the local and national levels. Panel B shows that in areas or countries where natives have higher unemployment rates, immigrants tend to be perceived as more unemployed as well; the same applies to education and poverty levels. These patterns are consistent with extrapolation from natives' characteristics and anchoring. Nevertheless, Panel C suggests that people do understand the differences between immigrants' and natives' economic conditions and may be stereotyping immigrants, at least at the national level. Indeed, we find that perceived immigrant characteristics are strongly positively correlated with differences between immigrants and natives in that characteristic. For instance, in countries where immigrants are more unemployed than natives, people believe that immigrants are more unemployed. Similarly, in countries where immigrants have lower education or higher poverty rates than natives, people do perceive immigrants as less educated and more likely to be poor.

Direct exposure to more immigrants through family or work matters not just for perceptions of the share of immigrants, but also for perceptions of their characteristics. Table 2, shows that second-generation immigrants tend to perceive immigrants as more culturally distant, but as economically stronger and less likely to free-ride. On the contrary, respondents who work in a high immigration sector believe that immigrants

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[28]In Appendix Table A-16, we further show the correlation between "having an immigrant friend of acquaintance" and misperceptions of immigrants. Respondents who have an immigrant friend or acquaintance perceive a lower overall share of immigrants and have lower misperceptions along the other dimensions as well. Because this variable is highly endogenous, we are not using it in the main tables.

[29]If we used the misperception instead of the perception as the dependent variable, the coefficient would simply be reduced systematically by one.

are economically weaker and more likely to free ride on government assistance.

To sum up, perceptions of immigrants' characteristics are positively correlated with the reality at the local and national levels. Furthermore, while respondents do extrapolate from natives' economic characteristics, their perceptions of each economic characteristic of immigrants is increasing when that characteristic is more represented among immigrants than among natives.

Media coverage of immigration issues

We also investigate whether misperceptions of immigration are correlated with media coverage of immigration. If the immigration issue is very salient in the news, people may be led to overestimate the share of immigrants. In addition, if some immigrants' characteristics systematically receive more coverage than others, people may over-perceive their actual prevalence. We construct two measures of national media coverage of immigration based on data compiled by the platform *Media Cloud*, as described in Appendix A-14. The first measure is the three-day moving average of the share of articles that are related to immigration issues. The second is the share of articles that mention immigrants, in conjunction with keywords related to unemployment and reliance on welfare. We control for country fixed effects in this analysis, thus leveraging the fact that different respondents took the survey on different days that had different intensities of media coverage of immigration. These results are to be taken as suggestive, since we cannot control for the actual news that any given respondent consumes, nor account for the endogeneity of news coverage to national events or policy views and perceptions.

Table A-53 shows that overall media coverage of immigration issues is positively correlated with the perceived cultural distance of immigrants, with the perceived share of immigrants from the Middle East, and with the perceived share of Muslim immigrants. It is, however, negatively correlated with the perceived share of immigrants overall. Thus, media coverage may not inflate misperceptions of the share of immigrants further, but may emphasize the perceived cultural diversity of immigrants. Conditional on overall media coverage, coverage of immigrants that is specifically related to redistribution is positively correlated with the perceived share of immigrants and with the perceived economic weakness of immigrants. Such coverage is also associated with a decline in perceived free-riding of immigrants, suggesting that the media's portrayal of economic struggles of immigrants may actually make respondents more likely to think that immigrants are the victim of adverse circumstances rather than free-loaders.

5 The Link between Immigration Perceptions and Redistribution

We now discuss the results of our experiments. We start with the priming or salience treatment that consists in randomizing the order in which respondents see the "redistribution" and the "immigration" blocks. Thus, this treatment tests whether simply making the immigration issue more salient to respondents – without any information – affects their answers to the questions on redistribution. We then turn to testing the channels through which this treatment acts by showing the results from three video treatments providing information on, respectively, the share of immigrants, their countries of origin, and their economic contributions.

5.1 Salience and Priming Treatment: Making Respondents Think About Immigrants

The effects of the order treatment are shown in the first line of Table 4. These effects are estimated only on respondents who have not seen any of the video treatments. Those who are shown the immigration questions first become more averse to redistribution, as captured by their preference for a less progressive income tax system and less budget allocated to the social safety net. They also believe inequality is less of a serious problem and donate less to charity. The magnitudes are economically significant; being prompted to think about immigrants reduces the preferred top income tax rate by around 2 percentage points, which corresponds to a 5% change relative to the control group mean and 90% of the gap between left and right-wing respondents. It also increases the preferred tax rate on the bottom 50% by around 1 percentage point, corresponding to 8% of the control mean and around the full size of the gap in preferred bottom 50% tax rate between left and right respondents. The share of respondents who say inequality is a serious problem declines by about 3 percentage points, which represents around 5% of the control group mean and 13% of the gap between left and right-wing respondents.[30] There is also a consistent effect on the desired share of the budget to be allocated to "social" spending, i.e., on the social safety net and on health. Seeing the immigration block first reduces desired social spending by an amount equivalent to 22.7% of the gap in desired spending between left and right-wing respondents, or, equivalently, around 2% of the control group mean.

One distinct pattern to note is the increase in support for education policies, contrary to all other redistributive policies. Being prompted to think about immigrants increases the desired share of the budget spent on education by 3% of the control group mean or 40% of the gap in desired spending between left and right-wing respondents. There are several possible interpretations for this result. One is that natives would like younger immigrants or their children to be more educated and be able to contribute more to society; the other is that they may think that education policies will not specifically benefit immigrants who arrive at later ages. The treatment effects from the informational and anecdotal treatments below will confirm this pattern.

We check whether the opposite treatment, i.e., seeing the redistribution block before the immigration block, has effects on perceptions of and support for immigration in Appendix Table A-26. There are no significant effects on the perceptions of immigrants and on support for immigration. This further suggests that the direction of causality is from perceptions of immigrants to support for redistribution rather than the other way around.

Explaining the effects of the salience treatment.

Why does priming respondents to think about immigration reduce their support for redistribution? We investigate three channels: i) the share of immigrants channel: people think that there are too many immigrants and that, hence, more of each dollar of redistribution goes towards immigrants; ii) the cultural and diversity channel: people dislike redistributing towards those who are different from them culturally and they think immigrants are culturally distant from them; iii) the economic channel: people think immigrants are economically weaker than natives and, thus, that they are more likely to benefit from redistribution. Worse, they may think that immigrants are more likely to "free ride" on the welfare system. We test these

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[30]The answers to all questions about immigration policies and about redistribution are tabulated by country and respondent characteristics in Tables A-17 and A-18.

channels in two ways. First, we group respondents' perceptions of and attitudes towards immigrants into categories corresponding to these channels and correlate them with respondents' support for redistribution. This allows us to see which set of perceptions or attitudes is the strongest predictor of opposition to redistributive policies. We then experimentally shift respondents' perceptions of immigrants' numbers, origins, and economic contribution using our video treatments.

5.2 Testing the Channels: Correlation between Misperceptions and Policy Views

Figure 10 reports the partial correlation between respondents' support for immigration and redistribution policies and their perceptions of the share, cultural distance, economic weakness, and free-riding of immigrants. The correlations come from regressions where the indices capturing these perceptions are included together on the right-hand side, in addition to the array of individual covariates and country fixed effects (not shown).[31] Support for immigration is captured by an index constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007), consisting of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of the variables related to support for immigration from Table 6 and is higher if respondents support more open immigration policy. Support for redistribution is an index based on the variables from Table 4 and is higher if the respondent supports more generous redistribution policy.

The strongest predictors of opposition to both immigration and redistribution are the perceptions that immigrants free ride on the welfare system. One standard deviation increase in the perceived free riding index reduces the immigration support index by 0.38 of a standard deviation and the redistribution support index by 0.114 of a standard deviation. Perceived economic weakness of immigrants is also a strong predictor of opposition to immigration and redistribution. One s.d. increase in the perceived economic weakness index reduces the immigration support index by 0.179 of a s.d. and the redistribution support index by 0.077 of a s.d. The perceived cultural distance of immigrants has more nuanced effects: while it is negatively correlated with support for immigration, it is mildly positively correlated with support for redistribution. The perceived share of immigrants in the population is uncorrelated with support for immigration and only slightly negatively correlated with support for redistribution.

These patterns are also consistent with the correlations between views on immigration and respondent characteristics observed earlier. People who are exposed to immigrants, but that we may expect to have a positive opinion of immigrants (those with immigrant parents, left wing respondents, or those who know an immigrant personally) perceive a higher cultural distance between natives and immigrants, but do not perceive immigrants as economically weaker or more likely to free ride (and do support immigration). From this correlational analysis, the economic channel seems to be the strongest predictor of support for redistribution.

The result that perceived free-riding of immigrants is negatively correlated with support for redistribution is consistent with previous literature that shows that people care about the deservingness of the recipients of redistribution. People who believe that poverty and wealth are determined by factors that individuals can control are less supportive of redistribution than those who believe income and wealth are shaped by adverse circumstances such as bad luck or lack of opportunity, (Fong, 2001; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011).

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[31]All these correlations are estimated only on respondents who have not seen any video treatment. Appendix Tables A-19 and A-21 report these regression results in full detail, as well as regressions of the perception indices on the components of the immigration and redistribution support indices. In Appendix Tables A-20 and A-22 we report the correlations between the immigration and redistribution support indices and their components and all components of the perception indices (see also Appendix Figures A-9 and A-10).

Respondents are also more generous towards poor people that they perceive to be hard-working as opposed to lazy (Drenik and Perez-Truglia, 2018; Saez and Stantcheva, 2016). The aversion to free riding and to "free loaders" and its implications for redistribution have also been documented in lab settings (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Cubitt et al., 2011; Lefgren et al., 2016).

5.3 Testing the Channels Experimentally: The Video Treatments

The video treatments

The first treatment, called "Share of immigrants" treatment, informs respondents about the actual share of immigrants in their country (see Panel A, Figure 11). To give respondents an accurate view of how their country ranks among other developed countries, the video also compares this domestic immigrant share to the immigrant shares of the OECD countries with the lowest and highest shares of immigrants (Finland, with 6.1% and Switzerland, with 29.1%).[32]

The second treatment informs respondents about the origins of the immigrants in their country. We call it "Origins of immigrants" treatment and it is illustrated in Panel B of Figure 11. All the countries in the world are grouped into nine broad areas (North America,[33] Latin America, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, North Africa, Australia and New Zealand, and Asia). Respondents see a map, with each region sequentially appearing in a different color (so that there is no doubt about which region any given country is part of) and a number of stick people proportional to the number of immigrants from that region appearing and moving to the bottom of the screen, where they remain until the end of the video.

The third video is an anecdote and does not provide factual information. This "Hard work" treatment aims to counter the narrative that immigrants free-ride on the welfare system. It shows a "day in the life" of a very hard-working immigrant.[34] She works long hours, puts in a lot of effort to also study at night in order to improve her modest living conditions and that of her children, and hopes to start her own small business in the future. The video (see the screenshots in Panel C of Figure 11) walks respondents through the hours of this immigrant's day, as indicated by a clock at the top of the screen.

First stage effects on perceptions

The first-stage effects on the key perceptions of immigration of the video treatments are shown in Table 5. Each treatment significantly affects perceptions along the dimension it was designed to do and generally

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[32]Because the issue of illegal immigration is so salient in the U.S., we run two versions of this treatment there: one shows respondents the share of total immigrants (13.5%), another one shows them the share of legal immigrants (10%); in the text displayed in each version, it is made clear whether the number relates to total or legal immigrants. There are several considerations to weigh here. On the one hand, showing respondents in the U.S. only legal immigrants may still leave them with very large overestimates of the share of illegal ones; on the other hand, making respondents focus on the gap between legal and illegal immigrants would make the treatment quite different for the U.S. than for the other countries (where this gap is close to negligible). We thus decided that it is most rigorous to run the two versions of this treatment on different samples of respondents and report both sets of results. As we will show, neither version increases support for redistribution. Since the other two treatments are designed in a more qualitative way, they would not change noticeably if we also ran a version for total immigrants for each of them (rather than for legal only).

[33]Or simply "Canada" in the U.S. survey.

[34]There are many articles in the media providing examples of very hard-working immigrants. We have combined several sources and changed the names. Two examples are: *The Washington post* "They said I was going to work like a donkey. I was grateful" July 11, 2017 available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/07/11/they-said-i-was-going-to-work-like-a-donkey-i-was-grateful and *Forbes* "6 Immigrant Stories That Will Make You Believe In The American Dream Again" Oct 4, 2016 available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/monteburke/2016/10/04/6-immigrant-stories-that-will-make-you-believe-in-the-american-dream-again.

does not shift perceptions along the other dimensions.[35]

The Share of immigrant' treatment reduces respondents' misperception of the share of immigrants by 5 percentage points (column 1). Given how far perceptions were from reality to start with, this represents a bit less than one third of the average misperception in the control group. Some respondents may not have believed the info provided, especially if it clashed with their prior, in an age of "alternative facts." They may not have paid sufficient attention to the exact number. Appendix Figure A-11 shows the full histograms of responses in the control and treatment groups for each country. The treatment significantly compresses all responses in the treatment group towards zero or low misperceptions. But some types of respondents – namely those with extreme initial responses – maintain their extreme opinions. Thus the respondents with the most extreme misperceptions may also be less prone to being convinced about the truth. Column 2 shows the effects of the treatment on a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent's misperception is close to zero. While only 4% of respondents are correct in the control group, this share increases to 27% among respondents treated with information on the number of immigrants. In fact, the share of respondents who are accurate within 2 percentage points is 34% in the treatment group, as opposed to 10% in the control group; the share of those who are accurate within 5 percentage points is 49% in the treatment group and 25% in the control group. This treatment does not significantly affect the perceived origin of immigrants, nor their perceived work ethic, which is as intended. For the U.S., the results for the "legal only" version of the Share of immigrants treatment in Table A-23 are stronger, understandably so since the number of legal-only immigrants is lower. The misperception on the share of immigrants is reduced by 13 percentage points, and the share of respondents who are exactly correct is 42% in the treated group, as opposed to just 6% in the control group. Yet, as we will see below, neither version of this treatment for the U.S. manages to improve support for redistribution.

The Origin of immigrants treatment significantly reduces some of the misperception on the origins of immigrants. It decreases the misperception of the share of immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa by 38% relative to the control group (column 3), as well as Muslim immigrants overall by 16% (column 5). It decreases also the misperceptions (equivalent to increasing the perceived shares) of immigrants from North America, Eastern and Western Europe by 32% (column 4) and Christian immigrants by 10% (column 6). It does not shift the perceived work effort of immigrants (column 7). It does, however, increase the perceived share of immigrants overall. This will be consistent with our argument below that the video treatments have the unavoidable side-effect of making the immigration topic more salient.

The Hard Work treatment makes treated respondents 5 percentage points less likely to say that lack of effort is the reason why poor immigrants are poor, which represents a 14% reduction relative to the control group. It also reduces the misperception of the unemployment rate of immigrants by 9% relative to the control group (Appendix Table A-24). In addition, there is a small effect on the perceived total share of immigrants, which could again be due to the treatment prompting people to think about immigrants overall.

Persistence

We also ran a follow-up survey in the U.S. one week after each respondent took the survey, to check how persistent the effects on perceptions were. 25% of the originally surveyed respondents also took the follow up between one and three weeks after the original survey. There is no strong selection on who took the follow-up;

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[35]To avoid selecting any variable, but in the interest of saving space, Appendix Table A-24 shows the first-stage effects on the full range of perception variables.

groups which in general have lower response rates, namely male, high-income, and young respondents are less likely to take the follow-up (see Appendix Table A-14).

Table A-25 shows the results and confirms that information about the share and origins of immigrants is much weaker and less effective in shifting views than the Hard work treatment, perhaps because facts are not as appealing or harder to remember than a narrative, or because people do not believe them. The treatment Origins of immigrants does persistently negatively affect the perceived share of Middle Eastern and North African immigrants and affectes positively the perceived share of Latin American immigrants. The treatment Share of immigrants does not exhibit persistent effects. The Hard work treatment displays strong persistence, with a treatment effect on respondents who took the first and follow-up survey that is almost identical in the first and follow-up surveys.

Second stage effects on support for immigration and redistribution

Before turning to our main outcomes of interest – support for redistribution policies – we briefly consider the impacts of the treatments on support for immigration policies. Consistent with the correlation patterns shown above in Figure 10, Table 6 shows that the Share of immigrants treatment somewhat increases support for immigration overall and in particular reduces the perception that immigration is a problem. The Hard work treatment has the strongest positive effects on overall support for immigration and specifically on the likelihood of saying immigrants should get benefits sooner, that immigration is not a problem, and that the government should care equally about everyone. The Origins of immigrants treatment barely has any effect.

Table 4 shows the effects of the video treatments on respondents' views on redistribution. These effects are estimated only on respondents who have not seen the immigration block before the redistribution block. The treatments on the share and origins of immigrants have negative, mostly insignificant effects on redistribution. The Hard work treatment has less negative, and even some positive insignificant effects, on support for redistribution. How should we interpret these results? Recall that the perceived share of immigrants was not significantly correlated with support for redistribution, and the perceived cultural distance of immigrants was only weakly related to it. Therefore, it is not surprising that shifting these types of perceptions of respondents generates little policy impact. But it remains to be explained why the effects are negative, albeit insignificant. Likely, the reason is that the treatments each do two things: First, they unavoidably prime respondents to think about immigration, before they answer the questions on policies and redistribution. They thus increase the salience of the immigration topic, which, as we showed, has a negative effect on support for redistribution *per se*. Second, they provide some factual information or narrative about immigrants, which could in principle reassure respondents. However, that content alone is not sufficient to correct for the many baseline misperceptions about immigrants and to counter the negative prime. As shown above, perceptions of the economic weakness of immigrants and, most importantly, of their likelihood to free-ride on the welfare system were most strongly correlated with support for redistribution. The Hard work treatment counters these narratives by providing an anecdote of a very hard-working immigrant. That treatment does have the least negative effects, suggesting it is able to neutralize more of the negative priming effect, but not all of it.[36]

Overall, the treatment effects suggest that views on immigration and redistribution, and the underlying perceptions and narratives they are based on, are hard to shift. "Hard facts" have very limited impact in

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[36] Note that there is again the same distinct pattern for education policies that we pointed out above for the salience treatment, namely that support for spending on education goes in the opposite direction of the other redistributive policies.

this context. A new narrative that counters an existing one – such as the story of a hard-working immigrant to counter the narrative about immigrants free riding – has more success. Yet, because the narratives about and misperceptions of immigrants are entrenched, salience and priming have stronger effects.

5.4 Heterogeneity

Tables A-27 shows the heterogeneity in treatment effects according to four key respondent characteristics, which we highlighted in Section 3: left- and right-wing respondents (Panel A); college and non college-educated (Panel B); women and men (Panel C); non college-educated in immigration intensive sectors and others (Panel D). We focus here on the effects of the "Order" treatment which is the treatment with the most significant effect in the overall sample.[37]

Although the results are noisier and many differences are not significant, they suggest that the groups which react most negatively to seeing the immigration block first are generally those with the most incorrect priors about immigrants, namely the right-wing, the non college-educated, and the non college-educated in high-immigration sectors: these groups want less government-driven redistribution (i.e., less income tax progressivity, less social spending) and less private charity donations. Note, however, that even left-wing respondents decrease their support for redistribution when they are primed to think about immigrants first.

5.5 Robustness Checks

We test for the robustness of our results in several ways. To start with, the lack of statistical significance of some of the treatment effects does not appear to be due to power issues. As we discuss in Appendix Section A-12, our sample size gives us 80 percent power to detect a treatment effect of about 7 percent of a standard deviation with a 5 percent significance. We are thus reasonably powered in comparison to other information provision experiments (see Haaland et al., 2021 for a review of this issue). As an additional check, we try to pool the Share of Immigrants and the Origin of Immigrants treatments. The results are reported in Appendix Section A-12. The coefficients that are insignificant in the non-pooled specification remain insignificant, further reassuring us that the lack of statistical significance is not due to a lack of statistic power.

To ensure that our results are not driven by careless answers, we implement a number of ex-post checks on the response quality by considering time spent on questions and answers patterns (see Appendix A-6.3). We then reproduce all of our results on a "reduced sample" that excludes respondents flagged as having careless answers, as well as answers to questions on which respondents spent too little or too much time. These results reported in Appendix Section A-13.1 are very similar, suggesting that our findings are not driven by (relatively few) inattentive respondents.

We also drop respondents who felt that the survey was biased based on their response to the feedback questions at the end of the survey (see Appendix Section A-13.2). Doing so strengthens the significance of the treatment effects, perhaps because the remaining respondents are more receptive to what they perceive to be non-biased information. We re-weight the sample to make it representative also along the two non-targeted dimensions of education and employment (see Appendix A-13.3). In our main sample we exclude respondents in the top and bottom 2% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey, as well as respondents who spent too much time (top 2%) on one of the treatment videos. We check that our results are not affected

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[37]The other treatments did not have differential effects by respondent groups.

by these sample refinements by re-estimating the main treatment effects on the "raw" sample, where we do not exclude any respondent who completed the survey (see Appendix Section A-13.4). The effects estimated on this sample are very close to those estimated in the main analysis sample. The first stage treatment effects are slightly smaller, suggesting that we are excluding some inattentive respondents by trimming the sample. We further check the robustness of our results to the choice of the 2% cut-off by re-estimating the main treatment effects on a smaller sample from which we drop respondents in the top and bottom 5% (see Appendix Section A-13.5). Finally, to account for time-varying factors and events that may confound our results by e.g., affecting the salience of the immigration issue – we re-estimate the main treatment effects including week fixed effects in the specification (see Appendix Section A-13.6).[38] These modifications do not significantly change our results.[39]

6   Conclusion

According to our surveys, respondents from six developed countries have strongly biased views on immigrants. They think that there are many more immigrants than there actually are, have incorrect views about their origins, and believe that immigrants are more reliant on the host country's welfare state, more unemployed, and less educated than is the case in reality. Misperceptions about immigrants, and the subsequent lack of support for immigration and redistribution, are starkest among three groups of respondents: the non college-educated, those working in immigration intensive sectors and without a college degree, and right-wing respondents. The strongest predictor of reduced support for redistribution is whether respondents believe in the "free-riding" narratives about immigrants, followed by their perceptions of the economic weakness of immigrants. The perceived cultural distance of immigrants is less predictive of policy support, as is the perceived share of immigrants.

Our randomized priming or salience treatment that prompts respondents to think about immigrants and their characteristics before asking them questions about redistribution generates a significant negative effect on support for redistribution. But factual information about the share and origins of immigrants in our experimental part is not effective in generating more support for redistribution. On the contrary, it also acts as a prime for respondents to think about immigrants, with the ensuing reduction in support for redistribution that the salience treatment generates. A "hard-work" narrative is somewhat more effective in countering the negative priming effect on redistribution. Overall, it seems that views on immigration are more sensitive to salience and narratives rather than to hard facts.

Our results suggest that much of the political debate about immigration takes place in a world of misinformation about immigrants. Obviously the amount and nature of information that citizens receive is endogenous. Anti-immigration parties have an incentive to maintain and even foster stereotypes, which can lead to a vicious cycle. The more natives are misinformed, the more they may look for confirmation of their stereotypes in the media. The latter have an incentive to offer information supporting these views in order to cater to their customers. For instance, immigrants who commit crimes or who free-ride on the welfare system may receive more media coverage than natives engaging in these same behaviors. Conversely, immi-

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[38] Results are virtually unchanged when we include day or month fixed effects instead.

[39] In a smaller pilot study, we randomize the names given as examples of immigrants in the question about whether immigrants receive more transfers on net (see Section 3.1). We also randomized the name of the immigrant whose story is told in the hard work treatment between i) a native-sounding name ("Emma"); ii) a Hispanic sounding name ("Isabella") for the U.S. and an Eastern European name for European countries; and iii) a Muslim-sounding name ("Fatima"). The effects of the "Hard work" treatment were not significantly different across the three name groups, but the samples were small.

grants who live standard and normal lives similar to natives will receive no coverage. Another implication of our results could be that a focus on immigration issues in the current political debate could have the unintended consequence of reducing support for redistribution, in addition to reducing support for more open immigration policies, particularly if the striking misperceptions respondents have about immigrants are not corrected. Anti-redistribution parties, even those not averse to immigration *per se*, can play the immigration card to generate backlash against redistribution.

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FIGURE 2: PERCEIVED VS. ACTUAL SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS

Notes: The left panel shows the average perceived share of immigrants (red squares) and the actual share (blue diamonds) in each country. The right panel shows the average misperception (perceived minus actual share) of the share of immigrants by groups. Groups are defined by the indicator variables listed to the left: the mean misperception when the indicator is equal to 1 is represented by the orange or red diamonds. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals around the mean.

FIGURE 3: PERCEIVED VS. ACTUAL RELIGION OF IMMIGRANTS

(A) PERCEIVED VS. ACTUAL SHARE OF MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS

(B) PERCEIVED VS. ACTUAL SHARE OF CHRISTIAN IMMIGRANTS

Notes: Panel A shows the perceived and actual share of Muslim immigrants; panel B shows the perceived and actual share of Christian immigrants. See the notes for Figure 2.

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(A) MISPERCEPTION OF IMMIGRANTS' AND NATIVES' SHARE OF HIGHLY EDUCATED

(B) MISPERCEPTION OF IMMIGRANTS' AND NATIVES' UNEMPLOYMENT

Notes: Panel A: The left panel shows the average misperception (perceived - actual share) of the share of immigrant (red squares) and natives (light blue diamonds) with a college degree in each country; the right panel shows the average misperception of the share of immigrants (green squares) and natives (blue diamonds) with a college degree by groups. Groups are defined by the indicator variables listed to the left. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals around the mean. Panel B: Average misperception of immigrants and natives unemployment rate by country (left panel) and by groups (right panel).

FIGURE 5: VIEWS ON IMMIGRANTS' WORK EFFORT

(A) % OF RESPONDENTS WHO THINK IMMIGRANTS (OR NATIVES) ARE POOR DUE TO LACK OF EFFORT

Share of Respondents

◆ Alesina et al. (2018)   ■ Q on Imm.

(B) % OF RESPONDENTS WHO THINK IMMIGRANTS (OR NATIVES) ARE RICH BECAUSE OF OWN EFFORT

Share of Respondents

◆ Alesina et al. (2018)   ■ Q on Imm.

Notes: Panel A shows the share of respondents who think that immigrants who are poor are in that situation because of lack of effort, by country (left panel) and by groups (right panel). Panel B shows the share of respondents who think that immigrants who are rich owe this to their own effort. Blue diamonds report the share of respondents who say the same about the general, non-immigrant population, with numbers coming from Alesina et al. (2018). In the right panel, groups are defined by the indicator variables listed to the left: the share when the indicator is equal to 1 is shown in orange or in red. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals around the average perception.

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FIGURE 6: ARE IMMIGRANTS THE BENEFICIARIES OF REDISTRIBUTION?

(A) % OF RESPONDENTS WHO THINK IMMIGRANTS RECEIVE AT LEAST TWICE AS MANY GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS AS NATIVES

(B) % OF RESPONDENTS WHO THINK MOHAMMAD RECEIVES MORE ON NET

Notes: Panel A shows the share of respondents who think that an average immigrant receives at least twice as many government transfers as an average native; Panel B shows the share of respondents who think that Mohammad receives more benefits on net (i.e., either receives more gross benefits or pays less taxes). See the notes for Figure 5.

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FIGURE 7: MISPERCEPTION OF POVERTY OF IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES

Notes: The figure shows misperceptions of the share of immigrants and of natives who live in poverty. See notes for Figure 4

FIGURE 8: PERCEIVED SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS VS. ACTUAL SHARE OF FIRST AND
SECOND GENERATION IMMIGRANTS

Notes: The Figure shows the average perceived share of first generation immigrants (red squares), the actual share of first generation immigrants (blue diamonds), and the actual share of first plus second generation immigrants (blue circles) in each country. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals around the mean. The share of first plus second generation immigrants for the U.S. also includes illegal immigrants.

Figure 9: Support for Immigration

A: By Country

B: By Core Characteristics

Notes: The figure shows the share of respondents answering "Yes" to the questions listed on the vertical axis, by country (Panel A) and respondent groups (Panel B). *Govt. should care about everyone* is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that the government should care about all the people living in the country (6 and 7 in a scale from 1 to 7). *American upon citiz. or before* is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent would consider an immigrant truly "American" at the latest when he gets citizenship. *Imm. allowed to get citiz. soon*, *Imm. should get benefits soon*, and *Imm. not a problem*, are dummies equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that immigrants should be allowed to apply for citizenship at most five years after arriving, immigrants should be eligible for benefits at most three years after arriving, and immigration is not a problem, respectively.

FIGURE 10: WHAT DRIVES SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION AND REDISTRIBUTION?

Notes: The figure shows the correlation between the variables listed on the left and the Immigration support index (blu squares) or the Redistribution support index (red diamonds). Indices are defined following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007) (see Appendix A-1 for more details). Each set of correlations is estimated in a regression including all the variables listed on the left, plus standard personal controls – indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having at least one parent not born in the country, working in a high immigration sector – and country fixed effects. All variables are transformed into z-scores, and the reported coefficients can be interpreted as partial correlations. The shaded areas are 95% confidence intervals constructed from robust standard errors. Sample: respondents who have not seen any video treatment.

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FIGURE 11: VIDEO TREATMENTS

(A) TREATMENT 1 – "SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS"

(B) TREATMENT 2 – "ORIGIN OF IMMIGRANTS"

(C) TREATMENT 3 – "HARD WORK OF IMMIGRANTS"

Notes: The figure shows some screenshots of the three video treatments. See Appendix Figures A-2, A-3 and A-4 for the full set of screenshots.

TABLE 1: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

	US		UK		France		Italy		Germany		Sweden	
	Sample (1)	Pop (2)	Sample (3)	Pop (4)	Sample (5)	Pop (6)	Sample (7)	Pop (8)	Sample (9)	Pop (10)	Sample (11)	Pop (12)
Male	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.50
18-29 y.o.	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.23	0.23	0.19	0.19	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.24
30-39 y.o.	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.19
40-49 y.o.	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.21
50-59 y.o.	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.23	0.23	0.19	0.18
60-69 y.o.	0.18	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.19	0.18
Income Bracket 1	0.16	0.16	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.32	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.26	0.33	0.33
Income Bracket 2	0.19	0.19	0.35	0.35	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.29
Income Bracket 3	0.22	0.22	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.20	0.19	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.22
Income Bracket 4	0.43	0.43	0.24	0.23	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.26	0.22	0.22	0.17	0.17
Married	0.51	0.49	0.52	0.41	0.42	0.46	0.58	0.46	0.47	0.46	0.34	0.33
Employed	0.60	0.70	0.68	0.74	0.64	0.65	0.65	0.57	0.65	0.75	0.72	0.77
Unemployed	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
College	0.51	0.41	0.37	0.36	0.50	0.31	0.36	0.16	0.27	0.25	0.43	0.36

Notes: This table displays summary statistics for the main analysis sample (in odd columns) alongside nationally representative statistics (in even columns). Detailed sources for each variable and country are: 1) For the U.S.: The Census Bureau and Current Population Survey. Income brackets (annual gross household income) are defined as less than $20,000; $20,000-$40,000; $40,000-$70,000; more than $70,000. 2) For the U.K.: Eurostat Census Data and Office of National Statistics. Income brackets (monthly net household income) are: less than £1,500; £1,500-£2,500; £2,500-£3,000; more than £3,000, 3) For France: Eurostat Census Data and INSEE. Income brackets (monthly net household income, in Euros) are: less than 1,500; 1,500-2,500; 2,500-2,000; more than 3,000; 4) For Italy: Eurostat Census Data, Bank of Italy and ISTAT. Income brackets (monthly net household income, in Euros) are: less than 1,500; 1,500-,2450; 2,450-3,350; more than 3,350; 5) For Germany: Eurostat Census Data and GfK Demographics. Income brackets (monthly net household income, in Euros) are: less than 1,500; 1,500-2,600; 2,600-4,000; more than 4,000; 6) For Sweden: Eurostat Census Data and Statistics Sweden. Income brackets (monthly gross household income, in SEK) are: less than 33,000; 33,000-42,000; 42,000-58,000; more than 58,000. We count as employed both full-time and part-time employees. Out of the labor force = 1 - (employed + unemployed). See Table A-5 for the equivalent statistics for the "raw" sample.

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Perc. Cultural Distance Index (2)	Perc Econ. Weakness Index (3)	Perc. Free Riding Index (4)
Act. local share of immigrants	0.203*** (0.0453)			
Act. local cultural distance index		0.0738*** (0.0211)		
Act. local economic circumstances index			0.0749*** (0.0226)	
Right-wing	0.895 (0.572)	0.0369*** (0.0130)	0.205*** (0.0179)	0.413*** (0.0203)
Female	4.143*** (0.567)	0.00599 (0.0124)	-0.0423** (0.0173)	0.0124 (0.0195)
Young	4.028*** (0.566)	-0.0101 (0.0124)	-0.0648*** (0.0174)	0.0218 (0.0196)
Immigrant parent	6.002*** (1.052)	0.0514*** (0.0188)	-0.0732** (0.0297)	-0.0603** (0.0303)
College	-4.219*** (0.788)	-0.00717 (0.0179)	-0.119*** (0.0248)	-0.172*** (0.0279)
High Income	0.0586 (0.799)	0.00423 (0.0170)	-0.0313 (0.0234)	-0.0861*** (0.0255)
H Imm Sect. No College	3.326*** (0.747)	0.000366 (0.0165)	0.0755*** (0.0230)	0.0468* (0.0268)
H Imm Sect. College	1.766** (0.889)	-0.0167 (0.0194)	0.00458 (0.0274)	0.0607** (0.0287)
Observations	5047	5065	5065	5065
Control mean	17.67	0.00	-0.00	0.00

Notes: Column (1) reports the correlation between the misperception of the share of immigrants (defined as the perceived share minus the actual national share) and the actual share of immigrants in the respondent's commuting zone or region (see Appendix A-1 for details). Columns (2)-(4) report the correlation between the Perceived Cultural Distance, Perceived Economic Weakness and Perceived Free Riding indices and their actual equivalent in the respondent's commuting zone or region. For the Perceived Free Riding Index we do not have the equivalent counterpart – most likely is 0. Hence, we omit it from the regression. All indices are constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007) (see Appendix A-1 for more details) All the regression include country fixed effects and the controls listed on the left: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having at least one parent not born in the country, working in a high immigration sector and having a college degree, working in a high immigration sector and not having a college degree. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Sample: respondents who have not seen any video treatment.

TABLE 3: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES AT THE LOCAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS

Panel A: Correlation of Perceived Immigrants Characteristics with Actual Immigrants Characteristics

	Share of Immigrants (1)	Imm. from Latin America (2)	Imm. from Africa (3)	Imm. from Asia (4)	Imm. from Europe (5)	Unemployment Imm. (6)	Low Educated Imm. (7)	High Educated Imm. (8)	Poverty Imm. (9)	Muslim Imm. (10)
Local correlation	0.227***	0.0860***	0.153***	0.145***	0.152***	0.486***	0.0645	0.0588		
	(0.0456)	(0.0303)	(0.0566)	(0.0296)	(0.0280)	(0.146)	(0.0546)	(0.0455)		
National correlation	-0.441***	0.478***	0.518***	0.376***	0.265***	1.118***	0.731***	0.327***	0.353***	0.792***
	(0.119)	(0.0146)	(0.0171)	(0.0206)	(0.0147)	(0.0740)	(0.0327)	(0.0224)	(0.0500)	(0.0237)

Panel B: Correlation of Perceived Immigrants Characteristics with Actual Natives Characteristics

	Unemployment Imm. (1)	Low Educated Imm. (2)	High Educated Imm. (3)	Poverty Imm. (4)
Local correlation	0.796***	0.0844	0.0691*	0.417***
	(0.131)	(0.0861)	(0.0419)	(0.0708)
National correlation	1.469***	0.484***	0.645***	0.0333
	(0.140)	(0.0403)	(0.0349)	(0.132)

Panel C: Correlation of Perceived Immigrants Characteristics with Actual Immigrants-Natives Differences

	Unemployment Imm. (1)	Low Educated Imm. (2)	High Educated Imm. (3)	Poverty Imm. (4)
Local correlation	-0.444***	0.0412	-0.0135	
	(0.140)	(0.0660)	(0.0431)	
National correlation	1.462***	0.784***	0.260***	0.466***
	(0.107)	(0.0443)	(0.0474)	(0.0579)

Panel D: Correlation of Perceived Natives Characteristics with Actual Natives Characteristics

	Unemployment Nat. (1)	Low Educated Nat. (2)	High Educated Nat. (3)	Poverty Nat. (4)
Local correlation	0.713***	0.222***	0.0608	0.323***
	(0.102)	(0.0824)	(0.0422)	(0.0612)
National correlation	1.906***	0.534***	0.164***	-0.467***
	(0.111)	(0.0385)	(0.0385)	(0.112)

Notes: Panel A reports the correlation between the perceptions of immigrants' characteristic listed at the top and their actual equivalent at the commuting zone or regional level ("Local correlation") or at the national level ("National correlation"). Panel B reports the correlation between the perceptions of immigrants' characteristics listed at the top and the actual corresponding characteristics for natives (at the local and national level). Since we do not have statistics on the poverty rate separately for immigrants and natives at the local level, in column (4) we report the correlation with the local overall poverty rate. Panel C reports the correlation between the perceptions of immigrants' characteristics listed at the top and the actual difference in that characteristic between immigrants and natives (at the local and national level). Panel D reports the correlation between perceptions of natives' characteristics listed at the top and their actual equivalent at the local or national level. The correlations are estimated in linear regressions including the indicator variables listed in Table 2. Local level regressions also include country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Sample: respondents who have not seen any video treatment.

TABLE 4: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-1.948***	0.914***	-0.543**	0.439**	-0.0280**	-0.0479***
	(0.416)	(0.276)	(0.238)	(0.175)	(0.0132)	(0.0138)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.627	0.0449	-0.479**	0.188	-0.00590	-0.0165
	(0.419)	(0.278)	(0.233)	(0.172)	(0.0133)	(0.0140)
T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.0662	0.0322	-0.465*	0.164	0.00626	0.00208
	(0.425)	(0.284)	(0.239)	(0.173)	(0.0132)	(0.0140)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0772	-0.212	-0.0944	0.333**	0.0158	0.00910
	(0.422)	(0.279)	(0.235)	(0.170)	(0.0132)	(0.0139)
Observations	19765	19765	19765	19765	19763	19765
Control mean	37.12	10.94	29.53	16.00	0.59	0.47

Notes: The table reports the effects of the Order/Salience treatment and the three video treatments on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in Appendix A-1. Social and Education budget are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile by country. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having at least one parent not born in the country, working in a high immigration sector, and country fixed effects. The regressions also include the interactions between the order treatment and the three other treatments, not reported. Hence, the effect of the Order treatment is estimated only on respondents who have not seen any of the video treatments. The effect of each video treatment is estimated only on respondents who have not seen the immigration block before the redistribution block. This implies that each treatment effect is effectively estimated on about 5,200 observations, equally split between treatment and control. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 5: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-4.864***	0.227***	-0.248	0.173	0.00857	0.144	0.000297
	(0.411)	(0.00691)	(0.313)	(0.357)	(0.419)	(0.397)	(0.00921)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.315***	0.00251	-4.794***	1.827***	-1.829***	2.456***	-0.000234
	(0.426)	(0.00411)	(0.295)	(0.356)	(0.405)	(0.397)	(0.00925)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.709*	-0.00420	-0.385	0.378	-0.869**	0.796**	-0.0535***
	(0.409)	(0.00396)	(0.308)	(0.352)	(0.404)	(0.393)	(0.00899)
Observations	19735	19735	19747	19728	19761	19757	19721
Control mean	17.02	0.04	12.60	-5.56	11.30	-23.98	0.36

Notes: The table reports the first-stage effects of the three video treatments on (mis)perceptions of immigration. Misperceptions are computed as perception minus actual statistic. *Accurate Perception All Immigrants* is a dummy equal to 1 if the absolute value of the respondent's misperception of the share of immigrants is less than 1. Appendix A-1 defines all variables. All regressions include the same controls as Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 6: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0242***	0.00991	0.0158*	0.00508	-0.00395	0.0238**
	(0.00825)	(0.00959)	(0.00857)	(0.00936)	(0.0359)	(0.0118)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00527	0.00360	0.000649	0.00448	-0.00222	0.00573
	(0.00822)	(0.00961)	(0.00863)	(0.00937)	(0.0361)	(0.0119)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0252***	0.0202**	0.0133	0.0171*	0.131***	0.0463***
	(0.00829)	(0.00957)	(0.00857)	(0.00934)	(0.0359)	(0.0119)
Observations	19727	19749	19745	19742	19754	19765
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.71	0.62	4.53	0.00

Notes: The table reports the effects of the three video treatment on the variables in the columns. Outcome variables are described in Appendix A-1. The Immigration Support Index is constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007), as explained in Appendix Section A-1. All regressions include the same controls as Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Online Appendix [Not for Publication]

A-1   Variables Definitions

Core Respondents' Characteristics:
Each variable is defined as a dummy equal to one if:
Male: respondent is male.
Female: respondent is female.
Young: respondent's age is below 45 years.
Old: respondent's age is above 45 years.
High Income: respondent's household income is in the top quartile of the household income distribution in the country.
Low Income: respondent's household income is not in the top quartile of the household income distribution in the country.
College: respondent has at least a college degree.
No College: respondent does not have a college degree.
Left-wing: respondent has voted or is planning to vote (in Italy and Sweden) for a party or presidential candidate classifiable as *Left* or *Far-Left*.[40]
Right-wing: respondent has voted or is planning to vote (in Italy and Sweden) for a party or presidential candidate classifiable as *Right* or *Far-Right*.[41]
Republican: respondent supports the Republican party (U.S. only).
Immigrant parent: at least one of the respondent's parents is not born in the country.
High Immigration Sector & No College: respondent works in an immigration-intensive sector and does not have a college degree. See Appendix A-3 for details on the sector classification.
High Immigration Sector & College: respondent works in an immigration-intensive sector and has a college degree. See Appendix A-3 for details on the sector classification.
Children: respondent has one or more children.
Has immigrant friend/acquaintance: respondent has foreign-born friends or acquaintances.

Perceptions of Immigration
Note: For all cross-country analyses we transform these variables into *misperceptions*, that is, we subtract the actual value of the variable in the data from the respondent's perception; a positive value represents an overestimation of the actual value, and a negative value represents an underestimation. See Section A-2 for a description of the data sources and calculations.

All Immigrants: perceived share of immigrants (according to the OECD definition of "foreign-born") in the country.
Share of Immigrants from ...: perceived share of immigrants born in, respectively, North Africa, Middle East, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania.
Share of Muslim/Christian immigrants: perceived share of immigrants of Muslim or Christian faith.
Share of Low-Educated immigrants: perceived share of immigrants without a high school diploma (in the

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[40]The candidates or parties that we classify as *Left* or *Far-Left* are: in the U.S., Clinton and Stein; in the U.K., Labour Party, Scottish National Party, Sinn Fein, Green Party and Party of Wales; in France, Arthaud, Hamon, Mélenchon and Poutou; in Italy, Democratic Party (PD), +Europa, Civica Popolare, Five Star Movement, Liberi e Uguali, Potere al Popolo; in Germany, SPD, Bundnis 90, Die Linke; in Sweden, Socialdemokraterna, Miljöpartiet, Vänsterpartiet, and Feministiskt Initiativ.

[41]The candidates or parties that we classify as *Right* or *Far-Right* are: in the U.S., Trump and Johnson; in the U.K., Conservative Party, Democratic Unionist Party, Ukip; in France, Dupont-Aignan, Fillon, Le Pen; in Italy, Forza Italia, Fratelli d'Italia, The League; in Germany, CDU, AfD, ÖDP; in Sweden, Sverigedemokraterna, Liberalerna, Moderaterna, and Kristdemokraterna.

U.S.) or equivalent in other countries.

Share of Highly Educated immigrants: perceived share of immigrants with at least a two-year bachelor degree in the U.S. or equivalent in other countries.

Share of Unemployed immigrants: perceived share of unemployed immigrants.

Share of Poor immigrants: perceived share of immigrants who live below the poverty line.

Attitudes towards Immigration

Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that an immigrant living in the country is poor because of lack of effort.

Immigrants Rich because of effort: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks an immigrant is rich because he has worked harder than others.

Mohammad Gets More: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that Mohammad receives on net more than John – either receives more social benefits but pays weakly less taxes, or receives weakly more social benefits but pays less taxes.

Immigrants receive more transfers: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that on average an immigrant receives more transfers from the government than a native.

Support for Immigration

Imm. Not A problem: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that immigration is not a problem or not a problem at all.

Imm. Benefits Soon: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that immigrants should get social benefits on the same basis as natives at most three years after they arrive in the country.

Imm. Citizenship Soon: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that immigrants should be allowed to apply for citizenship at most five years after they arrive in the country.

American Upon Citizenship/Before: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent would consider an immigrant to be "truly American" as the latest when the latter gets citizenship.

Govt. Should Care about Everyone: variable ranging from 1 to 7 where 1 means that the respondent thinks the government should only care about natives in the country and 7 means that he thinks the government should care equally about all the people living in the country.

Support for Redistribution

Inequality Serious Problem: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that income inequality is a serious or very serious problem.

Inequality No Problem: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent thinks that income inequality is not a problem.

Tax Top1: respondent's preferred tax rate on the top 1% of the income distribution in his country.

Tax Bottom50: respondent's preferred tax rate on the bottom 50% of the income distribution in his country.

Social Budget: share of the government budget that the respondent would allocate to health and social safety net (social insurance and income support programs)

Budget Education: share of the government budget that the respondent would allocate to schooling and higher education

Donation

Donation above Median: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent's donation amount is above the median in his country.

Total % donation: total amount the respondent wishes to donate to the charities, as a percentage of the potential prize ($1,000 in the U.S., 1,000 pound in the U.K., 1,000 euro in France, Italy and Germany, 10,000 SEK in Sweden).

Indices

Following the methodology in Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007), we define a set of indices to summarize respondents' perceptions and policy views, and local immigrants characteristics. Each index consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of its components. Variables are transformed into z-scores by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation, so that each z-score has mean 0 and standard deviation 1 for the control group.[42]

Perceptions

Misperception index: includes misperceptions of the share of Muslim immigrants, share of Christian immigrants, share of unemployed immigrants, share of low-educated immigrants, share of highly-educated immigrants, share of poor immigrants. Signs are oriented so that a higher index means that respondents think immigrants are more culturally distant and weaker economically.

Perceived cultural distance index: includes misperceptions of the origins of immigrants, share of Muslim immigrants and share of Christian immigrants, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that respondents perceive immigrants to be more culturally distant.[43]

Perceived economic weakness index: includes misperceptions of the share of unemployed immigrants, share of low-educated immigrants, share of highly-educated immigrants, share of poor immigrants, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that respondents perceive immigrants to be economically weaker.

Perceived free riding index: includes *Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort*, *Mohammad Gets More* and *Immigrants receive more transfers*. A higher index means that respondents are more likely to think immigrants "free ride" on the welfare system.

Support for Immigration and Redistribution

Immigration support index: includes the 5 variables listed under *Immigration Support*. Signs are oriented so that more support for pro-immigration policies means a higher corresponding index.

Redistribution Support Index: includes the 6 variables listed under *Support for Redistribution* and *Donation above Median*. Signs are oriented so that a higher index means that respondents support public and private redistribution more strongly.

Local Immigrants Characteristics

Actual local cultural distance index: includes the local origin of immigrants, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that immigrants in that region are more culturally distant from natives.

Actual local economic circumstances index: includes the local unemployment rate of immigrants and the local share of college-educated and low-educated immigrants, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that immigrants in that region are economically "weaker."

A-2 Definitions, Data Sources and Construction of Actual Statistics about Immigrants and Natives

A-2.1 Definitions

Number, Origins and Religion of Immigrants

Share of immigrants: share of foreign-born in the country.

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[42]When we transform the components of the indices into z-scores we set them to 0 if they are missing. This is to avoid dropping entirely from the analysis respondents who have just one missing component. Results are robust to just excluding these respondents.

[43]In the local-level regressions we omit religion from the cultural distance index, since we do not have actual local-level statistics on immigrants' religion.

Share of second generation immigrants: share of people born in the country from at least one foreign-born parent.

Origin of immigrants: share of the foreign-born residents in the country born in, respectively, North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North Africa, Middle East, Asia.

Religion of immigrants: share of foreign-born residents in the country who are of, respectively, Muslim and Christian religion.

Economic Circumstances of Immigrants

Share of Low Educated Immigrants: share of foreign-born population holding a qualification corresponding to ISCED 2011 levels 0-2 (in European countries) or having no high-school diploma in the U.S..

Share of High Educated Immigrants: share of foreign-born population holding a qualification corresponding to ISCED 2011 levels 5-8 (in European countries) or having at least an associate degree (two year bachelor degree in the U.S.).

Unemployment: Unemployment rate among the foreign-born in the country.

Poverty: U.S.: share of foreign-born population having income below the official Poverty Threshold.[44] European countries: share of foreign-born population with an adult-equivalent disposable income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, (60% of the national median disposable income).

Economic Circumstances of Natives

Equivalent definitions for native-born population.

Local Statistics

Unless otherwise stated, statistics are at the Commuting Zone level in the U.S., NUTS2 region level in France, Italy and Sweden, NUTS1 in the U.K. and Germany.

Local share of immigrants: number foreign-born (foreign nationals in Italy) living in the region over the total population of the region.

Local Origin of immigrants: share of the foreign-born (foreign national in Italy and Germany) living in the region who were born in (are citizens of, in Italy and Germany), respectively, North America, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia.

Local Share of Low Educated Immigrants: share of foreign-born population of the region holding a qualification corresponding to ISCED 2011 levels 0-2 (in European countries) or having no high-school diploma in the U.S..

Local Share of High Educated Immigrants: share of foreign-born population of the region holding a qualification corresponding to ISCED 2011 levels 5-8 (in European countries) or having at least an associate degree (two year bachelor degree in the U.S.).

Local Unemployment of Immigrants: Unemployment rate among the foreign-born in the region.

Local Education and Unemployment of Natives: equivalent definitions for native-born.

Local Minorities – U.S. only

Local Share of African American: Number of African American living in the region over the total population of the region.

Local Share of Hispanic: Number of Hispanics living in the region over the total population of the region.

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[44]See https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-thresholds.html

A-2.2 Data Sources and Construction – National Statistics

A-2.2.1 U.S.

For the U.S., the statics which are readily available refer to total immigrants, both legal and illegal. We construct our statistics on legal immigrants only using data on the total immigrant population and estimates on illegal immigrants. Given that there is some uncertainty surrounding the characteristics of illegal immigrants, we provide bounds for each statistic, using several different data sources. All the raw data and our calculations are available in the excel spreadsheet at https://www.dropbox.com/s/136otycl3tnkdsd/Database_US.xlsx?dl=0.

Number and Origins of Immigrants

Share of total immigrants: 13.4% (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

Share of legal immigrants: 10%, computed as:

$$\frac{\text{Number of foreign born in the U.S.} - \text{Number of illegal foreign born}}{\text{Total U.S. population}}$$

- Number of foreign born in the U.S. in 2015 = 43,158,110 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

- Number of illegal foreign born in the U.S. in 2015 = 11,000,000 (Source: Pew 2017)[45]

- Total U.S. population in 2015 = 321,418,821 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

The estimate of the unauthorized immigrant population in 2015 by Pew is consistent with the estimate provided by the Center for Migration Studies (11,042,503) and close to the estimate of the Migration Policy Institute for 2014 (11,009,000).

Origins of legal immigrants: for each area X, computed as:

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants from area X} - \text{Number of illegal immigrants from area X}}{\text{Number of immigrants in the U.S.} - \text{Number of illegals in the U.S.}}$$

- Number of immigrants from area X in 2015 – See excel spreadsheet (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

- Number of immigrants in the U.S. in 2015 = 43,158,110 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

- Number of illegal immigrants from area X in 2015 – See excel spreadsheet (Source: Pew 2017)[46]

- Number of illegals in the U.S. = 11,000,000 (Source: Pew 2017)

The Pew Research Center reports the number of illegal immigrants for all of the regions we consider in our analysis. However, the aggregate number of illegal immigrants is reported jointly for 1) Europe & Canada, and for 2) Middle East & North Africa. To obtain the shares of legals/illegals for Western Europe,

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[45]http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/25/as-mexican-share-declined-u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-population-fell-in-2015-below-recession-level/

[46]http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/25/as-mexican-share-declined-u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-population-fell-in-2015-below-recession-level/

Eastern Europe, Canada, the Middle East, and North Africa separately, we attribute them a share of illegal immigrants in proportion to their share of total immigrants within the larger areas reported by Pew. We obtain the following shares of legal immigrants: Canada: 2.3%; Western Europe: 7.7%; Eastern Europe: 6.2%; Middle East: 4.15%; North Africa: 0.3%. We can compute a very strict lower bounds by attributing all the illegals from the larger Pew areas to each of our areas in turn (e.g., attribute all illegals from Europe & Canada to Canada.) This would lead to the following shares of legals: Canada: 0.9%; Western Europe: 6.8%; Eastern Europe: 5.1%; Middle East: 4.12%; North Africa: 0%. See the excel spreadsheet for the exact calculations.

Second Generation Immigrants

Share of second-generation immigrants: 11.9% (Source: Pew Research Center (2018). Facts on U.S. Immigrants, 2016).

Religion of Immigrants

Data on legal immigrants' religions are taken directly from a report by the Pew Research Center (2013).[47]

Unemployment

Unemployment rate for total immigrants: 5.5% (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

Unemployment rate for legal immigrants: 5.5%, computed as:

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants unemployed} - \text{Number of illegals unemployed}}{\text{Number of immigrants in labor force} - \text{Number of illegals in labor force}}$$

- Number of immigrants unemployed in 2015 = 1,495,466 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

- Number of illegal immigrants unemployed in 2015 = 423,124 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

- Number of immigrants in the labor force in 2015 = 27,184,775 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

- Number of illegal immigrants in the labor force in 2015 = 7,721,686 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

Using the alternative estimate of illegals unemployed from the Migration Policy Institute (2014) and estimates of unemployed immigrants from the Pew Research Center (2014), we obtain unemployment rate = 5% for 2014.

Poverty

Poverty rate for total immigrants: 16.3% (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

Poverty rate for legal immigrants: 13.6%, computed as:

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants below the poverty threshold} - \text{Number of illegals below the poverty threshold}}{\text{Number of immigrants in the U.S.} - \text{Number of illegals in the U.S.}}$$

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[47]http://www.pewforum.org/2013/05/17/the-religious-affiliation-of-us-immigrants/

- Number of immigrants below the poverty threshold = 7,045,815 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

- Number of illegals below the poverty threshold = 2,673,947 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

- Number of immigrants in the U.S.= 43,158,110 (Source: Pew Research Center (2017). Characteristics of the U.S. foreign-born population: 2015)

- Number of illegals in the U.S.= 11,042,503 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

Using the alternative estimate of illegals below the poverty threshold from the Migration Policy Institute (2014) and estimates of poor immigrants from the Pew Research Center (2014), we obtain poverty rate = 12.3% for 2014.

Education
Share of low educated total immigrants: 27.6% (Source: CPS 2015)

Share of low educated legal immigrants: 22.0%, computed as

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants who have not completed high school} - \text{Number of illegals who have not completed high school}}{\text{Number of immigrants 18 and older in the U.S.} - \text{Number of illegals 18 and older in the U.S.}}$$

- Number of immigrants who have not completed high school = 10,961 (Source: CPS 2015)

- Number of illegals who have not completed high school= 4,413,535 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

- Number of immigrants 18 and older in the U.S. = 39,681,000 (Source: CPS 2015)

- Number of illegals 18 and older= 9,978,611 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

Using the alternative estimate for illegals 25 and older from the Migration Policy Institute (2014) and for immigrants 25 and older from the CPS 2014, we obtain share of low educated = 20.9%.

Share of high educated total immigrants: 35.9% (Source: CPS 2015)

Share of high educated legal immigrants: 41.4%, computed as

$$\frac{\text{Number of immigrants who have at least a 2-year degree} - \text{Number of illegals who have at least a 2-year degree}}{\text{Number of immigrants 18 and older in the U.S.} - \text{Number of illegals 18 and older in the U.S.}}$$

- Number of immigrants who have at least a 2-year degree= 13,075,000 (Source: CPS 2015)

- Number of illegals who have at least a 2-year degree= 1,955,770,[48] (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

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[48]The Center for Migration Studies reports joint estimates of illegals with some college or a 2-year degree. To obtain the number of illegals with a 2-year degree we assume that the splitting between some college and 2-year degree is proportional to the splitting in the total immigrant population in the CPS. If, instead, we assume that no illegal in the joint category has a 2-year degree, the number of high educated illegals would be 1,467,157, and the share of high educated among legal immigrants would be 43%.

- Number of immigrants 18 and older in the U.S.= 39,681,000 (Source: CPS 2015)

- Number of illegals 18 and older= 9,978,611 (Source: Center for Migration Studies. State-Level Unauthorized Population and Eligible-to-Naturalize Estimates 2015)

Using the alternative estimate for illegals 25 and older from the Migration Policy Institute (2014) and for immigrants 25 and older from the CPS 2014, we obtain share of high educated = 42.8%.

A-2.2.2 European countries

Number and Origins of Immigrants

Data on the number of immigrants is from the UN (Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2017 Revision) for all countries. Data on the origins of immigrants also comes from the UN (Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2017 Revision) for Italy, France, the U.K., and Germany. Data on origins for Sweden is from the OECD (International Migration Database, 2015). Both the UN and the OECD use national censuses as their original sources. For each country, we report here some information on the way these censuses are conducted and on the population they reach. In Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and Finland, censuses only cover legal immigrants. In the U.K., France and Germany, censuses cover both legal and illegal immigrants. However, *i)* illegal immigrants are likely to be severely underrepresented in the census, because they typically have very low response rates to official surveys; *ii)* estimates of the number of illegal immigrants suggest that these make up, on average, only around 0.5% of the population in these countries. Thus, none of our statistics would be affected in a non-negligible way if we tried to impute statistics for legal immigrants only for the U.K, France, and Germany. We thus use the UN and OECD data without further corrections.

Italy: 2011 Census. They only survey regular (legal) immigrants, that is, those who have a legal permit to stay in the country.[49]

Sweden: 2011 Census. The census is based on the population register, which takes data from the Swedish Tax Agency.[50] In Sweden only legal immigrants pay taxes.[51]

Germany: The 2011 Census is based on official registers and complemented by surveys. In Germany, illegal immigrants were estimated to be between 180,000 and 520,000 (less than 0.5% of the total population) as of 2014.[52]

U.K.: 2011 Census. Respondents are not asked about their legal status.[53] According to the most recent estimate, illegal immigrants were 533,000 in 2007, around 0.8% of the total population.[54]

France: 2011 Census. Respondents are not asked about their legal status, but, as in the U.K., illegal immigrants have very low response rates and are thus unlikely to be represented in that data. According to recent estimates from the Ministry of the Interior, in France there are about 300,000 illegal immigrants, making up around 0.5% of the total population.[55]

Finland: 2011 Census. The census is based on official registries. Only people with a valid residence permit

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[49]See Methodological notes to the 2011 Census, p. 16 https://www.istat.it/it/files/2012/12/volume_popolazione-legale_XV_censimento_popolazione.pdf

[50]See http://www.scb.se/contentassets/8f66bcf5abc34d0b98afa4fcbfc0e060/rtb-bar-2016-eng.pdf, pages 6 and 7.

[51]https://www.skatteverket.se/servicelankar/otherlanguages/inenglish/individualsandemployees/movingtosweden.4.7be5268414bea064694c40c.html

[52]http://irregular-migration.net/fileadmin/irregular-migration/dateien/4.Background_Information/4.5.Update_Reports/Vogel_2015_Update_report_Germany_2014_fin-.pdf

[53]See https://www.ons.gov.uk/aboutus/transparencyandgovernance/freedomofinformationfoi/illegalimmigrantsintheuk. According to survey agencies, illegal immigrants have very low response rates in the U.K. and are, hence not likely to be represented in the statistics derived from census data. See https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/key-topics/illegal-immigration.

[54]See https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_migrate_files_destination/irregular-migrants-report.pdf

[55]http://www.observationsociete.fr/population/combien-de-sans-papiers-en-france.html

(legal) may be registered in the Population Register.[56]

Switzerland: 2011 Census. The variable related to country of birth in the census is based on official residents' registers, which do not include illegal immigrants. Thus, all statistics are based on legal immigrants only.[57]

Second Generation Immigrants

For France, the U.K. and Italy data for 2017 are not available. Hence, we use the most recent available estimates, under the assumption that the share of second generation immigrant over the total population remained constant until 2017.

Sweden: 13%. Source: Statistics Sweden, 2017.

Germany: 7.4%. Source: Destatis, 2017, defined as people "with a migration background" born in Germany, with and without German citizenship.

France: 11%. Source: INSEE, 2015.

U.K.: 9.2%. Source: Eurostat, 2014.

Italy: 2.4%. Source: Eurostat, 2014.

Religion of Immigrants

Data are from the Pew Research Center, Global Religious Futures 2010, which is mostly based on national Censuses. The Pew Research Center has recently published a report on the inflow of Muslim immigrants in Europe between 2010 and 2016.[58] According to the report, Sweden is the country that experienced the most significant inflow of Muslim immigrants, relatively to its 2010 immigrant population, in particular because of the large inflow of refugees from Middle East.[59] The report only focuses on recent immigrants.

Unemployment, Poverty, Education

Data are from the Eurostat Labor Force Survey 2016. The survey covers legal immigrants only.[60]

A-2.3 Data Sources and Construction – Local Statistics

A-2.3.1 U.S.

Geographic area: All statistics except unemployment are the **Commuting Zone** level. Unemployment is at the **state** level.

All the statistics on immigrants and natives, and minorities, with the exception of unemployment, are computed at the county level from the 5-year 2017 ACS and then aggregated at the commuting zone level using David Dorn's county-cz crosswalk.[61] Because of lack of county-level data by country of birth, the unemployment rate for immigrants and natives is computed at the state level from the 5-year 2017 ACS.

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[56]http://www.maistraatti.fi/en/Services/place_of_domicile_and_population_data/Basic-information/

[57]See Roberts, C., Lipps, O., & Kissau, K. (2013). Using the Swiss population register for research into survey methodology. FORS Working Paper Series, paper 2013-1. Lausanne: FORS.

[58]Pew Research Center (2017). Europe's Growing Muslim Population, available at http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/

[59]However, there is some uncertainty around the number of Muslim immigrants in Sweden. The Pew Research Center reports that about 300,000 Muslim immigrants moved to Sweden between 2010 and 2016, while the Swedish government claims that in 2017 "The Muslim faith communities have approximately 140 000 members" (See https://www.government.se/articles/2017/02/facts-about-migration-and-crime-in-sweden/).

[60]See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey

[61]http://ddorn.net/data.htm

A-2.3.2   European Countries

Geographic area: Unless otherwise stated, the statistics for Italy, Sweden and France are at the **NUTS2** level, for Germany and the U.K at the **NUTS1** level.

Share of Immigrants
Italy: Foreign nationals resident in Italy on January 1, 2018, ISTAT.
Sweden: Foreign born resident in Sweden in 2017, Statistics Sweden.
Germany: Population with migration background born in a foreign country, Integrationsmonitoring der Länder 2017.
U.K.: Foreign born resident in U.K. in 2017, Annual Population Survey (APS), ONS.
France: Immigrant population in France in 2016, aggregated at the NUTS2 level from Département level data, Insee, RP2016 exploitation principale.

Origins of Immigrants
Italy: Foreign nationals resident in Italy on January 1, 2018, by country of nationality, ISTAT.
Sweden: Foreign born resident in Sweden in 2017, by country of birth, Statistics Sweden.
Germany: Foreigners resident in Germany in 2017, by country of nationality, DESTATIS.
U.K.: Foreign born resident in U.K. in 2017, by country of birth, Annual Population Survey (APS), ONS.
France: Own calculations at the NUTS1 level from microdata of the Recensement de la population 2016.

Unemployment and Education of Immigrants and Natives
Data are from the Eurostat Labor Force Survey 2017.

Poverty
We managed to find data only on the overall local poverty rate – i.e. not separately by immigrants and natives. Sources, definitions and reference years are as follows.
Italy, Sweden: At risk of poverty rate from Eurostat, 2017.
Germany: At risk of poverty rate from MICROCENSUS - Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017.
France: Aggregated at the NUTS2 level from Poverty rate at the Département level from Insee-DGFIP-Cnaf-Cnav-CCMSA, Fichier localisé social et fiscal, 2016.
U.K.: Percentage of individuals living in households with less than 60 per cent of contemporary median household income from FRS, average over 2014-2016.

A-3   High Immigration Sectors

We define a sector as *High Immigration* if the share of immigrants working in that sector is higher than the average share of immigrants employed in the country. The sectors that we classify as *High Immigration* are listed here in English for each country. Sectors are described in greater detail and in each original language online at https://www.dropbox.com/s/rud1ii161d39yxx/sector_list.pdf?dl=0.

- U.S.: Farming, fishing, and forestry, Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance, Construction and extraction, Computer and mathematical occupations, Production occupations, Life, physical, and social science, Food preparation and serving related occupations, Occupations related to transportation and material moving, Occupations related to personal care, childcare and leisure, and Healthcare support occupations. Source: CPS 2016.

- U.K.: Domestic personnel; Accommodation and food services; Transport and storage; Information and communication; Administrative and support service activities; Manufacturing; Professional, scientific

and technical activities; Health and social work; Financial and insurance activities. Source: Annual Population Survey, April 2016 - March 2017 (https://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=8197). Sector breakdown criteria: SIC 2007.

- France: Non qualified artisanal workers; Domestic personnel; Merchants and retailer workers; Qualified artisanal workers; Craftsmen; Agricultural workers; Non qualified industrial workers; Police ad military; Information, arts and entertainment; Drivers; Teachers and scientific occupations; Industrial workers. Source: INSEE (Enquete Emploi en continu 2016). Sector breakdown criteria: CSE two digits sectors.

- Italy: Street and related sales and service workers; Personal care workers; Cleaners and helpers; Food preparation assistants; Agricultural, forestry and fishery laborers; Laborers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport; Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians; Refuse workers and other elementary workers; Personal service workers; Food processing, wood working, garment and other craft and related trades workers; Market-oriented skilled forestry, fishery and hunting workers; Stationary plant and machine operators; Metal, machinery and related trades workers; Assemblers; Drivers and mobile plant operators. Source: RCFL Survey, January 2016 - December 2016. Sector breakdown criteria: ISCO2008.

- Germany: Transport, logistics, protection and security; Commodity production and manufacturing; Commercial services, trade, sales, hotels and tourism; Construction, architecture, surveying and mapping, and facility technology. Source: Destatis (Mikrozensus 2015).

- Sweden: Hotel and restaurant; Transport; Healthcare and care; Education; Business and financial operations. Source: Statistics Sweden (Sysselsatta efter näringsgren 2006-2015, Table 3).

A-4 Additional Information on the Surveys

A-4.1 Links to Surveys

- Survey U.S.: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_eKEjDcjYFz33eHr

- Survey U.S. version 2: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bCz2hXK5sjoyAzr

- Survey U.K.: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0ILUH3So1ChjhPv

- Survey France: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_77K4hoafSeGsuWN

- Survey Italy: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_004wAyEt6lDcE6N

- Survey Germany: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_1GgElOhY9ef75Pf

- Survey Sweden: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_cUvZMTYuYPRiAw5

- Additional Survey U.S. with incentives: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_6eUmUM48VDnbIDH

A-4.2 Survey Structure

TABLE A-1: RANDOMIZATION GROUPS

	Treatment/Control	Saw redistribution block before/after immigration block
Group 1	Control	Before
Group 2	Control	After
Group 3	Treatment 1	Before
Group 4	Treatment 1	After
Group 5	Treatment 2	Before
Group 6	Treatment 2	After
Group 7	Treatment 3	Before
Group 8	Treatment 3	After

Notes: "Before" and "After" refer to whether the redistribution block was seen before or after the immigration block.

A-4.3 Full U.S. Questionnaire in English

Answer options are in *italic*, separated by a semicolon.

1. See Figure A-1

   Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and confirm that I WAS BORN IN THE U.S. and I am 18 or older; *No, I would not like to participate*

2. Were you born in the United States?

   Yes; *No*

3. What is your gender?

   Male; *Female*

4. What is your age?

5. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year? *$0-$9999*; *$10000-$14999*; *$15000-$19999*; *$20000-$29999*; *$30000-$39999* ; *$40000-$49999* ; *$50000-$69999*; *$70000-$89999*; *$90000-$109999*; *$110000-%149999*; *$150000-$199999* : *$200000+*

6. Please indicate your marital status.

   Single; *Married*; *Legally separated or divorced*; *Widowed*

7. How many children do you have?

   I do not have children: *1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more*

8. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?

   European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Other

9. Were both of your parents born in the United States?

   Yes; *No*

10. *[If Yes to Q9]* Where was your father born?

    [dropdown menu with list of countries]

A-12

11. *[If Yes to Q9]* Where was your mother born?

    [dropdown menu with list of countries]

12. What is your ZIP code?

13. Which category best describes your highest level of education?

    Eighth Grade or less; Some High School; High School degree / GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)

14. What is your current employment status?

    Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree

15. *[If Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner]* Are you employed

in one of the following sectors? Check the one that applies. If you have multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

[See Appendix A-1]

16. *[If Unemployed and looking for work; Not currently working and not looking for work; Retiree]* Even if you are not currently working, what sector did your latest occupation fall under? Check the one that applies. If you have had multiple jobs, check the one that describes your main occupation.

[See Appendix A-1]

17. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative

18. In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an independent?

Republican; Democrat; Independent

19. Did you vote in the last presidential election?

Yes; No

20. *[If Yes to Q19]* In the last presidential election, you supported:

Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson

21. *[If No to Q19]* Even if you did NOT vote, please indicate the candidate that you were most likely to have voted for or who represents your views most closely

Hillary Clinton; Donald Trump; Jill Stein; Gary Johnson

22. Before proceeding to the next set of questions, we want to ask for your feedback about the responses you provided so far. It is vital to our study that we only include responses from people who devoted

their full attention to this study. This will not affect in any way the payment you will receive for taking this survey. In your honest opinion, should we use your responses, or should we discard your responses since you did not devote your full attention to the questions so far?

Yes, I have devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should use my responses for your study; No, I have not devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should not use my responses for your study

In the next two questions, we ask you to think about the total level of funds that the government raises and spends today on various policies. For the purpose of these questions, suppose that the level of government spending is fixed at its current level and cannot be changed. We will ask about your views on two aspects: a. First, on the fair split of the tax burden to raise these funds; b. Second, on how you think the government should spend these funds.

Emma legally came to the U.S. at age 25.

She lives with her husband - a construction worker - and two small children in a one-bedroom apartment.

For the past 5 years, she has been working in a retail store.

She starts work at 5 am every day of the week, earning the minimum wage for such tasks as restocking the shelves, helping customers, mopping the floor and cleaning the bathrooms.

When her day shift at the store ends at 3 pm, Emma starts her second job as a cleaning lady.

She takes two buses to get to her clients.

She finishes around 7 pm and gets home by 8 pm.

She then makes dinner for her family and sometimes helps the children with their homework before they go to bed.

Emma takes online courses. She stays up until midnight to work on her courses.

She cannot take out a loan to go to a full-time college.

Emma and her husband have no free time, no weekends, and haven't taken any holidays since arriving in the U.S..

Despite working two jobs and barely making ends meet, Emma is very happy to be in the U.S..

She hopes that thanks to her hard work she will one day be able to start her own small business.

23. See Figure A-5

24. See Figure A-6

25. Do you think income differences between rich and poor people are:

   Not a problem at all; A small problem; A problem; A serious problem; A very serious problem

26. To reduce income differences between rich and poor people, the government (at the local, state, or federal level) has the ability and the tools to do:

   Nothing at all; Not much; Some; A lot

27. Some people think that the government (at the local, state, or federal level) should not care about income differences between rich and poor people. Others think that the government should do everything in its power to reduce income inequality. Rate on a scale of 1 to 7 on how you feel about this issue, with 1 being the government should not concern itself with income inequality and 7 being the government should do everything in its power to reduce income inequality.

   Here are several things that the local, state, or federal government might do to reduce income differences between rich and poor people. Please indicate if you favor or oppose them. Keep in mind that, in order to finance an expansion of any of these, other types of spending (like spending on infrastructure and defense, for example) would have to be scaled down or taxes would have to be raised.

28. Would you say that you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose or strongly oppose spending more money on schools in poor neighborhoods?

   Strongly favor; favor; neither favor nor oppose; oppose; strongly oppose

The government currently raises a certain amount of revenue through the income tax in order to sustain the current level of public spending. In you view, what would be the fair split of the tax burden to sustain public spending?

The income tax* rate is the percentage of your income that you pay in federal income tax. For example, if you earn $30,000 and you pay $3,000 in income taxes, your income tax rate is 10%.

Please use the sliders below to tell us how much you think each of the following groups should pay as a percentage of their total income.

While you adjust the four sliders for each group, the fifth bar at the bottom moves in order to show you how much of the current revenue you have been able to raise so far. The bar appears red as long as you have not raised enough revenue, or if you have raised more money than what is needed.

You will only be able to move to the next question when you meet the revenue target and the bar becomes green.

The top 1% (Richest)
● ———————————————————————— 0%

The next 9% (Only 1% of households earn more, 90% earn less)
● ———————————————————————— 0%

The next 40% (Only 10% earn more, 50% earn less)
● ———————————————————————— 0%

The bottom 50% (Poorest)
● ———————————————————————— 0%

Revenue raised
○ ———————————————————————— 0%

You have not raised enough revenue.

29. Would you say that you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose strongly oppose spending more money to provide decent housing for those who cannot afford it?

    Strongly favor; favor; neither favor nor oppose; oppose; strongly oppose

30. Would you say that you strongly favor, favor, neither favor nor oppose, oppose or strongly oppose increasing income support programs for the poor?

    Strongly favor; favor; neither favor nor oppose; oppose; strongly oppose

31. How much of the time do you think you can trust our federal government to do what is right?

1) **Defense and National Security**, which refers to the costs of the Defense department and the costs of supporting security operations in the U.S. and in foreign countries.

2) **Public Infrastructure**, which includes, among others, transport infrastructure like roads, bridges and airports, and water infrastructure.

3) **Spending on Schooling and Higher Education**, including help for children from low income families to attend school and university.

4) **Social Security, Medicare, Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)**, which provide income support and help with health care expenses to the elderly and the disabled.

5) **Social Insurance and Income Support Programs**. This covers help to the unemployed (through unemployment insurance) and help for low income families (such as through Food stamps or the earned income tax credit (EITC), a tax credit for low-income working families)

6) **Public Spending on Health**, such as Medicaid for the poor (a healthcare program for low income families) or tax subsidies to help families buy health insurance.

7) **Affordable Housing.** This includes subsidies to make housing more affordable for low income families and funds to build and manage public housing.

Please enter the percent of the budget you would assign to each spending category (the total must sum to 100):

Defense and National Security	
Public Infrastructure	
Spending on Schooling and Higher Education	
Social Security, Medicare, Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)	
Social Insurance and Income Support Programs	
Public Spending on Health	
Affordable Housing	
Total	0

Almost always; A lot of the time; Not very often; Almost never

32. By taking this survey, you are automatically enrolled in a lottery to win $1000. In a few days you will

know whether you won the $1000. The payment will be made to you in the same way as your regular survey pay, so no further action is required on your part. In case you won, would you be willing to donate part or all of your $1000 gain for a good cause? Below you will find 2 charities which help people in the U.S. deal with the hurdles of everyday life. You can enter how many dollars out of your $1000 gain you would like to donate to each of them. If you are one of the lottery winners, you will be paid, in addition to your regular survey pay, $1000 minus the amount you donated to charity. We will directly pay your desired donation amount to the charity or charities of your choosing. Enter how much of your $1000 gain you'd like to donate to each charity:

Feeding America: ... ; The Salvation Army: ...

In what follows, we refer to immigrants as people who were not born in the U.S. and legally moved here at a certain point of their life. We are NOT considering illegal immigrants.

33. See Figure 1

34. The map here shows you the main regions of the world. The pie chart below represents all legal IMMIGRANTS currently living in the U.S.. Where do you think these immigrants come from? Move the sliders to indicate how many out of every 100 immigrants come from each region, in your opinion. As you move the sliders, the pie chart will adjust to show your responses, reflecting the colors of the various regions, as in the map. (Your responses must add up to 100)

    [See Figure A-7]

35. Think again about all of the legal immigrants currently living in the U.S.. What do you think is their religion? Fill in the boxes below to indicate how many out of every 100 immigrants you think practice each religion.

    Christianity ...; Islam ...; Buddhism ...; Hinduism ...; Other Religions/Atheist ...

36. Out of every 100 people born in the U.S. how many are currently unemployed? By "unemployed" we mean people who are currently not working but searching for a job (and maybe unable to find one).

    Now let's compare this to the number of unemployed among legal immigrants. Out of every 100 legal immigrants how many do you think are currently unemployed?

37. Out of every 100 people born in the U.S., how many have at least a two-year college degree?

    Now let's compare this to the number of college-educated legal immigrants. Out of every 100 immigrants in the U.S. today how many do you think have at least a two-year college degree?

38. Out of every 100 people born in the U.S., how many have not completed high school?

    Out of every 100 legal immigrants in the U.S. today how many do you think have not completed high school?

39. Out of every 100 people born in the U.S., how many live below the poverty line? The poverty line is the estimated minimum level of income needed to secure the necessities of life.

    Let's compare this to poverty among legal immigrants. Out of every 100 legal immigrants in the U.S. today, how many do you think live below the poverty line?

40. Some people think that the government (at the local, state, or federal level) should only support people who were born in the U.S.. Others think that the government should care equally about all the people living in the country, regardless of their country of origin and regardless of whether they are born in the U.S.. Rate on a scale of 1 to 7 on how you feel about this issue, with 1 being the government should focus on supporting people born in the U.S. and 7 being the government should care equally about everyone.

41. What is your view on the number of legal immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live? Pick the answer that best reflects your view.

    The excessive number of legal immigrants today is a very big problem. We should ask many legal immigrants to leave the country and we should stop accepting new immigrants; The number of legal immigrants today is a big problem and we should decrease by a lot the number permitted to come to the U.S. in the future; The number of legal immigrants today is somewhat of a problem and we should try and decrease a bit the number permitted to come in; The number of legal immigrants today is not a problem. We should keep letting in the same number of immigrants each year as until now; The number of legal immigrants today is not a problem at all. We should let even more legal immigrants come live in the U.S. and increase the number that is permitted to come every year

42. In your view, how soon after arriving should immigrants be entitled to government assistance such as Medicaid, food stamps, or welfare on the same basis as citizens?

    Immediately, as soon as they arrive; 1 year after; 3 years after; 5 or more years after; only after they receive citizenship; never

43. As you may know, once immigrants who come into the country receive U.S. citizenship, they are allowed to vote in all local, state, and federal elections. In your view, when should immigrants who come into the country legally be allowed to apply for U.S. citizenship?

    2 years after arriving; 5 years after arriving; 10 years after arriving; 20 years after arriving; They should never be allowed to apply for citizenship

44. Suppose someone is not born in the United States but now lives here. At what point would you consider this person to be "American"?

    Immediately, as soon as he arrives; After he has spent 5 years in the U.S.; After he has spent 10 years in the U.S.; It depends on where he comes from; As soon as he gets citizenship; I would never consider him to be American, but if his kids were born in the U.S. I would consider them truly American; I would not consider him or his kids to ever be truly American

45. Which has more to do with why an immigrant living in the U.S. is poor?

    Lack of effort on his or her own part; Circumstances beyond his or her control

46. Which has more to do with why an immigrant living in the U.S. is rich?

    Because she or he worked harder than others; Because she or he had more advantages than others

47. U.S. born residents receive government transfers in the form of public assistance, Medicaid, child credits, unemployment benefits, free school lunches, food stamps or housing subsidies when needed. How much do you think each legal immigrant receives on average from such government transfers? An average immigrant receives...

    No transfers; One third as much as a U.S. born resident; Half as much as a U.S. born resident; As much as a U.S. born resident; Slightly more than a U.S. born resident; Twice as much as a U.S. born resident; Three times as much as a U.S. born resident; More than ten times as much as a U.S. born resident

48. Imagine two people, John and Mohammad, currently living in the U.S. with their families. John is born in the U.S., while Mohammad legally moved to the U.S. five years ago. They are both 35, have three children, and earn the same low income from their jobs. In your opinion, does Mohammad pay more, the same, or less in income taxes than John?

    A lot more; More; same; less; a lot less

49. In your opinion does Mohammad, who is an immigrant, receive more, the same, or less government transfers (such as e.g., public assistance, Medicaid, child credits, unemployment benefits during unemployment spells, free school lunches, food stamps or housing subsidies) than John?

    A lot more; More; same; less; a lot less

50. Do you have any friends or acquaintances who were born outside the U.S.?

    Yes; No

51. *[If Yes to Q50]* Where do they come from? (check all that apply)

    Canada; Latin America; Western Europe; Eastern Europe; North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Middle-East; Asia; Australia/New Zealand

52. Do you feel that this survey was biased?

    Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel biased

A-4.4 Charities Listed for the Donation Question

We report here the charities we listed in the donation question in each country. See Q32 in Appendix A-4.3 for the exact wording of the question.

- **U.S.:** Feeding America, The Salvation Army

- **U.K.:** Save the Children U.K., The Salvation Army

- **France:** Les restos du cœur, Emmaüs

- **Germany:** SOS Kinderdorf, Tafel

- **Italy:** Caritas, Save the Children Italia

- **Sweden:** Frälsningsarmén, Majblomman

A-5 Summary of Perceptions and Misperceptions

TABLE A-2: PERCEPTIONS BY COUNTRY

	U.S. Actual	U.S. Perceived Mean (Stand. Error)	U.S. Perceived Median [Interq. Range]	U.K. Actual	U.K. Perceived Mean (Stand. Error)	U.K. Perceived Median [Interq. Range]	France Actual	France Perceived Mean (Stand. Error)	France Perceived Median [Interq. Range]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	36.08	31.00	13.40	31.39	30.00	12.20	28.81	25.00
		(0.73)	[20.00, 48.00]		(0.64)	[15.00, 42.00]		(0.61)	[14.00, 40.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	0.30	8.43	7.00	0.90	9.88	10.00	35.30	27.21	25.00
		(0.23)	[4.00, 11.00]		(0.27)	[5.00, 14.00]		(0.50)	[18.00, 35.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	4.10	12.20	10.00	5.10	10.84	9.00	5.60	10.98	9.00
		(0.32)	[5.00, 16.00]		(0.34)	[5.00, 15.00]		(0.34)	[4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	7.70	10.88	10.00	19.00	16.22	13.00	29.30	10.94	10.00
		(0.27)	[5.00, 15.00]		(0.43)	[7.00, 21.00]		(0.33)	[4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Eastern Europe	6.10	9.88	10.00	20.00	23.51	20.00	5.20	14.53	13.00
		(0.23)	[5.00, 13.00]		(0.47)	[14.00, 30.00]		(0.34)	[8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	2.30	9.69	7.00	2.30	6.10	5.00	1.00	5.97	3.00
		(0.33)	[4.00, 11.00]		(0.22)	[2.00, 9.00]		(0.31)	[1.00, 7.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	42.30	24.42	20.00	3.90	5.61	5.00	3.40	5.69	4.00
		(0.55)	[12.00, 32.00]		(0.19)	[2.00, 8.00]		(0.20)	[2.00, 8.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	10.00	22.69	20.00	23.00	33.89	30.00	48.00	50.23	50.00
		(0.50)	[10.00, 30.00]		(0.68)	[20.00, 45.00]		(0.72)	[30.00, 65.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	61.00	39.17	40.00	58.00	29.45	25.00	43.00	24.30	20.00
		(0.72)	[20.00, 50.00]		(0.65)	[15.00, 40.00]		(0.53)	[10.00, 31.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	5.50	26.39	20.00	5.70	27.00	20.00	16.60	38.79	30.00
		(0.77)	[8.00, 40.00]		(0.78)	[8.00, 40.00]		(0.85)	[15.00, 60.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	13.60	34.66	30.00	19.00	29.05	22.00	23.80	41.57	40.00
		(0.76)	[16.00, 50.00]		(0.72)	[10.00, 40.00]		(0.82)	[20.00, 60.00]
Share of Low-Educated Immigrants	22.00	28.96	20.00	16.60	25.58	20.00	39.10	51.62	50.00
		(0.79)	[10.00, 40.00]		(0.76)	[8.00, 40.00]		(0.84)	[30.00, 70.00]
Share of High-Educated Immigrants	41.40	34.86	30.00	48.80	25.33	20.00	28.80	27.36	24.50
		(0.77)	[15.00, 50.00]		(0.69)	[10.00, 40.00]		(0.61)	[10.00, 40.00]
Relative Transfers Received	1.23	1.17	1.00	1.42	1.02	1.00	1.39	1.77	1.00
		(0.06)	[0.33, 1.00]		(0.04)	[0.50, 1.00]		(0.08)	[1.00, 1.10]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.41			0.36			0.31	
		(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.01)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.67			0.70			0.62	
		(0.02)			(0.01)			(0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.26			0.18			0.34	
		(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.02)	
Observations		960			973			980	

TABLE A-2: PERCEPTIONS BY COUNTRY (CONT.)

	Italy			Germany			Sweden		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	26.41 (0.65)	20.00 [10.00, 35.00]	14.80	30.26 (0.68)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	17.60	27.00 (0.81)	21.00 [15.00, 33.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	10.20	24.90 (0.49)	23.00 [15.00, 31.00]	1.50	16.02 (0.37)	15.00 [8.00, 21.00]	1.20	12.09 (0.37)	10.00 [7.00, 17.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	2.90	8.95 (0.25)	8.00 [3.00, 13.00]	17.30	16.84 (0.45)	14.00 [7.00, 23.00]	23.80	25.09 (0.72)	22.00 [15.00, 34.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	14.30	6.02 (0.24)	4.00 [1.00, 9.00]	14.90	13.43 (0.42)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]	23.60	15.00 (0.71)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from Eastern Europe	38.10	18.63 (0.38)	18.00 [10.00, 25.00]	42.60	23.45 (0.41)	22.00 [15.00, 30.00]	22.20	13.80 (0.41)	13.00 [8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	0.90	4.55 (0.26)	2.00 [0.00, 5.00]	1.10	4.92 (0.20)	4.00 [1.00, 6.00]	1.40	4.74 (0.41)	3.00 [1.00, 5.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	9.10	9.59 (0.26)	9.00 [4.00, 13.00]	3.20	5.42 (0.16)	5.00 [2.00, 8.00]	5.50	7.93 (0.32)	6.00 [3.00, 10.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	33.00	46.95 (0.73)	45.00 [30.00, 60.00]	30.00	43.89 (0.68)	40.00 [30.00, 60.00]	27.00	44.77 (1.01)	40.00 [30.00, 60.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	57.00	26.82 (0.63)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	51.00	31.66 (0.61)	30.00 [20.00, 45.00]	61.00	32.67 (0.97)	30.00 [16.00, 48.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	14.70	41.80 (0.87)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	6.90	39.20 (0.93)	30.00 [12.00, 60.00]	16.10	37.16 (1.14)	30.00 [15.00, 55.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	34.90	42.86 (0.82)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	20.50	33.53 (0.81)	30.00 [10.00, 50.00]	29.80	25.26 (1.00)	20.00 [10.00, 35.00]
Share of Low-Educated Immigrants	49.10	43.56 (0.84)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	35.10	37.23 (0.80)	30.00 [16.00, 50.00]	33.70	40.88 (1.21)	38.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of High-Educated Immigrants	11.70	18.75 (0.59)	10.00 [5.00, 30.00]	22.30	21.88 (0.58)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	37.90	36.39 (1.01)	35.00 [20.00, 50.00]
Relative Transfers Received	1.29	1.34 (0.06)	1.00 [0.50, 1.10]	0.72	1.13 (0.04)	1.00 [1.00, 1.00]	1.44	1.28 (0.06)	1.00 [1.00, 1.10]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.31 (0.01)			0.41 (0.02)			0.32 (0.02)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.69 (0.01)			0.60 (0.02)			0.69 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.33 (0.02)			0.20 (0.01)			0.01 (0.01)	
Observations		971			973			481	

Notes: Panel A reports mean and median perceptions for each country. The standard errors of the means are in parentheses and the interquartile ranges (25th and 75th percentiles) are in square brackets. The actual value of the statistic for each country is reported in columns (1), (4), (7), (10), (13) and (16). Panel B reports the mean of each attitude variable for each country and its standard error (in parentheses). Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment.

TABLE A-3: MISPERCEPTIONS BY RESPONDENT GROUP

	Immigrants		Muslim		Christian		Unemployed		Poor		Low Educ		High Educ		Transfers		Obs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
College	15.34	10.00	8.95	7.00	-21.66	-23.00	19.48	13.10	9.82	6.20	3.63	-0.10	-3.33	-6.70	-0.10	-0.39	2155
	(0.45)	[0.0;25.0]	(0.44)	[-3.0;20.0]	(0.43)	[-37.0;-11.0]	(0.53)	[0.3;34.3]	(0.51)	[-9.0;25.1]	(0.52)	[-14.0;18.4]	(0.47)	[-18.8;11.2]	(0.03)	[-0.8;-0.2]	
No College	19.23	15.80	12.95	10.00	-25.78	-28.00	27.76	23.10	13.98	9.50	6.30	2.40	-5.54	-7.30	0.16	-0.29	3185
	(0.37)	[3.0;30.0]	(0.39)	[-3.0;27.0]	(0.36)	[-41.0;-12.0]	(0.48)	[4.3;45.3]	(0.47)	[-7.0;31.2]	(0.48)	[-14.1;24.9]	(0.41)	[-21.0;8.3]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
High Income	16.90	11.50	10.33	7.00	-22.63	-26.00	20.66	13.40	9.79	5.10	4.63	0.90	-5.14	-7.30	-0.13	-0.39	872
	(0.74)	[0.1;26.5]	(0.69)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.70)	[-37.0;-11.0]	(0.86)	[-0.5;35.3]	(0.81)	[-9.0;25.1]	(0.87)	[-14.1;20.9]	(0.72)	[-18.8;8.3]	(0.05)	[-0.8;-0.1]	
Low Income	17.82	14.20	11.54	10.00	-24.42	-27.00	25.15	18.10	12.79	8.50	5.34	0.90	-4.56	-6.70	0.09	-0.29	4470
	(0.31)	[1.6;27.8]	(0.32)	[-3.0;25.0]	(0.30)	[-41.0;-11.0]	(0.40)	[3.4;43.9]	(0.38)	[-8.6;29.5]	(0.39)	[-14.1;22.3]	(0.34)	[-18.8;8.6]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Young	19.77	16.60	10.30	7.00	-24.05	-27.00	25.01	18.40	13.67	9.50	4.10	0.90	-2.04	-3.70	0.01	-0.34	2826
	(0.39)	[3.6;30.0]	(0.41)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.38)	[-38.0;-11.0]	(0.49)	[3.4;43.9]	(0.48)	[-6.0;31.0]	(0.48)	[-14.6;20.9]	(0.44)	[-18.8;11.2]	(0.03)	[-0.8;0.3]	
Old	15.32	10.00	12.52	10.00	-24.22	-27.00	23.76	14.50	10.76	6.20	6.48	0.90	-7.59	-8.80	0.10	-0.29	2516
	(0.41)	[0.0;25.0]	(0.42)	[-2.0;27.0]	(0.40)	[-41.0;-11.0]	(0.53)	[2.5;43.1]	(0.49)	[-9.0;26.2]	(0.52)	[-13.7;24.9]	(0.43)	[-21.4;3.3]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Male	15.52	10.00	11.12	9.50	-22.88	-26.00	22.62	14.30	10.96	6.20	5.68	0.90	-7.03	-8.80	-0.03	-0.29	2615
	(0.42)	[0.0;25.0]	(0.42)	[-3.0;25.0]	(0.41)	[-38.0;-11.0]	(0.52)	[1.1;39.9]	(0.50)	[-9.6;26.2]	(0.52)	[-14.1;23.4]	(0.43)	[-21.3;6.2]	(0.03)	[-0.7;0.3]	
Female	19.73	16.80	11.56	10.00	-25.33	-28.00	26.14	19.50	13.59	9.50	4.79	0.90	-2.37	-2.30	0.14	-0.29	2727
	(0.39)	[4.2;30.0]	(0.41)	[-3.0;23.0]	(0.37)	[-41.0;-12.0]	(0.51)	[4.3;44.3]	(0.48)	[-5.5;30.1]	(0.49)	[-14.1;20.9]	(0.44)	[-18.8;11.2]	(0.04)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Left-Wing	18.01	14.00	9.40	7.00	-22.94	-26.00	23.24	15.30	13.07	9.50	2.50	-1.60	-2.02	-2.70	-0.21	-0.34	2452
	(0.43)	[1.2;27.8]	(0.41)	[-3.0;20.0]	(0.41)	[-37.0;-11.0]	(0.52)	[3.1;39.5]	(0.50)	[-5.5;29.5]	(0.50)	[-15.1;18.0]	(0.46)	[-17.3;11.2]	(0.03)	[-0.8;-0.2]	
Right-Wing	18.45	15.00	15.08	12.00	-26.50	-31.00	27.31	20.20	11.82	6.40	8.64	3.40	-8.85	-10.70	0.38	-0.23	2146
	(0.44)	[2.4;29.0]	(0.47)	[0.0;30.0]	(0.45)	[-41.0;-13.0]	(0.59)	[4.3;45.3]	(0.57)	[-9.0;30.1]	(0.59)	[-12.0;28.0]	(0.48)	[-23.8;3.3]	(0.05)	[-0.4;0.4]	
Immigrant Parent	23.46	20.00	9.79	7.00	-21.66	-23.00	22.10	14.30	11.45	6.40	5.94	-1.10	-2.68	-2.30	-0.10	-0.39	505
	(0.99)	[5.2;36.6]	(0.95)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.89)	[-36.0;-11.0]	(1.14)	[3.1;39.3]	(1.10)	[-9.0;26.4]	(1.12)	[-12.0;21.3]	(1.05)	[-18.8;12.1]	(0.06)	[-0.7;0.3]	
No Immigrant Parent	17.05	12.80	11.51	10.00	-24.39	-27.00	24.67	16.50	12.38	6.40	5.14	0.90	-4.86	-6.70	0.07	-0.29	4836
	(0.30)	[1.0;26.9]	(0.31)	[-3.0;25.0]	(0.29)	[-40.0;-11.0]	(0.38)	[3.1;43.4]	(0.36)	[-8.8;29.5]	(0.37)	[-14.1;22.0]	(0.33)	[-18.8;8.3]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Knows an Immigrant	16.37	11.60	10.33	7.00	-22.47	-23.00	21.50	13.90	10.47	6.20	4.10	-0.10	-2.90	-5.70	-0.02	-0.32	3560
	(0.35)	[0.4;26.2]	(0.35)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.33)	[-37.0;-11.0]	(0.42)	[1.5;35.3]	(0.42)	[-9.0;26.2]	(0.42)	[-14.1;20.9]	(0.38)	[-18.8;11.2]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Does Not Know any Immigrant	20.27	16.60	13.37	10.00	-27.44	-31.00	30.29	24.50	15.97	11.40	7.47	3.40	-8.15	-8.80	0.21	-0.29	1782
	(0.50)	[4.0;31.6]	(0.54)	[-3.0;27.0]	(0.49)	[-42.0;-13.0]	(0.67)	[5.1;53.1]	(0.61)	[-4.6;35.1]	(0.66)	[-13.6;28.0]	(0.54)	[-23.4;6.2]	(0.05)	[-0.7;0.3]	
High Imm. Sector & No College	20.56	17.20	12.62	10.00	-26.13	-28.00	28.47	23.40	15.16	11.00	7.09	3.40	-7.69	-8.80	0.17	-0.29	1721
	(0.51)	[4.2;30.8]	(0.54)	[-3.0;27.0]	(0.50)	[-41.0;-13.0]	(0.66)	[4.3;45.3]	(0.64)	[-4.9;35.1]	(0.66)	[-14.1;26.3]	(0.57)	[-23.8;7.7]	(0.05)	[-0.4;0.3]	
High Imm. Sector & College	16.49	10.80	8.40	7.00	-21.84	-23.00	20.96	13.40	10.41	6.20	4.32	-1.60	-4.11	-7.30	-0.13	-0.42	1025
	(0.67)	[0.2;26.6]	(0.64)	[-5.0;20.0]	(0.64)	[-37.0;-11.0]	(0.80)	[-0.5;34.5]	(0.73)	[-9.0;26.0]	(0.76)	[-12.6;18.0]	(0.71)	[-18.8;11.2]	(0.05)	[-0.9;-0.2]	
Not High Imm. Sector	16.14	11.20	11.66	10.00	-23.70	-26.00	23.01	14.50	11.13	6.20	4.25	0.90	-2.82	-6.30	0.05	-0.29	2568
	(0.40)	[0.2;26.0]	(0.42)	[-3.0;23.0]	(0.40)	[-38.0;-11.0]	(0.51)	[3.1;42.3]	(0.50)	[-9.0;26.4]	(0.50)	[-15.1;20.9]	(0.43)	[-17.8;9.2]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	

Notes: The table shows the mean (in odd columns) and median (in even columns) misperceptions – computed as perceived minus real – by groups. Groups are defined by the indicator variables listed to the left. The standard errors of the means are in parentheses and the interquartile ranges (25th and 75th percentiles) are in square brackets. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment.

TABLE A-4: MISPERCEPTIONS BY RESPONDENT GROUP – REGRESSIONS

	All immigrants (misp.) (1)	North Africa (misp.) (2)	Middle East (misp.) (3)	Western Europe (misp.) (4)	Eastern Europe (misp.) (5)	North America (misp.) (6)	Latin America (misp.) (7)	Muslim (misp.) (8)	Christian (misp.) (9)
Voted Right	0.841	1.030***	1.125***	-0.880***	-0.229	-0.217	-0.0385	5.955***	-4.463***
	(0.572)	(0.346)	(0.331)	(0.330)	(0.336)	(0.249)	(0.273)	(0.606)	(0.571)
Female	4.103***	-0.301	1.077***	-1.025***	0.109	0.393*	-0.283	0.434	-2.600***
	(0.567)	(0.338)	(0.319)	(0.319)	(0.324)	(0.238)	(0.268)	(0.585)	(0.558)
Young	4.182***	-1.234***	1.678***	-0.368	-0.951***	0.989***	0.330	-1.855***	-0.00924
	(0.566)	(0.335)	(0.321)	(0.314)	(0.325)	(0.238)	(0.268)	(0.590)	(0.558)
Immigrant parent	6.713***	0.169	-1.014**	0.316	-1.439***	-0.536*	1.465***	-1.356	1.838**
	(1.035)	(0.501)	(0.513)	(0.562)	(0.514)	(0.321)	(0.447)	(0.965)	(0.936)
College	-4.185***	-0.164	-1.362***	1.158**	0.564	-0.781**	0.311	-2.760***	3.507***
	(0.788)	(0.457)	(0.461)	(0.481)	(0.438)	(0.329)	(0.404)	(0.837)	(0.803)
High Income	0.453	0.874*	-0.933**	-0.139	-0.394	0.000510	0.0857	-0.637	0.934
	(0.796)	(0.463)	(0.407)	(0.424)	(0.453)	(0.331)	(0.382)	(0.775)	(0.772)
H Imm Sect. No College	3.211***	-0.210	-0.0295	-0.696*	0.0957	0.309	-0.00505	0.123	0.176
	(0.747)	(0.449)	(0.436)	(0.411)	(0.439)	(0.325)	(0.342)	(0.788)	(0.738)
H Imm Sect. College	1.820**	0.0798	0.432	-0.498	-0.0699	0.858**	-0.247	0.198	-0.348
	(0.889)	(0.507)	(0.463)	(0.519)	(0.467)	(0.361)	(0.445)	(0.877)	(0.865)
Observations	5061	5063	5064	5061	5063	5060	5065	5063	5065
Control mean	17.02	7.97	4.63	-5.70	-4.48	4.61	-1.98	11.29	-23.98

	Unemployment (misp.) (10)	Poverty (misp.) (11)	Low Educated (misp.) (12)	High Educated (misp.) (13)	Imm. Receive More Transfers (14)	Lack of Effort Poor (15)	Effort Rich (16)	Mohammad Gets More (17)
Voted Right	5.552***	-1.406**	4.667***	-5.093***	0.178***	0.252***	-0.0458***	0.138***
	(0.751)	(0.704)	(0.736)	(0.576)	(0.0129)	(0.0136)	(0.0137)	(0.0120)
Female	3.317***	2.282***	-1.157	4.762***	0.0261**	-0.0221*	-0.0425***	0.0112
	(0.731)	(0.684)	(0.708)	(0.566)	(0.0124)	(0.0131)	(0.0133)	(0.0115)
Young	1.735**	2.870***	-1.353*	4.737***	-0.0138	0.0319**	0.0167	0.0127
	(0.733)	(0.686)	(0.713)	(0.567)	(0.0125)	(0.0131)	(0.0134)	(0.0116)
Immigrant parent	-1.322	-0.889	-0.339	3.597***	-0.0108	-0.0257	0.00916	-0.0442**
	(1.180)	(1.101)	(1.173)	(1.029)	(0.0205)	(0.0219)	(0.0229)	(0.0178)
College	-7.106***	-4.715***	-2.760***	-0.210	-0.104***	-0.0472**	0.0611***	-0.0814***
	(1.033)	(0.977)	(1.017)	(0.830)	(0.0177)	(0.0190)	(0.0193)	(0.0161)
High Income	-2.146**	-2.224**	-0.433	0.203	-0.0616***	-0.00208	0.0773***	-0.0503***
	(0.974)	(0.910)	(0.970)	(0.773)	(0.0159)	(0.0178)	(0.0173)	(0.0150)
H Imm Sect. No College	2.780***	1.992**	1.019	-1.940***	0.0286*	0.0199	-0.0386**	0.0157
	(0.985)	(0.936)	(0.962)	(0.742)	(0.0171)	(0.0175)	(0.0179)	(0.0158)
H Imm Sect. College	4.262***	0.169	-0.836	2.525***	0.00501	0.0412**	-0.0242	0.0366**
	(1.095)	(1.005)	(1.069)	(0.914)	(0.0182)	(0.0199)	(0.0205)	(0.0172)
Observations	5057	5061	5057	5057	5060	5060	5052	5062
Control mean	24.44	12.40	5.34	-4.90	0.30	0.36	0.66	0.24

Notes: The table reports regressions of misperceptions of and attitudes towards immigrants on the personal characteristics listed on the left. Misperceptions are computed as the perception minus the actual value. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions. All regressions include country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-6 Sample and Response Quality

A-6.1 Time Spent on the Survey

FIGURE A-8: DISTRIBUTION OF TIME SPENT ON THE SURVEY

Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the time respondents in the main analysis sample across all countries spent on the survey (truncated at 200 minutes). The mean duration is 27 minutes, the median 21, and the 25th and 75th percentiles are 16 and 29.

A-6.2 Sample Representatives

TABLE A-5: SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS – "RAW" SAMPLE

	US		UK		France		Italy		Germany		Sweden	
	Sample (1)	Pop (2)	Sample (3)	Pop (4)	Sample (5)	Pop (6)	Sample (7)	Pop (8)	Sample (9)	Pop (10)	Sample (11)	Pop (12)
Male	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.50
18-29 y.o.	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.23	0.23	0.20	0.19	0.23	0.22	0.24	0.24
30-39 y.o.	0.19	0.20	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.22	0.22	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.19
40-49 y.o.	0.19	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.24	0.23	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.21
50-59 y.o.	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.18	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.19	0.23	0.23	0.19	0.18
60-69 y.o.	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.18	0.18
Income Bracket 1	0.16	0.16	0.30	0.31	0.31	0.32	0.28	0.27	0.25	0.26	0.33	0.33
Income Bracket 2	0.19	0.19	0.35	0.35	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.28	0.29
Income Bracket 3	0.22	0.22	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.14	0.20	0.19	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.22
Income Bracket 4	0.43	0.43	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.26	0.22	0.22	0.17	0.17
Married	0.51	0.49	0.52	0.41	0.42	0.46	0.58	0.46	0.48	0.46	0.34	0.33
Employed	0.60	0.70	0.68	0.74	0.64	0.65	0.66	0.57	0.66	0.75	0.72	0.77
Unemployed	0.08	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05
College	0.51	0.41	0.37	0.36	0.51	0.31	0.36	0.16	0.27	0.25	0.43	0.36

Notes: This table replicates Table 1 on the "Raw" sample that includes all respondents who have completed the survey.

	US	
	Sample (1)	Pop (2)
Male	0.48	0.49
18-29 y.o.	0.23	0.24
30-39 y.o.	0.20	0.20
40-49 y.o.	0.19	0.19
50-59 y.o.	0.20	0.20
60-69 y.o.	0.17	0.17
Income Bracket 1	0.15	0.16
Income Bracket 2	0.19	0.19
Income Bracket 3	0.23	0.22
Income Bracket 4	0.43	0.43
Married	0.53	0.49
Employed	0.64	0.70
Unemployed	0.06	0.05
College	0.60	0.41

Notes: This table displays summary statistics from the additional U.S. survey (in odd columns) alongside nationally representative statistics (in even columns). See notes to Table 1.

A-6.3 Flagging Respondents with Careless Answers

The three flags refer to i) respondents in the top 2% and bottom 10% of the time spent on a given question; ii) clearly suspicious patterns in respondents' answers that are indicative of carelessness, such as entering "0" or "100" to questions about shares (reported in Panel A of Table A-7 in the Online Appendix); iii) inattentive participants which are identified by computing a *Response Pattern Index* as in Meade and Craig (2012): this index represents the share of answers to qualitative questions for which the respondent selected answers in the same position – ordered as first, last or middle. Careless respondents are more likely to just mechanically select the option in the same position in every question to get to the end of the survey more quickly. As reported in Panel B of Table A-7, few respondents systematically select the same-positioned answer options; we flag those with a *Response Pattern Index* greater than or equal to 0.8.

Appendix Tables A-31 and A-32 report misperceptions by country and by group estimated on this "reduced" sample. They are very close to the misperceptions estimated in the benchmark sample, showing that the (few) inattentive respondents do not drive the aforementioned patterns.

Table A-8 shows the ability of covariates to predict "low quality answers", i.e. respondents who are dropped from the raw data because they spent too much or too little time on the survey (bottom and top 2% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey by country and treatment group) or who spent too much time on one of the treatment videos (top 2%). Young and high income respondents are more likely to be flagged as low quality. It is often the case that younger respondents tend to rush more through surveys. Male respondents and respondents working in a high immigration sector are also slightly more likely. However, these effects are quite small.

Panel A: Extreme Answers

	Control		Full sample	
	= 0	= 100	= 0	= 100
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Share of Immigrants	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.004
Share of Christian Immigrants	0.057	0.006	0.052	0.007
Share of Muslim Immigrants	0.016	0.020	0.017	0.018
High Educated - Immigrants	0.018	0.003	0.017	0.004
Unemployment - Immigrants	0.006	0.014	0.006	0.013
Poverty - Immigrants	0.020	0.010	0.019	0.011
High Educated - Natives	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.005
Unemployment - Natives	0.001	0.007	0.001	0.008
Poverty - Natives	0.003	0.007	0.004	0.007

Panel B: Response Pattern Indices

	Control		Full sample	
	≥ 0.6	≥ 0.8	≥ 0.6	≥ 0.8
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Response Pattern Index - First Option	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.000
Response Pattern Index - Last Option	0.004	0.000	0.004	0.000
Response Pattern Index - Middle Option	0.021	0.001	0.024	0.001

Notes: Panel A reports the share of respondents in the control group (columns 1 and 3) and in the full sample (columns 2 and 4) who gave extreme answers (= 0 or = 100) to the questions listed on the left; Panel B reports the share of respondents whose Response Pattern index for the first, last and middle option is greater or equal than 0.6 and 0.8. *Response Pattern Index - First Option* is computed as the number of qualitative questions (both in the immigration and in the redistribution block) where the respondent selected the first option divided by the total number of qualitative questions, and similarly for the other indexes. The First and Last Option indexes are based on 15 questions, the Middle Option index is based on 11 questions – we exclude questions for which it is difficult to identify a "middle" option (e.g., questions with four options).

TABLE A-8: ABILITY OF COVARIATES TO PREDICT LOW QUALITY ANSWERS

	Top/Bottom 2%		Top 2%	
	Time on Survey		Time on Video Treatment	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Voted right	0.000	0.895	-0.002	0.265
Voted left	-0.001	0.833	0.002	0.182
Male	0.006	0.020	0.000	0.982
Young	0.031	0.000	0.006	0.000
Immigrant parent	-0.007	0.112	0.003	0.382
College degree	0.003	0.233	0.001	0.392
High income	0.011	0.005	0.002	0.359
High immigration sector	0.006	0.019	0.002	0.196

Notes: The table shows the coefficients and p-values from a series of regressions of the form $y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta Covariate_i + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{ic}$, where $Covariate_i$ is the variable listed in the row and γ_c are country fixed effects. In the column "Top/Bottom 2% Time for Survey", y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent is in the bottom 2% or top 2% of the distribution of time spent on the survey. In the column "Top 2% Time for the Treatment", y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent is in the Top 2% of the distribution of time spent on one of the treatment videos.

A-6.4 Survey Fatigue

To test for survey fatigue, we exploit the randomization in the order of the redistribution and immigration blocks. We check whether there are differences in the time spent on questions and in the response patterns depending on the order in which the blocks were displayed. In Panel A of Table A-9 we regress the average time spent per question in the redistribution (column 1) and immigration (column 2) block on an indicator for whether the immigration block appeared first (randomly). Having seen the immigration block first reduces only slightly the time spent per question in the redistribution block. The effect is small and only significant at the 10% level.

In columns (1)-(6) in Panel B of Table A-9 the outcome variables are dummy variables equal to one if the respondent has a high *Response Pattern Index* for the first, last and middle option in the redistribution and immigration block. These indices represent the share of answers to qualitative questions for which the respondent selected options in the same position – ordered first, last or middle (see Appendix Section A-6.3 for more details). Careless respondents are more likely to mechanically select the option in the same position in every question to get to the end of the survey more quickly. We want to check whether respondents were more likely to do so as the survey progressed. In columns (7) and (8) the outcome variables are dummy variables equal to one if the respondent has a high *Extreme Answers Index* for the redistribution and the immigration block. This index is constructed as the share of numerical questions where the respondent gave extreme answers (e.g. $= 0$ or $= 100$). Having seen the immigration block first does not significantly increase the probability of having a high *Response Pattern Index* in the redistribution block, and actually slightly decreases the probability of giving extreme answers in the redistribution block.

TABLE A-9: TEST FOR SURVEY FATIGUE BASED ON RANDOMIZATION OF BLOCK ORDER

Panel A: Time spent on questions

	Minutes spent per question on Redistribution block (1)	Minutes spent per question on Immigration block (2)
Immigration block first	-0.638*	0.0822
	(0.328)	(0.128)
Observations	20859	20858
Sample mean	3.03	1.13

Panel B: Response patterns

	Response pattern index >= 0.8						Extreme Answers index >= 0.8	
	Redistribution block			Immigration block			Redistribution block	Immigration block
	First Option (1)	Last Option (2)	Middle Option (3)	First Option (4)	Last Option (5)	Middle Option (6)	(7)	(8)
Immigration block first	0.000192	-0.000208	0.00185	-0.000592	-0.000295	-0.00498	-0.00620**	-0.000492
	(0.000193)	(0.000573)	(0.00123)	(0.000540)	(0.000255)	(0.00339)	(0.00300)	(0.000497)
Observations	20859	20859	20859	20859	20859	20859	20859	20859
Sample mean	0.0002	0.0017	0.0080	0.0015	0.0003	0.0641	0.0497	0.0013

Notes: Panel A: the dependent variables are the average time spent per question in the redistribution block (column 1) and in the immigration block (column 2). The questions included are the the ones on tax rates and government budget allocation, in the redistribution block, and the ones on share, origin, religion of immigrants, and on unemployment, education and poverty of immigrants and natives, in the immigration block. Panel B: in columns (1)-(6) the dependent variables are dummies $= 1$ if the *Response Pattern Indices* for the first, last and middle option, for the redistribution block and the immigration block, respectively, are $>= 0.8$. In column (7) the dependent variables is a dummy $= 1$ if the *Extreme Answers Index* for the redistribution block is $>= 0.5$ (this is computed only on two questions). In column (8) the dependent variable is a dummy $= 1$ if the *Extreme Answers Index* for the immigration block is $>= 0.8$. The *Extreme Answers Indices* are defined as the number of numerical questions where the respondent gave extreme answers (i.e. $= 0$ or $= 100$) in the redistribution or in the immigration block divided by the total number of numerical questions in the relevant block. The independent variable "Immigration block first" is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent was randomly assigned to the group that saw first the Immigration block and then the Redistribution block. Regressions also include standard personal controls and indicator variables for exposure to the video treatments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-6.5 Monetary Incentives and Willingness to Pay for Information

Another possible concern about survey results in general is that respondents may not put in enough effort when answering, because they lack external incentives to do so, above and beyond their intrinsic motivation. To a randomly selected subsample of participants, we provide monetary incentives of varying amounts. More precisely, at the beginning of the immigration block and on top of each question about immigrants' statistics, respondents see a bold and highlighted message announcing that the five respondents whose guesses are closest to the true statistics will receive an additional monetary award. We design this incentive as a tournament to be able to offer substantial rewards randomized between $5, $10, $20, $30. To summarize the results, we also construct a "Misperception Index" following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007) that consists of an equally weighted average of the z-scores of misperceptions, with signs oriented so that a higher index means that respondents are more biased in a negative way towards immigrants.[62] Regardless of the size of the award and controlling for respondent characteristics, incentives do not seem to be effective at reducing misperceptions, as shown in Table A-10, which looks at incentives of different amounts separately, and Table A-11, which looks at the overall effect of being offered any positive monetary incentive at all.

Table A-12 summarizes the willingness ot pay to receive correct information about immigrants (Panel B), and shows the characteristics that correlate with it (Panel A, column 1) and with being surprised conditional on receiving the information (Panel A, column 2). See Section 3.2 for a discussion.

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[62]Variables included in the index are the perceived share of Muslim immigrants, share of Christian immigrants, share of unemployed immigrants, share of low-educated immigrants, share of highly-educated immigrants, share of poor immigrants.

TABLE A-10: Effect of Monetary Incentives on Misperceptions

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)
$5 Incentive	-0.354	0.0238	-1.305	0.182	-0.202	1.802
	(2.162)	(0.0211)	(1.083)	(1.371)	(1.476)	(1.951)
$10 Incentive	2.263	0.0195	0.0386	-1.024	-1.691	2.559
	(2.431)	(0.0208)	(1.412)	(1.541)	(1.340)	(2.197)
$20 Incentive	0.907	-0.00218	-0.340	1.582	-1.350	3.376
	(2.365)	(0.0181)	(1.383)	(1.601)	(1.525)	(2.130)
$30 Incentive	-1.085	0.00326	-0.680	-1.136	-1.163	3.416
	(2.188)	(0.0189)	(1.124)	(1.442)	(1.433)	(2.085)
Constant	20.37***	0.0286	20.02***	13.79***	13.41***	-22.68***
	(2.317)	(0.0231)	(1.534)	(1.561)	(1.602)	(2.303)
Observations	914	914	914	914	914	914

	Unemployment (misp.) (7)	Low-educated (misp.) (8)	High-educated (misp.) (9)	Poverty (misp.) (10)	Misperception Index (11)	
$5 Incentive	-0.448	-1.400	2.327	-2.234	-0.0416	
	(2.037)	(2.178)	(2.558)	(2.221)	(0.0374)	
$10 Incentive	-0.916	3.358	5.435**	0.718	-0.00939	
	(2.223)	(2.491)	(2.457)	(2.218)	(0.0388)	
$20 Incentive	1.471	-1.687	1.687	-1.596	-0.0502	
	(2.363)	(2.465)	(2.658)	(2.476)	(0.0405)	
$30 Incentive	2.539	-1.979	3.169	1.345	-0.0157	
	(2.241)	(2.334)	(2.547)	(2.333)	(0.0384)	
Constant	16.34***	-0.992	-10.76***	20.83***	0.0398	
	(2.379)	(2.589)	(2.700)	(2.497)	(0.0425)	
Observations	913	914	914	914	914	

Notes: The table reports the effect of monetary incentives on misperceptions, computed as perceptions minus actual statistics. *Accurate Perception All Immigrants* is a dummy equal to 1 if the absolute value of the respondent's misperception of the share of immigrants is less than 1. The *Misperception Index* is an index summarizing respondents' misperceptions, constructed following the methodology in Kling et al. (2007). All variables are detailed in Appendix A-1. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having at least one parent not born in the country, working in a high immigration sector. Sample: respondents who have not seen any video treatment, additional U.S. survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A-11: EFFECT OF MONETARY INCENTIVES ON MISPERCEPTIONS - POOLED

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)
Any Incentive	0.432	0.0115	-0.582	-0.109	-1.087	2.763*
	(1.486)	(0.0130)	(0.844)	(1.007)	(1.005)	(1.428)
Constant	20.46***	0.0283	20.06***	13.81***	13.37***	-22.66***
	(2.301)	(0.0232)	(1.537)	(1.560)	(1.600)	(2.297)
Observations	914	914	914	914	914	914

	Unemployment (misp.) (7)	Low-educated (misp.) (8)	High-educated (misp.) (9)	Poverty (misp.) (10)	Misperception Index (11)	
Any Incentive	0.621	-0.405	3.166*	-0.464	-0.0453	
	(1.454)	(1.592)	(1.713)	(1.552)	(0.0346)	
Constant	16.32***	-0.881	-10.72***	20.85***	0.0404	
	(2.364)	(2.575)	(2.700)	(2.490)	(0.0574)	
Observations	913	914	914	914	914	

Notes: The table reports the effect of monetary incentives on misperceptions, pooling all the incentives together. See notes to Table A-10

Panel A

	Willing To Pay (1)	Surprised (2)
Misperception Index	-0.107***	0.143***
	(0.0320)	(0.0442)
Republican	-0.0792**	0.0158
	(0.0339)	(0.0509)
Female	-0.0707**	0.0527
	(0.0327)	(0.0481)
H. Imm. Sector and No College	0.0822	0.0140
	(0.0510)	(0.0797)
H. Imm. Sector and College	0.0690	0.0150
	(0.0423)	(0.0589)
No College	-0.112**	0.0182
	(0.0458)	(0.0706)
High Income	-0.0317	0.0122
	(0.0410)	(0.0589)
Young	-0.0770**	0.0282
	(0.0328)	(0.0481)
Immigrant parent	0.125**	-0.0850
	(0.0545)	(0.0725)
Observations	918	448

Panel B

	All	$0.5	$1	$2	$5	$10
Share Willing to Pay	0.49	0.51	0.50	0.53	0.45	0.45

Notes: Panel A reports the determinants of willingness to pay to receive correct information about immigrants (column 1) and the determinants of being surprised by the information received, conditional on having accepted to pay for it (column 2). In column 1 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondents accepts to forfeit part of its lottery gain to receive the information. In column 2 the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent declares to have been surprised by the information received. All variables are detailed in Appendix A-1. The regression in (1) also includes dummies for the various "prices" of information, not reported. Sample: respondents who have not seen any video treatment, additional U.S. survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Panel B reports the share of respondents who are willing to forfeit part of their lottery gains to receive the information, conditional on the information "price" reported in each column.

A-6.6 Sample Selection

Table A-13: Ability of Covariates to Predict Treatment Status

	Order/Salience T		T: Share of Immigrants		T: Origin of Immigrants		T: Hard Work of Immigrants	
	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value	Coefficient	P-value
Voted right	-0.006	0.436	-0.001	0.888	0.004	0.549	-0.006	0.324
Voted left	0.002	0.820	-0.003	0.668	-0.002	0.758	0.009	0.150
Male	0.009	0.168	-0.003	0.588	0.002	0.721	-0.000	0.999
Young	-0.001	0.918	0.009	0.130	-0.003	0.671	-0.011	0.063
Immigrant parent	0.009	0.479	0.003	0.739	0.002	0.875	-0.013	0.189
College degree	-0.001	0.887	0.011	0.088	0.001	0.934	-0.011	0.087
High income	-0.006	0.516	0.001	0.857	-0.003	0.732	-0.005	0.556
High immigration sector	-0.005	0.485	0.004	0.517	-0.004	0.538	-0.002	0.769

Notes: The table shows the coefficients and p-values from a series of regressions of the form $y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta Covariate_i + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{ic}$, where $Covariate_i$ is the variable listed in the row and γ_c are country fixed effects. In the column "Order/Salience T", y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent was shown the immigration block before the redistribution block. In columns "Share of Immigrants", "Origins of Immigrants", and "Hard Work of Immigrants" y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent saw the corresponding treatment.

Table A-14: Ability of Covariates to Predict Participation in the Follow-up Survey

	Has taken the Followup	
	Coefficient	P-value
Voted right	-0.005	0.712
Voted left	0.005	0.712
Male	-0.126	0.000
Young	-0.132	0.000
Immigrant parent	-0.043	0.064
College degree	0.009	0.504
Rich	-0.122	0.000
High immigration sector	-0.020	0.161

Notes: The table shows the coefficients and p-values from a series of regressions of the form $y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta Covariate_i + \epsilon_{ic}$, where $Covariate_i$ is the variable listed in the row. y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent took the follow-up.

A-7 Where Do Misperceptions Come from: Additional Tables

TABLE A-15: PERCEIVED SHARE, CULTURAL DISTANCE AND ECONOMIC WEAKNESS OF IMMIGRANTS VERSUS REALITY – CONTROLLING FOR MINORITIES IN U.S.

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Perc. Cultural Distance Index (2)	Perc Econ. Weakness Index (3)	Perc. Free Riding Index (4)	Latin America (misp.) (5)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (6)	Muslim (misp.) (7)
Act. local share of immigrants	0.378*** (0.124)				0.180* (0.101)	-0.163*** (0.0594)	-0.139 (0.0906)
Act. cultural distance index		0.0796** (0.0354)					
Act. economic circumstances index			0.0223 (0.0367)				
Local share of African American	-0.0469 (0.0738)	-0.00149 (0.00161)	0.00230 (0.00213)	-0.000347 (0.00224)	0.0128 (0.0563)	0.0175 (0.0417)	0.00801 (0.0567)
Local share of Hispanic	-0.121 (0.0808)	0.000634 (0.00122)	-0.00114 (0.00182)	-0.0000376 (0.00169)	0.0281 (0.0678)	0.000346 (0.0402)	-0.0452 (0.0594)
Observations	943	944	944	944	944	944	943
Control mean	26.15	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-18.12	16.37	12.78

Notes: This table replicates Table 2 restricting the sample to the U.S. only. It includes the local share of African American and the local share of Hispanics as additional regressors and reports three additional outcomes to show the relation between misperceptions and local minorities. Regressions also include personal controls as in Table 2, not reported.

TABLE A-16: PERCEIVED SHARE, CULTURAL DISTANCE AND ECONOMIC WEAKNESS OF IMMIGRANTS VERSUS REALITY – HAVING AN IMMIGRANT FRIEND

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Perc. Cultural Distance Index (2)	Perc Econ. Weakness Index (3)	Perc. Free Riding Index (4)
Act. local share of immigrants	0.227*** (0.0456)			
Act. local cultural distance index		0.0755*** (0.0211)		
Act. local economic circumstances index			0.0642*** (0.0225)	
Right-wing	0.772 (0.572)	0.0386*** (0.0129)	0.195*** (0.0178)	0.406*** (0.0203)
Female	4.052*** (0.565)	0.00727 (0.0124)	-0.0496*** (0.0171)	0.00727 (0.0194)
Young	4.059*** (0.566)	-0.0107 (0.0124)	-0.0613*** (0.0172)	0.0243 (0.0195)
Immigrant parent	6.310*** (1.055)	0.0463** (0.0189)	-0.0441 (0.0294)	-0.0395 (0.0301)
College	-4.013*** (0.787)	-0.0100 (0.0180)	-0.103*** (0.0245)	-0.160*** (0.0278)
High Income	0.246 (0.797)	0.00112 (0.0170)	-0.0144 (0.0233)	-0.0737*** (0.0255)
H Imm Sect. No College	3.282*** (0.747)	0.00117 (0.0165)	0.0710*** (0.0227)	0.0435 (0.0267)
H Imm Sect. College	1.760** (0.887)	-0.0166 (0.0194)	0.00435 (0.0271)	0.0604** (0.0285)
Has immigrant friend/acquaintance	-2.723*** (0.623)	0.0361** (0.0140)	-0.207*** (0.0188)	-0.147*** (0.0220)
Observations	5047	5065	5065	5065
Control mean	17.67	0.00	-0.00	0.00

Notes: This table replicates 2 including a dummy for declaring to have an immigrant friend or acquaintance as additional control. See notes to Table 2.

A-8 Summary of Policy Views on Immigration and Redistribution

TABLE A-17: VIEWS ON IMMIGRATION POLICIES

|	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)
U.S.	0.37	0.39	0.83	0.80	4.68
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.06)
U.K.	0.19	0.45	0.73	0.52	4.43
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.06)
France	0.26	0.46	0.66	0.64	4.48
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Italy	0.19	0.51	0.58	0.57	4.35
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Germany	0.23	0.56	0.69	0.55	4.58
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.06)
Sweden	0.25	0.63	0.84	0.61	4.85
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.09)
Left-wing	0.35	0.59	0.79	0.68	5.07
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Right-wing	0.12	0.35	0.62	0.53	3.85
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
College	0.33	0.53	0.76	0.68	4.74
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
No College	0.19	0.46	0.68	0.57	4.39
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Young	0.28	0.51	0.72	0.61	4.65
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Old	0.22	0.46	0.70	0.62	4.40
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Imm. Parent	0.30	0.55	0.76	0.61	5.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)
High Income	0.28	0.51	0.70	0.64	4.68
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
H. Imm. Sec. & No College	0.16	0.45	0.65	0.55	4.23
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)
H. Imm. Sec. & College	0.31	0.56	0.78	0.68	4.80
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.06)
Not H. Imm. Sec	0.28	0.49	0.73	0.63	4.63
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)

Notes: The table reports the mean of the variables capturing views on immigration policies for each group of respondents or country. See Appendix A-1 for the variable definitions. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment. Standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE A-18: VIEWS ON REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES

	Inequality Serious Problem (1)	Tax Top1 (2)	Tax Bottom50 (3)	Social Budget (4)	Education Budget (5)	Total % Donation (6)
U.S.	0.49	27.29	9.04	23.27	14.93	36.45
	(0.02)	(0.57)	(0.44)	(0.41)	(0.31)	(1.70)
U.K.	0.53	35.00	7.52	31.34	14.84	29.78
	(0.02)	(0.61)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.25)	(1.57)
France	0.63	42.18	8.61	30.65	17.41	30.50
	(0.02)	(0.74)	(0.41)	(0.34)	(0.28)	(1.52)
Italy	0.62	34.27	11.06	33.17	13.92	27.73
	(0.02)	(0.76)	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.30)	(1.39)
Germany	0.76	42.56	12.69	27.32	17.73	32.19
	(0.02)	(0.76)	(0.52)	(0.34)	(0.27)	(1.42)
Sweden	0.45	46.55	23.44	34.23	17.74	29.46
	(0.03)	(0.91)	(0.69)	(0.47)	(0.40)	(2.31)
Left-wing	0.71	37.91	10.35	30.56	16.37	33.32
	(0.01)	(0.47)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.97)
Right-wing	0.45	35.76	11.70	28.26	15.28	28.74
	(0.02)	(0.50)	(0.34)	(0.28)	(0.20)	(1.04)
College	0.54	36.84	10.91	29.50	16.63	32.76
	(0.02)	(0.47)	(0.32)	(0.27)	(0.19)	(1.05)
No College	0.62	37.51	11.10	29.73	15.48	30.00
	(0.01)	(0.43)	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.84)
Young	0.59	36.40	11.74	28.86	16.55	34.00
	(0.01)	(0.44)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.94)
Old	0.59	38.13	10.23	30.50	15.29	27.98
	(0.01)	(0.45)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.17)	(0.90)
Imm. Parent	0.61	38.10	11.40	29.46	16.55	31.70
	(0.03)	(1.03)	(0.74)	(0.49)	(0.40)	(2.06)
High Income	0.50	34.99	11.27	28.96	16.45	36.39
	(0.02)	(0.77)	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.31)	(1.77)
H. Imm. Sec. & No College	0.61	36.03	11.01	29.99	15.02	30.79
	(0.02)	(0.59)	(0.38)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(1.15)
H. Imm. Sec. & College	0.56	36.32	11.09	29.62	16.74	35.00
	(0.02)	(0.71)	(0.51)	(0.39)	(0.28)	(1.58)
Not H. Imm. Sec	0.58	38.32	11.02	29.42	16.29	29.93
	(0.01)	(0.44)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.18)	(0.92)

Notes: The table reports the mean of the variables capturing views on redistribution for each group of respondents or country. See Appendix A-1 for the variable definitions. Social and Education budget are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile by country. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment and who have seen the redistribution block before the immigration block.

A-9 Immigration and Redistribution: Additional Figures and Tables

FIGURE A-9: WHAT DETERMINES SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION AND REDISTRIBUTION?
- EXTENDED

Notes: Panel A shows the correlation between the variables listed on the left and the Immigration support index (blu squares) or the Redistribution support index (red diamonds). All variables are included in the same regression, together with standard personal controls and country fixed effects. Panel B replicates Figure 10. See notes to Figure 10.

Notes: Panel A shows the correlation between the variables listed on the left and the Immigration support index (blu squares) or the Redistribution support index (red diamonds). Each correlation is estimated in a separate regression which also includes standard personal controls and country fixed effects. Panel B replicates Figure 10. See notes to Figure 10.

TABLE A-19: MISPERCEPTION INDICES AND SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
Perc. cultural distance index	-0.0523***	-0.0539***	0.00629	-0.0157	-0.0804***	-0.0611***
	(0.0145)	(0.0155)	(0.0165)	(0.0161)	(0.0148)	(0.0138)
Perc. economic weakness index	-0.167***	-0.0624***	-0.103***	-0.0838***	-0.143***	-0.170***
	(0.0130)	(0.0141)	(0.0147)	(0.0143)	(0.0136)	(0.0124)
Perc. free-riding index	-0.240***	-0.232***	-0.242***	-0.196***	-0.317***	-0.376***
	(0.0115)	(0.0139)	(0.0150)	(0.0145)	(0.0138)	(0.0121)
All Immigrants (misp.)	-0.0375***	0.0393***	0.00255	-0.0211	0.0351***	0.00535
	(0.0136)	(0.0137)	(0.0138)	(0.0139)	(0.0132)	(0.0122)
Observations	5056	5056	5056	5056	5059	5046

Notes: The table explores the correlation between support for immigration and misperceptions of immigrants. Indices are defined in Appendix A-1. Each regression includes the variables listed on the left, plus standard personal controls as in Figure 10 and country fixed effects. All variables have been transformed into z-scores and coefficients can be interpreted as partial correlations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-20: MISPERCEPTIONS AND SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
All Immigrants (misp.)	-0.0301**	0.0321**	0.00407	-0.0217	0.0383***	0.00623
	(0.0138)	(0.0139)	(0.0140)	(0.0142)	(0.0133)	(0.0124)
Muslim (misp.)	-0.0740***	-0.0594***	-0.0616***	-0.0679***	-0.0909***	-0.109***
	(0.0133)	(0.0150)	(0.0164)	(0.0156)	(0.0153)	(0.0135)
M. East and N. Africa (misp.)	0.0213	-0.0504**	0.0376	-0.0135	-0.0449**	-0.0164
	(0.0204)	(0.0225)	(0.0243)	(0.0233)	(0.0217)	(0.0199)
Latin America (misp.)	0.0306	0.0103	0.0424**	0.0274	-0.0382*	0.0219
	(0.0218)	(0.0210)	(0.0208)	(0.0204)	(0.0213)	(0.0192)
W. Europe (misp.)	0.0547***	-0.0404**	-0.00272	-0.0402*	0.00686	-0.00781
	(0.0186)	(0.0204)	(0.0211)	(0.0209)	(0.0197)	(0.0177)
E. Europe (misp.)	0.0434**	-0.0623***	0.0230	0.0119	-0.0348	-0.00709
	(0.0207)	(0.0227)	(0.0246)	(0.0236)	(0.0221)	(0.0203)
Asia (w/o M. East) (misp.)	0.0844***	-0.0589***	0.0436**	0.0126	0.0292	0.0329**
	(0.0180)	(0.0189)	(0.0199)	(0.0196)	(0.0188)	(0.0166)
Unemployment (misp.)	-0.0710***	-0.0310**	-0.0577***	-0.0659***	-0.0901***	-0.0955***
	(0.0142)	(0.0158)	(0.0164)	(0.0165)	(0.0154)	(0.0135)
Poverty (misp.)	-0.0203	0.0106	0.0127	0.0420***	0.0373**	0.0255*
	(0.0139)	(0.0154)	(0.0161)	(0.0156)	(0.0150)	(0.0132)
Low Educated (misp.)	-0.0612***	-0.0391***	-0.0530***	-0.0568***	-0.0715***	-0.0863***
	(0.0129)	(0.0145)	(0.0153)	(0.0147)	(0.0142)	(0.0127)
Lack of Effort Reason Poor	-0.134***	-0.119***	-0.142***	-0.0986***	-0.186***	-0.209***
	(0.0124)	(0.0143)	(0.0151)	(0.0148)	(0.0138)	(0.0123)
Mohammad receives more on net	-0.0987***	-0.0579***	-0.0817***	-0.0590***	-0.104***	-0.123***
	(0.0121)	(0.0153)	(0.0169)	(0.0161)	(0.0152)	(0.0131)
Immigrants receive more transfers	-0.0931***	-0.137***	-0.0975***	-0.0906***	-0.132***	-0.169***
	(0.0127)	(0.0156)	(0.0166)	(0.0163)	(0.0153)	(0.0133)
Observations	5022	5021	5022	5021	5024	5013

Notes: The table explores the correlation between support for immigration and misperceptions of immigrants. Each regression includes the variables listed on the left, plus standard personal controls as in Figure 10 and country fixed effects. All variables have been transformed into z-scores and coefficients can be interpreted as partial correlations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-21: MISPERCEPTION INDICES AND SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality No Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)	Redistribution Index (7)
Perc. cultural distance index	0.0633***	-0.0649***	0.0497***	0.0128	0.0268	-0.000323	0.0588***
	(0.0167)	(0.0173)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0171)	(0.0165)	(0.0174)
Perc. economic weakness index	-0.0372**	0.0930***	-0.0205	-0.0573***	-0.00357	-0.0104	-0.0772***
	(0.0150)	(0.0148)	(0.0147)	(0.0149)	(0.0166)	(0.0151)	(0.0158)
Perc. free-riding index	-0.0129	0.0287**	-0.0831***	-0.0785***	0.0318**	-0.0837***	-0.114***
	(0.0146)	(0.0145)	(0.0141)	(0.0146)	(0.0155)	(0.0149)	(0.0146)
All Immigrants (misp.)	-0.0171	0.0627***	-0.0425***	-0.0197	-0.0268*	0.00467	-0.0397**
	(0.0149)	(0.0166)	(0.0143)	(0.0151)	(0.0155)	(0.0149)	(0.0159)
Observations	5060	5060	5060	5060	5060	5060	5060

Notes: The table explores the correlation between support for redistribution and misperceptions of immigrants. Indices are defined in Appendix A-1. Each regression includes the variables listed on the left, plus standard personal controls as in Figure 10 and country fixed effects. All variables have been transformed into z-scores and coefficients can be interpreted as partial correlations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality No Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)	Redistribution Index (7)
All Immigrants (misp.)	-0.00871 (0.0152)	0.0479*** (0.0167)	-0.0321** (0.0144)	-0.00828 (0.0153)	-0.0279* (0.0156)	0.00204 (0.0152)	-0.0241 (0.0161)
Muslim (misp.)	0.0448** (0.0174)	-0.0410** (0.0177)	-0.00630 (0.0169)	-0.00158 (0.0169)	0.00296 (0.0172)	-0.0172 (0.0162)	0.0208 (0.0178)
M. East and N. Africa (misp.)	0.0557** (0.0260)	-0.0870*** (0.0253)	0.0886*** (0.0263)	0.0333 (0.0276)	0.0522** (0.0250)	-0.0198 (0.0241)	0.0692*** (0.0251)
Latin America (misp.)	-0.0155 (0.0207)	-0.0438** (0.0213)	0.00197 (0.0240)	0.0113 (0.0247)	0.0371 (0.0270)	0.00765 (0.0224)	0.00436 (0.0228)
W. Europe (misp.)	0.0284 (0.0217)	-0.0435** (0.0222)	0.0386* (0.0230)	0.00671 (0.0233)	0.0141 (0.0217)	-0.0316 (0.0219)	0.0257 (0.0212)
E. Europe (misp.)	0.0595** (0.0259)	-0.0973*** (0.0245)	0.0848*** (0.0257)	0.0690** (0.0268)	0.00383 (0.0237)	-0.0312 (0.0246)	0.0989*** (0.0265)
Asia (w/o M. East) (misp.)	0.0222 (0.0202)	-0.0678*** (0.0199)	0.0490** (0.0230)	0.0596*** (0.0226)	0.0277 (0.0219)	-0.00855 (0.0209)	0.0583*** (0.0201)
Unemployment (misp.)	-0.0203 (0.0169)	0.0590*** (0.0174)	-0.0167 (0.0164)	-0.0391** (0.0166)	0.00867 (0.0180)	-0.0199 (0.0169)	-0.0588*** (0.0172)
Poverty (misp.)	-0.0308* (0.0171)	0.0549*** (0.0171)	-0.00519 (0.0164)	-0.0376** (0.0167)	-0.0279* (0.0164)	0.0215 (0.0165)	-0.0284* (0.0170)
Low Educated (misp.)	-0.000623 (0.0160)	0.00908 (0.0164)	-0.0114 (0.0155)	0.0234 (0.0159)	0.0254 (0.0159)	-0.000882 (0.0156)	-0.00862 (0.0159)
Lack of Effort Reason Poor	-0.0475*** (0.0140)	0.0538*** (0.0144)	-0.107*** (0.0142)	-0.0328** (0.0149)	0.0739*** (0.0164)	-0.0363** (0.0150)	-0.126*** (0.0146)
Mohammad receives more on net	-0.00794 (0.0161)	0.0283* (0.0169)	-0.0215 (0.0158)	-0.0392** (0.0166)	0.000931 (0.0181)	-0.0485*** (0.0163)	-0.0526*** (0.0163)
Immigrants receive more transfers	0.0261* (0.0156)	-0.0321** (0.0162)	0.0137 (0.0151)	-0.0382** (0.0161)	-0.0291* (0.0174)	-0.0215 (0.0165)	0.0148 (0.0160)
Observations	5025	5025	5025	5025	5025	5025	5025

Notes: The table explores the correlation between support for redistribution and misperceptions of immigrants. Each regression includes the variables listed on the left, plus standard personal controls as in Figure 10 and country fixed effects. All variables have been transformed into z-scores and coefficients can be interpreted as partial correlations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-10 Treatment Effects: Additional Figures and Tables

FIGURE A-11: MISPERCEPTION OF THE SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS: CONTROL VS. SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS TREATMENT GROUPS

(A) U.S.

(B) U.K.

FIGURE A-11: MISPERCEPTION OF THE SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS: (CONT.)

(C) FRANCE

(D) ITALY

(E) GERMANY

(F) SWEDEN

Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the misperception of the share of immigrants of respondents in the control group (left panel) and in the "Share of Immigrants" treatment group (right panel), by country.

Table A-23: U.S. Sample: "Share of Immigrants" Treatment with Legal Immigrants only

Panel A: First Stage Effects on Perceptions

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
Share of Immigrants	-13.27***	0.417***	0.308	0.405	2.013	-5.464***	0.0511
	(1.982)	(0.0358)	(1.026)	(1.397)	(1.453)	(1.944)	(0.0399)
Observations	476	476	477	477	477	477	476
Control mean	24.78	0.06	15.31	13.19	11.78	-17.13	0.35

Panel B: Treatment Effects on Support for Redistribution

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Share of Immigrants	-0.970	0.144	0.359	-0.0155	0.0107	0.0119
	(1.081)	(0.662)	(0.809)	(0.610)	(0.0430)	(0.0455)
Observations	477	477	477	477	475	477
Control mean	28.13	7.92	22.62	16.18	0.51	0.41

Notes: Panel A reports the first-stage effect of the Share of Immigrants treatment on (mis)perceptions of immigration. Panel B reports the effect of the Share of Immigrants treatment on support for redistribution. See notes to Tables 4 and 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A-24: First Stage Effects on Perceptions – Additional Variables

	All immigrants (misp.) (1)	North Africa (misp.) (2)	Middle East (misp.) (3)	Western Europe (misp.) (4)	Eastern Europe (misp.) (5)	North America (misp.) (6)	Latin America (misp.) (7)	Muslim (misp.) (8)	Christian (misp.) (9)
Information T: Share of Immigrants	-4.864***	-0.181	-0.0628	-0.204	-0.0125	0.439**	0.231	0.00857	0.144
	(0.411)	(0.237)	(0.226)	(0.225)	(0.236)	(0.178)	(0.196)	(0.419)	(0.397)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	2.315***	-3.091***	-1.695***	0.372*	2.212***	-0.766***	2.556***	-1.829***	2.456***
	(0.426)	(0.226)	(0.213)	(0.212)	(0.243)	(0.176)	(0.213)	(0.405)	(0.397)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.709*	-0.303	-0.0824	-0.0802	0.416*	0.0548	0.371*	-0.869**	0.796**
	(0.409)	(0.231)	(0.227)	(0.223)	(0.231)	(0.172)	(0.192)	(0.404)	(0.393)
Observations	19735	19756	19756	19747	19759	19744	19758	19761	19757
Control mean	17.02	7.98	4.63	-5.70	-4.48	4.62	-1.98	11.30	-23.98

	Unemployment (misp.) (10)	Poverty (misp.) (11)	Low Educated (misp.) (12)	High Educated (misp.) (13)	Imm. Receive More Transfers (14)	Lack of Effort Poor (15)	Effort Rich (16)	Mohammad Gets More (17)
Information T: Share of Immigrants	-1.499***	-0.489	-0.654	-0.0276	0.000113	0.000297	-0.0116	0.000905
	(0.511)	(0.482)	(0.503)	(0.406)	(0.00874)	(0.00921)	(0.00943)	(0.00815)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.163	0.614	0.417	-0.375	-0.00305	-0.000234	-0.00870	-0.00693
	(0.517)	(0.484)	(0.505)	(0.404)	(0.00875)	(0.00925)	(0.00944)	(0.00812)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	-2.149***	3.159***	-0.730	-0.912**	-0.0105	-0.0535***	-0.00441	-0.0131
	(0.501)	(0.482)	(0.501)	(0.400)	(0.00871)	(0.00899)	(0.00944)	(0.00810)
Observations	19732	19739	19723	19729	19745	19721	19709	19752
Control mean	24.44	12.40	5.35	-4.91	0.30	0.36	0.66	0.24

Notes: The table reports first-stage effects on an extended set of (mis)perceptions of immigration. Misperceptions are computed as the perception minus the actual value. See Appendix A-1 for variable definitions. All regressions include the same controls as Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-25: FIRST STAGE EFFECTS: PERSISTENCE IN FOLLOW-UP (US ONLY)

	All immigrants (misp.)	Accurate Perception All immigrants	M. East and N. Africa (misp.)	L. America (misp.)	Muslim (misp.)	Christian (misp.)	Lack of Effort reason poor
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: First survey who took the follow-up							
Information T: Share of Immigrants	-7.045***	0.230***	1.515	-1.016	0.578	3.745*	0.0110
	(2.019)	(0.0280)	(1.038)	(1.487)	(1.347)	(2.061)	(0.0404)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	1.671	-0.0214**	-7.220***	15.12***	-3.436***	5.457**	-0.0418
	(2.115)	(0.0106)	(0.929)	(1.723)	(1.283)	(2.127)	(0.0427)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	1.035	0.00854	1.889*	0.278	1.008	0.336	-0.0889**
	(2.046)	(0.0142)	(1.105)	(1.598)	(1.322)	(2.005)	(0.0406)
Control mean	21.29	0.02	14.86	-16.85	12.08	-22.66	0.45
Panel B: Follow-up respondents							
Information T: Share of Immigrants	-1.369	0.0201	0.853	-1.303	0.539	3.411*	-0.0124
	(1.903)	(0.0183)	(1.039)	(1.398)	(1.213)	(2.038)	(0.0399)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	-1.301	-0.0177	-2.808***	7.234***	-0.566	2.148	-0.0370
	(1.859)	(0.0144)	(0.987)	(1.549)	(1.262)	(1.970)	(0.0421)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	-1.246	-0.00130	1.057	0.640	1.102	-1.584	-0.0822**
	(1.887)	(0.0157)	(1.049)	(1.416)	(1.222)	(1.899)	(0.0389)
Control mean	21.08	0.03	15.95	-18.61	11.05	-21.85	0.47
Panel C: Differences in perceptions between follow-up and main survey							
Information T: Share of Immigrants	5.669***	-0.210***	-0.660	-0.287	-0.0388	-0.334	-0.0234
	(1.991)	(0.0311)	(1.171)	(1.506)	(1.298)	(2.033)	(0.0410)
Information T: Origins of Immigrants	-2.971	0.00371	4.414***	-7.888***	2.870**	-3.308	0.00479
	(2.116)	(0.0165)	(1.155)	(1.886)	(1.421)	(2.074)	(0.0428)
Anecdote T: Hard Work of Immigrants	-2.355	-0.00986	-0.791	0.361	0.0946	-1.919	0.00676
	(1.978)	(0.0202)	(1.250)	(1.612)	(1.316)	(1.964)	(0.0406)
Observations	1031	1031	1033	1034	1034	1034	1032
Control mean	-0.21	0.01	1.10	-1.76	-1.03	0.81	0.02

Notes: Panel A reports estimates of the first-stage effects in the first-round survey, on the subsample of respondents who also took the follow up survey. Panel B shows the persistence of treatment effects on that subsample in the follow up survey. Panel C shows the effect of the treatments on the difference in perceptions between the followup and the main survey – defined as the value of the variable in the followup minus its value in the main survey. See notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-26: REDISTRIBUTION BLOCK FIRST: EFFECT ON PERCEPTIONS AND IMMIGRATION POLICY VIEWS

Panel A: Perceptions

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (2)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (3)	Muslim (misp.) (4)	Christian (misp.) (5)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (6)	Misperception Index (7)
Redistribution First	1.366**	-0.465	-0.519	-1.298**	-0.270	-0.00613	0.00652
	(0.560)	(0.431)	(0.492)	(0.579)	(0.553)	(0.0129)	(0.0139)
Observations	5060	5061	5054	5062	5064	5059	5064
Control mean	17.68	12.60	-5.56	11.30	-23.98	0.36	0.00

Panel B: Support for Immigration

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
Redistribution First	-0.0175	-0.0258*	-0.00938	-0.00562	-0.00525	-0.0255
	(0.0114)	(0.0135)	(0.0122)	(0.0131)	(0.0507)	(0.0167)
Observations	5060	5060	5060	5060	5063	5050
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.71	0.62	4.53	0.00

Notes: The table shows the effect of seeing the "Redistribution Block" before the "Immigration Block" on perceptions of immigrants – Panel A – and on support for immigration – Panel B. See Appendix A-1 for the definitions of the indices. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Sample: respondents who have not seen any video treatment.

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Panel A: Right-Wing vs. Left-Wing						
Order/Salience T x Right	-2.156***	0.987**	-0.947**	0.466*	0.00772	-0.0526**
	(0.630)	(0.438)	(0.375)	(0.270)	(0.0207)	(0.0210)
Order/Salience T x Left	-1.851***	0.851**	-0.336	0.306	-0.0575***	-0.0480**
	(0.605)	(0.390)	(0.343)	(0.256)	(0.0187)	(0.0200)
p-value diff.	0.727	0.815	0.229	0.668	0.019	0.875
Panel B: College-Educated vs. No College						
Order/Salience T x College	-1.636***	0.220	-0.496	0.495*	-0.0161	-0.0575***
	(0.613)	(0.390)	(0.366)	(0.272)	(0.0209)	(0.0218)
Order/Salience T x No College	-2.195***	1.396***	-0.575*	0.390*	-0.0356**	-0.0406**
	(0.563)	(0.381)	(0.313)	(0.230)	(0.0171)	(0.0178)
p-value diff.	0.503	0.032	0.869	0.769	0.471	0.548
Panel C: Male vs. Female						
Order/Salience T x Male	-2.045***	0.910**	-0.496	0.393	-0.00891	-0.0717***
	(0.592)	(0.399)	(0.345)	(0.252)	(0.0189)	(0.0198)
Order/Salience T x Female	-1.894***	0.928**	-0.589*	0.471*	-0.0459**	-0.0240
	(0.588)	(0.383)	(0.328)	(0.245)	(0.0186)	(0.0192)
p-value diff.	0.856	0.974	0.845	0.824	0.164	0.084
Panel D: High Immigration sector/No college vs. Not						
Order/Salience T x H imm	-2.590***	1.318**	-0.783*	0.628**	-0.0308	-0.0814***
	(0.790)	(0.533)	(0.426)	(0.308)	(0.0233)	(0.0240)
Order/Salience T x Not H imm	-1.710***	0.747**	-0.425	0.332	-0.0266*	-0.0316*
	(0.486)	(0.319)	(0.286)	(0.213)	(0.0161)	(0.0168)
p-value diff.	0.342	0.359	0.486	0.430	0.884	0.090
Control mean	37.12	10.94	29.53	16.00	0.59	0.47
Observations	5064	5064	5064	5064	5064	5064

Notes: The table reports the effects of the Order/Salience treatment, estimated only on respondents who have not seen any video treatment. Panel A reports heterogeneous effects on Left-wing and on Right-wing respondent. The regressions also include a "Treatment x Center" interaction, not reported. Panel B reports the effects on respondents with a college degree and respondents without. Panel C reports the effects on male and female respondents. Panel D reports the effects on respondents working in a high immigration sector who do not have a college degree, and on all the other respondents. "p-value diff." is the p-value of the test of equality of treatment effects on the pairs of groups. All regressions include the same controls as Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A-11   Effort vs. Luck in Germany

To get a sense of the general attitudes towards the importance of luck versus hard work in Germany we look at the following question from the 2014 wave of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS/GGSS):

What is the best way to get to the top in our society? Using the card, please rate the importance of the qualities and situations. Please tell me for each one how important you think it is for getting ahead in our society today. [Unimportant, Less Important, Important, Very important].

Figure A-12 reports the share of respondents thinking that the factor listed on the y-axis is important or very important to make it to the top. Some of these factors (Luck, Corruption, Opportunism, Right Social Background, Connections, Talent) are mostly related to luck/advantages, others (Industriousness, Initiative, Education) are more closely linked to hard work.

FIGURE A-12: WHAT FACTORS ARE IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT TO THE TOP?

Notes: The figure reports the share of German respondents who think that the factor listed on the y-axis is important or very important to make it to the top. Source: German General Social Survey (ALLBUS/GGSS) 2014. See Section A-11 for details.

A-12   Power Calculation and Pooling Treatments

We set the target sample size for our survey experiments to make sure that we have at least 80 percent power to detect a treatment effect of around 10 percent of a standard deviation with a 5 percent significance. This is in line with other information provision experiments. For instance, Haaland et al. (2021) recommend to have at least 80 percent power to detect a treatment effect of 15 percent of a standard deviation, or around 700 respondents per treatment arm. In our main survey we collect 2,750 observations for each group listed in Table A-1. After dropping respondents who spent too much or too little time on the survey (top 2% and bottom 2% in the time distribution per country and treatment arm) we are left with about 2,600 observations per group. Under the standard assumption of normality of estimation errors, this sample size gives us 80 percent power to detect a treatment effect of about 7 percent of a standard deviation with a 5 percent significance.

We have also tried pooling the two information experiments ("Share of Immigrants" and "Origins of Immigrants"), to further increase power. Results are reported in Tables A-28-A-30. The pooled information treatment still has a strong first stage effect on perception. However, its effect on policy preference is virtually identical to that of the two separate treatments. That is, the pooled information treatment slightly increases the share of respondents who think that immigration is not a problem (driven by the "Share of immigrants"

treatment) and has substantially no effects on support for redistribution — except for a small negative effect on preferred spending on health and safety net, as for the two treatments separately. Coefficients that were not statistically significant for the two separate treatments remain as such for the pooled treatment. This further supports that the lack of statistical significance is not due to power issues.

TABLE A-28: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – POOLED INFORMATION TREATMENT

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-1.948***	0.914***	-0.543**	0.439**	-0.0280**	-0.0479***
	(0.416)	(0.276)	(0.238)	(0.175)	(0.0132)	(0.0138)
Pooled T: Share & Origin of Immigrants	-0.347	0.0386	-0.472**	0.176	0.000175	-0.00721
	(0.365)	(0.244)	(0.204)	(0.149)	(0.0114)	(0.0121)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0772	-0.212	-0.0944	0.333**	0.0158	0.00910
	(0.422)	(0.279)	(0.235)	(0.170)	(0.0132)	(0.0139)
Observations	19765	19765	19765	19765	19763	19765
Control mean	37.12	10.94	29.53	16.00	0.59	0.47

Notes: The table replicates Table 4 pooling respondents who have seen the "Share of Immigrants" or the "Origin of Immigrants" treatment. See notes to Table 4 . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-29: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – POOLED INFORMATION TREATMENT

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
Pooled T: Share & Origin of Immigrants	-1.281***	0.115***	-2.520***	1.000***	-0.909**	1.300***	0.0000322
	(0.358)	(0.00464)	(0.264)	(0.307)	(0.356)	(0.342)	(0.00797)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.708*	-0.00416	-0.385	0.378	-0.868**	0.795**	-0.0535***
	(0.409)	(0.00396)	(0.308)	(0.352)	(0.404)	(0.393)	(0.00899)
Observations	19735	19735	19747	19728	19761	19757	19721
Control mean	17.02	0.04	12.60	-5.56	11.30	-23.98	0.36

Notes: The table replicates Table 5 pooling respondents who have seen the "Share of Immigrants" or the "Origin of Immigrants" treatment. See notes to Table 5 . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-30: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – POOLED INFORMATION TREATMENT

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
Pooled T: Share & Origin of Immigrants	0.0147**	0.00676	0.00823	0.00478	-0.00309	0.0148
	(0.00709)	(0.00829)	(0.00744)	(0.00808)	(0.0311)	(0.0103)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0252***	0.0202**	0.0133	0.0171*	0.131***	0.0463***
	(0.00829)	(0.00957)	(0.00857)	(0.00934)	(0.0359)	(0.0119)
Observations	19727	19749	19745	19742	19754	19765
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.71	0.62	4.53	0.00

Notes: The table replicates TableA-30 pooling respondents who have seen the "Share of Immigrants" or the "Origin of Immigrants" treatment. See notes to Table A-30 . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13 Robustness Checks

A-13.1 Reduced sample

In this section we report misperceptions by country and by group, and treatment effects estimated on a "reduced" sample that excludes flagged respondents. The three flags refer to i) respondents in the top 2% and bottom 5% of the time spent on a given question; ii) clearly suspicious patterns in respondents' answers that are indicative of carelessness, such as entering "0" or "100" to questions about shares (reported in Panel A of Table A-7 in the Online Appendix); iii) inattentive participants that have a *Response Pattern Index* greater or equal than 0.8. As in Meade and Craig (2012): this index represents the share of answers to qualitative questions for which the respondent selected answers in the same position – ordered as first, last or middle. Careless respondents are more likely to just mechanically select the option in the same position in every question to get to the end of the survey more quickly.

TABLE A-31: PERCEPTIONS BY COUNTRY – REDUCED SAMPLE

	U.S.			U.K.			France		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	34.88 (0.72)	30.00 [19.00, 45.00]	13.40	30.71 (0.64)	29.00 [15.00, 41.00]	12.20	28.59 (0.62)	26.00 [14.00, 40.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	0.30	8.44 (0.21)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	0.90	9.93 (0.26)	10.00 [5.00, 14.00]	35.30	27.45 (0.49)	26.00 [18.00, 35.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	4.10	12.35 (0.33)	10.00 [5.00, 16.00]	5.10	10.94 (0.32)	10.00 [5.00, 15.00]	5.60	11.31 (0.35)	9.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	7.70	10.89 (0.27)	10.00 [5.00, 15.00]	19.00	16.03 (0.41)	13.00 [7.00, 20.00]	29.30	10.84 (0.34)	10.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Eastern Europe	6.10	10.04 (0.24)	10.00 [5.00, 13.00]	20.00	23.61 (0.47)	20.00 [14.00, 30.00]	5.20	14.56 (0.33)	13.00 [9.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	2.30	9.02 (0.28)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	2.30	5.77 (0.20)	5.00 [2.00, 9.00]	1.00	5.20 (0.23)	3.00 [1.00, 7.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	42.30	24.28 (0.54)	20.00 [12.00, 32.00]	3.90	5.21 (0.17)	4.00 [2.00, 7.00]	3.40	5.36 (0.18)	4.00 [2.00, 8.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	10.00	22.58 (0.48)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	23.00	33.08 (0.63)	30.00 [20.00, 44.00]	48.00	48.57 (0.67)	50.00 [30.00, 60.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	61.00	38.83 (0.70)	40.00 [20.00, 50.00]	58.00	29.47 (0.64)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	43.00	24.70 (0.52)	20.00 [10.00, 33.50]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	5.50	25.44 (0.75)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	5.70	26.36 (0.79)	20.00 [7.00, 40.00]	16.60	37.16 (0.84)	30.00 [15.00, 55.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	13.60	34.49 (0.76)	30.00 [18.00, 50.00]	19.00	29.99 (0.75)	25.00 [10.00, 41.00]	23.80	41.18 (0.81)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of Low-Educated Immigrants	22.00	28.39 (0.77)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	16.60	25.73 (0.77)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	39.10	50.69 (0.84)	50.00 [30.00, 70.00]
Share of High-Educated Immigrants	41.40	34.80 (0.77)	30.00 [19.00, 50.00]	48.80	25.78 (0.71)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	28.80	27.81 (0.62)	25.00 [10.00, 40.00]
Relative Transfers Received	1.23	1.17 (0.06)	1.00 [0.33, 1.00]	1.42	1.02 (0.04)	1.00 [0.50, 1.00]	1.39	1.76 (0.08)	1.00 [1.00, 1.10]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.41 (0.02)			0.36 (0.02)			0.31 (0.01)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.67 (0.02)			0.70 (0.01)			0.62 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.26 (0.01)			0.18 (0.01)			0.34 (0.02)	
Observations		898			916			922	

Table A-31: Perceptions by Country – Reduced Sample (cont.)

	Italy			Germany			Sweden		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	25.41 (0.63)	20.00 [10.00, 33.00]	14.80	30.21 (0.69)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	17.60	26.41 (0.79)	21.00 [15.00, 33.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	10.20	24.76 (0.46)	23.00 [16.00, 30.00]	1.50	16.38 (0.38)	15.00 [8.00, 22.00]	1.20	12.35 (0.37)	10.00 [7.00, 17.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	2.90	9.04 (0.25)	8.00 [3.00, 13.00]	17.30	16.77 (0.44)	15.00 [7.00, 23.00]	23.80	25.26 (0.72)	23.00 [15.00, 34.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	14.30	5.99 (0.23)	4.00 [1.00, 9.00]	14.90	13.06 (0.41)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]	23.60	15.05 (0.73)	10.00 [4.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from Eastern Europe	38.10	18.70 (0.36)	19.00 [10.00, 25.00]	42.60	23.78 (0.41)	22.00 [15.00, 30.00]	22.20	14.07 (0.42)	13.00 [8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	0.90	4.12 (0.22)	2.00 [0.00, 5.00]	1.10	4.54 (0.17)	3.00 [1.00, 6.00]	1.40	3.95 (0.24)	3.00 [1.00, 5.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	9.10	9.49 (0.25)	9.00 [4.00, 13.00]	3.20	5.19 (0.15)	5.00 [2.00, 8.00]	5.50	7.67 (0.31)	6.00 [3.00, 10.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	33.00	45.49 (0.69)	45.00 [30.00, 60.00]	30.00	43.44 (0.66)	40.00 [30.00, 60.00]	27.00	44.37 (1.02)	40.00 [30.00, 60.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	57.00	26.77 (0.61)	22.00 [10.00, 40.00]	51.00	31.74 (0.61)	30.00 [20.00, 45.00]	61.00	32.56 (0.96)	30.00 [17.00, 47.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	14.70	40.99 (0.87)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	6.90	39.24 (0.95)	30.00 [15.00, 60.00]	16.10	37.13 (1.15)	30.00 [16.00, 55.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	34.90	42.88 (0.82)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	20.50	34.18 (0.83)	30.00 [15.00, 50.00]	29.80	25.81 (1.02)	20.00 [10.00, 37.00]
Share of Low-Educated Immigrants	49.10	43.91 (0.85)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]	35.10	37.66 (0.82)	30.00 [20.00, 50.00]	33.70	40.48 (1.21)	38.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of High-Educated Immigrants	11.70	18.53 (0.58)	10.00 [5.00, 27.00]	22.30	21.79 (0.59)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	37.90	36.67 (1.03)	35.00 [20.00, 50.00]
Relative Transfers Received	1.29	1.34 (0.06)	1.00 [0.50, 1.10]	0.72	1.13 (0.04)	1.00 [1.00, 1.00]	1.44	1.28 (0.06)	1.00 [1.00, 1.10]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.31 (0.01)			0.41 (0.02)			0.32 (0.02)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.69 (0.01)			0.60 (0.02)			0.69 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.33 (0.02)			0.20 (0.01)			0.01 (0.01)	
Observations		914			920			451	

Notes: Panel A reports mean and median perceptions for each country. The standard errors of the means are in parentheses and the interquartile ranges (25th and 75th percentiles) are in square brackets. The actual value of the statistic for each country is reported in columns (1), (4), (7), (10), (13) and (16). Panel B reports the mean of each attitude variable for each country and its standard error (in parentheses). Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment, excluding flagged respondents.

Table A-32: Misperceptions By Respondent Groups - Reduced Sample

	Immigrants		Muslim		Christian		Unemployed		Poor		Low Educ		High Educ		Transfers		Obs.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
College	14.43	10.00	8.17	7.00	-21.46	-23.00	18.93	11.30	9.36	6.00	3.48	-0.10	-3.31	-6.70	-0.10	-0.39	2152
	(0.43)	[-0.2;24.0]	(0.40)	[-3.0;20.0]	(0.41)	[-36.0;-11.0]	(0.52)	[0.3;33.4]	(0.49)	[-9.0;25.1]	(0.51)	[-13.7;18.0]	(0.46)	[-18.8;11.2]	(0.03)	[-0.8;-0.2]	
No College	18.59	15.20	12.08	10.00	-25.73	-28.00	26.75	23.10	14.42	10.20	6.30	3.00	-5.55	-7.30	0.16	-0.29	3182
	(0.36)	[3.0;28.8]	(0.36)	[-3.0;27.0]	(0.34)	[-41.0;-12.0]	(0.46)	[4.3;44.5]	(0.45)	[-4.9;31.2]	(0.46)	[-13.7;24.9]	(0.46)	[-20.3;8.3]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
High Income	14.87	10.50	9.65	7.00	-22.02	-23.00	20.43	13.40	9.68	5.10	4.79	0.90	-5.40	-7.30	-0.13	-0.39	869
	(0.66)	[0.0;25.0]	(0.63)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.65)	[-37.0;-11.0]	(0.83)	[0.1;34.5]	(0.79)	[-9.0;25.1]	(0.83)	[-13.7;20.9]	(0.69)	[-18.8;7.7]	(0.05)	[-0.8;-0.1]	
Low Income	17.34	14.00	10.68	9.00	-24.40	-27.00	24.27	16.40	12.91	9.50	5.25	0.90	-4.51	-6.70	0.09	-0.29	4467
	(0.30)	[1.6;27.8]	(0.30)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.29)	[-38.0;-11.0]	(0.38)	[3.4;43.4]	(0.37)	[-6.3;29.5]	(0.38)	[-13.7;21.3]	(0.33)	[-18.8;8.6]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Young	18.63	15.80	9.29	7.00	-24.19	-27.00	24.04	18.10	13.81	9.50	4.04	0.90	-2.05	-2.85	0.02	-0.34	2823
	(0.37)	[3.2;28.2]	(0.37)	[-3.0;20.0]	(0.35)	[-38.0;-11.0]	(0.47)	[3.4;43.1]	(0.47)	[-5.5;31.0]	(0.46)	[-14.1;20.9]	(0.42)	[-17.9;11.2]	(0.03)	[-0.8;0.3]	
Old	15.24	10.00	11.76	10.00	-23.86	-26.00	23.27	14.50	10.96	6.40	6.36	0.90	-7.33	-8.70	0.10	-0.29	2513
	(0.41)	[0.0;25.0]	(0.39)	[-2.0;25.0]	(0.40)	[-38.0;-11.0]	(0.52)	[3.1;43.1]	(0.47)	[-8.8;26.2]	(0.51)	[-12.6;23.4]	(0.42)	[-21.0;3.6]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Male	14.67	9.00	10.43	8.00	-22.92	-25.00	22.05	14.30	11.41	6.20	5.58	0.90	-7.01	-8.70	-0.03	-0.29	2611
	(0.40)	[-0.2;23.4]	(0.39)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.39)	[-38.0;-11.0]	(0.51)	[1.3;39.3]	(0.49)	[-9.0;26.2]	(0.50)	[-13.7;23.4]	(0.41)	[-20.3;5.6]	(0.03)	[-0.7;0.3]	
Female	19.15	16.60	10.60	8.00	-25.08	-27.00	25.19	19.50	13.35	9.50	4.80	0.90	-2.41	-2.30	0.13	-0.29	2725
	(0.37)	[4.2;29.0]	(0.37)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.35)	[-38.0;-12.0]	(0.48)	[4.3;43.4]	(0.46)	[-4.9;29.5]	(0.47)	[-13.7;20.9]	(0.43)	[-18.8;11.2]	(0.04)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Left-Wing	17.27	13.00	8.94	7.00	-22.92	-26.00	22.57	14.50	12.82	9.50	2.62	-1.30	-2.02	-2.30	-0.21	-0.34	2449
	(0.42)	[1.0;27.0]	(0.38)	[-3.0;20.0]	(0.39)	[-37.0;-11.0]	(0.50)	[3.1;38.4]	(0.49)	[-4.9;29.5]	(0.49)	[-15.1;19.4]	(0.45)	[-17.3;11.2]	(0.03)	[-0.8;-0.2]	
Right-Wing	17.62	14.40	14.13	12.00	-26.47	-28.00	26.33	19.50	12.35	6.40	8.53	3.40	-8.84	-9.70	0.38	-0.23	2144
	(0.43)	[2.4;27.8]	(0.42)	[0.0;27.0]	(0.42)	[-41.0;-13.0]	(0.57)	[4.3;44.5]	(0.54)	[-8.8;30.1]	(0.56)	[-11.6;28.0]	(0.47)	[-23.8;3.3]	(0.05)	[-0.4;0.4]	
Immigrant Parent	23.06	20.00	8.98	7.00	-21.29	-23.00	20.96	14.30	11.92	6.40	6.43	0.90	-2.24	-2.30	-0.10	-0.39	505
	(0.97)	[5.0;36.6]	(0.83)	[-3.0;20.0]	(0.85)	[-33.0;-9.0]	(1.07)	[3.1;37.5]	(1.08)	[-8.6;29.4]	(1.10)	[-12.0;23.2]	(1.01)	[-18.8;12.1]	(0.06)	[-0.7;0.3]	
No Immigrant Parent	16.29	12.40	10.69	8.00	-24.32	-27.00	23.95	15.30	12.44	6.40	5.04	0.90	-4.91	-6.70	0.07	-0.29	4830
	(0.28)	[0.8;26.0]	(0.28)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.28)	[-38.0;-11.0]	(0.37)	[3.3;43.1]	(0.35)	[-8.5;29.5]	(0.36)	[-14.0;20.9]	(0.32)	[-18.8;8.3]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Knows an Immigrant	15.83	11.60	9.89	7.00	-22.51	-23.00	21.21	13.90	10.52	6.20	4.19	0.90	-3.13	-6.40	-0.02	-0.32	3556
	(0.33)	[0.4;25.6]	(0.32)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.32)	[-37.0;-11.0]	(0.42)	[1.5;35.3]	(0.41)	[-9.0;26.2]	(0.41)	[-14.0;20.9]	(0.37)	[-18.8;11.2]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	
Does Not Know any Immigrant	19.30	15.80	11.84	10.00	-27.19	-31.00	28.89	24.30	16.29	11.40	7.27	3.40	-7.88	-8.80	0.21	-0.29	1780
	(0.48)	[3.0;30.0]	(0.48)	[-1.0;25.0]	(0.47)	[-41.0;-13.0]	(0.63)	[5.1;49.3]	(0.58)	[-3.8;35.1]	(0.62)	[-12.0;26.3]	(0.52)	[-21.4;6.2]	(0.05)	[-0.7;0.3]	
High Imm. Sector & No College	19.79	16.80	11.77	10.00	-26.20	-28.00	27.45	23.10	15.52	11.00	7.22	3.40	-7.61	-8.80	0.17	-0.29	1719
	(0.49)	[4.2;30.0]	(0.49)	[-3.0;27.0]	(0.47)	[-41.0;-13.0]	(0.64)	[4.3;45.3]	(0.61)	[-4.8;35.1]	(0.64)	[-12.0;25.9]	(0.55)	[-23.8;7.7]	(0.05)	[-0.4;0.3]	
High Imm. Sector & College	14.88	10.00	7.48	7.00	-21.62	-23.00	20.64	13.40	9.57	6.20	4.03	-1.60	-3.94	-6.70	-0.13	-0.42	1024
	(0.62)	[0.0;24.0]	(0.57)	[-3.0;18.0]	(0.59)	[-36.0;-11.0]	(0.79)	[0.2;34.5]	(0.69)	[-8.9;25.1]	(0.73)	[-12.0;16.3]	(0.70)	[-18.8;11.2]	(0.05)	[-0.9;-0.2]	
Not High Imm. Sector	15.79	11.00	10.86	10.00	-23.47	-26.00	22.18	14.50	11.39	6.40	4.19	0.90	-2.96	-6.40	0.05	-0.29	2565
	(0.39)	[0.2;25.2]	(0.39)	[-3.0;22.0]	(0.38)	[-37.0;-11.0]	(0.49)	[3.1;38.1]	(0.48)	[-8.8;26.4]	(0.49)	[-14.1;20.9]	(0.42)	[-17.3;8.6]	(0.03)	[-0.4;0.3]	

Notes: The table shows the mean (in odd columns) and median (in even columns) misperceptions – computed as perceived minus real – by groups. Groups are defined by the indicator variables listed to the left. The standard errors of the means are in parentheses and the interquartile ranges (25th and 75th percentiles) are in square brackets. Sample: respondents who were not exposed to any video treatment, excluding flagged respondents.

TABLE A-33: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – REDUCED SAMPLE

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-1.775***	0.927***	-0.401*	0.507***	-0.0276**	-0.0476***
	(0.424)	(0.274)	(0.232)	(0.175)	(0.0133)	(0.0138)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.512	0.150	-0.353	0.260	-0.00561	-0.0165
	(0.426)	(0.279)	(0.228)	(0.171)	(0.0133)	(0.0140)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.0223	0.0968	-0.395*	0.183	0.00754	0.00265
	(0.430)	(0.282)	(0.236)	(0.173)	(0.0132)	(0.0140)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0218	-0.00121	-0.0720	0.305*	0.0150	0.00918
	(0.428)	(0.277)	(0.230)	(0.169)	(0.0132)	(0.0140)
Observations	18656	18656	18657	18673	19724	19726
Control mean	37.46	10.65	29.79	16.14	0.59	0.47

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Flagged respondents are excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-34: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – REDUCED SAMPLE

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-5.296***	0.239***	-0.107	-0.0486	-0.230	-0.185	-0.000161
	(0.406)	(0.00720)	(0.305)	(0.352)	(0.397)	(0.386)	(0.00922)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.121***	0.00262	-4.778***	1.725***	-1.597***	2.316***	-0.000575
	(0.426)	(0.00424)	(0.288)	(0.351)	(0.388)	(0.391)	(0.00926)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.562	-0.00401	-0.343	0.321	-0.514	0.578	-0.0534***
	(0.408)	(0.00409)	(0.301)	(0.348)	(0.386)	(0.383)	(0.00900)
Observations	18554	18554	18640	18632	18437	18560	19682
Control mean	16.40	0.04	12.83	-6.07	10.51	-23.98	0.36

Notes: See notes to Table 5. Flagged respondents are excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-35: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – REDUCED SAMPLE

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0243***	0.0101	0.0165*	0.00547	-0.00192	0.0247**
	(0.00826)	(0.00960)	(0.00857)	(0.00937)	(0.0359)	(0.0119)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00535	0.00398	0.000912	0.00466	0.0000960	0.00636
	(0.00823)	(0.00962)	(0.00863)	(0.00937)	(0.0361)	(0.0119)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0247***	0.0202**	0.0130	0.0168*	0.131***	0.0459***
	(0.00829)	(0.00958)	(0.00857)	(0.00934)	(0.0359)	(0.0119)
Observations	19689	19710	19706	19703	19715	19726
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.72	0.62	4.53	0.00

Notes: See notes to Table 6 Flagged respondents are excluded from the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.2 Excluding Respondents who Think the Survey was Biased

At the end of the survey we asked respondents whether they thought that our survey was biased towards either left-wing or right-wing opinions. In this section we re-estimate the treatment effects dropping from the sample respondents who thought our survey was either left-wing or right-wing biased. These respondents account for 16.8% of our main sample. The treatment effects estimated in this sample are slightly stronger, perhaps because the remaining respondents are more receptive to what they think is un-biased information.

TABLE A-36: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – EXCLUDING RESPONDENTS WHO THINK THE SURVEY WAS BIASED

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-1.687***	0.774***	-0.612**	0.429**	-0.0312**	-0.0424***
	(0.447)	(0.289)	(0.247)	(0.186)	(0.0143)	(0.0150)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.520	0.0367	-0.383	0.135	-0.0106	-0.00957
	(0.448)	(0.297)	(0.245)	(0.184)	(0.0144)	(0.0153)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.119	0.0892	-0.442*	0.174	0.00213	0.0102
	(0.454)	(0.300)	(0.247)	(0.184)	(0.0143)	(0.0153)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.199	-0.122	-0.139	0.339*	0.0159	0.0133
	(0.458)	(0.301)	(0.245)	(0.182)	(0.0143)	(0.0153)
Observations	16575	16575	16575	16575	16573	16575
Control mean	37.49	10.53	29.93	16.12	0.60	0.47

Notes: This Table replicates Table 4 excluding from the estimation sample respondents who thought our survey was biased. See notes to Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-37: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – EXCLUDING RESPONDENTS WHO THINK THE SURVEY WAS BIASED

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-5.106***	0.232***	-0.119	0.106	0.0736	0.163	-0.00696
	(0.434)	(0.00760)	(0.331)	(0.381)	(0.444)	(0.423)	(0.00990)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.365***	0.00503	-4.945***	1.941***	-1.766***	2.571***	-0.00459
	(0.454)	(0.00451)	(0.314)	(0.380)	(0.432)	(0.423)	(0.00992)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.751*	-0.00448	-0.475	0.685*	-0.889**	0.747*	-0.0601***
	(0.435)	(0.00433)	(0.329)	(0.378)	(0.432)	(0.422)	(0.00963)
Observations	16555	16555	16559	16545	16574	16568	16538
Control mean	16.53	0.04	12.86	-5.80	11.30	-24.08	0.34

Notes: This Table replicates Table 5 excluding from the estimation sample respondents who thought our survey was biased. See notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-38: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – EXCLUDING RESPONDENTS WHO THINK THE SURVEY WAS BIASED

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0297***	0.0107	0.0185**	0.00694	0.00497	0.0295**
	(0.00906)	(0.0104)	(0.00920)	(0.0101)	(0.0389)	(0.0129)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00752	0.00265	0.00140	0.000589	-0.0230	0.00298
	(0.00897)	(0.0104)	(0.00927)	(0.0101)	(0.0390)	(0.0130)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0273***	0.0250**	0.0153*	0.0137	0.161***	0.0519***
	(0.00913)	(0.0105)	(0.00925)	(0.0102)	(0.0390)	(0.0129)
Observations	16548	16561	16562	16560	16566	16575
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.73	0.63	4.57	0.00

Notes: This Table replicates Table 6 excluding from the estimation sample respondents who thought our survey was biased. See notes to Table 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.3   Re-weighted sample

In our sample college-educated and unemployed are slightly over-represented compared to the population of our countries. As a robustness check, we compute weights to match the unemployment rate and the share of college educated in the countries of our sample. In order to keep our sample balanced along gender, age, and income, we also target these variables in constructing the weights. Hence, for each country, we split the sample into 160 cells based on gender (2, male vs. female) × age (5, the five groups in Table 1) × income (4, the four groups in Table 1) × unemployed (2, unemployed vs. not) × college (2, with vs. without a college degree), and we compute a weight for each cell, so that the distribution of these characteristics in the weighted sample matches the distribution in the population of our countries, reported in Table 1.

In this section we report mean perceptions by country and treatment effects estimated on the re-weighted sample. Re-weighting observations does not affect significantly our estimates.

TABLE A-39: PERCEPTIONS BY COUNTRY – RE-WEIGHTED SAMPLE

	U.S.			U.K.			France		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	36.20 (0.75)	31.00 [20.00, 48.00]	13.40	31.62 (0.64)	30.00 [15.00, 43.00]	12.20	29.62 (0.67)	29.00 [15.00, 40.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	0.30	8.48 (0.22)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	0.90	9.84 (0.27)	10.00 [5.00, 14.00]	35.30	26.74 (0.57)	25.00 [16.00, 35.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	4.10	12.19 (0.33)	10.00 [5.00, 16.00]	5.10	10.95 (0.35)	10.00 [5.00, 15.00]	5.60	11.44 (0.40)	9.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	7.70	10.85 (0.27)	10.00 [5.00, 15.00]	19.00	16.18 (0.43)	13.00 [7.00, 21.00]	29.30	10.79 (0.36)	9.00 [4.00, 15.00]
Share of Immigrants from Easter Europe	6.10	9.87 (0.24)	10.00 [5.00, 13.00]	20.00	23.44 (0.48)	20.00 [13.00, 30.00]	5.20	14.62 (0.41)	13.00 [8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	2.30	9.69 (0.35)	7.00 [4.00, 11.00]	2.30	6.16 (0.23)	5.00 [2.00, 9.00]	1.00	6.11 (0.35)	4.00 [1.00, 8.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	42.30	24.38 (0.57)	20.00 [11.00, 32.00]	3.90	5.65 (0.20)	5.00 [2.00, 8.00]	3.40	5.79 (0.22)	5.00 [2.00, 9.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	10.00	22.75 (0.52)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]	23.00	33.91 (0.68)	30.00 [20.00, 45.00]	48.00	50.55 (0.79)	50.00 [30.00, 65.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	61.00	39.09 (0.76)	40.00 [20.00, 50.00]	58.00	29.35 (0.65)	25.00 [15.00, 40.00]	43.00	23.79 (0.57)	20.00 [10.00, 30.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	5.50	26.52 (0.80)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	5.70	27.13 (0.78)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	16.60	40.07 (0.95)	35.00 [18.00, 60.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	13.60	35.11 (0.80)	30.00 [18.00, 50.00]	19.00	29.37 (0.73)	24.00 [10.00, 40.00]	23.80	42.91 (0.91)	40.00 [20.00, 60.00]
Share of Low-Educated Immigrants	22.00	29.25 (0.82)	20.00 [10.00, 44.00]	16.60	25.80 (0.77)	20.00 [8.00, 40.00]	39.10	52.57 (0.93)	50.00 [30.00, 75.00]
Share of High-Educated Immigrants	41.40	34.27 (0.80)	30.00 [15.00, 50.00]	48.80	25.44 (0.70)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]	28.80	26.60 (0.65)	20.00 [10.00, 40.00]
Relative Transfers Received	1.23	1.17 (0.06)	1.00 [0.33, 1.10]	1.42	1.02 (0.04)	1.00 [0.50, 1.00]	1.39	1.88 (0.09)	1.00 [1.00, 2.00]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.41 (0.02)			0.36 (0.02)			0.33 (0.02)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.67 (0.02)			0.70 (0.01)			0.61 (0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.26 (0.01)			0.18 (0.01)			0.36 (0.02)	
Observations		958			973			980	

	Italy			Germany			Sweden		
	Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived		Actual	Perceived	
		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]		Mean (Stand. Error)	Median [Interq. Range]
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel A: Perceptions									
Share of Immigrants	10.00	26.79	20.00	14.80	30.35	25.00	17.60	27.38	22.00
		(0.72)	[10.00, 36.00]		(0.68)	[15.00, 40.00]		(0.83)	[15.00, 34.00]
Share Immigrants from North Africa	10.20	25.60	23.00	1.50	16.06	15.00	1.20	12.18	10.00
		(0.58)	[16.00, 32.00]		(0.37)	[8.00, 21.00]		(0.39)	[7.00, 17.00]
Share of Immigrants from Middle East	2.90	8.98	8.00	17.30	16.87	15.00	23.80	25.52	23.00
		(0.28)	[3.00, 13.00]		(0.45)	[7.00, 23.00]		(0.77)	[15.00, 34.00]
Share of Immigrants from Western Europe	14.30	6.00	4.00	14.90	13.43	10.00	23.60	14.52	10.00
		(0.26)	[1.00, 9.00]		(0.42)	[4.00, 20.00]		(0.69)	[4.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from Easter Europe	38.10	18.12	18.00	42.60	23.40	22.00	22.20	13.87	13.00
		(0.41)	[10.00, 25.00]		(0.41)	[15.00, 30.00]		(0.44)	[8.00, 20.00]
Share of Immigrants from North America	0.90	4.56	2.00	1.10	4.90	4.00	1.40	4.64	3.00
		(0.28)	[0.00, 5.00]		(0.20)	[1.00, 6.00]		(0.38)	[1.00, 5.00]
Share of Immigrants from Latin America	9.10	9.46	9.00	3.20	5.41	5.00	5.50	7.80	6.00
		(0.28)	[3.00, 13.00]		(0.16)	[2.00, 8.00]		(0.32)	[3.00, 10.00]
Share of Muslim Immigrants	33.00	47.52	50.00	30.00	43.94	40.00	27.00	45.67	42.00
		(0.81)	[30.00, 60.00]		(0.68)	[30.00, 60.00]		(1.08)	[30.00, 60.00]
Share of Christian Immigrants	57.00	26.54	20.00	51.00	31.61	30.00	61.00	31.63	30.00
		(0.70)	[10.00, 40.00]		(0.61)	[20.00, 45.00]		(0.98)	[15.00, 45.00]
Share of Unemployed Immigrants	14.70	42.59	40.00	6.90	39.52	30.00	16.10	38.23	30.00
		(0.97)	[20.00, 60.00]		(0.94)	[12.00, 60.00]		(1.20)	[17.00, 60.00]
Share of Poor Immigrants	34.90	43.00	40.00	20.50	33.72	30.00	29.80	25.89	20.00
		(0.92)	[20.00, 60.00]		(0.82)	[11.00, 50.00]		(1.07)	[10.00, 40.00]
Share of Low-Educated Immigrants	49.10	43.48	40.00	35.10	37.42	30.00	33.70	41.16	38.00
		(0.95)	[20.00, 60.00]		(0.81)	[17.00, 50.00]		(1.26)	[20.00, 60.00]
Share of High-Educated Immigrants	11.70	18.31	10.00	22.30	21.94	20.00	37.90	36.41	35.00
		(0.62)	[5.00, 25.00]		(0.58)	[10.00, 30.00]		(1.05)	[20.00, 50.00]
Relative Transfers Received	1.29	1.40	1.00	0.72	1.14	1.00	1.44	1.29	1.00
		(0.07)	[0.50, 1.10]		(0.04)	[1.00, 1.00]		(0.07)	[1.00, 1.10]
Panel B: Attitudes									
Immigrants Poor due to Lack of Effort		0.31			0.41			0.32	
		(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)	
Immigrants Rich because of Effort		0.68			0.59			0.69	
		(0.02)			(0.02)			(0.02)	
Mohammad Gets More		0.35			0.20			0.01	
		(0.02)			(0.01)			(0.00)	
Observations		970			971			480	

Notes: See notes to Table A-2. Observations are re-weighted to match the distribution of gender, age, income, unemployment and college education in each country.

TABLE A-40: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – RE-WEIGHTED SAMPLE

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-2.060***	1.118***	-0.618**	0.446**	-0.0321**	-0.0441***
	(0.444)	(0.296)	(0.250)	(0.186)	(0.0139)	(0.0143)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.427	0.0812	-0.461*	0.218	-0.0127	-0.0161
	(0.452)	(0.294)	(0.246)	(0.183)	(0.0139)	(0.0145)
T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.0390	0.111	-0.454*	0.143	0.00511	0.00264
	(0.455)	(0.303)	(0.255)	(0.183)	(0.0139)	(0.0146)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.234	-0.205	0.0366	0.327*	0.0111	0.00755
	(0.452)	(0.295)	(0.246)	(0.178)	(0.0138)	(0.0145)
Observations	19753	19753	19753	19753	19751	19753
Control mean	34.97	12.12	28.83	16.35	0.56	0.43

Notes: See notes to Table 4. Observations are re-weighted to match the distribution of gender, age, income, unemployment and college education in each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The number of observations is slightly smaller than in Table 4 because some characteristics targeted by the re-weighting are missing for a few respondents of the main analysis sample.

TABLE A-41: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – RE-WEIGHTED SAMPLE

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-4.798***	0.223***	-0.353	0.245	-0.0767	0.0246	0.000783
	(0.433)	(0.00707)	(0.333)	(0.374)	(0.442)	(0.412)	(0.00966)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.381***	0.00420	-4.943***	1.968***	-1.885***	2.219***	0.00457
	(0.444)	(0.00420)	(0.317)	(0.375)	(0.429)	(0.412)	(0.00973)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.792*	-0.00379	-0.516	0.537	-0.980**	0.774*	-0.0516***
	(0.427)	(0.00399)	(0.327)	(0.368)	(0.427)	(0.410)	(0.00947)
Observations	19723	19723	19735	19716	19749	19745	19709
Control mean	17.33	0.04	12.85	-5.85	11.61	-24.31	0.36

Notes: See notes to Table 5. Observations are re-weighted to match the distribution of gender, age, income, unemployment and college education in each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-42: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – RE-WEIGHTED' SAMPLE

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0234***	0.0118	0.0162*	0.00117	-0.00327	0.0229*
	(0.00839)	(0.0100)	(0.00909)	(0.00985)	(0.0377)	(0.0123)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00595	0.00229	0.00187	0.00301	-0.0149	0.00418
	(0.00839)	(0.0100)	(0.00913)	(0.00985)	(0.0379)	(0.0125)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0268***	0.0208**	0.0160*	0.0197**	0.125***	0.0490***
	(0.00845)	(0.01000)	(0.00907)	(0.00980)	(0.0378)	(0.0124)
Observations	19715	19737	19734	19730	19742	19753
Control mean	0.24	0.48	0.71	0.61	4.50	-0.02

Notes: See notes to Table 6. Observations are re-weighted to match the distribution of gender, age, income, unemployment and college education in each country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.4 "Raw" Sample

In our main samples we exclude respondents in the top and bottom 2% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey, excluding respondents who may have rushed through the survey without paying sufficient attention, and respondents who got distracted while taking the survey. We also drop respondents who spent too much time on the video treatments page (who probably did something else instead of watching the video and did not realize it was over). In this section we re-estimate the main treatment effect on the "Raw" sample, where we do not apply any of these sample refinements. Results are broadly consistent with those estimated on the main sample. The first stage treatment effects are, not surprisingly, slightly smaller, showing that by trimming the sample we are indeed excluding some inattentive respondents.

TABLE A-43: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – "RAW" SAMPLE

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-2.095***	1.009***	-0.713***	0.369**	-0.0299**	-0.0485***
	(0.411)	(0.274)	(0.240)	(0.177)	(0.0130)	(0.0135)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.576	0.0334	-0.560**	0.157	-0.00300	-0.0174
	(0.412)	(0.276)	(0.233)	(0.173)	(0.0130)	(0.0136)
T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.0668	0.0612	-0.515**	0.110	0.00611	0.000946
	(0.418)	(0.281)	(0.239)	(0.174)	(0.0130)	(0.0137)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.162	-0.183	-0.143	0.307*	0.0174	0.0101
	(0.415)	(0.276)	(0.234)	(0.171)	(0.0129)	(0.0136)
Observations	20857	20857	20857	20857	20854	20857
Control mean	36.93	11.09	29.37	15.88	0.58	0.47

Notes: This Table replicates Table 4 on the "Raw" sample, where we do not apply any sample refinement. See notes to Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-44: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – "RAW" SAMPLE

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-4.712***	0.221***	-0.325	0.181	0.00151	0.0433	0.000393
	(0.408)	(0.00668)	(0.309)	(0.354)	(0.413)	(0.395)	(0.00904)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.200***	0.00245	-4.690***	1.615***	-1.662***	2.202***	0.000750
	(0.420)	(0.00399)	(0.294)	(0.352)	(0.402)	(0.394)	(0.00906)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.814**	-0.00461	-0.451	0.416	-0.664*	0.368	-0.0520***
	(0.405)	(0.00384)	(0.305)	(0.349)	(0.399)	(0.389)	(0.00884)
Observations	20823	20823	20838	20819	20853	20847	20811
Control mean	17.41	0.04	12.34	-5.26	11.05	-23.79	0.36

Notes: This Table replicates Table 5 on the "Raw" sample, where we do not apply any sample refinement. See notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-45: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – "RAW" SAMPLE

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0230***	0.00832	0.0133	0.00188	-0.0216	0.0184
	(0.00804)	(0.00936)	(0.00840)	(0.00915)	(0.0349)	(0.0116)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00325	0.000861	0.0000402	0.00232	-0.0100	0.00174
	(0.00801)	(0.00937)	(0.00846)	(0.00915)	(0.0351)	(0.0116)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0245***	0.0189**	0.0134	0.0149	0.121***	0.0437***
	(0.00808)	(0.00934)	(0.00838)	(0.00912)	(0.0350)	(0.0115)
Observations	20817	20841	20836	20833	20845	20857
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.71	0.62	4.54	0.00

Notes: This Table replicates Table 6 on the "Raw" sample, where we do not apply any sample refinement. See notes to Table 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.5 Alternative Sample Trimmings

In our main samples we exclude respondents in the top and bottom 2% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey. In this sections we re-estimate the main treatment effects on a smaller sample where, instead, we drop respondents in the top and bottom 5% of the distribution. Results are robust to this alternative sample refinement.

TABLE A-46: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – TRIMMING BOTTOM AND TOP 5%

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-2.103***	0.933***	-0.458*	0.464***	-0.0299**	-0.0489***
	(0.425)	(0.277)	(0.238)	(0.179)	(0.0137)	(0.0142)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.677	0.140	-0.444*	0.167	-0.00675	-0.0162
	(0.427)	(0.281)	(0.234)	(0.176)	(0.0137)	(0.0144)
T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.269	0.154	-0.407*	0.115	0.00522	-0.000263
	(0.433)	(0.289)	(0.238)	(0.176)	(0.0136)	(0.0144)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	-0.0855	-0.136	-0.0842	0.239	0.0134	0.00478
	(0.431)	(0.281)	(0.235)	(0.173)	(0.0136)	(0.0144)
Observations	18560	18560	18560	18560	18558	18560
Control mean	37.43	10.69	29.64	16.09	0.59	0.47

Notes: This Table replicates Table 4 on a smaller sample where we exclude respondents in the bottom and top 5% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey. See notes to Table 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-47: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – TRIMMING BOTTOM AND TOP 5%

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-5.028***	0.235***	-0.0925	-0.0259	0.170	0.0323	0.00376
	(0.420)	(0.00720)	(0.318)	(0.367)	(0.428)	(0.405)	(0.00946)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.201***	0.00338	-4.725***	1.653***	-1.717***	2.333***	0.00393
	(0.436)	(0.00429)	(0.301)	(0.364)	(0.413)	(0.405)	(0.00950)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.625	-0.00492	-0.287	0.258	-0.721*	0.645	-0.0525***
	(0.418)	(0.00410)	(0.313)	(0.360)	(0.412)	(0.401)	(0.00923)
Observations	18535	18535	18544	18526	18556	18553	18518
Control mean	16.76	0.04	12.68	-5.62	11.34	-23.92	0.35

Notes: This Table replicates Table 5 on a smaller sample where we exclude respondents in the bottom and top 5% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey. See notes to Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-48: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – TRIMMING BOTTOM AND TOP 5%

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0235***	0.00964	0.0148*	0.00416	-0.0137	0.0215*
	(0.00855)	(0.00988)	(0.00879)	(0.00964)	(0.0373)	(0.0123)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00230	0.00123	-0.00331	-0.00145	-0.0101	-0.00161
	(0.00851)	(0.00990)	(0.00888)	(0.00965)	(0.0374)	(0.0123)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0260***	0.0190*	0.0115	0.0138	0.131***	0.0440***
	(0.00858)	(0.00986)	(0.00881)	(0.00962)	(0.0372)	(0.0123)
Observations	18529	18545	18542	18540	18549	18560
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.72	0.62	4.54	-0.00

Notes: This Table replicates Table 6 on a smaller sample where we exclude respondents in the bottom and top 5% of the distribution of the time spent on the survey. See notes to Table 6. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-13.6 Time Fixed Effects

In this section we re-estimate the treatment effects on perceptions and on support for immigration and redistribution including week fixed effects – i.e., dummies for the weeks the respondent took the survey – to account for time varying factors that may confound our estimates. The coefficients and standard errors are almost identical to those estimated in the main specification without week fixed effects. Results are virtually unchanged if we use dummies for the day or the month of completion of the survey, instead of the week.

TABLE A-49: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR REDISTRIBUTION – TIME FIXED EFFECTS

	Tax Top 1 (1)	Tax Bottom 50 (2)	Social Budget (3)	Education Budget (4)	Inequality Serious Problem (5)	Donation Above Median (6)
Order/Salience T	-1.949***	0.915***	-0.541**	0.442**	-0.0280**	-0.0479***
	(0.416)	(0.276)	(0.237)	(0.175)	(0.0132)	(0.0138)
T: Share of Immigrants	-0.633	0.0471	-0.481**	0.195	-0.00624	-0.0163
	(0.419)	(0.278)	(0.233)	(0.172)	(0.0133)	(0.0140)
T: Origins of Immigrants	-0.0709	0.0349	-0.467*	0.167	0.00607	0.00219
	(0.425)	(0.284)	(0.239)	(0.173)	(0.0132)	(0.0140)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0740	-0.211	-0.0965	0.335**	0.0156	0.00930
	(0.422)	(0.278)	(0.235)	(0.170)	(0.0132)	(0.0139)
Observations	19765	19765	19765	19765	19763	19765
Control mean	37.12	10.94	29.53	16.00	0.59	0.47
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See notes to Table 4. All regressions include a set of week dummies to control for the week the respondent took the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-50: FIRST STAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS ON PERCEPTIONS – TIME FIXED EFFECTS

	All Immigrants (misp.) (1)	Accurate Perception All Immigrants (2)	M. East and N. Africa (misp.) (3)	N. America, W. and E. Europe (misp.) (4)	Muslim (misp.) (5)	Christian (misp.) (6)	Lack of Effort Reason Poor (7)
T: Share of Immigrants	-4.853***	0.227***	-0.255	0.178	0.000141	0.147	-0.0000126
	(0.411)	(0.00691)	(0.312)	(0.357)	(0.419)	(0.397)	(0.00921)
T: Origins of Immigrants	2.316***	0.00254	-4.801***	1.829***	-1.842***	2.458***	-0.000286
	(0.426)	(0.00411)	(0.295)	(0.356)	(0.405)	(0.397)	(0.00925)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.705*	-0.00416	-0.387	0.383	-0.872**	0.797**	-0.0536***
	(0.409)	(0.00396)	(0.308)	(0.352)	(0.404)	(0.393)	(0.00899)
Observations	19735	19735	19747	19728	19761	19757	19721
Control mean	17.02	0.04	12.60	-5.56	11.30	-23.98	0.36
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See notes to Table 5. All regressions include a set of week dummies to control for the week the respondent took the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

TABLE A-51: TREATMENT EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION – TIME FIXED EFFECTS

	Imm. Not A Problem (1)	Imm. Benefits Soon (2)	Imm. Citizenship Soon (3)	American Upon Citizenship/Before (4)	Govt. Should care About Everyone (5)	Imm Support Index (6)
T: Share of Immigrants	0.0242***	0.0104	0.0162*	0.00550	-0.00185	0.0246**
	(0.00825)	(0.00958)	(0.00857)	(0.00936)	(0.0359)	(0.0118)
T: Origins of Immigrants	0.00543	0.00378	0.000984	0.00468	-0.00128	0.00622
	(0.00823)	(0.00961)	(0.00862)	(0.00936)	(0.0360)	(0.0119)
T: Hard Work of Immigrants	0.0253***	0.0202**	0.0133	0.0172*	0.131***	0.0464***
	(0.00829)	(0.00956)	(0.00857)	(0.00934)	(0.0359)	(0.0118)
Observations	19727	19749	19745	19742	19754	19765
Control mean	0.25	0.49	0.71	0.62	4.53	0.00
Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: See notes to Table 6 All regressions include a set of week dummies to control for the week the respondent took the survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A-14 Media Coverage of Immigration

In this section we investigate whether (mis)perceptions of immigration are correlated with coverage of immigration by the media. If the immigration issue is very salient in the media, people may be led to overestimate the share of immigrants. In addition, if some immigrants' characteristics are systematically covered more than others in the media, people may over-perceive their actual prevalence. We construct two measures of media coverage of immigration based on data compiled by the platform Media Cloud, one capturing general coverage of immigration, the other focusing on specific coverage of immigration in association with issues related to redistribution and immigrants' reliance on welfare. We regress these variables on our measures of misperceptions and we report results in Table A-53. In what follows we give more information on the data compiled by Media Cloud, the way we construct our measures and the regressions we estimate. We close by briefly commenting on the results of the analysis.

Media Cloud   Media Cloud is an open source platform to study media ecosystems, designed by a team of researchers across multiple institutions, including the University of Massachusetts Amherst, Northeastern University, and the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University.[63] It collects news stories from media sites around the web using RSS feeds and stores them in a freely accessible database. Researchers can search this database through an explorer tool, which allows to track coverage of a certain issue by counting the number of news stories mentioning specific words over a given time period, geography and collection of media outlets. The database covers newspapers' and other traditional media outlets' websites (e.g., `nytimes.com`, `cnn.com`, `foxnews.com`) as well as websites of online-only media (e.g., `vox.com`, `breitbart.com`).

Measures of media coverage   We construct two measures of online media coverage of immigration by country: i) *Share Stories Imm.*, measuring general coverage of immigration; ii) *Share Stories Imm. + Welfare*, measuring coverage of immigration in association with issues related to welfare and unemployment. For the first measure, we search the Media Cloud database for news stories containing the word "immigration" and its derivatives.[64] We take the number of stories that satisfy this condition on a given day and collection of media outlets, and we divide it by the total number of stories in the Media Cloud database for the same day and collection. In this way we obtain the "Share" of stories mentioning immigration (over all the relevant stories available). For the second measure, we go over the same steps, but searching, instead, for stories containing the word "'immigration" together with "welfare" and/or "unemployed" (or their derivatives). Hence, the second measure is defined as the number of stories mentioning immigration in association with welfare or unemployment over the total number of relevant stories in the Media Cloud database.

To obtain media coverage by country we repeat this procedure for six geographic collections of media outlets compiled by Media Cloud, which include media that have national relevance in the six countries in our sample.[65] Finally, to reduce noise and account for persistence of potential exposure effects, we construct a moving average version of the measures, averaging media coverage over three days (MA3).

Table A-52 shows the average by country of the two measures of media coverage over the period we fielded our main survey. The first two rows report the averages of daily version of the measures, the MA3 version is summarized in the last two rows. Measures are defined in percentage points.

Regression specification   We link the media coverage variables to our main survey records and we estimated the following set of linear regressions.

$$y_{i,d,c} = \alpha + \beta_1 ShareStoriesImmMA3_{d,c} + \beta_2 ShareStoriesImmWelfareMA3_{d,c} + \gamma C_i + \lambda_c + \varepsilon_{i,d,c} \quad \text{(A-1)}$$

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[63]It is accessible at `https://mediacloud.org`.

[64]That is, we search for the string "immigr*".

[65]The specific reference to each collection, as well as the list of the sources included, are available at: U.S., `https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412234`; U.K, `https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412476`; Italy, `https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412372`; France, `https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412146`; Germany, `https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412409`; Sweden, `https://sources.mediacloud.org/#/collections/34412223`.

	U.S.	U.K.	Italy	France	Germany	Sweden
Share Stories Imm. – Daily	4.97	1.98	1.31	0.90	0.53	0.63
Share Stories Imm. + Welfare – Daily	0.38	0.22	0.10	0.04	0.02	0.12
Share Stories Imm. – MA3	5.39	2.11	1.35	1.04	0.69	0.68
Share Stories Imm. + Welfare – MA3	0.34	0.29	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.08

Notes: The table reports the average by country of our two measures of media coverage of immigration over the period we fielded our main survey – January 22 to February 11, 2018 for the U.S., February to mid-March 2018 for European countries. For each measure we summarize the daily version and the MA3 versions. Measures are defined in percentage points.

Where $y_{i,d,c}$ is the misperception or the perception index of respondent i in country c recorded on day d – the day he has taken the survey – $ShareStoriesImmMA3_{d,c}$ and $ShareStoriesImmWelfareMA3_{d,c}$ are the two measures discussed above, capturing average media coverage in country c on the day the survey was taken and the two days before, C_i is a vector of usual personal controls (age, gender, education, political affiliation, income, working in a high immigration sector, having a foreign born parent), and λ_c are country fixed effects.

Results Table A-53 shows the results of estimating equation A-1 on a set of misperceptions and on the perceived cultural distance, perceived economic weakness and perceived free riding index. General coverage of immigration is negatively correlated with the misperception on the share of immigrants – a one standard deviation increase in the share of stories mentioning immigration on the day the survey was taken and in the two days before is associated with a reduction in the misperception of the share of immigrants by 0.11 of a s.d. – positively correlated with the perceived cultural distance index – a one s.d. increase in the share of stories is associated with an increase in the index of 0.11 of a s.d. – and positively correlated with the perceived share of immigrants from Middle East and immigrants that are Muslim – one s.d. increase in the share of stories is associated with an increase in these two variables of 0.11 and 0.06 s.d., respectively. Coverage of immigration in association with "welfare" or "unemployment" is positively correlated with misperceptions of the share of immigrants and with perceptions of immigrants' economic weakness. A one s.d. increase in the share of stories mentioning "immigration" and "welfare" or "unemployment" is associated with an increase in the share of immigrants of 0.05 of a s.d., an increase in the perceived economic weakness index of 0.05 s.d., an increase in the misperception of the share of poor immigrants of 0.05 of a s.d. and a similar increase in the share of low educated immigrants. Coverage of immigration and welfare also seems to reduce the perceived free riding of immigrants – a one s.d. increase in the share of articles is associated with a reduction of the index of 0.051 of a s.d..

It is worth recalling that in this analysis we are not able to distinguish between media coverage *per se* and media coverage induced by specific events that make the immigration issue more salient. Events making immigration or certain aspects of immigration more salient are likely to have a direct effect on perceptions, in addition to the amplification that may come from the media.

TABLE A-53: MEDIA COVERAGE OF IMMIGRATION AND PERCEPTIONS

	All Immigrants (misp.)	Perc. Cultural Distance Index	Perc Econ. Weakness Index	Perc. Free Riding Index	Middle East (misp.)	Western Europe (misp.)	Muslim (misp.)	Christian (misp.)	Poverty (misp.)	Low Educated (misp.)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Shares Stories Imm. – MA3	-1.331**	0.0316***	-0.00545	0.0112	0.713***	-0.209	0.748*	-0.778	-0.0376	-0.142
	(0.520)	(0.0104)	(0.0138)	(0.0164)	(0.235)	(0.223)	(0.425)	(0.480)	(0.552)	(0.581)
Shares Stories Imm. + Welfare – MA3	5.861**	-0.0711	0.169**	-0.220***	-2.254*	0.265	-2.741	1.964	6.946**	7.373**
	(2.619)	(0.0561)	(0.0751)	(0.0833)	(1.340)	(1.478)	(2.444)	(2.721)	(2.998)	(3.132)
Observations	5061	5065	5065	5065	5064	5061	5063	5065	5061	5057
Control mean	17.68	-0.01	0.01	0.00	4.63	-5.70	11.29	-23.98	12.40	5.34

Notes: The outcome variables are the perception indices and misperceptions of immigrants listed on top of the columns. See Appendix Section A-1 for details on the variables. Each regression includes the two measures of media coverage listed on the left plus standard personal controls as in Table 2 (indicator variables for gender, college degree, age> 45, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, political affiliation, having at least one parent not born in the country, working in a high immigration sector with and without a college degree) and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Sample: only respondents in the main survey who have not seen any of the video treatments.