

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

CONCENTRATION IN US LABOR MARKETS:  
EVIDENCE FROM ONLINE VACANCY DATA

José A. Azar  
Ioana Marinescu  
Marshall I. Steinbaum  
Bledi Taska

Working Paper 24395  
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w24395>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH  
1050 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
March 2018

José Azar gratefully acknowledges the financial support of Secretaria d'Universitats I Recerca del Departament d'Empresa I Coneixement de la Generalitat de Catalunya. Ref.2016 BP00358. Steinbaum acknowledges the support of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

© 2018 by José A. Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall I. Steinbaum, and Bledi Taska. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence From Online Vacancy Data  
José A. Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall I. Steinbaum, and Bledi Taska  
NBER Working Paper No. 24395  
March 2018  
JEL No. J21,J42,K21

### **ABSTRACT**

Using data on the near-universe of online US job vacancies collected by Burning Glass Technologies in 2016, we calculate labor market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for each commuting zone by 6-digit SOC occupation. The average market has an HHI of 4,378, or the equivalent of 2.3 recruiting employers. 60% of labor markets are highly concentrated (above 2,500 HHI) according to the DOJ/FTC guidelines. Highly

concentrated markets account for 20% of employment. Many plausible alternative market definitions show that more than 40% of markets are highly concentrated, suggesting that employers have market power in many US labor markets.

José A. Azar  
IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra  
Avinguda Perason 21  
08034 Barcelona, Spain  
jazar@iese.edu

Marshall I. Steinbaum  
Roosevelt Institute,  
1789 Lanier Pl, NW Apt 1  
Washington, DC 20009  
msteinbaum@gmail.com

Ioana Marinescu  
University of Pennsylvania  
School of Social Policy & Practice  
3701 Locust Walk  
Philadelphia PA, 19104-6214  
and NBER  
ioma@upenn.edu

Bledi Taska  
Burning Glass Technologies  
One Lewis Wharf  
Boston, MA 02110  
btaska@burning-glass.com

# 1 Introduction

While interest in labor market monopsony power has increased in recent years ([Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom, 2010](#); [Manning, 2011](#); [CEA, 2016](#)), the effects of mergers and other anti-competitive conduct on labor markets are generally not taken into account in antitrust practice. Antitrust enforcement is based on the consumer welfare standard, i.e. examining the adverse effects of anticompetitive behavior for consumers. This is despite substantial evidence of market power in the labor market ([Staiger, Spetz and Phibbs, 2010](#); [Falch, 2010](#); [Ransom and Sims, 2010](#); [Dube, Lester and Reich, 2016](#)). But this empirical work has generally focused on particular labor markets (e.g. [Matsudaira, 2013](#)), and there is little evidence to inform the debate about how widespread labor market concentration is, and how it varies across occupations and geographies in the US.

In this paper, we directly quantify the level of labor market concentration across nearly all occupations and for every commuting zone in the US. Adequately measuring concentration is important because concentration is associated with lower wages ([Azar, Marinescu and Steinbaum, 2017](#))<sup>1</sup>, and the antitrust authorities rely on the levels of concentration for enforcement. We use a dataset from Burning Glass Technologies (BGT) covering the near-universe of online US vacancy postings in 2016. This allows us to give a comprehensive picture of labor market concentration in the US. Furthermore, this paper carefully discusses the definition of a labor market. In particular, we make use of a hypothetical monopsonist test analogous to the hypothetical monopolist test in antitrust practice. The essence of such a test is to ask whether significant wage suppression is profitable for firms; the profitability of wage suppression depends on how many workers will leave in the face of wage suppression, i.e. the labor supply elasticity.

We calculate Herfindahl Hirschman Indices (HHIs) for labor markets at the occupation (6-

---

<sup>1</sup>This working paper uses data for the most frequent occupations from one single online job board (Career-Builder.com), therefore presenting a partial measure of concentration.

digit SOC), commuting zone, and quarterly level. The average market has an HHI of 4378, which is the equivalent of 2.3 recruiting firms with equal shares of the total vacancy pool. 60% of markets are highly concentrated (above 2,500 HHI) by the standard of the Department of Justice / Federal Trade Commission 2010 horizontal merger guidelines. To understand the threshold for high concentration, note that a market with four firms and equal market shares has an HHI of 2,500, so an HHI of 2500 is the equivalent of 4 recruiting firms with equal shares of the total vacancy pool. Another 11% of markets are moderately concentrated by the standard of the Department of Justice / Federal Trade Commission 2010 horizontal merger guidelines, i.e. have an HHI between 1,500 and 2,500. When we weight markets by BLS total employment, we find that 20 percent of workers work in highly concentrated labor markets (by our measure of concentration from Burning Glass), and a further 8 percent work in moderately concentrated markets. Concentration is lower in large commuting zones, which explains why weighting by employment lowers the prevalence of high concentration.

We discuss the definition of a labor market, and provide a justification for our choice of the 6-digit SOC by commuting zone by quarter; we also calculate concentration for a number of alternative market definitions in terms of occupation, location and time. According to several plausible alternative market definitions, we find that at least 40% of markets are highly concentrated. Given the observed level of concentration, company mergers have the potential to significantly increase employers' *labor* market power. The labor market concentration measure we develop here can be usefully leveraged in merger reviews and the litigation of other anti-competitive behaviors in the labor market, as detailed in [Marinescu and Hovenkamp \(2018\)](#) and [Naidu, Posner and Weyl \(2018\)](#).<sup>2</sup>

Our measure of concentration is distinct from the industry concentration measures used by [Autor et al. \(2017\)](#) and [Barkai \(2016\)](#): it is based on concentration in the labor market rather than concentration in the product market. Our contribution is therefore complementary, and it

---

<sup>2</sup>Examples include no-poaching agreements ([Ashenfelter and Krueger, 2017](#)), and, in some cases, non-competition agreements ([Starr, Prescott and Bishara, 2017](#)).

is the first economy-wide measure of labor market concentration to have been made in many decades.<sup>3</sup>

The recent working paper that comes closest to our approach is [Benmelech, Bergman and Kim \(2018\)](#), which uses Census data for manufacturing industries over a long time horizon to measure employment concentration (as opposed to vacancy concentration) and its negative effect on wages. Those authors focus on county-industries as the analogues to local labor markets, whereas we use commuting zones and six-digit SOC occupations.

In contrast to [Benmelech, Bergman and Kim \(2018\)](#), we measure concentration using job openings rather than employment because we view vacancies as a better gauge of how likely searching workers (whether employed or unemployed) are to receive a job offer. Recent studies show that workers remain in jobs for longer.<sup>4</sup> The corollary is that jobs are vacated less frequently, and so the concentration of employment is a less relevant gauge of available work and employer market power than is the concentration of vacancies among the relatively few firms who are likely to be hiring at any given time.

Section 2 describes the Burning Glass data, section 3 addresses market definition for labor markets, and section 4 gives our estimates of labor market concentration. Section 5 places our results in the larger debate over inter-firm inequality compares concentration in the labor market to concentration in the product market, and section 6 concludes.

## 2 Data

We use data from Burning Glass Technologies (BGT). The company examines about 40,000 websites and believes to be able to capture the near-universe of online US vacancies. [Hershbein and Kahn \(2016\)](#); [Deming and Kahn \(2017\)](#); [Modestino, Shoag and Ballance \(2016\)](#) have used this data and provide a more in-depth description. Importantly, BGT data is fairly similar in terms of industry composition when compared to all vacancies recorded in the Job Open-

---

<sup>3</sup>The last, to our knowledge, is [Bunting \(1962\)](#); see review of literature by [Boal and Ransom \(1997\)](#).

<sup>4</sup>See [Haltiwanger et al. \(forthcoming\)](#), [Molloy et al. \(2016\)](#), and [Konczal and Steinbaum \(2016\)](#).

ings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) ([Hershbein and Kahn, 2016](#)). Furthermore, the occupational distribution is similar to the one found in the Occupational Employment Statistics ([Hershbein and Kahn, 2016](#)).

We restrict the data to 2016 because this is the year with the highest data quality and the greatest coverage for vacancies across the US. Indeed, the tools used by BGT improve over time, and more and more of the US vacancies are online.<sup>5</sup> To understand the share of job openings captured by BGT, it is important to note BGT only measures new postings (the same posting appears only on the first month it is recorded) while JOLTS measures active postings (the same posting can appear in two or more consecutive months if time to fill is more than 30 days). Help Wanted Online (HWOL) measures both. Therefore, the number of postings on BGT can be inflated using the new jobs to active jobs ratio in HWOL, i.e. the same method used in [Carnevale, Jayasundera and Repnikov \(2014\)](#). Based on this calculation, BGT shows that the share of jobs online as captured by BGT is roughly 85% of the jobs in JOLTS in 2016. The jobs that are not online now are usually in small businesses (the classic example being the “help wanted” sign in the restaurant window) and union hiring halls. Overall, however, research shows the online job market has consistently expanded over the last few years.

The data is cleaned by Burning Glass to remove vacancy duplicates and extract key characteristics for each vacancy. Of interest to our work are the location of the vacancy (county), name of the employer, and the occupation. The name of the employer is normalized by BGT so that similar employer names are grouped together into a single employer: for example, “Bausch and Lomb”, “Bausch Lomb”, and “Bausch & Lomb” would be grouped together. Still, 35.9% of employer names are missing, partly due to staffing companies not disclosing which employer the job is at. To calculate concentration, we will assume that all these missing employer names are different, thus providing a lower bound for labor market concentration.

The BGT dataset contains many variables describing the occupation of each vacancy. These include the SOC code, the standardized job title, and the BGT occupation. The standardized

---

<sup>5</sup> Average concentration levels in 2007-2015 are comparable to average concentration levels in 2016.

job title is based on the full text job title of the job vacancy: the full text job title is cleaned and similar job titles are grouped together. The BGT occupation starts with the SOC code, and either consolidates SOC codes or divides them into several categories based on the similarity of skills, education and knowledge requirements.

We drop internships and data with missing SOC or commuting zones, which represents 5.2% of the initial sample. We are left with a sample of 22,682,265 observations.

For our benchmark analysis, we keep 200 occupations, which represent 90% of vacancy postings in the BGT dataset. We trim away very small occupations because they may be defined too narrowly. We note that this choice results in lower HHI than if we had included all occupations. The total number of markets (6-digit SOC occupation by commuting zone) we consider in our main analysis is 117,369.

Our main summary statistics on HHI treat each cell (commuting zone by 6-digit SOC by quarter) as an observation. But we also want to understand how the summary statistics change when we weight by employment in each of these markets. When we report HHI weighted by employment, we include every occupation in the data, since small and possibly ill-defined occupations will not be overly influential after weighing by employment. To analyze HHI weighted by employment, we use the May 2016 Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS data is only available at the CBSA level, and not at the commuting zone level. To get commuting zone employment, we first estimate BLS county-level employment: we use county population shares within a CBSA and multiply these shares with the BLS employment by 6-digit SOC at the CBSA level. Finally, to get commuting zone 6-digit SOC employment numbers, we aggregate the 6-digit SOC employment numbers across the counties that form a commuting zone.

## 3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and Labor Market Definition

### 3.1 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index

Our baseline measure of concentration in a labor market is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) calculated based on the share of vacancies of all the firms that post vacancies in that market. The HHI is directly related to wages in the Cournot model of oligopsonistic competition. An increase in HHI leads to a proportional increase in the gap between the marginal productivity of labor and wages, i.e. Pigou's rate of exploitation or the wage markdown ([Boal and Ransom, 1997](#)).

The HHI is widely used as a measure of market concentration in the industrial organization literature and in antitrust practice. [Nocke and Schutz \(2018\)](#) show that it provides an adequate measure of the welfare distortions introduced by market power in the horizontal merger context. A further practical advantage of this measure of market concentration is that there are guidelines for what represents a high level of market concentration. The DOJ/FTC guidelines: an HHI above 1500 is "moderately concentrated", and above 2500 is "highly concentrated". Also, a merger that increases the HHI by more than 200 points, and leads to a highly concentrated market is "presumed likely to increase market power".

While these measures and thresholds are generally used to evaluate market concentration in product markets, the antitrust agency guidelines state that "[t]o evaluate whether a merger is likely to enhance market power on the buying side of the market, the Agencies employ essentially the framework described above for evaluating whether a merger is likely to enhance market power on the selling side of the market." This implies that adverse effects of mergers on the inputs market, including the labor market, are part of the legal framework for evaluating mergers.

The formula for the HHI in market  $m$  and time  $t$  is

$$\text{HHI}_{m,t} = \sum_{j=1}^J s_{j,m,t}^2 \quad (3.1)$$

where  $s_{j,m}$  is the market share of firm  $j$  in market  $m$  expressed as a number between 0 and 100. The market share of a firm in a given market and time is defined as the sum of vacancies posted by a given firm in a given market and time divided by total vacancies posted in that market and time. The inverse of the HHI multiplied by 10,000,  $10,000/\text{HHI}$ , gives the “equivalent” number of firms in the market, or the number of firms that would result in such an HHI if each had the same share of the market. When reporting average HHI, we first take the average over time  $t$  for each market  $m$ . A key question is how the labor market should be defined.

### 3.2 Frictions to worker mobility across markets

The economic literature shows that there are substantial frictions associated with transitioning between labor markets, however defined ([Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren, 2010](#); [Dix-Caneiro, 2014](#); [Artuc and McLaren, 2015](#); [Traiberman, 2017](#); [Macaluso, 2017](#)). [Marinescu and Rathelot \(2017\)](#) (and [Manning and Petrongolo \(2017\)](#) for the UK) find that job search behavior is quite local, implying that geographic labor markets are also narrowly defined.

No work, to our knowledge, attempts to define labor markets in the education space. [Macaluso \(2017\)](#) defines the concept of “skill remoteness” on the supply and demand sides of a labor market and finds that workers whose skills are further away from the available jobs in their local labor market (defined by city and occupation) are more likely to either move or exit the labor force in response to a layoff. [Hershbein and Kahn \(2017\)](#) and [Modestino, Shoag and Ballance \(2016\)](#) use the same dataset we employ in this paper to characterize the skill distribution of job vacancies as changing in response to the severity of local labor market recessions. But the extent to which workers confine their job searches to an education- or skills-delimited segment of available jobs has not yet been systematically explored (but see some evidence on search across

occupations in [Marinescu and Rathelot \(2017\)](#)).

It is important to note that monopsony and market power may render observed transition rates endogenous. For example, workers displaced from their job in a local labor market will be more likely to transition to an unconcentrated than a concentrated labor market.

Based on this literature, it is clear that labor markets are relatively narrow, but how exactly a labor market should be defined remains unclear.

Conceptually, to define a market, we have to strike a balance between too narrow a definition and too broad a definition. If the definition is too narrow, there are plenty of opportunities outside the market. If the definition is too broad, it overestimates the similarity of jobs within the market, and therefore overestimates the opportunities available within a market. Given that workers do transition occasionally across essentially any market, it is not reasonable to define a market by the requirement that no worker ever goes outside the boundaries of this market. Instead, a market can conceptually be defined by a threshold level of across-market transitions such that if transitions are above this threshold, the market is too narrow, and if they are below this threshold the market is too broad.

We now turn to the legal practice of product market definition, which develops a threshold concept, the critical elasticity. We will show how this concept can be applied to the labor market.

### **3.3 Market definition: legal framework**

In this subsection and the next two, we discuss our choice of the commuting zone by 6-digit SOC by quarter as our baseline market definition.

Under §7 of the Clayton Act the court must identify some “line of commerce” and “section of the country” in which a contemplated merger threatens lower output and higher prices. Ever since the Supreme Court’s Brown Shoe decision, it has become conventional to identify these two statutory requirements, respectively, as a relevant product market and a relevant geographic market. Under the approach laid out in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the

government first makes out a prima facie case that a merger is likely to result in an anticompetitive price increase in at least one affected market. A merger challenge only needs to identify one market and geography in which anticompetitive results would be substantially likely to occur.

### **3.4 Market definition: time and geography**

For our baseline analysis, we calculate HHI at the quarterly level, since the median duration of unemployment is about 10 weeks in 2016 [BLS \(2017\)](#).<sup>6</sup> We consider for our market share calculations all vacancies that occur within a given quarter. We will also show results for other time aggregations.

We use commuting zones (CZs) to define geographic labor markets. Commuting zones are geographic area definitions based on clusters of counties that were developed by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) using data from the 2000 Census on commuting patterns across counties to capture local economies and local labor markets in a way that is more economically meaningful than county boundaries. According to the USDA documentation, “commuting zones were developed without regard to a minimum population threshold and are intended to be a spatial measure of the local labor market.” [Marinescu and Rathelot \(2017\)](#) also show that 81% of applications on CareerBuilder.com are within the commuting zone, with the probability of submitting an application strongly declining in the distance between the applicant’s and the job’s zip code. We also conduct robustness checks using other geographical areas for our market definition instead of commuting zones.

### **3.5 Market definition: occupation**

To organize the discussion of market definition in terms of line of work (corresponding to the “line of commerce” in the Clayton Act), we can think of it in terms of the “hypothetical

---

<sup>6</sup>While most job transitions are employment-to-employment, no equivalent concept of search duration exists for such transitions.

monopsonist test” (HMT). The HMT is analogous to the hypothetical monopolist test that is commonly used for product market definition. Since 1982, the horizontal merger guidelines have included the hypothetical monopolist test to determine whether a product market could be profitably monopolized. The idea of the hypothetical monopolist test is to use as the relevant antitrust market the smallest market for which a hypothetical monopolist that controlled that market would find it profitable to implement a “small significant non-transitory increase in price” (SSNIP).

In the 1982 horizontal merger guidelines, there were no specific instructions about how this SSNIP test could be applied, but an influential paper soon defined a methodology ([Harris and Simons, 1991](#)): critical loss analysis. Analogously, the hypothetical monopsonist test would suggest as the relevant antitrust market the smallest labor market for which a hypothetical monopsonist that controlled that labor market would find profitable to implement “small significant non-transitory reduction in wages” (SSNRW).

Consider a simple model of monopsony, with a constant value of marginal product of labor given by  $a$ , a wage  $w$  which depends on the employment level of the monopsonist  $L$ . The profits of the monopsonist are

$$\pi(L) = (a - w)L.$$

If the monopsonist changes wages by  $\Delta w$ , and this generates a change in labor supply  $\Delta L$ , the change in profits is

$$\Delta\pi = \Delta L \times (a - w - \Delta w) - \Delta w \times L.$$

Thus, the SSNRW is profitable for the monopsonist if and only if

$$\Delta L \times (a - w - \Delta w) > \Delta w \times L.$$

Dividing on both sides by  $wL$ , we obtain

$$\frac{\Delta L}{L} \times \left( \underbrace{\frac{a-w}{w}}_{\text{Markdown } \mu} - \frac{\Delta w}{w} \right) > \frac{\Delta w}{w}.$$

Rearranging terms (and taking into account that the change in wage is negative, which changes the direction of the inequality):

$$\frac{\Delta L/L}{\Delta w/w} < \frac{1}{\mu - \Delta w/w}.$$

Since the left-hand side is approximately the elasticity of labor supply, which we denote  $\eta$ , we have that the critical elasticity (see [Harris and Simons \(1991\)](#) for the corresponding concept in the product market) for the wage reduction to increase profits is:

$$\eta \approx \frac{1}{\mu - \Delta w/w}.$$

The antitrust practice typically considers a 5% increase in price (for at least a year) as the SSNIP. Therefore, we will consider a 5% “small significant non-transitory reduction in wages” (SSNRW). The market is too broad if the actual labor supply elasticity is less than the critical elasticity. For example, if the markdown  $\mu$  of wages relative to the value of the marginal product of labor is 45% and the wage reduction is 5%, then the critical elasticity is  $1/(.45+.05)=2$ , implying that if the market-level elasticity of labor supply corresponding to the proposed market definition is less than 2, the market definition is too broad, and it should be defined more narrowly. On the other hand, if the market-level elasticity of labor supply is higher than 2, the market is too narrow, and it should be defined more broadly.

Empirically, we have estimates of the labor supply elasticity to the individual firm, which should be larger than the labor supply elasticity to an entire market  $\eta$ . Estimates of the elasticity of labor supply to the individual firm typically range between 0.1 and 4, with most estimates being below 2 ([Manning, 2011](#)). Even in online labor markets like Amazon Mechanical Turk,

where frictions should be minimal, the labor supply elasticity is only 0.1 (Dube et al., 2018). Therefore the elasticity of labor supply to the market is typically below 2. This implies that, unless we believe that the markdown is above 45%, markets with an elasticity below 2 are well defined according to the SSNRW.

The low elasticity of labor supply to the individual firms found in the literature suggests that even the narrowest definition of a labor market can pass the test: most *individual* firms already have very low elasticities of labor supply, and so each firm may be seen as a market of its own. For the purpose of the present paper, we take a less radical approach. We want to determine whether our baseline choice of the 6-digit SOC occupation is a reasonable market definition. Using online job board data from CareerBuilder.com, Marinescu and Wolthoff (2016) show that, within a 6-digit SOC, the elasticity of applications with respect to wages is *negative*. Therefore, the 6-digit SOC is too broad of a market according to the SSNRW.

When narrowing the market definition to look at job titles, as opposed to 6-digit occupations, the elasticity of applications with respect to wages is positive and equal to 0.77 (Marinescu and Wolthoff, 2016). The elasticity of applications with respect to wages, when interpreted as a recruitment elasticity, is roughly equal to half the elasticity of labor supply (Ashenfelter, Farber and Ransom, 2010). Therefore, the elasticity of labor supply for job titles is around 1.5, which is below the critical elasticity of 2 implied by a 45% markdown on wages. This analysis suggests that, according to the SSNRW test, a job title is a legitimate labor market for the purpose of antitrust analysis.

Ultimately, we choose to define the line of work as a 6-digit SOC as the baseline. This choice is conservative in that the 6-digit SOC is likely too broad, and therefore labor market concentration as measured by HHI will tend to be underestimated. In any case, we will report the HHI for alternative definitions of the occupation.

## 4 Labor Market Concentration Estimates

Table 1 shows summary statistics for the HHI. In our baseline market definition as a SOC-6 occupation by commuting zone by quarter, the average HHI is 4378. 60% of markets are highly concentrated, i.e. above the 2,500 HHI threshold established by the horizontal merger guidelines. To put the average HHI into perspective, one firm with 50% of vacancies, another one with 35% of vacancies, and a third with 15% yield an HHI of 3,950. On average, the number of firms is 12.6, which seems high<sup>7</sup>, but the average HHI of 4378 indicates that most vacancies are posted by just a few firms. In fact, the average HHI implies that the equivalent number of firms recruiting is just 2.3 on average. Furthermore, note that the 25th percentile for the number of firms is 1.5, i.e. in a quarter of the markets there are fewer than two firms recruiting on average.

Looking at percentiles of the HHI beyond the mean, the 75th percentile of HHI is 7279. Again, to place this 7279 number in perspective, a market with one firm having 80% of vacancies and another one having 20% yields an HHI of 6,800. While 60% of markets are highly concentrated, another 11% of markets are moderately concentrated, i.e. have an HHI between 1,500 and 2,500. Only 29% of markets have low concentration (below 1,500 HHI).

To complement these national statistics, Figure 1 shows a map of all the commuting zones in the United States color-coded by the average HHI, based on vacancy shares. Commuting zones around large cities have lower levels of labor market concentration than smaller cities or rural areas. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between commuting zone and concentration: we see that the relationship is roughly linear in logs, with commuting zones with larger populations having lower concentration. This suggests a new explanation for the city-wage premium (Yankow, 2006; Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012): cities, and especially large cities, tend

---

<sup>7</sup>The maximum number of firms, at 1983.8, is the average number of firms across the four quarters of 2016 for "Sales Representatives, Wholesale and Manufacturing, Except Technical and Scientific Products" in the New York commuting zone. Overall, there are 29 markets with more than 1000 firms.

to have less concentrated labor markets than rural areas.<sup>8</sup>

In Figure 2, we show the quartiles of HHI across the US, and reveal substantial heterogeneity in concentration across occupations even within a commuting zone. For each commuting zone, we define quartiles of concentration of the top 200 6-digit SOC: the first quartile contains the 25% least concentrated occupations on average over 2016 Q1-Q4 in that commuting zone, the second quartile contains the next 25% least concentrated occupations in the commuting zone, etc. Therefore, the quartiles can contain different occupations in each commuting zone depending on the local level of the HHI. The map is color coded according to the average level of the HHI in each quartile for each commuting zone. There are few commuting zones that have highly concentrated occupations in the first quartile of concentration. Most of the commuting zones with highly concentrated occupations in the first quartile are in the middle of the country at the west end of the Great Plains. At the other extreme, occupations in the fourth quartile of concentration are extremely highly concentrated with an HHI above 5,000 in almost all (86%) of the US commuting zones. Therefore, for much of the country, the least concentrated 25% of occupations have low concentration, while the most concentrated 25% of occupations have extremely high concentration.

To further explore the variation in HHI by occupation, we report the average HHI in the largest 30 occupations in Figure 4. There is substantial heterogeneity across the most frequent occupations: over a third are highly concentrated, about one third are moderately concentrated and less than one third have low concentration. The most concentrated frequent occupation is marketing managers and the least concentrated frequent occupation is registered nurses. The top 5 most concentrated occupations are all high skilled occupations, while the rest of occupations are more of a mix and of high and low skill.

The majority of labor markets are highly concentrated according to our baseline definition of concentration. The frequency of highly concentrated labor markets is important for merger policy because, as mentioned above, a merger challenge needs to identify only one market in

---

<sup>8</sup>Manning (2010) shows evidence on plant size that is consistent with lower monopsony power in cities.

which anticompetitive results would be substantially likely to occur. At the same time, it is also interesting to examine the extent to which US workers as a whole face high concentration. When weighing each labor market by the number of employed workers, we find that HHI is 1638 on average, implying an equivalent number of recruiting firms of 6.1. This relatively low level of concentration is due to the fact that, as mentioned above, concentration is lower in commuting zones with higher population. However, even after taking into account the unequal distribution of employment across markets, we find that 20% of employment is in SOC-6 by CZ by quarter cells that have high levels of concentration. Another 8% of employment is in markets that are moderately concentrated. Overall, 28% of employment is in moderately or highly concentrated markets, and these markets represent 71% of all labor markets.

The legal standard for merger review is that a merger that substantially reduces competition in any market is illegal, and under the precedent of *United States v. Philadelphia National Bank*, pro-competitive benefits in one market cannot be used to offset the loss of competition in another. Therefore, the existence of many highly concentrated labor markets matters for antitrust enforcement, even if most workers work in less concentrated markets.

So far, we have discussed variation in concentration while holding the market definition in terms of 6-digit SOC by commuting zone by quarter fixed. We now examine how concentration changes when we vary the definition of each one of these elements. Starting with occupation, we report HHI for four alternative definitions. As mentioned above, there are reasons to think that the job title may be the most appropriate definition of the labor market. When using standardized job titles to define an occupational labor market, we find that the average concentration is higher than in the benchmark, at 5,892 (Table 1). This higher concentration was to be expected, since job titles are more detailed than 6-digit SOC. When using job titles as the definition of an occupation, 78% of markets are highly concentrated.

Next, instead of using the SOC-6 definition, we use the Burning Glass Technology (BGT) occupation. This classification is based on the SOC, but expands or consolidates SOC categories using the similarity of skills, education and knowledge requirements. This classification gives

results (Table 1) that are almost identical to the baseline. We then broaden the occupational categories by using either the BGT broader occupation group or the 3-digit SOC (for the 3-digit SOC, we use top 60 occupations, representing 98% of vacancies). The BGT broader occupation group categorizes occupations based on similar work functions, skills, and profiles of education and training. When using either the BGT broader occupation group or the 3-digit SOC, HHI levels are very similar: the average market is a few hundred points above the 2,500 threshold for high concentration, and 40% of markets are highly concentrated.

We now examine the impact of alternative geographical market definitions. As would be expected, county-level HHIs are higher than CZ-level HHIs, and state-level HHIs are lower than CZ-level HHIs (Table 1). State-level HHIs are very low and only 7% of markets are highly concentrated according to this definition. However, a state is very likely too broad a market. By contrast, a county is smaller than a commuting zone and is sometimes used to define a geographic market, e.g. by the Federal Reserve to calculate banking concentration ([Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2017](#)). If we adopt the county as a definition of the geography for a labor market, 78% of labor markets are highly concentrated.

Finally, we examine time aggregations other than the quarter. Table 1 shows that the average HHI calculated using monthly data is higher than the baseline, and the HHI using semesters is lower but still highly concentrated.

In summary, we find that reasonably defined local labor markets are highly concentrated on average. In our preferred definition of the labor market, the majority of US labor markets are highly concentrated (above 2,500 HHI).

## 5 Discussion

One potential explanation of firm-specific earnings premia ([Card et al., 2016](#); [Song et al., 2016](#)) is a lack of competition among employers: if job offers are not frequent enough to equilibrate earnings of similar workers across firms, then firms likely have market power in wage

setting. The increase in the degree of inter-firm earnings inequality for similar workers in similar industries is an indication that firm-level wage-setting power has become relatively more important as job offers become less frequent. Empirical studies of the declining frequency of incoming job offers for employed workers ([Hyatt and Spletzer \(2016\)](#) and [Molloy et al. \(2016\)](#)) are thus consistent with a decrease in labor market competition among employers.

The estimates we offer of labor market concentration are comparable with estimates of market concentration in many antitrust product markets that are considered concentrated in the Industrial Organization literature. For example, [Kwoka, Hearle and Alepin \(2016\)](#) report an average HHI of 3930 in their sample of high-traffic airline routes. [Azar, Schmalz and Tecu \(forthcoming\)](#) estimate mean route-level concentration at 5202.

[Cooper et al. \(2015\)](#) find that mean HHI in hospital markets, defined by number of beds within a 15-mile radius, is 4160. For health insurers, for which the relevant market is the state, given state-level insurance regulation, the same authors calculate mean HHI as 2120. Another commonly-studied output market in which geography matters is retail groceries: [Hosken, Olson and Smith \(2012\)](#) find that in markets in which a merger occurred during their study period (2005-2009), the ex-ante HHI averaged 2334, while in their control group of markets that experienced no consolidation, concentration was 3368. Finally, concentration in local banking markets is typically measured at the county level; [Azar, Raina and Schmalz \(2016\)](#) estimate mean HHI for deposit-taking institutions is 1840. Altogether, many antitrust markets are very concentrated. In this sense, what we find in labor markets is not anomalous.

However, a crucial final point to be made is that labor markets are different from the goods markets which are the usual domain of antitrust analysis and hence of the concentration thresholds contained in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Goods markets are typically thought of as one-sided, and hence the extent of the market is delimited by the options among which consumers substitute. Labor markets, on the other hand, are two-sided: workers not only have to find an employer; they have to find an employer who is willing to hire them ([Naidu, Posner and Weyl, 2018](#)). This implies that traditional concentration measures overestimate the options

available to workers, and thus underestimate concentration. Indeed, 55% of job offers are accepted by the non-employed, showing that in practice workers have few offers they could have accepted ([Faberman et al., 2017](#)). The two-sided nature of labor markets therefore implies that job choice sets are typically more restricted than product choice sets.

## 6 Conclusion

Since the release of [Barkai \(2016\)](#), [Autor et al. \(2017\)](#) and [De Loecker and Eeckhout \(2017\)](#), and other papers documenting rising product market concentration and discussing its effect on the labor market, there has been a great deal of academic and popular interest in whether market concentration might be the cause of monopsony power, wage stagnation, and other macro labor trends.

In this paper, we contribute to this growing debate by calculating measures of market concentration in local labor markets for the near-universe of 2016 online vacancy postings constructed by Burning Glass, and building on [Azar, Marinescu and Steinbaum \(2017\)](#). We have shown that concentration is high (above 2,500 HHI) in 60% of US labor markets according to our baseline market definition, and in at least a third of US labor markets according to alternative labor market definitions. Our results suggest that the anti-competitive effects of concentration on the labor market could be important. As detailed in [Marinescu and Hovenkamp \(2018\)](#), the type of analysis we provide could be used to incorporate labor market concentration concerns as a factor in the legal review of company mergers.

## References

- Artuc, Erhan, and John McLaren.** 2015. "Trade policy and wage inequality: A structural analysis with occupational and sectoral mobility." *Journal of International Economics*, 97: 28–41.
- Artuc, Erhan, Shubham Chaudhuri, and John McLaren.** 2010. "Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: A Structural Empirical Approach." *American Economic Review*, 100: 1008–1045.
- Ashenfelter, Orley, and Alan B. Krueger.** 2017. "Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector." Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper. DOI: 10.3386/w23396.
- Ashenfelter, Orley C., Henry Farber, and Michael R. Ransom.** 2010. "Labor market monopsony." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 28(2): 203–210.
- Autor, David, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen.** 2017. "The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23396. DOI: 10.3386/w23396.
- Azar, Jose, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall Steinbaum.** 2017. "Labor Market Concentration."
- Azar, Jose, Martin Schmalz, and Isabel Tecu.** forthcoming. "Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership." *Journal of Finance*.
- Azar, Jose, Sahil Raina, and Martin Schmalz.** 2016. "Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition."
- Barkai, Simcha.** 2016. "Declining Labor and Capital Shares."
- Baum-Snow, Nathaniel, and Ronni Pavan.** 2012. "Understanding the City Size Wage Gap." *The Review of Economic Studies*, 79(1): 88–127.

- Benmelech, Efraim, Nittai Bergman, and Hyunseob Kim.** 2018. "Strong Employers and Weak Employees: How Does Employer Concentration Affect Wages?"
- BLS.** 2017. "Unemployed persons by duration of unemployment." Bureau of Labor Statistics.
- Boal, William M., and Michael R Ransom.** 1997. "Monopsony in the Labor Market." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 35(1): 86–112.
- Bunting, Robert.** 1962. *Employer Concentration in Local Labor Markets*. University of North Carolina Press.
- Card, David, Ana Rute Cardoso, Joerg Heining, and Patrick Kline.** 2016. "Firms and Labor Market Inequality: Evidence and Some Theory."
- Carnevale, Anthony P, Tamara Jayasundera, and Dmitri Repnikov.** 2014. "Understanding on-line job ads data."
- CEA.** 2016. "Labor market monopsony: trends, consequences, and policy responses." White House Council of Economics Advisors.
- Cooper, Zack, Stuart V. Craig, Martin Gaynor, and John Van Reenen.** 2015. "The Price Ain't Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured."
- De Loecker, Jan, and Jan Eeckhout.** 2017. "The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications."
- Deming, David, and Lisa B. Kahn.** 2017. "Skill Requirements across Firms and Labor Markets: Evidence from Job Postings for Professionals." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23328. DOI: 10.3386/w23328.
- Dix-Caneiro, Rafael.** 2014. "Trade Liberalization and Labor Market Dynamics." *Econometrica*, 82: 825–885.

- Dube, Arindrajit, Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu, and Siddharth Suri.** 2018. "Monopsony in Online Labor Markets." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24416.
- Dube, Arindrajit, William T. Lester, and Michael Reich.** 2016. "Minimum Wage Shocks, Employment Flows, and Labor Market Frictions." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 34: 663–704.
- Faberman, R. Jason, Andreas I. Mueller, Ayşegül Şahin, and Giorgio Topa.** 2017. "Job Search Behavior among the Employed and Non-Employed." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23731. DOI: 10.3386/w23731.
- Falch, Torberg.** 2010. "The Elasticity of Labor Supply at the Establishment Level." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 28(2): 237–266.
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.** 2017. "Competitive Analysis and Structure Source Instrument for Depository Institutions."
- Haltiwanger, John, Henry R. Hyatt, Lisa B. Kahn, and Erica McEntarfer.** forthcoming. "Cyclical Job Ladders by Firm Size and Firm Wage." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*.
- Harris, Barry C., and Joseph J. Simons.** 1991. "Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary The DOJ Merger Guidelines Part I: Market Definition 12 Research in Law and Economics 207 (1989)." *Journal of Reprints for Antitrust Law and Economics*, 21: 151–172.
- Hershbein, Brad, and Lisa B. Kahn.** 2016. "Do Recessions Accelerate Routine-Biased Technological Change? Evidence from Vacancy Postings." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 22762. DOI: 10.3386/w22762.
- Hershbein, Brad, and Lisa Kahn.** 2017. "Do Recessions Accelerate Routine-Biased Technological Change? Evidence from Vacancy Postings."
- Hosken, Daniel, Luke M. Olson, and Loren Smith.** 2012. "Do Retail Mergers Affect Competition? Evidence from Retail Grocery."


- Hyatt, Henry R., and James R. Spletzer.** 2016. "The Shifting Job Tenure Distribution." *Labour Economics*, 41: 363–377.
- Konczal, Mike, and Marshall Steinbaum.** 2016. "Declining Entrepreneurship, Labor Mobility, and Business Dynamism: A Demand-Side Approach."
- Kwoka, John, Kevin Hearle, and Philippe Alepin.** 2016. "From the Fringe to the Forefront: Low Cost Carriers and Airline Price Determination." *Review of Industrial Organization*, 48: 247–268.
- Macaluso, Claudia.** 2017. "Skill remoteness and post-layoff labor market outcomes."
- Manning, Alan.** 2010. "The plant size-place effect: agglomeration and monopsony in labour markets." *Journal of Economic Geography*, 10(5): 717–744.
- Manning, Alan.** 2011. "Imperfect competition in the labor market." *Handbook of labor economics*, 4: 973–1041.
- Manning, Alan, and Barbara Petrongolo.** 2017. "How Local Are Labor Markets? Evidence from a Spatial Job Search Model." *American Economic Review*, 107(10): 2877–2907.
- Marinescu, Ioana, and Herbert Hovenkamp.** 2018. "Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets." Social Science Research Network SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3124483, Rochester, NY.
- Marinescu, Ioana, and Roland Rathelot.** 2017. "Mismatch Unemployment and the Geography of Job Search." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, forthcoming.
- Marinescu, Ioana, and Ronald Wolthoff.** 2016. "Opening the Black Box of the Matching Function: the Power of Words." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 22508. DOI: 10.3386/w22508.
- Matsudaira, Jordan D.** 2013. "Monopsony in the Low-Wage Labor Market? Evidence from Minimum Nurse Staffing Regulations." *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 96(1): 92–102.

- Modestino, Alicia Sasser, Daniel Shoag, and Joshua Ballance.** 2016. "Downskilling: Changes in Employer Skill Requirements Over the Business Cycle."
- Molloy, Raven, Christopher L. Smith, Ricardo Trezzi, and Abigail Wozniak.** 2016. "Understanding declining fluidity in the U.S. labor market." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 183–237.
- Naidu, Suresh, Eric N. Posner, and E. Glen Weyl.** 2018. "Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power."
- Nocke, Volker, and Nicolas Schutz.** 2018. "An Aggregative Games Approach to Merger Analysis in Multiproduct-Firm Oligopoly." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 24578.
- Ransom, Michael R, and David P. Sims.** 2010. "Estimating the Firm's Labor Supply Curve in a "New Monopsony" Framework: Schoolteachers in Missouri." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 28(2): 331–355.
- Song, Jae, David J. Price, Fatih Guvenen, Nicholas Bloom, and Till von Wachter.** 2016. "Firming Up Inequality."
- Staiger, Douglas O, Joanne Spetz, and Ciaran S Phibbs.** 2010. "Is there monopsony in the labor market? Evidence from a natural experiment." *Journal of Labor Economics*, 28(2): 211–236.
- Starr, Evan, J. J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara.** 2017. "Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force." Social Science Research Network SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2625714, Rochester, NY.
- Traiberman, Sharon.** 2017. "Occupations and Import Competition: Evidence from Denmark."
- Yankow, Jeffrey J.** 2006. "Why do cities pay more? An empirical examination of some competing theories of the urban wage premium." *Journal of Urban Economics*, 60(2): 139–161.


**Table 1. Summary statistics for labor market concentration, for the baseline and alternative market definitions.**

This table shows summary statistics for labor market Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) under various market definitions, for the year 2016 using data from Burning Glass Technologies (BGT). The baseline is calculated using commuting zones for the geographic market definition, 6-digit SOC codes for the occupational market definition, aggregating the data at the quarterly level (and then averaging over quarters for a given CZ×SOC). In the alternative definitions, the calculation is done by changing the baseline along one dimension (occupation, geography, time horizon). Except for the HHI weighted by employment, concentration is calculated over the top occupations (top 200 ranked based on the number of vacancies in the case of 6-digit SOC, representing 90% of vacancies; or BGT occupation definitions, and top 60 in the case of 3-digit SOC (representing 98% of vacancies) or BGT broader occupation group definitions) over the period 2016Q1–2016Q4.


	Mean	Min	Max	25th Pctile.	75th Pctile.	Fraction Moderately Concentrated	Fraction Highly Concentrated
<i>Baseline market definition:</i>							
Number of Firms (Unweighted)	12.6	1.0	1983.8	1.5	8.3		
HHI (Unweighted)	4378	4	10000	1232	7279	0.11	0.60
HHI (Weighted by BLS Employment)	1638	4	10000	187	1774	0.08	0.20
<i>Alternative occupational definition:</i>							
HHI (By Job Title)	5892	11	10000	2896	10000	0.08	0.78
HHI (By BGT Occupation)	4384	4	10000	1230	7333	0.11	0.60
HHI (By BGT Broader Occupation Group)	2943	6	10000	568	4744	0.12	0.40
HHI (By 3-digit SOC)	2956	10	10000	570	4774	0.12	0.40
<i>Alternative geographical definition:</i>							
HHI (By County)	6029	5	10000	2971	10000	0.08	0.78
HHI (By State)	859	2	10000	141	769	0.05	0.07
<i>Alternative time aggregation:</i>							
HHI (Monthly)	5926	9	10000	3043	8750	0.07	0.78
HHI (Semesterly)	3466	2	10000	788	5278	0.14	0.47




**Figure 1. Average HHI by commuting zone, based on vacancy shares.** This figure shows the average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by commuting zone code for the top 200 SOC-6 occupations (ranked based on the number of vacancies) over the period 2016Q1–2016Q4 in the Burning Glass Technologies dataset. The categories we use for HHI concentration levels are: "Low": HHI between 0 and 1500; "Moderate": HHI between 1500 and 2500; "High": HHI between 2500 and 5000; "Very High": HHI between 5000 and 10000. These categories correspond to the DOJ/FTC guidelines, except that we add the additional distinction between high and very high concentration levels around the 5,000 HHI threshold. Market shares are defined as the sum of vacancies by a given firm in a given market (6-digit SOC by commuting zone) and year-quarter divided by total vacancies posted in that market and year-quarter.



**Figure 2. Map of average HHI by commuting zone, by quartile of HHI.** This figure shows averages by quartile of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by commuting zone for the top 200 SOC-6 occupations (ranked based on the total number of national-level vacancies) over the period 2016Q1–2016Q4 in the Burning Glass Technologies dataset. Within each commuting zone (CZ), we order the 200 occupations by concentration to form four quartiles. The map for the first quartile represents the average concentration across 2016Q1–2016Q4 among first quartile occupations for each CZ, and similarly for other quartiles. The categories we use for HHI concentration levels are: "Low": HHI between 0 and 1500; "Moderate": HHI between 1500 and 2500; "High": HHI between 2500 and 5000; "Very High": HHI between 5000 and 10000. These categories correspond to the DOJ/FTC guidelines, except that we add the additional distinction between high and very high concentration levels around the 5,000 HHI threshold. Market shares are defined as the sum of vacancies by a given firm in a given market and year-quarter divided by total vacancies posted in that market (6-digit SOC by commuting zone) and year-quarter.



**Figure 3. Binned scatter of HHI and Population.** This figure shows a binned scatter of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by commuting zone for the top 200 SOC-6 occupations (ranked based on the number of vacancies) over the period 2016Q1–2016Q4 in the Burning Glass Technologies dataset, and log of population in the corresponding commuting zone in 2016 (based on Census data).



**Figure 4. Average HHI by occupation, based on vacancy shares, for the largest 30 occupations.** This figure shows the average of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by 6-digit SOC occupation code for the 30 largest occupations as measured by number of vacancies over the period 2016Q1–2016Q4 in the Burning Glass Technologies dataset. Market shares are defined as the sum of vacancies posted by a given firm in a given market (6-digit SOC by commuting zone) and year-quarter divided by total vacancies posted in the website in that market and year-quarter.