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THE PERILS OF VOTER MOBILIZATION

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ABSTRACT

Voter mobilization campaigns face trade-offs in young democracies. In a large-scale experiment implemented in 2013 with the Kenyan Electoral Commission (IEBC), text messages intended to mobilize voters boosted participation but also decreased trust in electoral institutions after the election, a decrease that was stronger in areas that experienced election-related violence, and for individuals on the losing side of the election. The mobilization backfired because the IEBC promised an electronic voting system that failed, resulting in manual voting and tallying delays. Using a simple model, we show signaling high institutional capacity via a mobilization campaign can negatively affect beliefs about the fairness of the election.

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1 Introduction

A key challenge faced by young democracies is how to organize fair and transparent elections that solidify, rather than undermine, the degree to which citizens trust electoral institutions. In the long term, both the participation and the trust of citizens are essential for the consolidation of democracy (Lipset 1959; Powell 1982). As a result, vast resources are being spent to make elections more transparent and to increase electoral participation in developing countries. Previous studies have focused on the impact of various forms of information provision to target issues of clientelism (Wantchekon 2003) and vote-buying (Vicente 2014), or to reveal information about candidates. However, the findings from this literature are generally limited to short-term electoral outcomes. By contrast, there is a dearth of evidence on the medium-run effects of information campaigns on citizens' trust in the electoral system itself and democracy.

In this paper, we show that basic information provided via mobile phone can have a large (and, in our context, negative) effect on attitudes towards electoral institutions. This finding was obtained from a text messaging experiment conducted before the 2013 general elections in Kenya. In the six days leading up to the election, the Kenyan Electoral Commission (IEBC) sent approximately eleven million SMS to slightly less than two million registered voters (14% of the electorate) across 12,160 randomly selected polling stations. Messages were sent to individuals who provided their phone number to the electoral administration in those polling stations. The messages gave either basic encouragements to vote, information on the positions to be voted for on Election Day, or detailed information on the IEBC. Unfortunately, the IEBC encountered numerous problems (including equipment failures) which led it to abandon its plan for a fully electronic tallying of the results in favor of a manual counting that seemed to lack transparency. In addition, some areas experienced outbursts of election-related violence. The difficulties encountered by the IEBC were widely documented (EU Election Observation Mission 2013).

We use official electoral data, as well as survey data collected with a subset of our sample to measure the effects of this SMS campaign. Our estimates show that the text messages had a positive and significant effect on voter turnout, and no effects on candidate vote shares. Our key results relate to political attitudes measured eight months after the election. While our messages were designed to increase trust in the IEBC, they had the opposite effect. We find that on average, our SMS treatments decreased trust in the IEBC and satisfaction with the way democracy works in Kenya, both by a large magnitude. These effects are stronger for voters in constituencies that experienced some election-related violence, and for individuals associated with the losing side of the election.¹ Our results (fortunately) do not suggest that the intervention reduced support for democracy in general; but there is also no evidence that dissatisfaction

¹We refer here to voters self-identified as Luos. The main opposition candidate was a Luo himself, and ethnic voting is extremely prevalent in Kenya (Ferree, Gibson and Long 2014).

with the electoral process translated into the emergence of “critical democrats” (Norris 2011).

We provide a simple model to account for our empirical results. The model highlights a trade-off faced by voter mobilization campaigns in contexts where institutions must still build a reputation of fairness. In this model, institutional capacity and fairness (or impartiality) are the two ingredients of a successful election. The text messages sent by the IEBC could have been interpreted as signalling high capacity, fairness, or both. Our model shows that election failures observed after receiving a signal of high capacity leads citizens to re-evaluate their belief that the election was fair, while a signal of fairness yields the opposite effect. In addition, the citizens most exposed to symptoms of electoral failure are most likely to update their priors in this way. The results we find are consistent with voters interpreting the campaign as a signal of high capacity. First, treated voters report lower trust in the IEBC and in the fairness of the 2013 election, especially in the two treatment groups where messages did not emphasize the IEBC’s commitment to a free and fair election. Second, treated individuals on the winning side do not revise their prior (or revise it positively), while individuals on the losing side, who were predictably most disappointed with the electoral outcome and most likely to consider the election was a failure, update their prior negatively. Third, individuals exposed to election-related violence in their constituency are also most likely to lose trust in electoral institutions.

1.1 Contribution to the literature

The 2013 Kenyan election took place in a context of broad institutional change initiated by the 2010 constitutional referendum. There is little evidence on the role played by the institutions responsible for organizing elections in young democracies, such as electoral commissions, despite the prominent role that these institutions play in recent democracies. This paper fills this gap by focusing on an institution, the IEBC, that was entirely new at the time of our experiment.

Beyond the direct influence of political institutions, trust and satisfaction with these institutions also matter for the functioning of democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996; Diamond 1999). The literature distinguishes between general support for the democratic ideal and satisfaction with the way democracy works in a particular society. While support for democracy is relatively high and stable over time (Klingemann 1999), satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions are in general much lower, both in older and newer democracies (Norris 2011; Doorenspleet 2012). Yet these attitudes matter for the quality and stability of democracy. Trust and political efficacy result in higher electoral participation (Blais and Rubenson 2013) and increase system stability (Lipset 1959; Powell 1982). Conversely, dissatisfaction with the democratic process (especially among losers of elections) can lead to violent forms of protests (Nadeau and Blais 1993). A comprehensive review of the determinants of institutional trust and satisfaction with democracy is beyond the scope of this paper – for this we refer the reader to Mattes and Bratton (2007). In this literature, we relate in particular to studies that show that improving the administration

of elections can increase satisfaction with democracy (Berman et al. 2014) by improving citizens' confidence that their vote was actually counted (Atkeson and Saunders 2007) and their assessment of government performance (Dahlberg, Linde and Holmberg 2015).

Beyond attitudes, a large experimental literature (starting with the seminal study of Gerber and Green (2000)) shows that information can affect electoral outcomes. Several of these studies focus on developing countries (Wantchekon 2003; Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013; Vicente 2014). These studies generally report experimental effects on short-term electoral outcomes, such as voter turnout and candidate vote shares. We make three contributions to this literature. First, beyond immediate effects of our intervention on turnout, we look at a different outcome – the evolution of attitudes towards electoral institutions after the election has taken place. Second, we highlight the potential trade-off between building up expectations about the democratic process (via increased mobilization of voters) and increasing the probability of disappointing these expectations and disenfranchising losers. Third, building on Dale and Strauss (2009) and Malhotra et al. (2011), we provide evidence about the effectiveness of text messages as a medium to convey information in a developing country, and we assess the extent to which information conveyed by text messages disseminates, since we varied the fraction of phone holders that received the messages.²

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide background on electoral institutions in Kenya. We describe our experimental design in section 3 and our data in section 4. Section 5 presents our empirical framework and Section 6 our main findings. Section 7 provides a simple model to rationalize our empirical results, and Section 8 concludes.

2 Background

2.1 The IEBC

The new Kenyan Constitution adopted in 2010 created an Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in lieu of the defunct ECK, which was disbanded in the wake of the catastrophic 2007 election. Nevertheless, the IEBC faced an uphill battle to establish its credibility and impartiality. Data from the Afrobarometer surveys shows that support for the previous Commission was more than halved between 2005 and 2008, and that satisfaction with democracy in Kenya did not improve in that timeframe, in contrast to the rest of Africa (Figure 1).

A key step taken by the IEBC to reduce electoral fraud was the purchase of Biometric Voter Registration kits and Electronic Voter Identification machines to mitigate identification issues in the voter register. The devices were used to make sure that every individual in the new IEBC

²Existing evidence on the impact of SMS on electoral participation is mixed: initial studies in the GOTV literature highlighted the importance of face-to-face interactions, but subsequent research (Aker, Collier and Vicente 2015) found that text messages could be effective.

register could be uniquely identified from their fingerprints and photographs before voting. The system would process the biometrics electronically and match every person turning up at the polls to a registered voter in its database. In addition, the IEBC relied on an Electronic Transmission of Results System that would make available online, in real time, the polling station-level results, allowing the public to monitor the tallying of votes across the country.

2.2 The 2013 Election

The 2013 elections were considered “the first real test of Kenya’s new Constitution, new electoral framework and reformed Judiciary” (EU Election Observation Mission 2013). For the first time, Kenyan voters were asked to vote for six different positions on the same day: President, Member of Parliament, Ward Representative, Governor, Senator, and Women’s Representative.

Eight candidates contested the 2013 presidential election, two of which were considered frontrunners: the incumbent Deputy Prime Minister, Uhuru Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), and the sitting Prime Minister, Raila Odinga (a Luo), who had narrowly lost the 2007 election. Voters from these tribes were expected to support their respective candidates; and estimates based on exit polls suggest this was indeed the case (Ferree, Gibson and Long 2014). In addition, each candidate built a coalition with one other major tribe through their choice of running mate. Kenyatta formed a ticket with a Kalenjin (William Ruto) under the banner of the Jubilee Alliance, while Odinga formed a coalition with a Kamba (Kalonzo Musyoka), called the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD). Five days after the election, Kenyatta was declared the winner of the presidential ballot with 50.07% of the vote. Odinga, who garnered 43.7% of the vote, filed a petition with the Kenyan Supreme Court to contest the outcome of the election. The petition claimed that the ballot should be declared null and void due to the failures of the BVR kits and of the electronic tallying system. The case was denied on March 30, 2013, which triggered instances of localized violence – at least five fatalities were recorded in clashes between rioters and the police on that day (Raleigh et al. 2010).

The IEBC encountered major difficulties in organizing the ballot. First, “the Electronic Voter Identification Devices (EVIDs) were not working or not used in about half the polling stations observed” (EU Election Observation Mission (2013), 1) because there were insufficient generators and extension cords to power the devices required for identification. As a result, in many polling stations IEBC officials had to identify voters and to count ballots manually. Second, the Electronic Transmission of Results System “stalled, for a number of technical reasons” (ibid, 31) and “eventually delivered just less than half of polling station results, much later than originally envisaged. (...) The failure to operate [the technology] successfully led to delays and ignited suspicion about the IEBC’s management of the elections” (ibid, 2). Finally, “the processing of official results lacked the necessary transparency” (ibid, 2) as a result of the various problems encountered. For example, a controversy arose from the fact “a programming error had caused

entries for rejected votes to be multiplied by eight” (ibid, 32). In the assessment of the election observers, “following Election Day, trust in the IEBC was in a precarious state, after the failure of electoral technology and the lack of transparency during the tallying process, both of which left it open to rumours and speculation” (ibid, 29). There was significant media coverage of the IEBC’s errors in the aftermath of the election.³ In several instances, local IEBC officials were physically assaulted, and IEBC premises were attacked (Raleigh et al. 2010).

3 Experimental Design

3.1 Design

In partnership with the IEBC, we designed a text messaging intervention to promote public interest and knowledge about the election, and to raise voter turnout. For the IEBC, the intervention addressed two main goals. First, anticipating that the electoral results would be contested if the election was perceived to not be free and fair, the Commission wanted to increase the confidence of the public in the official electoral outcome. Second, in view of its recent creation, the IEBC wanted to explore different ways to establish itself as a capable and neutral institution. This justified exploring variations in the content of the text messages.

The experiment was conducted by SMS between February 27 and March 4, 2013. The experimental sample was composed of cell phone holders who 1) had registered to vote during the 2012 countrywide biometric registration drive, 2) had a Safaricom cell phone number, and 3) had provided this phone number to the IEBC during registration. Safaricom is the dominant telecom operator in Kenya, with more than 20 million subscribers and a market share of approximately 80% in 2013. Randomization was conducted at the polling station level and stratified by county. Our sampling frame was composed of all polling stations where the fraction of registered voters with a Safaricom cell phone number exceeded 25%. This represented 12,160 polling stations across the country out of 24,560 stations set up for the election. The number of registered voters with a (Safaricom) phone number in our sampling frame was 4.9 million.

Our intervention involved two levels of experimental variation. First, each of the 12,160 polling stations was randomly allocated to either one of four groups: one control group and three treatment groups defined by the content of the six messages they received (Table 1 describes the exact number of polling stations contained in each group). In the first group, we sent basic reminders about the election as well as general encouragements to vote. In the second group, the messages provided information on each position to be voted for on Election Day,

³We conducted a Lexis Nexis search of one of the two main Kenyan newspapers, *the Nation*. In the five-week period between the election and the Supreme Court ruling that settled it, *the Nation* had a total of 1,233 articles on Lexis Nexis, of which 136 (11%) were about the IEBC, and 473 (38%) were about the election. Many of these articles focused on the failures described above.

i.e. they described the responsibilities involved with each position excluding the President (MP, Senator, Governor, Ward Representative and Women’s Representative), and encouraged recipients to vote for each of the six positions. In the third treatment group, the messages highlighted the transparency and neutrality of the IEBC, its successful record in organizing by-elections, its efforts to create a reliable voter register via biometrics, and its efforts to conduct a peaceful election. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to these three groups as T1, T2 and T3, respectively. Text messages were all sent in English. Table 2 shows the exact content of all text messages. Finally, we verified that the randomization produced balanced groups – randomization balance checks are discussed in Appendix 1 and shown in Appendix Tables 2a through 2f.

The second level of experimental variation was the fraction of voters treated within each polling station. For each treatment, a polling station was either allocated to a group where every Safaricom phone number in the polling station would receive our text messages (in the remainder of the paper, we refer to these treatment cells as “full treatment”); or where only half of these phone numbers would receive the text messages (hereafter referred to as “half treatment” cells). The objective of this randomization was to test for the presence of spillovers in the diffusion of information contained in our text messages.⁴ Overall, we found limited evidence in favor of spillovers – we show these results separately in Appendix Table 5.

3.2 Implementation

The text messages were broadcast by Safaricom’s mass texting technology. Phone numbers in our treatment groups received a total of six messages – one per day over the six last days prior to Election Day. Safaricom reported to us the rate of delivery of the text messages, by day and by treatment cell (delivery implies that the SMS was successfully transmitted to the client’s device, not necessarily that it was read). When a text message was not successfully delivered on the first attempt, Safaricom would keep attempting to deliver the message as many times as needed until the close of business on that day. We report these delivery rates in Figure 2. The success rate of the text messages was slightly over 70% on the first day of the experiment, and approximately 90% in the following five days.⁵

⁴Even in the “full treatment” cells, not all voters were treated. Voters who did not have a Safaricom cell phone number or did not provide it to the IEBC did not receive text messages.

⁵Individual delivery data was not stored by Safaricom.

4 Data

4.1 Administrative Data

To measure the impact of our text messages on participation, we first use official electoral results. The IEBC reported for each polling booth the number of registered voters, the number of votes cast, the number of spoilt, rejected, objected, and disputed ballots, the number of valid votes, and the vote tally for each candidate. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain similar data for the other five ballots.

The data from the presidential ballot was made available online in the form of scanned images (a sample image of a typical polling sheet is shown in Figure 1 of the Appendix). Since all the results were handwritten, we relied on a U.S.-based software company to process and digitize the data from these scanned images. The final dataset contains official results from 11,257 polling stations across all provinces of Kenya, out of the original 12,160 in our sample. The slight attrition (7%) comes from our inability to process the scanned polling sheets for approximately 900 polling stations, either due to illegible handwriting, or because the polling sheets were not scanned properly or simply missing. Table 3a presents summary statistics from the electoral data. Note that turnout for the presidential ballot was generally high, averaging 88% of registered voters (based on votes cast).

4.2 Survey Data

We conducted a phone survey drawing a random subset of individuals from the IEBC/Safaricom Database in November-December 2013 – approximately eight months after the election. The survey targeted a total of 14,400 individuals across 7,200 randomly selected polling stations. The survey sample was drawn as follows. First, we randomly drew 1,800 polling stations from each treatment group (totalling 5,400 stations) and 1,800 stations from the control group. Second, two phone numbers to call were drawn randomly from each polling station. In total, 7,400 of all phone numbers sampled (51%) across 5,389 polling stations were successfully reached and surveyed. The numbers of sampled polling stations and survey respondents in each group are described in Table 1.

In our main analysis, we report results for two sets of political attitudes (effects on the remaining attitudinal variables are reported in Appendix Table 10). The first are questions related to trust and satisfaction with democracy specifically in Kenya, and the second are questions related to democratic principles more generally. Table 3b presents summary statistics from the survey data, and the complete endline survey is available in Appendix 12. Note that we are not concerned about experimenter demand effects since the survey questions did not reference the experiment conducted by the IEBC, nor did it specifically ask about the messages sent as part of

the experiment.

4.3 Election Violence Data

We use geocoded data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to measure the intensity of election-related violence during the 2013 electoral period. We aggregated the ACLED data in two steps. First, we coded all election-related violent events recorded in Kenya between February 27, 2013 (the beginning of our intervention) and November 10, 2013 (the beginning of our endline survey). We define as “election-related” any event for which the ACLED description contains one or several following words: IEBC, polling center, polling station, tallying centre, election, candidate, CORD, Jubilee, TNA, Kenyatta, Odinga.⁶ Second, we plotted these events on the 2013 constituency map of Kenya, and we aggregated the number of violent events by constituency. Overall, 10.4% of constituencies in our sample experienced some election-related violence over the period considered. We show the spatial distribution of these constituencies in Figure 3.

5 Estimation Strategy

5.1 Main Specification

Our estimation strategy is straightforward given the study was a randomized experiment. In the administrative (polling station-level) data we run:

$$y_j = \alpha + \sum_k \beta_k T_{jk} + \delta_l + \varepsilon_j \quad (1)$$

where y_j is an electoral outcome (voter turnout or candidate vote shares) measured at the level of polling station j , T_{jk} denotes assignment of polling station j to treatment group k , and the δ_l are fixed effects for the strata used in the randomization. We present intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates throughout and we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. We also show Sidak-Holm p -values to adjust for multiple testing. We run different versions of equation (1) where we either include three dummies for assignment to one of the three main treatment groups ($k = 3$), or two dummies for assignment to any treatment (pooling T1, T2 and T3) in a 100% cell, and any treatment in a 50% cell, respectively. In Appendix Table 4, we also show a version of equation

⁶We systematically reviewed all events in the ACLED database to ensure these classifications were appropriate. After this review, we included 5 additional election-related events where none of the above terms appeared: namely one event in which a former MP was attacked by the supporters of an opponent, one event in which a campaign staff member for a local MP-elect was killed, one instance of an armed group attacking villagers for political revenge, and two instances of politically motivated attacks committed by an unknown group.

(1) that includes six dummies for assignment to one of the six treatment cells, including both the T1/T2/T3 dimension and the full/half treatment dimension.

In the survey data we run the following regressions:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \sum_k \beta_k T_{jk} + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

where y_{ij} is an outcome measured for individual i sampled from polling station j , and the other terms are defined as above. Here we cluster standard errors by polling station. We show the absence of significant spillovers on our main outcomes separately in Table 5 of the Appendix.⁷

5.2 Heterogeneity Analysis

We test whether treatment effects vary with the intensity of local election-related violence using the following specification:

$$y_{ijc} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{jc} + \beta_2 V_c + \beta_3 T_{jc} \times V_c + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ijc} \quad (3)$$

where T_{jc} denotes assignment to any treatment group, V_c denotes election-related violence measured at the level of constituency c , and the other variables are defined as before. We have aggregated treatments for simplicity of presentation – in Appendix Tables 6a and 6b, we show full specifications interacted with any treatment in a 100% cell and any treatment in a 50% cell. In this specification, we cluster standard errors at the constituency level. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient on the interaction, β_3 .

Finally, to test for heterogeneous treatment effects based on whether individuals were affiliated with the winning or the losing side of the election, we run:

$$y_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_j + \beta_2 win_{ij} + \beta_3 lose_{ij} + \beta_4 T_j \times win_{ij} + \beta_5 T_j \times lose_{ij} + \delta_l + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (4)$$

where T_j denotes assignment to any treatment group at the level of polling station j , win_{ij} denotes whether the individual belongs to the tribe of the winning candidate in the presidential ballot (the Kikuyu tribe) and $lose_{ij}$ denotes belonging to the tribe of the losing candidate (Luo). We also run an alternative version of equation (4) where win_{ij} equals one for all tribes that

⁷In this table, we look at spillovers in two specifications. We first use the individual randomization in the 50% treatment groups to create a dummy for whether an individual was treated (as opposed to a polling station treated). The turnout effect is reported in column (1). In column (2), we then split the treatment indicators into an indicator for individual treatment but in a polling station where everyone was treated, an indicator for individual treatment but in a polling station where only 50% of people were treated and an indicator for being a spillover individual (i.e. a non-treated individual in a 50% treated polling station). As can be seen, there is no evidence of statistically significant spillover effects on turnout in column (2). The same is true in columns (3) and (4), where we use as an outcome the dummy variable for individuals reporting voting for all six positions in 2013.

formed a coalition around the winning candidate (the Kikuyus and Kalenjins) and $lose_{ij}$ equals one for all tribes that formed a coalition around the losing candidate (the Luos and Kambas) in the 2013 presidential election. The main coefficients of interest are the coefficients on the interactions, β_4 and β_5 .

6 Results

In this section, we first present evidence that our text messages were received. We then discuss the effects of our experimental treatments on voter turnout, vote shares, political attitudes, political participation, information, and trust in institutions. As described in section 4, these outcome variables were collected from administrative electoral data as well as survey data collected over the phone with treatment and control participants.

6.1 The Text Messages Were Received

In Table 4, we provide evidence that treated individuals remembered the SMS campaign. In columns (1) and (2), we show that treated individuals were 4 to 5 percentage points more likely to report receiving a text message (with a control mean of 76% – recall that both treated and control individuals received messages from the IEBC, especially during the registration period). Column (2) shows this holds across all three treatment groups. In columns (3) and (4) we report treatment effects on the number of SMS survey respondents reported receiving from the IEBC. This is set to zero for individuals who did not report receiving any text message. Overall, individuals reported receiving between a half and one more text message (a 15% to 30% increase) than the control. In columns (5) and (6), we show that treated individuals were 4 to 6 percentage points more likely to remember the content of the SMS they received.

The survey also elicited what individuals remembered about the messages. We test whether respondents described the SMS as mentioning some form of encouragement to vote in columns (7)-(8); and whether they discussed these messages with others in columns (9) through (12). We find positive, statistically significant effects of the intervention on all these outcomes. Across the board, there is evidence that the respondents remembered and discussed the messages, in spite of the high number of messages received in the control group.

6.2 Effects on Participation and Vote Shares

In Table 5, we report treatment effects on participation and vote shares. Columns (1)-(8) present results using the administrative data and columns (9)-(12) using the survey data. We report results for two different specifications: (i) the pooled treatment effects across all 100% cells and all

50% cells, and (ii) treatment effects across the three groups (Encouragement, Positions information, and IEBC information).

6.2.1 Administrative Data

In columns (1) through (4), we use two different measures of turnout: the first is based on the number of votes cast, and the second on the number of valid votes. Results using either measure are similar. We find that the dummy for any treatment in 100% cells has a positive, significant effect on turnout of about 0.3 percentage points (about a 0.5% effect). This effect is robust to adjusting for multiple testing, with a Sidak-Holm p -value of 0.09. Treatment in 50% cells has no significant effect on turnout. Looking at the three treatment groups separately, we find that the Encouragement group dummy (T1) has a significant effect on turnout, also of 0.3 percentage points (note however that the Sidak-Holm p -value is 0.29). The coefficients on the other two treatment dummies (T2 and T3) are positive but not statistically different from zero.

In columns (5) through (8), we report impacts on the vote shares of the top two candidates in the election, who together garnered 94% of all valid votes in the country. These specifications are weighted by the number of voters in each polling station so that they roughly replicate the overall results of the election. Overall, although the treatments affected turnout, they had no significant effects on vote shares.

6.2.2 Survey Data

In columns (9)-(12), we report treatment effects on turnout among our survey respondents. In addition to asking respondents whether they voted in the 2013 election (columns (9) and (10)), we also asked them if they voted for each of the six ballots conducted on Election Day. We use this to create a measure of whether a respondent voted for all six positions (columns (11) and (12)). In columns (9) and (11), we find a positive, statistically significant effect of any treatment in the 100% cells on turnout, of about 2 percentage points. This effect is robust to adjusting for multiple testing. The effect of any treatment in the 50% cells is positive but not statistically significant.

In columns (10) and (12), we find significant effects of T1 and T2 on participation, with magnitudes larger than those in columns (1)-(4). In addition, the mean participation in the control group is slightly larger than turnout in the administrative data (93% versus 88%). We are not concerned by these differences, for the following reasons. First, the phone survey is limited to individuals with phones (as was the intervention itself), while the administrative data covers all individuals in a polling station. The average fraction of Safaricom phone numbers in the register is 56%, which implies that in the absence of any spillovers we would expect the effects in the survey data to be about 1.8 times larger than those in the administrative data for this

reason alone. In addition, phone owners may have a different propensity to vote than others, explaining the difference in our mean participation measures. Second, there is attrition in the survey. Attrition is likely higher among people who use their phone less or whose phone number was misreported during registration, i.e. people that were less likely to be mobilized by the SMS campaign. Table 11 of the Appendix shows Lee bounds on this effect. Combining these two mechanisms, we find that our treatment effect on administrative turnout is not statistically different from the lower Lee bound of the treatment effect on self-reported turnout. Third, even if the magnitude of this effect reflected some social desirability bias, the sign of our treatment effects on political attitudes is inconsistent with such a bias.

6.3 Effects on Political Attitudes

6.3.1 Average Effects on Trust

Table 6 reports treatment effects on trust and satisfaction with democracy in Kenya. In columns (1)-(2), we look at trust in the IEBC. Across the 100% cells, treatment reduced trust in the IEBC by four percentage points, a 5% drop relative to the control group (column (1)). This effect (unlike others in this table) is robust to adjusting for multiple testing, with a Sidak-Holm p -value of 0.01. All three coefficients in column (2) are negative, although the coefficient on T3 is not statistically different from zero.

In columns (3) and (4), we report results for trust in the Supreme Court, which settled the result of the presidential ballot after the main opposition candidate filed a petition against the IEBC. We find negative effects of the treatments on trust in the Supreme Court, but none of the coefficients are statistically different from zero. In columns (5) and (6), we report impacts of the treatment on whether the survey respondent considered that the 2013 election was fair and transparent. We find negative, significant effects across the 100% groups of about two percentage points (column (5)). In columns (7) and (8), where we ask whether the 2013 Supreme Court ruling that settled the election was fair, all but one coefficient are negative, but none of the coefficients are significantly different from zero.

In columns (9) and (10), we report effects on a dummy variable for individuals responding “very satisfied” to the question: “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Kenya?” We find a negative, significant treatment effect on this variable. This holds across the 100% groups, 50% groups (column (9)), in T1 and in T2 (column (10)). The coefficient on T3 is also negative but not significant (note again that the coefficients across treatments are not significantly different from each other). The magnitude of these effects is sizeable: individuals in the 100% groups were 2.6 percentage points less likely to report being very satisfied with Kenyan democracy. Relative to a control mean of 32%, this corresponds to a 8% decrease.

Finally, in columns (11) and (12), we report treatment effects on a standardized index (de-

noted “index”) of each of the previous five outcomes shown in Table 6. We follow the procedure in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007). We find that the 100% treatment decreases the standardized index of these outcomes (significant at the 1% level; see column (11)). These effects are driven by treatments T1 and T2: the decrease in trust in both these groups is significant at 5%, while the effect is smaller in magnitude and non-significant in T3 (column (12)).

These results suggest that text message recipients were on average more likely to mistrust Kenyan electoral institutions after the election. The sign of these effects is opposite to what we anticipated at the onset of the campaign. This is true particularly for trust in the IEBC, which the intervention was intended to reinforce: the messages were designed to enhance the transparency of the election and to improve the reputation of the Electoral Commission. The backlash in voters’ attitudes that we observe instead may have resulted from the fact that the IEBC did not deliver on what it promised. The model presented in Section 7 rationalizes these results by showing how this observed failure may have interacted with text messages to generate a negative update of voters’ beliefs on fairness.

6.4 Heterogeneity Analysis

Exposure to the various shortcomings of the IEBC was not uniform across the Kenyan electorate. If the negative effect we observe on trust came from a backlash caused by the failures of the electoral process, it is important to check whether this negative effect was larger in places where this failure was most visible or salient: in particular, places that experienced some election-related violence, and places that voted *en masse* for the losing side of the election.

6.4.1 Heterogeneity with Election Violence

To explore the first of these mechanisms (election-related violence), in Tables 7a and 7b we test for heterogeneity in our treatment effects by a measure of election-related violence, constructed from the ACLED data as described in section 4. Specifically, we interact our treatment variable with a binary variable indicating whether any violent events were recorded in the constituency. We show violence interacted with treatment in the 100% groups and the 50% groups in Table 6a of the Appendix.

In Table 7a, we find no evidence that our treatment effects on electoral outcomes differed by the intensity of local violence. The coefficient on the interaction of treatment with violence is a precisely estimated zero when the dependent variable is turnout (columns (1)-(2)) or vote shares (columns (3)-(4)), both measured in the administrative data. This coefficient is negative, but not statistically different from zero, when the outcome is self-reported turnout (columns (5)-(6)). Overall, the estimates in Table 7a suggest our treatment effects on turnout were no different across different levels of election-related violence.

In Table 7b, however, we find evidence that the impacts on trust are heterogeneous across our measure of violence (column (1)). The coefficient on the interaction of interest is negative, statistically significant, and large in magnitude (7 percentage points, or 9% of the control group mean). This suggests that individuals exposed to *both* election-related violence in their constituency and to our SMS treatment were significantly more likely to update their beliefs on the IEBC negatively. In columns (2) and (3), the coefficient on the interaction of interest is negative but not statistically significant. Finally, there is no evidence for the same kind of heterogeneity in columns (4) and (5), where we look at individuals' perceptions of the Supreme Court ruling, and at satisfaction with democracy in Kenya (in column (5), the main effect of any treatment remains negative and significant). In column (6), we report treatment effects on the same standardized index used in columns (11)-(12) of Table 6. The effect of the interaction of any treatment with violence on this index is negative, but not statistically significant.

6.4.2 Heterogeneous Effects on Winners and Losers

We now look at complementary variation capturing political preferences of individuals in our sample. Specifically, in Table 8 we look at heterogeneity in our treatment effects by whether the individual was on the winning or the losing side of the election.⁸ We use tribes to proxy for winners and losers. Exploiting this dimension of heterogeneity is reasonable given the high prevalence of ethnic voting in Kenya: as members of specific tribes typically align with specific candidates, tribes can be used to predict whether an individual was likely on the winning or the losing side of the election. In the 2013 election, [Ferree, Gibson and Long \(2014\)](#) estimated using exit polls that 83% of Kikuyu voters (and 74% of Kalenjin voters) sided with the Kikuyu candidate, and that 94% of Luo voters (and 63% of Kambas) voted for the Luo candidate.

We look at Kikuyu voters and Luo voters separately from all other tribes in odd-numbered columns. In even numbered- columns, we look at a similar specification where, instead of using the Kikuyu/Luo dimension to proxy for winners and losers, we use political coalitions formed for the 2013 election. We code Kikuyu and Kalenjin voters as being part of the winning coalition (Jubilee), and Luo and Kamba voters as being part of the losing coalition (CORD). In addition, at the bottom of Table 8, we report the F-statistic on the test that the treatment coefficient for the winners is not different from the treatment coefficient for the losers. Finally, in all columns we control for the interactions of treatment with education and wealth to make sure that our results are not driven by education and wealth differences across tribes.⁹

In columns (1) and (2), we look at heterogeneous impacts on trust in the IEBC. Trust in the IEBC is reduced for individuals who are neither Kikuyu nor Luo in response to the messages.

⁸In Table 6b of the Appendix we show heterogeneity with treatment in the 100% groups and the 50% groups.

⁹In Appendix Table 7, we show that these results are unchanged when we do not control for education and wealth and their interactions with the treatment dummy.

Trust is reduced further for the Luos, but the interaction is positive (partly offsetting the main effect) for Kikuyus. While the individual interactions are not statistically different from zero, we can reject (at 10%) that the effects for Luos and Kikuyus are identical. The estimates in column (2), obtained using winning and losing coalitions, are qualitatively similar. Here too, we can reject (at 1%) that the effects for losers and winners are identical: tribes from the losing coalition are more likely to lose trust in the IEBC.¹⁰ Note that the main effects of Luo and Kikuyu are extremely strong – Luos (and other members of the losing coalition) are less likely to trust the IEBC, whereas Kikuyus (and other members of the winning coalition) are more likely to do so.

In columns (3) and (4), we report results from similar regression specifications for trust in the Supreme Court. The interaction coefficients have the expected sign, and the interaction with being a Luo, as well as the interaction with being in the losing coalition, are both significant at 5%. We can again reject that the treatment impact on winners and losers is identical. The same holds for the impacts on whether individuals thought the election was fair and transparent (columns (5) and (6)). We can reject that the impact on winners and losers is identical, in column (6). In columns (7) and (8), we show heterogeneous effects on whether the Supreme Court’s ruling on the election was considered fair. Members of the Luo tribe and of the losing coalition were less likely to consider this was the case, and the difference between effects on losers and winners is statistically significant in both columns. Overall, across columns (1)-(8), we reject the null that treatment effects are the same for winners and losers of the election. In columns (9) and (10), we look at heterogeneous impacts on whether the respondent is very satisfied with how democracy works in Kenya. Here the relevant interactions are not different from zero, and we cannot reject that treatment effects for Luos and Kikuyus, as well as treatment effects for the winning and losing coalitions are the same. Finally in columns (11)-(12), we report effects on a standardized index of all previous five outcomes (computed as above). The interaction of treatment with being a Luo, or being in the losing coalition yields a negative, significant effect in both columns.

6.5 Other Outcomes

6.5.1 Support for Democratic Principles

The evidence presented so far suggests that the information campaign backfired: the messages *decreased* trust in the IEBC on average. This effect is most pronounced in constituencies where some election-related violence was recorded, and for individuals on the losing side of the political spectrum. In this section, we ask whether the backlash against electoral institutions affected preferences towards democracy more generally.

In Table 9, we look at measures of support for democratic ideals as they pertain to Kenyan

¹⁰These effects are not driven by differential effects on turnout across tribes (results available upon request).

politics (the statements were prefaced with the question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding politics in Kenya?). To do this, we focus on five questions on political attitudes (Appendix Table 1 provides a list of these variables). We ask whether the respondent agrees with the following statements: (i) democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, (ii) leaders should be chosen through regular, open and honest elections, (iii) leaders should be actively questioned, (iv) all individuals should be permitted to vote, and (v) violence is never justified in politics.¹¹ We report average effects in Table 9 and heterogeneous effects across Luos/Kikuyus and across tribes of the winning and losing coalitions in Tables 8 and 9 of the Appendix. Across all outcomes, we largely find small and statistically insignificant results. Table 9 suggests the effects we found in earlier tables pertain to satisfaction with specific institutions (the IEBC and, to some extent, the Supreme Court), but not to general support for the democratic ideal as an organizing principle of Kenyan society.

6.5.2 Effects on Information

The negative effects we found on attitudes may have been compensated by increased information, to the extent that the SMS campaign succeeded in creating a group of “informed citizens”. To test for this, in Table 10 we look at different measures of political knowledge of the survey respondents. The survey questionnaire asked respondents about practical details of the election (i.e., to name the day and month the election was held), about a particular institution elected on that day (i.e., to describe the role of the Women’s Representative), as well as details of local politics (i.e., to name the party of the elected President, and to name the President of Uganda). We use these variables as objective measures of information. In addition, we asked whether respondents felt well-informed about the election overall.

In columns (1) and (2), we show treatment effects on whether the survey respondent could correctly identify the day of the election. Columns (3) and (4) report the effects on whether the respondent could identify the month of the election. We largely do not find effects of the treatment on these measures of information. The same is true for whether the respondent could identify the role of the Women’s Representative (columns (5) and (6)), whether they could identify the party of the President (columns (7) and (8)) and whether they could name the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni (columns (9) and (10)). Across these columns, there is no evidence that the treatments had any effects on our objective measures of information about the election and politics. In columns (11)-(12), we look at subjective beliefs on information. The treatment had no effect on these self-reports. Finally, we should note that the survey included questions on how often the respondent listens to the radio, watches TV and reads the newspaper. The text messages had no effects on these outcomes (results not reported but available

¹¹In Appendix Table 10, we show that the intervention did not affect other attitudes unrelated to elections.

on request), implying that the texts did not create a set of more engaged citizens based on this metric.

7 Model

7.1 A simple model of capacity and fairness

In this section, we provide a simple theoretical framework to explain our empirical results. The model highlights how communication efforts by the electoral administration can backfire if the administration (in our case, the IEBC) fails to organize a successful election. A successful election has two ingredients in the model: institutional capacity (the level of “resources” allocated to the organization of the election, broadly defined) and institutional fairness or impartiality (the extent to which the final official results correspond to the choice of voters). If voters interpret messages from the IEBC as a signal of high capacity, i.e., a signal that enough resources were devoted to the organization of the election, then they are more likely to conclude, upon observing electoral turmoil, that the election was unfair or rigged. However, if messages are interpreted as a signal of fairness, then they will draw the opposite conclusion.

In our model, citizens observe the quality of the administration of the election: $S = 1$ describes a success, and $S = 0$ describes a failure. Failure may entail problems in the logistics of the ballot, delays in the announcement of the results, or election-related violence. Such problems occurred in the 2013 Kenyan election, as described in section 2. Two factors affect the quality of the election: R , the resources available to the IEBC; and F , fairness – of the election, the IEBC, or Kenyan democracy as a whole. The resources can be high ($R = H$) or low ($R = l$) and the election can be fair ($F = 1$) or unfair ($F = 0$). If citizens believe that $F = 1$, they report in our survey data that they trust the IEBC, that the election was fair, and that they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Kenya. Citizens know that R and F are independent and they have identical priors about F and R , denoted as $P(F = 1) = p$, $P(R = H) = q$. They also know the conditional probabilities $P(S = 0 | R, F)$, which fully describe how different values of R and F affect the likelihood of success and failure. We assume the following regarding these conditional probabilities when the election is a failure:

Assumption 1.
$$\frac{P(S = 0 | F = 0, R = H)}{P(S = 0 | F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(S = 0 | F = 0, R = l)}{P(S = 0 | F = 1, R = l)}$$

This assumption means that when resources are low, the fairness of the election does not have much influence on the likelihood of a failed election (because failure is almost inevitable). Instead, when resources are high, success is much more likely when the election is fair than when it is unfair.

Citizens do not observe R and F directly. Before the election, a fraction of citizens observe

a signal $\delta = \{\delta_l, \delta_H\}$ on the level of resources, and a fraction of citizens observe a signal $\gamma = \{\gamma_0, \gamma_1\}$ on the fairness of electoral institutions. We assume that these signals are informative:

Assumption 2.

- 2A. δ is independent of F , and $P(\delta = \delta_H | R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H | R = l)$.
- 2B. γ is independent of R , and $P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F = 1) = \mu > \eta = P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F = 0)$.

Lemma 1. People who receive δ_H positively update their prior on the level of resources allocated to the organization of the election.

Proof. See Appendix. □

Lemma 2. People who receive γ_1 positively update their prior on the fairness of the election.

Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 1. □

Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the following two propositions hold.

Proposition 1. $P(F = 1 | S = 0) > P(F = 1 | S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)$: in case of an electoral failure, citizens who received the signal that resources were high ($\delta = \delta_H$) have a lower posterior about the fairness of the election than those who did not receive any signal.

Proof. See Appendix. □

The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. By sending a signal of its own high capacity to conduct elections ($\delta = \delta_H$), the IEBC sets high expectations in terms of the quality of the actual election. But voters know that capacity is not the only determinant of electoral success – the honesty of the Commission can also affect the election’s outcome. Upon observing electoral turmoil, such as election-related violence or logistical problems at the polling stations, recipients of the messages infer that the election is unlikely to have been fair. This result does not hold, however, if voters primarily interpret the campaign as a signal of fairness ($\gamma = \gamma_1$):

Proposition 2. $P(F = 1 | S = 0) < P(F = 1 | S = 0, \gamma = \gamma_1)$: in case of an electoral failure, citizens who received the signal that the election was fair ($\gamma = \gamma_1$) have a higher posterior about the fairness of the election than those who did not receive any signal.

Proof. See Appendix. □

Whether the campaign leads to an increase or a decrease in trust in the IEBC therefore depends on how treated voters interpreted the messages they received. In other words, the sign of our treatment effects on trust in the IEBC is informative about the way these messages were understood: conditional on observing signals of electoral failure, a signal of high institutional capacity will lead to a decrease in trust on average (Proposition 1), while a signal of fairness will

have the opposite effect (Proposition 2). The question of which interpretation prevailed was ex ante ambiguous. On the one hand, individuals who received the messages from the IEBC must have observed that it had the resources to conduct a mass texting campaign, suggesting the campaign sent a signal of high capacity ($\delta = \delta_H$). On the other hand, some messages (in particular those included in Treatment 3, which provided information about the IEBC) emphasized the IEBC's role in ensuring the election would be free and fair – a signal of honesty ($\gamma = \gamma_1$). Note that when the signal received by voters contains information on both F and R , we cannot derive any general result on the relationship between $P(F = 1 | S = 0)$ and $P(F = 1 | S = 0, \gamma = \gamma_1)$ absent any further assumptions. Then, the sign of the combined effect on citizens' perception of F is informative about which of the two signals was more salient.

Given Proposition 1 and the risk that an unsuccessful election would alienate voters, why would the IEBC ever want to conduct this kind of campaign? Under one additional assumption, text messages can actually reinforce trust after a *successful* election, even if the messages are understood as a signal of high capacity. We make the following assumption regarding voters' beliefs in case the election is a success:

Assumption 3.
$$\frac{P(S = 1 | F = 1, R = H)}{P(S = 1 | F = 0, R = H)} > \frac{P(S = 1 | F = 1, R = l)}{P(S = 1 | F = 0, R = l)}$$

As under Assumption 1, the mapping between electoral success and fairness is stronger when resources are high – fairness yields electoral success relatively more often when resources are high. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the following proposition holds:

Proposition 3. $P(F = 1 | S = 1) < P(F = 1 | S = 1, \delta = \delta_H)$: *in case of an electoral success, citizens who received the signal that resources were high ($\delta = \delta_H$) have a higher posterior about the fairness of the election than those who did not receive any signal.*

Proof. See Appendix. □

Proposition 3 implies two additional predictions. First, the sign of the average treatment effect on trust depends on the relative fractions of citizens who observe electoral failure, and of those who do not. Second, the magnitude of the decrease in trust should be largest among citizens who directly received a signal of electoral failure (such as those voting in areas affected by violence) or among those who lost the election and, as a result, are more likely to show disappointment and to consider the election was a failure (on psychological effects induced by the outcomes of elections, see e.g. [Anderson et al. \(2005\)](#)). In other words, as observed in Section 6, the interaction of treatment status with measures of exposure to, or perception of the electoral failure should be negative.

7.2 Interpretation

As we documented in section 2, the 2013 Kenyan election was widely perceived to have been a failure because of a variety of implementation problems. A majority of Kenyan citizens had the opportunity to witness this failure – either because they were directly confronted with problems at the polling station, or because they were dissatisfied with the electoral outcome, or both. Under these circumstances, the model shows that recipients of the text messages would negatively update their beliefs about the fairness of the election if they interpreted the campaign as a signal of high institutional capacity; while they would update positively if they understood the campaign as a signal of honesty and transparency.

Our results are consistent with the former mechanism (highlighted in Proposition 1) – whether these beliefs are measured in terms of trust in the IEBC, satisfaction with the way democracy works in Kenya, or the perception that the election was fair. This result is intuitive: recipients of the messages were more likely to update their beliefs on the capacity of the electoral commission (because they observed the IEBC had the resources to conduct a mass texting campaign) than on the fairness of the commission or the election, which would require more than the simple information communicated in the messages. Note, however, that the negative treatment effects on trust is particularly pronounced in groups T1 and T2 which did not emphasize the IEBC’s commitment to conduct a free and fair election. Treatments T1 and T2 only conveyed information about institutional capacity: the messages sent to these groups do not make any claim about the fairness of the election; but in and of themselves they send a signal of high resources to conduct the election. Instead, treatment T3 repeatedly mentions the IEBC’s commitment to fair elections: it is the only treatment which conveys both a signal of resources and of fairness (see Table 2 for the details of messages sent to each group). Consistent with our model, we find suggestive (though not statistically significant) evidence that the negative effect on trust is mainly driven by T1 and T2.¹²

Finally, the results of our heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the predictions of the model: the magnitude of the decrease in trust towards the IEBC increases with exposure to election-related violence, and with being on the losing side of the election. These additional findings help us rule out another possible interpretation of our results, namely that the decrease in trust was caused by a behavioral response, as we discuss below.

7.3 Alternative Interpretations

Alternative interpretations could explain the negative effect of the text messages on attitudes. First, the campaign could have affected trust through electoral participation: voters who re-

¹²Looking at the last column of Table 6 (which compares effects across groups on a trust index), a test of the null that the effect of T3 differs from the average effect of T1 and T2 yields a p -value of 0.17.

ceived the messages were more likely to vote and, as a result, to observe the multiple failures of voting systems. Individuals who voted as a result of receiving the messages may also have paid more attention to election-related news, including those covering implementation failures and instances of election-related violence. This participation channel seems unlikely to fully explain our results in light of the relative magnitudes of our effects on trust and turnout: the decrease in trust in the IEBC is 1.5 percentage points (117%) larger than the increase in turnout. Yet, we cannot formally reject that the magnitude of our treatment effects on turnout and trust (in absolute value) are the same. A non-linear Wald test of this hypothesis (regressing outcomes on the dummy for any treatment) yields a p-value of 0.22.

A second alternative interpretation is a simple model of voter disappointment. In this model, each voter forms expectations about the quality of the electoral administration, \tilde{q}_i . On the day of the election, she receives a signal about the election's actual quality, q_i . The difference between voters' expectations and actual observation, $(q_i - \tilde{q}_i)$, determines their level of satisfaction or disappointment and affects their answer to the survey questions on trust. For example, the text messages raise people's expectations by some δ , to $\tilde{q}_i + \delta$ and, thus, decrease their satisfaction by the same δ : upon observing the same degree of electoral failure, voters who received a message are more likely to hold a negative view of electoral institutions. Having set relatively higher expectations, treated voters are relatively more disappointed.

We cannot formally rule out that this interpretation contributed to the negative effect we observe on trust in the IEBC, but note that according to this interpretation, the intervention did not affect people's actual level of trust. In other words, this interpretation amounts to assuming that voters answer a slightly different question (the extent to which the IEBC's action matched their expectations) than the one they are asked (their level of trust towards the IEBC). In addition, in this interpretation stated in its simplest form, the size of the effect is entirely determined by the extent to which the messages raise peoples prior (δ), irrespective of the realized quality. For instance, even if the election is a success, we should still expect people who received a message to be relatively less positively surprised, and, thus, to report a lower level of satisfaction. Thus absent additional assumptions (e.g. regarding some asymmetry between voters' reaction to good or bad news), this interpretation cannot explain our heterogeneous results by the extent to which the election is a success or a failure (and voters observe it).

8 Conclusion

This paper evaluates the impact of information disseminated by the Kenyan Electoral Commission in an effort to increase voter participation and trust in a set of new electoral institutions. Shortly before the election, the IEBC sent eleven million text messages to approximately two million registered voters – 14% of the Kenyan electorate. The messages provided either basic

encouragements to vote, information on the positions to be voted for on Election Day, or information on the IEBC itself. We measure treatment effects using official electoral results as well as survey data collected several months after the information campaign.

The intervention increased voter turnout by 0.3 percentage points overall in treated polling stations, in administrative data which includes individuals who did not themselves receive text messages. The self-reported increase in turnout among treated individuals is approximately two percentage points. However, the intervention also *decreased* trust in the Electoral Commission and institutions that were similarly involved in the electoral process.

While this outcome was certainly unexpected, should we also deem it undesirable? Decreased trust in the Electoral Commission was associated with decreased satisfaction with how democracy works in Kenya, but it did not undermine support for democratic principles: citizens who received the text messages remained equally likely to find democracy preferable to any other kind of government, to agree that leaders should be chosen through regular, open, and honest elections, and to disapprove of the use of violence in politics. A possible interpretation is that the information campaign contributed to the emergence of critical dissatisfied democrats (Norris 2011). We do not find much empirical support for this interpretation: eight months after the election, citizens are neither more informed nor more engaged in the treatment groups than in the control group. The simple model we provide suggests another interpretation. If voters interpreted the IEBC's SMS campaign as a signal of high institutional capacity, then under plausible assumptions, witnessing electoral failure could have led them to believe that the election was unfair or rigged, or that the IEBC was corrupt. Our results suggest treated voters interpreted the campaign in this way.


The decrease in trust towards the Electoral Commission and the larger effects we find among losers of the election are a cause for concern. In the long run, systematic differences in institutional trust between different ethnic groups could make it harder to build consensus around important reforms. In addition, growing dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy among repeated losers may result in social unrest, if the losers feel they do not have any other option to have their voices heard. Overall, this implies that mobilizing voters comes at a risk when the quality and the transparency of the election cannot be guaranteed. Failure by the electoral administration to deliver such an election may dramatically reinforce distrust in institutions. In young democracies, voter mobilization is a complex, and potentially perilous task.

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Figure 1: Trust and Democracy in Kenya



Note: Figures computed using rounds 2 through 4 of Afrobarometer Data.

Figure 2: Success Rates of SMS Broadcast





Figure 3: ACLED Election-Related Violence By Constituency



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED).

We coded all election-related events recorded by ACLED between February 27, 2013 and November 10, 2013 (see text for details).

Table 1: Sample Size by Treatment Group

Group	Polling Stations in Experiment	Polling Stations in Survey Sample (Target)	Respondents in Survey Sample (Target)	Polling Stations in Survey Sample (Actual)	Respondents in Survey Sample (Actual)
Encouragement	2,016	1,800	3,600	1,325	1,852
Positions Info	2,035	1,800	3,600	1,359	1,875
IEBC Info	2,023	1,800	3,600	1,357	1,848
Control	6,086	1,800	3,600	1,348	1,825
Total	12,160	7,200	14,400	5,389	7,400

Table 2: Content of the Text Messages by Treatment Group

Group	Content	Date
1	It is your duty to vote. Please make sure you vote in the March 4 General Election	Feb 27
1	You have a duty to vote for good leaders for your country. Please vote on March 4	Feb 28
1	Don't just complain about leaders, do something. Make sure you vote for good leaders on March 4	March 1
1	A good citizen helps promote democracy in his country by participating in the elections. Please vote on March 4	March 2
1	Remember the General Election is next Monday, on March 4. Please make sure you vote	March 3
1	Make sure you have your original ID or passport when you go to the polling station on March 4	March 4
2	Vote for all 6 ballots on March 4: Governor, County Assembly Ward Rep, Member of Parliament, Women Rep, Senator, President	Feb 27
2	Your governor will manage funds on your behalf. Choose the right person for this important job. Vote wisely on March 4	Feb 28
2	Your senator will help determine how many resources your county receives from the central government. Vote for a competent candidate on March 4	March 1
2	Your member of National Assembly will be responsible for making laws for Kenya. Vote for a true nationalist on March 4	March 2
2	Every voter, male or female, votes for the Womens Rep on March 4. She will represent your county at the National Assembly	March 3
2	Your Ward Rep ensures that your interests are represented at the County Assembly. Vote for an accessible leader on March 4	March 4
3	Free and fair Elections are important for democracy. The IEBC is committed to strengthening the democracy. Vote on March 4	Feb 27
3	Credible elections require a peaceful environment. The IEBC is committed to free and fair elections; please keep the peace	Feb 28
3	Elections are organized by the IEBC, an independent body created by the new Constitution to ensure free and fair elections	March 1
3	Show your confidence in the IEBC by voting in the election next Monday, March 4th 2013	March 2
3	The IEBC has managed 12 successful by-elections and the Constitutional referendum. Help us make this election a success	March 3
3	As part of its mission, the IEBC has established a clean voter register. You are in the register. Now, go and vote	March 4

Table 3a: Summary Statistics: Administrative Data

	Mean	SD	N
Registered voters	689.1	1002.2	11257
Votes cast	587.4	818.0	11257
Turnout, cast votes	.878	.082	11254
Valid votes	581.9	810.7	11257
Turnout, valid votes	.870	.083	11255
Non-valid votes	6.9	21.1	12160
Non-valid votes, fraction	.011	.014	11257
Election-related violence	.105	.306	12160
Kenyatta vote	.510	.389	11252
Odinga vote	.435	.362	11253

Note: The Kenyatta and Odinga vote shares are weighted by the number of votes cast in each polling station.

Table 3b: Summary Statistics: Survey Data

	Mean	SD	N
Age, years	36.3	12.5	7365
Gender (1=Male)	.606	.489	7399
Years of education	8.9	4.7	7364
Kikuyu	.176	.380	7356
Luo	.117	.321	7356
Winning coalition	.293	.455	7356
Losing coalition	.299	.458	7356
Voted in elections	.944	.229	7341
Voted for all six positions	.930	.255	7254
Received election-related SMS	.793	.405	7324
Total SMS received from IEBC	3.9	5.0	5879
Remember SMS content	.695	.460	7400
Texts encouraged turnout	.246	.431	6608
Mentioned texts to others	.704	.457	6103
Others mentioned texts	.687	.464	7196
Trust the IEBC	.781	.414	7327
Trust the Supreme Court (SCK)	.711	.453	7227
Elections were fair	.712	.453	7287
SCK decision on election fair	.684	.465	7204
Satisfied with democracy	.303	.459	7309
Democracy preferable	.900	.300	7321
Elect through open elections	.975	.157	7359
Actively question leaders	.834	.372	7364
All allowed to vote	.918	.275	7371
Violence never justified	.930	.256	7320
Month of election correct	.824	.381	6712
Day of election correct	.785	.411	5475
Role of Women Rep correct	.473	.499	6595
Party of President correct	.926	.262	6652
Ugandan President correct	.963	.188	6442
Well informed about election	.872	.334	7369

Note: See the text and Appendix table 1 for the full definitions of the trust and political attitudes variables.

Table 4: Recollection of SMS Received, Survey Data

	Received SMS		Received from IEBC		Remember Content		Turnout		Mentioned SMS		Others Mentioned SMS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	0.050*** [0.012]		0.944*** [0.175]		0.057*** [0.014]		0.052*** [0.014]		0.037** [0.016]		0.042*** [0.014]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.036*** [0.013]		0.340** [0.162]		0.038*** [0.014]		0.016 [0.013]		0.018 [0.016]		0.023 [0.014]	
Encouragement		0.042*** [0.014]		0.565*** [0.183]		0.048*** [0.015]		0.045*** [0.015]		0.031* [0.017]		0.023 [0.015]
Positions Info		0.036*** [0.014]		0.755*** [0.189]		0.044*** [0.015]		0.024 [0.015]		0.024 [0.017]		0.034** [0.015]
IEBC Info		0.050*** [0.013]		0.594*** [0.185]		0.051*** [0.015]		0.034** [0.015]		0.027 [0.017]		0.041*** [0.015]
Control Mean	0.759	0.759	3.371	3.371	0.658	0.658	0.221	0.221	0.682	0.682	0.662	0.662
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.00		0.00		0.00		0.00		0.02		0.01	
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.02		0.14		0.03		0.40		0.40		0.27	
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.01		0.13		0.14
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.03		0.00		0.02		0.20		0.20		0.08
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.00		0.01		0.00		0.05		0.11		0.02
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02
Observations	7324	7324	5879	5879	7400	7400	6608	6608	6103	6103	7196	7196

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects

In columns (3)-(4), there are fewer obs due to a malfunction in the electronic survey instrument. The Lee bounds on Any 100% Treatment are [0.666 1.084].

In columns (7)-(8), we report whether respondents mentioned that the text messages were about encouraging them to turnout or to vote.

In columns (9)-(10), we report on whether respondents reported mentioning the texts to others.

In columns (11)-(12), we report on whether respondents reported that others mentioned the texts to them.

Table 5: Effects on Turnout and Vote Shares

	Turnout (%): Admin Data				Vote Shares (%): Admin Data				Turnout (%): Survey Data			
	(1) Cast	(2) Cast	(3) Valid	(4) Valid	(5) Kenyatta	(6) Kenyatta	(7) Odinga	(8) Odinga	(9) Voted	(10) Voted	(11) All	(12) All
Any 100% Treatment	0.003** [0.001]		0.003** [0.001]		0.006 [0.007]		-0.006 [0.007]		0.020*** [0.007]		0.025*** [0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.000 [0.001]		0.000 [0.001]		0.000 [0.007]		-0.002 [0.007]		0.007 [0.007]		0.008 [0.008]	
Encouragement		0.003* [0.001]		0.003* [0.002]		-0.000 [0.008]		-0.000 [0.008]		0.014* [0.008]		0.018** [0.009]
Positions Info		0.001 [0.002]		0.001 [0.002]		0.004 [0.009]		-0.007 [0.009]		0.015* [0.008]		0.017** [0.009]
IEBC Info		0.001 [0.002]		0.000 [0.002]		0.005 [0.008]		-0.006 [0.008]		0.011 [0.008]		0.014 [0.009]
Control Mean	0.877	0.877	0.869	0.869	0.458	0.494	0.481	0.450	0.934	0.934	0.917	0.917
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.09		0.09		0.55		0.55		0.03		0.01	
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		0.89		0.89	
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.29		0.29		1.00		1.00		0.29		0.18
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.89		0.89		0.89		0.89		0.26		0.26
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.92		0.92		0.89		0.89		0.64		0.51
R-squared	.48	.48	.49	.49	.83	.83	.82	.82	.02	.02	.02	.02
Observations	11254	11254	11255	11255	11252	11252	11253	11253	7341	7341	7254	7254

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust in col. (1)-(8) and clustered by polling station in col. (9)-(12).

All regressions include strata fixed effects.

We use administrative data at the polling station level in col. (1)-(8), and self-reported data at the individual level in col. (9)-(12).

In col. (1)-(2), turnout = votes cast/registered voters. In col. (3)-(4), turnout = valid votes/registered voters.

In col. (5)-(8), vote shares are for the top two candidates.

In col. (9)-(10), turnout is whether the respondent reports having voted.

In col. (11)-(12), turnout is whether the respondent reports having voted for all six positions.

Table 6: Effects on Trust in Kenyan Electoral Institutions

	Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy		Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	-0.037***		-0.019		-0.021*		-0.012		-0.026*		-0.052**	
	[0.012]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.014]		[0.021]	
Any 50% Treatment	-0.020*		-0.009		0.004		-0.004		-0.024*		-0.023	
	[0.012]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.014]		[0.021]	
Encouragement		-0.042***		-0.016		-0.011		-0.009		-0.028*		-0.048**
		[0.013]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.015]		[0.024]
Positions Info		-0.022*		-0.014		-0.014		-0.020		-0.030**		-0.048**
		[0.013]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.015]		[0.023]
IEBC Info		-0.021		-0.011		-0.000		0.005		-0.017		-0.017
		[0.013]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.014]		[0.015]		[0.023]
Control Mean	0.800	0.800	0.721	0.721	0.715	0.715	0.688	0.688	0.320	0.320	-0.000	-0.000
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.01		0.29		0.26		0.36		0.22			
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.36		0.88		0.93		0.93		0.36			
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.01		0.60		0.70		0.70		0.24		
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.30		0.53		0.53		0.42		0.21		
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.41		0.84		0.98		0.93		0.72		
R-squared	.1	.1	.07	.07	.16	.16	.15	.15	.04	.04	.16	.16
Observations	7327	7327	7227	7227	7287	7287	7204	7204	7309	7309	7034	7034

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Across all columns the dependent variable is a dummy for the following survey answers:

Col. (1)-(2), Yes to: Do you trust the IEBC?

Col. (3)-(4), Yes to: Do you trust the Supreme Court of Kenya?

Col. (5)-(6), Yes to: Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?

Col. (7)-(8), Yes to: Do you think the ruling of the Supreme Court on the election was fair?

Col. (9)-(10), Very satisfied to: Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?

In col. (11)-(12) we report effects on an index of all previous 5 outcomes (computed as in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007)).

Table 7a: Effects on Turnout and Vote Shares: Heterogeneity with Election Violence

	Cast Votes	Valid Votes	Kenyatta (%)	Odinga (%)	Voted in 2013	Voted All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Treatment*Violence	0.002 [0.006]	0.002 [0.006]	-0.004 [0.008]	0.006 [0.008]	-0.024 [0.037]	-0.037 [0.035]
Any Treatment	0.001 [0.001]	0.001 [0.001]	0.002 [0.003]	-0.003 [0.003]	0.016** [0.007]	0.021*** [0.007]
Violence	-0.017** [0.008]	-0.016** [0.008]	-0.015 [0.022]	0.014 [0.021]	-0.012 [0.032]	0.000 [0.030]
Control Mean	0.877	0.869	0.458	0.481	0.934	0.917
Interaction Sidak-Holm p-val	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.92	0.95	0.87
Anytreat Sidak-Holm p-val	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.08	0.02
Violence Sidak-Holm p-val	0.17	0.17	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.99
R-squared	.48	.49	.87	.87	.02	.02
Observations	11254	11255	11252	11253	7341	7254

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by constituency in brackets.

S-H p-val refers to Sidak-Holm p-values.

We use administrative data at the polling station level in col. (1)-(4).

In columns (1), turnout = votes cast/registered voters and in (2), turnout = valid votes/registered voters.

In columns (5)-(6), we use self-reported turnout from the survey data. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Table 7b: Effects on Trust: Heterogeneity with Election Violence

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Fair SCK Ruling	Satisf Democracy	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Treatment*Violence	-0.068** [0.029]	-0.045 [0.035]	-0.029 [0.035]	0.007 [0.037]	-0.000 [0.042]	-0.082 [0.058]
Any Treatment	-0.021* [0.011]	-0.008 [0.012]	-0.004 [0.011]	-0.008 [0.013]	-0.024* [0.013]	-0.027 [0.020]
Violence	0.026 [0.030]	-0.016 [0.040]	-0.036 [0.031]	-0.075** [0.037]	-0.030 [0.037]	-0.044 [0.059]
Control Mean	0.800	0.721	0.715	0.688	0.320	-0.000
Interaction Sidak-Holm p-val	0.11	0.61	0.78	0.98	0.99	
Anytreat Sidak-Holm p-val	0.27	0.87	0.87	0.87	0.27	
Violence Sidak-Holm p-val	0.78	0.78	0.68	0.20	0.78	
R-squared	.1	.07	.16	.15	.04	.16
Observations	7327	7227	7287	7204	7309	7034

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by constituency in brackets.

Dependent variables are defined as in the footnote to Table 6. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In col. (11)-(12) we report effects on an index of all previous 5 outcomes (computed as in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007)).

Table 8: Winners and Losers: Effects on Trust in Kenyan Electoral Institutions

	Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy		Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any Treatment*Kikuyu	0.030 [0.020]		0.001 [0.026]		0.001 [0.021]		-0.015 [0.023]		-0.040 [0.035]		-0.008 [0.037]	
Any Treatment*Luo	-0.048 [0.040]		-0.081** [0.041]		-0.056 [0.041]		-0.117*** [0.041]		-0.056 [0.035]		-0.168** [0.067]	
Any Treatment*Win		0.012 [0.022]		0.002 [0.027]		0.001 [0.024]		-0.018 [0.025]		-0.015 [0.032]		0.001 [0.041]
Any Treatment*Lose		-0.055* [0.029]		-0.070** [0.030]		-0.075** [0.031]		-0.094*** [0.031]		0.005 [0.029]		-0.128*** [0.050]
Kikuyu	0.127*** [0.024]		0.160*** [0.029]		0.192*** [0.025]		0.206*** [0.026]		0.126*** [0.036]		0.366*** [0.044]	
Luo	-0.154*** [0.045]		-0.152*** [0.046]		-0.228*** [0.046]		-0.229*** [0.046]		-0.022 [0.039]		-0.348*** [0.075]	
Winning Coalition		0.127*** [0.024]		0.137*** [0.030]		0.187*** [0.027]		0.224*** [0.028]		0.104*** [0.033]		0.354*** [0.046]
Losing Coalition		-0.063** [0.031]		-0.033 [0.033]		-0.086*** [0.033]		-0.081** [0.034]		-0.041 [0.031]		-0.131** [0.054]
Any Treatment	-0.057* [0.033]	-0.035 [0.034]	0.007 [0.038]	0.026 [0.039]	0.042 [0.037]	0.067* [0.038]	0.037 [0.038]	0.065 [0.040]	-0.046 [0.039]	-0.057 [0.041]	-0.004 [0.060]	0.031 [0.064]
Control Mean	0.801	0.801	0.722	0.722	0.714	0.714	0.687	0.687	0.322	0.322	-0.001	-0.001
Win = Lose F-stat	3.67*	6.85***	3.50*	5.90**	1.86	7.64***	5.68**	7.27***	0.14	0.35	5.38**	8.31***
Win = Lose p-val	0.06	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.17	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.71	0.55	0.02	0.00
R-squared	.12	.12	.09	.08	.18	.18	.17	.18	.06	.06	.2	.2
Observations	7137	7137	7043	7043	7101	7101	7019	7019	7119	7119	6859	6859

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Dependent variables are defined as in the footnote to Table 6.

In odd-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Any Treat*Kikuyu = Any Treat*Luo.

In even-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Any Treat*Win = Any Treat*Lose.

In all columns, we control for education and wealth as well as the interactions of these variables with any treatment.

In the last two columns we report effects on an index of all previous 5 outcomes (computed as in Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007)).

Table 9: Null Effects on Support for Democratic Principles

	Democracy Preferable		Open Elections		Actively Question Leaders		All Permitted to Vote		Violence Never OK	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any 100% Treatment	0.004 [0.009]		0.002 [0.005]		0.001 [0.012]		0.004 [0.008]		-0.008 [0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	-0.001 [0.009]		0.003 [0.005]		0.005 [0.011]		-0.006 [0.008]		-0.013 [0.008]	
Encouragement		0.005 [0.010]		0.004 [0.005]		-0.012 [0.013]		-0.000 [0.009]		-0.009 [0.008]
Positions Info		-0.003 [0.010]		-0.001 [0.005]		0.007 [0.013]		-0.004 [0.009]		-0.014* [0.009]
IEBC Info		0.002 [0.010]		0.003 [0.005]		0.014 [0.012]		0.002 [0.009]		-0.008 [0.008]
Control Mean	0.898	0.898	0.972	0.972	0.831	0.831	0.918	0.918	0.938	0.938
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.98		0.98		0.98		0.98		0.80	
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.94		0.94		0.94		0.94		0.42	
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.86		0.81		0.81		0.98		0.81
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.96		0.96		0.96		0.96		0.40
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.96		0.88		0.79		0.96		0.80
R-squared	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02
Observations	7321	7321	7359	7359	7364	7364	7371	7371	7320	7320

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Across all columns, the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the respondent agreed with the following statements:

Col. (1)-(2): Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

Col. (3)-(4): We should choose our leaders through regular, open and honest elections.

Col. (5)-(6): As citizens we should be more active in questioning actions of our leaders.

Col. (7)-(8): All people should be permitted to vote. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

Col. (9)-(10): The use of violence is never justified in politics.

Table 10: Null Effects on Information

	Correct Month		Correct Day		Women Role Correct		Party Correct		Museveni Correct		Well Informed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	0.005 [0.012]		-0.019 [0.014]		-0.014 [0.016]		-0.007 [0.008]		0.005 [0.006]		0.010 [0.010]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.006 [0.012]		-0.017 [0.014]		-0.005 [0.016]		-0.005 [0.008]		0.006 [0.006]		0.008 [0.010]	
Encouragement		0.007 [0.013]		-0.000 [0.015]		-0.007 [0.018]		-0.004 [0.009]		0.007 [0.007]		0.005 [0.011]
Positions Info		0.015 [0.013]		-0.027* [0.016]		-0.014 [0.017]		-0.008 [0.009]		0.005 [0.007]		0.010 [0.011]
IEBC Info		-0.006 [0.013]		-0.027* [0.016]		-0.008 [0.018]		-0.006 [0.009]		0.003 [0.007]		0.011 [0.011]
Control Mean	0.820	0.820	0.800	0.800	0.481	0.481	0.930	0.930	0.960	0.960	0.865	0.865
100% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.87		0.68		0.87		0.87		0.87		0.87	
50% Sidak-Holm p-val	0.90		0.79		0.90		0.90		0.90		0.90	
T1 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.99		0.83		0.99
T2 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.74		0.40		0.82		0.82		0.82		0.82
T3 Sidak-Holm p-val		0.95		0.41		0.95		0.92		0.95		0.84
R-squared	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02	.02	.02	.03	.03	.02	.02
Observations	6712	6712	5475	5475	6595	6595	6652	6652	6442	6442	7369	7369

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the month of the election.

In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the day of the election.

In col. (5)-(6), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly describe the role of the Women's Rep.

In col. (7)-(8), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the party of President.

In col. (9)-(10), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the President of Uganda (Museveni).

In col. (11)-(12), the dependent variable is whether respondent answered yes to: Overall do you feel you were well informed about the election?

**ONLINE APPENDIX
(NOT FOR PUBLICATION)**

Appendix 1: Randomization Balance Checks

We first show that the experimental randomization produced balanced samples. Appendix Table 2a reports these results for the administrative data. We report balance checks for all the data we have access to from the IEBC, i.e. the number of registered voters per polling station, the number and fraction of registered voters who submitted their phone number, and the number of streams per polling station. In addition, we check attrition across treatment cells: as was mentioned above, some of the polling sheets could not be processed or were returned empty, resulting in the fact that we do not observe outcomes for 7% of polling stations in the administrative data.

In columns (1) and (2) of Appendix Table 2a, we test whether the missing data is correlated with treatment status. We report two specifications, one with two treatment dummies for the 100% and 50% treatment cells (pooling together T1, T2 and T3), and one with the three main treatment groups. In column (2), the IEBC information group has a marginally significant coefficient, but the p -value of the test of joint significance across all three treatment coefficients does not allow us to reject that these coefficients are zero. In columns (3) through (10), we show balance for the polling station-level covariates described above. Of the 12 coefficients tested across these specifications, none are statistically different from zero. At the bottom of the table, we also report the p -value on the joint F-test for all treatment group coefficients. Across all four outcomes we cannot reject that these coefficients are jointly zero.

In Appendix Table 2b, we report balance checks for the survey data. In columns (1) and (2) we show that survey attrition is balanced across treatment groups. In columns (3) through (14), since we did not collect any baseline data, we look at time-invariant variables collected at endline, such as the gender, age, and years of education of respondents, whether they reported voting in the 2007 election, whether they reported voting in the 2010 constitutional referendum, and whether they reported having registered to vote for the 2013 election (registration ended before the beginning of our experiment). Across the 12 specifications and 30 coefficients, only one coefficient is significantly different from zero. At the bottom of the table we report the p -value of the F-test that the treatment coefficients are jointly zero. We cannot reject this for 11 of the 12 regressions (one is rejected at 10%).

We report balance checks for the variables we use in the heterogeneity analysis in Appendix Table 2c. These variables are a dummy variable indicating the incidence of election-related violence in the constituency (columns (1)-(2)), and dummy variables indicating whether the respondent belongs to one of the following tribes: Luos (columns (3)-(4)), Kikuyus (columns (5)-(6)), tribes in the winning electoral coalition (columns (7)-(8)), and tribes in the losing coalition (columns (9)-(10)). Two out of the 25 coefficients appear significant at the 10% level.

Finally, we report balance checks across all sub-cells (including 100% and 50% cells) in Appendix Tables 2d through 2f. We present these estimates for the administrative data (with the same variables as in Appendix Table 2a) in Appendix Table 2d, for the survey data (with the same variables as in Appendix Table 2b) in Appendix Table 2e, and for the heterogeneity variables (with the same variables as in Appendix Table 2c) in Appendix Table 2f. These checks suggest that the randomization produced balanced samples across all the sub-cells, except perhaps for ACLED violence (Appendix Table 2f).

Appendix 2: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma. *People who receive δ_H positively update their prior on the level of resources allocated to the organization of the election.*

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(R = H \mid \delta = \delta_H) &= \frac{P(\delta = \delta_H, R = H)}{P(\delta = \delta_H, R = H) + P(\delta = \delta_H, R = l)} \\
 &= \frac{P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) P(R = H)}{P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) P(R = H) + P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) P(R = l)} \\
 &= \frac{\alpha q}{\alpha q + \beta(1 - q)} \\
 &> q
 \end{aligned}$$

since $\alpha > \beta$ by assumption.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 1

Proposition 1. $P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) > P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)$.

Sketch of the proof:

1. We first show that:

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) &> P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \\
 &\Leftrightarrow P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0)
 \end{aligned}$$

2. We then show that:

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) &> P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \\
 &\Leftrightarrow \frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = H)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = l)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = l)}
 \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality is true by Assumption 1. This completes the proof.

Detailed proof (Step 1):

Note that:

$$\begin{aligned}
P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) &= \frac{P(F = 1, S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)}{P(S = 0, \delta = \delta_H)} \\
&= \frac{P(F = 1, S = 0) P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0)}{P(S = 0) P(\delta = \delta_H \mid S = 0)} \\
&= P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) \frac{P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0)}{P(\delta = \delta_H \mid S = 0)}
\end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}
&P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) > P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \\
\Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H \mid S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \\
\Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) + P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) P(F = 0 \mid S = 0) \\
&> P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \\
\Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) P(F = 0 \mid S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) [1 - P(F = 1 \mid S = 0)] \\
\Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) P(F = 0 \mid S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) P(F = 0 \mid S = 0) \\
\Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0)
\end{aligned}$$

Detailed proof (Step 2):

$$\begin{aligned}
&P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0) > P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \\
\Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0, R = H) P(R = H \mid F = 0, S = 0) \\
&\quad + P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 0, S = 0, R = l) P(R = l \mid F = 0, S = 0) \\
&> P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0, R = H) P(R = H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \\
&\quad + P(\delta = \delta_H \mid F = 1, S = 0, R = l) P(R = l \mid F = 1, S = 0) \\
\Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) P(R = H \mid F = 0, S = 0) + P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) P(R = l \mid F = 0, S = 0) \\
&> P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) P(R = H \mid F = 1, S = 0) + P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) P(R = l \mid F = 1, S = 0)
\end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\Leftrightarrow &P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) [P(R = l \mid F = 0, S = 0) - P(R = l \mid F = 1, S = 0)] \\
&> P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) [P(R = H \mid F = 1, S = 0) - P(R = H \mid F = 0, S = 0)] \\
\Leftrightarrow &[P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) - P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H)] [P(R = H \mid F = 1, S = 0) - P(R = H \mid F = 0, S = 0)] > 0 \\
\Leftrightarrow &P(R = H \mid F = 0, S = 0) > P(R = H \mid F = 1, S = 0) \\
\Leftrightarrow &\frac{P(R = H, F = 0, S = 0)}{P(F = 0, S = 0)} > \frac{P(R = H, F = 1, S = 0)}{P(F = 1, S = 0)}
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Leftrightarrow \frac{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(F=0, R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(F=0, R=H) + P(S=0 | F=0, R=l) P(F=0, R=l)} \\
&> \frac{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(F=1, R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(F=1, R=H) + P(S=0 | F=1, R=l) P(F=1, R=l)} \\
&\Leftrightarrow \frac{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(R=H) + P(S=0 | F=0, R=l) P(R=l)} \\
&> \frac{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(R=H) + P(S=0 | F=1, R=l) P(R=l)} \tag{3} \\
&\Leftrightarrow P(S=0 | F=0, R=H) P(S=0 | F=1, R=l) \\
&> P(S=0 | F=1, R=H) P(S=0 | F=0, R=l) P(R=l) \\
&\Leftrightarrow \frac{P(S=0 | F=0, R=H)}{P(S=0 | F=1, R=H)} > \frac{P(S=0 | F=0, R=l)}{P(S=0 | F=1, R=l)}
\end{aligned}$$

where:

(1) comes from the fact that δ is only determined by R ,

(2) uses Assumption 2a,

and (3) uses the independence between F and R .

The last inequality is true by Assumption (Assumption 1). We infer that $P(F=1 | S=0) > P(F=1 | S=0, \delta = \delta_H)$.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Proposition 2

The proof is identical to that of Proposition 1:

1. We first show that:

$$\begin{aligned}
P(F=1 | S=0) &< P(F=1 | S=0, \gamma = \gamma_1) \\
&\Leftrightarrow P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=0, S=0) < P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=1, S=0).
\end{aligned}$$

The proof of this step is identical to the proof of the first step in Proposition 1.

2. We then show that:

$$\begin{aligned}
P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=0, S=0) &< P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=1, S=0) \\
&\Leftrightarrow P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=0) < P(\gamma = \gamma_1 | F=1)
\end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality is true by assumption (Assumption 2b) and the equivalence comes from the fact that γ is only determined by F . This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 3

By showing Proposition 1, we have shown that for a variable S affected by two independent variables R and F ,

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(S = 0 \mid F = 0, R = H)}{P(S = 0 \mid F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(S=0|F=0,R=l)}{P(S=0|F=1,R=l)} \\ \text{and } & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) \\ \text{implies } & P(F = 1 \mid S = 0) > P(F = 1 \mid S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

This is true for any three variables \tilde{S} , \tilde{R} , and \tilde{F} where \tilde{R} and \tilde{F} are independent:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(\tilde{S} = 0 \mid \tilde{F} = 0, \tilde{R} = H)}{P(\tilde{S} = 0 \mid \tilde{F} = 1, \tilde{R} = H)} > \frac{P(\tilde{S}=0|\tilde{F}=0,\tilde{R}=l)}{P(\tilde{S}=0|\tilde{F}=1,\tilde{R}=l)} \\ \text{and } & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid \tilde{R} = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid \tilde{R} = l) \\ \text{implies } & P(\tilde{F} = 1 \mid \tilde{S} = 0) > P(\tilde{F} = 1 \mid \tilde{S} = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

In particular, it is true for $\tilde{S} = 1 - S$, $\tilde{R} = R$, and $\tilde{F} = 1 - F$ (note that the independence of \tilde{R} and \tilde{F} directly comes from the independence between R and F):

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(1 - S = 0 \mid 1 - F = 0, R = H)}{P(1 - S = 0 \mid 1 - F = 1, R = H)} > \frac{P(1-S=0|1-F=0,R=l)}{P(1-S=0|1-F=1,R=l)} \\ \text{and } & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) \\ \text{implies } & P(1 - F = 1 \mid 1 - S = 0) > P(1 - F = 1 \mid 1 - S = 0, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

which can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(S = 1 \mid F = 1, R = H)}{P(S = 1 \mid F = 0, R = H)} > \frac{P(S=1|F=1,R=l)}{P(S=1|F=0,R=l)} \\ \text{and } & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) \\ \text{implies } & P(F = 0 \mid S = 1) > P(F = 0 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

But

$$\begin{aligned} & P(F = 0 \mid S = 1) > P(F = 0 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \\ \Leftrightarrow & 1 - P(F = 1 \mid S = 1) > 1 - P(F = 1 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \\ \Leftrightarrow & P(F = 1 \mid S = 1) < P(F = 1 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{P(S = 1 \mid F = 1, R = H)}{P(S = 1 \mid F = 0, R = H)} > \frac{P(S=1|F=1,R=l)}{P(S=1|F=0,R=l)} \\ \text{and } & P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = H) = \alpha > \beta = P(\delta = \delta_H \mid R = l) \\ \text{implies } & P(F = 1 \mid S = 1) < P(F = 1 \mid S = 1, \delta = \delta_H) \end{aligned}$$

We conclude that Proposition 3 (the third line) derives from Assumption 3 (the first line) and Assumption 2 (the second line).

Q.E.D.

Appendix Table 1: Description of Political Attitude Variables

Question	Response Options
How do you feel about the outcome of the last elections?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Satisfied, 3=Indifferent, 4=Dissatisfied, 5=Very dissatisfied
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding politics in Kenya: Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on. The world is run by few people in power, and there is not much that someone like me can do about it. We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree 1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree 1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree
Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion?	1=Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government, 2=In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable, 3=For someone like me, it doesn't matter what government we have
Overall how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Fairly satisfied, 3=Not very satisfied, 4=Not at all satisfied, 5=Kenya is not a democracy
For each of the following pairs of statements, tell me which of the two is closest to your view about Kenyan politics: 1: The use of violence is never justified in politics. 1: As citizens we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders. 1: All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election. 1: Women can be good politicians and should be encouraged to stand in elections. 1: In our country, it is normal to pay a bribe to a government official to encourage them.	2: In this country it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause. 2: In our country these days we should show more respect for authority. 2: Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders. 2: Women should stay at home to take care of their children. 2: It is wrong to pay a bribe to any government official.
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	1=Most people can be trusted, 2=Need to be careful
In general, can you trust members of your tribe?	1=Yes, 2=No
In general, can you trust members in other tribes?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you trust the IEBC, the electoral commission of Kenya?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you trust the Supreme court?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you trust the police?	1=Yes, 2=No
Do you think the elections this year were fair and transparent?	1=Yes, 2=No
In general, in your life, are you very happy, somewhat happy or not happy?	1=Very happy, 2=Somewhat happy, 3=Not happy

Appendix Table 2a: Randomization Checks, Administrative Data

	Data Missing		# Registered Voters		# Phones		% Phones		# Streams	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any 100% Treatment	0.005 [0.005]		5.487 [17.910]		1.541 [12.660]		-0.007 [0.007]		0.010 [0.021]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.005 [0.005]		6.615 [17.460]		4.485 [12.320]		-0.003 [0.007]		0.009 [0.020]	
Encouragement		0.008 [0.006]		16.018 [22.701]		14.109 [15.888]		-0.002 [0.009]		0.015 [0.026]
Positions Info		-0.003 [0.006]		10.374 [19.348]		4.376 [13.930]		-0.009 [0.007]		0.010 [0.023]
IEBC Info		0.011* [0.006]		-8.326 [19.365]		-9.412 [13.544]		-0.004 [0.009]		0.003 [0.023]
F-test p-value	0.49	0.16	0.91	0.77	0.94	0.63	0.63	0.61	0.87	0.94
Control Mean	0.07	0.07	685.99	689.06	402.21	403.70	0.56	0.56	1.40	1.40
R-squared	.14	.14	.43	.43	.42	.42	.06	.06	.43	.43
Observations	12160	12160	11257	11257	12160	12160	12160	12160	11191	11191

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard errors reported in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Registered voters denotes the number of registered voters per polling station.

Phones denotes the number of registered voters with a valid Safaricom phone number per polling station.

% Phones denotes the fraction of registered voters with a valid Safaricom phone number per polling station.

Streams denotes the number of polling booths per polling station.

Appendix Table 2b: Randomization Checks, Survey Data

	Non-Response		Gender		Age		Years of Educ		Voted 2007		Voted 2010		Registered 2013	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Any 100% Treatment	-0.006		-0.009		0.553		-0.178		0.010		0.011		-0.000	
	[0.011]		[0.015]		[0.371]		[0.142]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.003]	
Any 50% Treatment	-0.013		-0.003		0.596		-0.142		0.020		0.012		-0.003	
	[0.011]		[0.015]		[0.374]		[0.143]		[0.013]		[0.013]		[0.003]	
Encouragement		-0.008		-0.025		0.714*		-0.104		0.008		0.023		0.000
		[0.012]		[0.016]		[0.410]		[0.156]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.003]
Positions Info		-0.014		0.017		0.532		-0.127		0.016		0.005		-0.005
		[0.012]		[0.016]		[0.412]		[0.157]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.003]
IEBC Info		-0.006		-0.010		0.478		-0.249		0.020		0.007		0.000
		[0.012]		[0.016]		[0.408]		[0.155]		[0.015]		[0.014]		[0.003]
F-test p-value	0.49	0.69	0.81	0.07	0.22	0.34	0.43	0.46	0.32	0.52	0.60	0.40	0.57	0.43
Control Mean	0.49	0.49	0.61	0.61	35.89	35.89	9.06	9.06	0.73	0.73	0.75	0.75	0.99	0.99
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01
Observations	14400	14400	7399	7399	7365	7365	7364	7364	7332	7332	7261	7261	7339	7339

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
 In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Appendix Table 2c: Randomization Checks, Heterogeneity Variables

	Violence		Luos		Kikuyus		Winners		Losers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any 100% Treatment	0.017 [0.011]		-0.009 [0.007]		-0.000 [0.005]		0.002 [0.008]		0.001 [0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.015 [0.011]		-0.003 [0.007]		-0.003 [0.006]		0.006 [0.008]		-0.007 [0.008]	
Encouragement		0.022* [0.012]		-0.007 [0.008]		-0.003 [0.006]		-0.003 [0.009]		-0.005 [0.009]
Positions Info		0.020 [0.013]		-0.012 [0.008]		0.003 [0.006]		-0.003 [0.009]		0.003 [0.009]
IEBC Info		0.005 [0.011]		0.001 [0.008]		-0.004 [0.006]		0.016* [0.009]		-0.007 [0.009]
F-test p-value	0.28	0.13	0.41	0.34	0.83	0.62	0.78	0.11	0.55	0.62
Control Mean	0.10	0.10	0.19	0.19	0.13	0.13	0.29	0.29	0.31	0.31
R-squared	.26	.26	.64	.64	.71	.71	.67	.67	.7	.7
Observations	7327	7327	7356	7356	7356	7356	7356	7356	7356	7356

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by constituency (the level at which violence is measured) in columns (1)-(2) and by polling station in columns (3)-(10). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Appendix Table 2d: Randomization Balance across all treatment cells

	Data Missing	# Registered Voters	# Phones	% Phones	# Streams
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Encouragement, 100%	0.014 [0.009]	10.823 [31.812]	8.616 [22.363]	-0.008 [0.009]	0.006 [0.036]
Encouragement, 50%	0.003 [0.008]	21.164 [29.341]	19.614 [20.313]	0.005 [0.013]	0.024 [0.034]
Positions Info, 100%	-0.005 [0.008]	10.966 [24.880]	-1.935 [17.182]	-0.011 [0.008]	0.020 [0.031]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.002 [0.008]	9.781 [26.203]	10.680 [19.579]	-0.007 [0.008]	-0.000 [0.031]
IEBC Info, 100%	0.007 [0.008]	-5.385 [26.246]	-2.023 [18.919]	-0.001 [0.013]	0.003 [0.032]
IEBC Info, 50%	0.015* [0.009]	-11.285 [24.851]	-16.779 [16.698]	-0.007 [0.010]	0.002 [0.028]
F-test p-value	0.37	0.97	0.83	0.83	0.99
Control Mean	0.074	689.059	403.699	0.561	1.400
R-squared	.14	.43	.42	.06	.43
Observations	12160	11257	12160	12160	11191

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust Standard errors reported in brackets.

All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In each column we report the p-value of a test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies.

Registered voters denotes the number of registered voters per polling station.

Phones denotes the number of registered voters with a valid phone number per polling station.

% Phones denotes the fraction of registered voters with a valid phone number per polling station.

Streams denotes the number of polling booths per polling station.

Appendix Table 2e: Randomization Balance across all treatment cells

	Non-Response	Gender	Age	Years of Educ	Voted 2007	Voted 2010	Registered 2013
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Encouragement, 100%	0.004 [0.015]	-0.023 [0.020]	0.551 [0.497]	-0.020 [0.188]	-0.006 [0.019]	0.018 [0.017]	0.002 [0.004]
Encouragement, 50%	-0.019 [0.015]	-0.027 [0.020]	0.870* [0.513]	-0.183 [0.192]	0.022 [0.018]	0.027 [0.017]	-0.002 [0.004]
Positions Info, 100%	-0.023 [0.014]	0.003 [0.019]	0.532 [0.497]	-0.315 [0.193]	0.017 [0.018]	0.012 [0.017]	-0.004 [0.004]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.005 [0.015]	0.031 [0.020]	0.531 [0.520]	0.068 [0.193]	0.015 [0.018]	-0.002 [0.018]	-0.006 [0.004]
IEBC Info, 100%	0.002 [0.014]	-0.008 [0.020]	0.577 [0.509]	-0.190 [0.187]	0.017 [0.018]	0.002 [0.017]	0.001 [0.004]
IEBC Info, 50%	-0.014 [0.014]	-0.011 [0.020]	0.382 [0.495]	-0.306 [0.192]	0.023 [0.018]	0.011 [0.017]	-0.001 [0.004]
F-test p-value	0.50	0.19	0.72	0.39	0.66	0.70	0.65
Control Mean	0.493	0.612	35.894	9.061	0.726	0.751	0.991
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.02	.01
Observations	14400	7399	7365	7364	7332	7261	7339

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station. All regressions include strata fixed effects.
 In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Appendix Table 2f: Randomization Balance across all treatment cells

	Violence	Luos	Kikuyus	Winners	Losers
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Encouragement, 100%	0.016 [0.013]	-0.012 [0.010]	0.002 [0.008]	-0.005 [0.011]	0.003 [0.011]
Encouragement, 50%	0.028* [0.015]	-0.002 [0.010]	-0.008 [0.007]	-0.001 [0.011]	-0.013 [0.010]
Positions Info, 100%	0.006 [0.012]	-0.015 [0.010]	0.001 [0.007]	-0.004 [0.012]	0.004 [0.011]
Positions Info, 50%	0.035** [0.016]	-0.008 [0.009]	0.005 [0.008]	-0.001 [0.011]	0.003 [0.011]
IEBC Info, 100%	0.029** [0.013]	-0.000 [0.010]	-0.003 [0.007]	0.014 [0.011]	-0.005 [0.011]
IEBC Info, 50%	-0.018 [0.013]	0.002 [0.010]	-0.005 [0.008]	0.019* [0.011]	-0.010 [0.011]
F-test p-value	0.05	0.63	0.76	0.40	0.70
Control Mean	0.100	0.186	0.125	0.290	0.309
R-squared	.26	.64	.71	.67	.7
Observations	7327	7356	7356	7356	7356

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered by constituency (the level at which violence is measured) in col. (1) and by polling station in col. (2)-(5). All regressions include strata fixed effects. In each column we report the p-value of a F-test of joint significance of all the treatment dummies in each regression.

Appendix Table 3: Effects on Turnout by Position (Survey Data), Additional Results

	President		MP		Senator		Governor		Women's Rep		Ward Rep	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any 100% Treatment	0.019*** [0.007]		0.020*** [0.007]		0.020*** [0.007]		0.022*** [0.007]		0.021*** [0.008]		0.023*** [0.008]	
Any 50% Treatment	0.008 [0.007]		0.007 [0.008]		0.005 [0.008]		0.007 [0.008]		0.007 [0.008]		0.008 [0.008]	
Encouragement		0.014* [0.008]		0.014* [0.008]		0.016* [0.008]		0.016** [0.008]		0.016* [0.008]		0.017** [0.008]
Positions Info		0.015* [0.008]		0.014* [0.008]		0.011 [0.008]		0.014* [0.008]		0.013 [0.008]		0.016* [0.008]
IEBC Info		0.012 [0.008]		0.012 [0.008]		0.010 [0.008]		0.011 [0.008]		0.013 [0.009]		0.013 [0.009]
Control Mean	0.932	0.932	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.928	0.924	0.924	0.923	0.923
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02
Observations	7307	7307	7300	7300	7304	7304	7302	7302	7303	7303	7297	7297

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Appendix Table 4: Effects on Trust and Satisfaction with Democracy in Kenya, Additional Results

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Satisf Democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Encouragement, 100%	-0.058*** [0.017]	-0.025 [0.018]	-0.028 [0.018]	-0.020 [0.019]
Encouragement, 50%	-0.027* [0.016]	-0.008 [0.018]	0.006 [0.017]	-0.035** [0.018]
Positions Info, 100%	-0.020 [0.016]	-0.011 [0.018]	-0.025 [0.017]	-0.050*** [0.018]
Positions Info, 50%	-0.024 [0.016]	-0.017 [0.018]	-0.003 [0.017]	-0.009 [0.019]
IEBC Info, 100%	-0.034** [0.016]	-0.020 [0.018]	-0.011 [0.017]	-0.007 [0.019]
IEBC Info, 50%	-0.008 [0.016]	-0.002 [0.018]	0.009 [0.017]	-0.026 [0.018]
Control Mean	0.800	0.721	0.715	0.320
R-squared	.1	.07	.16	.04
Observations	7327	7227	7287	7309

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets.
All regressions include strata fixed effects..

Appendix Table 5: Spillovers

	Voted in 2013		Voted for All Positions		Trust IEBC		Fair Election		Satisf Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Individual treatment	0.016** [0.007]		0.021*** [0.008]		-0.033*** [0.011]		-0.017 [0.012]		-0.024* [0.013]	
Treatment, 100% Groups		0.020*** [0.007]		0.025*** [0.008]		-0.037*** [0.012]		-0.021* [0.013]		-0.026* [0.014]
Treatment, 50% Groups		0.009 [0.009]		0.012 [0.010]		-0.026* [0.014]		-0.009 [0.015]		-0.020 [0.016]
Spillover	0.004 [0.009]	0.004 [0.009]	0.005 [0.010]	0.005 [0.010]	-0.015 [0.014]	-0.015 [0.014]	0.017 [0.015]	0.017 [0.015]	-0.027* [0.016]	-0.027* [0.016]
Control Mean	0.936	0.936	0.919	0.919	0.796	0.796	0.725	0.725	0.309	0.309
R-squared	.02	.02	.02	.02	.1	.1	.16	.16	.04	.04
Test 100%=50% p-val		0.17		0.12		0.39		0.37		0.69
Observations	7341	7341	7254	7254	7327	7327	7287	7287	7309	7309

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent reports having voted.

In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the respondent reports having voted for all six positions.

Across columns (5)-(10), the dependent variable is a dummy for the following survey answers:

Col. (5)-(6), Yes to: Do you trust the IEBC?

Col. (7)-(8), Yes to: Do you think the elections were fair and transparent?

Col. (9)-(10), Very satisfied to: Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?

Appendix Table 6a: Effects on Trust: Heterogeneity with Election Violence

	Trust IEBC	Trust SCK	Fair Election	Fair SCK Ruling	Satisf Democracy
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any 100% Treatment*Violence	-0.078** [0.032]	-0.049 [0.034]	-0.037 [0.030]	-0.008 [0.039]	-0.010 [0.047]
Any 50% Treatment*Violence	-0.057 [0.040]	-0.040 [0.047]	-0.022 [0.046]	0.022 [0.048]	0.009 [0.043]
Any 100% Treatment	-0.028** [0.013]	-0.013 [0.013]	-0.016 [0.012]	-0.010 [0.014]	-0.024 [0.016]
Any 50% Treatment	-0.014 [0.012]	-0.004 [0.015]	0.007 [0.013]	-0.006 [0.014]	-0.024* [0.014]
Violence	0.026 [0.030]	-0.016 [0.040]	-0.036 [0.031]	-0.075** [0.037]	-0.030 [0.037]
Control Mean	0.800	0.721	0.715	0.688	0.320
R-squared	.1	.07	.16	.15	.04
Observations	7327	7227	7287	7204	7309

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by constituency in brackets.

Dependent variables are defined as in the footnote to Table 6. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Appendix Table 6b: Effects on Trust: Heterogeneity with Winners and Losers

	Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Treat 100%*Kikuyu	0.056** [0.022]		0.020 [0.029]		0.025 [0.023]		0.009 [0.025]		0.003 [0.039]	
Any Treat 50%*Kikuyu	0.005 [0.022]		-0.017 [0.029]		-0.023 [0.024]		-0.038 [0.026]		-0.081** [0.039]	
Any Treat 100%*Luo	-0.020 [0.045]		-0.037 [0.046]		-0.013 [0.045]		-0.099** [0.046]		-0.087** [0.038]	
Any Treat 50%*Luo	-0.077* [0.046]		-0.128*** [0.047]		-0.098** [0.046]		-0.136*** [0.047]		-0.024 [0.040]	
Any Treat 100%*Win		0.041* [0.024]		0.027 [0.031]		0.031 [0.026]		0.014 [0.028]		0.038 [0.035]
Any Treat 50%*Win		-0.016 [0.024]		-0.022 [0.031]		-0.027 [0.026]		-0.048* [0.028]		-0.066* [0.035]
Any Treat 100%*Lose		-0.047 [0.032]		-0.043 [0.034]		-0.053 [0.035]		-0.085** [0.035]		-0.009 [0.032]
Any Treat 50%*Lose		-0.063* [0.032]		-0.096*** [0.034]		-0.095*** [0.035]		-0.103*** [0.035]		0.020 [0.032]
Any 100% Treatment	-0.082** [0.037]	-0.064* [0.039]	0.006 [0.042]	0.016 [0.044]	-0.012 [0.041]	0.004 [0.043]	0.021 [0.042]	0.044 [0.044]	-0.079* [0.043]	-0.093** [0.045]
Any 50% Treatment	-0.031 [0.037]	-0.006 [0.038]	0.008 [0.042]	0.035 [0.044]	0.097** [0.041]	0.128*** [0.042]	0.053 [0.042]	0.087** [0.044]	-0.011 [0.044]	-0.020 [0.046]
Control Mean	0.801	0.801	0.722	0.722	0.714	0.714	0.687	0.687	0.322	0.322
Win = Lose F-stat	2.74*	9.43***	1.34	4.43**	0.69	7.52***	5.15**	9.98***	3.22*	1.72
Win = Lose p-val	0.10	0.00	0.25	0.04	0.41	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.07	0.19
R-squared	.12	.12	.09	.09	.18	.18	.17	.18	.06	.06
Observations	7137	7137	7043	7043	7101	7101	7019	7019	7119	7119

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Main effects for Kikuyu, Luo, Winning Coalition and Losing Coalition are included in the regressions but not reported for space reasons.

Dependent variables are defined as in the footnote to Table 6.

In odd-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Any Treat 100%*Kikuyu = Any Treat 100%*Luo.

In even-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Any Treat 100%*Win = Any Treat 100%*Lose.

In all columns, we control for education and wealth as well as the interactions of these variables with any treatment.

Appendix Table 7: Effects on Satisfaction with Democracy in Kenya by Tribe, Not Controlling for Other Interactions

	Voted		Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Satisf Democracy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Treatment*Kikuyu	-0.014 [0.015]		0.021 [0.019]		-0.002 [0.025]		0.003 [0.020]		-0.056 [0.035]	
Any Treatment*Luo	-0.009 [0.016]		-0.049 [0.040]		-0.085** [0.041]		-0.054 [0.040]		-0.055 [0.035]	
Any Treatment*Win		-0.020 [0.016]		0.009 [0.021]		0.003 [0.027]		0.002 [0.023]		-0.024 [0.031]
Any Treatment*Lose		-0.025 [0.016]		-0.056* [0.028]		-0.071** [0.030]		-0.074** [0.031]		-0.004 [0.029]
Kikuyu	0.011 [0.018]		0.129*** [0.023]		0.163*** [0.028]		0.186*** [0.024]		0.123*** [0.036]	
Luo	0.036* [0.021]		-0.168*** [0.044]		-0.158*** [0.046]		-0.236*** [0.045]		-0.033 [0.038]	
Winning Coalition		0.024 [0.019]		0.121*** [0.024]		0.132*** [0.029]		0.182*** [0.026]		0.091*** [0.033]
Losing Coalition		0.043** [0.017]		-0.074** [0.031]		-0.039 [0.033]		-0.093*** [0.033]		-0.045 [0.030]
Any Treatment	0.017* [0.009]	0.026** [0.012]	-0.024* [0.013]	-0.013 [0.018]	-0.002 [0.015]	0.007 [0.020]	-0.000 [0.015]	0.014 [0.019]	-0.007 [0.015]	-0.016 [0.019]
Control Mean	0.935	0.935	0.800	0.800	0.721	0.721	0.714	0.714	0.320	0.320
Win = Lose F-stat	0.07	0.10	3.13*	6.44**	3.66*	6.47**	2.08	7.78***	0.00	0.38
Win = Lose p-val	0.80	0.75	0.08	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.98	0.53
R-squared	.02	.02	.11	.11	.09	.08	.18	.18	.04	.04
Observations	7304	7304	7289	7289	7192	7192	7251	7251	7271	7271

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In odd-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Kikuyu*Any Treat = Luo*Any Treat.

In even-numbered columns, the Win = Lose F-stat and p-value are from the test: Winning Coalition*Any Treat = Losing Coalition*Any Treat.

Appendix Table 8: Heterogeneous Effects on Support for Democratic Principles

	Democracy Preferable		Open Elections		Actively Question Leaders		All Permitted to Vote		Violence Never OK	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Any Treatment*Violence	-0.022 [0.026]		0.006 [0.014]		0.020 [0.029]		-0.047** [0.022]		-0.024 [0.015]	
Any Treatment*Kikuyu		0.013 [0.023]		0.011 [0.011]		-0.001 [0.027]		-0.005 [0.019]		-0.017 [0.016]
Any Treatment*Luo		0.024 [0.024]		-0.011 [0.015]		-0.037 [0.031]		-0.022 [0.026]		-0.031 [0.021]
Violence	0.020 [0.022]		-0.001 [0.013]		0.008 [0.029]		0.048*** [0.017]		0.025 [0.020]	
Kikuyu		-0.026 [0.025]		-0.011 [0.013]		-0.017 [0.028]		0.030 [0.020]		0.024 [0.017]
Luo		0.016 [0.028]		-0.016 [0.016]		0.043 [0.035]		-0.009 [0.029]		-0.018 [0.024]
Any Treatment	0.004 [0.008]	0.028 [0.027]	0.001 [0.005]	-0.034** [0.015]	0.000 [0.011]	0.064* [0.035]	0.004 [0.008]	-0.032 [0.021]	-0.008 [0.007]	-0.025 [0.023]
Control Mean	0.898	0.898	0.972	0.972	0.831	0.830	0.918	0.918	0.938	0.938
Win = Lose F-stat		0.15		1.57		0.93		0.29		0.37
Win = Lose p-val		0.70		0.21		0.33		0.59		0.54
Observations	7321	7129	7359	7165	7364	7168	7371	7175	7320	7130

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Standard errors are clustered by constituency in odd-numbered columns and by polling station in even-numbered columns.

In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is whether respondent answered that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is whether respondent agreed with: We should choose our leaders through regular, open and honest elections.

In col. (5)-(6), the dependent variable is whether respondent sided with: As citizens we should be more active in questioning actions of our leaders.

In col. (7)-(8), the dependent variable is whether respondent sided with: All people should be permitted to vote. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (9)-(10), the dependent variable is whether respondent sided with: The use of violence is never justified in politics.

Appendix Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects on Information

	Correct Month		Correct Day		Women Role Correct		Party Correct		Museveni Correct		Well Informed	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Any Treatment*Violence	0.008 [0.035]		-0.024 [0.043]		-0.075* [0.041]		0.019 [0.021]		-0.005 [0.023]		0.004 [0.030]	
Any Treatment*Kikuyu		0.010 [0.028]		0.018 [0.033]		-0.013 [0.040]		0.000 [0.014]		0.003 [0.014]		-0.008 [0.024]
Any Treatment*Luo		0.008 [0.032]		0.052 [0.042]		-0.029 [0.045]		0.015 [0.028]		-0.005 [0.015]		-0.048** [0.024]
Violence	-0.017 [0.036]		0.039 [0.031]		0.030 [0.035]		0.002 [0.016]		0.004 [0.021]		0.004 [0.025]	
Kikuyu		0.043 [0.029]		0.013 [0.035]		0.012 [0.041]		0.026* [0.016]		-0.007 [0.014]		0.015 [0.025]
Luo		0.042 [0.036]		0.045 [0.045]		0.071 [0.049]		-0.015 [0.029]		0.001 [0.014]		0.042 [0.028]
Any Treatment	0.005 [0.012]	0.027 [0.038]	-0.016 [0.014]	-0.040 [0.044]	-0.002 [0.014]	0.024 [0.046]	-0.008 [0.008]	-0.044* [0.026]	0.006 [0.005]	-0.017 [0.020]	0.008 [0.009]	0.005 [0.032]
Control Mean	0.820	0.820	0.800	0.797	0.481	0.478	0.930	0.930	0.960	0.959	0.865	0.868
Kikuyu = Luo p-val		0.95		0.49		0.78		0.61		0.65		0.19
R-squared	.01	.02	.01	.02	.02	.05	.02	.04	.03	.04	.02	.04
Observations	6712	6535	5475	5324	6595	6428	6652	6471	6442	6264	7369	7171

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

Standard errors are clustered by constituency in odd-numbered columns and by polling station in even-numbered columns.

In col. (1)-(2), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the month of the election.

In col. (3)-(4), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the day of the election.

In col. (5)-(6), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly describe the role of the Women's Rep.

In col. (7)-(8), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the party of President.

In col. (9)-(10), the dependent variable is whether respondent could correctly name the President of Uganda (Museveni).

In col. (11)-(12), the dependent variable is whether respondent answered yes to: Overall do you feel you were well informed about the election?

Appendix Table 10: Effects on All Other Attitudes

	Trust Police		Trust Own Tribe		Trust Others		Not Run by Few		Complicated		Women		Bribery Normal		Happy?	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Any 100% Treat	0.00		-0.00		-0.02		-0.02		0.00		-0.00		-0.00		-0.02	
	[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]	
Any 50% Treat	-0.01		0.01		-0.01		0.00		0.00		0.00		-0.00		-0.01	
	[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]	
Encouragement		-0.01		0.01		-0.01		-0.01		0.01		-0.00		-0.00		-0.03
		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]
Positions Info		-0.00		-0.00		-0.02		-0.00		-0.00		-0.00		-0.01		-0.01
		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]
IEBC Info		0.00		-0.00		-0.00		-0.02		0.01		0.00		0.00		-0.01
		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.02]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.01]		[0.02]
Control Mean	0.47	0.47	0.53	0.53	0.49	0.49	0.25	0.25	0.80	0.80	0.96	0.96	0.10	0.10	0.51	0.51
R-squared	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.02
Observations	7349	7349	7362	7362	7358	7358	7344	7344	7349	7349	7368	7368	7360	7360	7341	7341

Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors clustered by polling station in brackets. All regressions include strata fixed effects.

In col. (1)-(2), the dep var is whether respondent answered yes to: Do you trust the police?

In col. (3)-(4), the dep var is whether respondent answered yes to: In general, can you trust members of your tribe?

In col. (5)-(6), the dep var is whether respondent answered yes to: In general, can you trust members of other tribes?

In col. (7)-(8), the dep var is whether respondent agreed with: The world is run by a few people in power. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (9)-(10), the dep var is whether respondent agreed with: Politics and government sometimes seem complicated. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (11)-(12), the dep var is whether respondent sided with: Women can be good politicians and should be encouraged to stand in elections.

In col. (13)-(14), the dep var is whether respondent sided with: In our country, it is normal to pay a bribe. See Appendix Table 1 for full statement.

In col. (15)-(16), the dep var is whether respondent answered very happy to: In general, in your life are you very happy, somewhat happy or unhappy?

Appendix Table 11: Lee Bounds

	Voted 2013		Trust IEBC		Trust SCK		Fair Election		Fair SCK Ruling		Satisf Democracy	
	(1) T	(2) T,100%	(3) T	(4) T,100%	(5) T	(6) T,100%	(7) T	(8) T,100%	(9) T	(10) T,100%	(11) T	(12) T,100%
Lower bound	0.013* [0.007]	0.019** [0.008]	-0.030*** [0.011]	-0.037*** [0.013]	-0.017 [0.012]	-0.020 [0.013]	-0.009 [0.013]	-0.019 [0.015]	-0.008 [0.013]	-0.010 [0.017]	-0.038** [0.016]	-0.034* [0.017]
Upper bound	0.030* [0.016]	0.029* [0.016]	-0.013 [0.016]	-0.027 [0.017]	-0.003 [0.016]	-0.012 [0.017]	0.007 [0.016]	-0.013 [0.016]	0.003 [0.016]	-0.008 [0.019]	-0.017 [0.014]	-0.020 [0.014]
Lower CI	0.001	0.006	-0.048	-0.059	-0.038	-0.043	-0.031	-0.046	-0.030	-0.043	-0.065	-0.063
Upper CI	0.058	0.056	0.014	0.002	0.024	0.018	0.033	0.016	0.031	0.029	0.006	0.003
Control Mean	0.934	0.934	0.800	0.800	0.721	0.721	0.715	0.715	0.688	0.688	0.320	0.320
Proportion Trimmed	0.018	0.009	0.016	0.010	0.015	0.008	0.016	0.006	0.011	0.003	0.021	0.013
Observations	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000	14400	9000

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. All dependent variables orthogonalized from strata fixed effects.

The Lower and Upper CI are the upper and lower bound on the treatment-effect 95% confidence interval.

In odd-numbered columns, we report Lee bounds on Any Treatment.

In even numbered columns, we report Lee bounds on Any 100% Treatment.

In these columns, we compare the Any 100% Treatment and Control by restricting the sample to not include the Any 50% Treatment.

Appendix 4: Endline Survey instrument

HHID: _____

SECTION B: INTERVIEWER INFORMATION/IDENTIFICATION

Enumerator instruction: call the phone number provided. Seek consent from the respondent. Questions 1-3 should be filled in by you. Then ask the respondent the remaining questions. If they fail to answer use the following codes: DK=-99; NA=-98; RTA=-97

1.	Enumerator name and ID	First: _____ Last: _____	Enumerator ID: _____
2.	Individual's phone number	_____	_____
3.	Interview Language	1. English, 2. Swahili, 3. Other specify _____	
4.	Interview Date	Day: _____ Month: _____ Year: 2013	
5.	Start Time (24 Hour clock)	Hour: _____ Min: _____	
6.	Individual's name	First: _____ Last: _____	
7.	Individual's gender	1=Male, 2=Female _____	
8.	Where do you live?	Province: 1=Nairobi, 2=Coast, 3=Eastern, 4=Central, 5=Rift Valley, 6=Western, 7=Nyanza, 8 =NE _____	
		County: _____	Sub location: _____
		District: _____	Village (if rural) : _____ or town (if urban): _____
		Location: _____	Constituency: _____
9.	How long have you lived there?	Number of years: _____	Number of months: _____
10.	Where were you born?	Province: 1=Nairobi, 2=Coast, 3=Eastern, 4=Central, 5=Rift Valley, 6=Western, 7=Nyanza, 8 =NE _____	
		County: _____	Sub location: _____
		District: _____	Village (if rural): _____ or town (if urban): _____
		Location: _____	Constituency: _____

HHID: _____

SECTION C: SOCIOECONOMICS

		Years: __ __ __ __	Months: __ __ __
1.	What is your age?		
2.	What is the highest level of education you have completed?	USE EDUCATION CODES	__ __
3.	Can you read?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
4.	What is your marital status?	1=Single, 2=Monogamously married, 3=Polygamously married, 4=Cohabiting, 5=Separated, 6=Widowed, 7=Divorced, 8=Other, specify	__ __
5.	How many children do you have?	__ __	__ __
6.	How many people above the age of 18 live with you?	__ __	__ __
7.	What is your main occupation?	USE OCCUPATION CODES	__ __
8.	Does your household own or rent the place where you live?	1=Own, 2=Rent, 3=Occupy without ownership or payment, 4=Other, specify	__ __
9.	How much land does your household own, if any? (acres)	__ __ __ __	
10.	Does your household own a TV?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
11.	Does your household own a radio?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
12.	Does your household own a bicycle?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
13.	Does your household own a car/motorbike/truck?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
14.	Does your household own a water tank?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
15.	Does your household own a car battery?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
16.	Does your household own a computer?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
17.	Does your household own a generator?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
18.	Does your household own a refrigerator?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
19.	Does your household own a stove?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
20.	Does your household own any livestock?	1=Yes, 2=No	__ __
21.	What is your main source of lighting?	1=Electricity, 2=Lantern, 3=Pressure lamp or tin lamp, 4=Fuel wood, 5=Solar, 6=Other, specify	__ __

HHID: _____

22.	What type of toilet do you use?	1=Own flush toilet, 2=Shared flush toilet, 3=Ventilated Improved Pit (VIP), 4=Traditional pit, 5=bucket, 6=bush/river/stream, 7=Other, specify	____
23.	What is your main source of cooking fuel?	1=Firewood, 2=Charcoal, 3=Kerosene, 4=Gas, 5=Electricity, 6=Other, specify	____
24.	What is your main source of drinking water?	1=Piped in compound/ House, 2=Public tap, 3=Mechanical well, 4=Ordinary well, 5=Water trucks, 6=Spring, 7= River/stream/pond, 8=Dam, 9=Rainwater, 10=Borehole, 11=Tank, 12=Other, specify	____
25.	What is the main type of material that the roof of the main house is made of?	1=Grass/ thatch, 2=Corrugated Iron (mabati), 3=Tiles, 4=Wood, 5= Tarpaulin/plastic sheets, 6= Asbestos, 7=Concrete, 8=Other, specify	____
26.	What is the main type of material that the walls of the main house are made of?	1=Stone, 2=Brick, 3=Iron sheet, 4=Mud/dung, 5=Wood, 6=Other, specify	____
27.	What is the main type of material that the floor of the main house is made of?	1=Mud/Dung/ Sand (Natural floor), 2=Wood Planks (Rudimentary floor), 3=Polished wood/ vinyl/ tiles (Finished), 4=Cement, 5=Other, specify	____
28.	How often do you listen to the radio?	1= Once a day, 2= Once a week, 3= Once a month, 4= Once in two months, 5=Once in six months, 6=Once a year, 7=Never, 8=Other, specify	____
29.	What sorts of programs do you usually listen to on the radio?	1=news/current events, 2=talk shows, 3=sports, 4=drama, 5=religious, 6=music, 7=social announcements, 8=other, specify	____
30.	How often do you watch TV?	1= Once a day, 2= Once a week, 3= Once a month, 4= Once in two months, 5=Once in six months, 6=Once a year, 7=Never, 8=Other, specify	____
31.	What sorts of programs do you usually watch on the TV?	1=news/current events, 2=talk shows, 3=sports, 4=drama, 5=religious, 6=music, 7=social announcements, 8=other, specify	____
32.	How often do you read a newspaper?	1= Once a day, 2= Once a week, 3= Once a month, 4= Once in two months, 5=Once in six months, 6=Once a year, 7=Never, 8=Cannot read, 9=Other, specify	____
33.	What is your favorite newspaper to read? Enumerator: do not prompt; allow multiple responses	1=Nation, 2=Standard, 3=Taifa Leo, 4=The People Daily, 5=Other, specify, 6=Cannot read, 7=No preference	____ , ____ , ____
34.	Are you a member of a community organization or group or of a credit, saving or insurance group (eg cooperatives, SACCO, merry-go-round)?	1=Yes, 2=No	____
35.	What is your religious affiliation?	1=Catholic, 2=Protestant, 3=Adventist, 4=Muslim, 5=Atheist (none), 6=Other, specify:	____
36.	How often do you attend a religious event like Church or Mosque?	1= Once a day, 2= Once a week, 3= Once a month, 4= Once in two months, 5=Once in six months, 6=Once a year, 7=Never, 8=Other, specify	____
37.	What is your tribe?	1=Luo, 2=Luhya, 3=Kalenjin, 4=Kamba, 5=Kikuyu, 6=Other, specify	____
38.	What is the tribe of your mother?		____
39.	What is the tribe of your father?		____

OCCUPATION CODES

- 1=Farming
 2=Public service
 3=Carpenter/mason
 4=Clerk
 5= Policeman
- 6=Conductor
 7=Cleaner/househelp
 8=Waiter/cook
 9=Driver
 10=Electrician
- 11=Mechanic
 12=Industrial worker
 13=Manager
 14=Dairy farmer
 15=Professional
- 16=Watchman
 17=Messenger
 18=Sales/shopkeeper
 19=Secretary
 20=Tailor
- 21=Teacher
 22=Health worker
 23=Doctor
 24=Nurse
 25=Unemployed
- 26=Student
 27=Business, specify
 28=Salonist
 29=Retired
 30=Other, specify
- 0=None
 1-8=Std1-8
 9=Form 1
- 10=Form 2
 11=Form 3
 12=Form 4
- 13=Form 5
 14=Form 6
 15=Univ 1
- 16=Univ 2
 17=Univ 3
 18=Univ 4
- 19=Univ 5
 20=Nursery
 21=Vocational
- 22=Adult educ
 23=Other, specify
- HHID: _____

EDUCATION CODES

SECTION D: POLITICAL ATTITUDES, KNOWLEDGE AND BEHAVIOR/PARTICIPATION

Enumerator instruction: Please say: "Thanks a lot for answering all my questions so far. I will now finish the interview with a few questions regarding the last general election."
Do not prompt the answers at all.

1.	What does IEBC stand for?	_____
2.	What are the missions of the IEBC? Enumerator: If the respondent provides one answer prompt them a second time to ask if they know of other missions of the IEBC.	1. 2. 3. 4.
3.	Can you tell me what the date of the last general election was? DD/MM/YYYY	____/____/____
4.	Who was elected President? Name and party. Enumerator: do not prompt	Name: _____ Party: _____ 1=Uhuru Kenyatta, _____ 2=Other, specify _____
5.	Who is your county governor? Name and party	Name: _____ Party: _____
6.	Who is your senator? Name and party	Name: _____ Party: _____
7.	What is the role of the Women's Rep? Enumerator: prompt	1=She sits with the country governor, 2=She sits in the parliament, 3=She sits in the senate
8.	Who is the current president of Uganda? If no specify Enumerator: do not prompt	1= Yoweri Museveni, 2=Other, specify _____ Specify if other: _____
9.	Did you receive any text messages related to the election after getting registered and before the election?	1=Yes, 2=No
10.	If Q9=Yes, do you remember from whom you received texts? Enumerator: allow multiple responses, do not prompt.	1=IEBC, 2=Political party, specify which, 3=NGO, specify which, 4=Presidential candidate, specify which, 5=Other, specify Specify: _____

HHID: _____

23.	Did you go to a political meeting or a road show?	1=Yes, 2=No	
24.	Did you listen to political radio shows or watch political TV shows?	1=Yes, 2=No	
25.	Overall, do you feel you were well informed about the election?	1=Yes, 2=No	
26.	How much did you follow the campaigns for the election, on a scale of 1-5 where 1 is not at all and 5 is very intensely (such as on a daily basis)?	Enumerator: range is 1-5	
27.	How much did you discuss the elections with your friends, family members and neighbors, on a scale of 1-5 where 1 is not at all and 5 is very intensely (such as on a daily basis)?	Enumerator: range is 1-5	
28.	How many of the presidential debates between the candidates did you watch on TV?	Enumerator: range is 0-2	
29.	Did the last elections affect or change your life in any way?	1=Yes, 2=No	
30.	If Q29=Yes, how?		
31.	How do you feel about the outcome of the last elections?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Satisfied, 3=Indifferent, 4=Dissatisfied, 5=Very dissatisfied	
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements regarding politics in Kenya?			
32.	Politics and government sometimes seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree	
33.	The world is run by few people in power, and there is not much that someone like me can do about it.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree	
34.	We should choose our leaders in this country through regular, open and honest elections.	1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Disagree, 5=Strongly disagree	
35.	Which of the following statements is closest to your own opinion?	1=Democracy is preferable to any other kind of govt, 2=In some circumstances, a non-democratic govt can be preferable, 3=For someone like me, it doesn't matter what govt we have	
36.	Overall how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Kenya?	1=Very satisfied, 2=Fairly satisfied, 3=Not very satisfied, 4=Not at all satisfied, 5=Kenya is not a democracy (Enumerator: don't prompt option 5)	
For each of the following pairs of statements, tell me which of the two is closest to your view about Kenyan politics. Choose either Statement 1 or Statement 2			
37.	1: The use of violence is never justified in politics.	2: In this country it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.	

HHID: _____

38.	1: As citizens we should be more active in questioning the actions of our leaders.	2: In our country these days we should show more respect for authority.	_____
39.	1: All people should be permitted to vote, even if they do not fully understand all the issues in an election.	2: Only those who are sufficiently well educated should be allowed to choose our leaders.	_____
40.	1: Women can be good politicians and should be encouraged to stand in elections.	2: Women should stay at home to take care of their children.	_____
41.	1: In our country, it is normal to pay a bribe to a government official to encourage them.	2: It is wrong to pay a bribe to any government official.	_____
Enumerator: Say "Now I am going to ask you some questions on trust."			
42.	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	1=Most people can be trusted, 2=Need to be careful	_____
43.	In general, can you trust members of your tribe?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
44.	In general, can you trust members in other tribes?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
45.	How important is your ethnic or tribal origin to your life?	1=Very important, 2=Somewhat important, 3=Not important	_____
46.	Do you trust the IEBC, the electoral commission of Kenya?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
47.	Do you trust the Supreme court?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
48.	Do you trust the police?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
49.	Do you think the elections this year were fair and transparent?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
50.	Do you think the IEBC, the electoral commission of Kenya, should be replaced?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
51.	Do you think the supreme court decision on the election was fair?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
52.	How interested are you in public affairs?	1=Very interested, 2=Somewhat interested, 3=Not interested	_____
53.	In general, in your life, are you very happy, somewhat happy or not happy?	1=Very happy, 2=Somewhat happy, 3=Not happy	_____
Enumerator: Say "Now I am going to ask you some questions about your participation in this past election and previous elections."			
54.	Did you register to vote for the 2013 election?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
55.	If Q54=Yes, where did you register to vote?	Polling Station: _____ Constituency: _____ Ward: _____	_____
56.	How far is that from where you live?	Distance (km): _____ Minutes to walk: _____ or Hours in a matatu: _____	_____

HHID: _____

57.	Is it located in the same town or village as where you live?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
58.	Did you vote in the general election this year?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
59.	Where did you vote?	Polling station: _____	Ward: _____
60.	Did you vote for President?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
61.	If Q60=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify	_____
62.	Did you vote for MP?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
63.	If Q62=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify	_____
64.	Did you vote for Governor?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
65.	If Q64=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify	_____
66.	Did you vote for Senator?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
67.	If Q66=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify	_____
68.	Did you vote for Women's Rep?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
69.	If Q68=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify	_____
70.	Did you vote for Ward Rep?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
71.	If Q70=No, why not?	1=Did not know candidates/did not have enough information, 2=Was told not to, 3=Didn't think my vote would matter, 4=Other, specify	_____
72.	Did you vote in the previous general election in 2007?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
73.	Were you affected by the violence following the last election in 2007/2008?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____
74.	If Q73=Yes, how were you affected? Enumerator: allow multiple responses	1=Someone in my HH died, 2=Someone in my HH was injured, 3=My HH was displaced, 4=A relative outside my HH was killed, 5=A relative outside my HH was injured, 6=A related HH was displaced, 7=Other, specify	_____, _____, _____, _____, _____
75.	Did you vote in the 2010 constitutional referendum?	1=Yes, 2=No	_____

Thank you for your time