NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

PUBLIC INSURANCE AND PSYCHOTROPIC PRESCRIPTION MEDICATIONS FOR MENTAL ILLNESS

Johanna Catherine Maclean Benjamin L. Cook Nicholas Carson Michael F. Pesko

Working Paper 23760 http://www.nber.org/papers/w23760

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 August 2017

Johanna Catherine Maclean, Benjamin Le Cook, and Michael Pesko were supported by a Research Scholar Grant – Insurance, RSGI-16-019-01 – CPHPS, from the American Cancer Society. We thank Joachim Marti, Douglas Webber, and session participants at the 2017 International Health Economics Association World Congress for helpful comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

© 2017 by Johanna Catherine Maclean, Benjamin L. Cook, Nicholas Carson, and Michael F. Pesko. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Public Insurance and Psychotropic Prescription Medications for Mental Illness Johanna Catherine Maclean, Benjamin L. Cook, Nicholas Carson, and Michael F. Pesko NBER Working Paper No. 23760 August 2017 JEL No. I1,I13,I18

ABSTRACT

Mental illnesses are prevalent in the United States and globally, and cost is a critical barrier to treatment receipt for many afflicted individuals. Affordable insurance coverage can permit access to effective healthcare services and treatment of mental illnesses. We study the effects of recent and major eligibility expansions within Medicaid, a pubic insurance system in the U.S. that finances healthcare services for the poor, on psychotropic medications prescribed in outpatient settings. To this end, we estimate differences-in-differences models using administrative data on medications prescribed in outpatient settings for which Medicaid was a third-party payer between 2011 and 2016. Our findings suggest that these expansions increased psychotropic prescriptions by 22% with substantial heterogeneity across psychotropic class and state characteristics that proxy for patient need, expansion scope, and system capacity. We provide further evidence that Medicaid, and not patients, primarily financed these prescriptions. These findings suggest that public insurance expansions have the potential to improve access to evidence-based treatments among low-income populations suffering from mental illnesses.

Johanna Catherine Maclean Department of Economics Temple University Ritter Annex 869 Philadelphia, PA 19122 and NBER catherine.maclean@temple.edu

Benjamin L. Cook Cambridge Health Alliance 1035 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02141 bcook@charesearch.org Nicholas Carson Cambridge Health Alliance 1035 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02141 ncarson@charesearch.org

Michael F. Pesko Department of Economics Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Georgia State University PO Box 3992 Atlanta, GA 30302-3992 mpesko@gsu.edu

1. Introduction

Mental illnesses are prevalent in all countries of the world (World Health Organization, 2017). For example, in 2015 17.9% of adults in the United States met the diagnostic criteria for any mental illness and 4% met criteria for a serious mental illness (Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2016). Mental illnesses impose heavy burdens on afflicted individuals as these illnesses harm overall health, employment, and relationships (World Health Organization, 2017). In addition to imposing costs internalized by afflicted individuals, mental illnesses levy costs on broader society (Frank and McGuire, 2000). Each year mental illnesses cost the U.S. economy \$504B in healthcare expenditures, disability payments, and a less productive work force (Insel, 2015).¹ Additionally, mental illness prevalence is not homogenous across the population. Less advantaged groups are more likely to suffer from such illnesses (World Health Organization, 2017). Within the U.S., mental illness prevalence is particularly high among lower income individuals (Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2016).

Although they impose substantial costs, mental illnesses can be effectively treated by primary care providers, who can prescribe psychotropic medications² and provide brief counseling, and specialty providers (e.g., psychiatrists, psychologists), who provide intensive psychopharmacological and psychosocial treatment, in outpatient or inpatient settings (Olfson, 2016). Despite established treatment effectiveness (American Psychiatric Association, 2006), there is a substantial amount of unmet need for mental illness treatment in the U.S. According to National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) data, in 2015, more than half of U.S. adults who could benefit from mental illness treatment did not receive any treatment (Center for

¹ The authors inflated this number from the original estimate (\$467B in 2012 dollars) to 2017 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.

² Psychotropic medications are used to treat mental illnesses such as anxiety, depression, and psychosis.

Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2016). Unmet need for mental illness treatment is particularly high among the uninsured (Garfield et al., 2011). Among individuals who sought care but did not receive it, the most commonly reported reason for failure to receive care was inability to pay (Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2016). Thus, expanding insurance coverage to low income, uninsured individuals may remove cost-related barriers to unmet mental illness treatment needs.

In 2010, the U.S. federal government implemented the Affordable Care Act (ACA). This Act, arguably the most substantial U.S. healthcare legislation in a generation, was designed to address perceived inadequacies within the healthcare delivery system. A primary objective of the Act was to reduce uninsurance. In 2009, the year before the ACA was enacted, the U.S. uninsurance rate was 15.4% (Cohen et al., 2010). By 2016, the uninsurance rate had fallen to a historically low rate of 9% (Cohen et al., 2017); a 42% decline. The ACA increased insurance coverage through three principle policy levers: (i) premium subsidies to purchase private insurance, (ii) mandates that required employers to offer insurance and individuals to hold insurance, and (iii) expanded eligibility for Medicaid; an insurance system that finances healthcare services for the poor (Frean et al., 2017). Another objective of the ACA was to mitigate 'underinsurance': insurance that provides inadequate coverage of healthcare services. In particular, the ACA required that most insurance plans cover ten benefit classes, including mental illness treatment and prescription medications (Garfield et al., 2010).

We explore the effects of ACA-related Medicaid expansions that occurred between 2011 and 2016 on psychotropic medications prescribed in outpatient settings for which Medicaid was a third-party payer. While we do not directly capture medication use, prescriptions provide a reasonable proxy for such use (Lehmann et al., 2014). Analyses of pre-ACA data suggest that

individuals who gained eligibility through these expansions had elevated need for mental illness treatment (Garfield et al., 2011, Cook et al., 2016), which implies that newly insured populations may benefit from these expansions. This particular treatment modality is endorsed by providers – in professional practice treatment guidelines psychotropic medications are recommended as a component of treatment for most major mental illnesses (American Psychiatric Association, 2017) – and common – in 2015, 36.7% of U.S. adults with mental illness used psychotropic medications (Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2016). Because patients must receive a prescription from a provider to obtain them, studying psychotropic medications allows us to indirectly explore the ability of newly insured individuals suffering from mental illness to form relationships with providers and navigate the healthcare system.

Economic theory suggests that Medicaid expansions, by reducing out-of-pocket prices, will increase the quantity of prescriptions demanded by enrollees suffering from mental illnesses (Grossman, 1972). Moreover, increased awareness of mental illness treatment and its benefits may occur with Medicaid expansion, which may increase demand for psychotropic medications. There are numerous factors that may mute expansion effects, however: mental illness and treatment stigma, new patients' unfamiliarity with the healthcare delivery system, lack of participation in Medicaid by healthcare providers, and so forth (Decker, 2012, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2016). Thus, the extent to which Medicaid expansions lead to changes in psychotropic medication prescriptions is an empirical question.

We couple administrative data on the universe of prescriptions obtained in outpatient settings and purchased through retail and online pharmacies for which Medicaid was a thirdparty payer with differences-in-differences models to study Medicaid effects. These models leverage within-state variation in Medicaid eligibility 2011-2016. Our findings suggest that,

post-expansion, psychotropic prescriptions increased 22% in expanding states relative to nonexpanding states. There was heterogeneity by psychotropic class and state characteristics in effect sizes. Increased prescriptions were financed by Medicaid and not patients.

2. Medicaid and related literature

2.1 Medicaid and ACA-related expansions

Medicaid is the primary insurer for low-income families, low income elderly Medicare³ beneficiaries, and disabled individuals in the U.S., covering 77 million individuals in 2017 (Sommers and Grabowski, 2017). Medicaid is a joint federal-state program, with the federal government setting minimum eligibility and coverage standards. States historically had ample latitude to determine specific eligibility criteria and benefit design within these standards. Prior to the ACA, most states limited Medicaid eligibility to the disabled and low-income parents; other low-income groups (e.g., childless, non-disabled adults) were simply not eligible for coverage. Medicaid is characterized by low patient cost-sharing and coverage of a relatively expansive list of healthcare services, including mental illness services (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017). Indeed, comparison of plans suggests that Medicaid may provide more generous coverage for mental illness services than private insurance (Garfield et al., 2010).

Beginning in 2014, as part of the ACA, Medicaid was expanded in 31 states and D.C. (as of August 2017) to cover parents and other non-disabled adults with incomes up to 138% of the Federal Poverty Level [FPL] (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2016).⁴ Categorical restrictions were removed. Individuals who gained eligibility through these

³ Medicare is a public insurance system for the elderly and patients suffering from specific diseases (e.g., end stage renal disease) in the U.S.

⁴ Originally, the ACA legislated that the Medicaid expansion was to occur nationally. Non-compliant states were to be denied all federal Medicaid funds. However, in 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states would not lose federal funds if they choose not to expand Medicaid. Thus, the decision to expand, or not expand, Medicaid was left to states' discretion. We leverage these state decisions in our empirical models (outlined later in the manuscript).

Medicaid expansions are referred to as 'newly eligible'⁵ and are insured by 'expansion' plans that cover both mental illness treatment and prescription medications (Garfield et al., 2010).

Medicaid expansions lead to large decreases in the uninsured rate among groups eligible for expansion coverage (Wherry and Miller, 2016). Moreover, Medicaid expansions increased access to care as measured by having a personal doctor and receiving an annual check-up (Sommers et al., 2016), and may have improved self-assessed health (Simon et al., 2017).⁶

2.2 Medicaid and mental illness

While there are numerous studies into the effects of Medicaid expansions on general health and healthcare use, there is less evidence on the effects of such expansions on mental illness. In particular, little is known on the effects of Medicaid expansions on psychotropic medications. This dearth represents a serious gap in our understanding of Medicaid health effects as use of psychotropic medications is an important indicator of access to prescribing physicians, is recommended as part of effective treatment for most major mental illnesses (American Psychiatric Association, 2017), and reflects a large share of mental illness treatment received in the U.S. (Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2016). Moreover, a

⁵ Although we emphasize the newly eligible in our study, other groups experienced changes in insurance status and eligibility post-ACA. (i) Through 'welcome mat' effects, individuals who were previously eligible enrolled in Medicaid (Frean et al., 2017). (ii) In all states – both expansion and non-expansion – income eligibility was increased by 5 percentage points (this increase occurred with the migration to the 'Modified Adjusted Gross Income' [MAGI] criteria for determining program eligibility; https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/modifiedadjusted-gross-income-magi/ [accessed August 17th, 2017]). For expansion states the post-ACA income threshold is 138% of FPL (133% + 5 percentage points) and for non-expansion states the post-ACA income threshold is set 5 percentage points above the state's Medicaid income threshold in March 2010 (i.e., in advance of implementation of the major provisions of the ACA). These groups are not referred to as newly eligible and are not covered by expansion plans (Garfield et al., 2010). We leverage variation in Medicaid eligibility for the newly eligible group, but we note the possibility that welcome mat effects and the effect of increasing income eligibility by 5 percentage points may differ across expansion and non-expansion states. If such differences are present, our estimates will conflate these three distinct effects. Nonetheless, studying the overall effects of the ACA-related Medicaid expansion is an important first order question for understanding whether a large-scale public insurance expansion leads to changes in psychotropic medication prescriptions among low income populations with little historic access to insurance and elevated need for such treatment. We encourage further research, relying on other data sources, to explore the potentially differential effects across groups that gained Medicaid insurance through these expansions. ⁶ We note that not all studies demonstrate health gains. See, for example, Courtemanche et al. (2017).

concern among policymakers is that mental healthcare demand is more elastic than general healthcare (Frank and McGuire, 2000) and insurance expansions may lead to particularly high costs for payers. Hence, providing evidence on the mental healthcare insurance-elasticity is critical for understanding how expansions will change service use, health, and costs.

Several studies examine the effects of Medicaid on overall mental illness service use and unmet treatment need, and mental illness using variation afforded by pre-ACA state expansions.⁷ Golberstein and Gonzales (2015) find little effect of Medicaid on mental illness service use using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. On the other hand, Wen et al. (2015) utilize NSDUH data to show Medicaid expansions increased the probability of receiving mental illness treatment and reduced reports of unmet treatment need. Leveraging the National Health Interview Survey, McMorrow et al. (2016) find that Medicaid expansions reduced psychological distress among adults.⁸ Finally, using experimental data from a large-scale randomized control trial in the state of Oregon, Baicker et al. (2013) document a substantial reduction in the rates of a positive screening result for depression among adults randomized to Medicaid.

To the best of our knowledge, only one study examines the effect of ACA-related Medicaid expansions on mental illness treatment. In an extension to their main analyses of the effect of ACA-related Medicaid expansions on overall prescriptions Ghosh et al. (2017), using

⁷ These studies examine overall mental illness service use and do not distinguish psychotropic medications from other treatment modalities.

⁸ While it is beyond the scope of our study to reconcile findings across these studies, we suspect that differences in the manner in which the authors modelled Medicaid expansion may play a role. Golberstein and Gonzales impute Medicaid eligibility following Cutler and Gruber (1996). Wen et al use indicator variables for a Section 1115 waivers expansion and specific features of the waivers (such waivers allow states to adjust Medicaid by expanding coverage to groups not historically eligible, for example: <u>https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/section-1115-demo/index.html</u> [accessed August 15th, 2017]). Finally, McMorrow et al enter Medicaid eligibility income thresholds directly into their regression models. See Hamersma and Kim (2013) for a recent discussion of various approaches to modelling pre-ACA Medicaid expansions.

claims data, find that psychotropic medications increased 19%, post-expansion, in expanding states relative to non-expanding states (overall prescriptions increased by the same percent).

Our analysis builds on the Ghosh et al. (2017) analysis in several important ways. (i) We assess heterogeneity across classes of psychotropic medications: antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, anti-psychotics, mood stabilizers, and stimulants. Understanding the impact of Medicaid expansion on sub-classes of psychotropic medications provides critical evidence for policymakers assessing changes in the use of psychotropic medications shown to be beneficial for patients and those that present a higher risk to patients, and how insurance expansions may impact links to providers qualified to prescribe these medications. (ii) We directly estimate the overall costs of increases in psychotropic medication; costs are an essential input for assessing the value of major policy initiatives such as the Medicaid expansions we study. (iii) We test the extent to which state Medicaid programs vs. patients assumed the financial responsibility of increased psychotropic medication prescriptions, which allows us to shed additional light on the distributional effects of Medicaid expansion. (iv) We examine how Medicaid effects vary across state characteristics (e.g., uninsurance) that proxy for expansion scope, patient need, and system capacity. (v) We are able to study longer-term expansion effects as we have access to 36 months post-expansion (vs. 15 post-expansion months examined by Ghosh and colleagues).⁹

3. Data and methods

3.1 Prescriptions

We draw data on Medicaid-financed prescription medications from the State Drug Utilization Database (SDUD). The Centers for Medicaid and Medicare (CMS) compile the SDUD using state data supplied by Medicaid programs. The SDUD includes the universe of

⁹ More specifically, these are post-expansion months for the states that expanded on January 1st 2014; this is the most common expansion date for ACA-related Medicaid expansions (see Table 2).

outpatient prescription medications covered under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program for which Medicaid serves as a third-party payer (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012).

While the SDUD has included information from fee-for-service (FFS) since its inception, data on prescriptions financed by managed care (MC) plans were added to the SDUD in March 2010 following implementation of the Drug Rebate Equalization Act (2009). We use data from 2011 onward to examine both FFS and MC given the movement away from FFS and toward MC within Medicaid over time (Hurley and Somers, 2003).

We use SDUD data in all quarters between 2011 and 2016, yielding 24 periods of data for each state and D.C.: 12 periods pre-2014 and 12 periods post-2014. We exclude Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Virginia due to odd data patterns.¹⁰

We study overall prescriptions for medications with indications for mental illnesses, and consider heterogeneity across major psychotropic groups: anti-depressants, anti-anxiety medications, anti-psychotics, mood stabilizers, and stimulants (Table 1). We first use medications provided by the National Institute of Mental Health to identify the medications in each psychotropic class. Next we refer to each medications' Medline webpage to broaden the list of included medications. Only medications with Food and Drug Administration indicators for treatment of adult mental illness are included in our analyses.¹¹ We identify medications in the SDUD with crosswalks between National Drug Codes (Roth, 2017).

3.2 Medicaid expansions

¹⁰ Broadly, these states' data showed large spikes in prescriptions in at least one quarter of our study period. Results are robust to including these states in the analysis. Details available from the corresponding author.
¹¹ <u>https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/mental-health-medications/index.shtml</u> (accessed May 5th, 2017). We note that these lists do not provide a complete enumeration of all psychotropic medications used to treat mental illness. However, we argue that they reflect a substantial share of medications plausibly available to a Medicaid patient. Our medication selection was further informed by one of the authors who is a practicing psychiatrist.

Our classification of expansion states and expansion dates are listed in Table 2. The majority of states expanded Medicaid on January 1st, 2014 in conjunction with core ACA provisions. Two states expanded later in 2014 (Michigan, New Hampshire). Five states expanded in 2015 or 2016 (Alaska, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, Pennsylvania). Prior to 2011, 4 states (Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont) and D.C. expanded eligibility to cover parents and childless adults with full Medicaid benefits up to 100% FPL or higher, and continued to enroll new beneficiaries. We code these states as treated throughout our study period.

We match Medicaid expansion dates to the SDUD by state, year, and quarter. Our expansion state classification algorithm closely follows prior examples; e.g., Wherry and Miller (2016), Maclean et al. (2017), and Simon et al. (2017).

3.3 Outcomes

We construct variables that reflect Medicaid-financed prescriptions for psychotropic medications. These include the number of prescriptions filled overall and within five psychotropic classes (anti-depressants, anti-anxiety, anti-psychotics, mood stabilizers, and stimulants). We convert all outcome variables to the rate per 100,000 18-64 year olds in the state using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) (Ruggles et al., 2015) and the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research Center (2016). This group was the primary target of the ACA-related Medicaid expansions (Frean et al., 2017).

3.4 Controls

We attempt to control for variables that plausibly predict our outcomes and a state's propensity to expand Medicaid in our regression models, and minimize omitted variable bias. To this end, we merge state-level variables into the SDUD.¹²

(i) We link the annual seasonally adjusted unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the poverty rate (University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research Center, 2016) to the SDUD. (ii) We merge in demographics from the ACS (age, sex, race, ethnicity, education). (iii) We link factors that possibly reflect sentiment toward social policies targeting the poor (University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research Center, 2016): a Democrat governor, monthly maximum Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF) for a family of four, the effective minimum wage, and the state-to-federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) ratio. We translate monetary variables to 2016 dollars using a healthcare cost Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator (Dunn et al., 2016).

3.5 Model

Our differences-in-differences (DD) model is specified in Equation (1):

(1)
$$M_{st} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 E x_{st} + \alpha'_2 X_{st} + S_s + \tau_t + \Omega_{st} + \varepsilon_{st}$$

 M_{st} is a psychotropic prescription variable in state *s* in state/year/quarter ('period') *t*. Ex_{st} is an indicator for whether or not a state has expanded its Medicaid program in period *t*. X_{st} is a vector of time-varying state characteristics. S_s and τ_t are vectors of period fixed effects. Inclusion of state fixed effects allows for control of time-invariant state factors that are

¹² We note that many of the control variables we link to the SDUD are not yet available for 2016, the final year of our study period. We linearly extrapolate the 2016 values for these variables. We will incorporate the 2016 values into our analyses as they become available. However, we have re-estimated our models using the 2011-2015 period and results are robust. See Supplementary Table 1. Details are available from the corresponding author on request.

unobservable to the econometrician. Period fixed effects control for national trends in prescriptions. We also include state-specific linear time trends (Ω_{st}) .¹³ Including these trends allows each state to follow a separate linear trend in outcomes and allows us to control for time-varying state-level unobservable (to the econometrician) factors. ε_{st} is the error term.

We cluster standard errors around the state (Bertrand et al., 2004). The 45 clusters in our analysis dataset allow us to consistently estimate standard errors (Cameron and Miller, 2015). We estimate all regressions using unweighted OLS.

3.6 Validity

A necessary assumption for the DD model to recover causal estimates is that the treatment and comparison groups would have followed the same trend in the post-treatment period, had the treatment states not been treated. This assumption is untestable as expansion states did expand Medicaid and thus we cannot observe these states in the untreated state post-expansion. We attempt to provide suggestive evidence on this assumption in two ways.

(i) We examine unadjusted trends in the pre-expansion period in our outcome variables for the treatment group and 2011-2013 for the comparison group. If we find that the outcomes appear to have trended similarly in the pre-treatment period across these groups, such trends provide suggestive evidence that the SDUD data satisfy the parallel trends assumption. (ii) Using pre-Medicaid expansion data for each expanding state and 2011-2013 data for nonexpanding states,¹⁴ we estimate the regression model outlined in Equation (2):

(2)
$$M_{st} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 Treat_s * Trend_t + \beta'_2 X_{st} + S_s + \tau_t + \epsilon_{st}$$

¹³ Specifically, we interact each state fixed effect with a linear time trend that takes on a value of one in 2011 Q1, 2 in 2011 Q2, and so forth.

¹⁴ We use 2011-2013 data for states that expanded Medicaid after January 1st, 2014 in validity testing (see Table 2).

We replace the Ex_{st} variable in Equation (1) with an interaction between the treatment group indicator (*Treat*_s) and a linear time trend (*Trend*_t).¹⁵ If we cannot reject the null hypothesis that γ_1 is zero, this finding provides support that our data satisfy the parallel trends assumption.¹⁶

4. Results

4.1 Summary statistics

Table 3 reports summary statistics for expansion and non-expansion states in the period 2011-2013.¹⁷ In expanding states, the quarterly number of psychotropic prescriptions per 100,000 non-elderly adults was 9,641. The number of quarterly prescriptions for antidepressants, anti-anxiety medications, anti-psychotics, mood stabilizers, and stimulants was 2,940; 2,598; 2,034; 1,239; and 830. Within non-expanding states the comparable quarterly prescriptions per 100,000 non-elderly adults was 9,169; 2,702; 2,327; 1,839; 1,496; and 806. Thus, medication use was higher in expanding states than non-expanding states, pre-expansion.

Turning to control variables, there were clear level differences between expanding and non-expanding states in the pre-expansion period; e.g., higher unemployment rates in expanding states. We control for all these variables in our regression model and DD models require common trends, not levels, for identification.

4.2 Validity

Figures 1-6 report graphical analysis of trends in outcomes aggregated to the yeartreatment level.¹⁸ The psychotropic prescription variables moved broadly in parallel preexpansion, although stimulant trends were more ambiguous. Post-expansion, psychotropic

¹⁵ We do not include state-specific linear time trends in Equation (2) because these would be perfectly collinear with our main interaction testing for pre-expansion parallel trends between expanding and non-expanding states. ¹⁶ States with substantial expansions prior to 2011 are excluded from both validity tests (see Table 2).

¹⁷ States with substantial pre-2011 Medicaid expansions are excluded (see Table 2).

¹⁸ We aggregate the SDUD data to the year level to smooth out noise from seasonality.

prescriptions increased in expanding states relative to non-expanding states overall and for antidepressants and anti-anxiety medications, while trends for other medications were less clear.

Table 4 reports regression-based parallel trends testing. In five of six regressions we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treatment and comparison groups followed the same trend in psychotropic prescriptions pre-expansion: $\hat{\gamma}_1$ is not statistically different from zero and is small in magnitude. The exception is the mood stabilizer regression. $\hat{\gamma}_1$ is statistically different from zero and carries a negative sign, suggesting that expanding states were trending *downward*, relative to non-expanding states, in the pre-expansion period. Because we expect Medicaid expansion to have increased, or have left unchanged, prescription rates we suspect that these pre-expansion trends work against our ability to detect effects.

4.3 Differences-in-differences

Table 5 reports DD results. Post-expansion, overall psychotropic prescriptions increased by 2,076 per quarter per 100,000 non-elderly adults in expanding states relative to nonexpanding states, or an 22% increase relative to the baseline mean in expanding states in the preexpansion period (9,641). Henceforth, all coefficient estimates are compared to this time period/group to convert estimates from absolute to relative terms.

Turning to heterogeneity by psychotropic class, Medicaid expansion increased prescriptions for anti-depressants, anti-anxiety medications, and stimulants. Post-expansion, anti-depressants and anti-anxiety medications prescriptions increased by 34% and 25% in expanding states relative to non-expanding states, with no statistically significant change in antipsychotic, mood stabilizer, or stimulant prescriptions. Although coefficient estimates are positive, providing suggestive evidence that prescriptions for these medications increased.

We next construct total, Medicaid, and non-Medicaid (e.g., patient cost-sharing)¹⁹ payments for the psychotropic medications so that we can study the costs of increased psychotropic medications post-expansion. We consider both Medicaid and non-Medicaid payments so that we can explore financing. In particular, we can investigate the following question: did state Medicaid programs or patients bear the financial responsibility of increased prescriptions? We convert payments to 2016 terms using the previously noted GDP-deflator.²⁰

Table 6 reports DD estimates of the effect of Medicaid expansion on total, Medicaid, and non-Medicaid psychotropic medication payments. Medicaid financed the majority of the psychotropic medications in the pre-expansion period. For instance, for all psychotropic medications considered here, Medicaid payments captured roughly 97% of total payments.²¹

We find no statistically significant changes in any payments post-expansion. Postexpansion, total and Medicaid payments increased for depression (10% and 11%) and antianxiety (17% and 17%) medications, in expanding states relative to non-expanding states. We find no change in total and Medicaid payments for other psychotropic classes and no change in non-Medicaid payments for any psychotropic class. The magnitude of the estimates for total and Medicaid payments are comparable and non-Medicaid payments were unchanged postexpansion, suggesting that Medicaid programs – not patients – provided the majority of the financing for the increased medication use.²²

¹⁹ We note that the non-Medicaid payment variable likely includes payments from other payers, for example, Medicare in the case of 'dual eligibles' (i.e., individuals who qualify for both Medicaid and Medicare insurance programs). Nonetheless, examining total and Medicaid payments can shed light on the financial burden shouldered by Medicaid vs. other payers, which include patients.

²⁰ We do not convert payments to rates as we are interested in overall payments. We control for the state population age 18 to 64 years in all payment regressions, however.

²¹ We note that the sum of Medicaid and non-Medicaid payments do not sum to total payments. SDUD

documentation notes that differences are due to rounding and reporting errors. More details available on request. ²² Indeed, the estimated coefficients in the Medicaid payments regressions are often larger than the estimated coefficients in the total payments regressions. However, 95% confidence intervals overlap and thus we cannot reject the hypothesis that total payments increased more than Medicaid payments. Details available on request.

That we observe no statistically significant evidence that overall payments increased post-expansion in expanding states is somewhat surprising. There are several possible mechanisms for this finding. (i) Coefficient estimates are positive and standard errors are large, thus we cannot rule out the possibility that payments increased. (ii) By expanding, Medicaid programs may have gained a stronger negotiating position vis-à-vis pharmaceutical manufacturers, which allowed Medicaid to bargain lower prices, at least for some medications.²³ (iii) The newly eligible may have been directed towards less expensive medications through, for example, the use of generics vs. branded drugs or less costly medications within the same psychotropic class. (iv) The overall psychotropic group includes medications that increased and did not increase post-expansion; combining groups may attenuate effects.

5. Extensions and robustness checks

5.1 Heterogeneity

The effects of Medicaid expansion on psychotropic prescriptions may vary across state features, such as need for mental illness treatment, access to primary care, mental illness comorbidities, and uninsurance. These characteristics plausibly reflect differences in the potential benefits to states from expansion and capacity of states' healthcare delivery systems to support a large-scale insurance expansion. Documenting the impact of such heterogeneity is important for policymakers in the 19 states that have not expanded Medicaid in determining whether expanding could benefit their constituents, and in the 31 states and D.C. that have expanded Medicaid for understanding how to amplify expansion benefits and/or the costs of curtailing Medicaid, and for considering the distributional effects of a large policy shift across states.

²³ However, we note that Medicaid primarily, but not solely, price negotiates over rebates from manufacturers and, as we discuss later in the manuscript, we do not have access to rebates in our data. Nonetheless, we argue that it is plausible that the expansions allowed at least some state Medicaid programs to better negotiate on non-rebate prices.

We explore such heterogeneity by estimating separate regressions for states at/above and below the national median for (i) prevalence of serious mental illness among adults from the NSDUH, (ii) ratio of primary care doctors to Medicaid beneficiaries using data from the Area Resource File (ARF) and CMS, (iii) adult smoking rate from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey,²⁴ (iv) adult substance use disorder (SUD) prevalence rate from the NSDUH, and (v) uninsurance rate among adults 18-64 from the ACS.²⁵ We use 2010 data (in advance of the expansions we study) to construct these variables to avoid concerns that we are stratifying our sample on an endogenous variable.

Results are reported in Appendix Tables 1 (treatment need), 2 (primary care access), 3 (smoking), 4 (SUD), and 5 (uninsurance). Expansion effects were generally larger in states with high treatment need, low primary care access, high smoking rates, low SUD rates, and high uninsurance rates. These findings are in line with our expectations, with the exception of SUD rates: we hypothesized larger effects within states with higher SUD rates.²⁶

5.2 Policy endogeneity

State policies are determined by the political economy within the state. An important empirical concern is therefore reverse causality. For example, state legislatures, concerned with

²⁴ We stratify by adult smoking rate because smoking is highly correlated with mental illness. In the U.S. adults with mental illness consume 30% of all cigarettes (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2013). We stratify on SUD prevalence given the established co-morbidities between mental illness and SUDs (Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2016).

²⁵ We rely on NSDUH data from 2009/2010 for this analysis as we use the public state-level NSDUH which is only available at two-year intervals. Our proxy for need for mental illness treatment is defined as follows: 'Serious mental illness (SMI) is defined as having a diagnosable mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder, other than a developmental or substance use disorder, that met the criteria found in the 4th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) and resulted in serious functional impairment.' Our SUD variable is based on the DSM-IV definition. Details available on request.

²⁶ While it is beyond the scope of our study to explore the somewhat unexpected finding for our SUD stratification, we suspect that it is plausible that newly eligible enrollees suffering from SUDs may receive treatment for their SUDs and manage co-morbidities (Maclean and Saloner, 2017).

rising mental illness or other factors, may implement policies, such as the decision to expand Medicaid, in an attempt to reverse these trends.

We estimate an event study to examine reverse causality following Autor (2003). We include a series of variables for each time period before and after expansion (policy leads and lags) in Equation (1). These lead and lag variables are constructed by interacting each period indicator with an indicator for expansion states.²⁷ We set Q4 2013 as the index period. State-specific linear time trends are excluded from the event study following Wolfers (2006).²⁸ We drop states with substantial expansions before 2011. Results are presented graphically in Figures 7-12. We report the coefficient estimates and associated 95% confidence intervals that account for within-state clustering for each lead/lag.²⁹

The event studies do not reveal evidence of reverse causality: the coefficient estimates on the leads are small and imprecise,³⁰ and alternate in sign. Post-expansion for all medications, anti-depressants, anti-anxiety medications, and stimulants, the estimated coefficients are positive and generally precise. The event study results suggest that increases in prescriptions were not immediate and instead emerged over time. This pattern of results is not surprising as the newly eligible must take up Medicaid and make an appointment with a provider prior to filling and obtaining a prescription. We find no evidence that anti-psychotic or mood stabilizer medication prescriptions changed post-expansion.³¹

²⁷ Coded one if the state expanded Medicaid during our study period and zero otherwise.

²⁸ Wolfers argues that models with dynamics (such as the leads and lags in an event study) should not include statespecific trends as such trends can muddle interpretation of the estimates of dynamic effects.

²⁹ Coefficient and standard error estimates for each lead/lag variable are available on request.

³⁰ We note that some coefficients do raise to statistical significance, but these estimates carry a negative a sign and thus work against our DD findings that the expansions increased utilization.

³¹ We observe that the confidence intervals surrounding the 2016 lags are somewhat large. We suspect that this reduction in precision is due to noise in the CMS data as the 2016 was just released and may contain some errors due to reporting difficulties by state Medicaid programs. We will update the 2016 data with any new data provided by CMS. In unreported analyses, we have dropped the 2016 data from our analyses and the results are robust and, in particular, the confidence intervals do not fan out in the post-expansion period.

5.3 Weighting

The economics field has not yet reached consensus regarding the use of weights in analyses seeking to estimate causal effects. Given the lack of consensus, we re-estimate Equation (1) using the state population ages 18-64 years as weights. Weighted results (Appendix Table 6) are not appreciably different.

5.4 Unobservables

We next probe the sensitivity of our results to alternative approaches to controlling for between state heterogeneity. Specifically, we rely on (i) state- and period-fixed effects, and (ii) state-specific quadratic time trends. We also include additional time-varying observable state characteristics from the ARF: doctors providing primary care, registered nurses, managed care penetration, and community mental healthcare centers. We note that some of these additional state variables may be bad controls and urge readers to interpret findings generated in this specification with some caution (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Results are reported in Appendix Table 7 and are not appreciably different from our main findings. Estimates are generally larger (smaller) in specifications that provide less (more) control for between state heterogeneity.

5.5 Additional robustness checks

We convert our medication variables to the rate per 100,000 individuals ages 18-64. Due to other changes embedded in the ACA,³² it is plausible that older adults may be affected by Medicaid expansions. We re-estimate Equation (1) using the state population ages 18+ as the denominator. Results (Appendix Table 8) are not appreciably different. We explore the robustness of our results to alternative functional forms: the non-transformed measure of prescriptions (i.e., we do not convert this variable to a rate), a Poisson model, and taking the

³² E.g., individuals eligible for Medicaid and Medicare ('dual eligibles').

logarithm of our prescription variables. Results are broadly robust, although estimates generated in the model that uses the non-transformed prescription variables and Poisson model are more precisely estimated (Appendix Table 9). Finally, we test alternative approaches to coding Medicaid expansion. We drop states with substantial pre-2011 expansions following Wherry and Miller (2016) and use a coding scheme outlined in Maclean and Saloner (2017). Results are broadly robust (Appendix Table 10).

6. Discussion

Lower income populations are at elevated risk for mental illness and are less likely to have insurance. Public insurance expansions can allow such populations to obtain insurance coverage and, in turn, receive effective treatment for mental illness. We examined the effect of a large-scale and recent public insurance expansion that covered mental illness services and prescription medications in the U.S. Specifically, we leveraged within-state variation in Medicaid eligibility generated by provisions in the ACA 2011-2016 to study changes in Medicaid-financed prescriptions for psychotropic medications obtained in outpatient settings.

We find that post-expansion the number of Medicaid-financed psychotropic prescriptions increased by 22% in expanding states relative to non-expanding states. This finding is similar to the findings of Ghosh et al (2017) who document a 19% increase using claims data. Given that we study a longer post-expansion period (by 21 months), our findings suggest that expansion effects are persisting, and perhaps increasing, over time. We identify heterogeneity in effects across psychotropic class: post-expansion prescriptions for anti-depressants and anti-anxiety medications increased by 34% and 25% in expanding states relative to non-expanding states while anti-psychotic, mood stabilizer, and stimulant prescriptions were unchanged.

While the SDUD will not allow us to explore the factors that lie behind the differential response by psychotropic class, we hypothesize that differences in patients, providers, and/or treatment access through charity care or other programs potentially drive these differences (Garfield et al., 2010). For example, patients receiving antipsychotics and mood stabilizers are likely to have more severe psychiatric disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder), and face greater barriers to treatment access and medication adherence (e.g., cognitive, functional, logistical, social) (Wilder et al., 2010). Individuals with depressive and anxiety disorders may be more able or more highly motivated to seek treatment. Because psychotropic medications require a prescription from a healthcare provider, our findings imply that newly eligible beneficiaries were able to meet with a healthcare provider within the complex outpatient mental healthcare system. This level of self-management would likely be more challenging for individuals with severe psychiatric disorders. Alternatively, a proportion of individuals with severe psychiatric disorders may have had insurance pre-expansion through other programs (e.g. disability benefits, charity care), thus moving pre-expansion medication access higher.

We identify heterogeneity in effects by state pre-ACA characteristics that proxy for patient need and system capacity. Effects generally were larger in states with high need for mental illness treatment, low access to primary care, high smoking rates, low SUD prevalence, and high uninsurance. Our analysis suggests that increases in medication prescriptions were primarily financed by Medicaid and not patients, likely due to low cost-sharing within Medicaid.

Our findings contribute to the growing literature investigating the effects of the ACArelated Medicaid expansions. In line with previous research we show that these expansions increased use of healthcare services (Ghosh et al., 2017, Sommers et al., 2016, Miller and Wherry, 2017, Wherry and Miller, 2016, Maclean et al., 2017, Wen et al., 2017). In particular,

we document that individuals suffering from mental illnesses are also experiencing these increases in healthcare service use.

Our study has limitations. (i) We lack data on patients and providers, and cannot explore issues such as the appropriateness of care (i.e. evidence-based clinical indication for psychotropic medications), and the characteristics of patients obtaining prescriptions and the providers delivering such care. (ii) The SDUD does not include manufacturer rebates to states and thus we have error in our payment variables. (iii) We have information on a single payer.

Our analysis suggests that public insurance expansions allow low-income individuals with mental illnesses to access valuable healthcare services. Reforms that curtail such access could worsen health outcomes for such individuals and, given the established negative externalities associated with mental illness (Insel, 2008), have implications for broader society.

| Class: | Medications |
|-----------------|---|
| Antidepressant | Aplenzin, Budeprion, Bupropion, Celexa, Citalopram, Cymbalta, Duloxetine, |
| - | Effexor, Escitalopram, Fluoxetine, Forfivo, Lexapro, Paroxetine, Paxil, Pexeva, |
| | Prozac, Rapiflux, Sarafem, Selfemra, Sertraline, Venlafaxine, Wellbutrin, and Zoloft. |
| Anti-anxiety | Alprazolam, Ativan, Buspar, Buspirone, Clonazepam, Klonopin, Lorazepam, |
| | Niravam, and Xanax. |
| Anti-psychotic | Abilify, Aripiprazole, Chlorpromazine, Clozapine, Clozaril, Etrafon, Fazaclo, |
| | Fluphenazine, Geodon, Haldol, Haloperidol, Invega, Latuda, Lurasidone, Olanzapine, |
| | Paliperidone, Perphenazine, Permitil, Prolixin, Quetiapine, Risperdal, Risperidone, |
| | Seroquel, Symbyax, Thorazine, Trilafon, Triavil, Ziprasidone, and Zyprexa. |
| Mood stabilizer | Depakene, Depakote, Divalproex sodium, Eskalith, Lamictal, Lamotrigine, Lithane, |
| | Lithium, Lithobid, Stavzor, Valproate sodium, and Valproic acid. |
| Stimulant | Adderall, Amphetamine, Aptensio, Concerta, Dexedrine, Dextroamphetamine, |
| | Dextrostat, Lisdexamfetamine, Metadate, Methylin, Methylphenidate, Procentra, |
| | Quillichew, Quillivant, Ritalin, and Vyvanse. |

Table 1. Psychotropic medications

Notes: Data source is National Institute of Mental Health: https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/mental-healthmedications/index.shtml and Medline websites (https://www.medline.com/) for specific medications (e.g., Aplenzin) embedded in the website (both websites accessed June 10th, 2017). Overall psychotropic medications include the union of the classes listed in this table. More details available on request from the corresponding author.

| State: | Medicaid expansion date |
|---|-------------------------|
| States with substantial expansions before 2011 | |
| Delaware | Before 2011 |
| District of Columbia | Before 2011 |
| Massachusetts | Before 2011 |
| New York | Before 2011 |
| Vermont | Before 2011 |
| States with substantial expansions in 2011-2014 | |
| Arizona ^{a,b} | 1/1/2014 |
| Arkansas | 1/1/2014 |
| California ^c | 1/1/2014 |
| Colorado | 1/1/2014 |
| Connecticut ^d | 1/1/2014 |
| Hawaii ^b | 1/1/2014 |
| Illinois | 1/1/2014 |
| Iowa | 1/1/2014 |
| Kentucky | 1/1/2014 |
| Maryland | 1/1/2014 |
| Michigan | 4/1/2014 |
| Minnesota ^d | 1/1/2014 |
| Nevada | 1/1/2014 |
| New Hampshire | 8/15/2014 |
| New Jersey ^d | 1/1/2014 |
| New Mexico | 1/1/2014 |
| North Dakota | 1/1/2014 |
| Ohio ^b | 1/1/2014 |
| Oregon | 1/1/2014 |
| Rhode Island ^b | 1/1/2014 |
| Washington ^e | 1/1/2014 |
| West Virginia | 1/1/2014 |
| Late expansion states (post-2014) | |
| Alaska | 9/1/2015 |
| Indiana | 2/1/2015 |
| Montana ^f | 1/1/2016 |
| Louisiana ^f | 7/1/2016 |
| Pennsylvania | 1/1/2015 |

Table 2. State Medicaid eligibility expansions

Notes: Medicaid expansion dates derived from Simon et al. (2017). 'Substantial' expansions covered both parents and childless adults up to at least 100% FPL, were open to new enrollees, and had full Medicaid benefits.

^a Expanded eligibility prior to 2011 but closed to new enrollees in 2011.

^b Excluded, with Virginia, from the analysis due to data quality issues.

^c From 2011 through 2013, some but not all California counties expanded eligibility, and income eligibility thresholds varied by county.

^d Expanded eligibility prior to 2014 but with low eligibility thresholds.

^e Expanded eligibility prior to 2014 but only to people who had previously enrolled in a state program.

^f Non-expansion during the entire study period, 2011-2015.

| | Expansion | Non-expansion | Difference |
|---|-----------|---------------|------------|
| Sample: | states | states | (p-value)* |
| Mental illness prescriptions per 100,000 | | | |
| All medications | 9,641 | 9,169 | 0.1863 |
| Depression medications | 2,940 | 2,702 | 0.0621 |
| Anxiety medications | 2,598 | 2,327 | 0.0305 |
| Ant-psychotic medications | 2,034 | 1,839 | 0.0011 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 1,239 | 1,496 | 0.0005 |
| Stimulant medications | 830 | 806 | 0.3852 |
| State-year level characteristics | | | |
| Unemployment rate | 7.643 | 7.204 | 0.0103 |
| Poverty rate | 13.80 | 14.82 | 0.0013 |
| Family income (\$) | 80,104 | 70,357 | 0.0000 |
| Age | 38.07 | 37.50 | 0.0001 |
| Female | 0.505 | 0.507 | 0.0010 |
| Male | 0.495 | 0.493 | 0.0010 |
| White | 0.714 | 0.719 | 0.7317 |
| African American | 0.085 | 0.130 | 0.0000 |
| Other race | 0.082 | 0.055 | 0.0000 |
| Hispanic | 0.118 | 0.096 | 0.0205 |
| Less than high school | 0.311 | 0.327 | 0.0000 |
| High school | 0.295 | 0.296 | 0.6089 |
| Some college | 0.193 | 0.197 | 0.0192 |
| College degree | 0.201 | 0.180 | 0.0000 |
| Democrat governor | 0.565 | 0.098 | 0.0000 |
| Max monthly TANF benefit for a family of 4 (\$) | 556.8 | 395.0 | 0.0000 |
| Minimum wage (S) | 8.080 | 7.723 | 0.0000 |
| EITC (state-to-federal ratio) | 0.066 | 0.017 | 0.0000 |
| Observations | 276 | 204 | |

Table 3. Summary statistics for expansion and non-expansion states: SDUD 2011-2013

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. States with substantial expansions before 2011 excluded from the analysis (see Table 2). *Two-tailed *t*-tests applied.

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|---|---------------|
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 9,641 |
| All medications | -49 |
| | (48) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,940 |
| Depression medications | -1 |
| | (17) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,598 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | -14 |
| | (28) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,034 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | -5 |
| | (6) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,239 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | -31** |
| | (12) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | |
| Stimulant medications | 1 |
| | (3) |
| Observations | 480 |
| | |

Table 4. Parallel trends test for psychotropic medication prescriptions: SDUD 2011-2013

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, and state and period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. States with substantial expansions before 2011 excluded from the analysis (see Table 2).

***, **, * = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%,10% level.

| Table 5. Effect of Medicaid expansion on psychotropic medication prescriptions using differences-in- differences models: SDUD 2011-2016 | | |
|--|---------------|--|
| Outcome: | Prescriptions | |
| Manual and a start | 0 (41 | |

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|---|---------------|
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 9,641 |
| All medications | 2,076** |
| | (913) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,940 |
| Depression medications | 1,004*** |
| • | (370) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,598 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 647*** |
| | (235) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,034 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 212 |
| | (198) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,239 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 83 |
| | (96) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 830 |
| Stimulant medications | 130 |
| | (86) |
| Observations | 1,080 |
| | |

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**;* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%, 10% level.

| | Total | Medicaid | Non-Medicaid |
|---|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Outcome: | payments | payments | payments |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | \$41,584,276 | \$40,286,436 | \$1,297,840 |
| All medications | 3,808,271 | 4,136,150 | -327,880 |
| | (3,020,319) | (2,945,167) | (240,579) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | \$4,991,200 | \$4,884,278 | \$106,922 |
| Depression medications | 521,055* | 543,814* | -22,760 |
| - | (288,031) | (288,643) | (18,519) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | \$873,554 | \$844,733 | \$28,821 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 149,690*** | 143,240*** | 6,450 |
| | (45,542) | (45,617) | (21,764) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | \$27,361,517 | \$26,595,418 | \$766,099 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 2,581,007 | 2,814,623 | -233,617 |
| | (2,420,894) | (2,360,065) | (143,044) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | \$6,524,606 | \$6,239,572 | \$285,034 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 423,470 | 468,847 | -45,377 |
| | (713,954) | (674,657) | (76,855) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | \$1,833,399 | \$1,722,436 | \$110,964 |
| Stimulant medications | 133,048 | 165,625 | -32,577 |
| | (207,823) | (205,416) | (20,551) |
| Observations | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 |

 Table 6. Effect of Medicaid expansion on psychotropic medication prescription payments using differencesin-differences models: SDUD 2011-2016

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All models control for demographics, social policies, the state population ages 18 to 64 years, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses.

***,**,* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%, 10% level.

Appendix Table 1. Heterogeneity in Medicaid expansion effects on psychotropic medication prescriptions by need for mental illness healthcare using differences-in-differences models: SDUD 2011-2016

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|--|----------------|
| Sample: High mental illness care need states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 10,090 |
| All medications | 2,349*** |
| | (694) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 3,105 |
| Depression medications | 1,265*** |
| | (301) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,775 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 725*** |
| | (205) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,969 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 169 |
| | (110) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,405 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 54 |
| | (95) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 837 |
| Stimulant medications | 136** |
| | (57) |
| Observations | 552 |
| Sample: Low mental illness care need states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 9,056 |
| All medications | 1,901 |
| | (1,333) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,725 |
| Depression medications | 703 |
| | (553) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,369 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 481 |
| Maan value in expansion states, pro expansion | (315) 2,118 |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,118 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | (251) |
| Maan value in expansion states and emperation | 1,024 |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion Mood stabilizer medications | 287* |
| wood stabilizer medications | |
| Maan value in expansion states, pro expansion | (160) 820 |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion Stimulant medications | <u> </u> |
| Sumulant medications | (124) |
| Observations | 528 |
| OUSCI VALIOIIS | 520 |

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. Need for mental illness treatment calculated using National Survey of Drug Use and Health 2009/2010 state-level data. ***,**,* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%, 10% level.

| Appendix Table 2. Heterogeneity in Medicaid expansion effects on psychotropic medication prescriptions by |
|---|
| access to primary care using differences-in-differences models: SDUD 2011-2016 |

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|---|---------------|
| Sample: High primary care access states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 8,755 |
| All medications | 1,105 |
| | (808) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,812 |
| Depression medications | 600** |
| | (283) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,230 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 366** |
| | (170) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,911 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 27 |
| | (173) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,028 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 77 |
| | (135) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 773 |
| Stimulant medications | 36 |
| | (77) |
| Observations | 528 |
| Sample: Low primary care access states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 11,018 |
| All medications | 1,851 |
| | (1,157) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 3,138 |
| Depression medications | 998* |
| | (507) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 3,171 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 697** |
| | (320) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,225 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 204 |
| | (224) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,567 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | -165 |
| | (128) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 917 |
| Stimulant medications | 117 |
| | (99) |
| Observations | 552 |

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. Access to primary care calculated using CMS and Area Resource File 2010 data.

***,**,* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%, 10% level.

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|---|---------------|
| Sample: High smoking rate states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 10,445 |
| All medications | 2,594** |
| | (1,000) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 3,007 |
| Depression medications | 1,261*** |
| | (405) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,897 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 864*** |
| | (288) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,179 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 240 |
| | (163) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,471 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 83 |
| | (121) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 892 |
| Stimulant medications | 146* |
| | (77) |
| Observations | 576 |
| Sample: Low smoking rate states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 8,763 |
| All medications | 2,198* |
| | (1,191) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,866 |
| Depression medications | 1,007* |
| | (526) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,273 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 452 |
| | (308) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,876 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 404* |
| | (213) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 986 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 130 |
| | (148) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 762 |
| Stimulant medications | 204* |
| | (104) |
| Observations | 504 |

Appendix Table 3. Heterogeneity in Medicaid expansion effects on psychotropic medication prescriptions by smoking status using differences-in-differences models: SDUD 2011-2016

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. Smoking rates calculated using Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey 2010 data. ***,**,* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%,10% level.

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|---|---------------|
| Sample: High SUD prevalence states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 8,384 |
| All medications | -317 |
| | (886) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,611 |
| Depression medications | 190 |
| | (362) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,193 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 8 |
| | (189) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,859 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | -293 |
| | (233) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 986 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | -132 |
| | (129) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 735 |
| Stimulant medications | -90 |
| | (92) |
| Observations | 528 |
| Sample: Low SUD prevalence states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 11,012 |
| All medications | 3,637*** |
| | (1,023) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 3,298 |
| Depression medications | 1,597*** |
| • | (453) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 3,041 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 1,034*** |
| | (307) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,224 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 463*** |
| | (154) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,516 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 278* |
| | (136) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 933 |
| Stimulant medications | 264*** |
| | (76) |
| Observations | 552 |
| | 1 100 000 1 |

Appendix Table 4. Heterogeneity in Medicaid expansion effects on psychotropic medication prescriptions by SUD prevalence using differences-in-differences models: SDUD 2011-2016

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. SUD prevalence rates calculated using National Survey of Drug Use and Health 2009/2010 state-level data. ***,**,* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%,10% level.

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|---|---------------|
| Sample: High uninsurance rate states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 9,355 |
| All medications | 2,742** |
| | (1,088) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,784 |
| Depression medications | 1,302*** |
| | (447) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,572 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 840*** |
| | (274) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,972 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 288 |
| | (237) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,202 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 147 |
| | (97) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 825 |
| Stimulant medications | 165 |
| | (106) |
| Observations | 600 |
| Sample: Low uninsurance rate states | |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 10,012 |
| All medications | 1,918** |
| | (690) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 3,142 |
| Depression medications | 842*** |
| • | (222) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,633 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 461** |
| • | (181) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,115 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 269* |
| 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 | (137) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,287 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 189 |
| | (160) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 835 |
| Stimulant medications | 158** |
| | (64) |
| Observations | 480 |

Appendix Table 5. Heterogeneity in Medicaid expansion effects on psychotropic medication prescriptions by uninsurance rate using differences-in-differences models: SDUD 2011-2016

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. Uninsurance rates calculated using the American Community Survey 2010 data.

***,**,* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%,10% level.

Appendix Table 6. Effect of Medicaid expansion on psychotropic medication prescriptions using differencesin-differences models using population weights: SDUD 2011-2016

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|---|---------------|
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 8,928 |
| All medications | 2,538*** |
| | (819) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,720 |
| Depression medications | 1,111*** |
| | (344) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,440 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 685*** |
| | (196) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,032 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 369** |
| | (166) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 956 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 182* |
| | (91) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 780 |
| Stimulant medications | 191** |
| | (77) |
| Observations | 1,080 |

Notes: State populations ages 18 to 64 years serve as the weights. Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses.

***,**,* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%,10% level.

| Model: | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|--|----------|----------|--------|---------|
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 9,641 | 9,641 | 9,641 | 9,641 |
| All medications | 2,076** | 2,070** | 1,517* | 1,618** |
| | (913) | (948) | (872) | (642) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,940 | 2,940 | 2,940 | 2,940 |
| Depression medications | 1,004*** | 1,240*** | 798** | 840*** |
| | (370) | (387) | (358) | (292) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,598 | 2,598 | 2,598 | 2,598 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 647*** | 702*** | 519** | 570*** |
| | (235) | (222) | (211) | (198) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,034 | 2,034 | 2,034 | 2,034 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 212 | 141 | 119 | 125 |
| | (198) | (193) | (176) | (116) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,239 | 1,239 | 1,239 | 1,239 |
| Mood stabilizer | 83 | -150 | -7 | -5 |
| medications | (96) | (139) | (105) | (77) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 830 | 830 | 830 | 830 |
| Stimulant medications | 130 | 137 | 88 | 88 |
| | (86) | (89) | (78) | (54) |
| Observations | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 |

Appendix Table 7. Effect of Medicaid expansion on psychotropic medication prescriptions using differencesin-differences models with different controls for between-state differences: SDUD 2011-2016

Notes: The outcome variable in each regression is the number of prescription fills and refills. Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. Model (1) controls for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends (baseline mode, see Equation [1] in the manuscript text for more details). Model (2) controls for demographics, social policies, and state and period fixed effects. Model (3) controls for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific quadratic time trends. Model (4) controls for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, state-specific linear time trends, and extended set of state-level controls.

***,**,* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%,10% level.

Appendix Table 8. Effect of Medicaid expansion on psychotropic medication prescriptions using differencesin-differences models using the population 18 years+ as the denominator: SDUD 2011-2016

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|---|---------------|
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 7,870 |
| All medications | 1,659** |
| | (719) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,400 |
| Depression medications | 803*** |
| | (292) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,119 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 514*** |
| | (184) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,664 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 170 |
| | (157) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,009 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 68 |
| | (76) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 678 |
| Stimulant medications | 104 |
| | (68) |
| Observations | 1,080 |

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 years and older. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%,10% level.

Appendix Table 9. Effect of Medicaid expansion on psychotropic medication prescriptions using differencesin-differences models using alternative Medicaid expansion coding schemes: SDUD 2011-2016

| Medicaid expansion coding scheme: | Maclean & Saloner | Wherry & Miller |
|---|-------------------|-----------------|
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 10,774 | 9,641 |
| All medications | 1,606 | 2,262*** |
| | (1,012) | (813) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 3,319 | 2,940 |
| Depression medications | 787* | 1,078*** |
| | (411) | (329) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,932 | 2,598 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 517* | 702*** |
| | (259) | (217) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,164 | 2,034 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 118 | 204 |
| | (216) | (176) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1,452 | 1,239 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 102 | 146* |
| | (97) | (86) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 907 | 830 |
| Stimulant medications | 82 | 131* |
| | (94) | (77) |
| Observations | 1,080 | 960 |

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. See text for a discussion of the alternative Medicaid expansion coding schemes. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses.

***,**;* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%, 10% level.

| Functional form: | Non-transformed LS | Logged model | Poisson model |
|---|--------------------|--------------|---------------|
| Mean value in expansion states, pre- expansion | 356,035 | 9,641 | 356,035 |
| All medications | 61,719*** | 0.095 | 73,179*** |
| | (19,370) | (0.080) | (25,422) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre- expansion | 108,453 | 2,940 | 108,453 |
| Depression medications | 29,439*** | 0.195** | 31,268*** |
| - | (8,140) | (0.082) | (9,643) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre- expansion | 97,321 | 2,598 | 97,321 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 19,141*** | 0.170** | 23,804*** |
| | (6,492) | (0.082) | (6,716) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre- expansion | 81,017 | 2,034 | 81,017 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 6,962** | -0.008 | 10,031** |
| | (2,594) | (0.088) | (4,628) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre- expansion | 38,127 | 1,239 | 38,127 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 2,250 | -0.016 | 3,666 |
| | (2,806) | (0.082) | (3,269) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre- expansion | 31,118 | 830 | 31,118 |
| Stimulant medications | 3,927*** | 0.045 | 5,023** |
| | (1,138) | (0.082) | (2,253) |
| Observations | 1,080 | 1,080 | 1,080 |
| | | | |

Appendix Table 10. Effect of Medicaid expansion on psychotropic medication prescriptions using differencesin-differences models using alternative functional forms: SDUD 2011-2016

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. Non-transformed LS regression controls for the state population ages 18 to 64 years. Logged model outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years and the natural logarithm transformation is applied to this rate. Average marginal effects are reported in Poisson models rather than beta coefficients, and the state population ages 18 to 64 years is the exposure variable. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses.

***,**;* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%, 10% level.





Figure 1. Trends in all psychotropic medication prescriptions in expansion and non-expansion states: SDUD 2011-2016

Notes: Data is aggregated to the treatment-year level.

Figure 2. Trends in depression medication prescriptions in expansion and non-expansion states: SDUD 2011-2016



Notes: Data is aggregated to the treatment-year level.





Figure 3. Trends in anti-anxiety medication prescriptions in expansion and non-expansion states: SDUD 2011-2016

Notes: Data is aggregated to the treatment-year level.

Figure 4. Trends in anti-psychotic medication prescriptions in expansion and non-expansion states: SDUD 2011-2016



Notes: Data is aggregated to the treatment-year level.






Figure 5. Trends in mood stabilizer medication prescriptions in expansion and non-expansion states: SDUD 2011-2016


Notes: Data is aggregated to the treatment-year level.

Figure 6. Trends in stimulant medication prescriptions in expansion and non-expansion states: SDUD 2011-2016



Notes: Data is aggregated to the treatment-year level.





Notes: Unit of observation is a state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. Event study dummy variables include each year-quarter cell between Q1 2011 and Q4 2016, the omitted category is Q4 2013. All models control for demographics, social policies, and state and period fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for state-level clustering and are reported in vertical bars. States with substantial expansions before 2011 excluded from the analysis (see Table 2). N=960.






Figure 8. Effect of Medicaid expansions on depression medication prescriptions per 100,000 using an event study model: SDUD 2011-2016

Notes: Unit of observation is a state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. Event study dummy variables include each year-quarter cell between Q1 2011 and Q4 2016, the omitted category is Q4 2013. All models control for demographics, social policies, and state and period fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for state-level clustering and are reported in vertical bars. States with substantial expansions before 2011 excluded from the analysis (see Table 2). N=960.





Notes: Unit of observation is a state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. Event study dummy variables include each year-quarter cell between Q1 2011 and Q4 2016, the omitted category is Q4 2013. All models control for demographics, social policies, and state and period fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for state-level clustering and are reported in vertical bars. States with substantial expansions before 2011 excluded from the analysis (see Table 2). N=960.







Figure 10. Effect of Medicaid expansions on anti-psychotic medication prescriptions per 100,000 using an event study model: SDUD 2011-2016


Notes: Unit of observation is a state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. Event study dummy variables include each year-quarter cell between Q1 2011 and Q4 2016, the omitted category is Q4 2013. All models control for demographics, social policies, and state and period fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for state-level clustering and are reported in vertical bars. States with substantial expansions before 2011 excluded from the analysis (see Table 2). N=960.





Notes: Unit of observation is a state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. Event study dummy variables include each year-quarter cell between Q1 2011 and Q4 2016, the omitted category is Q4 2013. All models control for demographics, social policies, and state and period fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for state-level clustering and are reported in vertical bars. States with substantial expansions before 2011 excluded from the analysis (see Table 2). N=960.





Notes: Unit of observation is a state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. Event study dummy variables include each year-quarter cell between Q1 2011 and Q4 2016, the omitted category is Q4 2013. All models control for demographics, social policies, and state and period fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals account for state-level clustering and are reported in vertical bars. States with substantial expansions before 2011 excluded from the analysis (see Table 2). N=960.

| Outcome: | Prescriptions |
|---|---------------|
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 9,641 |
| All medications | 1,946*** |
| | (542) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,940 |
| Depression medications | 966*** |
| | (240) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,598 |
| Anti-anxiety medications | 552*** |
| | (159) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 2,034 |
| Anti-psychotic medications | 196** |
| | (81) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 1239 |
| Mood stabilizer medications | 106 |
| | (75) |
| Mean value in expansion states, pre-expansion | 830 |
| Stimulant medications | 126*** |
| | (39) |
| Observations | 900 |

Supplementary Table 1. Effect of Medicaid expansion on mental illness medication prescriptions using differences-in-differences models: SDUD 2011-2015

Notes: Unit of observation is the state-year-quarter. All outcomes are converted to a rate per 100,000 persons 18 to 64 years. All models control for demographics, social policies, state and period fixed effects, and state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses. ***,**;* = statistically different from zero at the 1%,5%, 10% level.

References

- AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 2006. American Psychiatric Association Practice Guidelines for the treatment of psychiatric disorders: Compendium 2006, American Psychiatric Publications.
- AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION. 2017. *American Psychiatric Association Practice Guidelines* [Online]. Available: <u>http://psychiatryonline.org/guidelines</u> [Accessed August 8 2017].
- ANGRIST, J. D. & PISCHKE, J. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- AUTOR, D. H. 2003. Outsourcing at will: The contribution of unjust dismissal doctrine to the growth of employment outsourcing. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 21, 1-42.
- BAICKER, K., TAUBMAN, S. L., ALLEN, H. L., BERNSTEIN, M., GRUBER, J. H., NEWHOUSE, J. P., SCHNEIDER, E. C., WRIGHT, B. J., ZASLAVSKY, A. M. & FINKELSTEIN, A. N. 2013. The Oregon Experiment — Effects of Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 368, 1713-1722.
- BERTRAND, M., DUFLO, E. & MULLAINATHAN, S. 2004. How much should we trust differences-in-differences estimates? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119, 249-275.
- CAMERON, C. A. & MILLER, D. L. 2015. A practitioner's guide to cluster-robust inference. Journal of Human Resources, 50, 317-372.
- CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND QUALITY 2016. 2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
- COHEN, R., MARTINEZ, M. & WARD, B. 2010. Health Insurance Coverage: Early Release of Estimates From the National Health Interview Survey, 2009. National Center for Health Statistics.
- COHEN, R., ZAMMITTI, E. & MARTINEZ, M. 2017. Health Insurance Coverage: Early Release of Estimates From the National Health Interview Survey, 2016. National Center for Health Statistics.
- COOK, B. L., TRINH, N.-H., LI, Z., HOU, S. S.-Y. & PROGOVAC, A. M. 2016. Trends in racial-ethnic disparities in access to mental health care, 2004–2012. *Psychiatric Services*, 68, 9-16.
- COURTEMANCHE, C., MARTON, J., UKERT, B., YELOWITZ, A. & ZAPATA, D. 2017. Early effects of the Affordable Care Act on healthcare access, risky health behaviors, and self-assessed health. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- CUTLER, D. M. & GRUBER, J. 1996. Does public insurance crowd out private insurance? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 111, 391-430.
- DECKER, S. L. 2012. In 2011 nearly one-third of physicians said they would not accept new Medicaid patients, but rising fees may help. *Health Affairs*, 31, 1673-1679.
- DUNN, A., GROSSE, S. D. & ZUVEKAS, S. H. 2016. Adjusting Health Expenditures for Inflation: A Review of Measures for Health Services Research in the United States. *Health Services Research*, In press.
- FRANK, R. G. & MCGUIRE, T. G. 2000. Economics and mental health. *In:* CULYER, A. J. & NEWHOUSE, J. P. (eds.) *Handbook of Health Economics*. Elsevier.

- FREAN, M., GRUBER, J. & SOMMERS, B. D. 2017. Premium subsidies, the mandate, and Medicaid expansion: Coverage effects of the Affordable Care Act. *Journal of Health Economics*, 53, 72-86.
- GARFIELD, R. L., LAVE, J. R. & DONOHUE, J. M. 2010. Health Reform and the Scope of Benefits for Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Services. *Psychiatric Services*, 61, 1081-1086.
- GARFIELD, R. L., ZUVEKAS, S. H., LAVE, J. R. & DONOHUE, J. M. 2011. The impact of national health care reform on adults with severe mental disorders. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 168, 486-494.
- GHOSH, A., SIMON, K. & SOMMERS, B. D. 2017. The effect of state Medicaid expansions on prescription drug use: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- GOLBERSTEIN, E. & GONZALES, G. 2015. The Effects of Medicaid Eligibility on Mental Health Services and Out-of-Pocket Spending for Mental Health Services. *Health Services Research*, 50, 1734-1750.
- GROSSMAN, M. 1972. On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. *Journal of Political Economy*, 80, 223-255.
- HAMERSMA, S. & KIM, M. 2013. Participation and crowd out: Assessing the effects of parental Medicaid expansions. *Journal of Health Economics*, 32, 160-171.
- HURLEY, R. E. & SOMERS, S. A. 2003. Medicaid And Managed Care: A Lasting Relationship? *Health Affairs*, 22, 77-88.
- INSEL, T. R. 2008. Assessing the economic costs of serious mental illness. *American Journal of Psychiatry*, 165, 663-5.
- INSEL, T. R. 2015. Mental Health Awareness Month: By the Numbers. National Instite of Mental Health.
- KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 2016. Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility, Enrollment, Renewal, and Cost-Sharing Policies as of January 2016: Findings from a 50-State Survey. Washington, DC: Kaiser Family Foundation.
- KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 2017. Medicaid's Role in Behavioral Health.
- LEHMANN, A., ASLANI, P., AHMED, R., CELIO, J., GAUCHET, A., BEDOUCH, P., BUGNON, O., ALLENET, B. & SCHNEIDER, M. P. 2014. Assessing medication adherence: options to consider. *International Journal of Clinical Pharmacy*, 36, 55-69.
- MACLEAN, J. C., PESKO, M. F. & HILL, S. C. 2017. The Effect of Insurance Expansions on Smoking Cessation Medication Use: Evidence from Recent Medicaid Expansions. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- MACLEAN, J. C. & SALONER, B. 2017. The effect of public insurance expansions on substance use disorder treatment: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act. *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series*. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research
- MCMORROW, S., KENNEY, G. M., LONG, S. K. & GOIN, D. E. 2016. Medicaid Expansions from 1997 to 2009 Increased Coverage and Improved Access and Mental Health Outcomes for Low-Income Parents. *Health Services Research*, 51, 1347-1367.
- MILLER, S. & WHERRY, L. R. 2017. Health and access to care during the first 2 years of the ACA Medicaid expansions. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 376, 947-956.

- OLFSON, M. 2016. The Rise of Primary Care Physicians in the Provision of US Mental Health Care. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law,* 41, 559-583.
- ROTH, J. 2017. NDC Data -- National Drug Code Data.
- RUGGLES, S., GENADEK, K., GOEKEN, R., GROVER, J. & SOBEK, M. 2015. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN.
- SIMON, K., SONI, A. & CAWLEY, J. 2017. The impact of health insurance on preventive care and health behaviors: Evidence from the first two years of the ACA Medicaid expansions. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, 36, 390-417.
- SOMMERS, B. D., BLENDON, R. J., ORAV, E. & EPSTEIN, A. M. 2016. Changes in utilization and health among low-income adults after Medicaid expansion or expanded private insurance. *JAMA Internal Medicine*, 176, 1501-1509.
- SOMMERS, B. D. & GRABOWSKI, D. C. 2017. What is Medicaid? More than meets the eye. *JAMA*, In press.
- SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 2013. Adults with mental illness or substance use disorder account for 40 percent of all cigarettes smoked. *The NSDUH report*. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
- U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 2012. States' collection of rebates for drugs paid through Medicaid managed care organizations. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General.
- UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY CENTER FOR POVERTY RESEARCH CENTER 2016. State level data of economic, political, and transfer program information for 1980-2015. Lexington, KY.
- WEN, H., DRUSS, B. G. & CUMMINGS, J. R. 2015. Effect of Medicaid Expansions on Health Insurance Coverage and Access to Care among Low-Income Adults with Behavioral Health Conditions. *Health Services Research*, 50, 1787-1809.
- WEN, H., HOCKENBERRY, J. M., BORDERS, T. F. & DRUSS, B. G. 2017. Impact of Medicaid expansion on Medicaid-covered utilization of Buprenorphine for opioid use disorder treatment. *Medical Care*, 55, 336-341.
- WHERRY, L. R. & MILLER, S. 2016. Early coverage, access, utilization, and health effects associated with the affordable care act medicaid expansions: A quasi-experimental study. *Annals of Internal Medicine*, 164, 795-803.
- WILDER, C. M., ELBOGEN, E. B., MOSER, L. L., SWANSON, J. W. & SWARTZ, M. S. 2010. Medication preferences and adherence among individuals with severe mental illness and psychiatric advance directives. *Psychiatric Services*, 61, 380-5.
- WOLFERS, J. 2006. Did unilateral divorce laws raise divorce rates? A reconciliation and new results. *American Economic Review*, 96, 1802-1820.
- WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 2017. Mental disorders fact sheet. World Health Organization.