ABSTRACT

This chapter focuses on women, work, and family, with a particular focus on differences by educational attainment. First, we review long-term trends regarding family structure, participation in the labor market, and time spent in household production, including time with children. In looking at family, we focus on mothers with children. Next we examine key challenges faced by mothers as they seek to combine motherhood and paid work: workforce interruptions associated with childbearing, the impact of home and family responsibilities, and constraints posed by workplace culture. We also consider the role that gendered norms play in shaping outcomes for mothers. We conclude by discussing policies that have the potential to increase gender equality in the workplace and mitigate the considerable conflicts faced by many women as they seek to balance work and family.
I. Introduction

Over the last half century sweeping changes have occurred in women’s and men’s roles in the household and in their participation in the labor market. These changes have a strong educational gradient. For instance, marriage has declined for all groups but especially among those with less education, while women’s labor force participation rates have risen, but most markedly among those with more education. In this chapter, we begin by documenting major transformations in the family and labor market, with a particular focus on differences by educational attainment. In looking at family, we mainly focus on mothers with children – principally those who are married or single, though we recognize the growing number of cohabitators. Also, given space limitations, we focus on opposite-sex couples. However, there is an important and growing literature on the allocation of time in the household and labor market by gay and lesbian couples with children.¹

Next, we examine key challenges faced by women as they seek to combine motherhood and work: workforce interruptions due to childbearing, the impact of home and family responsibilities, and constraints posed by workplace culture and “how business is done.” A particular contribution of this discussion is that we pay close attention to the very different experiences of women at the top and bottom of the educational distribution. We also look at persistent gendered norms about appropriate roles in the family and how they impact labor market and family outcomes. Finally, we consider possible changes in employer and government

¹ See, for instance, Black, Sanders, Taylor (2007) and Giddings, Nunley, Schneebaum, and Zietz (2014).
policies and in how the workplace is structured that have the potential to benefit individuals, families, and society at large.

II. Work and Family: Then and Now

In this section, our focus is on major transformations in the family, in mothers’ employment and earnings, and in their allocation of time between the household and the market. While our focus is on major, long-term shifts we also note that many dimensions of this transformation have stalled in more recent decades.

A. Sweeping Changes in the American Family

The most dramatic change in the family since the 1960s and 70s, has been the decline in married couple families – what has been termed a “retreat” from marriage (see for instance, Andrew Cherlin, 2009; Ellwood and Jencks, 2004, and Lundberg and Pollak, 2016). This decline can be seen in Figure 1, which provides data on the percentage of currently married adults for 1970 to 2014.² Over that period, the percentage declined from 72 to 55 percent for all race/ethnic groups. This figure also shows that while a majority of white non-Hispanic and Hispanic women were married in 2014 (59 and 52 percent, respectively), this was true for just 38 percent of African-American women. As discussed at length in Blau and Winkler (2018), the move away from marriage is related to a host of forces: economic (increases in women’s labor force participation, educational attainment, career commitment, and wages combined with declining real wages for less skilled men); technological (reproductive technology such as the pill and household technology such as the microwave); social (attitudes about premarital sex and

² U.S. Census Bureau data on all women ages 15+ indicate that the percentage married was 66 percent in both 1950 and 1960, fell to 62 percent in 1970, and stood at 51 percent in 2015. See U.S. Census Bureau, Table MS-1, “ Marital Status of the Population 15 Years Old and Over, by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin: 1950 to Present,” www.census.gov, accessed April 21, 2017.
unmarried fertility), and legal (changing divorce laws). The decline in married-couple families was accompanied by a considerable increase in single-parent families and, especially in more recent decades, many more cohabiting families.

Figure 2 provides data on the rise in single-mother families. By 2015, they comprised 26 percent of all families with children (and 75 percent of all single-parent families), up from just under 12 percent in 1970. Notably most of this increase had occurred by 1990. The figure also points to substantial and persistent differences across race/ethnicity groups; in 2015 mother-only families comprised 54 percent of all African-American families with children as compared to 19 percent of white, non-Hispanic families and 29 percent of Hispanic families.

Trends in family structure also diverge by educational attainment and this divergence is growing as observed by Blau (1998) and McLanahan (2004) and more recently by Isen and Stevenson (2010) and Lundberg and Pollak (2016). This is illustrated in Figure 3, which provides data on the percentage of women aged 30-50 currently married by educational attainment for 1970 and 2015. In 1970, differences across education groups were not very large, ranging from 78 to 85 percent, with the higher figure for women with a high school education. Between 1970 and 2015, marriage declined for all educational groups, but most dramatically for those with less education. By 2015, the share currently married was 71 percent for college graduates versus 54 to 56 percent for the other education groups.

B. Trends in Labor Force Participation, Work Experience, and Hours Worked

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3 Goldin and Katz (2002) first pointed to the pivotal role of the birth control pill in family decisions. However, in recent research Caitlyn Myers (forthcoming) finds that access to abortion played a larger role.

4 There is also a strong educational gradient in rates of cohabitation and unmarried births; both outcomes are substantially higher among those with less education as discussed in Fletcher and Polos, this volume, Lundberg and Pollak (2015), and Blau and Winkler (2018).
Dramatic changes have similarly occurred in women’s labor force participation rates and their broader presence in the labor market, especially since the 1960s, what Claudia Goldin (2006) has called a “quiet revolution.” Key factors behind these changes are women’s rising levels of educational attainment and wages, greater availability of market substitutes for household production and improvements in household technology, the development and dissemination of the birth control pill, and demand shifts that favored occupations like clerical work where women were well represented, as well as changes in the family (see, for instance, Blau and Winkler, 2018; Bailey and DiPrete, 2016; Blau and Kahn, 2007; and Blau and Kahn, forthcoming). The labor force participation rate of women (ages 16+) rose from 37.7 percent in 1960 to 60 percent in the mid-1990s and remained at roughly that level through the first decade of the 2000s. It subsequently declined to 57 percent as of 2015. In contrast to the experience for women, men’s labor force participation rate has steadily declined since WWII, albeit at a more modest rate. It stood at 83.3 percent in 1960 and subsequently declined to 69 percent in 2015. Thus, from 1960 to 2015, the gender difference in the overall labor force participation rate fell from 45.6 percentage points to just a 12 percentage point difference.5

Again, there is a strong educational gradient. Figure 4 shows trends in the labor force participation rates of women and men (ages 25-64) by educational attainment for 1970 and 2015. Over this period, while women’s labor force participation rates increased for all groups, they rose

most sharply for college-educated women and hardly at all for women who did not complete high school. As just one point of comparison, panel a shows that the participation rate for women who completed high school (only) increased from 51.3 to 62.2 percent (11 percentage points), while it rose from 60.8 to nearly 80 percent (19 points) for women with a college degree or more. For men, panel b shows declining labor force participation rates for all groups, with the smallest decrease for men with a college degree or more and an especially marked decline for the least skilled (those who completed HS or less).6

Focusing on mothers, we see in Figure 5 that labor force participation rates for women with children under age 18 have increased dramatically over the past half century, contributing to the large increases for women overall. From 1960 to the mid-1990s, participation rates for married mothers rose from just 28 to a high of 70 percent. The rate then plateaued and began to decline slightly starting in the early 2000s. These patterns closely track and help to drive the patterns for women overall. In 1975, (the first year for which these data were available) the participation rate for never-married mothers was fairly similar to the rate for their married counterparts, but changed little through the early 1990s and so increasingly lagged that of married women. However, the participation rate for this group subsequently sharply increased, rising from 53 percent in 1992 to 75 percent by the early 2000s, eventually surpassing that of married mothers. These participation rate gains resulted from a combination of major federal policy changes and the buoyant labor market of the 1990s (Blank, 2000; and Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000). The participation rate of this group has declined somewhat since the early 2000s as well. The net result is that by 2015 the participation gap between married and never-married mothers stood at just 4.6 percentage points. The participation rate for ever-married  

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6 For detailed trends by educational attainment from 2000 to 2015, see Hipple (2016).
(separated, divorced or widowed) mothers exceeded that of married mothers throughout the period and experienced a comparable 1990s increase to that of never-married mothers for similar reasons. As of 2015, the participation rate for this group stood 10.6 percentage points higher than that for married mothers.

As for all women (and all men), there is a sharp educational gradient in participation rates for mothers. Illustrating this point, Figure 6 provides figures on labor force participation rates of mothers with infants. In 2013, the rate was 74 percent for those who had completed four years of college or more as compared to 64 percent for those with some college and just 50 percent for those with high school or less. Note that not only did college-graduate mothers have the highest participation rates, they also had the largest increase in participation between 2006 and 2013.

Also of importance, particularly for wages, women’s labor force attachment (continuity of employment) has also been increasing. This is the case, for example over the course of a year, with the share of employed women working year-round and full-time increasing from 41 percent in 1970 to 61 percent in 2014. Women are also working more consistently over the life cycle. While employed women still have less average labor-market experience than men, the gender experience gap—the difference in average years of labor market experience between women and men—began to decline beginning in the 1980s (O’Neil and Polachek, 1993; and Blau and Kahn, 1997). Blau and Kahn (forthcoming) report that the gap fell from 6.8 years in 1981 to 3.8 years

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in 2007 (just before the Great Recession) and 1.4 years in 2011.\footnote{Blau and Kahn (forthcoming) note that the very small experience gap in 2011 may be partly due to the negative effect of the Great Recession on male experience levels.}

As with the other outcomes reviewed, there is a strong educational gradient in accumulated work experience. Goldin and Mitchell (2017) show that women’s work experience is greatest for the most highly educated. For instance, for the 1970 to 1974 birth cohort, average work experience for college graduates was 8.7 years at ages 25-34, as compared to 7.3 years for those with some college or less.

The increase in women’s labor force attachment is further illustrated by changes in how quickly women return to the labor force after a first birth. Table 1 provides comparison figures for the 1960s and first decade of the 2000s. Of those women who worked during pregnancy, 72 percent in the recent cohort returned to work within 6 months as compared to just 21 percent in the earlier cohort. Dey (2016) further documents a narrowing of the gender difference in workforce interruptions, which she largely attributes to new mothers’ swifter return to the labor force than in decades past (rather than men’s reduced participation rates). Goldin and Mitchell (2017) point to another new development. With the rise in the mean age of first birth, declines in labor women’s force participation associated with childbearing interruptions are occurring later than in past years, a pattern they describe as a new “sagging middle.” This trend may also be associated with the rise what is known as the “sandwich generation,” mothers of children who are concurrently taking care of their elderly parents (Parker and Patten, 2013).\footnote{For a more detailed discussion of fertility patterns in developed countries including age at first birth see Adsera, this volume.}

While gender differences in work hours are narrowing, important differences remain. Among these, a larger fraction of women work part-time compared to men. Also, not
surprisingly, part-time employment is substantially higher for mothers than for all women.

Table 2, which provides figures on mothers’ employment status, indicates that around one-half of all employed mothers with children under 18 years of age were employed part time and the corresponding figure for those with a child under age 1 was 61 percent (figures for married mothers differ only slightly). Nonetheless, these figures also point to the fact that a substantial share of employed mothers, even those with infants, combine family with full-time paid employment.

At the top end of the hours distribution, a greater fraction of men than women engage in what has been termed “long hours” or “overwork,” typically defined as employment of more than 50 hours per week. Cha and Weeden (2014) find that this gender difference in long hours changed little over the 1979 to 2009 period. There is a notable educational (and occupational) gradient in who is working long hours. Jacobs and Gerson (2004) and Kuhn and Lozano (2008) find that the length of the workweek has generally decreased for workers with less than a high school education, while it rose for those who completed four or more years of college, as well as for those in professional, managerial, and technical occupations. Boushey and Ansel (2016) provide detailed evidence on this divide by occupation using pooled data for 2011-2014. They find that workers with jobs in health-care support, food preparation, and clerical occupations (occupations more dominated by women) were employed the fewest hours and those in legal and management positions were employed the greatest number of hours.¹⁰

C. Earnings and Income by Family Type

The increase in married women’s labor force participation that we have reviewed has led

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¹⁰ Pan and Cortés , this volume, discuss trends in occupational segregation and implications for the gender wage gap.
in turn to an increase in dual-earner families among married couples. As may be seen in Table 3, among couples with children under 18, the share of dual-earner families rose from 54 percent in 1976 (the first year for which data are available) to a high of nearly 70 percent in 1990. It stayed at that level through 2000 and then declined to 64 percent in 2010, where it remained in 2014. This pattern tracks the labor force participation trends of married women discussed earlier. As may also be seen in Table 3, the decline in dual-earner couples since 2000 primarily reflects a rise in husband-only employed (stay-at-home mother) families, as well as smaller increases in wife-only employed (stay-at-home father) families and families where neither parent works. Kreider and Elliott (2010) and Livingston (2014) provide ancillary evidence that it is less-educated mothers who comprised the growing share of stay-at-home mothers. (This point is discussed further below in light of particular concern about “opting out” among college-educated mothers.)

Women’s economic contribution in dual-earner families has increased considerably. For instance, in families with employed wives, wives’ contribution to family income rose from 26.6 percent in 1970 to 37.3 percent in 2013.11 Consistent with this, the percentage of wives with higher annual earnings than their husbands increased from 16 percent in 1981 to 29 percent by 2015.12 An issue which has been relatively unexamined, with the exception of Winkler, McBride, and Andrews (2005), is whether this earnings pattern is transitory or more permanent (which would likely affect the strength of women’s bargaining power in the household). These

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authors find that this earnings pattern is persistent, as measured over a three-year period, for a large fraction of such couples (60 percent). The increasing share of wives who out-earn their husbands is part of a broader pattern of a narrowing of the earnings difference between husbands and wives. One factor contributing to this is that couples are increasingly likely to marry those who are similar to themselves in terms of educational attainment (McKinnish and Mansour, this volume, Schwartz and Mare, 2005).13 However, more generally, the narrowing gender earnings gap among married couples reflects an overall rise in the gender earnings ratio. For the labor force as a whole, the gender earnings ratio for year-round, full-time workers rose from around 60 percent in the 1970s to nearly 80 percent in 2015.14 This trend reflects many of the factors previously discussed, including women’s rising educational attainment and labor force attachment. In addition, the occupational upgrading of women, combined with a reduction in labor market discrimination and shifts in the overall demand for labor favoring women relative to men also contributed (see Blau and Kahn (forthcoming) for recent evidence and a review).15

Single-mother families are at a substantial relative economic disadvantage compared to married-couple families, in part because there is only one earner and in part because never-married mothers, who tend to have less education, are a large and increasing share of all single mothers—the share of never-married mothers among single mothers rose from 4 percent in 1960 to 44 percent in 2011 (Wang, Parker, and Taylor, 2013). The net result is that in 2015, nearly 40

13 This pattern also has the effect of widening family inequality, all else equal. For more detail on assortative mating and inequality see Mansour and McKinnish, this volume.
14 The ratio is calculated using median earnings for each sex. The figures are from U.S. Census Bureau,”Women’s Earnings as a Percentage of Men's Earnings by Race and Hispanic Origin: 1960 to 2015,” www.census.gov, accessed April 17, 2017.
15 See Kunze, this volume, for further discussion regarding convergence in the gender earnings ratio.
percent of female-headed families were poor, compared to around 8 percent of married couples. Poverty rates were particularly high for black and Hispanic female-headed families, with 46 percent of both groups living in poverty. Even among white, non-Hispanic female-headed families, the poverty rate was 32 percent.\footnote{16 U.S. Census Bureau, Table 4, “Poverty Status of Families by Type of Family, Presence of Related Children, Race and Hispanic Origin,” accessed March 1, 2017, www.census.gov.}

D. Time Spent in Housework and Parents’ Time with Children

Among married couples with children, the gender gap in housework and childcare has considerably narrowed, though it is far from parity. Arlie Hochschild (1989) famously described large amount of unpaid work performed by employed women as “the second shift.” Bianchi et al. (2000, with the trend updated in a 2012 follow-up piece) found that married women spent 1.7 times as much time in housework as married fathers in 2010, down from 7 times as much in 1965. This decline was mainly due to women’s considerable reduction in time spent in housework; men only modestly increased their housework time in the 1980s. Another piece of evidence on the current (unequal) situation is that, in 2014, husbands with employed wives spent only slightly more time in unpaid work than those with nonemployed wives; far from more equally sharing the load (Blau and Winkler, 2018). Nonetheless, a key consequence of women’s substantial reduction in housework time, combined with their rising labor force participation rates, is a considerable narrowing of the difference in women’s and men’s allocation of time to home activities and paid work.

Parents’ time with children has also changed considerably from the 1960s to present, as documented by Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie (2006), Hofferth and Lee (2015), and Parker and Wang (2015). From 1965 to 1985, mothers’ primary time spent caring for children declined as
they entered the labor force in greater numbers, but it rose steadily thereafter, for both single and married mothers and for both the employed and nonemployed.\textsuperscript{17} Fathers’ time with children (principally those in two-parent families) has also increased since 1985. Nevertheless, in married-couple families, a substantial gender gap in time spent with children remains.

As might be expected, employed mothers spend somewhat less time with children than nonemployed mothers (see for instance, Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney, 2008; and Fox, Han, Ruhm; and Waldfogel, 2013). However, Bianchi (2000) points out that a number of factors narrow this difference including the fact that, as we have seen, a large fraction of mothers are employed part-time and many children (even those of nonemployed mothers) are in preschool.\textsuperscript{18} Single mothers spend somewhat less time with children, in part because they do not have a second parent in the household with whom they can coordinate care and other household tasks (Fox et al., 2013).

Much attention has focused on the allocation of parental time with children by parent’s level of education. More highly educated mothers and fathers spend more time directly engaged with their children than their less-educated counterparts, a pattern that holds regardless of the parent’s employment or marital status, and is observed across a large number of economically advanced countries (Guryan, Hurst and Kearney, 2008). And, this gap has been widening over time (Ramey and Ramey, 2010; and Lundberg and Pollak, 2014). The fact that highly-educated parents spend more time with their children is in some respects counter to what would be

\textsuperscript{17} The figures on child-care time discussed here focus on primary time when parents are directly involved with children. They do not include secondary time—time spent with children while also engaged in another activity.

\textsuperscript{18} 2015 figures indicate that 36 percent of 3-year olds and 60 percent of 4-year olds were in preschool. These figures exclude children in center-based daycare; see National Center for Education Statistics, “Preschool and Kindergarten Enrollment,” \textit{The Condition of Education}, Figure 3, accessed June 9, 2017, nces.ed.gov/programs.
expected based on economic theory, since they have a higher opportunity cost of time. Among alternative explanations, time spent with children may be regarded as a luxury good (Guryan et al. 2008). Also, more-educated parents have the financial resources to enable them to make more time for children: they are more able to outsource household tasks or purchase market substitutes, are likely to have jobs that provide greater flexibility, and are more likely to be married and so have a second adult with whom they can coordinate schedules. Some research also suggests that highly educated parents tend to regard time with children as a necessary “investment” for their future success (Ramey and Ramey, 2010; and Lundberg and Pollak, 2014).

III. Women, Work, and Family: Bringing It All Together

Considerable progress has been made on many fronts since the 1960s – women’s rising participation rates and labor force attachment, a declining gender pay gap, and a narrowing of the difference in time spent in housework and childcare by wives and husbands—but progress is far from complete. And, new challenges have arisen, with the rise in dual-earner families, including those with small children, and the increase in employed single-parent families. In other words, a growing share of the workforce is seeking to balance the dual demands of paid work and family. In this section we examine work-family challenges for mothers with children under age 18 with a primary focus on the effect of child care burdens, but, as previously noted, some mothers are concurrently caring for aging parents as well. As relevant and as data and research findings permit, we look at the different experiences and challenges for women at various points in the educational distribution.

A. Pregnancy, Childbearing and Workforce Intruptions
As reviewed in Section II, childbearing continues to involve at least some amount of workforce interruption for most employed women, even if it is just for a few months after each birth. Leave, especially paid leave, is important in placing women and men on a more equal footing in the workforce and ensuring continuity in general and firm-specific work experience. However, the United States is the only economically advanced country that does not have a federal paid leave policy (it mandates 12 weeks of unpaid leave and it has been estimated that only 59 percent of private sector workers are eligible). In addition, the United States is also less generous in the provision of other family friendly policies, including child care and opportunities for part-time work. In their analysis of data for 22 OECD countries over the period 1990 to 2010, Blau and Kahn (2013) show that the gap in family-friendly policies between the United States and other countries is large and growing with consequent effects for women’s labor force participation rates. Indeed, they find that over the study period, a substantial portion (nearly 30 percent) of the considerable decrease in U.S. women’s labor force participation rates relative to other economically advanced nations that occurred at that time was due to the greater expansion in these other countries of various family-friendly policies, including the length and generosity of parental leave, mandates for part-time availability, and expenditures on child care. (Their findings also suggest that extended leave may come at a cost for women’s careers, as discussed in a subsequent section.) For the United States, Rossin-Slater, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2013) provide research evidence on California, one of the few states that mandates paid leave. Using a difference in differences approach, they find that paid leave increased the usual weekly work hours of employed mothers of one-to-three year olds.

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19 Figure is from Klerman, Daley, and Pozniak (2012). For a comprehensive discussion of maternity leave policy in the U.S. please see Rossin-Slater, this volume.
While family-friendly policies undoubtedly play an important role in women’s labor force participation rates, the Blau and Kahn (2013) findings suggest that they are not the whole story (again, accounting for about 30 percent of the U.S. relative participation rate decline). This is consistent with Goldin and Mitchell’s (2017) conclusion that differences in leave policy are not the main reason for the differences in women’s participation between the U.S. and other countries. They note that life cycle-participation patterns (including post-birth participation dips) are similar for the United States and the United Kingdom even though the latter has longer protected and paid leave. Olivetti and Petrongolo’s (2017) review of the literature and analysis of the international data gives a more important role to spending on early education and childcare than to leave policies; these are also areas where the United States performs poorly relative to other countries.20

Childbearing and childrearing may also affect wages as first discussed in Mincer and Polachek (1974). Subsequent work including Light and Ureta (1995) confirmed that interruptions played an important role in explaining the gender gap in wages for young workers over the 1966-1984 period. However, research by Blau and Kahn (forthcoming) which compared 2010 to earlier years found that labor market experience has significantly diminished in importance in explaining the overall gender wage gap, as women’s average experience levels have become more similar to men’s, although they still play a role. Moreover, the importance of gender differences in experience and workforce interruptions appears to vary by skill level and occupation. Recent influential work by Goldin (2014) and others, discussed at length shortly, has

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20 For a more detailed discussion of child care policy in the U.S. please see Kimmel and Connelly, this volume.
pointed to large negative effects of long hours and workforce interruptions on wages and the gender wage gap in high-skilled occupations, particularly law and business.

Women who are pregnant and those who have recently borne children face a number of unique challenges. For instance, pregnant women must be careful to avoid heavy lifting and excessive physical exertion and may require extra water or restroom breaks (Bakst, 2012; and Schulte, 2014). To the extent that manual occupations and service positions provide less flexibility at the worker’s discretion than professional jobs (Williams, Blair-Loy, and Berdahl, 2013), women in such positions are likely to be more negatively affected.

Another issue unique to new mothers is breastfeeding. For mothers who return to work and continue to breastfeed, employers tend to vary in their willingness to make needed accommodations such as permitting breaks and providing a private area. In their statistical analysis, Rippeyoung and Noonan (2012) find that, controlling for “work orientation” prior to childbirth (among other factors), mothers who breastfed their children for a longer duration (six months or more), experienced a much greater loss in income (due to reduced hours and exit from the labor force) for the first five years post-birth than those who did so for a shorter duration or used formula.

B. Impact of Home Responsibilities, Including Child Care, on Employment and Earnings

As we saw in Section II, the allocation of time in the home remains extremely unequal between married parents and single mothers have no adult with whom to share household responsibilities. Due to these unequal burdens, home responsibilities tend to disproportionately impact mothers’ paid labor market activity on a range of dimensions, whether it be the occupations they choose, the jobs they take, or the hours that they work, with consequent effects on their earnings and career trajectories. Becker (1985) put forth a theory of diminished work
effort as one explanation for a gender wage difference. He argued that the time devoted by married women to home and child-care activities might reduce the effort that they put into their market jobs, controlling for hours, and thus decrease their hourly wages compared to men with similar qualifications. Hersch and Stratton (1997) provide evidence of a negative impact of housework on married women’s wages in models estimated using fixed effects and instrumental variables to address concerns that an unobservable factor might be driving the results or that women with higher wages “buy” themselves out of housework. In a follow-up 2002 paper they examine this relationship for all women regardless of marital status and again identify a negative relationship, suggesting that it is the effort involved with housework, not marriage per se that drove the original finding. We note however, that neither study was restricted to mothers, which is the focus here.

There is a voluminous research literature on motherhood and employment (for early influential papers see Fuchs, 1988; Korenman and Neumark, 1992, and Waldfogel, 1998). Mothers earn less than non-mothers, what has come to be known as a “motherhood penalty.” As we saw in the prior section, a large fraction of women, especially mothers, work part-time. Part-time work, by and large, comes at a cost in terms of lower wages and benefits, and fewer opportunities for promotion (see for instance, Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann, 2016). And motherhood tends to be associated with work force interruptions and lower accumulation of work experience—although less so than in the past. However, what has received considerable attention (see, for instance, Budig and England, 2001; Binder, Anderson, and Krause, 2003; and Budig, 2014) is that a motherhood penalty exists even for mothers with the same labor-market experience and education as non-mothers. An important methodological issue in this literature is identifying causal relationships. For instance, a selection argument is plausible in that women
with lower wage offers will have lower costs of children. To address this specific concern, the common approach taken in this research is to estimate fixed-effect regressions.

Of particular interest here, the aforementioned authors – Binder et al. (2003), Budig and England (2001), and Budig (2014) – investigated not just the overall motherhood penalty, but also looked at it by mother’s educational attainment. Taken together, these studies find that the largest wage penalties are borne by women in medium-skill jobs or those at the lower end of the wage distribution—rather than by high-skilled women or those at the top of the wage distribution. One possible explanation for this overall set of findings is that more high-skilled mothers may have greater workplace flexibility which serves to attenuate negative wage impacts associated with motherhood.

Apart from flexibility issues, another explanation for the motherhood penalty is that some mothers may be unable to return to their previous employer after childbirth, and instead must change firms, especially if their employer does not provide adequate maternity leave or if they are not eligible for or cannot take advantage of unpaid leave through the 1993 federal Family and Medical Leave Act. (Waldfogel, 1998).21 Women in this situation lose out on the benefits of firm-specific training and potential rewards from an especially good job match.

Laboratory and field experiments by Correll, Benard, and Paik (2007) provide compelling evidence for an additional factor, suggesting that at least part of the explanation for the motherhood penalty is labor market discrimination against mothers – differential treatment of otherwise equally qualified mothers by employers. In a lab study, they modified resumes to

21 Lopoo and Raissian, this volume, provide detail on parental leave and child-care policies in the US.
include an indicator of parental status. They found that mothers were perceived more negatively than non-mothers as measured by indicators of perceived competence and commitment. In a field experiment, they again used fictitious resumes (which varied by indicators of parental status) but in this case sent them to employers. They found that mothers received fewer callbacks than non-mothers. Fathers did not face a disadvantage in either setting.

Seminal papers by Mincer (1978) and Sandell (1977) point to another way that family ties can negatively affect married women’s job and career opportunities: most often, couples place greater priority on husbands’ careers rather than wives’ careers. This means that wives may find themselves more likely to be “tied movers,” relocating when it is not advantageous for them to leave a job where they have accumulated considerable seniority and firm-specific training or “tied stayers,” unable to relocate despite better opportunities elsewhere. A more recent analysis by Cooke, Boyle, Couch, and Feijten (2009), which employs fixed-effects regression to account for unobserved heterogeneity, provides evidence that family relocation decisions lead to an increase in total family earnings (and so are economically rational for the family, as a whole), but at the expense of married women’s own earnings. Compton and Pollak (2007) find that, even among couples in which both spouses have a college degree, it is the education (and presumably the earning power) of the husband that principally affects the couple’s propensity to migrate to a large metropolitan area. A methodological challenge that the authors seek to overcome is that migration and educational investment decisions are endogeneous; to at least partly address this concern, they include control variables to reduce the likelihood of joint determination (e.g. whether the current state of residence is the home resident of one of the spouses). Geographic

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22 Parental status was subtly indicated by including information on the application such as PTA coordinator for a parent and fundraiser for a neighborhood association for a nonparent.
considerations may impact women’s job choices, even prior to marriage and motherhood. Benson (2014) shows that anticipation of a lesser ability to determine the geographic location of the family may lead women to select occupations in which they can later secure a position in a wide swath of geographic areas (e.g. physicians and accountants) rather than choosing occupations that tend to have more geographically limited opportunities (e.g., research scientists)\textsuperscript{23}.

C. Workplace Culture, Constraints, and Flexibility (or lack thereof)

Workplace culture and expectations significantly contribute to the challenge of combining work and family, especially with the advent of the ‘24/7’ work culture, both for women in professional jobs and those in medium-skill and low-wage jobs. These groups are discussed in turn.

According to Davies and Frink (2014), the norm of the “ideal” office worker—typically applied to white middle-class men—began to emerge towards the start of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, with the rise in white-collar (office) work. They describe the ideal worker of that time as “a man completely devoted to his employer, his faithfulness rewarded by promotions” (p. 26). Even today, especially for those in professional positions, the maintained assumption by employers is that work should take precedence over family. This places mothers as well as those fathers who undertake a substantial share of childcare and housework responsibilities in a bind, and the degree of conflict has only intensified with the general increase in weekly work hours for professional and other highly skilled workers that we discussed in Section II.\textsuperscript{24} Williams, Blair-Loy, and Berdahl (2013) theorize that professional men and women who make family

\textsuperscript{23} Antman, this volume, discusses the impact of family migration on women.

\textsuperscript{24} Two high-profile professional women -- Anne-Marie Slaughter, the first woman to be head of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department and Sheryl Sandberg, Chief Operating Officer of Facebook --- have brought public and media attention to these issues. See Slaughter (2012 and 2015) and Sandberg (2013, and 2016).
considerations an overt priority may experience career repercussions, though for different reasons. Men may bear a penalty because they are engaging in what the authors call “gender non-conforming behavior,” given that the idealized male worker focuses exclusively on his career, while women may bear a penalty since they are engaging in “gender-conforming behavior,” since their behavior is essentially validating that the workplace is not their main focus.

Recent influential work by Goldin (2014) and others has focused attention on the impact of workplace culture and expectations (including long hours) on women’s wages, the gender wage gap, and occupational choice. Goldin focuses on the concept of temporal flexibility (or lack thereof) and its impact on wages. Temporal flexibility refers to work schedules as they pertain to hours worked per day and per week, where the work is performed, and the need to work specific days and times. She observes that some occupations/firms offer disproportionate rewards for working long hours and particular hours. One common characteristic is that workers in these situations are not readily substitutable – another worker cannot readily substitute person-specific or knowledge-specific capital. Thus, workers willing to provide longer hours or cover certain time periods receive a wage premium, while those not willing to do so incur a wage penalty. Given that women continue to hold a greater share of household responsibilities, they are more likely to place a higher value on flexibility and hence to bear this type of wage penalty. Goldin points to lack of temporal flexibility in top management positions and high-powered law firms as a key factor behind the larger gender wage gaps in these areas. She points to pharmacy as a

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25 For a detailed discussion of gender differences in response to various work environments, see Kato and Kodama, in this volume.
26 As just one example, a trial lawyer may need to work long hours right before going to court because he or she has developed a close working relationship with the client and has detailed knowledge of the case.
notable contrast (Goldin 2014, 2016). These days most pharmacists are employed by large firms and computerization of the field has facilitated substitutability across workers and thus flexibility in work hours and scheduling. The result is that the penalties for part-time or part-year work are small as is the gender wage gap. The Goldin analysis highlights that findings showing returns to longer hours and labor market experience and penalties to workforce interruptions are susceptible to interpretations other than human capital.

In related work, Cha and Weeden (2014) find that trends in “overwork” (working 50+ hours per week) contributed to the slower convergence of the gender wage gap over the 1979 to 2007 period. Specifically, while the gender gap in overwork remained largely unchanged, the rising returns to overwork combined with the fact that more men engage in this type of employment served to lower women’s wages relative to men’s, an effect equal to about 10 percent of the total change in the gap over the 1979-2007 period. Furthermore, this factor was especially important in managerial and professional occupations.

One methodological challenge in looking at the relationship between long work hours and the gender wage gap is identifying a causal relationship. To address this, Cortés and Pan (2016) create an instrumental variable from a supply-side shock; cities differ in the stock of low-skilled immigrant women. Presumably a greater stock of such women (who provide substitute labor in home production) should enable a greater proportion of women to work long hours and reap the attendant rewards. As expected, they find that in cities with more low-skilled immigrant female labor, the gender wage gap is reduced relatively more in occupations which have the greatest returns to long work hours.

The findings of Goldin (2016), Cha and Weeden (2014), and Cortes and Pan (2016) point to long hours as being an important and growing contributor to the gender pay gap in some high
skill occupations. This may be one reason that highly skilled women appear to have fared less well than their counterparts in narrowing the gender pay gap over the past thirty years. Blau and Kahn (forthcoming) found that, in 2010, the gender wage gap was larger at the top of the wage distribution (90th percentile) than at the middle (50th percentile) or the bottom (10th percentile). Moreover, they found that the gender wage gap had declined less at the top of the wage distribution since 1980 than it had at the middle and the bottom of the wage distribution. These results—a larger current gender wage gap at the top of the wage distribution and slower progress for those in this group since 1980—remained even after adjusting for gender differences in qualifications.

Another potential response to lack of adequate flexibility apart from part-time work or working in occupations with shorter hours is to exit the labor force entirely. Lisa Belkin (2003) first famously raised this issue in a 2003 New York Times Magazine article in which she coined the term “opt out revolution” for college-educated women. Evidence on this varies considerably, but a key take-away is that there has not been an “opt-out revolution” for this group. Claudia Goldin (2006) analyzed the career and family patterns of female graduates of selective colleges from around 1980 (when they graduated) until 15 years later. She found that women with at least one child spent, on average, just 2 of the 15 years out of the labor market, and fully half of these women had not been out of the labor market (or an educational institution) for more than six months.

Antecol (2011) also examined the extent of opting out among college-educated workers. While she did not find broad evidence of this behavior, she did find it among the narrow set of white married college-educated women in male-dominated occupations. Similarly, Cha (2013) found that overwork (working more than 50 hours per week) in male-dominated occupations is
associated with mothers, but not their female childless counterparts or men, leaving the occupation. Her finding is suggestive of a “push” from the occupation. Moreover, she found that such mothers tend to respond by exiting the labor force, rather than shifting to a less male-dominated occupation.

While a desire for flexibility may be an explanation for some high-powered women opting out, Hersch (2013) suggests it may not be the full explanation. In her study, she compares labor force participation rates for women who graduated from the most elite schools, especially those who earned MBAs, as compared to those who graduated from less-selective institutions. After accounting for a host of personal factors, she finds that women who graduated from elite schools have lower participation rates. She argues that workplace flexibility or lack thereof cannot explain the difference because women who graduated from both types of schools would likely find employment at the same firms (and thereby face the same workplace policies). This may be the case, but it is also possible that the women from the elite schools are disproportionately employed in high pressure workplaces (firms or departments within firms) with less flexibility. Hersch suggests that women from the most elite schools may place a higher value on investing time in children, all else equal.

A complete picture of workplace culture and flexibility necessitates looking at non-professional workers because such individuals comprise the majority of the U.S. workforce. These individuals are both low- and middle-wage workers. Low-wage workers, a large fraction of whom are women, tend to be subject to the most rigid schedules—schedules that are set

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27Williams, Blair-Loy and Berdahl (2013) divide families into three groups: low income, professional (those in the top 20 percent of income and include at least one college graduate), and the “missing middle.” This latter group is so named because although it is, by far, the largest, it receives the least attention from researchers.
largely at the employers’ discretion, not the workers’ (Council of Economic Advisers, 2010; Golden, 2015; and Boushey and Ansel, 2016b). The middle wage group faces flexibility issues somewhere in between the other two groups (the group is too heterogeneous to be described by a single paradigm).

Considerable concern has been raised regarding the prevalence and consequences of unpredictable schedules. Workers are often required to be available at a moment’s notice, what has been referred to as “open availability” or “just in time” scheduling so that the firm can avoid the costs associated with overstaffing. Workers may also be sent home earlier than expected when demand is slow, a practice that also leads to irregular shifts and unpredictable earnings. Williams, Blair-Loy, and Berdahl (2013) and Boushey and Ansel (2016b) discuss that when low-wage workers request more flexible hours they are often instead offered fewer hours, which negatively impacts earnings. Further, they observe that lack of adequate employment flexibility contributes to greater tardiness and absenteeism as well as more quits. Albeda (2011) points out that these concerns are especially acute for single mothers who, unless they live with extended family, find it extremely difficult to juggle schedules. From a policy standpoint, these negative impacts are of considerable importance. However, we would note that research to date has not devoted the same level of analytical rigor as has been applied to high-skilled occupations.

D. Gendered Norms about Appropriate Roles for Women and Men

Research points to gendered attitudes about appropriate roles for women and men as an explanation for trends in women’s labor force participation rates (Cotter, Hermsen and Vanneman 2011; and Fortin 2015). These authors point out that gender roles were becoming more egalitarian from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s when female labor force participation was growing, but then did not change further when female participation rate growth stagnated.
However, one challenge is firmly establishing causality since broad changes in participation rates may influence attitudes. Fortin (2015) addresses this issue by using an instrumental variable approach. Specifically, she uses an exogenous shock to attitudes in the form of the HIV/AIDS “scare”—individuals’ concerns about contracting AIDS well-exceeded their actual chances—to instrument for gender role attitudes. While she acknowledges that the HIV/AIDS is likely to be only one of the factors that produced the changes in gender role attitudes, she argues that its effect is sufficient to provide an exogenous source of identification. Using this approach, she finds that the stalling of progress in gender role attitudes in the mid-1990s explains at least a third of the leveling-off in female labor force participation trends.

In related research, Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) find that gendered norms continue to hold considerable sway, even in couples with nontraditional earnings patterns—those in which wives potentially outearn their husbands. While one would expect women in such couples to have increased bargaining power as a result of their greater earnings, these authors find that a wife whose earnings are predicted to be greater than her husband’s (and so their economic roles do not conform to the gender appropriate ones) is actually less likely to participate in the labor force, all else equal. And, if she does work, she earns less than predicted, in part due to lower work hours (perhaps to hold down her earnings). Bertrand et al. also find that the wife spends more time in household tasks, perhaps to make the situation more acceptable to her husband. They also find that such couples are less happy in their marriage and more likely to divorce.

Bertrand et al.’s finding regarding time spent in housework is consistent with earlier work by Bittman, England, Folbre, Sayer, and Matheson (2003), who find that wives who earn the majority of family earnings spend more time in housework than those who bring home a smaller share of the earnings. Some research has questioned Bittman et al’s findings (see England, 2011;
Gupta, 2007; and Sullivan, 2011), but what particularly distinguishes Bertrand et al.’s study is that they found this result in models that looked at within couple variation in earnings over time. In addition, they included controls for the level of both husband’s and wife’s income; if this is not done, the impact of relative income might pick up some of the effect of the absolute income levels of each spouse.

An additional point relates to Bertrand et al.’s finding for divorce. They found that couples with a nontraditional earnings pattern are more likely to divorce. However some evidence suggests attitudes about gender appropriate roles are changing (Wang, Parker, and Taylor, 2013), and so this impact may be diminishing. Consistent with this, related work by Schwartz and Han (2014), which examines divorce patterns by spouse’s relative educational advantage (rather than earnings advantage), finds that married couples formed since the early 1990s in which the wife holds the educational advantage are less prone to divorce then earlier cohorts and are now no longer more likely to divorce than couples in which the husband has the educational advantage.28

Recent research nonetheless indicates that gender identity as it affects the marriage market may shape the responses of even young, college-educated single (and childless) women, suggesting that such views continue to have a strong hold. Using survey and experimental methods applied to MBA students, Bursztyn, Fujiwara, and Pallais (2017) collected information on single women’s expressed job preferences and personality traits. They found that when these women expected their responses to be public (shared with their MBA classmates) single women gave less career-minded responses than when they expected their classmates would not see their responses, perhaps to make themselves appear less ambitious and thus more attractive in the

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28 Lehrer and Son, this volume, present a detailed examination of trends in divorce by socioeconomic status.
marriage market.

While much research looks at the impact of gendered norms on labor market outcomes, Pedulla and Thébaud (2015) investigate the extent to which the family-friendly nature of the workplace (e.g. the availability of paid family leave, subsidized child care, the option for flexible hours) affects preferences regarding spouses’ gender roles (e.g. male/primary earner, wife/primary earner, egalitarian). They use an experimental research design applied to young unmarried childless women and men. In one experiment, they randomly ask respondents about preferred gender roles (without any information about the availability of family-friendly workplace policies) and in another they ask respondents the same question after “priming” them with information about the broad availability of such policies. They find that when “primed” with this information, men’s preferences regarding gender roles are not affected while women indicate that they are more likely to prefer an egalitarian arrangement. Their findings suggest that the availability of family-friendly workplace policies may be effective in shifting gendered preferences, particularly of women, and, in turn, reducing inequality in the allocation of time between husbands and wives.

IV. Conclusion and Suggestions for Moving Forward

In this chapter we reviewed long-term trends and research evidence on women, work, and family. In doing so, we looked at evidence by educational attainment to a greater extent than is usually done. We saw that mothers, at all points in the educational distribution, face challenges in balancing work and family, though the specifics differ. There is also an important intergenerational dimension to differences by parents’ educational attainment. As we have seen, time with children has especially increased among highly-educated parents. To the extent that less educated mothers have less flexibility in the workplace, they cannot as easily adjust their
schedules to spend more time with children, contributing to this difference. To reduce the disproportionate challenges faced by mothers in the labor market, policies and practices should take explicit account of differences by educational attainment so that they meet the needs of all Americans, not just those who are in one segment of jobs or the other.

When available, leave policies and other family friendly policies, have the potential to increase gender equality in the workplace, especially if men utilize these policies as well as women. As discussed earlier, Blau and Kahn (2013) point to the important role that family policy plays in supporting women’s paid work. However, they also present evidence suggesting that extremely generous family policies may encourage women’s employment in part-time work and lower-level occupations. Thus the participation gains may come at a cost in terms of advancing women’s status in the labor market. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) similarly point to potentially beneficial effects of moderate (up to one year) leave on women’s employment (largely driven by effects on the employment of less-skilled women). In contrast, they find that longer leaves have detrimental effects on employment for all women (regardless of skill level) and negative effects on the relative earnings of higher-skilled women, indicative of the consequences of losing out on valuable career advancement opportunities.

It might be argued that the negative effects of parental leave on women’s outcomes could be considerably mitigated if men more equally shared in leave taking. For this reason, some countries, including Norway and Sweden, have instituted “daddy leave” which provides a period of paid leave that is available exclusively to the father after the birth of a child on a “use it or lose it” basis. Such policies have been found to increase leave utilization by fathers (although not to the point of equalizing the duration of leave taken across mothers and fathers). One reason for this is that if the family wishes to fully avail itself of the entire leave allotment, fathers have an
incentive to take the “daddy leave” since they cannot transfer this benefit to the mother (Haas and Rostgaard, 2011). However, evidence for a similar program in Quebec suggests that fathers had a very high take up even though most families had not fully exhausted their leave allotment under the previous program—that is the draw into the program was not simply to “stretch” the total amount of leave time available to the family (Patnaik, 2016). Patnaik suggests that the “daddy only” label itself may help to promote father’s leave-taking through its effect on norms about paternal leave-taking.

Another very important point about family-friendly policies is that child-care subsidies potentially have different effects than leave and part-time policies. This is a policy option that make it easier to combine work and family and unambiguously increase women’s labor force participation, without the potentially detrimental effects associated with leave policies (Olivetti and Petrolongo, 2017; and Blau and Winkler, 2018).

Another “way forward” is restructuring the workplace and re-setting workplace norms. Goldin (2014, 2016) point to the case of pharmacy as an occupation in which hourly wages are not much impacted by shorter or longer work hours. However, the question remains as to how applicable the example of pharmacy is for other professions requiring college and advanced degrees, since conditions which have permitted such a high degree of substitution among pharmacy workers may not be present elsewhere. Regarding workplace norms, France has taken an interesting step by pushing back on the intrusion of technology into the private lives of workers (The Guardian, 2016). It has passed a law that requires firms with more than 50 workers to set out times when workers can be disconnected from email communication. Another option, as discussed by Boushey and Ansel (2016) and Correll, Kelly, O’Connor and Williams (2014), among others, is for firms to give workers greater say over where and when work is
performed. Government can also mandate this as well, such as Vermont, which, in 2014, adopted a “right to request” part-time policy. However, it is policies like these in other OECD countries that, as discussed above, are believed to have contributed to women’s concentration in part-time and lower-level jobs. Thus, similar to the reasons discussed regarding leave, it is crucial that both male and female workers utilize any flexibility that is provided so that they are on a level playing field in the workplace.

As we have noted, it is likely that professional workers have more flexibility than other workers. Nonetheless, our review of the evidence on the role of temporal inflexibility in adversely impacting some highly skilled workers, particularly in law and management, suggests that they could benefit from additional flexibility. With regard to the workplace situation of the vast majority of workers who are neither professionals nor employed in positions requiring a college degree, policies that give greater employee discretion over work hours and provide greater predictability in hours would facilitate work-family balance, without unduly jeopardizing the earnings that they need to support their families.
References


Giddings, Lisa, John M. Nunley, Alyssa Schneebaum and Joachim Zietz. ”Cohort and the Specialization Gap Between Same-Sex and Different-Sex Couples.” *Demography* 51, no. 2 (April 2014): 509-34.


Notes: Data are for adults, ages 18+. For 2014, data on whites are for white, non-Hispanics and individuals are able to report more than one race; whites are defined as persons who selected this race group only and blacks are those who selected black alone or in combination with other race. For all years, persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race. Married adults include married spouse present, married spouse absent, and separated.

Notes: Mother-only families include female household heads and those living in the in the households of others. Prior to 2015, these figures may include some cohabiting families. For 2015, figures are for white, non-Hispanics and individuals are able to report more than one race; whites are persons who selected this race group only and blacks are those who selected black alone or in combination with another race. For all years, persons of Hispanic origin may be of any race.

Figure 3. Share of Women Currently Married, Ages 30-50, By Educational Attainment, 1970 and 2015

Source: Francine D. Blau and Anne E. Winkler, *The Economics of Women, Men, and Work*, 8th edition (Oxford University Press, 2018), figure 13-1. Figure are based on authors’ calculations from March Current Population Surveys accessed from IPUMS.
Figure 4. Labor Force Participation by Education, 1970 and 2015, Ages 25-64
(b) Men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 4 years of high school</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>89.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 years of high school</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3 years of college</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 or more years of college</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Trends in Labor Force Participation Rates of Women With Children Under Age 18, 1960-2015

Sources: Francine D. Blau and Anne E. Winkler, The Economics of Women, Men, and Work, 8th edition (Oxford University Press, 2018), figure 6-4. Figures are from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2004 (Table 597), 2008 (Table 580), and 2012 (Table 599), Proquest Statistical Abstract of the United States 2016 (Table 617) (accessed May-2016); BLS Bulletin 2340 (August 1989); Bernan Press, Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics, 1st ed. (1997); and unpublished data from the BLS.
Figure 6. Labor Force Participation of Women With Births in the Past Year by Educational Attainment, 2006 and 2013

Table 1. Employment Patterns of Pregnant and New Mothers, 1960s and 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worked during pregnancy</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of those working</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during pregnancy who</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>returned to work within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of those working</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during pregnancy who</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>returned to work within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2. Employment Status of Mothers, by Age of Youngest Child, 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Mothers</th>
<th>Married Mothers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Child Under Age 18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% employed</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% employed part-time</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Child Under Age 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% employed</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% employed part-time</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Child Under Age 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% employed</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% employed part-time</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Part time refers to usually works fewer than 35 hours per week at all jobs.

Table 3. Trends in Employment Patterns of Married Couples with Children Under Age 18, 1976 to 2014 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both Spouses Employed (Dual-Earner)</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband Employed Only</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife Employed Only</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither Spouse Employed</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Employed is defined as having positive earnings.