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ABSTRACT

We provide the first general empirical test of tax invariance (TIV). When a 25 per-cent tax remitted by manufacturers was eliminated in Washington state and the retail cannabis excise tax was simultaneously increased from 25 to 37 percent—a shift intended to be revenue-neutral—TIV did not hold. Manufacturers kept two-thirds of their tax savings instead of passing all their savings through to retail firms via lower prices as predicted by TIV. One-third of the retail tax increase was passed on to consumers via higher retail prices – TIV would have predicted constant or even declining tax-inclusive retail prices.

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1 Introduction

Tax invariance (TIV)—the principle that who remits taxes does not influence incidence—is a bedrock principle of tax design. TIV allows policymakers to focus on minimizing administrative and evasion costs without worrying about the welfare effects of alternative tax collection strategies. TIV is routinely taught in “Principles of Economics” courses (McConnell et al., 2018; Mankiw, 2020). While recent empirical work suggests that TIV can fail under specific circumstances—when tax evasion opportunities vary along the supply chain (Slemrod, 2008; Kopczuk et al., 2016; Brockmeyer and Hernandez, 2016), when there are price rigidities (Muysken et al., 1999; Saez et al., 2012; Lehmann et al., 2013), or if tax salience is different for consumers and firms (Chetty et al., 2009; Finkelstein, 2009)—it is unclear whether TIV simply does not hold, or just that it cannot be applied in particular settings.

We provide a more general test of TIV than has previously been possible by studying the cannabis market in Washington state\footnote{We describe the market in Section 2.} The frequently-audited comprehensive regulatory reporting system makes tax evasion difficult. Prices both increase and decrease often, which means rigidities are unlikely. Tax salience is likely high for manufacturers and retailers. Regulatory requirements ensure that owners are highly-skilled and well-capitalized. The posted retail prices include all taxes, so tax-inclusive prices are likely salient to consumers. Finally, tax leakage and competition are not relevant as the market is closed: each gram of cannabis purchased in Washington was grown in Washington, and vice versa, and neighboring states did not have legal cannabis markets at the time we examine.

We study an ideal reform for testing TIV. Prior to July 1, 2015, a 25% gross receipts
tax applied to each transfer of cannabis. Cultivators remitted the tax when they sold to manufacturers, manufacturers remitted the tax when they sold to retailers, and retailers remitted the tax when they sold to consumers. The retail tax was required to be included in the posted price making it functionally equivalent to other excise and sales taxes. After the reform, the retail tax was increased to 37% and all other taxes were eliminated. Crucially, this change was unexpected by market participants; the reform was passed on June 27, 2015, and signed by the Governor on June 30 (La Corte, 2015).

Our setting features imperfect competition—retailers have substantial market power (Hollenbeck and Uetake, 2019; Mace et al., 2020) and manufacturers, while more competitive, retain some market power too (see Table 1). We therefore begin by establishing a framework for TIV under percent-based taxes—the relevant tax instrument in our setting—and imperfect competition. We write a general model of supply and demand in the style of Weyl and Fabinger (2013) featuring flexible competition between firms captured by conduct parameters. We show that for a wide range of competitive conducts, manufacturers respond to the elimination of their tax by passing along their entire savings and retailers either leave tax-inclusive prices unchanged (under perfect competition) or lower them (under imperfect competition).

With these benchmarks in hand, we measure the effects of this reform empirically using an interrupted time series regression in first differences; that is, we ask how prices change in the week of the reform relative to weeks surrounding the reform. Identification rests on the assumption that, after controlling for product characteristics, prices would not have changed in the week of the reform (relative to a baseline trend) if the reform had not occurred. We conduct event studies and placebo permutation tests which provide no evidence to reject this
assumption. We employ this approach rather than a difference-in-differences design as the only potential comparison state is Colorado, which had a significantly different regulatory and industry structure—the assumption that prices in the two states co-move in the period of the reform is likely much stronger than the assumptions we impose.

We then examine how manufacturer prices change post-reform. Our framework predicts that across competitive environments, manufacturers should pass-through savings from tax decreases; in this case we predict that manufacturers’ prices should decrease 28.7% from pre-reform levels. We also consider a second benchmark based on assuming TIV and monotonicity of cost pass-through: since the reform slightly decreased the total tax burden, manufacturers following a monotone pricing policy should decrease their prices at least 17.7% in order to leave retailers’ per-gram profits and consumer-facing tax-inclusive prices constant. We find that manufacturers reduce their prices by only 7.2%; we reject the null hypothesis of TIV based on either benchmark at the 0.1% level.

Finally, we examine retail behavior. Our framework predicts that retailers should either leave their tax-inclusive prices constant or decrease them. Instead, we find tax-inclusive retail prices increased by an average of 2.5%. Retailers pass through one-third of the tax increase to consumers. Another roughly one-third is borne by manufacturers, leaving retailers to bear about one-third of the increase. We find evidence that retailers maintained constant tax-exclusive markups, consistent with our model’s pricing rule.

In summary, we find that TIV fails. A reform that should have left the welfare of manufacturers, retailers, and consumers unchanged or improved instead increased the profits of manufacturers at the expense of retailers and consumers. We conclude by discussing potential mechanisms for this result, implications for policymakers, and future research.
2 Background

Our analysis focuses on the adult-use cannabis market in Washington state, which opened in July 2014 after a successful ballot initiative in 2012. We have written elsewhere about the history of this market (Miller and Seo, 2021; Hansen et al., 2020)—here we focus on features of the market and the reform that underlie our analysis.

Washington’s cannabis market consists of three types of firms: cultivators, who grow cannabis plants, manufacturers, who transform plant material into marijuana products, and retailers, who sell products they obtain from manufacturers to consumers. Potential entrants have to pass background checks and undergo a lengthy regulatory process requiring substantial capital investment before entry. Cultivators face capacity constraints—the largest firms may cultivate 30,000 sq. ft. of plant canopy and may not merge to increase capacity. While retailers must be financially independent from other firms, a cultivator and a manufacturer may vertically integrate, though the capacity constraint remains. When the reform was implemented, approximately 94% (by weight) of usable marijuana—dried and cured cannabis flowers—was produced through a vertically-integrated process (Hansen et al., 2020b). Thus, we focus our analyses on two types of firms, “manufacturers” and “retailers”.

The market features a closed supply: all cannabis sold by retailers is grown in the state, and every ounce grown legally within the state is sold at a Washington retailer. These rules are enforced through the state’s “seed-to-sale” traceability system, which tracks each plant from cultivation through processing and retail. This system was implemented to respond to the informal federal regulations created by the “Cole Memo” (Cole, 2013). The system

\[\text{State law calls cultivators “producers” and manufacturers “processors”—we choose nomenclature to represent functional equivalents in other markets.}\]
provides information that can be used to check for tax evasion: retailers cannot sell cannabis without manufacturing records, which forces manufacturers to report accurately. Reporting is enforced through frequent audits—firms typically face one or more visits per year—backed by significant penalties for non-compliance.

Washington’s initial tax regime consisted of a 25% tax collected at every transfer of cannabis. Vertically-integrated manufacturers owed no tax on intra-firm transfers. The reform we analyze eliminated the 25% excise taxes within the supply chain and increased the retail excise tax rate to 37%. The excise tax at retail applied to the sales-tax-inclusive price pre-reform and the sales-tax-exclusive price post-reform. Accounting for changes to the base and rate of the retail tax, the reform changed the retail tax rate by 6.93%, on average. This change was designed to be revenue neutral under the assumption that tax-exclusive prices remained constant (whereas TIV predicts constant tax-inclusive prices). We account for both the change in the rate and the base of the retail excise tax in our analyses. We provide calculations of revenue pre- and post-reform in Section 4. Other regulations concerning cannabis production, distribution, and sales were unaffected.

Our identification assumes that the policy change was unanticipated. The bill originated and was passed in the Washington House during the 2015 Regular Session, but stalled in the Senate. The bill was reintroduced in the First Special Session, but again stalled. Finally, on June 27, the last day of the Second Special Session, the bill passed both chambers. The Governor signed it on June 30 and the law went into effect the next day. Contemporaneous

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3 Retailers can under-report their sales, but such behavior is detectable as retail sales can be compared to purchases from manufacturers. Our estimates are unaffected by dropping the few retailers that engage in significant under-reporting.

4 The average sales tax rate during this period was 8.9%, thus \( \log \left( \frac{1.25(1+0.089)}{1.37+0.089} \right) = -0.0693 \)
reporting portrayed the industry as unprepared. According to one retail manager, “[we] have a few hours to change an entire market’s pricing structure. It is an exceptionally short window for such a tremendous change” (La Corte, 2015).

3 An Analytic Framework for Tax Invariance

TIV is not axiomatic – it is derived as a consequence of models of supply and demand behavior – and so therefore some framework is required to establish a benchmark against which to compare data. Thus, to motivate our empirical analyses, we introduce a stylized model of the supply chain with imperfect competition in the style of Spengler (1950) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) (whose notation we largely adopt) with the addition of percent-based taxes. In the model, upstream manufacturers choose prices charged to retailers, who then charge prices to consumers. Both types of firms engage in imperfect competition characterized by a type-specific conduct parameter; Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that this structure nests many common models of imperfect competition including homogeneous products oligopoly (e.g. Cournot competition), differentiated Nash-in-prices (e.g. discrete choice demand), and monopolistic competition (e.g. Dixit-Stiglitz competition). We focus on the case in which firms within each layer are symmetric and on the unique symmetric equilibrium for ease of exposition. We conclude this section by considering asymmetric imperfect competition.

We begin with retailers. Suppose there are $n_r$ symmetric retailers in the industry, denoted by $i$, each producing a single product. Each firm faces constant marginal cost of $p_1$, the price charged by manufacturers inclusive of all taxes. Each firm sells quantity $q_i(p_i, \mathbf{p}_{-i})$ that depends on its own price and the prices charged by the other firms. Products are
assumed to be (weak) substitutes in the sense that \( \sum_{k \neq i} \frac{\partial q_k}{\partial p_i} / \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial p_i} \geq 0 \) for all \( i \); the profit function is concave. Market demand is smooth and symmetric-at-symmetric prices: \( q(p_0) \equiv q_i(p_0, p_0, \cdots, p_0) \) for any \( i \) where \( p_0 \) is the price paid by consumers inclusive of all taxes. The price elasticity of demand is \( \epsilon_D = -(dq/dp_0) \cdot (p_0/q) \) and is assumed to be greater than unity over the range of prices (i.e. if all retailers increased their prices infinitesimally, industry revenues would decrease). Retailers face a tax rate \( \tau_r \) that is implemented as an excise tax, so if the unit price paid by consumers is \( p_0 \), the unit net-of-tax revenue earned by the retailer is \( p_0/(1 + \tau_r) \).

Following [Weyl and Fabinger (2013)], we do not specify a model of firm competition. Instead, we assume that the elasticity-and-tax adjusted Lerner index is set equal to a conduct parameter \( \theta_r \). That is, we assume

\[
\frac{p_0 - (1 + \tau_r)p_1}{p_0} \epsilon_D = \theta_r. \tag{1}
\]

While in what follows we take \( \theta_r \) to be exogenous with respect to the tax rate, we note that in general \( \theta_r \) might depend on \( p_0 \) and therefore indirectly on \( \tau_r \). Given the assumptions above, given \( p_1 \) there exists some unique \( p_0(p_1) \) that satisfies Equation (1). [Weyl and Fabinger (2013)] show that when products are weak substitutes, the conduct parameter ranges from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly).

Suppose that retailers purchase their products from a total of \( n_m \) upstream manufacturers, denoted by \( j \). These manufacturers in turn face a constant marginal cost of production \( mc \). As above we focus on the unique symmetric equilibrium. Since there are \( n_r \) retailers and \( n_m \) manufacturers, manufacturers face effective symmetric-at-symmetric prices demand
The effective demand elasticity for manufacturers is 
\[ \epsilon_D = \frac{dq}{dp_1}, \]

Note that \( \frac{dq}{dp_0} = \epsilon_D \frac{q}{p_0}. \) Rearrange Equation (1) to write \( p_0 = \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_D - \theta_r} p_1 (1 + \tau_r) \) so \( \frac{dp_0}{dp_1} = \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_D - \theta_r} (1 + \tau_r). \) At the unique equilibrium, therefore, we can now write

\[ \epsilon_D = (1 + \tau_r) \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_D - \theta_r} \cdot p_1 \frac{\epsilon_D}{p_0}. \] (2)

Manufacturers face a tax rate \( \tau_m \) implemented as a gross receipts tax, so if the unit price paid by retailers to manufacturers is \( p_1 \), the unit net-of-tax revenue earned by manufacturers is \( (1 - \tau_m)p_1. \) This definition does not precisely parallel the relationship between \( p_0, \tau_r, \) and net unit revenues for retailers; we define taxes this way to match our empirical setting, though our results are invariant to this distinction. We again model imperfect competition through a conduct parameter: we assume manufacturers choose prices such that

\[ \frac{p_1 - mc/(1 - \tau_m)}{p_1} \epsilon_D = \theta_m. \] (3)

As above, given our assumptions, \( \theta_m \in [0, 1]. \)

Equilibrium in this supply chain is characterized by the prices \( p_0 \) and \( p_1; \) Equations (1) and (3) are the equilibrium conditions. As \( \epsilon_D \) is well-defined at the equilibrium, this system of equations can be solved to yield

\[ p_0 = \frac{(1 + \tau_r) \epsilon_D^2 mc}{(1 - \tau_m) (\epsilon_D - \theta_m) (\epsilon_D - \theta_r)}, \quad p_1 = \frac{\epsilon_D mc}{(1 - \tau_m) (\epsilon_D - \theta_m)}. \] (4)

These relationships hold at equilibrium. Furthermore, by substituting these expressions into Equation (2), we demonstrate that in equilibrium, \( \epsilon_D = \epsilon_D; \) in other words \( \tau_r \) does not
change the effective demand elasticity for manufacturers, and so that tax does not enter their pricing condition. Finally, under the assumption of constant elasticity of demand and conduct parameters, these expressions provide equilibrium prices in closed form (though we do not make those additional assumptions in the proceeding analyses).

To understand these relationships, it is useful first to consider the case of a supply chain which is perfectly competitive in each stage i.e. $\theta_r = \theta_m = 0$. In this case, manufacturers price equal to their effective marginal cost, $p_1 = \frac{mc}{1-\tau_m}$ and retailers face this price as their marginal cost and set $p_0 = mc \frac{1+\tau_r}{1-\tau_m}$. Now consider the case of a monopoly-monopoly supply chain, in which $n_m = n_i = 1$ and $\theta_m = \theta_r = 1$. In this case, the equilibrium conditions reduce to a double marginalization condition. $\theta \in [0,1]$, therefore, can be thought of as the extent to which firms in the supply chain behave as though they have monopoly power.

With the equilibrium characterized, we now turn to the issue of TIV. The taxing authority earns per-unit taxes of $rev(\cdot) = p_0 \frac{\tau_r}{1+\tau_r} + p_1 \tau_m$. We can substitute Equation (4) to write

$$rev(\tau_r, \tau_m) = mc \frac{1+\tau_r}{1-\tau_m} \left[ \frac{\epsilon_D \tau_r}{\epsilon_D - \theta_r} + \tau_m \right].$$

Define $p_0(\tau_r, \tau_m)$ as the tax-inclusive unit price faced by consumers as a function of the tax instruments. Given some desired per-unit revenue $R$, TIV holds if $p_0(\tau_r, \tau_m) = p$ for all $\{\tau_r, \tau_m \text{ s.t. } rev(\tau_r, \tau_m) = R\}$. To see that TIV holds in this model under perfect competition, define $\tau = \frac{1+\tau_r}{1-\tau_m}$. Then since $\theta_r = \theta_m = 0$, $p_0 = mc \cdot \tau$ and $rev(\tau_r, \tau_m) = mc \frac{\tau_m}{1-\tau_m}(\tau + \tau_m)$. Note that $\tau_r = \tau(1 - \tau_m) - 1$ and substitute into $rev(\cdot)$ to write $rev(\tau) = mc(\tau - 1)$. In other words, given some $\tau$, a policy maker can freely move one of $\tau_r$ or $\tau_m$, solve for the other, and
hold $p_0$ and per-unit revenue constant.\(^5\)

Now consider the case when $\theta_r > 0$. Mechanically, if $\tau = \frac{1+\tau_r}{1-\tau_m}$, the term in brackets in Equation (5) cannot be simplified to a function of $\tau$ alone. Given some $p$, if a policy maker shifts $\tau_r$ and $\tau_m$ to hold $p_0 = p$, $rev$ must change. Thus, TIV fails whenever $\theta_r > 0$. Intuitively, the percentage taxes act as demand shifters, but manufacturers do not internalize retailers’ responses to retail percentage taxes because their effective demand elasticities are unchanged.

Given TIV generally does not hold under percentage taxes when retailers are imperfectly competitive (and per the discussion in Section 4, it is likely that retailers have market power in our context), we want to understand the effect of a movement from a manufacturing tax to a retail tax—the change that occurred in our empirical setting. Although these results suggest that we should not expect TIV to hold empirically, this model may allow us to set expectations for empirical movements in prices; if we find evidence conflicting with these expectations, we can reject the (very general) assumptions of the model.

Suppose the policy $\omega_1 = \{\tau_r = 0, \tau_m = \tau\}$ is replaced with $\omega_2 = \{\tau_r, 0\}$. From Equation (4), it is clear that $p_0(\omega_1) = p_0(\omega_2)$ and thus the market quantity remains constant. Manufacturers pass-through their tax savings and earn identical per-unit profits. However, the retailer’s per-unit profits decrease because the $\tau$ savings on the manufacturers’ prices is more than offset by the new retail tax of $\frac{\tau}{1-\tau}$. By the same logic, $rev(\omega_2) > rev(\omega_1)$ as $\frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_D - \theta_r} > 1$.\(^6\) In other words, a policy change that moves taxes from manufacturers to retailers yet maintains constant retail prices increases total tax revenues.

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\(^5\) Similar logic applies whenever $\theta_r = 0$ if $\epsilon_D$ is constant: in that case $p_0 = \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_D - \theta_m} mc \cdot \tau$ and $rev = \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_D - \theta_m} mc (\tau_r + \tau_m)$ so since $\tau_r = \tau(1 - \tau_m) - 1$, $rev = \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_D - \theta_m} mc (\tau - 1)$.

\(^6\) Note that since $p_0(\omega_1) = p_0(\omega_2), \epsilon_D(\omega_1) = \epsilon_D(\omega_2)$ by construction.
Now consider the policy $\omega_3 = \{\tau', 0\}$ where $\tau' = \frac{p_{1(\omega_1)} \tau}{p_0(\omega_1) - p_1(\omega_1)}$ is "naive-revenue-neutral": it would raise the same total revenue if the tax-inclusive retail price $p_0$ was assumed to be the same under $\omega_3$ as it is under $\omega_1$; this closely matches our empirical setting. In this case, since $\tau' < \frac{\tau}{1-\tau}$, $p_0(\omega_3) < p_0(\omega_1)$. Since $\epsilon_D > 1$ for the entire range of prices, per-unit profits for both types of firms and per-unit tax revenues increase.

Finally, suppose $\omega_1$ is replaced with $\omega_4 = \{\tau'', 0\}$, where $\tau''$ is chosen to be "true-unit-revenue-neutral": $rev(\omega_1) = rev(\omega_4)$. Since $rev(\omega_3) > rev(\omega_1)$, $\tau'' < \tau'$ and thus $\omega_4$ increases per-unit profits for both retailers and manufacturers relative to profits under $\omega_1$ beyond the increases realized under $\omega_3$. Thus, our analytic results are consistent with the notion that, under imperfect competition, ad valorem taxes improve welfare over unit taxes (Suits and Musgrave 1953; Skeath and Trandel 1994; Keen 1998).

In summary, the combination of retail market power and percent taxes leads traditional TIV to fail. However, revenue-neutral policies (whether "naive" or "true") that shift taxes from manufacturers to retailers lead to full pass-through from manufacturers to retailers and a decrease in tax-inclusive retail prices faced by consumers, regardless of the precise model of imperfect competition or demand.

While we have assumed symmetry for ease of exposition, our results are robust to relaxing this assumption. In the asymmetric case where manufacturers and retailers behave according to individual conduct parameters $\{\theta_{r,i}, \theta_{m,i}\} \in [0, 1]$, Weyl and Fabinger (2013) show that equilibrium objects can be characterized by taking the quantity-weighted mean of the conduct parameters as a market-level conduct parameter. If all of the firm-level con-

\[\text{In fact, Equation (4) makes it clear that manufacturers should fully pass-through any changes to tax rates whether or not those changes are revenue-neutral.}\]
duct parameters are in the range $[0, 1]$, the market-level conduct parameters will also be within this range and thus the previous discussion of TIV and the impacts of changes from manufacturing taxes to retail taxes follows.

4 Data and Methods

Our data consist of administrative records from the “traceability” (or seed-to-sale) system maintained by the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board (WSLCB). We obtain data on all plants, products, and sales. We restrict our analysis to “usable marijuana” products—74.5% of the total transactions observed in our data. Within this category, products are differentiated by “strain” (analogous to fruit cultivars), potency, and whether the marijuana is loose or pre-rolled into a joint. These characteristics are captured by our fixed effects.

Harvested flowers and other plant material are converted into an “inventory lot” that is assigned a unique identifier (ID). Products or material within a single inventory lot are assumed to be homogeneous. Large inventory lots of finished product are split into smaller “retail” lots for sale to retailers. Each retail lot consists of multiple sealed packages of a specific weight of cannabis (e.g. 1 gram, 3.5 grams, etc) which are considered identical. When lots are sold to retailers, the system records the date, quantity, and price, and assigns a new lot ID. Thus, retail lot IDs uniquely identify the retailer, manufacturer, product, and package size.\footnote{A small number of lots have multiple package sizes, which we identify and correct for.}

We observe each retail sale and link the price, quantity, and transaction time to the relevant inventory lots.

\footnote{Indeed, even if some firms were to behave (paraphrasing Weyl and Fabinger) “less competitively than monopolists” or if some products were effectively complements, the logic follows as long as the quantity-weighted average conduct parameter is less than $\epsilon_D$ over the relevant range of prices.}
We aggregate retail sales by inventory-lot-week. We exclude firms with less than two months of pre- and post-reform data. The reform also changed technical reporting rules which affect the price data. We clean the price data for each retail firm to reflect the prices faced by consumers using an algorithm based on rounding behavior verified by spot checks of historical menus.\footnote{See Appendix B for details.}

Table 1 reports summary statistics for retail inventory lots for the six weeks pre-reform (the basis for our analyses in Section 5). The average tax-inclusive retail price was $13.03 per gram and the tax-exclusive price was $9.57 per gram. Retailer tax-exclusive prices are more than double manufacturer tax-inclusive prices. Both manufacturer and retail prices change week-over-week by more than one percent almost 40 percent of the time, split fairly evenly between price increases and price decreases, suggesting prices are not rigid.

The average market share of retailers in the 10-mile radius around their location was 31%, suggesting that there is substantial market power at retail, consistent with Hollenbeck and Uetake (2019) and Mace et al. (2020). The manufacturer market is effectively state-wide and the average market share is 1.4%. No manufacturer has more than 7% of the total market share. However, manufacturers may exert market power on individual retailers. We construct a retail-level manufacturer concentration index by sorting each retailer’s suppliers by the weight of inventory sold and counting the number of manufacturers that comprise at least 75% of total sales. On average, about seven manufacturers supply 75% of a retailer’s inventory.

It is clear from Equation (4) that across competitive environments and tax reforms, our\footnote{Cannabis retailers have limited access to financial services and so choose to set tax-inclusive prices that are round numbers (e.g. $8 or $10.25) to lower cash-handling costs. While this represents a potential friction, the effective minimum price change is smaller than the effects we estimate.}
framework predicts that manufacturers should pass-through any savings or expenses from tax changes to retailers. In this case, our framework predicts that that manufacturers should decrease their tax-inclusive prices by \( \log(1 - 0.25) = -28.7\% \). If we estimate a different price response to the reform, we can reject the assumptions of the framework.

It may be possible to construct alternative models which both rationalize any price responses we observe and which feature a TIV result. We therefore construct an alternative benchmark by asking what we would learn about responses to this reform from models that satisfy weak monotonicity in cost pass-through and provide a TIV result. If TIV were to hold and a revenue-neutral reform occurred, tax-inclusive retail prices would remain constant, as would post-tax retail and manufacturers’ profits. Washington’s reform decreased the total tax burden per gram, which implies that firms should respond by at least holding tax-inclusive retail prices and post-tax profits constant (if not lowering retail prices), as not doing so would imply non-monotonicity in cost pass-through. Given pre-reform prices, therefore, to maintain a constant tax-inclusive retail price and constant per-gram retail profits (and therefore to satisfy TIV), manufacturers would have to decrease their prices by an average of 64 cents, or 17.7\%. This alternative benchmark therefore represents the most conservative notion of behavior that could be potentially compliant with TIV across models that feature monotonicity in cost pass-through, a weaker assumption than that imposed by the framework of Section 3.

\[11\] For example, a model in which manufacturers and retailers bargain over surplus may violate the assumptions of our framework, yet may satisfy TIV. In models of Nash bargaining, as the surplus is a function of costs, if costs decrease through a reduction in the tax rate, bargaining participants should not be made worse off i.e. costs are passed-through at least weakly monotonically.

\[12\] \( \frac{13.03/(1.37+0.089) - 13.03/(1.25*(1+0.089))}{13.03/(1.25*(1+0.089))} = 64 \) cents.

\[13\] Stackleberg-like models of sequential entry and capacity setting can feature non-monotone policy functions driven by incentives to foreclose upon future entry (for a simple example see Chapter 12 of Cabral, 2017). In our context, entry was restricted by the government; more entrepreneurs applied for licenses than were permitted to enter by the government and lotteries were used to allocate licenses (Thomas, 2018).
Under a revenue-neutral reform, TIV predicts that retailers would reduce their tax-exclusive prices by 6.93% (the amount of the change in the retail tax rate) and maintain constant tax-inclusive prices. Under weak substitution and imperfect competition, we predict tax-inclusive prices will decline. As we calculate the reform is slightly revenue-decreasing, our framework suggests retailers should reduce tax-inclusive prices further.

To summarize, if we estimate a decrease in average manufacturer tax-inclusive prices of less than 28.7% (in a statistically significant sense), we reject our framework and therefore the TIV results of Weyl and Fabinger (2013). If we estimate a decrease in average manufacturer tax-inclusive prices of less than 17.7%, we reject TIV under any model with monotone cost pass-through. Moreover, if we estimate any increase in retailer tax-inclusive prices, this provides an additional rejection of both our framework and the more general monotonicity assumption.

Figure 1 plots the panel of retail tax-exclusive prices normalized to the week before reform. For each week, we take inventory lots in their first week of sale and match them with the price paid to the manufacturer, restricting observations to those where the first retail sale and manufacturer sale both happened pre- or post-reform; thus, this illustrates the relation between retailer per-gram revenue and variable costs. The two series move in a highly correlated way through the entire pre- and post-reform period (including the period around April 20, an industry promotional event). This implies a constant markup of the retail tax-exclusive price over variable costs (the manufacturer price) that appears to be

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Differences in the timing of entry were likely driven by local regulatory processes, rather than a dynamic state-level or intra-industry process, and so it is unlikely that firms made decisions with the aim of foreclosing entry.

14If prices had remained constant, the reform would have decreased the average total tax revenue per gram from $4.49 to $4.10.
preserved in response to the tax reform. This figure does not provide any evidence of a longer-run response to the reform. If there were a slow, long-run price adjustment, the gap between matched wholesale and retail prices (which will both experience the same market level shocks) would slowly diverge as wholesale prices continued to adjust downwards relative to retail prices towards the TIV equilibrium. If anything, we see the opposite – wholesale prices are rising slightly relative to retail prices in the period post-reform. This figure depicts a set of products that is changing over time. To disentangle the effects of the reform from long-run trends and control for potential compositional changes, we employ regression and, in Section 5.4 event study analyses.

We model responses to the tax reform as an interrupted time-series in first differences:

\[
\Delta \log(p_{it}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \Delta TaxReform_t + \alpha_2 FE_i + u_{it},
\]

where \(i\) is the unit of observation which differs between manufacturer and retail analyses as described below, and \(t\) indicates the week. \(p\) is the wholesale or retail price per gram, \(TaxReform\) is an indicator variable that is one after July 1, 2015 and zero before, and FE are fixed effects. \(\alpha_1\) is the parameter of interest.\(^{15}\) Our analysis window spans six weeks before and after the reform—we examine the robustness of our estimates to this bandwidth. We two-way cluster standard errors on manufacturer and retail location.\(^{16}\) Our identifying assumption is that within a given product, there are no shocks in the week of the reform that would have a significant and systematic impact on prices besides

\(^{15}\)Without fixed effects, this regression is equivalent to an interrupted time series regression in levels with fixed effects at the level of our first differences and a control for time to the reform.

\(^{16}\)Firm clusters or two-way clusters on firm and week yield similar standard errors.
the direct effect of the tax reform. Given the short interval between observations (i.e. a week, not a year), this assumption is plausible.

Our identifying assumption is much more likely to hold in our setting than the assumption made in a classic difference-in-differences design – that, for a lengthy period (e.g. a year), two states would experience the same systematic price shocks in the cannabis market. In general, it’s not clear which of these two would be more likely to hold a priori, but in this setting, it is very unlikely that the latter would hold because each state is a closed market and there are substantial differences in market regulatory structures, processes and outcomes.\(^{17}\)

Moreover, we will provide extensive evidence through placebo analyses and event studies that we have no reason to reject the null hypothesis that our identifying assumption is valid.

Our implementation of interrupted time series, also known as regression discontinuity in time (RDIT), addresses critiques previously raised against this method (Hausman and Rapson, 2018). We select a narrow bandwidth (measured in weeks, not years) and we estimate the regression in first-differences rather than levels; this, along with our event study figures, allows us to precisely pin down the response in the week of the reform, rather than allowing the regression to obtain part of its identification from shifts that may happen many weeks away from the reform. In addition, we address autocorrelation over time with firm-level standard error clustering, we aggregate at the weekly level to avoid challenges associated with estimating day-of-week fixed effects, and we include fine-grained fixed effects to address any compositional shifts over time. Moreover, our placebo analyses in this paper will also allow us to empirically examine whether our RDIT design appears suitable in this setting. And, when

\(^{17}\)In addition, Colorado is the only reasonable comparison state that was selling at the time of this reform and it is prohibited by state law for us to obtain and publish with Colorado administrative data.
we used the same data to examine another natural experiment that allowed for the addition of a comparison group to our RDIT design\textsuperscript{18} (i.e. a difference-in-discontinuities regression) (Hansen et al., 2020a), we found the estimates remained quantitatively and qualitatively similar.

For the manufacturer analysis, we aggregate to the manufacturer-retailer-strain-week level, so that $i$ is a manufacturer-retailer-strain tuple, and then take first differences.\textsuperscript{19} Each manufacturer-retailer-strain tuple does not sell every week. We thus calculate the minimal-length difference and include difference-length fixed effects.\textsuperscript{20} The maximum difference-length allowed is 4 weeks. As a robustness check, we aggregate to the month-level to avoid this issue. We are thus estimating the magnitude of price changes in response to the reform within a specific firm-product pairing. When we add retailer-manufacturer-strain fixed effects, we allow each retailer-manufacturer-strain to have a separate time trend.

For our main retail analysis, we aggregate to the inventory-lot-week level so that $i$ is a retail inventory lot.\textsuperscript{21} Retail sales from an inventory lot are frequent, so we construct one-week differences. We are thus estimating the change in the retail price of an inventory lot in response to the tax reform holding all possible product and firm variation constant. Sales of retail inventory lots typically last multiple weeks, so we include fixed effects for the week since the first week a particular inventory lot sold. When we add inventory lot fixed effects, we allow prices in each inventory lot to have a separate time trend.

We separately examine the first week of retail sales for each inventory lot and include only

\textsuperscript{18} Washington firms near the Oregon border were “treated” while those away from the border were not.

\textsuperscript{19} Aggregation beyond the inventory lot is required because each lot is sold only once. Other possible aggregations produce similar estimates with lower power (though statistical significance remains).

\textsuperscript{20} These fixed effects are not significant. Our estimates are similar when restricted to one-week differences, but with less power.

\textsuperscript{21} We are able to work at this level because retailers repeatedly sell out of a single inventory lot.
those that were purchased from manufacturers in the same week. Similar to our manufacturer analysis, we aggregate by retailer-manufacturer-strain and take varied length differences. We include difference-length fixed effects. In these regressions, we ask how prices for *new inventory lots purchased post-reform* change relative to *pre-reform lots of the same strain from the same manufacturer*. This allows us to examine whether prices change more or less if the inventory was purchased post-reform relative to inventory that had already been purchased and was selling pre-reform.

5 Results

We first present the main manufacturer and retail price responses in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. In those sections, we provide additional analysis that is specific to these respective results. We then conduct additional robustness checks applicable to both sets of analyses including placebo permutation tests in Section 5.3 and event studies in Section 5.4.

5.1 Manufacturer Price Response

Table 2 reports estimates of Equation (6) for manufacturers. The estimate in Column (1), which includes no fixed effects, implies that prices changed by -6.5% in response to the tax reform (statistically significant at the 0.1% level). When we include manufacturer-retailer-strain fixed effects in Column (2) – our baseline specification – the point estimate becomes -7.2% (significant at the 0.1% level). This is roughly one-third of the 17.7% price decrease needed to preserve retailer per-gram profits (and therefore to minimially satisfy TIV), and one-quarter of the 28.7% decrease predicted by our framework. We can reject
the null hypothesis that our estimate is consistent with TIV at the 0.1% level. Column (3) repeats Column (2) for the price in levels instead of logs – we find that the reform decreased manufacturer prices by 23 cents, about one-third of the 64 cent benchmark.

Table 2 Column (4) aggregates the data by months instead of weeks and we find the estimates are very similar with smaller standard errors. This aggregation is an alternative way to address the fact that manufacturers do not sell every strain they produce to every retailer every week, and also allows us to examine a longer-term response (particularly when we consider a monthly event study in Section 5.4). The cost of this aggregation is the requirement of a stronger identification assumption stemming from the longer time span between observations.

The bottom panel of Table 2 repeats the specification of each column for a placebo reform dated one year later. The estimates are near zero across all four columns, providing support that our regression specifications are valid. Even when we aggregate to the month level, the estimate is still very close to zero. If one wanted a difference-in-differences design, one could subtract the placebo estimates from the main estimates; the estimates would be very similar.

It is possible that our rejection of TIV is driven by price stickiness or that the dampened response we observe (relative to the TIV benchmark) is driven by the sheer magnitude of the TIV-consistent response relative to typical price shifts in this market. We have already provided some summary statistics about the lack of price stickiness in this market in Table 1. Figure 2 provides additional evidence of price mobility by plotting the entire distribution of weekly price changes for each retail-manufacturer-strain pair that is in the baseline estimate as a histogram in the top panel (and monthly price changes in the bottom panel). The period of the tax reform is marked by the hollow green histogram and the other surrounding periods
are marked by the gray histogram. The width of each bin is 0.04, so that all price changes within 2 percent of zero are included in the bin centered around zero. The dashed lines from right to left indicate: full pass-through predicted by models of firm behavior (-28.7%), our alternative benchmark of pass-through (-17.7%), and zero (i.e. no price change).

These histograms illustrate several things. First, we see the shift in the distribution in the period of the reform. Note that there is a substantial increase in pass-through all the way down to the full pass-through benchmark. While TIV fails in aggregate, there are retail-manufacturer-strain tuples for which TIV appears to hold in isolation. Second, the histograms highlight that large price shifts do occur with reasonable frequency in the absence of the reform – about 16 percent of retail-manufacturer-strain tuple weekly price changes were at least as large as our alternative benchmark. This statistic rises to almost 20 percent at the monthly level. Moreover, less than 10 percent of retail-manufacturer-strain tuples do not adjust their prices in the period of the reform. Even if we rescaled our estimate assuming that any observation with minimal adjustment in this period was caused by rigidities or lack of awareness, the data would still reject the null hypothesis of TIV.

Figure 2 is consistent with our identification assumptions and therefore provides additional evidence of the validity of our regression estimates – the price shifts are concentrated in the region one would expect. That is, there are substantial increases in the distribution of price decreases in the period of the reform in each of the bins up to our full pass-through benchmark, and much less beyond that benchmark. As expected, this can be seen most cleanly in the top panel for weekly price changes. If the response we estimate were partially

\[22\]

However, this does not rule out additional adjustments by many firms over a longer horizon. To fully assess whether there is evidence of a longer-run adjustment towards TIV, we consider event studies in Section 5.4.
attributable to some more generic market shift in that same week, there is no reason to think that the price shifts would have this particular pattern.

5.2 Retail Price Response

Table 3 reports estimates of Equation (6) for retailers. The estimate in Column (1), which includes no fixed effects, implies that the reform decreased the tax-exclusive price by 4.5% (significant at the 0.1% level). We include inventory lot fixed effects in Column (2)—our baseline specification. The estimates are very similar; the coefficient in Column (2) implies that the reform reduced tax-exclusive retail prices by 4.4% (significant at the 0.1% level). Combined with the rate change, this implies that tax-inclusive prices increased by 2.5%; retailers passed through roughly one-third of the tax to consumers. We find that we can reject the null hypothesis of TIV-consistent pricing behavior at the 0.1 percent level.

As firms might have taken time to adjust (and the Independence Day holiday may have generated temporary price adjustments), Column (3) repeats Column (2) for two week differences and drops the first week after the reform, so that the effect of the reform is identified from the difference between the week before and the week after the reform. The estimates are approximately the same, indicating that neither of these concerns play a large role. We will return to a broader discussion of timing in Section 5.4.

Table 3 Column (4) repeats Column (2) with the dependent variable in levels—we estimate that average retail tax-exclusive prices fell by 41 cents per gram. This implies that retailers are an average of 41 cents per gram worse off on existing inventory as a result of the reform. On fresh inventory, firms were roughly 18 cents per gram worse off (41 less the
estimated 23 cent decrease in manufacturer prices estimated in Table 2. In other words, under TIV this reform should have caused manufacturer and retail tax-exclusive prices to fall by 64 cents leaving profit and consumers unaffected. Instead, it caused smaller manufacturer price cuts leaving both retailers and consumers worse off.

Table 3 Columns (5) and (6) take an alternative approach to identification examining inventory lots only in their first week and only if retailers purchased the inventory lot from the manufacturer in that week. For this, we create a panel of retail-processor-strain-weight group-weeks. The estimates are quite similar—a 4.9% decrease in Column (5) versus a 4.4% decrease in Column (2)—suggesting that retailers’ price responses are largely unaffected by whether they are still selling inventory lots purchased pre-reform or selling new inventory lots purchased post-reform. Column (6) adds the first-differenced log manufacturer price. When included, the coefficient on the wholesale price is not statistically different from one and the coefficient on $\Delta TaxReform$ is now approximately zero. This suggests that retailers largely maintained a constant tax-exclusive markup. This is consistent with the adjusted Lerner pricing rule of Equation (1). In other words, while retail behavior as a whole is inconsistent with TIV, after conditioning on the pass-through from manufacturers, retailers behaved, on average, in a way consistent with marginal-cost pricing (and therefore potentially consistent with TIV).

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23We could also estimate the response of retail margins to the tax reform directly on this sample to reach the same conclusion. The estimate with the change in retail margins as the dependent variable is 0.007 (se: 0.007).
5.3 Placebo Permutation Test and Bandwidth Sensitivity

We have already provided one-year-later placebo tests. While these are a relevant snapshot in time for cyclical concerns, they provide evidence at only one additional point in time. Given that the largest concern for this type of identification is that the regression would routinely pick up weekly market shifts in prices due to other secular market shocks, we provide extensive placebo test evidence here that this is not the case for either our manufacturing nor our retail estimates. We do this by conducting a placebo permutation test in Figure 3.

The top panel is for our manufacturing price estimates and the bottom panel is for our retail tax-inclusive price estimates. The figures plot placebo estimates using our baseline specification, but reassigning treatment to each week in our data, except those within two weeks of the tax reform, Black Friday, and 4/20. The gray dashed line marks our estimated effect in each figure. These lines are well outside the next most extreme estimates. Moreover, even if we assume that, in the absence of the reform, our manufacturing estimate would have been twice the most positively biased estimate we observe in this histogram, our estimate would still be less (in absolute value) than our TIV benchmarks. We have 83 observations in each of our permutation tests, so the implied p-value is 0.012 (=1/83).

Figure 4 considers bandwidths from 2 to 8 weeks for both the manufacturing (top panel) and retail (bottom panel) estimates. This figure confirms that our estimates are not sensitive

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24 We do not begin these estimates until there are at least 5,000 observations in our manufacturing regressions (which occurs in mid-March 2015). Before this, the smaller sample size, driven by many firms still opening and ramping up their production, makes the estimates substantially more noisy and thus a less good comparison to the period of the reform. However, if we did include earlier periods, most estimates are still near zero, and the resulting permutation test p-value would be smaller. Hence we are reporting a more informative, but also more conservative, permutation test.

25 While we don’t have enough months to do a meaningful formal manufacturing permutation test at the monthly level, excluding the month of the tax reform, and each April for 4/20, there is no monthly estimate as large as the estimate we document for the tax reform either.
to the bandwidth chosen.

5.4 Event Studies

The analyses above indicate that prices changed at the time of the reform—yet it is possible that these changes were part of the ongoing evolution of the market, something that the placebo tests one year later cannot rule out. Moreover, the estimates above do not indicate whether there is additional adjustment towards TIV beyond the first week. To address these issues, we conduct event studies for both the manufacturer and retailer responses using our baseline specifications from Tables 2 and 3. For manufacturers, we do not drop the $t-1$ tax reform coefficient due to our varied difference lengths. Figure 5 plots the relevant coefficients and confidence intervals.

Figure 5 plots the relevant coefficients and confidence intervals.

In both event studies in Figure 5, there is no clear trend in prices pre-reform. Note that this implies that once we control for the compositional shifts in Figure 1 with appropriate fixed effects, we no longer observe any significant trends in prices prior to the reform. The entire response happens in period $t$, the reform date. Given the varied difference lengths for manufacturers, this implies that manufacturers adjust their prices the first time they sell a particular retail-strain pair post-reform. This is compelling evidence that our estimates are unlikely to be driven by the ongoing market evolution and are instead a true response to the reform. The immediate nature of the response suggests that prices in this market follow a unit root process, further supporting our first-difference specification. Moreover, this suggests that our results are not driven by learning in the short run.

---

26E.g., for a two week difference that spans $t-1$ to $t+1$, both the $t$ and $t+1$ coefficients are relevant.
27Appendix Figure A.1 replicates the event study plots one year later, further emphasizing the placebo findings in previous sections—our identification strategy is effective in this setting when tested in other periods with similar cyclicality and holiday patterns.
To obtain longer-run evidence, we repeat this event study using monthly data in Figure A.2. The top panel provides our estimates, and the bottom is a one-year-later placebo. Note that we begin plotting coefficients from this event study in the excluded period (period $t - 1$) because periods $t - 2$, $t - 3$ include effects of the April 20 industry promotional holiday and are thus contaminated – we expect there to be a non-zero response in those months. Despite that omission, the event study in the top panel remains useful as we find no evidence of long-run learning either (Doraszelski et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2018). The bottom panel repeats the event study one year later as a placebo test – the fact that the estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero (and small in magnitude) in each period provides no evidence that the validity of our estimates weakens as we transition to monthly differences.

6 Discussion and Conclusion

TIV is a key component of tax policy design and analysis—it states that taxes may be collected at any point in the supply chain without concern as to the ultimate incidence. While the literature has documented cases in which TIV fails, these results have come with caveats driven by specific frictions or asymmetries present in the markets studied. We study a reform in a market with none of these issues and show that TIV fails. A reform intended to be welfare-neutral or even welfare-enhancing had negative consequences for both retailers and consumers. This result is driven by manufacturers, who on average reduced prices significantly less than broad classes of models consistent with TIV would predict. Conditional on manufacturer prices, we find evidence that retailers applied a constant markup over marginal costs, consistent with standard models of firm behavior.
Our empirical results allow us not only to reject the benchmark of our framework, which nests standard market power explanations, but also the more conservative model-free benchmark derived from monotonicity of cost pass-through, and thus these results are likely robust to a great deal of model uncertainty. In particular, if manufacturers employed average-cost pricing mechanisms (Hall and Hitch, 1939; Altomonte et al., 2015), we would expect the reform to cause similar or larger price drops than under marginal-cost pricing. While the reform eliminated incentives for inefficient vertical integration and, in the long run, production increased (Hansen et al., 2020b); increased production efficiency should similarly drive down prices. The frequency of price changes—and the prevalence of at least some drop in manufacturer prices in response to the reform—suggest that managerial inattention is not relevant (Gabaix, 2019). Our event studies suggest the response is immediate, which decreases the likelihood that learning can explain our findings.

We thus turn to the literature establishing asymmetric firm responses to changes in market conditions for possible explanations, as others have found asymmetric firm behaviors in related settings. The work of Benzarti et al. (2020) is particularly relevant—they find increases in value-added taxes are passed-through to consumers at twice the rate of decreases. In our setting, retailers, which experienced a tax increase, passed-through taxes in a way that is consistent with standard models of profit maximization, while manufacturers, which experienced a tax decrease, failed to pass-through their savings as predicted. Unlike the VAT context, however, our setting features a simultaneous change and a marketplace where firms and consumers are highly aware of relevant prices; furthermore both retailers and manufacturers engage in repeated transactions with each other over a long period of time. More broadly, the industrial organization literature has identified potential asymmetries
in firm responses to changes in demand and costs (Butters et al., 2019; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019).

We view our results as consistent with models that generate asymmetric responses to changes in market conditions due to behavioral phenomena, as opposed to information, transaction, or competitive frictions. In particular, anchoring and loss aversion may explain the outcomes we observe (Kahneman et al., 1982, 1991; Bernheim and Rangel, 2009). While the modal response by manufacturers in the week of the reform was to adjust their prices, the default option of “doing nothing” by maintaining constant tax-inclusive manufacturer prices (and thus realizing a significant increase in variable per-unit profits) may have anchored their negotiations with retail firms. The relatively common and small changes in manufacturer prices we do observe may be a result of competition—manufacturers may “do something” if they incorporate quantity or reputation effects into their analysis of post-tax outcomes (Rotemberg, 2011) and competitors may be compelled to act as a consequence. In contrast, in aggregate, retailers may have overcame their default “do nothing” option (constant tax-inclusive prices) because this option represented a loss in variable per-unit profit. Once the default was overcome, they made decisions consistent with standard models.

Our findings have wide-ranging implications for tax policy. First, designers of new taxes may face welfare tradeoffs when choosing where in a supply chain to locate a tax. Both efficiency and equity considerations arise. When considering efficiency, variation in elasticities or competitive structures across the market may affect optimal tax placement. In terms of equity, if a policy goal is to ensure all market participants bear portions of the tax, it may be necessary to impose taxes on these different groups directly.

Second, policymakers considering changes to existing tax policy face greater consequences
for doing so. While it may be possible to implement revenue-neutral reforms, restructuring will create clear winners and losers. In this case, manufacturers benefited—despite being in an arguably more competitive market—while retailers and consumers were harmed.

Taken together, these concerns point to broader political economy issues surrounding tax policy (Winer and Hettich 2006, von Hagen 2008). Political systems may be designed to limit the ability of policymakers to enact tax reforms and thus rational actors may unknowingly design systems which have additional inefficiencies as described here. Indeed, in Washington state, the legislature may not reform measures passed by ballot initiative for two years after passage. Though local government officials knew from the moment of passage that the gross receipts tax was likely to have negative consequences on the market, their hands were tied. Flexibility in political and policy systems may help avoid these concerns—though at the cost of volatility and asymmetric responses.

Finally, these results demonstrate a need for further experimental and modelling work. Modern models of competition, growth, trade, inflation, and the business cycle generally make assumptions about taxes which are appealing from a tractability standpoint. These assumptions generally imply TIV (e.g. Judd 2002, Melitz 2003, Galí 2015). Instead of failures of TIV being the exception, our work provides evidence that TIV simply may not hold in practice because of the ubiquitous nature of default options in reform contexts. In the absence of TIV, it may be necessary to conduct experiments which examine the way in which firms and consumers respond to tax policy and construct models which more accurately capture these responses.
References


Hollenbeck, B. and K. Uetake (2019). Taxation and market power in the legal marijuana industry. *Available at SSRN 3237729*.


### Tables

#### Table 1: Pre-Reform Retail Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prices and Taxes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax-Inclusive Retail Price ($/g)</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>13.033</td>
<td>3.798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax-Exclusive Retail Price ($/g)</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>9.570</td>
<td>2.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of &gt; 1% Retail Price Increase</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of &gt; 1% Retail Price Decrease</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturer Price ($/g)</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>4.103</td>
<td>1.309</td>
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<tr>
<td>Probability of &gt; 1% Manufacturer Price Increase†</td>
<td>7,954</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.382</td>
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<tr>
<td>Probability of &gt; 1% Manufacturer Price Decrease†</td>
<td>7,954</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.397</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retail State + Local Sales Tax Rate</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>1.089</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenue Pre-Reform ($/g)</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>4.489</td>
<td>1.246</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Competition</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Share of Retailer in 10 Mile Radius</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.282</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market-level Manufacturer Market Share</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.016</td>
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<td>Retail-Level Manufacturer Concentration Index</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>6.997</td>
<td>2.691</td>
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<td><strong>Benchmarks Assuming TIV</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Expected Tax Revenue Post-Reform ($/g)</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>4.104</td>
<td>1.200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturer Pass-Through Cents</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>−0.640</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturer Pass-Through Percent Change</td>
<td>63,668</td>
<td>−0.177</td>
<td>0.058</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

An observation is an inventory-lot-week pre-reform. The data come from our retail analysis set and cover the six weeks prior to the tax reform. Tax revenue is calculated using both excise and state and local sales taxes. The retail-level manufacturer concentration index is calculated as follows: for a given retailer, we sort their suppliers by the weight of inventory sold, and count the number needed to comprise at least 75% of total sales. The “benchmarks assuming TIV” account for changes in the base and rate of the retail excise tax. The “manufacturer pass-through” statistics assume constant tax-inclusive retail prices and indicate the post-reform changes to manufacturer prices that would have left retailer variable-profit-per-gram constant. 

† These probabilities are calculated for the subset of retail-processor-strain-weight group-weeks when the inventory lot changes (and thus a new purchase from a manufacturer has occurred).
Table 2: Manufacturer Price Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \log(\text{Price}) )</td>
<td>( -0.065^{***} )</td>
<td>( -0.072^{***} )</td>
<td>( -0.228^{***} )</td>
<td>( -0.059^{***} )</td>
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<td></td>
<td>( (0.015) )</td>
<td>( (0.018) )</td>
<td>( (0.068) )</td>
<td>( (0.014) )</td>
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<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{Tax Reform} )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>12,087</td>
<td>12,087</td>
<td>12,087</td>
<td>20,902</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturer Firms</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Value for Test of TIV-Predicted Pass-Through</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \text{Placebo} )</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( (0.012) )</td>
<td>( (0.014) )</td>
<td>( (0.040) )</td>
<td>( (0.010) )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>21,288</td>
<td>21,288</td>
<td>21,288</td>
<td>42,354</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturer Firms</td>
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<td>180</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bandwidth</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>6 months</td>
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<td>MRS FE?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aggregation</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This table reports estimates of Equation (6) – other variables in that equation are included, but not reported. An observation is a manufacturer-retailer-strain-week. The outcome is the change in the log of the price per gram charged by the manufacturer to the retailer (except for in column (3) which is the same outcome, but not logged). MRS stands for manufacturer-retailer-strain fixed effects. The estimates are weighted by the total grams sold across the two weeks of the difference. The P-value tests the null hypothesis that the estimated pass-through is equal to that predicted by TIV. For the placebo regressions, we repeat the analysis one year later. These regressions are estimated with \texttt{reghdfe} in Stata. Standard errors two-way-clustered by manufacturer and retailer are in parentheses (Cameron et al., 2011). *5% significance level. **1% significance level. ***0.1% significance level.
Table 3: Retail Tax-Exclusive Price Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Δlog(Price)</td>
<td>Δlog(Price)</td>
<td>Δlog(Price)</td>
<td>ΔPrice</td>
<td>Δlog(Price)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ΔTax Reform</td>
<td>-0.045***</td>
<td>-0.044***</td>
<td>-0.046***</td>
<td>-0.413***</td>
<td>-0.049**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>145,357</td>
<td>145,357</td>
<td>11,265</td>
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<td>ΔPlacebo</td>
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<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>(0.053)</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>1 week</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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This table reports estimates of Equation (6) – other variables in that equation are included but not reported. An observation is an inventory-lot-week. The outcome is the log of the tax-exclusive price per gram charged by the retailer to consumers (except for in column (4) which is the same outcome, but not logged). MRS stands for manufacturer-retailer-strain fixed effects. The estimates are weighted by the total grams sold in the first week of the difference. The P-value tests the null hypothesis that the tax-inclusive price remained constant as predicted by TIV. For the placebo regressions, we repeat the analysis one year later. These regressions are estimated with reghdfe in Stata. In the last two columns we only include observations in their first week of being sold at retail and only if the cannabis was also purchased from the processor in that same week. Standard errors two-way-clustered by manufacturer and retailer are in parentheses (Cameron et al., 2011). *5% significance level. **1% significance level. ***0.1% significance level.
Figures

Figure 1: Matched Retail and Manufacturer Prices

This figure plots average prices in Washington’s cannabis industry for four months before and after the tax reform, normalized to 100 in the week before the reform. For each week, we take inventory lots in their first week of sale and match them with the price paid to the manufacturer, restricting observations to those for which the first retail sale and manufacturer sale both happened pre- or post-reform (before any applicable taxes are paid from the manufacturer to the government). This therefore illustrates the relation between retailer per-gram revenue and variable costs. The left dashed line in the figure marks 4/20 (an industry promotional period) and the right dashed line marks the week before the tax reform.
Figure 2: Histogram of Manufacturer Price Changes

This figure plots the dependent variable, $\Delta \log(Price)$, for each retail-manufacturer-strain tuple in the baseline estimate sample. Weekly log manufacturer price changes are in the top panel and monthly log manufacturer price changes are in the bottom panel. The period of the tax reform is marked by the hollow green histogram and the other surrounding periods – six weeks or months pre- and post-reform – are marked by the gray histogram (the months affected by 4/20 are excluded from that histogram). The width of each bin is 0.04, so that all price changes within 2 percent of zero are included in the bin centered around zero. The dashed lines from right to left indicate: full pass-through predicted by models of firm behavior (-28.7%), our alternative benchmark of pass-through (-17.7%), and zero (i.e no price change). Outliers outside the interval [-1,1] are excluded.
This figure conducts a placebo permutation test. The top panel is for our manufacturing price estimates and the bottom panel is for our retail tax-inclusive price estimates. The histogram plots placebo estimates using our baseline specification, but reassigning treatment to each week in our data, except those within two weeks of the tax reform, Black Friday, and 4/20. We also do not begin these estimates until there are at least 5,000 observations in our manufacturing regressions (which occurs in mid-March 2015). The gray dashed line marks our estimated effect in each figure. These lines are well outside the next most extreme estimates. There are 83 observations in each of our permutation tests, so the implied p-value is 0.012 (=1/83).
Figure 4: Manufacturer and Retail Price Bandwidth Choices

This figure plots estimates of Table 2 Column (2) in the top panel and Table 3 Column (2) in the bottom panel, varying the bandwidth. The bandwidth in our baseline specifications is 6 weeks. The estimates plotted are for the coefficient on TaxReform. The dots indicate the point estimates and the lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the notes for Tables 2 and 3 for regression details.
Figure 5: Manufacturer and Retail Price Event Studies

This figure plots estimates of Table 2 Column (2) (top panel) and Table 3 Column (2) (bottom panel) with additional leads and lags of $\Delta TaxReform$. The plotted coefficients are leads and lags of $\Delta TaxReform$. We include in the regression (but do not plot) leads and lags are for periods $t - 4$ and before and $t + 4$ and after as is standard in event study designs. The dots indicate the point estimates and the lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the notes for Tables 2 and 3 for regression details.
Appendices

A Appendix Figures

Figure A.1: Placebo Manufacturer and Retail Price Event Study

This figure plots placebo estimates of Table 2 Column (2) (top panel) and Table 3 Column (2) (bottom panel) with additional leads and lags of $\Delta \text{Placebo}$. The plotted coefficients are leads and lags of $\Delta \text{Placebo}$. We include in the regression (but do not plot) leads and lags are for periods $t - 4$ and before and $t + 4$ and after as is standard in event study designs. The dots indicate the point estimates and the lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. See the notes for Tables 2 and 3 for regression details.
This figure repeats the top panels of Figure 5 and Figure A.1 in our paper for monthly, rather than weekly, differences. The plotted coefficients are leads and lags of $\Delta TaxReform$. The dots indicate the point estimates and the lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. We include in the regression (but do not plot) leads and lags are for periods $t - 4$ and before, and $t + 4$ and after as is standard in event study designs. We additionally exclude periods $t - 2$, $t - 3$ from our plot (even though they are included in the regressions) because first differences for both of those time periods include effects of the holiday 4/20 and are thus contaminated – we expect there to be a non-zero response in those months.
B  Data Cleaning Appendix

In this appendix we detail our data cleaning procedure. We begin by detailing our methods for cleaning prices in the face of changing reporting requirements and tax rates. We then discuss other cleaning steps to transform the raw data into the set used in our analyses.

The retail sales prices reported by firms in the “seed-to-sale” traceability system were supposed to be all-tax-inclusive pre-reform and tax-exclusive post-reform. However, compliance varied from firm to firm and changed over time. For example, some firms reported prices with the sales tax included and some reported prices without the sales tax.

This reporting confusion means that we must infer, for each firm, how they reported their prices and therefore the true tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive prices they charged. For each firm-week, we assign a “multiplier” that reveals the relationship between the reported price and the price faced by consumers. This chosen multiplier is selected from a set of multipliers based on possible tax rates for the firm. We merge in the state and local sales tax rates for each firm in order to construct this choice set.\footnote{For five firms, the state and local tax rates do not match the rates they are using, so we adjust these. And a few firms do not ever change their local tax rate for reporting purposes—we make that adjustment as well. This transforms these firms from very unround to very round, but otherwise has approximately no effect on the data as the difference between the statutory and reported local tax rates is very small.}

To understand the relationship between the multiplier, reported prices, and faced prices, consider the following equation:

\[
\text{Price}_{\text{Consumer}} = \text{Price}_{\text{Reported}} \times \text{Multiplier}
\]

We algorithmically determine which tax-based multiplier makes the prices faces by consumer’s (\(\text{Price}_{\text{Consumer}}\)) most round for each week, where roundness is the closeness of the price to a 25 cent increment of a dollar. For each product type, \(\text{Price}_{\text{Reported}}\) is the modal observed price for the week, where idiosyncratic discounts have been removed\footnote{We determine that a price is a one-off discount if the price for that transaction is 5% to 95% (in increments of 5 percentage points) or 33%/66.67% less than the previously reported price.}

We consider two orthogonal methods of determine the proper set of multipliers. Our results are robust to the method used. Ultimately, we find the modal firm never included
the sales tax, included the excise tax pre-reform, and excluded the excise tax post-reform.

**Cash Market Identification** In order to determine how each firm reports their prices in the traceability system, we take advantage of two characteristics of retail prices. First, publicly advertised prices (or ‘list’ prices) are nearly universally all tax-inclusive. Second, retailers nearly always choose to set prices in whole-dollar or (rarely) quarter-dollar increments.\(^{30}\) We use these two facts to determine the difference between the list prices faced by consumers and the prices reported in the traceability system.

We assign each firm a multiplier before and after the tax change. We begin by assigning the modal firm’s multiplier choices to all firms—all firms’ prices were adjusted by the state and local sales tax pre-reform and all firm’s prices were adjusted by the excise tax plus state and local sales tax post-reform. We then make the following adjustments based on the results from our algorithm:

1. We leave prices unadjusted (i.e. a multiplier of 1) where are algorithm finds that this choice maximizes roundedness and at least 85 percent of weekly sales are round with this multiplier choice.\(^{31}\) This applies to 16% of firms.

2. We adjust the multiplier post reform to account for only the excise tax when the algorithm finds that this choice maximizes roundness and at least 85 percent of weekly sales are round with this multiplier choice. This applies to one firm (out of 110).

There are three additional firms for whom an only excise tax adjustment makes them most round, but their roundness in the immediate post period is less than 85 percent. We leave two of the firms alone because they were also left alone in the pre-reform period because of unroundness and we could either adjust them both before and after

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\(^{30}\)We verified this through conversations with retailers as well as using historical menus available through The Internet Archive and a full set of menus for almost all firms we took screen shots of on 7/18/2017.

\(^{31}\)For the 4.5% of firms that suggest the multiplier could be 1 but are quite unround, there is too much uncertainty to confidently make an adjustment. Leaving these firms’ multipliers unchanged, if wrong, will bias our estimates towards our main null hypothesis in the retail section of the paper—that firms did not adjust their prices in response to the reform.
the reform or leave them both alone with similar effects to the log price change. The third firm becomes more round a few weeks after the reform and keeps this multiplier through the end of our data (and we have confirmed the multiplier in the menu screen shots), so we make this multiplier adjustment.

3. There are two firms for whom the multiplier that makes them round post-reform is the excise tax + state and local sales taxes divided by the state and local sales tax rate. In both cases, we have clear evidence that this is because they adjusted their prices post-reform by making their prices sales-tax exclusive post-reform. One firm keeps this choice permanently and we see this in the menu screen shots at the end of our data. The other firm eventually adjusts to the modal firms’ multiplier. Our assumption keeps prices roughly constant through this reporting change.

**Product Batch Price Stability**  To provide additional evidence that our multiplier decisions are not systematically biasing our estimates, we consider a completely different mechanism for determining multipliers—we pick the set of multipliers that makes the tax-inclusive prices for the most number of inventory lots for a given firm the same pre- and post-reform.

There are a couple of reasons why this is a reasonable alternative to consider. A number of inventory lots did leave prices constant in response to the tax reform and the main null hypothesis in our retail analysis is that firms did not change their tax-inclusive prices—this is what we would expect if the tax reform was indeed tax invariant.

We consider two variants of this. One is to begin with the modal firms’ multipliers and adjust it to another multiplier if it decreases the number of price changes by any margin. The second variant is to begin with our estimates based on roundedness and then make adjustments for firms that under the best set of multipliers leaves at least 25% of their inventory lots constant in response to the reform. The latter changes the multipliers for only four firms and three of those four leave the percent price changes quite similar. The former method decreases our baseline estimate by 0.4 percentage points and the latter decreases
our baseline estimate by 0.2 percentage points. This evidence strongly supports our price cleaning methods and suggests that any remaining bias is extremely small.

**Additional Cleaning**

In addition to adjusting retail prices, we also drop some extreme outliers in the data. In particular, we drop all wholesale transactions with a usable weight above 2,500 grams\(^{32}\) and all retail transactions if the usable weight was above 28.5 grams.\(^{33}\) We also drop all wholesale or retail price per grams above $42.\(^{34}\) We censor the THC content data if it is zero or above 40 in both the manufacturer and retailer data.\(^{35}\) We also drop wholesale prices less than $1. This effectively drops samples from our data, which are sold well below market value. We typically see these as the first recorded sale from a parentlot.

Lastly, we drop some firms or firm-days in our data set. In particular, we require for each firm that the first sales transaction occurs two months before the tax reform and continues to have transactions through the two months after the reform (either because they had not yet opened, had closed, or because they took a long hiatus from selling any cannabis). A few retailers conduct a “soft opening” by opening briefly, closing for more than a month, and then re-open permanently. In these cases, we drop the first brief selling period and consider their first activity date the first date upon re-opening in our data. We also drop 20 retail firms for whom at some point in the 8 weeks before or after the reform report their data only once per day—this is a clear indicator of poor overall data quality and, because of this, determining the appropriate multipliers for these firms is difficult.

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\(^{32}\)This is about 0.025% of wholesale transactions.

\(^{33}\)This is because the maximum legal sale was one ounce. This step drops 0.15% of retail transactions.

\(^{34}\)This is less than 0.03% of wholesale transactions and less than 0.04% of retail transactions.

\(^{35}\)This affects 0.2% of wholesale transactions and 5% of retail transactions.