

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

WHY ARE SOME IMMIGRANT GROUPS MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN OTHERS?

Edward P. Lazear

Working Paper 23548

<http://www.nber.org/papers/w23548>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138

June 2017, Revised October 2017

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

© 2017 by Edward P. Lazear. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Why Are Some Immigrant Groups More Successful than Others?

Edward P. Lazear

NBER Working Paper No. 23548

June 2017, Revised October 2017

JEL No. F22,J01,J15,J61,M5

ABSTRACT

Success of immigrants in the US measured by earnings or education varies dramatically by country of origin. For example, average educational attainment among immigrants ranges from 9 to 16 years, depending on origin country. Perhaps surprisingly, immigrants from Algeria have higher educational attainment than those from Israel or Japan. Also true is that there is a strong inverse relation of attainment to number of immigrants from that country. There is excess supply of potential immigrants to desirable destination country like the US and the rationing rule results in selection from the top of a source country's ability distribution. As a consequence, average immigrant attainment is inversely related to the number admitted from an origin country and positively related to the population of that country. The results are supported by results from the American Community Survey. The model's three variables explain 73% of the variation in educational attainment of immigrant groups. Additionally, a structural model that is more explicit in the assumptions and predictions also fits the data well.

Edward P. Lazear

Graduate School of Business

Stanford University

Stanford, CA 94305

and Hoover Institution

and also NBER

lazear@stanford.edu

Algeria, Israel, and Japan, along with over one hundred other countries, are sources of migrants to the United States. Try the following thought experiment: Rank those three countries' immigrants, highest to lowest, by educational attainment. The ranking is Algeria, Israel, and Japan. Surprised? Consider an additional fact: Algerians make up .0005 of immigrants, Israelis comprise .003 of US immigrants whereas about 1% of immigrants are from Japan. The largest origin country of US immigrants is Mexico, accounting for 27% of the immigrant population. Mexican immigrants rank 134th out of 136 in educational attainment, as compared with Algerian immigrants who rank 25th. Yet average education attainment in Mexico is 8.5 years, whereas in Algeria it is only 7.6 years. The group with the highest educational attainment are those from the former Soviet Union, who make up .001 of all immigrants.

The attainment of immigrants in the US varies greatly by country of origin. Average educational attainment by country of origin ranges from a low of 9 years of schooling to a high of 16 years. Similarly, average annual earnings by country of origin ranges from about \$16,000 to \$64,000. Not surprisingly, the correlation between these two measures of attainment across 134 origin countries is .7. Additionally, two of the largest sources of US immigrants are at both extremes, with Mexico's migrants to the US having a mean educational attainment of 9 years, whereas India's migrants to the US have a mean of 16 years. Contrast that with the fact that the average educational level in Mexico is almost twice that of the average educational attainment in India. What explains these immigrant attainment differences across origin countries and the counterintuitive patterns?

Because the US admits as immigrants only a small fraction of most origin countries' populations, almost every country has a large enough group of highly educated people from which the US could draw its immigrants. Many of these individuals might be willing to move to the US if admitted. If so, then the average educational attainment of immigrants from any origin country depends in large part on whom the US is willing to admit. The more selective is immigration policy, the higher is the educational attainment of the group.

Few Algerians ever obtain permission to come to the United States and those who do tend to be highly educated. In contrast, most Mexican immigration is based on family reunification. Although family reunification is a worthy goal, a selection system based primarily on that factor will not generate a population of immigrants with levels of education that match countries for which selection determined largely by skill.

Important is that inferences about the quality of various countries as sources of immigrants are likely to be incorrect if they are based on the attainment of immigrants in the US from the particular country. Mexico is not an inferior source country merely because those who are in the US rank near the bottom in educational attainment. That is a result of the policy filter and selection criterion, not the inherent quality of Mexico. A desirable destination country like the US could likely select high attainment immigrants from almost any country if that were the goal. In general, it is not. Other considerations such as refugee needs as emphasized by Sweden or family reunification as emphasized in the US influence the admission choice and consequent attainment of immigrants.

Most models of immigration treat migrants as if they are mobile labor, moving from one

sector to another freely, without any constraints on the migrant imposed by policy.¹ These models have served analysts well in considering who chooses to come to the US, but they are less well-suited describing attainment of the immigrant population when excess supply and rationing of immigration slots is the rule.

Here, supply plays a different and arguably more realistic role. Policy, explicit or implicit, determines the number of immigrants that a country that rations slots accepts from each country. In the US, strong emphasis on family reunification means many slots for some countries and few for others. But given the number of slots, it is still necessary to determine which individuals come from each country. It is argued that selection is from the top and supply considerations may play a heavy role here.

Rationing of immigration slots is clearly important. For example, between 2009 and 2014, approximately 1 million individuals per year were granted permanent resident status. In each of those years, there was a large number of applicants who were in the queue for resident status, equaling about four times as many as the number granted permanent residency.² There is excess supply of immigrants, even by measures of those who apply. There are surely many more who would apply if they thought they would be admitted, but decline to do so because the likelihood that their application will succeed is too low. Each year, H-1B visas, awarded to individuals who are sponsored to work at US firms, run out well before the year ends.

Rationing also has a dramatic effect on performance of immigrants. Without country-based rationing, a strict supply approach would suggest that most immigrants would come from large countries with large skilled populations like India. Although that is true to some extent, other countries, like El Salvador and Mexico, are highly over-represented and, as shown below, pure selection on skill or costs of migration does not explain these patterns.

To explain the attainment of immigrants, another extreme approach is adopted, albeit a caricature of the true situation. The analysis here emphasizes rationing. The destination country is assumed to choose the number of immigrants that it will admit from each of the world's source countries. Selection is from the top of that country's attainment distribution, either because the destination country uses that criterion of admission, given the number admitted, or because those with higher levels of attainment are more likely to migrate. The latter could be because of standard supply considerations, like the returns to migration being positively correlated with skill, or simply because those with higher attainment levels are better able to learn about and secure a scarce slot.³ As a consequence, the shape of the education distribution in the origin

¹Models, such as the one by Roy (1951) are frequently used to describe the flow of migrants to the US. See, for example, the seminal work by Borjas (1987).

²U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, "Annual Immigrant Visa Waiting List Report as of November 1, 2015," 2015, and Department of Homeland Security, "Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2014," 2016.

³Borjas and Friedberg (2009) argue that selection rules explain the rise in wages of immigrants that occurred between 1990 and 2000. Additionally, Kerr and Lincoln (2010) examine the effect of the rise in H-1B visas on innovation and document its importance. Kerr, Kerr, and Lincoln (2015) use the LEHD data and find that a skilled immigrant labor is an important determinant of the overall increase in the skilled workforce of American firms. H-1Bs are important because the H-1B program is always over-subscribed and the number of

country, the country's population, and importantly, the target immigrant number from that country determine the composition and attainment of immigrants in the US.

At some level, it is obvious that policy is a key determinant of immigration outcomes. The large shift of migrants to the US from source countries in Europe to those in Latin America occurred after policy changed in 1965 favoring family reunification. There was no abrupt corresponding change in supply conditions. Natives of the West Indies and Surinam make up 3% of the population of the Netherlands as a consequence of Dutch policy toward their former colonies. They account for only a tiny fraction of the US population despite those countries being geographically closer to the US than to Europe. The major presence of Algerians in France and minor presence in the US is a consequence of France allowing people from its former colonies to settle in the country.⁴

Although the point of this analysis is not unique to the United States, the focus is the US because the assumption that the selection filter is paramount is applicable to the US. The excess supply of potential migrants to the US means that the rationing rule is a key factor in determining the nature of immigrants in the US.

The model, which implies that three and only three variables should determine educational attainment does well. In the US, 73% of the variation in immigrant educational attainment is explained by the variables of interest in the model, namely the number of immigrants in the US, the population of the origin country, and the mean level of educational attainment in the origin country.

Figure 1 illustrates the main argument. Consider two countries, 1 and 2, with equal population sizes and with educational distributions as shown. Country 2's distribution is a rightward displacement of country 1's distribution.

Suppose that the US were to decide that 3% of its immigrants will come from country 1, but that 30% will come from country 2 and suppose further that all who are offered US residency accept. If the US also allows only the most educated immigrants in first from each country, or alternatively, if the most educated in each country are most attracted to the US or most able to navigate their way through the immigration process, then the upper tail of each distribution will end up migrating to the US. In this case, because the US targets 3% from country 1 and 30% from country 2, the minimum cutoff level of education in each country is A_1^* and A_2^* , respectively. Note that the educational cutoff level for country 1, the lower education country, is considerably above that for country 2, the higher education


H-1Bs permitted is a policy choice that results in selection from the top, made by the US government.

Two Hunt papers, Hunt (2011) and Hunt (2015), examine the performance of highly skilled immigrants in the US. Another measure of ability to perform in the US relates to English fluency, which was explored in Lazear (1999). Lewis (2013) picks up on that theme and discusses the ability of immigrants to substitute for native-born US labor and how that relates to language skills. Similarly, Peri, Shih and Sparber (2015) estimate the effect of STEM immigration on productivity and find it is substantial, using city differences. None of these papers speaks to the empirical validity of the assumption that selection is from the top of an origin country's distribution, but the fact that many of the origin countries have low educational levels implies that the high skilled ones are selected from the top.

⁴One factor is that common language facilitates settlement and although that is surely true, this does not explain time series changes nor the fact that the majority of immigrants in the US are not native English speakers.

country, because so many more are being admitted from country 2. Given the cutoffs and the underlying distributions, the average level of education among immigrants from country 1 and country 2 are A_1 and A_2 . The educational attainment of immigrants from 1 exceeds that from 2,

Figure 1



i.e., $A_1 > A_2$, even though country 1's education level at home is below that of country 2 at home.

Of course, this is not a necessary outcome. It depends on the amount by which country 2's education level dominates country 1 and in particular on the number of immigrants that the US admits from each of the two countries. But figure 1 illustrates that other things equal, the smaller the proportion of immigrants in the US who come from a country, the higher is the expected level of education of immigrants in the US who are supplied by that country.

Model

The general model captures the intuition of the figure and discussion. Suppose that the US chooses a selection rule such that I_i of the immigrants have origins in country i . The selection rule that determines I_i is taken to be exogenous, determined by policy, politics, or considerations outside the model.

Assume that anyone outside the US offered immigrant status in the US accepts it. Assume additionally that rationing is such that the top of the educational (or any other dimension of immigrant ability) is admitted first. This can either be a result of explicit US policy or a consequence of the supply side, where the people most likely to come to the US from any other country are at the top of the ability distribution, the latter resulting either because they are best able to navigate the immigrant hurdles or because they have the highest return from migrating. This policy-determined selection of immigrants fits those who come in legally with official documentation. Those who enter the country without documentation are more likely to fit a strict

supply-determined mechanism because the rationing rule chosen by the US does not bind.⁵

Let N_i be the population of country i and let $f_i(A)$ be the density of education or some other measure of ability or attainment, A , in country i among. It is not necessary to assume that anyone offered residency in the US accepts, although that is the most straightforward way to think about it. Another interpretation of $f_i(A)$ is that it is the transformed distribution that takes into account not only attainment, but also the proportion of those in country i with attainment level A attainment who will migrate to the US if permitted to do so. The necessary condition in this case is simply that immigrants from countries that are admitted in higher quantities are a lower attainment group than those from countries admitted in lower quantities. Limiting quantities of entrants has the effect of raising the average ability of those selected.

Given the policy determined I_i , A_i^* is the cutoff ability level of immigrants from country i determined such that

$$N_i \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} f_i(A) dA = I_i$$

or

$$(1) \quad N_i [1 - F_i(A_i^*)] - I_i = 0$$

Given this cutoff for immigrants, the expected level of education among those from country i in the US is simply the conditional expectation or

$$(2) \quad \bar{A}_i = \frac{1}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA$$

The goal is to predict the effect of the key variables on the average educational level or other measure of attainment of a country's migrants to the US. Those variables are the number of immigrant slots allocated to country i , I_i , the population of country i , N_i , and the level of education in country i , μ_i , where μ_i is defined as the average level of education in origin country i .

To obtain the theoretical predictions, differentiate (2) with respect to I_i , N_i , and μ_i . In general, from (2), for any variable x ,

⁵It is possible that the policy on internal enforcement and border control may have an effect even on those who do not apply through legal channels.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial x} &= \frac{f_i(A_i^*) \frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial x}}{[1 - F_i(A_i^*)]^2} \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A \frac{\partial f_i(A)}{\partial x} dA \\ &\quad - \frac{A_i^* f_i(A_i^*) \frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial x}}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} \end{aligned}$$

or

$$(3) \quad \begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial x} &= \frac{f_i(A_i^*) \frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial x}}{[1 - F_i(A_i^*)]} \left[\frac{\int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} - A_i^* \right] \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A \frac{\partial f_i(A)}{\partial x} dA \end{aligned}$$

The derivation in (3) allows the basic theoretical predictions to be stated. This is done in the form of propositions, the proofs of which are contained in the appendix.

Proposition 1:

$$\frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial I_i} < 0 .$$

The larger is the number of immigrants admitted from country i , the lower is their expected level of attainment, \bar{A}_i .

Proposition 2:

$$\frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial N_i} > 0 .$$

For any given number of immigrants, I_i , the larger is the population in country i , the higher is the expected level of attainment of immigrants \bar{A}_i from that country.

Finally, let $F_i(A) = F(A - \mu_i)$ so that every country's ability distribution is of the same form, but merely displaced by country-specific parameter μ_i . Countries with higher μ_i values have higher ability distributions. Assume further that $f'(A)$ is negative for all $A \geq A_i^*$. This is likely to hold empirically under the assumption that the most able are taken first because there is no country that provides so many immigrants that the cutoff ability, A_i^* , would not be in the upper tail of the ability distribution, which is expected to be negatively sloped. Then,

Proposition 3:

$$\frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial \mu_i} > 0$$

Immigrants from countries with higher levels of attainment have higher attainment in the destination country.

It is also possible to express the concepts in propositions 1-3 in terms of the “representation ratio” defined as

$$R_i \equiv \frac{I_i / \sum I_i}{N_i / \sum N_i} .$$

R_i should be interpreted as the over-representation of country i among immigrants, given the country’s relative population importance. If R_i equals 1, the proportion of immigrants in the US from country i reflects its weight in the overall population of the world. If R_i exceeds 1, that country is over-represented among US immigrants. If R_i is less than 1, then country i is under-represented among immigrants in the US.

India is under-represented among immigrants by a factor of almost four, despite the fact that Indians are the third largest group of immigrants (behind Mexicans and Filipinos). In contrast, Jamaicans are over-represented, making up over forty times the number of immigrants as would be expected given Jamaica’s population even though there are only one-third as many immigrants from Jamaica as there are from India.

It is then possible to state a corollary to propositions 1 and 2 in terms of the representation ratio:

Corollary 1: Given a fixed number of immigrants,

$$\frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial R_i} < 0$$

At any point in time, the number of immigrants is given. Therefore countries with higher representation ratios have lower expected levels of attainment \bar{A}_i .

Additional theoretical predictions can be derived. The model provides implications not only for immigrants and their relative standing in the recipient country, in this case the US, but also for their situation vis à vis the general population of the origin countries. For these purposes, define A as referring to and only to levels of attained education. Then let

$$\Delta \equiv E_i(A | A > A_i^*) - E_i(A) \equiv \bar{A}_i - \mu_i$$

where E_i is the expected level of education within country i , given the distribution of education $f_i(A)$ in country i . Then Δ is interpreted as the difference between the attained education of immigrants in the US from country i and the average level of education of the overall population in country i .

Recall that $\bar{A}_i \equiv E_i(A | A > A_i^*)$ so

$$\Delta \equiv \frac{1}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA - \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA$$

The empirically verifiable implications are stated as corollaries here and proved in the appendix.

Corollary 2: $\partial\Delta/\partial I_i < 0$.

The difference between the mean education of immigrants from origin country i and the mean education of the population of that country falls in I_i .

Corollary 3: $\partial\Delta/\partial N_i > 0$.

The difference between the mean education of immigrants from origin country i and the mean education of the population of that country rises in N_i .

Corollary 4: $\partial\Delta/\partial\mu_i = 0$.

Under the assumptions above, a shift in the mean of the origin country's education distribution is neutral, having no effect on the difference between the mean education of immigrants from that country and the mean education in the origin country's overall population.

Equivalently, if $I_i = I_j$ and $N_i = N_j$, then the difference between the mean level of education among immigrants from country i and country j equals the difference between the mean level of education in the origin countries' overall population.

Discussion

The logic behind the propositions and corollaries fits the example in the introduction and the data on immigrant background and attainment, both education and earnings, in the US.


Proposition 1 predicts the basic point made at the outset. When a country is permitted to send only a small number of immigrants and when selection is from the top down, those who enter the US will be highly talented. The group with the highest level of educational attainment are those who came from the USSR. Note that this is "USSR," not Russia, which means that they entered before the breakup of the Soviet Union. Among the pool of immigrants in the sample, there were only 400 from the former Soviet Union as compared with over 395,000 from Mexico, the largest source of US immigrants. The former Soviets were a rare group, needing to obtain both exit permission from the USSR as well as entry permission from US. A large proportion were highly-educated political dissidents, many of whom were elite academics. The same is true perhaps to a lesser extent of other countries, like Algeria. The average level of education in Algeria is well below the mean for origin countries, but those who succeed in moving to the US were not typical Algerians. Instead, they were more educated than their

compatriots, so much so that as a origin country, Algeria is in the top 20% of immigrant groups to the US in educational attainment. Algerians make up less than .0005 of US immigrants - a tiny fraction - and those who have been admitted to the US have been selected for reasons that correlate well with education. The same educational attainment would not likely be found of Algerian migrants to France, where they make up a much larger fraction of the immigrant population.

Proposition 2 is slightly more subtle, but almost equally intuitive. Consider selecting the most highly educated 100,000 people from a tiny country like Laos with 7 million people versus 100,000 from India with 1.3 billion. If the distribution of underlying ability were the same in both countries, A^* for India would be higher than A^* for Laos because 100,000 people comprise a much smaller fraction of the top tail of the distribution when there are 1.3 billion than when there are 7 million. In fact, that is what is seen in the data. A substantial fraction of US immigrants come from India, comprising almost 5% of the sample of immigrants. But because India is so large, India is very much under-represented (by a factor of almost four), given its importance in world population. As such, those who come from India are from the top part of India's educational distribution. India itself is not a country with a high average level of education. Only 14 countries in the world have lower average levels of education than India has. However, because US immigration policy does not select randomly from origin countries nor from individuals within each country, Indians in the US rank second among immigrants in educational attainment.

Proposition 3 makes the more intuitive point that the more highly educated are people in the home country, the more educated are those who immigrate from them. Consider two countries with exactly the same populations and that make up exactly the same proportion of US immigrant pool. If the ability distribution from country 2 lies to the right of that from country 1, then selecting the same fraction of the upper tail from each results in a higher average level of education among those selected. This is shown in Figure 2. Two countries, 1 and 2, have similarly shaped distributions of talent, but country 2's distribution is a rightward shift of country 1's distribution. Consequently, A_2^* exceeds A_1^* by the difference in their means. Furthermore, as is the subject of corollary 4, A_2 , defined as the expectation of ability among immigrants from 2, exceeds A_1 , defined as the expectation of ability among immigrants from 1, by the difference in their means. This is equivalent to the statement that A_2 exceeds the mean of distribution 2 by the same amount that A_1 exceeds the mean of distribution 1.

Figure 2



Corollary 1 simply states propositions 1 and 2 in another intuitive form. A country can be over- or under-represented among immigrants. When a country is over-represented, the cutoff level of ability from that population must be lower than it would be were that same country under-represented among immigrants.

Corollaries 2, 3, and 4 follow directly from the model, but empirically, they are different tests of the model's logic. The dependent variable in the corollaries is Δ_i , which is not the same as \bar{A}_i . The average attainment among immigrants from country i , \bar{A}_i could be high relative to that from country j , \bar{A}_j , but that does not imply mechanically that \bar{A}_i is high relative to the average level of education in country i . For example, immigrants from the United Kingdom have average schooling attainment of 15 years, above the immigrant mean. But the average level of education in the UK is well above the mean education for other countries in the world, so the value of Δ for the UK is low. Conversely, immigrants in the US from Yemen have only 9 years of schooling, while the average level of education in Yemen is only 2.5 years, resulting in a high value of Δ . Obviously, as a statistical matter, Δ_i and \bar{A}_i are related because the former contains the latter, but they are not the same. Corollaries 2-4 provide additional predictions that can be tested and could be rejected, even were propositions 1-3 to hold empirically. Furthermore, note that the predicted relation of Δ to μ_i is zero, not negative as would result from pure statistical bias.

In the analysis below, attainment among immigrants is measured by three different variables, namely average education, hourly wages among working immigrants, and average

earnings among all immigrants from a particular country.

Without exception, all predictions of propositions 1 through 3 and corollary 1 are borne out for all three measures. Corollaries 2-4 are found to hold with respect to educational attainment, but cannot be tested for the two income variables because the data do not contain information on income for origin countries.

Specific Distributions of Ability and Implied Structural Estimates

Under more specific assumptions, the propositions and corollaries stated above can be parameterized. This approach has the advantage that it allows for interpretation of estimates, but more important, it provides additional checks on the credibility of the model and its assumptions.⁶

To begin, suppose that each origin country has a normal distribution of A with mean μ_i and variance σ^2 assumed to be the same for all countries. Some assumption on σ^2 is necessary because the data on underlying attainment in each origin country are unavailable. Recall that I_i is the exogenously determined policy variable. Let F_i^* denote the cumulative normal distribution with mean μ_i and variance σ^2 . Further, let f_i^* be the normal density with mean μ_i and variance σ^2 . Then, from (1), A_i^* can be determined as

$$(1) \quad N_i [1 - F_i^*(A_i^*)] - I_i = 0$$

and similarly

$$(2) \quad \bar{A}_i = \frac{1}{1 - F_i^*(A_i^*)} \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i^*(A) dA$$

If all the μ_i and σ were known, the exact \bar{A}_i for each country i would be determined, given μ_i . That is, once the country's ability distribution is known precisely and once A_i^* is given, it is straightforward to calculate the conditional expectation of those who are above A_i^* . Then a goodness-of-fit statistic can be computed by checking to see how well the actual \bar{A}_i compare to those predicted based on the observed μ_i of the origin country and σ .

The data below provide an average attained level of education for the 129 countries studied so that μ_i is observable. The only missing parameter is σ but this can be obtained by an iterative approach where a σ is selected, the \bar{A}_i are estimated and then are compared to the actual values of attained education among immigrants in the US. The σ is chosen so as to maximize goodness-of-fit.

⁶I ask the reader to excuse my self-indulgence. One of (if not the) first structural estimation approaches in labor and applied microeconomics appeared in my 1977 paper on a different topic. See Lazear (1977).

Data

The data on attainment of immigrants in the US are taken from the American Community Survey from years 2011 through 2015. This is a series of five consecutive cross-sectional data sets. By combining years, a larger sample is created so that more precision can be obtained. It is straightforward to adjust standard errors for population weights and to correct wage data for inflation to turn nominal wages and earnings into real values. Given the individual data, the means of attainment variables, namely, education, wages, and annual earnings can be computed by country of origin.

The variables of interest are those that measure attainment of the immigrants once in the US. They include educational attainment, wages, and income. The independent variables are either internally constructed as is the case for I_i or drawn from other data sets. UN reports provide information on average education within the origin country and population statistics are taken from World Bank data. Additionally, information on GDP per capita, share in agriculture, growth rates, proportion with tertiary education and distance of the origin country from the US is obtained. Appendix B contains the sources for each of the variables used. Additionally, data from Sweden described in a later section is used to corroborate findings and distinguish the hypothesis here from other more traditional explanations.

Results

The main results are presented in tables 1 through 3. Table 1 tests the propositions using the average educational attainment of immigrants from country i as the dependent variable. There are 129 countries with information necessary for the analysis. For each of those countries, observations on each individual in the ACS sample is used. The 129 observations consist of origin-country averages among those immigrants who are in the ACS sample.

Columns 1 through 4 of table 1 use different weighting schemes and subsamples. Column 1 is a full sample analysis where countries are weighted by the number of observations that are used to compute the mean of the dependent variable. Column 2 presents the same analysis on the same sample but weights every country equally. The results are similar, both in terms of sign and statistical significance. All the propositions are supported by these results. Specifically, the average educational attainment of immigrants from country i decline in I_i , as predicted by proposition 1, increase in N_i , as predicted by proposition 2, and increase in μ_i as predicted by proposition 3. Furthermore, the three variable model explains 73% of the variation in immigrant educational attainment (column 1).

Note that in the empirical analysis, I_{i*} is used, where I_{i*} is the number of immigrants from country i in the ACS sample, not the actual number in the US population. The relation of I_{i*} to I_i is that the latter is a scalar times the former, where the scalar is the ratio of immigrants in the country to immigrants used to compute the averages in the sample. That scalar, as elaborated below in Appendix C, is 20.7. That is, there are about 1/20th as many immigrants in the ACS sample used as in the actual US population. This has no effect on the estimates, however, because all calculations below are merely expressed either in unit-free numbers or in units that relate to the sample. It is important to remember these scale issues in comparing coefficients on

I_i^* and N_i because N_i is the actual population of the origin country in billions, whereas I_i^* is 1/20th of the immigrants in the US. The mean of I_i^* is around 11,000 whereas the mean of N_i is .05 so the coefficient on N_i is much larger than that on I_i in the table.

In accordance with proposition 1, a one standard deviation increase in a country's number of immigrants decreases the predicted level of educational attainment in the US by about .4 years on a mean level of education of 13.3 years. The predicted difference in education among immigrants from the highest immigrant provider, Mexico, and the lowest immigrant provider, Estonia is 4.3 years. The actual difference between immigrants from the two countries is not far off at 5.6 years in favor of those from Estonia.

Proposition 2 predicts that the larger the population of the origin country, the higher is the attained level of education among immigrants. A one standard deviation increase in the population of the origin country implies about .4 of a year increase in the education levels of the immigrants from that country. (Coincidentally, this is the same number as a one standard deviation change in I_i produces.) Compare a tiny country like Cape Verde with ½ million people to a large country like Nigeria with almost 200 million people. Both have similar average levels of education, but the average level of education among immigrants in the US is 9.8 years for Cape Verde immigrants versus over 15 years for those from Nigeria.⁷

The more intuitive prediction of proposition 3, that the education of immigrants from country i is positively associated with education among natives in country i , is borne out by the positive and significant coefficients on μ_i in table 1. A one standard deviation increase in the mean level of education in the origin country implies about a one year increase in education among immigrants. This is not completely consistent with the theory, however. The proof of proposition 3, derived in the appendix, yields the result that $\partial \bar{A}_i / \partial \mu_i = 1$. The coefficient in table 1 on μ_i is always less than one. Some of this may be attributed to an errors-in-variables issue, where μ_i is mis-measured, but the coefficient is substantially below 1, seeming to deviate from the literal prediction of the model.

Finally, table 1, columns 7 and 8, speak to corollary 1, where the representation ratio is used in place of I_i and N_i . Corollary 1 is supported by the results, which yield negative and statistically significant coefficients. Recall that India is very much under-represented among US immigrants, despite being US third largest supplier of immigrants. Because India is the second most populous country in the world, it is under-represented by a factor of 4 among US immigrants. The implied difference between the education of immigrants from India and that from, say, El Salvador, which is highly over-represented is about 3.5 years based on this factor alone. The actual difference is about 6 years, but it is also true that average education in El Salvador is about two years higher than that in India.

Columns 3 - 6 repeat the analysis, but with different sub-samples. In columns, 3 and 4, the four largest origin countries of immigrants are omitted to ensure that the results are not driven by a few countries. In columns 5 and 6, the smallest countries are omitted. Qualitatively, the results are unchanged, although the magnitudes do change some, especially and not

⁷The actual difference is much greater than that predicted from the coefficients in table 1, but the direction and nature of the effect is as predicted. Also, there are about 6 times as many immigrants from Nigeria than there are from Cape Verde, but there are 400 times more people in Nigeria than in Cape Verde. Indeed, Cape Verde is over-represented among immigrants by a factor of 12, whereas Nigeria is under-represented by a factor of 5.

surprisingly for the coefficient on N_i , because the omission of very large population countries changes the scale of that factor. Additionally, the conclusions are robust to weighting and sample choice. Table 2 performs the same analysis, but defines attainment in terms of the hourly wage received among those working rather than educational attainment. Columns 1 through 7 of table 2 mirror columns 1 through 7 of table 1, with all signs and statistical precision being similar across dependent variable definitions. A one standard deviation decrease in I_i implies about a \$1.20 increase in the wage on a mean wage of \$28 and a one standard deviation decrease in the representation ratio implies an over \$5 increase. Just as was the case for education, the larger the number of immigrants from an origin country, the lower is the average wage, and the larger is the population of the country, the higher is the average wage among those immigrants. Additionally, the higher is the level of education in the origin country, which serves as a proxy for the average wage in the origin country, the higher is the immigrant wage. Indeed, substituting GDP per capita for education as a proxy for wage in the origin country gives essentially the same results. Also, as was the case in table 1, all robustness checks on weightings and sub-samples confirm the initial results of the first column.

Table 3 is analogous to table 2, but the dependent variable is average earnings among all immigrants from country i . This takes into account wage conditional on working, as in table 2, but also is affected by hours of work and employment rates among the immigrant population. Again, results are qualitatively identical. The one slight difference is that μ_i does not have as important nor as precisely estimated an effect on the dependent variable as it did in table 2.

The effects estimated in table 3 can be quite large. For example, the predicted difference between average earnings of those from the Philippines, which supplies the second largest fraction of US immigrants and Mexico, which supplies the most, is \$12,495 in favor of Philippines. Although Filipinos are the second largest group of US immigrants, there are almost five times as many Mexican immigrants in the US as Filipino. That difference accounts for the much higher predicted income for Philippine immigrants. The actual difference between the two groups is about \$17,000 in favor of the Philippines. Note that the both origin countries have average levels of education of around 9 years, so the origin countries are comparable at least in this respect. Furthermore, Mexico's per capital GDP is much higher than that of the Philippines so the result among US immigrants from these two countries reflects the implicit rationing rule.

Corollary 1 has already been discussed in the context of tables 1-3. Corollary 1 simply condenses propositions 1 and 2 into the representation ratio, which is analyzed in columns 7 and 8 of the three tables. As discussed earlier, the data strongly support the contention of corollary 1, namely that the lower the representation ratio, the higher the achievement of a given country's immigrants in the US.

Corollaries 2-4 are testable in the same way that Propositions 1-3 were tested, with two exceptions. First, because there is no direct measure of average wage or earnings for all the countries in the dataset, the analysis is restricted to estimating only Δ defined in terms of education, namely the education of immigrants from country i minus the average level of education in country i .⁸

⁸It is important to use measures that are on the same scale, particularly with respect to proposition 4. The closest to wages or earnings in the US would be purchasing power parity GDP per capita, but this would not be a good proxy of comparable earnings at home if for no reason other than scaling.

Second, there is a standard statistical problem introduced by regressing Δ on independent variables that include μ because μ is part of Δ . Recall that Δ is defined as $\bar{A}_i - \mu_i$, so any measurement errors in μ_i bias the coefficient on μ_i downward. The standard solution for this problem is to instrument the independent variable, in this case, using something that is correlated with μ_i but does not have the same measurement error associated with it. Fortunately, there is another measure of education at home that is correlated with average education (as is evidenced by the first stage), but is not the same variable. The proportion of the population with tertiary education from Barro and Lee (2010) is a measure of a country's education level that is different from μ_i but related to it. That variable is used as an instrument.

Table 4 reports the results. Column 1 provides the estimates from the instrumental variables approach. As corollary 2 predicts, the sign on I_i is negative and as corollary 3 predicts, the sign on N_i is positive. The larger is the group of immigrants in the US, the smaller is the difference between the immigrants' educational attainment in the US and the average educational attainment of the population in the origin country. The larger is the population of the home country, the larger is the difference between the immigrants' educational attainment in the US and the average educational attainment of the population in the origin country. Finally, as predicted, the effect of μ is not significantly different from zero. Of course, the failure to find a significant effect of μ does not imply that corollary 4 is proved, but merely that it is not refuted and the standard error is large enough to prohibit ruling out a sizeable effect of μ_i . The r-squared from the first stage is .54 with an $F(1, 66) = 28.1$, which provides some additional evidence on the validity of the estimates.

Column 2 reports the OLS results. They are similar, with the exception of the coefficient on μ , which, not surprisingly, is negative. Entering the same variable on both sides of the equation results in bias, in this case negative.

Structural Estimates

Under the assumption of normality, a predicted attainment of immigrants in the US can be determined for each of the 129 countries. The details of the estimation are described in Appendix C. Briefly, a starting value of σ is selected. Given that value and the actual values of I_i and N_i , it is possible, using the structure in (1') and (2'), to estimate A_i^* implied by truncating the top tail of the education distribution of the origin country and assuming that all immigrants in the US from that country come from that tail. Again, this makes the extreme and obviously incorrect assumption that every immigrant in the US is from that truncated upper tail in accordance with (1').⁹ Given A_i^* and the distribution of underlying education in each origin

⁹Recall that $f_i(A)$ can be interpreted as the the transformed distribution that takes into account not only attainment, but also the proportion of those in country i with attainment level A attainment who will migrate to the US if permitted to do so. Then the assumption necessary is that the that the transformed distribution is the same across countries, up to a shifter in the mean.

country, the predicted average attained level of education, \bar{A}_i , among immigrants from each origin country i can be obtained. Goodness-of-fit can be calculated by regressing the actual \bar{A}_i on the estimated one.

A value of $\sigma = 4.7$ maximizes r-squared at .53.¹⁰ Thus, slightly more than half the variation in average attained level of education is explained by the structural model that builds in explicitly selection from the top of a normal distribution. The functional form of the normal distribution, coupled with the assumption that A^* is chosen so as to take only those from the top in accordance with (1), gives an exact predicted value of \bar{A}_i . This can be compared to the unconstrained version of table 1, column 2, which yields an r-squared of .73. The structural version of the model, which relies heavily on the assumption that immigrants are taken exclusively from the top of each countries distribution, is about 74% as effective in explaining the variation in educational attainment among immigrants as the unconstrained reduced form.

Functional Form

Equations (1) and (2) imply a particular homogeneity. Specifically, changing both I_i and N_i proportionately should not alter attainment among immigrants because A_i^* in (1) is not affected when both are multiplied by any factor λ . Multiplying I_i and N_i by λ in (1) gives

$$\lambda N_i [1 - F_i(A_i^*)] - \lambda I_i = 0$$

which reduces to equation (1) so A_i^* is independent of the scalar. Additionally, since \bar{A}_i in (2) depends only on A_i^* and on $f_i(A)$, neither of which changes with λ , \bar{A}_i is not affected by λ . This is testable. It implies that attainment across immigrant origin countries should only depend on the ratio of I_i to N_i and on μ_i , which locates the origin country's attainment distribution, but not on the absolute levels of I_i and N_i directly. Table 5 tests this homogeneity implication and explores other functional form issues.

Columns 1 and 2 report the results when only the ratio of I_i to N_i and μ_i are included as independent variables. (The mean should be included even in the form that tests heterogeneity because the distribution is permitted to shift across countries.) Column 1 weights by number of immigrants from country i and column 2 is the unweighted version. In both forms, the ratio enters negatively, as predicted.

Compare column 1 with column 3 and column 2 with column 4, the latter two allowing I_i and N_i to enter directly. Homogeneity implies that neither I_i nor N_i should matter, given the ratio of the two. That is clearly violated in both forms with I_i continuing to enter negatively and N_i entering positively. There are a number of possible explanations.

Recall that the assumption was that the distribution of A was identical across countries up to a shifter in the mean, μ_i . That assumption is violated. Specifically, large population countries have a higher conditional expectation than would be predicted, which suggests a thicker upper

¹⁰This weights observations by the number of immigrants from each country, as does column 1 of table 1. The unweighted version yields an r-squared of .503.

tail in larger countries. One possibility is economies of scale in educational production. For example, India and China have top technical universities. Smaller countries with equal per capita GDP cannot afford to support major educational institutions. If true, there would be disproportionately more highly educated individuals in large countries than in small countries, which would thicken the upper tail and result in a positive coefficient on N_i .

The negative coefficient on I_i may be driven by different immigration policy selection rules for countries that account for many versus few immigrants. In the case of countries that account for only a small number of immigrants that are under-represented in the US (like the USSR or African countries that fit the Algerian example), skill rather than other factors may be a more important consideration. Family reunification is likely to play a greater role for those countries that have large numbers of immigrants in the US. As a consequence, I_i enters negatively, even holding constant the ratio of I_i to N_i , because small countries fit the selection-from-the-top assumption more closely.

The final two columns report the results when logs rather than levels are used. Unsurprisingly, the results are not affected qualitatively.

Additional Considerations

Other Explanatory Factors

Table 6 allows other variables that are not explicitly modeled to affect the educational attainment of immigrants in the US. The inclusion of other factors raises the explanatory power by about 15 percentage points, from .73 to .88 in the weighted version of column 1. In particular, variables that measure growth and stage of development are included as is the origin country's distance from the US (capital city to Washington, DC). The variables that measure stage of development include GDP per capita, the last five years' growth rate, and the share of GDP that is comprised of agricultural output.

The results in table 6 show that none of the additional variables remains significant through all specifications. The opposite is true of the variables predicted by the model. Those coefficients maintain sign and significance throughout all specifications. Although the magnitudes are somewhat different from those found in table 1, the basic story remains the same.

In the preferred specification of column 1, the coefficients on distance, the GDP growth rate, and agriculture's share of GDP are significant. The latter two suggest that the less developed and less rapidly growing is the economy, the greater incentive for high education individuals to seek residency in the US. This seems more consistent with a supply side explanation and recall that the supply side is expected to play an important role in making the assumption of selection from the top.

Distance of the origin country from the US is also significant in column 1 and might be associated with more traditional supply-side explanations. Immigrants who are further away must bear larger costs to come to the US and this would be a barrier that might cut most for lower skilled migrants. This explanation, while plausible, is questionable for a few reasons.

First, the result is driven entirely by the four largest origin countries: Mexico, Philippines, India and China. When those countries are excluded or when each of those four

countries is allowed to have its own fixed effect, the importance of distance as an explanatory variable vanishes.

Second, India, China and the Philippines are all distant from the US. Immigrants from India have high levels of education, those from China are slightly below the median and those from Philippines are slightly above. Similarly, Mexico and Canada each border the US. Canadian immigrants have over five years more education on average than those from Mexico. Additionally, Mexicans are three times more over-represented among US immigrants than Canadians, despite equal distance of travel, which suggests that distance cannot be the primary determinant of migration patterns.

Third, the correlation between the number of immigrants from an origin country and distance is close to zero. This is not surprising because unlike in the past, in the 21st century distance is not much of an impediment to movement. The cost of airplane ticket even from distant countries to the US is low. For example, a quick online search shows that a ticket from Delhi to New York can be purchased for \$711. The difference in earnings between the US and origin countries, even for low skilled immigrants, is on the order of \$11,000 per year.¹¹ Can transportation costs really rationalize the fact that that Mexican immigrants are third from the bottom in educational ranking where those from India are second third from the top when the cost of a plane ticket is so low? Other factors must be at work.

In one of the four specifications, column 1, share in agriculture and growth are significant. Their signs suggest that the highly educated flee countries that are stagnant and agricultural. This is consistent with a supply story. But again, the result is driven by the four large countries, primarily India. India does not fit the supply story alone. Although the US tends to get highly educated Indians, as supply would suggest, they are very much under-represented among US immigrants. If supply were the only factor, one would expect large numbers of educated Indians entering the US. The fact that Indians also make up a significant fraction of those applying for H-1B visas and that those visas run out long before demand is satisfied suggests that rationing must be a major part of the explanation.

The conclusion from the empirical analysis is that the model works well in predicting who ends up in the US. Although supply considerations may matter, particularly in determining who is successful in being admitted to the US, a structure that assumes that all who are admitted come and that the US admits from the top of the attainment distribution of each country after determining how many to admit from each county explains the data well. All predictions are borne out and the structural model provides a good fit with the data.

Explicit Policy Deviates from that Assumed

In a typical year, over 60% of those issued permanent resident status are family sponsored. Although this does not rule out that those individuals are from the top of the educational attainment distribution at home, it does not appear to be a criterion that is closely related to selecting the most able from each country.

Even though the model is admittedly stylized, it would be useful to find some evidence that lends some credence to its assumptions and especially the assumption is that potential

¹¹See Hanson, et. al., (2017) and my comment on that paper in the same volume.

migrants are selected from the top of the origin country's attainment distribution.

There is at least some support for the view that immigrants are selected from the top of the distribution. Recall that Δ_i is defined as the difference between the average educational attainment among immigrants and the average attainment in origin country i . To the extent that immigration slots to the US are scarce and desirable, ability may come into play in finding ways to make it into the US. Some of this is explicit. A number of skills-based green cards are issued to highly educated foreign citizens who eventually become residents and citizens of the US. But given the number who enter through other legal channels, not to mention those who come in illegally, it is worth exploring the validity of the assumption that the highly able from any given country are selected into the United States. In 129 out of 129 cases, Δ_i is positive, meaning that the average educational attainment of immigrants from country i exceeds the average level of education in country i . The difference averages 4.8 years, with a low of $\frac{1}{2}$ year and a high of 11 $\frac{1}{2}$ years.

Although supportive of the assumption, the evidence is not conclusive because educational attainment of those who are in the US might be higher than that of those who remain in the origin country if for no other reason than the US has higher average education than the world as a whole. After arriving in the US, immigrants might invest in education, consistent with being in a more highly educated society. If there is an effect of this sort, it is apparently swamped by other factors as discussed below. Column 6 of table 6 enters the average number of years in the US. The coefficient is negative, meaning that the longer in the US, the lower level of education. This does not disprove the hypothesis that being in the US increases education relative to what would be attained at home, but it is not supportive of that view. Of course, selection and cohort effects, as discussed later, may account for this finding.¹²

In considering the validity of the assumptions, there are a number of other factors to consider. First, the countries most likely to have immigrants who come in on family, with a few exceptions,¹³ sponsorship are those that have the largest number already in the US. They may bring the average level of education down, not because there are so many of them, but because they are selected on family basis, rather than skill. Although possible and probably true to some extent, the relationships predicted by the propositions and corollaries hold even whether the high immigrant countries, which also account for much of family reunification, are included or not.

Second, as already discussed, it is likely that in addition to the rationing rule, supply side considerations enter. Obtaining permission to reside in the United States may be more easily acquired by those who are the most educated, given that slots are rationed. This pushes in the direction of getting the top immigrants from any given country, as assumed.

Third, Hanson, Liu, and McIntosh (2017) find that even for Mexico, which supplies the largest number of migrants to the US and which also is the largest source of unskilled labor, those who come to the United States are drawn from middle-income Mexicans, not from the lowest part of the income distribution. Grogger and Hanson (2015) find selective preference for

¹²Chiswick and Miller (2011) argue that there is some negative assimilation that occurs after migration. This pertains particularly when the origin country is the same as the destination country so may have less validity in this context. Chiswick and Miller (2012) investigate both negative and positive assimilation.

¹³El Salvador being a good example, being over-represented by a factor of 32.

staying in the US among foreign students in the US who have more educated parents and merit-based financial support. Again, this is a supply-side justification for the assumption that selection ends up being from the top of the distribution. Additionally, Docquier, Lohest, and Marfouk (2007) pay explicit attention to “brain drain” from developing countries to more advanced places and document this, noting in particular that it has increased over time. Selection from the top is the recipient country’s description of what the origin country calls brain drain.

Why Aren’t Supply-based Explanations Sufficient?

Consider a pure supply theory of migration where those who get the most out of migrating move to the United States. There are a variety of versions of this, with the earliest being that of Sjaastad (1962). Already mentioned is the well-known work of Borjas (1987), which formalizes and applies the Roy (1951) model to migration.¹⁴

If country-specific rationing were not a factor, then there would be a supply determined A^* that in the simplest case would be world-wide. Whether a Sjaastad or Roy-style model determined the desire to migrate, absent country-specific idiosyncratic factors, one would expect that there would be a level of ability such that those above that cutoff level found it worthwhile to migrate and those below did not.¹⁵ Under these circumstances, there would be no implied negative relation between the number from any country and average attainment in the US. In fact, it would likely go in the opposite direction from that predicted by this model and found in the data. Consider two countries of the same size. Given the same cutoff A^* , if country A sends more migrants to the US than does country B, then there must be a fatter upper tail in country A than in B, which would generally imply that the expected attainment of those from A would exceed that of those from B. But the reverse is true. The higher is I_i , the lower is the attainment of immigrants from i .

Either country specificity of some sort and a policy-driven country-based rationing rule is necessary to achieve the results. The role for supply emphasized here is in having the most able fill whatever quota is set by policymakers. An alternative is to simply assume that there are characteristics that vary by country causing the cost of migration to be higher from some countries than from others so that countries with high migration costs send few and able migrants. This has already been addressed in previous sections, but it is worth considering the argument more specifically in this context.

Allowing costs to differ by country of origin is analogous to the gravity models used in trade economics¹⁶. Countries tend to trade more with their closest neighbors. Analogously,

¹⁴Grogger and Hanson (2011) find some support for the wage differential model driving selection of immigrants into a country. In particular, because there is a large difference between wages of high and low-skilled immigrants in the US, skilled immigrants tend to prefer the US as a destination country. What seems most relevant is the difference between the wages of the skilled in the destination country and the origin country, but this is likely to be correlated with the destination country’s skill premium.

¹⁵If unskilled labor were favored in the US relative to other countries, then the reverse would be true. Those with ability below some A^* would migrate and those above would not.

¹⁶See, for example, Bergstrand (1985) and Lewer, and Karemera, Oguledo and Davis (2000) and Van den Berg (2008), the latter two of which are direct applications to immigration.

individuals are more likely to move closer neighbors than to more distant ones. It is surely true that a migration version of gravity models explains some of the migration pattern. When countries are ranked by their representation ratios, nine of the top ten are from the Western Hemisphere. Without exception, these are countries with small populations, the largest being El Salvador with about 6 million people. As already discussed in detail above, distance is not a good predictor of the number of immigrants in the US. Recall that there is no significant correlation between distance of a country from the US and the number of immigrants from that country. Nor is distance a consistent factor in explaining attainment in the US (see table 6). Distance matters in some specifications in table 6, but not in others. A couple of additional points are relevant.

First, from a supply point of view, it is the gain from migration, not the final attainment, that should be related to the desire to migrate. As a consequence, it is necessary to argue that those who attain the highest levels of education in the US also have the most to gain from migration, given the costs. This is not an obvious proposition, but it is not unreasonable given that the value of education in a highly developed economy may well be higher than that in a less developed one.

Second, factors that are most likely to affect supply do not consistently explain attainment in the US in table 6. More important, those factors do not explain the number of immigrants from a given country. When the number of immigrants from a given country is regressed on potential supply determinants, which include per-capita GDP, origin country growth rate, share in agriculture and distance from the US with a control for country size, none (except country size) is significant. Similarly, the same regression, but using as the dependent variable the ratio I_i / N_i (and omitting N_i from the independent variables) finds no significant relationships, except distance. This suggests that supply alone does not do well to explain the pattern of migration from the various source countries.

Finally, can there be any doubt that immigration policy affects migration flows? If a desirable destination country decides for political reasons to let in more people from a given source country, there will be more from that country. Evidence from a comparison between Sweden and the US makes that clear.

Sweden does not base its immigration on the basis of skill. Like the US, other factors are important in determining the composition of migrants to Sweden, but the factors in Sweden are different from those in the US. Sweden accepts immigrants largely on the basis of refugee status. Other than the Scandinavian countries and countries related to them through history, the most over-represented origin countries for immigrants in Sweden are Bosnia, Lebanon, Somalia, Eritrea, and Iraq, which are countries with many fleeing from war.

Data were obtained from the Swedish Registry administrative data (Statistics Sweden) and from Registret över befolkningens utbildning for data on educational attainment.¹⁷ The

¹⁷The Swedish dataset contains statistics for 98 countries (including Sweden) between the years 2011 and 2015. The number of observations included for each year are as follows: 5,472,582 (2011); 5,499,465 (2012); 5,528,680 (2013); 5,568,916 (2014); and 5,605,685 (2015). Immigrants account for about 19% of the sample. The earnings and transfer values refer to individuals between the ages 20 and 64, while the education values refer to individuals between the ages of 25 and 64. All variables come from register data (administrative sources) by Statistics Sweden and therefore cover all individuals who were registered in

underlying dataset is similar to the ACS for the US and covers years 2011-2015 as in the US. Table 7 reports results.

First, columns 1 and 2 repeat the analysis done for the US in table 1. The only change is that I_i used is the number of immigrants from country i in Sweden, rather than in the US. The mean level of education and population of the origin country do not change. Just as for the US, the number of immigrants from a country has a strong negative effect, whereas population and education of the origin country have strong positive effects. Important is that the negative effect of number of immigrants from country i is completely different in Sweden than it is in the US because of Swedish policy, not plausibly because of supply conditions that differ since the only difference would be distance. Sweden does not have many Iraqis and Somalis relative to the US because those countries are closer; it is because Sweden chose to let them in. Yet the effect of the variable is the same as it is in the US, even though it is driven by different countries.

Column 3 provides additional evidence on this point. If supply were sufficient to explain migration patterns and attainment, then because the US economy is not so different from that of Sweden, one might expect the number who come to the US would be a good indicator of supply forces inducing those to come to Sweden as well. Thus, the number of immigrants in the US from country i is entered in column 3. It has no effect on attainment in Sweden, but the number of immigrants in Sweden from country i continues to matter. Even the educational attainment of immigrants from i in the US is not a very strong predictor of attainment of immigrants in Sweden as seen in column 4, and again, the number of immigrants from country i in Sweden remains a negative factor, albeit on the margin of significance.

Reverse Causation

The primary implication of the model is that those countries that provide a large number of migrants to the US have lower educational attainment. The assumption is that I_i , the number selected from country i , is the policy variable, not the educational attainment level itself. But suppose the US had an explicit policy of letting in only low-skilled individuals, say to prevent competition with the higher skilled native-born Americans, and let in more from low-skilled countries intentionally.

First, μ_i which measures education in the origin country, should control for this factor. If the US is intentionally admitting those from low skilled countries, μ_i would be lower on average among the immigrant population, but including μ_i as an explanatory variable should leave no room for I_i or N_i to influence average attainment among immigrants. Still, it is worth exploring the reverse causation more directly.

The best evidence is provided by the simple correlation of I_i and μ_i , which is essentially zero at $-.02$.¹⁸ There does not seem to be any pattern of selecting more immigrants from countries with low levels of educational attainment.

Sweden each particular. All variables associated with education level come from Statistics Sweden's *Registret över befolkningens utbildning* or "Register of Population Education."

¹⁸It is $-.004$ when weighted by the number of immigrants from the country.

Another possibility is that immigrants with low levels of education are more likely to be admitted to the United States on an individual basis. Although possible, there is no reason why this would result in a negative correlation between number from any particular country and average skill level. Low-skill immigrants might be selected, but there are plenty of low-skilled immigrants in the world and there is nothing that implies that the lowest skilled would all be from one country. Were this the case, randomly selected low skilled would come disproportionately from high population countries with many low skilled individuals. India is the second most populous country and has one of the lowest levels of education of the 134 countries. Yet Indians in the US are both under-represented among immigrants in the US and highly educated. Given that the US allows in many Indians and given that there are many poorly educated Indians, if the policy were to select negatively on the basis of skill, one would expect that the Indians who are here would be of low skill. The model implies the opposite, namely that selection is from the top of the distribution, not the bottom. Indians in the US are highly educated because a small number of Indians are admitted relative to the Indian population. That selection rule is consistent with the results.

Furthermore, a policy that seeks low-skilled immigrants does not appear to be a true description of the data. The average educational attainment among immigrants in the sample as a whole is a little over 12 years, which is not much below that for the native-born American population.

Random Selection of Immigrants

The implications on I_i and N_i that form the basis of propositions 1 and 2 and corollaries 2 and 3, are a result of a model that assumes immigration slots are rationed on the basis of ability, from the top down. Were the selection process random, there would be no reason to expect that countries that were sources of a larger number of immigrants, I_i , would have lower levels of attainment. The same is true of population of the origin country. Were immigrants selected randomly, then the distribution of talent in the US would mimic that of the origin country. Proposition 3 and corollary 4, which postulate a positive correlation between origin country educational attainment and educational attainment of their US immigrants, would result from random selection because countries with higher levels of educational attainment would also send migrants with higher levels of education under random selection. The most important implications, however, are violated by the random selection model.

Dynamics

The model is a static one period structure. Individuals are treated as if they are endowed with a particular level of attainment before migrating and that level sticks with them throughout their lifetimes. But individuals may choose to alter their levels of education after arriving in their destination country and as mentioned earlier, it may be easier to invest in education in the US than in the country of origin. It is worth considering that empirically. In column 5 of table 6, the average number of years that an immigrant group has been in the United States is included as a regressor. Although it is significant, it is negative, meaning that groups that have been here longer have lower levels of attainment, not higher ones. Apparently, the changes have taken place over time in educational attainment levels of immigrants swamp the presumably positive

effects of being in the US on educational attainment. Those groups that have been here for many years have lower levels of educational attainment than more recent arrivals, perhaps because the average level of education in the world has increased over time and individuals tend to migrate when they are young.

Conclusion

The larger the number of immigrants from a given country, the lower is the educational attainment and wages of that group. The pattern is a result of a selective immigration process that rations slots. Because of variations in the way the various origin countries are treated by the immigration system, a particular distribution of immigrants results, which gives rise to differences in educational attainment and earnings by country of origin. Those countries that are awarded the largest number of slots tend to supply lower average ability immigrants.

For the same reason, the larger the population of the origin country, the higher the attainment of immigrants from that country. It is easier to select one million highly educated people from India with 1.3 billion people than it is from Laos with 7 million people. Consequently, immigrants of Indian origin have higher levels of educational attainment than do immigrants of Laotian origin.

A model of selection is constructed that yields seven specific empirical implications, all of which are borne out by data from the American Communities Survey, 2011-2015. The larger the number of immigrants from an origin country, the lower the level of educational attainment, of wages and of earnings in the US. The larger the population of the origin country, the higher the educational attainment, the higher the wages and the higher the earnings of those immigrants in the US. A more parsimonious approach expresses predictions in terms of a representation ratio, which is a measure of how under- or over-represented a country is in the US immigrant stock. Countries that are more over-represented are predicted and found to have lower attainment in education, wages and earnings.

The theory also has implications for the difference between attainment of immigrants and that of the population in the origin country. This provides a separate test of the model and all implications are borne out. In particular, the larger is the stock of immigrants from any given country, the smaller is the difference between the attainment of immigrants from that country and the origin population. Additionally, the larger is the population of the origin country, the larger is the difference between the attainment of immigrants from that country and the origin population.

The model that gives a role to only these three variables explains 73% of the variation in country-mean educational attainment of immigrants in the US. A structural approach that assumes normality of the underlying educational distribution coupled with the model's specific selection rule performs well in explaining the data, yielding a goodness-of-fit statistic that is about three-quarters as high as the unconstrained reduced form version. Overall, the model that postulates selection from the top of origin countries' ability distribution does well in describing the actual data.

References

- Barro, Robert and Jong-Wha Lee. 2010. "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010." *Journal of Development Economics* 104(C): 184-198.
- J.H. Bergstrand. 1985. "The gravity equation in international trade: Some microeconomic foundations and empirical evidence." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 67(3): 474-481.
- Borjas, George J. 1987. "Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants." *The American Economic Review* 77(4): 531-553.
- Borjas, George J. And Rachel M. Friedberg. 2009. "Recent Trends in the Earnings of New Immigrants to the United States." Working Paper no. 15406, NBER, Cambridge, MA.
- Chiswick, Barry R. and Paul Miller. 2011. "The 'Negative' Assimilation of Immigrants: A Special Case." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 64(3): 502-525.
- Chiswick, Barry R. and Paul Miller. 2012. "Negative and Positive Assimilation, Skill Transferability, and Linguistic Distance." *Journal of Human Capital* 6(1): 35-55.
- Docquier, Frederic, Olivier Lohest, and Abdeslam Marfouk. "Brain Drain in Developing Countries." *The World Bank Economic Review* 21(2): 193-218.
- Grogger, Jeffrey and Gordon Hanson. 2011. "Income Maximization and the Selection and Sorting of International Migrants." *Journal of Development Economics* 95(1): 42-57.
- Grogger, Jeffrey and Gordon H. Hanson. 2015. "Attracting Talent: Location Choices of Foreign-Born PhDs in the United States." *Journal of Labor Economics* 33(S1): S5-S38.
- Hanson, Gordon, Chen Liu, and Craig McIntosh. 2017. "Along the Watchtower: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Low-Skilled Immigration." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Washington, D.C.
- Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. Penn World Table Version 7.1. Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, Nov 2012.
- Hunt, Jennifer. 2011. "Which Immigrants are Most Innovative and Entrepreneurial?" *Journal of Labor Economics* 29(3): 417-457.
- Hunt, Jennifer. 2015. "Are Immigrants the Most Skilled US Computer and Engineering Workers?" *Journal of Labor Economics* 33(S1): S39-S77.

- Karemera, David, Victor Iwuagwu Oguledo, and Bobby Davis. 2000. "A gravity model analysis of international migration to North America." *Journal of Applied Economics* 32(13): 1745-55.
- Kerr, William R. and William F. Lincoln. 2010. "The Supply Side of Innovation: H1-B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention." *Journal of Labor Economics* 28(3): 473-508.
- Kerr, William R., Sari Pekkala Kerr, and William F. Lincoln. 2015. "Skilled Immigration and the Employment Structure of US Firms." *Journal of Labor Economics* 33(S1): S147-S186.
- Lazear, Edward P. 1999. "Culture and Language." *Journal of Political Economy* 107(S6): S95-S126.
- Lazear, Edward P. 1977. "Education: Consumption or Production?" *Journal of Political Economy* 85:3 (June 1977): 569-97.
- Lewis, Ethan. 2013. "Immigrant-Native Substitutability and the Role of Language" in *Immigration, Policy, and Socioeconomic Inequality*, ed. David Card and Stephen Raphael. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2013, pp. 60-97.
- Peri, Giovanni, Kevin Shih, and Chad Sparber. 2015. "STEM Workers, H-1B Visas, and Productivity in US Cities." *Journal of Labor Economics* 33(S1): S225-S255.
- Roy, Arthur. 1951. "Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings." *Oxford Economic Papers* 3(2): 135-146.
- Sjaastad, Larry A. 1962. "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration." *Journal of Political Economy* 70(5): 80-93.
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics. *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2014*. Washington, D.C., August 2016.
<<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%202014%20Yearbook.pdf>>
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents: 2015*. by Ryan Baugh and Katherine Witsman, Washington D.C., March 2017.
<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Lawful_Permanent_Residents_2015.pdf>
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents: 2014*. by Nadwa Mossaad, Washington D.C., April 2016.
<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Lawful_Permanent_Residents_2014.pdf>

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. Annual Immigrant Visa Waiting List Report as of November 1, 2015. 2015.

Van den Berg, Hendrik and Joshua L. Lewer. 2008. "A gravity model of immigration."
Economic Letters 99(1):164-167.

Table 1. Attainment of Immigrants in US

Dependent Variable: A_i measured as average years of schooling completed among immigrants from country i

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
I_i	-0.0000109*** (0.000000694)	-0.0000146*** (0.00000319)	-0.0000384*** (0.00000598)	-0.0000543*** (0.0000103)	-0.0000103*** (0.00000145)	-0.0000108*** (0.00000384)		
N_i	2.530*** (0.309)	2.851*** (0.688)	15.27*** (1.933)	12.00*** (2.050)	2.702*** (0.631)	2.899*** (0.829)		
μ_i	0.324*** (0.0532)	0.267*** (0.0412)	0.405*** (0.0365)	0.293*** (0.0367)	0.364*** (0.124)	0.401*** (0.109)	0.192** (0.0799)	0.252*** (0.0419)
R_i							-0.112*** (0.0168)	-0.0458*** (0.0101)
Weight	I_i	None	I_i	None	I_i	None	I_i	None
Sample	Full	Full	Without Mexico, Philipp., India, China	Without Mexico, Philipp., India, China	$I_i > 10,000$	$I_i > 10,000$	Full	Full
Constant	10.19*** (0.496)	11.09*** (0.380)	9.373*** (0.373)	10.84*** (0.351)	9.631*** (1.179)	9.348*** (1.037)	11.41*** (0.703)	11.47*** (0.381)
Observations	129	129	125	125	29	29	129	129
R^2	0.726	0.346	0.633	0.461	0.760	0.515	0.279	0.304

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2. Attainment of Immigrants in the US

Dependent Variable: A_i measured as average hourly wage among working immigrants from country i

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
I_i	-0.0000332*** (0.00000288)	-0.0000432*** (0.0000155)	-0.000120*** (0.0000278)	-0.000145*** (0.0000547)	-0.0000306*** (0.00000606)	-0.0000325* (0.0000172)		
N_i	12.08*** (1.282)	13.18*** (3.338)	48.90*** (8.969)	38.32*** (10.86)	12.53*** (2.639)	13.39*** (3.718)		
μ_i	1.484*** (0.221)	1.521*** (0.200)	1.868*** (0.170)	1.607*** (0.195)	1.446*** (0.518)	1.752*** (0.488)	0.819*** (0.295)	1.440*** (0.198)
R_i							-0.414*** (0.0621)	-0.196*** (0.0476)
Weight	I_i	None	I_i	None	I_i	None	I_i	None
Sample	Full	Full	Without Mexico, Philipp., India, China	Without Mexico, Philipp., India, China	$I_i > 10,000$	$I_i > 10,000$	Full	Full
Constant	13.89*** (2.060)	14.63*** (1.843)	10.47*** (1.731)	13.77*** (1.859)	13.22** (4.934)	10.75** (4.650)	21.33*** (2.599)	16.65*** (1.805)
Observations	129	129	125	125	29	29	129	129
R^2	0.658	0.358	0.567	0.390	0.690	0.476	0.286	

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3. Attainment of Immigrants in the US
 Dependent Variable: A_i measured as average earnings among immigrants from country i

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
I_i	-0.0401*** (0.00449)	-0.0557** (0.0239)	-0.196*** (0.0434)	-0.216** (0.0847)	-0.0364*** (0.00940)	-0.0425 (0.0275)		
N_i	15811.9*** (1996.2)	17487.7*** (5156.7)	60725.9*** (14029.1)	52094.2*** (16802.8)	16086.6*** (4090.0)	17307.1*** (5942.8)		
μ_i	985.4*** (343.9)	1206.6*** (308.7)	1585.7*** (265.2)	1334.4*** (301.2)	753.9 (802.6)	1446.6* (780.1)	104.3 (418.1)	1093.7*** (309.1)
R_i							-501.7*** (87.98)	-226.1*** (74.20)
Weight	I_i	None	I_i	None	I_i	None	I_i	None
Sample	Full	Full	Without Mexico, Philipp., India, China	Without Mexico, Philipp., India, China	$I_i > 10,000$	$I_i > 10,000$	Full	Full
Constant	22766.2*** (3208.5)	22583.9*** (2846.8)	18438.9*** (2708.3)	21453.6*** (2878.3)	23413.6*** (7646.9)	18274.8** (7432.9)	32686.0*** (3683.2)	25141.0*** (2813.7)
Observations	129	129	125	125	29	29	129	129
R^2	0.539	0.171	0.364	0.197	0.587	0.308	0.205	0.143

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4
 Difference Between Educational Attainment in US and Origin Country

	(1)	(2)
	Δ_i	Δ_i
	IV	OLS
I_i^*	-.0000109*** (.0000006)	-.0000109*** (.0000006)
N_i	3.40*** (0.61)	2.53*** (0.31)
μ_i	-.279 (.183)	-.675*** (.053)
Observations	70	70
R-squared	0.79	.83

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Functional Form Explorations

Attainment of Immigrants in US

Dependent Variable: A_i measured as average years of schooling completed among immigrants from country i

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
I_i/N_i	-0.000000540*** (.0000000811)	-0.000000221*** (.0000000485)	-0.000000219*** (.0000000517)	-0.000000182*** (.0000000453)		
μ_i	0.192** (0.0799)	0.252*** (0.0419)	0.312*** (0.0500)	0.270*** (0.0389)	0.277*** (0.0552)	0.307*** (0.0351)
I_i			-0.00000997*** (0.000000686)	-0.0000130*** (0.00000304)		
N_i			2.158*** (0.303)	2.451*** (0.658)		
$\ln(I_i)$					-1.379*** (0.0872)	-0.647*** (0.0816)
$\ln(N_i)$					0.951*** (0.0892)	0.551*** (0.0612)
Weight	I_i	None	I_i	None	I_i	None
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full
Constant	11.41*** (0.703)	11.47*** (0.381)	10.67*** (0.479)	11.28*** (0.362)	27.15*** (1.133)	18.47*** (0.865)
Observations	129	129	129	129	129	129
R^2	0.279	0.304	0.761	0.421	0.680	0.536

Standard errors clustered at the area level.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6. Attainment of Immigrants in U.S.

Dependent Variable: A_i measured as average years of schooling completed among immigrants from country i

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
I_i	-0.00000660*** (0.00000104)	-0.0000104*** (0.00000313)	-0.0000296** (0.0000131)	-0.0000510*** (0.0000163)	-0.00000678*** (0.00000099)
N_i	1.599*** (0.385)	1.801** (0.692)	9.680*** (3.626)	11.98*** (3.385)	1.1512*** (0.367)
μ_i	0.447*** (0.125)	0.360*** (0.105)	0.565*** (0.115)	0.401*** (0.0962)	.504*** (0.120)
Distance from US	0.000275*** (0.0000709)	0.000152** (0.0000737)	0.0000653 (0.0000828)	0.000000662 (0.0000785)	.000274*** (0.0000673)
GDP per capita	0.0000310 (0.0000218)	0.0000142 (0.0000172)	-0.00000153 (0.0000201)	0.0000144 (0.0000157)	.0000513** (.0000219)
GDP Growth Rate (last five years)	-0.117* (0.0568)	0.0423 (0.0471)	0.0713 (0.0574)	0.0880* (0.0441)	-.147*** (.0549)
Share of GDP from agriculture	0.161*** (0.0507)	0.0573 (0.0356)	0.0795* (0.0453)	0.0421 (0.0324)	.153** (.0481)
Years in the United States					-.0843*** (.0302)
Constant	6.718*** (1.286)	8.706*** (1.103)	6.965*** (1.154)	8.982*** (1.025)	8.407*** (1.361)
Weight	I_i	None	I_i	None	I_i
Sample	Full	Full	Without Mexico, Philipp., India, China	Without Mexico, Philipp., India, China	Full
Observations	69	69	65	65	69
R^2	0.879	0.461	0.579	0.503	0.893

 $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Analysis of Sweden

Dependent Variable: Proportion with post-secondary degree

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$I_{i \text{ Sweden}}$	-0.000000801** (0.000000348)	-0.00000211*** (0.000000558)	-0.000000766** (0.000000349)	-0.000000670* (0.000000347)
N_i	0.205*** (0.0437)	0.213*** (0.0498)	0.149** (0.0677)	0.109 (0.0697)
μ_i	0.0189*** (0.00423)	0.0256*** (0.00396)	0.0184*** (0.00424)	0.0145*** (0.00465)
$I_{i \text{ US}}$			0.00000110 (0.00000102)	0.00000142 (0.00000101)
$A_{i \text{ US}}$				0.0210* (0.0110)
Weight	$I_{i \text{ Sweden}}$	None	$I_{i \text{ Sweden}}$	$I_{i \text{ Sweden}}$
Constant	0.102** (0.0445)	0.0957** (0.0402)	0.0975** (0.0446)	-0.157 (0.140)
Observations	77	77	77	77
R^2	0.397	0.482	0.406	0.435

Standard errors clustered at the area level.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix A

Proofs

Proposition 1:

From (1), using the implicit function theorem,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial I_i} &= - \frac{\partial / \partial I_i}{\partial / \partial A_i^*} \\ &= \frac{-1}{N_i f_i(A_i^*)} \end{aligned}$$

which is negative.

Note also that in (3), $\left[\frac{\int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} - A_i^* \right]$ is just the conditional expectation of A , given $A > A_i^*$,

minus A_i^* , which is necessarily positive since the conditional expectation must exceed its lower limit. This implies that the sign of the first term in (3) is just the sign of $\partial A_i^* / \partial x$.

Additionally, when underlying distribution of ability, $f_i(A_i^*)$, is independent of x as it is for $x = I_i$, the sign of the derivative in (3) is the same as that of $\partial A_i^* / \partial x$ because the second term is zero.

Thus, since $\partial A_i^* / \partial I_i < 0$, \bar{A}_i decreases in I_i . |||

Proposition 2:

Analogously,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial N_i} &= - \frac{\partial / \partial N_i}{\partial / \partial A_i^*} \\ &= \frac{1 - F_i(A_i^*)}{N_i f_i(A_i^*)} \end{aligned}$$

which is positive. By the same logic is in the proof above, and since $f_i(A)$ does not depend on N_i ,

$$\frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial N_i} > 0. \quad |||$$

Proposition 3:

First note that when $F_i(A) = F(A - \mu_i)$,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial \mu_i} &= -\frac{\partial / \partial \mu_i}{\partial / \partial A_i^*} \\ &= \frac{N_i f(A_i^* - \mu_i)}{N_i f(A_i^* - \mu_i)} \\ &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

from (1).

Substituting into (3) yields

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial \mu_i} &= \frac{f_i(A_i^* - \mu_i)}{1 - F(A_i^* - \mu_i)} \left[\frac{\int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} - A_i^* \right] \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{1 - F(A_i^* - \mu_i)} \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A \frac{\partial f(A - \mu_i)}{\partial \mu_i} dA \end{aligned}$$

The first term is positive because, as stated before, the conditional expectation exceeds its lower limit. The second term is positive because

$$\frac{\partial f(A - \mu_i)}{\partial \mu_i} = -f'(A - \mu_i)$$

and because $f'(A) < 0$ for $A > A_i^*$. |||

Corollaries

The proofs of the corollaries follow.

Corollary 1:

Rewrite (1) as

$$[1 - F_i(A_i^*)] - R_i \frac{\sum_i I_i}{\sum_i N_i} = 0$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial R_i} &= \frac{-\partial}{\partial R_i} \\ &= \frac{-\partial}{\partial A_i^*} \\ &= \frac{-\sum_i I_i / \sum_i N_i}{f_i(A_i^*)} \end{aligned}$$

which is negative. Using the same logic as in the proof of proposition 1 and noting that $F_i(A)$ does not depend on R_i ,

$$\frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial R_i} < 0 \quad \parallel$$

To prove the corollaries that relate to Δ , note that for any variable x ,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \Delta}{\partial x} &= \frac{f_i(A_i^*) \frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial x}}{[1 - F_i(A_i^*)]} \left[\frac{\int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} - A_i^* \right] \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A \frac{\partial f_i(A)}{\partial x} dA \\ &\quad - \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} A \frac{\partial f_i(A)}{\partial x} dA \end{aligned}$$

Corollary 2:

Since $F_i(A)$ does not depend on I_i and since $\frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial I_i} = \frac{-1}{N_i f_i(A_i^*)}$,

$$\frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial I_i} = \frac{f_i(A_i^*) \left[\frac{-1}{N_i f_i(A_i^*)} \right]}{[1 - F_i(A_i^*)]} \left[\frac{\int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} - A_i^* \right] < 0$$

|||

Corollary 3: Since $F_i(A)$ does not depend on N_i and since $\frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial N_i} = \frac{1 - F_i(A_i^*)}{N_i f_i(A_i^*)}$, which is positive,

$$\frac{\partial \bar{A}_i}{\partial N_i} = \frac{f_i(A_i^*) \left[\frac{1 - F_i(A_i^*)}{N_i f_i(A_i^*)} \right]}{[1 - F_i(A_i^*)]} \left[\frac{\int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} - A_i^* \right] > 0$$

|||

Corollary 4:

Consider two countries. Define the base country as having an ability distribution given by $F(A)$ and arbitrary country i as having an ability distributions $F_i(A)$, where as in the text, $F_i(A)$ is a displacement of $F(A)$ by μ_i .

The cutoff level for the base country is A^* to satisfy (1) such that

$$N_0 [1 - F(A^*)] = I_0$$

where I_0 is the policy determined number of immigrants from the base country. The expectation of A among those who immigrate.

Recall that

$$\frac{\partial A_i^*}{\partial \mu_i} = 1$$

so that $A_i^* = A^* + \mu_i$. The goal is to show that Δ is invariant with respect to μ . This is equivalent to showing that average ability among immigrants, \bar{A}_i , is greater than \bar{A} by μ_i because

$$\Delta_i = \bar{A}_i - E(A_i)$$

$$\Delta = \bar{A} - E(A)$$

and

$$E(A_i) - E(A) = \mu_i$$

so if $\Delta_i = \Delta$,

then

$$\bar{A}_i - \bar{A} = \mu_i$$

Definitionally,

$$\bar{A}_i = \frac{1}{1 - F_i(A_i^*)} \int_{A_i^*}^{\infty} A f_i(A) dA$$

or

$$\bar{A}_i = \frac{1}{1 - F(A^*)} \int_{A^* + \mu_i}^{\infty} A f(A - \mu_i) dA$$

because $F_i(A) = F(A - \mu_i)$, $f_i(A) = f(A - \mu_i)$ and $A_i^* = A^* + \mu_i$.

A change of variables allows this to be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{A}_i &= \frac{1}{1 - F(A^*)} \int_{A^*}^{\infty} (A + \mu_i) f(A) dA \\ &= \frac{1}{1 - F(A^*)} \int_{A^*}^{\infty} A f(A) dA + \frac{\mu_i}{1 - F(A^*)} \int_{A^*}^{\infty} f(A) dA \\ &= \frac{1}{1 - F(A^*)} \int_{A^*}^{\infty} A f(A) dA + \frac{\mu_i [1 - F(A^*)]}{1 - F(A^*)} \\ &= \bar{A} + \mu_i \end{aligned}$$

Appendix B
Additional Tables

Table B-1

Variable	Description	Source	Mean	Std Dev
A_i (Education)	Mean years of schooling among immigrants from country i	ACS	13.32207	1.641941
A_i (Hourly Wage)	Mean wage among immigrants from country i (condition on working)	ACS	27.79516	7.738721
A_i (Annual Earnings)	Mean earnings among immigrants from country i (unconditional)	ACS	33062.38	10567.58
I_i	Number of immigrants in US from country i	ACS	11291.1	36397.28
N_i	Population of country i	World Bank Database 2015	0527341	170682
u_i	Mean schooling in country i	UN Development Reports 2016	8.611628	2.796416
R_i	Representation ratio	created	6.279349	12.64804
Tertiary _i	Percentage with tertiary education in country i	Barro and Lee	10.6199	6.762148
GDP/person _i	Per capita GDP in purchasing power parity dollars	Heston and Summers	18071.52	13331.35
GDP growth _i	5 year growth rate of GDP	Heston and Summers	3.774583	3.437578
Agr share in GDP _i	Agricultural output / total output in country i	World Bank	6.976657	6.589

Appendix C

Recall that I_i refers to the actual number of immigrants from country i . For most of the analysis, the number is the sample was used because the scaling of I_i relative to N_i is of no consequence. But for this analysis, which relies on the actual number of immigrants and of the population of the native country, that scalar is relevant, but easy to obtain.

Immigrants make up .0993 of the ACS sample (of those 25 years old and above). In the middle sample year of 2013, the population of the US was 316 million meaning that an ACS based estimate would imply about 31 million in the US are immigrants. Thus, to estimate the actual number of immigrants from country i , it is sufficient to blow up the ACS by the ratio of observations relative to the population. There are 1.513 million immigrants used to compile the averages used in tables 1-4. Since the actual number of immigrants is 31 million,

$$\begin{aligned} I_i &= (\text{sample number of immigrants}) \times (31/1.513) \\ &= (\text{sample number of immigrants}) \times 20.7 \end{aligned}$$

The number of immigrants from country i is given by (1) as $N_i [1 - F_i(A_i^*)] = I_i$.

Given assumptions, $F_i(A_i^*)$ is a normal, where μ_i displaces the distribution as specific to country i . Define the cumulative standard normal as $G(z_i)$ with $z_i = (A_i^* - \mu_i) / \sigma$. Then

$$N_i [1 - G(z_i)] = I_i$$

or

$$G(z_i) = 1 - I_i / N_i$$

Thus,

$$z_i = G^{-1}(1 - I_i / N_i)$$

so

$$(C1) \quad A_i^* = \sigma G^{-1}(1 - I_i / N_i) + \mu_i$$

which is easily obtainable.

Given A_i^* , it is possible to estimate A_i . That is done as follows. Because A_i^* is in the upper tail of the normal for all countries (even Mexicans at about 7 million equal only about 5% of Mexico's population), the tail of the distribution is flat, close to linear, and negatively sloped.

Because A_i^* is so high relative to μ_i , it is assumed that the upper tail has value $f_i(A_i^*)$ at A_i^* , but tapers down to zero at A_i^*+1 . Then the distribution of the part above A_i^* is a triangle

with a height of 2 at A_i^* and 0 at $A_i^* + 1$. (The results are empirically insensitive to this assumption because variation in A_i^* is the major predictor of average education among immigrants.) Thus

$$E(A_i | A_i > A_i^*) = \int x(2A_i^* + 2 - 2x)dx$$

$$= A_i^* + 1/3 .$$

Iterating over σ yields $\sigma=4.7$ which maximizes the r-squared for the actual average attained level of education on the estimated $E(A_i | A_i > A_i^*)$. The r-squared is .53 (weighted by number of immigrants from each country). Thus, the model that assumes selection from above explains about half the actual variation in average attained education among immigrants, but does about 3/4 as well as the unconstrained version.