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ABSTRACT

We use household-level panel data from China and a quantitative framework to document the extent and consequences of factor misallocation in agriculture. We find that there are substantial frictions in both the land and capital markets linked to land institutions in rural China that disproportionately constrain the more productive farmers. These frictions reduce aggregate agricultural productivity in China by affecting two key margins: (1) the allocation of resources across farmers (misallocation) and (2) the allocation of workers across sectors, in particular the type of farmers who operate in agriculture (selection). We show that selection can substantially amplify the static misallocation effect of distortionary policies by affecting occupational choices that worsen the distribution of productive units in agriculture.

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1 Introduction

A central theme in the study of economic growth and development is the large productivity differences in the agricultural sector across countries. Since labor in poor countries is primarily allocated to agriculture, understanding these differences is essential in accounting for aggregate income differences between rich and poor countries.\(^1\) Productivity gaps in agriculture between developing and developed countries are also consistent with increasing evidence that resource misallocation across households that are heterogeneous in skill is more prevalent in developing countries.\(^2\) Institutions and policies giving rise to misallocation are highly pervasive in agriculture in poor countries and can account for a large portion of the productivity differences across countries.\(^3\) These institutions often diminish the efficiency of land and other complementary markets in directing resources to their most productive uses.

We use micro farm-level panel data from China and a quantitative framework to document the extent and consequences of factor misallocation in agriculture. We find that there are substantial frictions in both the land and capital markets in rural China that disproportionately affect the more productive farmers. We argue that these distortions reduce aggregate agricultural productivity by affecting two key margins: (1) the allocation of resources across farmers (misallocation); and (2) the allocation of workers across sectors, in particular, the type of farmers who operate in agriculture (selection). The key insight of our paper is that there is an important interaction between selection and misallocation. Selection can amplify the misallocation effect of distortionary policies and influence the extent of measured misallocation through its effect on the distribution

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\(^1\)See, for instance, Gollin et al. (2002), Restuccia et al. (2008).


\(^3\)See, for instance, recent studies linking resource misallocation to land market institutions, such as land reforms in Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2015); the extent of marketed land across farm households in Restuccia and Santeulalia-Llopis (2015); and the role of land titling in Chen (2016) and Gottlieb and Grobovsek (2015). de Janvry et al. (2014) study a land certification reform in Mexico delinking land rights from land use which allowed for a more efficient allocation of individuals across space.
of productivity. Intuitively, institutions generating misallocation have a particularly negative effect on more highly skilled farmers, who are then less likely to operate a farm in agriculture, thereby reducing average agricultural productivity and widening even further the productivity gap between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. A key conceptual novelty of our framework, relative to the standard selection framework, is that idiosyncratic frictions directly distort occupational choices even if there is no aggregate change or movements in aggregate relative prices. Further, we show that quantitatively this mechanism can have a large aggregate impact, especially when distortions are strongly positively correlated with productivity as is the case in China.

We focus on China for several reasons. First, China is a rapidly growing economy experiencing substantial reallocation within and across sectors. Yet, productivity growth in agriculture has been lacklustre, especially in the cropping sector, the focus of this paper. Second, the operational size of farm units in China is extremely small, only about 0.7 hectares on average, and has not increased over time. This average size compares with 16 and 17 hectares in Belgium and the Netherlands, countries with similar amounts of arable land per capita as China, and to 178 hectares in the United States. Third, institutionally, there is a lack of well-defined property rights over land, which can lead to both factor misallocation within agriculture and distortions of sectoral-occupational choices. And fourth, we have a unique panel dataset of households with detailed input and output information on all farm and non-farm activities over 1993-2002. The data allow us to construct precise real measures of value added and productivity at the farm-level, and to observe the incomes of the same households across sectors. In the context of a widespread shift into non-agricultural activity these data offer a unique opportunity to examine the selection effect of distortionary policies.

Our goal is to measure the extent of misallocation across farmers implied by the land market institutions in China, and to quantify its consequences for occupational choices, agricultural productivity, and real GDP per capita. We do so by combining our detailed panel-level data from China and a

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4The data are collected by the Research Center for the Rural Economy under the Ministry of Agriculture as part of a nation-wide survey.
two-sector model with selection and idiosyncratic distortions in agriculture. The panel dimension of the data is important for our purposes because it allows us to: (i) obtain better measures of farm productivity and idiosyncratic distortions than what typical cross-sectional analyses of misallocation can, and (ii) identify selection across sectors, by tracing the sectoral shifts of households and their incomes.

Our empirical approach combines micro-level data with economic theory. Basic producer theory implies that in the absence of market frictions, marginal products of factors should be equalized across farms, with more productive farmers operating larger farms and using more capital. However, given land market institutions in China, we expect this basic principle to be violated, as more productive farmers are unable to accumulate additional land. This will show up as a gap in marginal products of land, with more productive farmers having a higher marginal product. Even if there is no other friction in capital markets, the friction in the land market will induce a gap between marginal products of capital as well since the more productive farmers will now utilize less capital.

To measure the deviations between marginal products and the overall extent of static inefficiency, we use a diagnostic tool from modern macroeconomics, a heterogeneous firm-industry framework with minimal structure. In this set-up, the land market institutions in China manifest themselves as “wedges” in marginal products, with the property that these wedges are larger for farmers with higher productivity. To apply this framework we use our panel data to construct TFP for each household by averaging outputs and inputs across all plots and all years for that household. This measure of TFP is less susceptible to transitory idiosyncratic shocks and other measurement issues. We find that the output (productivity) gains from reallocation are sizeable. Nationally, reallocating capital and land across existing farmers to their efficient use would increase aggregate agricultural output and TFP by 57 percent. Reallocation within villages—a much narrower geographical def-

\footnote{We do not study the effect of land market institutions on farm-level productivity. While insecurity over property rights may also affect the type of investments that households may make on their land (investments in irrigation and drainage, long-term soil fertility, etc.) and other related investments, we focus on the role that insecure land rights play for the operation of land markets.}
inition of reallocation—is a substantial contributor to these gains, representing 53 percent of the overall gains. This is important as within villages the variation in land quality across farmers is much more limited (than across villages), and the set and varieties of crops produced is much more similar. We note that the cross-sectional variation in farm TFP and our metric of distortions, are about 20 percent higher than our panel-based measures and, as a result, implying larger gains from reallocation in the cross-section. Moreover, we do not find substantial changes in the extent of misallocation over time, consistent with an absence of substantial changes in China’s land market institutions over this period.

We then embed the agricultural framework into a two-sector model of agricultural and nonagricultural production in order to study the impact of misallocation in agriculture on the selection of individuals across sectors. We use the equilibrium properties of the model to calibrate the parameters to observed moments and targets from the micro data for China. In particular, the substantial reallocation of households from agriculture to non-agriculture and their cross-sector income correlation allow us in our framework to pin down the population correlation of abilities across sectors. We then conduct a series of counterfactual experiments to assess the quantitative importance of misallocation and its overall impact on aggregate agricultural productivity, accounting for distortions in sectoral occupational choices. We emphasize three sets of counterfactuals.

First, we assess the effect of misallocation on aggregate productivity by eliminating all distortions. This counterfactual generates a large 8.4-fold increase in agricultural labor productivity; a significant increase in agricultural TFP of 3.1-fold; and a substantial reallocation of labor across sectors, with the share of employment in agriculture falling from 46 percent to 7 percent. The total effect on agricultural productivity is substantially larger than the static effect of eliminating misallocation across existing farmers. The difference is due to the significant amplification effect that distortions have on the selection of farmers in the model, which produces an additional increase in agricultural TFP of 2.1-fold. That is, selection more than doubles the impact of reduced misallocation on
agricultural productivity.

Second, to isolate the contribution of correlated distortions (i.e., the property of distortions that they increase with farm productivity), we eliminate only these distortions by setting their correlation with agricultural ability to zero. This results in an increase of agricultural productivity of 6.8-fold, which is about 90 percent of the increase in productivity from eliminating all distortions. This implies that although correlated and uncorrelated distortions to agricultural activity contribute equally to misallocation in China, it is the systematic component of distortions affecting more heavily the more productive farmers, which is responsible for most of the amplification effect on productivity through distorted occupational choices and selection.

And third, we compare the productivity gains from eliminating “static” misallocation in the previous counterfactual with an equivalent increase in economy-wide productivity. We find that there is no additional increase in agricultural TFP in this case and the share of employment in agriculture falls to 23 percent compared to 7 percent when eliminating distortions. Distortions in the agricultural sector generate much larger selection effects than comparable changes in economy-wide TFP because distortions have a direct impact on occupational choices instead of just the general equilibrium effects generated via common shifts in production parameters.

Our paper contributes to the broad literature on misallocation and productivity by addressing two essential issues emphasized in Restuccia and Rogerson (2017). First, we link misallocation to specific policies/institutions, in our context, land market institutions in China. Second, we study the broader impact of misallocation, in particular, the effect of distortionary policies on misallocation and the selection of skills across sectors, which substantially amplifies the productivity losses from factor misallocation. In this context, our paper relates to the role of selection highlighted

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6 Our paper also relates to earlier studies of the Chinese economy emphasizing the role of agriculture (Lin, 1992; Zhu, 2012); the importance of misallocation across provinces and between the state and non-state sectors (Brandt et al., 2013); and growth in economic transition in Song et al. (2011). Tombe and Zhu (2015) and Ngai et al. (2016) analyze the important impact of migration restrictions in the “hukou” system for reallocation and welfare in China.
in Lagakos and Waugh (2013). A key difference in our work is that we empirically document the role of distortions in the agricultural sector as the key driver of low agricultural productivity and show that these distortions generate much larger effects on selection than equivalent changes in economy-wide TFP. Moreover, the panel dimension of the data allows us to identify a key parameter in models of selection that captures the correlation of abilities across sectors with important implications for aggregate outcomes. We underline that in our calibration economy-wide changes in TFP have no amplification effects on agricultural TFP; hence, our selection results are distinct from Lagakos and Waugh (2013) in that they are solely driven by the impact of idiosyncratic distortions on occupational choices.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the specifics of the land market institutions in China which are intertwined with additional mobility restrictions across space through the “hukou” registration system. Section 3 presents the basic framework for identifying distortions and measuring the gains from reallocation. In Section 4, we describe the panel data from China and the variables we use in our analysis. We construct in Section 5 measures of household-farm productivity and present the main results on misallocation in agriculture in China. Section 6 embeds the framework of agriculture into a heterogeneous-ability two-sector model with non-agriculture. We calibrate the model to aggregate, sectoral, and micro moments from the Chinese data in Section 7. Section 8 reports the main results from our quantitative experiments. We conclude in Section 9.

2 Land Market Institutions in China

The Household Responsibility System (HRS), established in rural China in the early 1980s, dismantled the system of collective management set up under Mao and extended use rights over farmland to rural households. These reforms triggered a spurt in productivity growth in agriculture in the early 1980s that subsequently dissipated. This level effect is often attributed to the improved effort
incentives for households as they became residual claimants in farming (McMillan et al., 1989; Lin, 1992). Ownership of agricultural land however remained vested with the collective, and in particular the village or small group, a unit below the village. Use rights to land were administratively allocated among rural households by village officials on a highly egalitarian basis that reflected household size. In principle, all individuals with “registration” (hukou), in the village were entitled to land.

The law governing the HRS provided secure use rights over cultivated land for 15 years (in the late 1990s use rights were extended to 30 years), however village officials often reallocated land among households before the 15-year period expired. Benjamin and Brandt (2002) document that in over two-thirds of all villages reallocations occurred at least once, and on average more than twice. Their survey data show that reallocations undertaken between 1983-1995 typically involved three-quarters of all households in the village, and most of village land. A primary motivation of the reallocations was to accommodate demographic changes within a village. In addition, village officials reallocated land from households with family members working off the farm to households solely engaged in agriculture (Brandt et al., 2002; Kung and Liu, 1997).

In principle, households had the right to rent or transfer their use rights to other households (zhuanbao), however in practice these rights were abridged in a variety of ways, resulting in thin land rental markets. Brandt et al. (2002) document that in 1995, while 71.6 percent of villages reported no restrictions on land rental activity, households rented out less than 3 percent of their land, with most rentals occurring among family members or close relatives, hence not necessarily directing the land to the best uses. The limited scope for farm rental activity is frequently associated with perceived “use it or lose it” rules: Households that did not use their land and either rented it to others or let it lie fallow risked losing the land during the next reallocation. As a result, households may have been deterred from renting out land because of fear that it may be viewed by village officials as a signal that the household did not need the land (see, for example, Yang, 1997).
Finally, we note that lack of ownership of the land also meant that households could not use it as collateral for purposes of borrowing.

The difficulty in consolidating land either through land purchases or land rentals is one of the reasons that operational sizes of farms have been typically very low in China and have not changed much over time. According to the World Census of Agriculture of the Food and Agricultural Organization in 1997 average farm size in China was 0.7 hectares. Contrast this to the United States where in the same year average farm size was 187 hectares or to Belgium and the Netherlands—two developed countries with similar arable land per person as China—where average farm size is around 16-17 hectares. Moreover, in developed countries, farm size is growing over time.\footnote{Small operational farm scales are not unique to China, as average farm sizes among the poorest countries in the world are below 1 hectare and also reflect low productivity in agriculture, see for instance Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014).}

The administrative egalitarian allocation of land combined with the limited scope for land rentals implied that more able farmers or those that valued land more highly were not able to increase operational farm size. To the extent that village officials either do not observe farmer ability (unobserved heterogeneity) or do not make land allocation decisions based on ability (egalitarian concerns), reallocations were unhelpful in improving operational scale and productivity (Benjamin and Brandt, 2002). These frictions in the land market could generate allocative inefficiency or misallocation by distorting the allocation of land across farmers. Also, the inability to use land as collateral for borrowing purposes could result in the misallocation of other inputs such as capital. Further, the distortions faced in agriculture may affect the occupational choices of individuals between working in agriculture or other sectors of the economy, thus affecting the type of farmer that remains in agriculture. The interaction of allocative inefficiency with distortions in occupational choices can affect agricultural productivity and overall development.

In the next sections we describe our basic framework, the panel data we use for China, and the two-sector model with selection, which allows us to quantify the broader consequences of misallocation.
for occupational choices, aggregate agricultural productivity, and real GDP per capita.

3 Basic Framework for Measuring Misallocation

We describe the industry framework we use to assess the extent of misallocation in agriculture in China. We derive the efficient allocations that maximize agricultural output given a set of inputs, and then contrast these to the actual allocations. The ratio of efficient to actual output characterizes the potential gains from an efficient reallocation. We rationalize the actual allocations as an equilibrium of this framework with input and output wedges, which enables us to use the equilibrium equations to identify farmer-specific input and output distortions from the data. We then use these wedges to construct a summary measure of distortions faced by each farmer in China.

3.1 Description

We consider a rural economy that produces a single good and is endowed with amounts of farm land \( L \) and capital \( K \), and a finite number \( M \) of farm operators indexed by \( i \). Following Adamopoulos and Restuccia (2014), the production unit in the rural economy is a family farm. A farm is a technology that requires the inputs of a farm operator (household), as well as the land and capital under the farmer’s control. Farm operators are heterogeneous in their farming ability \( s_i \).

As in Lucas Jr (1978), the production technology available to farmer \( i \) with productivity \( s_i \) exhibits

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8For ease of exposition and tractability our framework abstracts from differences across farmers in the intensive margin of labor input. We deal with this by adjusting outputs and inputs in the data, generating a residual measure of farm TFP that is unaffected by this abstraction. We note however that since labor days may also be misallocated, our estimates of misallocation from this framework may be conservative.
decreasing returns to scale in variable inputs and is given by the Cobb-Douglas function,

$$y_i = (A_a s_i)^{1-\gamma} \left[ \ell_i^{\alpha} k_i^{1-\alpha} \right]^{\gamma},$$

where $y$, $\ell$, and $k$ denote real farm output, land, and capital. The parameter $A_a$ is a common productivity term, $\gamma < 1$ is the span-of-control parameter which governs the extent of returns to scale at the farm-level, and $\alpha$ captures the relative importance of land in production.

### 3.2 Efficient Allocation

Our starting point is the static efficient allocation of factors of production obtained from the solution to a simple planner’s problem that takes the distribution of productivities as given. We use this efficient allocation and the associated maximum aggregate agricultural output as a benchmark to contrast with the actual (distorted) allocations and the agricultural output in the Chinese economy.

The planner chooses how to allocate land and capital across farmers in the rural economy to maximize aggregate agricultural output subject to aggregate resource constraints. Specifically, the problem of the planner is:

$$\max_{\{k_i, \ell_i\}_{i=1}^M} \sum_{i=1}^M y_i,$$

subject to

$$y_i = (A_a s_i)^{1-\gamma} \left( \ell_i^{\alpha} k_i^{1-\alpha} \right)^{\gamma}, \quad i = 1, 2, \ldots, M;$$

and the resource constraints,

$$\sum_{i=1}^M \ell_i = L; \quad \sum_{i=1}^M k_i = K. \quad (2)$$

Using the first-order conditions to this problem along with the rural economy-wide resource constraints in equation (2), the efficient allocation involves allocating total land and capital across
farmers according to relative productivity,

\[ \ell_i^e = \frac{s_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{M} s_j} L, \]  
\[ k_i^e = \frac{s_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{M} s_j} K, \]  

where the superscript \( e \) denotes the efficient allocation. Equations (3) and (4) indicate that in the efficient allocation, more productive farmers are allocated more land \( \ell \) and capital \( k \).

Using the definition of aggregate agricultural output \( Y = \sum_{i=1}^{M} y_i \) along with individual technologies and input allocations as derived above, we obtain a rural economy-wide production function,

\[ Y^e = A^e M^{1-\gamma} \left[ L^\alpha K^{1-\alpha} \right]^{\gamma}, \]

where \( Y^e \) is aggregate agricultural output under the efficient allocation, \( A^e \) is agricultural TFP \( A^e = (A_a \bar{S})^{1-\gamma} \), where \( \bar{S} = (\sum_{i=1}^{M} s_i) / M \) is average farm productivity.

### 3.3 Equilibrium and Identification of Distortions

We estimate farm-specific distortions as implicit input and output wedges or taxes. These taxes are abstract representations that serve to rationalize as an equilibrium outcome the actual observed allocations in the Chinese economy. While this representation is not required for assessing the aggregate consequences of misallocation—since we can directly compare efficient allocations and output with the actual data—it will be useful in the estimation of the two-sector economy in Section 6 and the subsequent counterfactual exercises. Denote by \( \tau_i^\ell \) and \( \tau_i^k \) the land and capital input taxes, and by \( \tau_i^y \) the output tax faced by farm \( i \). Tax revenues are equally distributed lump-sum across all households. We solve the farmer problem subject to all the farm-specific taxes and
then show the identification issue that arises.

Given distortions, the profit maximization problem facing farm $i$ is,

$$\max_{\ell_i, k_i} \left\{ \pi_i = \left(1 - \tau_i^y\right) y_i - \left(1 + \tau_i^k\right) r k_i - \left(1 + \tau_i^\ell\right) q \ell_i \right\},$$

where $q$ and $r$ are the rental prices of land and capital. In equilibrium, the land and capital markets for the rural economy must clear as in equation (2).

We use this framework to identify the farm-specific distortions from the observed land and capital allocations across farmers. In our abstraction these distortions are induced by “taxes” but in practice they arise from China’s land market institutions. In particular, the first-order conditions with respect to land and capital for farm $i$ imply:

$$\frac{MRPL_i}{\alpha \gamma} = \frac{y_i}{\ell_i} = \frac{q \left(1 + \tau_i^\ell\right)}{\alpha \gamma \left(1 - \tau_i^y\right)} \propto \frac{\left(1 + \tau_i^\ell\right)}{\left(1 - \tau_i^y\right)},$$

$$\frac{MRPK_i}{\left(1 - \alpha\right) \gamma} = \frac{y_i}{k_i} = \frac{r \left(1 + \tau_i^k\right)}{\left(1 - \alpha\right) \gamma \left(1 - \tau_i^y\right)} \propto \frac{\left(1 + \tau_i^k\right)}{\left(1 - \tau_i^y\right)},$$

where $MRPL$ and $MRPK$ are the marginal revenue products of land and capital, respectively. Given that we normalize the price of agricultural goods to one, $MRPL$ and $MRPK$ are also the marginal products of the respective factors. Equations (5) and (6) show that in the presence of farm-specific distortions, average products and marginal products of land and capital are not equalized across farms, but rather vary in proportion to the idiosyncratic distortion faced by each factor relative to the output distortion.

Equations (5)-(6) imply two things. First, only two of the three taxes can be separately identified, either taxes on the two inputs $\{\tau_i^k, \tau_i^\ell\}$ or the output tax and one of the two input taxes, i.e., $\{\tau_i^\ell, \tau_i^y\}$ or $\{\tau_i^k, \tau_i^y\}$. Second, farm-specific distortions can be identified up to a scalar from...
the average product of each factor.\footnote{The scalar for the land input common to all farms is $q/\alpha\gamma$, while the scalar for the capital input is $r/(1-\alpha)\gamma$.}

We construct the following summary measure of distortions faced by farm $i$,

$$ TFPR_i = \frac{y_i}{\ell_i^\alpha k_i^{1-\alpha}} = \widetilde{TFPR} \left( \frac{1 + \tau_i^\ell}{1 - \tau_i^y} \right)^\alpha \left( \frac{1 + \tau_i^k}{1 - \tau_i^n} \right)^{1-\alpha}, \quad (7) $$

where $\widetilde{TFPR} \equiv \left( \frac{q}{\alpha\gamma} \right)^\alpha \left( \frac{r}{(1-\alpha)\gamma} \right)^{1-\alpha}$ is the common component across all farms. We note that $TFPR$ corresponds to the concept of “revenue productivity” in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and use this notation to make the analogy clear. Equation (7) indicates that $TFPR_i$ is proportional to a geometric average of the farm-specific land and capital distortions relative to the output distortion.

We emphasize that $TFPR$ is different from “physical productivity” or TFP, which in our model is,

$$ TFP_i \equiv (A_s s_i)^{1-\gamma} = \frac{y_i}{\left(\ell_i^\alpha k_i^{1-\alpha}\right)^\gamma}, \quad (8) $$

for farm $i$.\footnote{In Hsieh and Klenow (2009)’s terminology farm TFP is $TFPQ$.} In a world without distortions farms with higher physical productivity $TFP_i$ command more land $\ell_i$, and capital $k_i$, and marginal products of each factor equalize across farms. However, with idiosyncratic distortions this need not be the case as indicated by equations (5) and (6).

Using the fact that total output is $Y = \sum_{i=1}^M y_i$, we can derive the rural economy-wide production function,

$$ Y = TFP \cdot M^{1-\gamma} [L^\alpha K^{1-\alpha}]^\gamma, \quad (9) $$

where $(L, K)$ are total land and capital, and $TFP$ is rural economy-wide TFP,

$$ TFP = \left[ \frac{A_s \sum_{i=1}^M s_i \left( \frac{TFPR}{TFPR_i} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}}}{M} \right]^{1-\gamma}, \quad (10) $$
with average revenue productivity $\overline{TFPR}$ given by

$$\overline{TFPR} = \frac{\overline{TFPR}}{\left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M} y_i \frac{1-\tau_i^f}{1+\tau_i^f} \right]^\alpha \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{M} y_i \frac{1-\tau_i^f}{1+\tau_i^f} \right]^{1-\alpha}}. \quad (11)$$

Equation (10) makes clear that with no dispersion in TFPR$_i$ across farm households, the equilibrium allocations and aggregate output and TFP coincide with the corresponding efficient statistics. Farm-level behavior in the presence of distortions aggregates up to a rural economy-wide production function with aggregate land $L$, capital $K$, number of farmers $M$, and aggregate (distorted) productivity $TFP$. Under the described identification of distortions from the data, allocations and aggregate distorted output $Y$ in the model coincide with actual observations in the data for China.

We measure aggregate agricultural output reallocation gains by comparing efficient output to actual output in the Chinese economy. Since aggregate factors $K$, $L$, and $M$ are held fixed in this comparison, the output gains represent TFP gains, i.e., $Y^e/Y = A^e/TFP$.

4 Data

We use household survey data collected by the Research Center for the Rural Economy under the Ministry of Agriculture of China.\footnote{For a detailed description and analysis of the data see Benjamin et al. (2005).} This is a nationally representative survey that covers all provinces. The survey has been carried out annually since 1986 with the exception of 1992 and 1994 when funding was an issue. An equal number of rich, medium and poor counties were selected in each province, and within each county a similar rule was applied in the selection of villages. Within villages, households were drawn in order to be representative. Important changes in survey design in 1993 expanded the information collected on agriculture, and enabled more accurate estimates of farm revenues and expenditures.
We have data for ten provinces that span all the major regions of China, and use the data for the period between 1993 and 2002. The data are in the form of an unbalanced panel. In each year, we have information on approximately 8000 households drawn from 110 villages. For 104 villages, we have information for all 9 years. The average number of household observations per village-year is 80, or a quarter to a third of all households in a village. We have data for all 9 years for approximately 6000 households. Attrition from the sample is not a concern and is examined in detail in Benjamin et al. (2005). Much of the attrition is related to exit of entire villages from the survey. Household exit and entry into the sample is not systematically correlated with key variables of interest. During the period of our study, migration of entire households was severely restricted.

The survey provides disaggregated information on household income and labor supply by activity. For agriculture, we have data on total household land holdings, sown area and output by crop, and major farm inputs including labor, fertilizer, and farm machinery. Regarding non-agricultural activities, for family businesses we have information on revenues, expenditures, and net incomes from each type of household non-family business. We also know household wage earnings.

The richness of the data on crops, inputs, and prices allows us to construct precise real measures of output and productivity at the farm-level. We focus on the household farm as the main production unit—outputs and inputs from all the plots of land operated by the household are aggregated—rendering farm-level measures that are less subject to unobserved idiosyncratic shocks, potential land quality differences, and measurement errors at the plot level.

**Value added agricultural output** We utilize the detailed information on farm output by crop in physical terms to construct estimates of “real” gross farm output. Output of each crop is valued at a common set of prices, which are constructed as sample-wide averages (unit values) over 1993-2002 for each crop. Unit values are computed using information on market sales, and are exclusive of any “quota” sales at planned (below market) prices. In these calculations, a household’s own
consumption is implicitly valued at market prices. Intermediate inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides are treated in an analogous way. We subtract expenditures on intermediate inputs from gross output to obtain our estimate of net income or value added for the cropping sector. In what follows, we use this measure of real value added at the farm-level when we refer to farm output.

Land, capital, and labor The measure of land that we use in our analysis is cultivated land by the household, which corresponds to the concept of operated rather than “owned” farm size. The survey provides household-level information beginning in 1986 on the value at original purchase prices of farm machinery and equipment, larger hand tools, and draft animals used in agriculture. Assuming that accumulation began in 1978, the year the reforms of the agricultural system began, we utilize the perpetual inventory method to calculate the value of farm machinery in constant Renminbi (RMB). The survey does not capture household ownership of smaller farm tools and implements, and so for just over a third of household-years, the estimated value of their capital stock is zero. To deal with these cases, we impute for all farm households a value equal to the amount of land operated by the household multiplied by ten percent of the median capital to land ratio by village-year. Robustness tests show that our results are not crucially sensitive to the adjustment factor we use. For the labor input, we have the total labor days supplied on agricultural activities by all members of the household and by hired labor.

5 Measuring TFP and Misallocation in Agriculture

We use the micro data from China to measure farm-level TFP and document the input allocations in relation to farm TFP and the hypothetical efficient allocations. We next estimate the implicit farm-specific distortions implied by our simple framework of Section 3. This provides an important input for our two-sector analysis with selection in Section 6. We then report the static efficiency
gains for the agricultural sector in China from eliminating farm-specific distortions, providing a benchmark number relative to which we can compare the efficiency gains that would result from eliminating distortions in our two-sector model with selection.

5.1 Measuring Farm Productivity

Our measure of productivity at the farm-level is “physical productivity” or TFP, which we construct residually from the farm-level production function in Section 3 using equation (8) and data on operated land, capital, labor, and value added as described in Section 4. In our framework household labor supply to agriculture is assumed to be the same across all households, however in the data households differ in the number of days worked on the farm. To make a consistent mapping of the data to model variables, we remove the variation in labor input by normalizing output, land, and capital by total labor days. To see that this normalization results in a residual measure of farm TFP that is not affected by labor supply differences, consider the extended production function in equation (1) that includes labor supply, \( n_i \), by the household:

\[
\hat{y}_i = \left( A a s_i n_i \right)^{1-\gamma} \left[ \hat{\ell}_i^{\alpha} \hat{k}_i^{1-\alpha} \right]^{\gamma},
\]

where the hat variables distinguish these from the per labor days variables in our baseline framework. Dividing both sides of this equation by \( n_i \), and defining variables in per labor days (i.e., \( y_i = \hat{y}_i/n_i \)) yields the production function in equation (1). Our residual measure of idiosyncratic farm TFP computed from equation (8) is also unaffected by differences in labor supply when \( y, k, \) and \( \ell \) are measured in per labor days.

Computing farm TFP from equation (8) requires values for the parameters \( \gamma \) and \( \alpha \). The values we use are \( \gamma = 0.54 \), reflecting an income share of labor of 0.46, and \( \alpha = 2/3 \), implying a land income share of 0.36 and hence a capital income share of 0.18. These values represent the best estimates of
these shares we know for China. Some discussion of these is in order. Data on income shares for the U.S. would attribute a similar income share of labor (same $\gamma$) but a larger income share for capital, roughly reversing the shares of capital and land. If the capital-to-land ratios across farmers were constant in the data, this alternative calibration using U.S. shares would imply the same overall reallocation gains, and only change the relative contribution of capital and land to these gains. Because capital-to-land ratios are not constant across farmers in our data (the capital to land ratio is larger in less productive farms), the reallocation gain results would be larger using a larger capital share as implied by a calibration to US data. In this context, our choices of production elasticities are conservative with respect to the reallocation gains we highlight below.

We exploit the panel nature of our data by computing as our baseline farm-level TFP based on the average of outputs and inputs for all the years in our sample. This panel measure of TFP at the farm level is less subject to transitory variations in outputs and inputs that may exaggerate the variation in TFP across farm households in the cross-section data.\footnote{Our resulting farm-level TFP would be nearly identical if instead we compute farm TFP in each year and average across the years.} We find that the dispersion in farm TFP in our data is substantial, with the standard deviation of log–farm TFP equal to 0.61. The 90/10 percentile ratio in farm TFP is 4.3-fold whereas the 75/25 percentile ratio is 2-fold. While this dispersion in farm-level TFP is substantial, it is lower than the cross-sectional dispersion of farm TFP in a much poorer country such as Malawi reported in Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2015); and in plant-level TFP documented in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for Indian, Chinese and U.S. manufacturing. For instance, in China the 90/10 ratio of plant-level TFP is 12.7-fold whereas the 75/25 ratio is 3.8-fold.
5.2 Factor Allocations and Productivity

If land and capital were allocated across farms in a decentralized fashion through unhindered factor markets, the resulting allocations would resemble the efficient allocations in Section 3.2, with relatively more productive farmers employing more land and capital. In other words, the relationship between input use and TFP would be strongly positive. In addition, we would expect marginal (and average) products of factors to be unrelated with farm TFP since in an efficient world these marginal products are equalized.

In fact, in the case of China we observe the exact opposite patterns. Figure 1 documents the patterns of farm allocations in land and capital by farm-level TFP (in logs) using the panel average. Land use and capital use are not systematically positively correlated with farm productivity in China.\(^{13}\) In addition, the average productivity (output per unit of input) of land and capital inputs are systematically positively correlated with farm TFP across farms in China. These patterns are not consistent with an efficient allocation of resources across farmers in China (red dotted lines). They are however consistent with the institutional setting in China we described in Section 2 including the fairly uniform administrative allocation of land among members of the village. The lack of ownership over the allocated plots (and hence inability to use land as collateral) can also partly rationalize the misallocation of capital. Overall, the land market institutions in China prevent the flow of resources to the most productive farmers.

5.3 Distortions and Productivity

The input allocations across farmers in China indicate that there is substantial misallocation. In the context of the decentralized framework we presented in Section 3, this misallocation is manifested

\(^{13}\)If anything capital use appears to be slightly negatively correlated with farm TFP. This slight negative correlation may be due to other frictions in the capital market, some of which are discussed in Brandt et al. (2013).
Figure 1: Factor Allocations by Farm TFP—Panel Average

Notes: Land and capital are measured relative to total labor days supplied to agriculture by the household. The solid blue line is the estimated relationship between inputs and farm TFP whereas the dashed red line is the efficient allocation associated with each level of farm TFP. Land productivity refers to value added per unit of land and capital productivity refers to value added per unit of capital, both of which are proportional to the marginal products of each factor in our framework.
through farm-specific distortions or “wedges” in equations (5)-(6). We use these equations to measure farm-specific distortions as deviations of the observed input allocations from the efficient ones. We summarize the distortions faced by a farmer in both the land and capital markets by the measure of revenue productivity TFPR in (7). The higher $TFPR_i$ for farmer $i$, the higher the overall distortion that farmer faces. As we explained in Section 3, from (5)-(6) we can separately identify only two of the three taxes (the two input taxes, or the output tax and one input tax), but this choice will not influence the magnitude of the overall farm-specific distortion as can be seen from equation (7). Here, we identify the two input taxes for each farmer to construct their summary measure of farm-specific distortions TFPR.

Figure 2: Farm-specific Distortions and Productivity—Panel Average

![Figure 2: Farm-specific Distortions and Productivity—Panel Average](image)

Notes: Revenue productivity TFPR is a summary measure of distortions faced by each household, with higher TFPR implying higher distortions. The standard deviation of log TFPR is 0.78 and the correlation between log TFP and log TFPR is 0.86.

In Figure 2 we plot the farm-specific distortions, as captured by TFPR, against farm TFP (in logs) for the panel average. There is a strong positive correlation between farm distortions (TFPR) and productivity (TFP), with the correlation equal to 0.86.\(^\text{14}\) The more productive farmers face higher distortions.

\(^{14}\)The dispersion in TFPR is also substantial. The standard deviation of log-TFPR is 0.78, while the 90/10 and 75/25 percentile ratios are 7.2 and 2.8 respectively.
farm-specific distortions. This relationship reflects the nature of the land market institutions in China. The administrative egalitarian allocation of land, along with the thin rental land markets, provide little scope for farmers to adjust the operational size of the farm they are “endowed” with. The farmers hurt the most from such an institutional setting are the more productive ones who would have wanted to expand the most in unfettered markets, acquiring more land and capital. In the context of our decentralized framework, this is reflected in higher farm-specific distortions on the more productive farmers.

5.4 Static Efficiency Gains

In order to measure the efficiency gains associated with the misallocation of resources in agriculture we conduct a counterfactual exercise. We ask how much larger would aggregate output (and as a result TFP) be in agriculture if all farm-specific distortions were eliminated holding constant aggregate resources? The efficiency gains from eliminating misallocation are given by the ratio of the efficient to the (distorted) observed total output, \( Y^e / Y \).

Table 1 reports the efficiency gains from factor reallocation using our baseline measure of farm TFP, constructed as the panel average. Eliminating all misallocation in China increases aggregate agricultural output (and hence TFP) by 57 percent (first row, first column). About 53 percent \((\log(1.27)/\log(1.57))\) of these gains is due to reallocating resources to their efficient use within villages (keeping village resources fixed), which increases aggregate agricultural output by 27 percent (second row, first column). This finding is important in light of the potential measurement issues of TFP across farmers, associated with the quality of inputs (such as land) and the quality of outputs (such as the variety of crops). Within the narrow geographic area of a village that we consider in the second row, there is much less variation in land quality, and much more similarity in the type and variety of crops produced. Factor misallocation is observed both across farm households...
Table 1: Efficiency Gains from Reallocation—Panel Average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eliminating misallocation:</th>
<th>Output (TFP) Gain</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baseline Panel</td>
<td>Across s Misallocation</td>
<td>Cross-section Productivity</td>
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<tr>
<td>nationwide</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within village</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.41</td>
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Notes: Reports the output (TFP) gain from efficient reallocation as the ratio of efficient to actual aggregate agricultural output. “Baseline Panel” refers to reallocation when farm TFP is calculated from the average of outputs and inputs in the panel data. “Across s Misallocation” refers to the reallocation gains only eliminating misallocation across farm households with different productivity and “Cross-section Productivity” refers to reallocation gains when farm TFP and reallocation gains are calculated for each cross section and then averaged for all the years in the panel.

With different levels of productivity (correlated) as well as among households with similar levels of productivity (uncorrelated). In Table 1 we report the efficiency gains from eliminating only the correlated distortions (second column). Our estimates suggest these two sources of misallocation contribute equally to the efficiency gains from reallocation \((\log(1.25)/\log(1.57)=0.50)\).

Typical analyses of misallocation with cross-sectional data are often criticized for potentially misinterpreting idiosyncratic transitory shocks or measurement error as permanent TFP differences. Our analysis is less subject to these critiques since we exploit the panel nature of our data.\(^{15}\) Measures of misallocation using a single cross-section are around 20 percent larger in our data.

While there are not explicit prohibitions of rentals in China, we noted in the description of the institutional setting in Section 2 that frequent reallocations of land within villages likely lead households to fear loss of their use rights if they do not farm their land themselves. Indeed, rental markets are very thin in China during our sample period, constituting less than 5 percent of cultivated land. Moreover, there is no significant change in the amount of rented land over time. In addition, rentals

\(^{15}\)Also important in mitigating measurement concerns is the fact that we focus on the household farm as the production unit rather than the individual plots operated by the household.
of land typically involve family members or close relatives and hence do not necessarily direct the land to best uses. Nevertheless, we can assess the extent to which rented land alleviates misallocation. Controlling for farm TFP, we find that the reallocation gains among farms with no rented land are 20 percent larger than among farms with some rented land. This finding suggests that rentals help reduce misallocation but their scale is too limited to prevent large productivity losses due to misallocation.

Figure 3 reports the annual output gains of efficient reallocation, that is, the ratio of efficient to actual output, for each year from 1993 to 2002 based on our baseline measure of farm TFP and yearly farm inputs. Importantly, there is no substantial change in the magnitude of the misallocation in
the rural sector, and thus the gains from reallocation over time in China. For example, the standard deviation of log TFPR is 0.79 on average and as low as 0.77 in 1993 and 2000 and as high as 0.80 in 2001. If anything, misallocation appears to be slightly increasing. This finding contrasts with the reduction in misallocation found for the manufacturing sector in China in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) over a similar period. Within-village misallocation of capital and land across farmers is a substantial source of reallocation gains, with an efficient reallocation generating an increase in output (and hence TFP) of more than 25 percent. When capital and land are efficiently allocated across all farmers in China, the increase in output is nearly 60 percent in the 1990’s and almost 70 percent in 2002. These findings are consistent with the view of costly farm-specific distortions that are tied to land market institutions in China that have not changed much over the period we study.

6 Misallocation and Selection across Sectors

We now integrate our framework of agriculture into a standard two-sector general-equilibrium Roy (1951) model of selection across sectors to assess: (1) how farm-specific distortions in agriculture alter the occupational choice of individuals between agriculture and non-agriculture; and (2) how selection affects measured misallocation in the agricultural sector and the productivity gains from factor reallocation.

We augment our model of agriculture along the following dimensions. First, we extend the model to a two-sector model by introducing a non-agricultural sector. Second, we consider preferences for individuals over consumption goods for agriculture and non-agriculture, with a subsistence constraint for the agricultural good. Third, individuals are endowed with a pair of productivities, one for each of the two sectors. Fourth, individuals make an occupational choice of whether to become farm operators in agriculture or workers in the non-agricultural sector. We show that a key determinant of the occupational choice is the farm-specific distortion individuals face if they
become farm operators. For analytical tractability, we consider a continuum of individuals. The fraction of individuals that choose agriculture, and thus the number and productivity distribution of farms are endogenous. In what follows, we discuss in detail the economic environment and define the equilibrium, and then describe some key properties of the model.

6.1 Environment

At each date there are two goods produced, agricultural \((a)\) and non-agricultural \((n)\). The non-agricultural good is the numeraire and we denote the relative price of the agricultural good by \(p_a\). The economy is populated by a measure 1 of individuals indexed by \(i\).

Preferences Each individual \(i\) has preferences over the consumption of the two goods given by,

\[
U_i = \omega \log (c_{ai} - \bar{a}) + (1 - \omega) \log(c_{ni}),
\]

where \(c_a\) and \(c_n\) denote the consumption of the agricultural and non-agricultural good, \(\bar{a}\) is a minimum subsistence requirement for the agricultural good, and \(\omega\) is the preference weight on agricultural goods. The subsistence constraint implies that when income is low a disproportionate amount will be allocated to the agricultural good. Individual \(i\) faces the following budget constraint,

\[
p_a c_{ai} + c_{ni} = I_i + T,
\]

where \(I_i\) is the individual’s income, and \(T\) the transfer to be specified below.

Working in the agricultural sector involves operating a farm and is subject to idiosyncratic distortions, captured by \(\varphi_i\), which we define more fully below. Income from working in the non-agricultural sector is subject to a tax \(\eta\), common to all individuals. \(\eta\) operates as a barrier to labor mobility from
agriculture to non-agriculture and is meant to capture the factors that restrict access to off-farm opportunities for farmers. Quantitatively, this parameter allows us to fit the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural labor productivity.

**Individual abilities and distortions** Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their abilities in agriculture and non-agriculture, and the farm-specific distortions they face in agriculture. In particular, each individual $i$ is endowed with a pair of sector-specific abilities $(s_{ai}, s_{ni})$ and an idiosyncratic farm distortion $\varphi_i$. The triplet $(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})$ is drawn from a known population joint trivariate distribution of skills and distortions with density $f(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})$ and cdf $F(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})$. We allow for the possibility that skills are correlated across sectors, and that agricultural skills (but not non-agricultural skills) are correlated with farm-specific distortions. In particular, we assume a trivariate log-normal distribution for $(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})$ with mean $(\mu_a, \mu_\varphi, \mu_n)$ and variance,

$$\Sigma = \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_a^2 & \sigma_{a\varphi} & \sigma_{an} \\ \sigma_{a\varphi} & \sigma_\varphi^2 & 0 \\ \sigma_{an} & 0 & \sigma_n^2 \end{pmatrix}.$$  

We denote the correlation coefficient for abilities across sectors by $\rho_{an} = \sigma_{an}/(\sigma_n\sigma_a)$, and the correlation coefficient between agricultural ability and farm-specific distortions by $\rho_{\varphi a} = \sigma_{\varphi a}/(\sigma_\varphi\sigma_a)$.

Individuals face two choices: (a) a consumption choice, the allocation of total income (including transfers) between consumption of agricultural and non-agricultural goods; and (b) an occupational choice, whether to work in the non-agricultural sector or the agricultural sector. We denote the income an individual $i$ would earn in agriculture as $I_{ai}$ and that in non-agriculture as $I_{ni}$, and the individual chooses the sector with the highest income. We denote by $H_n$ and $H_a$, the sets of $(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})$ values for which agents choose each sector $H_n = \{(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni}) : I_{ai} < I_{ni}\}$, and $H_a = \{(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni}) : I_{ai} \geq I_{ni}\}$. 

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**Consumption allocation** To determine the allocation of income between agricultural and non-agricultural goods individuals maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, given their income $I_i + T$, and the relative price of the agricultural good $p_a$. The first order conditions to individual $i$’s utility maximization problem imply the following consumption choices,

$$c_{ai} = \bar{a} + \frac{\omega}{p_a} (I_i + T - p_a\bar{a}), \quad c_{ni} = (1 - \omega) (I_i + T - p_a\bar{a}).$$

**Production in non-agriculture** The non-agricultural good is produced by a stand-in firm with access to a constant returns to scale technology that requires only effective labor as an input,

$$Y_n = A_n Z_n,$$

where $Y_n$ is the total amount of non-agricultural output produced, $A_n$ is non-agricultural productivity (TFP), and $Z_n$ is the total amount of labor input measured in efficiency units, i.e., accounting for the ability of workers $Z_n = \int_{i \in H_n} s_{ni}di$. The total number of workers employed in non-agriculture is,

$$N_n = \int_{i \in H_n} di.$$

The representative firm in the non-agricultural sector chooses how many efficiency units of labor to hire in order to maximize profits. The first order condition from the representative firm’s problem in non-agriculture implies $w_n = A_n$.

**Production in agriculture** As described previously, the production unit in the agricultural sector is a farm. A farm is a technology that requires the inputs of a farm operator with ability $s_{ai}$ as well as land (which also defines the size of the farm) and capital under the farmer’s control. The
farm technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale and takes the form used previously,

\[ y_{ai} = (A_a s_{ai})^{1-\gamma} \left( \ell_i^\alpha k_i^{1-\alpha} \right)^\gamma, \] (12)

where \( y_a \) is real farm output, \( \ell \) is the land input, and \( k \) is the capital input. \( A_a \) is an agriculture-specific TFP parameter, common across all farms.

An individual that chooses to operate a farm faces an overall farm-specific tax on output \( \tau_i \), which summarizes the farm-specific taxes on output \( \tau_i^y \), and inputs \( (\tau_i^\ell, \tau_i^k) \) from Section 3,

\[ (1 - \tau_i) \equiv \frac{(1 - \tau_i^y)}{(1 + \tau_i^\ell)^\alpha (1 + \tau_i^k)^{1-\alpha}}. \]

Note that in the data \( (1 - \tau_i) \) is constructed as a summary of the distortions faced by each farm, as identified in Section 5. Tax revenues are redistributed equally to the \( N \) workers independently of occupation, and equal to \( T \) per individual.

The profit maximization problem for farm \( i \) is given by,

\[ \max_{\ell_i, k_i} \{ \pi_i = p_a (1 - \tau_i) y_{ai} - r k_i - q \ell_i \}, \] (13)

where \((q, r)\) are the rental prices of land and capital. The first-order conditions to farm operator \( i \)'s problem imply that farm size, demand for capital input, output supply, and profits depend not only on productivity but also on the farm-specific distortions,

\[ \ell_i = A_a (\gamma p_a)^{\frac{1}{\gamma r \beta_1}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{r} \right)^{\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{q} \right)^{\frac{1-\gamma(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} (1 - \tau_i)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} s_{ai}, \] (14)

\[ k_i = A_a (\gamma p_a)^{\frac{1}{\gamma r \beta_1}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{r} \right)^{\frac{1-\alpha \gamma}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{q} \right)^{\frac{\alpha \gamma}{1-\gamma}} (1 - \tau_i)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} s_{ai}, \] (15)
\[ y_{ai} = A_a (\gamma p_a)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{r} \right)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{q} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\gamma}} (1 - \tau_i)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}} s_{ai}, \quad (16) \]

\[ \pi_i = A_a (1 - \gamma) p_a^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \gamma^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{r} \right)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{q} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\gamma}} (1 - \tau_i)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} s_{ai}. \quad (17) \]

The income of a farmer is the (after-tax) value of their output \( I_{ai} = p_a (1 - \tau_i) y_{ai} \). As a result farmer income includes not only the return to the farmer’s labor input \( \pi \) but also the land and capital incomes. We can re-write an individual’s income from agriculture as,

\[ I_{ai} = w_a \varphi_i s_{ai}, \quad (18) \]

where \( \varphi_i \equiv (1 - \tau_i)^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \) captures the overall farm-specific distortion faced by farmer \( i \), and \( w_a \) is the component of the farmer’s income that is common to all farmers,

\[ w_a \equiv p_a^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} A_a \gamma^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{r} \right)^{\frac{\gamma(1-\alpha)}{1-\gamma}} \left( \frac{\alpha}{q} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\gamma}}. \quad (19) \]

Note that \( w_a \) summarizes the effects of relative prices as it is a function of the endogenous relative price of agriculture \( p_a \), the rental price of land \( q \), and the rental price of capital \( r \).

Similarly, we can re-write land input demand, capital input demand, output supply and profits for farmer \( i \) in terms of their agricultural ability and farm-specific distortions,

\[ \ell_i = \bar{\ell} \varphi_i s_{ai}; \quad k_i = \bar{k} \varphi_i s_{ai}; \quad y_{ai} = \bar{y}_a \varphi_i^\gamma s_{ai}; \quad \pi_i = \bar{\pi} \varphi_i s_{ai}, \]

where the terms in bars denote the components that are common across all farmers: \( \bar{\ell} = w_a \alpha \gamma / q; \)
\( \bar{k} = (1 - \alpha) \gamma w_a / r; \)
\( \bar{y}_a = w_a / p_a; \)
\( \bar{\pi} = (1 - \gamma) w_a. \)
**Occupational choice** Individuals can become farm operators in the agricultural sector or workers in the non-agricultural sector. If individual \( i \) chooses to become a farm operator in agriculture their income is given by (18), while if they become a non-agricultural worker their income is,

\[
I_{ni} = (1 - \eta) w_n s_{ni}.
\]

We note that these incomes are net of the transfer \( T \), which is common to all individuals and hence does not affect occupational choices. Individual \( i \) will choose the sector that provides the highest possible income, given the individual’s triplet \((s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})\). Individual \( i \) will choose agriculture, i.e. \( i \in H_a \), if \( I_{ai} \geq I_{ni} \) and non-agriculture otherwise. As a result individual \( i \)’s income is given by,

\[
I_i = \max \{ I_{ai}, I_{ni} \}.
\]

Note that income in agriculture depends not only on the individual’s agricultural ability \( s_{ai} \) but also on the individual’s farm distortion \( \varphi_i \). We can define an individual’s effective ability as the product of the two, \( \hat{s}_{ai} \equiv s_{ai} \varphi_i \). An individual will then choose to operate a farm if \( w_a \hat{s}_{ai} \geq (1 - \eta) w_n s_{ni} \). We note that, holding relative prices constant, farm-specific taxes directly distort the occupational choices of individuals. For given common sectoral returns \((w_a, w_n)\), barrier \( \eta \), and individual abilities \((s_{ai}, s_{ni})\), a lower \( \varphi \) (higher tax) reduces the effective return in agriculture. We denote the occupational choice of an individual \( i \) facing triplet \((s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})\) by an indicator function \( o(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni}) \) that takes the value of 1 if \( I_{ai} \geq I_{ni} \) and 0 otherwise.

**Definition of equilibrium** A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices \( \{p_a, r, q\} \), an allocation for each farm operator \( \{\ell_i, k_i, y_{ai}\} \), and allocation for the non-agricultural firm \( \{Y_n, N_n\} \), an occupational choice \( o(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni}) \) for each individual \( i \) faced with triplet \((s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})\), a per capita transfer \( T \), a consumption allocation \( \{c_{ai}, c_{ni}\} \) for each individual \( i \), such that: (a) the consumption allocation for each individual \( \{c_{ai}, c_{ni}\} \) maximizes their utility subject to their budget constraint, given prices,
abilities, distortions, and transfers; (b) the production allocation for each farm operator \(\{\ell_i, k_i, y_{ai}\}\) maximizes profits given prices, agricultural ability, and distortions; (c) the non-agricultural production allocation \(\{Y_n, N_n\}\) maximizes the profits of the non-agricultural representative firm, given prices; (d) occupational choices \(\{o(s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})\}\) maximize income for each individual given relative prices, abilities, distortions, transfers, and barrier to labor mobility; (e) the markets for labor, capital, land, agricultural goods, and non-agricultural goods clear; and (f) the government budget constraint from the tax-transfer scheme is satisfied.

### 6.2 Analysis

The model laid out above has implications for the share of employment in agriculture, the occupational choices of individuals, the pattern of selection, and sectoral and aggregate productivity. In addition to aggregate implications, the model has micro-level implications summarized by moments of sectoral incomes conditional on sectoral choices, as well as by moments of farm-level productivity and farm-level distortions for those operating in agriculture. We exploit the properties of the multivariate log-normal distribution over \((s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})\) in order to provide analytical results.

In Appendix A we show that when \((s_{ai}, \varphi_i, s_{ni})\) are drawn from a multi-variate log-normal distribution the share of employment in agriculture is given by,

\[
N_a = \Phi (b), \tag{20}
\]

where \(\Phi(.)\) is the standard normal cdf and,

\[
b \equiv \frac{b_a - b_n}{\sigma}, \quad b_a \equiv \log (w_a) + \mu_\varphi + \mu_a, \quad b_n \equiv \log (w_n) + \log (1 - \eta) + \mu_n, \tag{21}
\]

where \(\sigma\) is the variance of relative effective abilities between non-agriculture and agriculture.
We use the conditional averages of log-effective sectoral abilities to illustrate the possible patterns of sorting of individuals across sectors and the average quality of those that choose to work in each sector relative to the population. The average log-effective ability in agriculture among those that choose to work in agriculture is,

\[
E \{ \log (\tilde{s}_{ai}) | i \in H_a \} = \tilde{\mu}_a + \frac{\tilde{\sigma}_a^2 - \tilde{\sigma}_a^2}{\sigma} \lambda^l (b),
\]

(22)

while the average log-ability in non-agriculture among those choosing non-agriculture is,

\[
E \{ \log (s_{ni}) | i \in H_n \} = \mu_n + \frac{\tilde{\sigma}_n^2 - \sigma_{an}}{\sigma} \lambda^u (b),
\]

(23)

where \(\tilde{\mu}_a = \mu_a + \mu_\varphi\). \(\lambda^l (b) \equiv E [\xi | \xi \leq b] < 0\) and \(\lambda^u (b) \equiv E [\xi | \xi > b] > 0\) represent lower tail truncation and upper tail truncation of a standard normal random variable \(\xi\). The coefficients in (22) and (23) can be re-written as \(\frac{\tilde{\sigma}_a \sigma}{\sigma} [\rho_{an} - \tilde{\rho}_a]\) and \(\frac{\tilde{\sigma}_a \sigma}{\sigma} [\tilde{\sigma}_a - \rho_{an}]\). As a result, the average quality of those that choose to work in a given sector relative to the average quality in the population depends on the dispersions of effective abilities in agriculture \(\tilde{\sigma}_a\) and non-agriculture \(\sigma_n\), and their correlation \(\rho_{an}\). For example, if effective abilities are sufficiently positively correlated across sectors and the dispersion of non-agricultural ability is larger in relative terms \((\tilde{\sigma}_a^2 < \sigma_{an} \text{ and } \sigma_n^2 > \sigma_{an})\), then the average effective ability of those in agriculture (non-agriculture) is lower (higher) than the population average.

7 Calibration

Our strategy is to calibrate distortions, abilities, and sectoral selection in a Benchmark Economy (BE) to the panel household-level data from China. We proceed in two steps. First, we infer population parameters on abilities and distortions from observed moments on sectoral incomes,
TFP, and estimated wedges. Second, given the calibrated population moments in the first step, we
calibrate the remaining parameters from the general equilibrium equations of the sectoral model to
match relevant data targets. We now describe these steps in detail.

7.1 Inferring Population Moments from Observed Moments

Assuming a multivariate log-normal distribution for the joint population distribution of abilities and
distortions, we first back out the moments of that distribution (means, variances, and covariances)
so that we match observed moments on incomes across sectors, as well as agricultural TFP and
farm-specific distortions. There are eight population moments that need to be calibrated: three
means, $\mu_a, \mu_n, \mu_\varphi$; three variances, $\sigma^2_a, \sigma^2_n, \sigma^2_\varphi$; and two covariances, $\sigma_{a,\varphi}, \sigma_{an}$. These moments govern
the occupational choices of individuals in the economy. To back out the population moments we: (i)
construct in the model moments on sectoral incomes, farm TFP, and farm distortions, conditional
on sectoral choices, as functions of the population moments; (ii) compute the counterparts to the
conditional moments in our panel-data from China; and (iii) solve a system of equations for the
population moments.

Exploiting log-normality, our system of equations on conditional moments consists of:

1. Variance of log income in agriculture conditional on choosing agriculture,

$$ VAR \{ \log (I_{ai}) | i \in H_a \} \equiv \tilde{\sigma}_a^2 = \tilde{\sigma}_a^2 \left\{ 1 - \left( \frac{\sigma_{an} - \tilde{\sigma}_a^2}{\sigma_{\tilde{\sigma}_a}} \right)^2 \lambda_l (b) \left[ \lambda_l (b) - \tilde{b} \right] \right\}. \tag{24} $$

2. Variance of log income in non-agriculture conditional on choosing non-agriculture,

$$ VAR \{ \log (I_{ni}) | i \in H_n \} \equiv \tilde{\sigma}_n^2 = \tilde{\sigma}_n^2 \left\{ 1 - \left( \frac{\sigma_n^2 - \sigma_{an}}{\sigma_{\sigma_n}} \right)^2 \lambda_u (b) \left[ \lambda_u (b) - \tilde{b} \right] \right\}. \tag{25} $$

35
3. Covariance of log incomes in agriculture, non-agriculture conditional on choosing agriculture,

\[
\text{COV} \{ \log (I_{a_i}), \log (I_{n_i}) | i \in H_a \} \equiv \tilde{c}_{an} = \sigma_{an} - \left( \frac{\sigma_n^2 - \sigma_{an}}{\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{\sigma_{an} - \hat{\sigma}_n^2}{\sigma} \right) \lambda^l (b) \left[ \lambda^l (b) - b \right].
\] (26)

4. Variance of log TFPR in agriculture conditional on choosing agriculture,

\[
\text{VAR} \{ \log (\text{TFPR}_i) | i \in H_a \} \equiv \hat{\sigma}_{\text{TFPR}} = (1 - \gamma)^2 \sigma_{\varphi}^2 \left\{ 1 - \left( \frac{\sigma_{\varphi}^2 + \sigma_{a\varphi}}{\sigma\sigma_{\varphi}} \right) \right\} \lambda^l (b) \left[ \lambda^l (b) - b \right].
\] (27)

5. Covariance of log TFP and log TFPR in agriculture conditional on choosing agriculture,

\[
\text{COV} \{ \log (\text{TFP}_i), \log (\text{TFPR}_i) | i \in H_a \} \equiv \hat{c}_{\text{TFP,TFPR}} =
\]

\[- (1 - \gamma)^2 \left\{ \sigma_{a\varphi} + \left( \frac{\sigma_{\varphi}^2 + \sigma_{a\varphi}}{\sigma} \right) \left( \frac{\sigma_{an} - \sigma_{an}^2 - \sigma_{a\varphi}}{\sigma} \right) \lambda^l (b) \left[ \lambda^l (b) - b \right] \right\}. \] (28)

6. Average log income in agriculture conditional on choosing agriculture,

\[
E \{ \log (I_{a_i}) | i \in H_a \} \equiv \hat{m}_a = b_a + \frac{\sigma_{an} - \hat{\sigma}_a^2}{\sigma} \lambda^l (b).
\] (29)

7. Average log distortions in agriculture conditional on choosing agriculture,

\[
E \{ \log (\varphi_i) | i \in H_a \} \equiv \hat{m}_\varphi = \mu_\varphi - \left( \frac{\sigma_{\varphi}^2 + \sigma_{a\varphi}}{\sigma} \right) \lambda^l (b).
\] (30)

8. Average log income in non-agriculture conditional on choosing non-agriculture,

\[
E \{ \log (I_{n_i}) | i \in H_n \} \equiv \hat{m}_n = b_n + \frac{\sigma_n^2 - \sigma_{an}}{\sigma} \lambda^a (b).
\] (31)

In these expressions, the relationship between the variance of ability and the variance of effective
ability in agriculture is given by,
\[ \hat{\sigma}_a^2 = \sigma_a^2 + \sigma_\varphi^2 + 2\sigma_{a\varphi}, \]
and farm TFPR, as a summary measure of distortions, and farm TFP in the model are given by equations (7) and (8).

We then compute empirical moments in our panel data from China as household-level averages over 1993-2002 on the standard deviations of log agricultural income for those in farming; log non-agricultural income for those working in non-agriculture; log TFPR for farm operators; covariance of log agricultural income and log non-agricultural income for those that switch employment from agriculture to non-agriculture over time; and the covariance of log TFP and log TFPR for those operating farms. In our system of equations, the 5 population moments of variances and covariances are identified by the 5 conditional moments of variances and covariances given by equations (24)-(28). Table 2 contains the empirical conditional variances and covariances along with the share of employment in agriculture that we target. The three population means are identified from equations (29)-(31) along with three normalizations we make. The details of how we use the targeted empirical moments with the above system of equations to infer the population moments are provided in Appendix B. Our procedure ensures that the occupational choices of individuals are consistent with the observed share of employment in agriculture of 46 percent in China.

In Table 3 we report the resulting population moments following the procedure outlined above. Note that instead of reporting the covariances of agricultural ability and distortions of agricultural and non-agricultural ability, we report their respective correlations, \( \rho_{a\varphi} \) and \( \rho_{an} \), which have a more intuitive interpretation. The correlation of abilities across sectors is negative (-0.34), which means that individuals that are skilled farmers tend to be less skilled in non-agricultural occupations. This implies that individuals will sort into the sector in which they possess a comparative advantage, and that individuals working in each sector will be on average more skilled in that sector than the general population. The correlation of ability in agriculture and distortions \( \varphi \) is strongly negative.
Table 2: Targeted Empirical Conditional Moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(N_a)</td>
<td>Share of labor in agriculture</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{\nu}_a)</td>
<td>STD of agricultural income</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{\nu}_n)</td>
<td>STD of non-agricultural income</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{\nu}_{TFPR})</td>
<td>STD of farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{c}_{an})</td>
<td>COV between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes of switchers</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\hat{c}_{TFP,TFPR})</td>
<td>COV of farm TFP and farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All variables refer to logs.

Table 3: Calibrated Population Moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma_a)</td>
<td>STD of agricultural ability</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma_n)</td>
<td>STD of non-agricultural ability</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\sigma_\varphi)</td>
<td>STD of distortions</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\rho_{a\varphi})</td>
<td>CORR of agricultural ability and distortions</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\rho_{an})</td>
<td>CORR of agricultural–non-agricultural ability</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All variables refer to logs.

\((-0.88)\), consistent with our description of the institutional environment in China.

7.2 Calibrating Remaining Parameters

In order to calibrate the remaining parameters and to simulate the model we generate correlated data of 1,000,000 triplets \((s_a, \varphi, s_n)\), drawn from a multivariate log-normal distribution, using the inferred population moments from the previous step.\(^{16}\)

\(^{16}\)We find that drawing a large sample of 1,000,000 data points produces the same results as drawing 10,000 samples of 10,000 data points each, and taking the average.
We calibrate the remaining parameters using the generated correlated data, which embed the distributional properties of the population moments, so that the model equations constitute an equilibrium. The parameters to calibrate in this step are: $A_n$ productivity in non-agriculture which is normalized to 1; $(\alpha, \gamma)$ the elasticity parameters in the technology to produce the agricultural good, which are set to $\alpha = 0.66$ and $\gamma = 0.54$, following our analysis of measuring farm TFP and misallocation in agriculture in Section 5; $\omega$, the weight of the agricultural good in preferences, is set to 0.01 to match a long run share of employment in agriculture of 1 percent; and the endowments in agriculture of capital $K_a$ and land $L$, are set to match a capital-output ratio in agriculture of 0.3 and an average farm size of 0.45 hectares, both as observed in our micro data. We normalize the relative price of agriculture to 1 and solve the equilibrium of the model to obtain the subsistence consumption of agricultural goods in preferences $\bar{a}$ to reproduce a share of employment in agriculture of 46 percent and the productivity in agriculture $A_a$ to match our definition of the common term in agricultural income $w_a = 1$ in equation (19). Table 4 displays the aggregate and micro-level statistics for the benchmark economy, as well as the values for the calibrated parameters. The model reproduces well the macro and micro statistics for China. Note for example that whereas the static gain from efficient reallocation in the data is 57 percent, it is 45 percent in the model. The difference arises mainly because the actual distributions of TFP and distortions in the data are approximated in the model by a log-normal distribution.

8 Quantitative Experiments

We conduct a set of counterfactual experiments in order to assess the quantitative importance of farm-specific distortions for the allocation of resources within agriculture, the sector-occupation choices of individuals, as well as the amplification effect that selection imparts on sectoral productivity and real GDP per worker. We consider in turn: (a) the effects of eliminating farm-specific
Table 4: Calibrated Benchmark Economy (BE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value in BE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y_a/N_a$</td>
<td>Real agricultural labor productivity</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N_a$</td>
<td>Share of employment in agriculture</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$TFP_a$</td>
<td>TFP in agriculture</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(Y_n/N_n)/(Y_a/N_a)$</td>
<td>Real non-agricultural to agricultural productivity gap</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_a/N_a$</td>
<td>Average ability in agriculture</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_n/N_n$</td>
<td>Average ability in non-agriculture</td>
<td>4.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(Z_n/N_n)/(Z_a/N_a)$</td>
<td>Ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural ability</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y/N$</td>
<td>Real GDP per worker</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_a^c/Y_a$</td>
<td>Static gain of misallocation</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Micro-level Statistics

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STD of log– farm TFP</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD of log– farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log– farm TFP and log– farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Calibrated Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_a$</td>
<td>mean agricultural ability</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_n$</td>
<td>mean non-agricultural ability</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_\phi$</td>
<td>mean distortion</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{a}$</td>
<td>subsistence constraint</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A_a$</td>
<td>productivity in agriculture</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_a$</td>
<td>capital stock in agriculture</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L$</td>
<td>total agricultural land</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Distortions; (b) these effects compared to those from an exogenous increase in TFP; and (c) the pattern of selection with sectoral reallocation.

8.1 Eliminating Distortions

Our main experiment involves studying the effects from removing farm-specific distortions in agriculture. In Section 5 we showed that not only is there large dispersion in implicit distortions across farms but that they are also strongly positively correlated with farm productivity. In the data, more
productive farmers face larger distortions as they are unable to operate larger farms (i.e. obtain more land and capital for their operation). Land market institutions that restrict the allocation of land within villages are at the heart of these patterns. In order to assess the aggregate and micro-level effects of distortions we consider two cases: first, we eliminate all distortions on farmers in the economy, i.e., we set \( \varphi = 1 \) for all \( i \); and second, we eliminate only the correlation of distortions with farmer ability, keeping uncorrelated distortions the same as in the benchmark, i.e. we set \( \sigma_{a\varphi} = 0 \). Since about half the dispersion in distortions is due to the correlation with farmers ability, we also reduce \( \sigma_{\varphi} \) by half of the benchmark value. The results from these counterfactuals highlight the importance of distortions for aggregate, sectoral, and micro outcomes as well as the contribution of the systematic component of distortions for these patterns. The results of these two counterfactuals along with the benchmark economy are presented in Table 5.

### Eliminating all distortions

As can be seen from the third column in Table 5, eliminating all distortions on farmers has a substantial impact on the economy. Agricultural labor productivity increases 8.4-fold and the share of employment in agriculture falls 39 percentage points, from 46 percent to 7 percent. As a reference for comparison, consider that the “static” gains of the efficient reallocation from eliminating distortions in the model involve an increase in agricultural TFP of 45 percent while the total increase in agricultural TFP is a factor of 3-fold. To understand the relationship between the increases in agricultural labor productivity and TFP, we use aggregate agricultural output in equation (9) to express agricultural labor productivity as,

\[
\frac{Y_a}{N_a} = A \cdot \bar{Z}_a^{1-\gamma} \cdot \left[ \frac{L^a K^{1-a}}{N_a} \right]^{\gamma},
\]

(33)

where \( A \) includes both \( A_a^{1-\gamma} \) and the effect of idiosyncratic distortions on TFP (see equation 10). Since \( A_a \) is constant, changes in \( A \) reflect the static efficiency gains from eliminating misallocation. The term \( \bar{Z}_a^{1-\gamma} \) captures the effects of selection. Note that these first two terms represent the
Table 5: Counterfactuals: Effects of Eliminating Distortions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Benchmark Economy BE</th>
<th>No Correlated Distortions</th>
<th>No Distortions $\varphi_i = 0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregate Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Agricultural Productivity ($Y_a/N_a$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>8.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Employment in Agriculture ($N_a$) (%)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP in Agriculture ($TFP_a$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Non-Agricultural Productivity ($Y_n/N_n$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ability in Agriculture ($Z_a/N_a$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>5.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ability in Non-Agriculture ($Z_n/N_n$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP per Worker ($Y/N$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro-level Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD of log–farm TFP</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD of log–farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log–(farm TFP, farm TFPR)</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log–(agr. ability, non-agr. ability)</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log–(agr. income, non-agr. income)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The counterfactual “No Correlated Distortions” refers to the economy when only eliminating the correlation of farm-level distortions with farmer ability. In this case, we set $\sigma_{a \varphi} = 0$ and since the correlation accounts for about half the dispersion of distortions we set $\sigma_{\varphi} = 0.5 \times \sigma_{BE}^{BE}$. The counterfactual “No Distortions” eliminates all farm-level distortions, correlated and uncorrelated. In this case we set $\varphi_i = 0$ for all $i$. All aggregate variables, except for the share of employment in agriculture, are reported relative to the same statistic in the Benchmark Economy (BE). All micro-level statistics are reported in levels, and are conditional on choosing agriculture in the corresponding simulated economy.

components of agricultural TFP that are affected by misallocation. The last term in (33) represents the impact of the share of employment in agriculture on labor productivity holding fixed aggregate endowments of land and capital. Eliminating farm-specific distortions increases agricultural labor productivity directly by eliminating misallocation across farms, but it also induces higher ability farmers to sort back into agriculture since they no longer face restrictions on consolidating land. These two effects constitute the increase in agricultural TFP. At the same time, the associated increases in productivity via eliminating misallocation and improved selection reduce the share of employment in agriculture, which further raises agricultural labor productivity by increasing the...
Notes: Reports the fraction of employment in agriculture from each decile of the farming ability distribution in the benchmark economy and the economy with no distortions. The ratio of farm TFP between the top and bottom deciles is a factor of 7.3-fold.

amount of land and capital available per farmer. To appreciate the effect of eliminating distortions on selection, Figure 4 reports the fraction of employment in agriculture for each decile of the farming ability distribution. Whereas in the benchmark economy with distortions employment in agriculture is uniformly distributed across all agricultural ability types, removing distortions improves selection into agriculture of mostly high ability farmers.

Eliminating distortions is the driver of all these changes, but to gauge the magnitude of each, we use equation (33) to decompose the change in agricultural labor productivity into: (1) the misallocation effect on productivity which results in an increase of 1.45-fold or about 18 percent of the overall increase (log(1.45)/log(8.4)); (2) the effect of a 5-fold increase in average ability in agriculture as the more able farmers find it optimal to stay in agriculture, which translates into a 2.1 fold increase in agricultural labor productivity or 35 percent of the overall increase; and (3)
the effect of the reduction in the share of employment in agriculture $N_a$, which implies a further increase in agricultural labor productivity of 2.75-fold or 48 percent of the overall increase. This is how a 1.45 fold increase in agricultural TFP due to reduced misallocation translates into a 8.4-fold increase in agricultural labor productivity. In terms of TFP in agriculture, the overall increase is a factor of 3.1-fold, out of which two-thirds is the effect of selection ($\log(2.1)/\log(3.1)$). In other words, the amplification effect of selection on agricultural TFP more than doubles the static gains from reduced misallocation.

Average ability in non-agriculture, and as a result labor productivity in non-agriculture, falls to 72 percent of their benchmark economy values, due to the mass influx of workers, not all of which are as productive in non-agriculture. Despite the significant impact on agricultural productivity, real GDP per worker increases about 25 percent. The reason for the dampened effect on aggregate output is that there is a large shift of labor to the sector that sees a drop in its productivity relative to the benchmark.\(^{17}\) The dispersion of TFP in agriculture is now lower, albeit with a higher mean.

**Eliminating correlated distortions** Consider next the case of eliminating only the correlation of distortions. Note that in this experiment there is still misallocation related to the dispersion of distortions. As discussed above, in the data there are two types of misallocation: misallocation of factors across farmers with different productivity, as well as misallocation of factors among farmers with the same productivity, each of which accounts for roughly 50 percent of the dispersion of distortions and the efficient reallocation gains. In this experiment, we only eliminate the distortions across farmers with different productivity so we set $\rho_{a\varphi} = 0$ and $\sigma_\varphi = 0.5 \times \sigma_\varphi^{BE}$. The results of this quantitative experiment are summarized in the second column of Table 5. The results are in the same direction and almost of the same magnitude as when we eliminate all distortions. For instance, agricultural labor productivity increases 6.8-fold versus 8.4-fold when eliminating all\(^{17}\) In reality however non-agricultural labor productivity increases by 84 percent over the period we examine. Taking this into account, the effect on real GDP per worker from eliminating distortions is more pronounced, with aggregate real GDP per worker increasing 2.1-fold (vs. 1.25-fold with just reduced misallocation).
distortions, implying that the strong correlation between distortions and farmer ability accounts for 90 percent \( \frac{\log(6.8)}{\log(8.4)} \) of the change in agricultural labor productivity from eliminating all distortions. Whereas correlated distortions account for about 50 percent of the static gains from reduced factor misallocation, they account for a much larger share of the productivity gains with selection, suggesting that the correlation property of distortions is much more important in the amplification mechanism of selection.

**Discussion** The aggregate quantitative impact from eliminating farm-level distortions depends on two key empirical moments: the dispersion of farm-level distortions, which largely determines the extent of static misallocation in the model, and the correlation of distortions with farm productivity, which as just shown largely determines the amplification effect through selection. As our benchmark, we have calibrated these empirical moments to the average nationwide across all farmers in China. As mentioned earlier, typical cross-sectional analyses of misallocation are often criticized for misattributing measurement error in the quality of inputs and outputs and idiosyncratic transitory shocks to misallocation. In Table 6 we report the two key empirical moments for farmers in the cross-section of our data, in our baseline panel, as well as within villages both for the cross-section and the panel. As expected both the panel dimension and the narrower geographical characterization of the data reduce the extent of misallocation as evidenced in the lower TFPR dispersion. But as shown earlier, the amplification effect of selection hinges largely on the systematic pattern of distortions with respect to farm TFP and as reported in Table 6 this component remains strong, if not even stronger, in the panel and within villages. This result is to be expected under the interpretation of the implicit distortions in the agricultural sector as stemming from the land institution in China, which roughly provides equal amounts of land to farmers of very different productivities.

We also discuss our results with alternative values for the population correlation of abilities across
Table 6: Alternative Moments of Misallocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cross-section average</th>
<th>Baseline panel</th>
<th>Within village</th>
<th>Baseline + w/village</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STD of farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of farm TFP and farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All variables refer to logs. Cross-section average refers to distortions from farm TFP in the panel applied to year-specific inputs and averaged across the years. Baseline panel refers to our baseline specification. Within village refers to the average of statistics computed for each village.

sectors $\rho_{an}$ considered in the literature and show that our results are conservative in terms of potential amplification effects. In the benchmark economy, the calibrated population correlation $\rho_{an}$ is -0.34. We consider an alternative value of 0.4 and re-calibrate the benchmark economy to assess the impact of removing distortions. Table 7 reports the results. Removing distortions has a large effect on aggregate agricultural productivity, 8.4-fold in the baseline calibration and 18.4-fold in the alternative calibration. This is largely due to a stronger effect of selection on agricultural TFP which increases by 4.7-fold compared to 3.1-fold in the baseline and the consequent larger decline in agricultural labor. The stronger selection effect in agriculture can be observed in Figure 5 where the positive correlation between distortions and abilities generates an even stronger bias towards low productive farmers selecting into agriculture.

To summarize, our results suggest that farm-specific distortions have an important effect on the occupational choices of farmers, particularly high productivity farmers, which in turn substantially affect agricultural productivity, and the allocation of labor across sectors.
Table 7: Eliminating Distortions for Different Population $\rho_{an}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Benchmark Economy</th>
<th>No distortions $\rho_{a,n} = -0.34$</th>
<th>No distortions $\rho_{a,n} = 0.40$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregate Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Agricultural Productivity ($Y_a/N_a$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>8.42</td>
<td>18.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Employment in Agriculture ($N_a$) (%)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP in Agriculture ($TFP_a$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Non-Agricultural Productivity ($Y_n/N_n$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ability in Agriculture ($Z_a/N_a$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>18.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ability in Non-Agriculture ($Z_n/N_n$)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP per Worker</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro-level Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD of log–farm TFP</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD of log–farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log–(farm TFP, farm TFPR)</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log–(agr. ability, non-agr. ability)</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log–(agr. income, non-agr. income)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: “Baseline” is the main calibration of data moments in China that results in a population correlation of abilities across sectors $\rho_{an} = -0.34$. For $\rho_{an} = 0.40$, the benchmark economy is calibrated to the same targets in the second stage and distortions are removed. All aggregate variables, except for the share of employment in agriculture, are reported relative to the same statistic in the benchmark economy in each correlation case. All micro-level statistics are reported in levels, and are conditional on choosing agriculture in the corresponding simulated economy.
Notes: Reports the fraction of employment in agriculture from each decile of the farming ability distribution in the benchmark economy and the economy with no distortions. The ratio of farm TFP between the top and bottom deciles is a factor of 7.3-fold.

8.2 Comparison to an Exogenous Increase in TFP

In the context of our model, improvements in resource allocation in agriculture produce an increase in aggregate agricultural productivity and labor reallocation away from agriculture. Qualitatively such effects can also be generated through an exogenous increase in agricultural TFP or economy-wide TFP. To put our results from reduced misallocation in context we compare them to the results from a 45 percent exogenous increase in TFP, corresponding to the static gains from eliminating misallocation in our model.

In the first two columns of Table 8 we reproduce the results for the benchmark economy and the economy without farm-level distortions (our main counterfactual). In columns three and four we show in turn the effects of increasing exogenously TFP in agriculture and then in both agriculture and non-agriculture, by 45 percent (keeping farm-level distortions in place). While the share of employment in agriculture drops from 46 percent to 23 percent, agricultural TFP increases only
by 44 percent. The reason overall TFP increases less than the exogenous increase in TFP in agriculture is that the effect of selection partially counteracts the exogenous increase in TFP, i.e., there is a 4 percent drop in the average quality of workers in agriculture, which suggests that the relatively better farmers leave agriculture (since farm-level distortions are still positively related with ability in agriculture). However, the average ability of workers in non-agriculture drops even more (by 18 percent), which suggests that those moving into non-agriculture are of relatively lower non-agricultural ability than those already in non-agriculture.

Table 8: Comparison: Removing Distortions vs. Exogenous TFP Increases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>No Distortions</th>
<th>↑ (A_{a}^{1-\gamma})</th>
<th>↑ (A_{a}^{1-\gamma}, A_n)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregate Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>× 1.45</td>
<td>× 1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Agricultural Productivity (Y_a/N_a)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>8.42</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Employment in Agriculture (N_a) (%)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP in Agriculture (TFP_a)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Non-Agricultural Productivity (Y_n/N_n)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ability in Agriculture (Z_a/N_a)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ability in Non-Agriculture (Z_n/N_n)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP per Worker (Y/N)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micro-level Statistics</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STD of log– farm TFP</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD of log– farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log– (farm TFP, farm TFPR)</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log– (agr. ability, non-agr. ability)</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log– (agr. income, non-agr. income)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The first column “BE” refers to the benchmark economy. The second column “No Distortions” refers to the counterfactual of eliminating all farm-level distortions. The third column refers to the case of exogenously increasing TFP in agriculture 1.45-fold relative to the benchmark, and the fourth column refers to the case of increasing TFP in both agriculture and non-agriculture 1.45-fold relative to the benchmark. All aggregate variables, except for the share of employment in agriculture, are reported relative to the same statistic in the benchmark economy. All micro-level statistics are reported in levels, and are conditional on choosing agriculture in the corresponding simulated economy.

The reduction in misallocation associated with the elimination of farm-level distortions has a much larger aggregate effect on agricultural labor productivity than an equivalent-in-magnitude exoge-
nous increase in TFP. When TFP increases exogenously, as explained above, selection works to mitigate the effect of the increase in TFP. This mitigating effect is small in magnitude and operates through general equilibrium effects (changes in relative prices). To see this, note that if relative prices remained unchanged, a 45 percent increase in both $A_{1}^{1-\gamma}$ and $A_{n}$ would have no effect on occupational choices as they would leave the relative return to agriculture and non-agriculture unaltered for every individual. In the case of reduced misallocation, selection works to generate a large amplification effect on agricultural labor productivity, over and above the static misallocation gains of 45 percent. The reason for this is that farm-level distortions directly impact the occupational choices of individuals, particularly the high agricultural ability ones. Removing farm-level distortions alters the pattern of occupational choices of individuals even holding constant aggregate prices.

This result is important as a challenge in the literature is to find measurable drivers of sectoral reallocation and increased productivity in agriculture relative to non-agriculture. In an important contribution, Lagakos and Waugh (2013) highlighted selection as a substantial amplification mechanism of productivity differences, an insight we build on in our paper. But as emphasized in our results, reasonable economy-wide productivity differences are unlikely to generate differences in sectoral reallocation and selection large enough to explain the large real sectoral productivity gaps across rich and poor countries. We provide a measure of idiosyncratic distortions in agriculture as a specific and distinct driver of sectoral reallocation that has a strong effect on occupational choices and selection, generating both a direct effect on agricultural productivity and an amplification effect that is orders of magnitude larger than the effect from aggregate distortions or economy-wide productivity differences.
8.3 Sectoral Reallocation and Selection Patterns

Our empirical findings indicate that farm-level distortions have not changed much over the period we examine, consistent with the unchanged land-market institutions in China. Yet in the data we observe that households are moving out of agriculture and into non-agriculture at a rate of about 1 percent per year. This occurs because the economy grows even with farm-level distortions. Non-agricultural labor productivity increases 7 percent per year over the period we examine, with an overall increase of 84 percent over 1993-2002. In Table 9 we show what happens in the benchmark economy in the presence of the observed farm-level distortions when TFP increases in both agriculture and non-agriculture. The second column displays the results where TFP increases by 7 percent to capture the year-to-year change, and the third column when TFP increases by 84 percent to capture the overall change during our sample period. As productivity increases in both sectors, the share of employment in agriculture drops by an amount roughly consistent with the drop we observe in our survey data.

One question that arises is whether there is a particular type of household that switches from agriculture to non-agriculture as productivity rises. This can have important implications given our approach of backing out the correlation of abilities across sectors from the observed correlation of incomes of “switchers,” i.e., households that switched from agriculture to non-agriculture. In our data, the observed correlation of incomes across sectors of the switchers is fairly constant over time. The question though is whether this correlation is biased because of the type of households that in fact switch. We examine this question in the context of our model by considering the micro-level implications of exogenous increases in TFP, and in particular the implications for the correlation of abilities and the correlation of incomes across sectors, as the share of individuals in agriculture drops. The results of Table 9 indicate that for year-to-year changes (second column) the correlation of agricultural and non-agricultural abilities or incomes across sectors are largely unchanged. Over the entire period (third column), the correlation of abilities again exhibits little change, while the
Table 9: Effects of TFP Increases on Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>BE</th>
<th>( A_{a}^{1-\gamma}, A_{n} ) ( \times 1.07 )</th>
<th>( A_{a}^{1-\gamma}, A_{n} ) ( \times 1.84 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggregate Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Agricultural Productivity ( Y_{a}/N_{a} )</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Employment in Agriculture ( N_{a} ) (%)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP in Agriculture ( TFP_{a} )</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Non-Agricultural Productivity ( Y_{n}/N_{n} )</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ability in Agriculture ( Z_{a}/N_{a} )</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Ability in Non-Agriculture ( Z_{n}/N_{n} )</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP per Worker ( Y/N )</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro-level Statistics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD of log–farm TFP</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STD of log–farm TFPR</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log–(farm TFP, farm TFPR)</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log–(agr. ability, non-agr. ability)</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORR of log–(agr. income, non-agr. income)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The first column “BE” refers to the benchmark economy. The second and third columns refer to the cases of increasing TFP in both agriculture and non-agriculture by 7% (annual) and 84% (overall) relative to the benchmark. All aggregate variables, except for the share of employment in agriculture, are reported relative to the same statistic in the benchmark economy. All micro-level statistics are reported in levels, and are conditional on choosing agriculture in the corresponding simulated economy.

correlation of incomes increases more. These changes however are roughly consistent with the range of changes observed in the data. These results suggest that the bulk of changes in sectoral reallocation in China during the sample period are driven by changes in non-agricultural labor productivity and not so much by changes in the agricultural distortions associated with the land market institutions and the “hukou” system.


9 Conclusions

Using a simple quantitative framework and micro panel data, we presented evidence that capital and land are severely misallocated across farmers in China. Given the institutional framework, we argued that this factor misallocation reflects primarily restrictions in the land market, which also dampens access to credit for farmers. The administrative allocation of land-use rights on an egalitarian basis manifests itself as a larger idiosyncratic distortion on the more productive farmers. Over time, the resulting pattern of misallocation shows no systematic tendency to improve, consistent with the persistent nature of the institutional restrictions in the Chinese economy.

Using the idiosyncratic distortions we measure across farmers in China, we develop and estimate a two-sector general-equilibrium model of occupational selection. The panel data provide us with information on income in agriculture and wages in non-agriculture for households that switch occupations, which we use to restrict the correlation of abilities across sectors in the population. We find that measured distortions substantially affect the observed distribution of farm TFP in the Chinese data, and that eliminating the correlation of these distortions with farmer’s ability improves aggregate agricultural productivity via reduced misallocation and improved selection of more able farmers into agriculture. This effect substantially contributes to structural change and growth.

Our analysis implies that implementing a system of secure property rights to facilitate a decentralized allocation of land would generate large aggregate productivity gains. To the extent that village officials do not observe farmer ability or do not make land allocation decisions based on ability, any administrative (re)allocation of land would be unable to channel land to farmers that value it the most or can make the most out of it. Developing a market allocation mechanism by extending fully transferable use rights over land to farmers will not only allow farmers to increase their operational scales through land consolidations, but would also induce the best farmers to stay in agriculture, while releasing labor to non-agriculture. The productivity and farm size increases
due to a better allocation of factors of production among farmers and an improved selection of farmers in agriculture can arguably also induce changes in farm operations by incentivizing farmers to use modern inputs and better technologies. We leave this important extension of our framework for future research.

References


A Model Implications Under Log-Normality

Define deviations of log draws from means,

\[ u_{ai} = \log(s_{ai}) - \mu_a, \]

\[ u_{ni} = \log(s_{ni}) - \mu_n, \]

\[ u_{\varphi i} = \log(\varphi_i) - \mu_{\varphi}. \]

Define the deviation of log effective agricultural ability from mean,

\[ \hat{u}_{ai} = \log(\varphi_i) + \log(s_{ai}) - \mu_{\varphi} - \mu_a = u_{\varphi i} + u_{ai}. \]

Note that \( u_{ni} \) is normally distributed with mean \( \mathbb{E}(u_{ni}) = 0 \) and variance \( \text{VAR}(u_{ni}) = \mathbb{E}(u_{ni}^2) = \sigma_n^2. \)

In turn, \( \hat{u}_{ai} \) is also normally distributed with mean \( \mathbb{E}(\hat{u}_{ai}) = \mathbb{E}(u_{\varphi i}) + \mathbb{E}(u_{ai}) = 0 \) and variance,

\[ \text{VAR}(\hat{u}_{ai}) = \sigma_{\varphi}^2 + \sigma_a^2 + 2\sigma_{a\varphi} \equiv \hat{\sigma}_a^2. \]

Since \( s_n \) and \( \varphi \) are uncorrelated, the covariance of \( \hat{u}_{ai} \) and \( u_{ni} \) is given by,

\[ \text{COV}(\hat{u}_{ai}, u_{ni}) = \mathbb{E}[(u_{ai} + u_{\varphi i}) u_{ni}] = \sigma_{an}. \]

Finally note that \( (u_n - \hat{u}_a) \) has mean \( \mathbb{E}(u_{ni} - \hat{u}_{ai}) = 0 \) and variance given by,

\[ \text{VAR}(u_{ni} - \hat{u}_{ai}) = \hat{\sigma}_a^2 + \sigma_n^2 - 2\sigma_{an} \equiv \sigma^2. \]
The log-incomes of individual $i$ from agriculture and non-agriculture respectively are,

$$
\log (I_{ai}) = \log (w_a) + \log (\varphi_i) + \log (s_{ai}),
$$

$$
\log (I_{ni}) = \log (w_n) + \log (1 - \eta) + \log (s_{ni}).
$$

We can re-write agricultural and non-agricultural incomes as the sums of constants and log mean deviations,

$$
\log (I_{ai}) = b_a + u_{\varphi_i} + u_{ai} = b_a + \hat{u}_{ai}, \quad (34)
$$

$$
\log (I_{ni}) = b_n + u_{ni}, \quad (35)
$$

where $b_a \equiv \log (w_a) + \mu_\varphi + \mu_a$ and $b_n \equiv \log (w_n) + \log (1 - \eta) + \mu_n$.

**Sectoral employment**  The probability an individual chooses to become a farm operator in agriculture,

$$
n_a = Pr \{ \log (I_{ai}) > \log (I_{ni}) \} = Pr \{ b_a + \hat{u}_{ai} > b_n + u_{ni} \} =
$$

$$
= Pr \{ b_a - b_n > u_{ni} - \hat{u}_{ai} \} = Pr \left( \frac{b_a - b_n}{\sigma} > \frac{u_{ni} - \hat{u}_{ai}}{\sigma} \right).
$$

Let $b \equiv \frac{b_a - b_n}{\sigma}$ and note that $\xi_i \equiv \frac{u_{ni} - \hat{u}_{ai}}{\sigma}$ is a standard normal random variable. Then,

$$
n_a = \Phi (b),
$$

where $\Phi(.)$ is the standard normal cdf. Given that we have a continuum of individuals of measure 1, $n_a$ is also the fraction of individuals that choose agriculture, i.e., $N_a = n_a$. Similarly, we can show that the probability an individual chooses to become a worker in non-agriculture (and therefore the fraction of individuals that choose non-agriculture) is $N_n = 1 - \Phi (b)$. 

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B Inferring Population Moments from Observed Moments

The following are the specific steps in the procedure we follow to recover the population moments of the distributions of abilities across sectors and distortions.

1. Using equation (20) we invert the standard normal to recover the parameter $b$ that generates a share of employment in agriculture of 46 percent. This gives $b = -0.10$.

2. Note that equations (24), (25), and (26) give the variance of the log of agricultural income conditional on choosing agriculture $\hat{v}_a$, the variance of the log of non-agricultural income conditional on choosing non-agriculture $\hat{v}_n$, and the covariance of the two conditional on having chosen agriculture $\hat{c}_{an}$, in terms of the dispersion in effective abilities in agriculture $\sigma_a$ and non-agriculture $\sigma_n$, and the covariance of abilities $\sigma_{an}$ alone. We solve this $3 \times 3$ system for the three population moments $\hat{\sigma}_a, \sigma_n, \sigma_{an}$ to match the observed conditional moments on incomes from the panel data on China.

3. We then solve for the dispersion of abilities in agriculture $\sigma_a$, the dispersion of distortions $\sigma_\varphi$, and the covariance of abilities in agriculture and distortions $\sigma_{a\varphi}$ using the $3 \times 3$ system in equations (27), (28), and (32). These equations give the variance of the log of TFPR $\hat{v}_{TFPR}$, the covariance of log TFP and log TFPR conditional on working in agriculture $\hat{c}_{TFP,TFPR}$, and the definition of the variance of agricultural ability in relation to the variance of effective agricultural ability solved in previous step 2.

4. To determine the means of the multivariate log normal we proceed as follows. We normalize the mean of distortions in the data $\hat{m}_\varphi = 0$ since this mean is irrelevant in our analysis and solve for $\mu_\varphi$ from (30). Subtracting (29) from (31), we first recognize that $b$ and the population variances alone from steps 1-3 fully determine $(\hat{m}_n - \hat{m}_a)$. We then normalize $\hat{m}_n$ to 0, and solve $\hat{m}_a$ to reproduce the difference $(\hat{m}_n - \hat{m}_a)$. Then (29) and (31) can be solved
for $b_a$ and $b_n$ respectively. We normalize $A_n = 1$ implying $w_n = 1$. We set the common component of agricultural income $w_a$ to 1 and in the second stage of the calibration choose $A_a$ to be consistent with that choice. We choose the barrier $\log(1 - \eta)$ to reproduce a real non-agriculture to agriculture labor productivity gap of 4. Then $\mu_a$ and $\mu_n$ can be residually solved for in turn from the definition of $b_a$ and $b_n$ in equation (21).