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MOBILE MESSAGING FOR OFFLINE SOCIAL INTERACTIONS:  
A LARGE FIELD EXPERIMENT

Tianshu Sun  
Guodong (Gordon) Gao  
Ginger Zhe Jin

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**ABSTRACT**

While much research has examined the role of technology in moderating online user connections, how IT motivates offline interactions among users is much less understood. Using a randomized field experiment involving 80,000 participants, we study how mobile messaging can leverage recipients' social ties to encourage blood donation. There are three main findings: first, both behavior intervention (in the form of reminder message) and economic reward (in the form of individual or group reward) increase donations, but only the messages with group reward are effective in motivating more donors to donate with their friend(s); second, group reward tends to attract different types of donors, especially those who are traditionally less active in online social setting; and third, across all treatments, message recipients donate a greater amount of blood if their friends are present. Structural estimation further suggests that rewarding group donors is four times more cost-effective than rewarding individual donors. Based on the structural estimates, we perform policy simulations on the optimal design of mobile messaging. The method of combining structural model and randomized field experiment opens new frontiers for research on leveraging IT to mobilize a user's social network for social good.

Tianshu Sun  
Robert H. Smith School of Business  
3330 Van Munching Hall  
College Park, MD 20742  
tianshusun@rsmith.umd.edu

Guodong (Gordon) Gao  
4025 Van Munching Hall  
University of Maryland  
College Park, MD, 20742  
ggao@rsmith.umd.edu

Ginger Zhe Jin  
University of Maryland  
Department of Economics  
3115F Tydings Hall  
College Park, MD 20742-7211  
and NBER  
jin@econ.umd.edu

A randomized controlled trials registry entry is available at:  
<http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/935/history>

## 1. Introduction

Information technology has greatly reduced the communication and coordination cost among individuals. As a result, individuals are connected online and offline, ready to influence each other's behavior on an unprecedented scale. In light of this trend, organizations have increasingly used social interventions (Godes et al. 2005, Hill et al. 2006, Valente 2012), but academic research is lagged behind. More specifically, a large stream of literature has studied online information sharing (Aral and Walker 2011, 2012, Bapna and Umyarov 2014, Ma et al. 2014, Susarla et al. 2012), while much less is known about how firms use digital interventions to improve offline social interaction. As Aral (2015) points out, "...there remains a danger in relying too heavily on digital substrates to explore human behavior. Not only are digital samples biased toward those who are more active online, potentially missing large swaths of society, but limiting inquiry to digital behaviors constrains the theoretical reach of experimental work." Hence Aral (2015) calls for networked experiments to link online treatment with offline response.

Our study is one attempt to answer this call. Specifically, we use mobile messaging to leverage recipients' social ties for an important offline behavior – blood donation. Blood shortage is prevalent worldwide, partly due to the low level of voluntary donation, especially among developing countries (WHO 2015). While individual incentives are important<sup>1</sup>, recent literature finds that donors behave differently when surrounded by other donors or watched by third-party observers (Goes et al. 2014, Toubia et al. 2013, Jabr et al. 2013, Ozbay and Ozbay 2014, Ariely et al. 2009). Such a group effect usually leads to more donations, although its effectiveness depends on group size (Zhang and Zhu 2011), group composition (Chen and Li 2009), and information structure (Chen et al. 2010). In light of this literature, our study offers a new approach to address the global challenge of blood shortage.

Up till now, most studies on group effects employ a researcher-controlled environment that defines group *exogenously*. In reality donor groups are often formed endogenously even before the charitable event organizer greets any potential donor. Therefore, important questions are left unanswered such as: How can we use mobile interventions to encourage potential donors to form a group? Why do people donate or not donate as a group? What kinds of individuals are

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<sup>1</sup> On economic rewards, see Lacetera, Macis and Slonim 2012, 2013, 2014, Iajya et al. 2013, Goette and Stutzer 2008. On mechanism design, see Kessler and Roth 2012, 2014. On behavioral interventions, see Andreoni and Rao 2011. On social pressure and social image, see DellaVigna, List and Malmendier 2012, Kessler 2013, Ariely, Bracha and Maier 2009, Karlan and McConnell 2014, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009.

more prone to the digital interventions in offline social interactions? In this paper, we examine how to take advantage of endogenous group formation to increase donation in a real world setting.

There are multiple reasons why leveraging offline group formation can be more beneficial to society than addressing each donor separately. First, donating in front of a friend may generate extra value to the donor in terms of a more positive social image or warm glow. Second, to the extent that friends are alike, the friend of an active donor is likely a prospective donor. Third, coming to the charitable event together may generate a shared experience valuable to both the donor and her friend. This will in turn enhance the likelihood of the two coming as a group. Fourth, if we can identify what types of donors are more likely to enjoy group donation, reaching out to them can have a long run ripple effect that further spread the benefits of group donation.

If it is so desirable to donate as a group, why don't all donors already donate in a group? One explanation is coordination failure: a donor may need to reach out to her friend and educate him/her about the charitable event, and to coordinate schedule and transportation. The other explanation reflects more fundamental issues such as negative peer pressure (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2010): the donor may be reluctant to ask a friend to donate together if doing so amounts to asking for a favor or imposing social pressure on the friend. Whether the lack of group donation is due to coordination failure or negative peer pressure, we argue that encouraging group donation has a potential to improve Pareto efficiency. For example, suppose group donation can generate an extra value of \$1,000 to the charity (as compared to solo donation), but it does not occur because the private benefit of group donation is only \$500 to the donor and her friend, while the coordination cost and the negative social pressure of asking or being asked sum up to \$600. In this case, the charity can offer a \$200 reward for group donation, which allows the donor and her friend to receive a net benefit of \$100 via group donation and the charity to realize a net benefit of \$800.

To study ways to motivate group donation, we collaborated with a Chinese blood bank and conducted a large field experiment in December 2014. We randomly assigned 80,000 potential donors into seven test groups. The first one is a control group with 14,000 subjects. For the remaining six groups (with 11,000 subjects in each), we sent out a mobile message and varied its content across groups. The message content explored two tools to overcome the hurdle

of group donation. One is behavioral intervention: some treatments do not mention group donation at all, while the others explicitly request a potential donor to donate together with friend(s). The second tool is providing economic reward for solo or group donation. Our experimental design incorporates six combinations of these two tools (Table 1).

In particular, message 1 only reminded subjects to donate, message 2 added an explicit reward for donation (a supermarket voucher that is worth 30-50 RMB, equivalent to 6-8.3 US dollars). The average daily wage in this city in 2014 was about 100 RMB, so the reward amount is non-trivial. Neither message 1 nor 2 mentions group donation. In message 3, we reminded the subject to donate with friend(s), but did not mention the economic reward for donation; message 4 included both a reminder for donating with friend(s) and the economic reward. Note that in both message 2 and message 4, the reward is presented as reward per donor, without any condition on whether the donor comes alone or with friend(s). Message 5 is similar to message 4, except that we made the reward conditional on donating with friends (“...if you and your friend(s) donate together, each one of you will get a reward of...”). Message 6 is similar to message 4, but highlighted additional gifts available for all donors that come in group (“... you will get a reward of ... upon donation. If you and your friend(s) donate together, each one of you will get an additional gift.”). Table 1 summarizes the behavioral intervention and economic rewards in each treatment group, together with their corresponding parameters in our model (introduced in Section 3). For every donor who showed up during the experiment period, we also conducted a detailed survey that includes questions on their perception of social image and donating in a group.

Our experiment generates three main findings. First, a subject’s donation decision – none, solo, or group donation – depends on both the reminder to donate and the economic reward for donation. Compared with the control group, receiving a message that encourages donation (message 1) has a positive effect on the overall donation rate, but receiving a message that encourages donation with a friend (message 3) has no significant effect. This suggests that simply mentioning group donation does not work: while the message reminds donors of the pleasure of donating with a friend, it also increases the perceived costs associated with getting a friend and convincing him to donate, which might even backfire and hurt donation rate. When we added economic reward to the mobile message (messages 2,4,5,6), the effect on donation rate is always positive and significant, but the effect is of the largest magnitude when the reward is

conditional on donating with friends (message 5), especially for those who have donated within the past 9 months. Not only does the conditional reward lead to a higher donation rate from message recipients, but these recipients are also more likely to bring friends who also donate at the same time.

The second main finding is that different messages tend to attract different types of donors. Thanks to our randomization design, all seven control and treatment groups are similar in observable demographics. However, the donors who respond to message 5 (with economic reward conditional on group donation) are more likely to be married, to be older than 35, to have local resident permit (hukou) in the city, to have donated more recently, and to have donated more times before the experiment than donors responding to other messages. It is interesting to note that this group of people tends to be less active in online social platforms compared to those who are younger and single (Pew Research Center 2014). However, our finding suggests that they are more prone to our digital interventions, possibly because of stronger social ties in local area. Survey results confirm that donors responding to message 5 are more willing to share the donation experience with family and friends, to bring a friend next time, and to believe that encouragement from friends are important to motivate donation.

Thirdly, across all treatments, message recipients donate a greater amount of blood if their friends are present, regardless of whether their friends donate or not. This confirms the group effect demonstrated in the literature, and suggests that a friend's presence provides another margin to increase donation even if the friend does not donate.

We further fit our experimental data into a structural model, in order to shed light on the optimal design of incentive scheme and targeting strategy. We find that rewarding group donors is four times more cost-effective than rewarding individual donors in motivating blood donation, as the bank only needs to reward donors who come in groups and enjoy even more donation amount when people donate in front of friends. The cost that the bank needs to pay to donors is calculated to be 50RMB per unit of blood (400ml) under individual reward and 10.2RMB under group reward, both of which are arguably well below the social value of having one additional blood unit available. The blood bank can further improve the cost efficiency by targeting a subset of donors that tend to respond more positively to group reward, namely female donors who are local, married, highly educated and have donated recently.

Altogether, our experiment suggests that charities can leverage endogenous group formation to stimulate voluntary donation, but only if it is bundled with appropriate economic incentives. With group reward conditional on donating together with friends, charities can attract a special group of donors that are more pro-social and more likely to share donation experience and recruit donors through their social networks. In the rest of the paper, we first present a simple model in Section 2, and then describe the field experiment design in Section 3. Reduced-form results are reported in Section 4, followed by structural estimation and counterfactual simulations in Section 5. A brief conclusion is offered in Section 6.

## 2. Model

Consider a potential donor  $i$  who faces the decisions of not donating ( $d=0$ ), donating alone ( $d=1, g=0$ ), and donating with a friend ( $d=1, g=1$ )<sup>2</sup>. Let us normalize the utility from non-donation as zero ( $U_i(d=0) = 0$ ). If  $i$  donates  $Y_d$  amount of blood, her utility consists of a fixed component and a variable component. The fixed component captures the economic and non-economic rewards of donating the minimum amount (200ml) minus the related time, transportation, health and psychological cost ( $\alpha^d - C^d$ ). Additional economic reward for the donor is reflected in  $M^{sr}$ . If  $i$  brings a friend, donating 200ml also generates positive social image or warm glow in front of the friend ( $\alpha^g$ ), but it also entails a cost of asking and coordinating with the friend ( $C^g$ ). This includes the cost of finding such a friend, educating him/her, persuading him/her to donate together, and in the future returning the favor if the friend consents to donation due to the social pressure from  $i$ . Here we abstract from the detailed search process that  $i$  may engage in to find friend and form a group. It is worth noting that the cost of persuading a friend to donate together may depend on the reward that the blood bank offers to the donating friend. The bank can also offer group reward to  $i$  for bringing in a donating friend, which is included in the benefit of bringing a donating friend ( $M^{gr}$ )<sup>3</sup>.

In the fixed component of donation utility, we assume there is one cognitive cost of remembering to donate at all and another cognitive cost of remembering to bring a friend. Receiving the reminder message to donate (DMSG=1) or a reminder to bring a friend (GMSG=1) will therefore increase the utility of donation (Karlan et.al. 2010). In addition, if a subject

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<sup>2</sup> For simplicity we assume the friend will donate blood. In Section 5, we introduce another variable  $f$  to differentiate the two situations: the friend donates ( $g=1, f=0$ ), and the friend does not donate ( $g=1, f=1$ ).

<sup>3</sup> Our model in section 5 has a more general setup where reward can be separately given to each group member.

receives GMSG from the bank but donates alone, this incurs a cost associated with the social pressure, because she may feel guilty for not fulfilling the request. We denote this social pressure from the bank as  $C^{sp}$ , which by definition only occurs when  $d=1$  and  $g=0$ .

In combination, the utility from the decisions  $\{d, g\}$  can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned}
U_i(d = 0) &= 0 \\
U_i(g|d = 1) &= \alpha^d - C^d + \beta^{DMSG} \cdot DMSG - C^{sp} \cdot GMSG \cdot (1 - g) + \beta^{sr} \cdot M^{sr} \\
&\quad + (\alpha^g - (C^g - \beta^{fr} \cdot M^{fr}) + \beta^{GMSG} \cdot GMSG + \beta^{gr} \cdot M^{gr}) \cdot g + \varepsilon^{idg} \\
Likelihood(d, g) &= prob(U_i(d, g) > U_i(d', g')) \\
\forall \{d', g'\} &= \{\{0,0\}, \{1,0\}, \{1,1\}\}
\end{aligned}$$

Individual  $i$  chooses  $\{d, g\}$  to maximize her utility. As described in Section 1, our field experiment varies DMSG, GMSG,  $M^{sr}$ ,  $M^{fr}$  and  $M^{gr}$ .

This model captures several incentives for group donation. First, if bringing a friend yields net positive benefits to individual  $i$ , it may convert her from no donation or solo donation to group donation. Second, from the bank's perspective, if the incentives for group donation through  $\alpha^g$  and  $M^{gr}$  are not high enough, the request for group donation may backfire because it introduces social pressure  $C^{sp}$  on the donor. Such social pressure, if substantial, may persuade a potential solo donor into no donation at all. Third, in the presence of a friend, one may donate a higher amount, and the extra benefits of donating more in front of a friend may affect the donor's decision of whether and how to donate in the first stage.

The first and second points can be illustrated in Figures 1-4. For the purpose of illustration, we ignore the option of bringing a non-donating friend and restrict donation amount to a fixed level of 200ml – more variations are included in the full model and empirical analysis. In Figure 1, we define the vertical axis  $\mathcal{H}$  as the benefit of donation that individual  $i$  expects to get regardless of whether she brings a friend or not. Following previous notation,  $\mathcal{H} = \alpha^d - C^d + \beta^{DMSG} \cdot DMSG + \beta^{sr} \cdot M^{sr}$ . The horizontal axis  $\mathcal{L}$  is defined as the extra benefit  $i$  can get from group donation if she brings a friend. Mathematically,  $\mathcal{L} = (\alpha^g - (C^g - \beta^{fr} \cdot M^{fr}) + \beta^{GMSG} \cdot GMSG + \beta^{gr} \cdot M^{gr})$ . Figure 1 describes a benchmark case where  $DMSG = GMSG = M^{sr} = M^{fr} = M^{gr} = 0$  (which corresponds to our control group). In this case, Figure 1 shows that (1)  $i$  will not donate in the yellow area because  $\mathcal{H} < 0, \mathcal{H} + \mathcal{L} < 0$ ; (2)  $i$  will donate alone in



the green area where  $\mathcal{H} > 0$  &  $\mathcal{L} < 0$ , and (3) i will donate with a friend in the blue area where  $\mathcal{L} > 0$  &  $\mathcal{H} + \mathcal{L} > 0$ .

Figure 2 increases the return to solo donation from  $\mathcal{H}$  to  $\mathcal{H} + \Delta\mathcal{H}$ . This can be achieved by offering more economic reward to solo donation (i.e. increase  $M^{sr}$ ) or by sending a reminder message to the donor and reducing her cost of remembering to donate (i.e. change  $DMSG$  from zero to one). Comparing with Figure 1, an increase in  $\mathcal{H}$  leads some non-donating people to donate alone (the black-line shaded area that turns green from yellow), and some non-donating subjects to donate with a friend (the white-line shaded area that turns blue from yellow).

Similarly, compared to Figure 1, Figure 3 increases the extra return to group donation (as compared to solo donation) from  $\mathcal{L}$  to  $\mathcal{L} + \Delta\mathcal{L}$ . This can be achieved by rewarding i for donating with a friend (i.e. increasing  $M^{gr}$ ), providing economic reward  $M^{fr}$  to the donating friend and therefore reducing the cost of i persuading a friend, or sending a reminder message for i to bring a friend (i.e. changing  $GMSG$  from zero to one but assuming  $C^{sp} = 0$ ).

Figure 2 and Figure 3 show some interesting contrasts. Compared to Figure 1, both of them convert some non-donors into group donors (the lower shaded area with white lines). This is because for some people group donation is more desirable than solo donation ( $\mathcal{L} > 0$ ), but the total benefits are not big enough to overcome the associated cost ( $\mathcal{H} + \mathcal{L} < 0$ ). The introduction of  $\Delta\mathcal{H}$  or  $\Delta\mathcal{L}$  helps to boost them into group donation. In addition to this common effect, Figure 2 brings in another group of donors who do not donate in Figure 1 but become solo donors in Figure 2 (the shaded area with dark lines). These new donors are primarily those who expect negative benefit from group donation ( $\mathcal{L} < 0$ ) but are almost ready to donate solo ( $\mathcal{H} < 0$  &  $\mathcal{H} + \Delta\mathcal{H} > 0$ ). In comparison, Figure 3 brings in another group of donors who would have donated by themselves in Figure 1 but now donate in group in Figure 3 (the upper shaded area with white lines). These always donors need a nudge to overcome some small net cost of group donation ( $\mathcal{L} < 0$  &  $\mathcal{L} + \Delta\mathcal{L} > 0$ ). In summary, the difference between Figure 2 and Figure 3 suggests that all donors responding to the increased reward for group donation will come in group, while some donors responding to the increased reward for solo donation will come solo.

Figure 4 allows for social pressure for not bringing a friend upon the bank's message for group donation ( $C_{sp} > 0$ ). In this case, receiving a group message but donating alone needs to overcome the social pressure  $C^{sp}$ . Therefore, compared to Figure 1, the yellow no-donation area expands ( $\mathcal{H} - C^{sp} < 0, \mathcal{H} + \mathcal{L} < 0$ ), the green donation-alone area shrinks ( $\mathcal{H} > C^{sp}$  &  $\mathcal{L} <$

$-C^{sp}$ ), and the blue group-donation area expands ( $\mathcal{H} + \mathcal{L} > 0$  &  $\mathcal{L} > -C^{sp}$ ). In other words, when the bank's request for group donation imposes a social pressure, the pressure may lead to more group donation (the white-line shaded area) but less solo donation (the dark-line shaded area).

In summary, the model has a few testable implications: 1) DMSG will lead to more solo donation and more group donation, GMSG will lead to less solo donation but more group donation; 2) An increase in the reward for solo donation will lead to more solo donation and more group donation; 3) An increase in the reward for group donation will lead to more group donation and less solo donation, but the total donation should always increase; 4) Reward for solo donation and reward for group donation are driving different types of donors. Donors who are motivated by individual reward are likely to have relatively high utility for solo donation; donors who are motivated by group reward are likely to have relatively high utility for group donation.

### **3. Background and Experiment Design**

We collaborated with a centralized blood bank in a provincial capital city in China with a population of over 8 million. The blood bank is responsible for supplying blood to 18 hospitals in the city and is encouraged to be self-sufficient in blood supply. In the past ten years, the blood bank has recruited more than 400,000 whole blood donors, who have contributed more than 500,000 donation episodes. The donations are collected using 17 bloodmobiles spread across the city and by special drives at specific universities, companies and government agencies. Our experiment focuses on individual donations collected by bloodmobiles.

The experiment was run in the 15-day period from late December 2014 to early January 2015. We started by choosing participants from past donors of the blood bank based on three criteria: first, the blood donated by the particular donor must pass a battery of blood test, which is important because the bank aims to increase supply of qualified blood; second, the donor has not donated in the last six months, as a 1998 nationwide law disallows any donor from donating whole blood twice within six months; third, the donor has made at least one donation in the past 25 months. Because donors that only donated long time ago may have moved out of the city, the last criterion is used to better capture donors that are still living in the city.

A sample of 80,000 participants who were registered as past donors was randomly assigned into seven test groups. The first one is the control group with 14,000 subjects who received no message from the blood bank. The remaining six groups (with 11,000 subjects in each) received different mobile messages as described in Section 1.

Once the participants decided to donate and visited the bloodmobile (either alone or in group), they first filled out a standard questionnaire on demographics and medical conditions, designed by the blood bank to evaluate their eligibility of making donation. The donors then underwent a blood screening test. While waiting for the test results, they were asked to fill out an additional survey designed by the researchers (approximately 10 minutes). The nurse then collected the survey and informed donors of the standard gifts and special rewards they would receive based on the donation amount. The donors would then decide how much to donate and make the donation.

In particular, donors who choose to donate 200ml would receive standard gifts (e.g. souvenir such as cup or t-shirt). Donors who donate 300ml of blood were eligible for a 30RMB supermarket voucher (around \$5), and those donating 400 ml were eligible for a 50RMB

supermarket voucher. In addition, group donors received an additional gift: a fruit cutting gear (worth about 10RMB) for each of them. These rewards were dispensed to all donors, regardless of whether they were in our experiment or what text message they have received from the bank. In other words, participants in different treatments only differ in the message from the bank, not the actual gifts upon donation. Because all our messages with economic reward mentioned the reward as “30-50 RMB in supermarket voucher” and did not link the exact reward to donation amount, we believe most participants in our experiment did not know the correlation between reward and donation amount until they came near a bloodmobile. This implies that the differential reward by donation amount should not affect the decision of whether to donate (solo or with a friend) but it will affect the donation amount after one has approached the bloodmobile.

After each donation, the nurse completed two tasks. First, the nurse marked the donor ID on each survey, which would help us link the survey to the donor; second, if the donors donated in a group or a donor brought non-donor friends, the nurse recorded donor ID of each donor in the group, as well as the number of non-donor friends with them. All nurses on the bloodmobile went through a centralized training session before the campaign and are instructed to strictly follow the same procedures in administrating the donation.

For every donor who participated during the experiment period, we also conducted a detailed survey which is designed to help us identify unobserved constructs such as a donor’s social environment (e.g. whether friends and family donated before, coordination cost), image motivation (willingness to share donation experience, and the channel to share) and relationship with other donors in group. Finally, we augment the data from the field experiment with rich archival data, including demographics (age, gender, education, occupation, marriage status, resident status, and health indicators) and donation history (across 10 years) for the 80,000 subjects in our experiment.

#### **4. Reduced-form Evidence**

This section reports the reduced-form effect of treatments on the share of donors who choose to donate ( $d=1$ ), the amount of donation by donors, and the total amount of donation by donors and their friends. From now on, we use “donors” to refer to the donors that are our experiment subjects. Friends of donors who donated are referred to as “donating friends”.

Before presenting the main results, we first check the validity of randomization. As shown in Table 2, there is no detectable variation across the groups in terms of gender, age, marriage status, residency, and the number of past donations. The t-tests on these variables across groups are insignificant at conventional level. The well-balanced sample indicates that our randomization is at work.

Table 3 summarizes key outcomes across treatment groups. Panel A focuses on subjects' own decision to donate ( $d$ ). On average, the donation rate in our sample during the campaign period is about 1%, which is consistent with previous studies on blood donation (e.g. Lacetera et.al. 2012, 2014). Comparing T1 to T0 shows that there is a sizable reminder effect. While the donation rate is 0.71% in T0, that number jumped to 0.98% in T1. More interestingly, groups with economic rewards (T2, T4, T5, and T6) show additional gain in boosting donation rate beyond the reminder effect, with donation rates all greater than 1%. This suggests that economic reward have a noticeable effect in motivating potential donors. The most striking increase is T5, with a relative increase of more than 60% over the control group (from 0.71% to 1.17%).

Further examination reveals that donor demographics differ by treatment, as presented in the right columns of Table 3 Panel A. Donors from the group reward treatment (T5) are more likely to be married, local, older, more recent in the last donation, and have more donations in the past. In contrast, subjects who donate under individual reward treatment (T2) are more likely to be unmarried, non-local, younger, last donated long time ago, and have fewer past donations. In summary, this panel shows evidence that both individual reward and group reward are effective, but they may motivate different types of donors. This is consistent with our model.

Table 3 Panel B focuses on the subjects' decision to donate in group, conditional on self donation ( $d=1$ ). There are two outcomes related to a donor's group donation decision: whether to donate with a friend, and her own amount of donation. Both outcomes vary across treatments. Since the friend might or might not donate, we focus on the percentage of donors who bring donating friends, as our research goal is to motivate more donations. One might think that reminding a donor to bring a friend (T3) will lead to more donating friends. As shown in Column 7 (second to last column), this is not true. The behavior intervention alone (T3) is not effective in motivating friends at all. However, once the group reward is added to the treatment, there is a large increase in donating friends (1.05% in T3 vs. 10.85% in T5). In contrast, individual reward does not lead more group donations when compared to the control group. As to the amount of

donation, we find that donors are likely to donate more blood when friends are present (Column 8), even when the friends do not donate (Column 6). This is consistent with the image motivation effect identified in the literature (Ariely et al. 2009)

While the summary statistics provide suggestive evidence on the impact of treatments, we formally test such impact using regressions. Table 4 provides reduced form estimates of the treatment effects on various outcomes. Panel A presents results of an OLS regression on the full sample (80,000 donors)<sup>4</sup>. First, results in Columns 1 and 2 suggest that the effects of reminder message (T1) and individual reward (T2) on a donor's donation decision (d) are both positive and significant. Then adding request to bring friends on top of reminder message (T3) seems to dampen donation (though the difference between T1 and T3 is not statistically significant). This may be driven by the fact that the request to bring friends imposes social pressure on the subject and therefore discourages those donors who cannot meet the request. Interestingly, once the individual reward is coupled with the friend reminder (T4), the negative social pressure is overcome and there is a large increase in donation rate. The group reward (T5) works even better in promoting donation. Comparing T4 to T3, as well as T5 to T3, suggest that the economic reward has a significant impact on donation. In contrast, adding an additional group gift on individual reward (T6) does not lead to a significant lift in donation rate, which suggests that the incentive might have saturated.

Columns 3-4 of Table 4 Panel A reports the effect of treatments on an alternative outcome variable: the subject's amount of blood donation. The value is set to 0 if the subject does not come to donate. The result is similar to findings in Columns 1-2, suggesting a substantial increase in T1, T2, T4, and especially T5, but not T3.

We also examine the effect of treatments on the volume of friend donation in Columns 5-6 of Table 4 Panel A. The dependent variable is created by aggregating the donation amount of all donating friend(s) in a donor's group. Consistent with the above summary statistics, only the group reward is effective in increasing the amount of donation from friends. The magnitude of increase is non-trivial as compared to solo donation (0.50ml increase in donation from friends vs. 1.88ml increase in donation from self).

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<sup>4</sup> We report estimates based on linear OLS in Table 4 for easy interpretation of the results. The findings are robust to alternative estimation methods such as the logit regression.

Finally, we construct the volume of total donation by adding the donation amount from the subject herself and the donation amount from her friends (if any). In this way, the dependent variable can capture the additional blood supply due to group donation, which is of central interest to the blood bank. As shown in Columns 7-8, the effect of economic reward on the total blood supply is significant. Compared to the average donation amount in the control group (2.49ml per subject), adding group reward leads to an increase of 2.47ml, almost 100 percent more in supply, which is bigger than the effect of individual reward (1.59ml) at the 10% significance level after we control for subject age, gender and weight (Column 8).

Panel B of Table 4 evaluates the treatment effects on the same set of outcomes, but conditional on a subject's donation ( $d=1$ ). While the sample size is much smaller, Table 4 provides statistically significant evidence that group reward is effective in motivating subjects to donate with friends, which leads to great blood supply through extensive margin.

Panel C of Table 4 divides the experimental sample according to whether a subject's last donation was no more than 9 months ago, 10-14 months ago, or more than 14 months ago. Consistent with Lacetera et al. (2014), we find that economic rewards are more effective on the subjects that donated more recently last time. Interestingly, if we focus on the subjects that donated no more than 9 months ago, group reward (T5) motivates significantly more blood donations than individual reward (T2). This difference is driven by both a higher likelihood of solo donation and a higher likelihood of bringing a donating friend. One explanation is that it is easier to share a donation experience with friends if it happened not long time ago. It is also possible that those who donated more recently last time are more pro-social.

Table 5 switches perspective and focuses on the intensive margin. We regress the donor's donation amount on whether she is donating with (donating or non-donating) friends. The positive and significant coefficient on the binary indicator suggests that donors who donate in group are also donating more blood, *regardless of* the treatments they are exposed. This finding is well aligned with the previous literature and provides another key rationale for the higher efficacy of group donation. In this way, we close the loop and confirm benefits on both extensive margin and intensive margin yielded by the group reward.

Analyses of the heterogeneous treatment effects and the survey data are presented in Tables 6 and 7. In particular, Table 6 looks at two outcomes – the dummy of self donation and the total amount of blood donated by self and friends. Each column includes the interaction of

one demographic variable and all the treatment dummies.<sup>5</sup> These regressions suggest that group reward encourages more donation from subjects that are married, local, older, and with more recent donation and more past donations, probably because these people are likely to have a lower cost of bringing friends. While these people are generally less active in online social setting, our study suggests that with the right incentive design, digital interventions can be used to leverage their offline social connections. In this way, organizations may take advantage of the relative strength of this population in social interactions. Using survey data, Table 7 shows that donors that are motivated by group reward are more likely to hear about friends donating in the past, more willing to share the donation experience, and more willing to bring friends to donate together in the future.

## 5. Structural Estimation and Counterfactuals

So far, the reduced-form estimates suggest that economic reward matters and group reward can be effective in motivating donation from a specific type of donors. In this section, we estimate a structural model, which is closely tied to our experiment design, and brings several advantages compared to the reduced-form estimates. First, by leveraging the variation of messages in our experiment design, the structural model can separate and quantify the effect of each element in our treatments. Second, the structural model allows us to simulate different combinations of behavior intervention and economic reward, and the counterfactual simulations provide deeper insights for optimizing the incentive design. Finally, by allowing certain parameters to vary by demographic variables of donors, the structural model also enables us to assess donor heterogeneity, which generates insights on targeting different types of donors with the most effective mobile interventions.

### 5.1 Structural Model

In the first stage, the subject makes a joint decision  $\{d, g\}$  about whether to donate and whether to donate with friend(s) in a group, based on her own primitives as well as the exogenous treatment. Her own primitive includes the utility derived from the donation  $\alpha^d$ , cost of making the donation  $C^d$ , as well as the utility of donating in a group  $\alpha^g$ , and the cost of bringing friend(s) to form a group  $C^g$ . The exogenous variations in our field experiment include

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<sup>5</sup> We do not put all demographics in one regression because many of them are highly correlated.



sending a reminder message for donation (DMSG), requesting for group donation in the reminder message (GMSG), offering reward for the message recipient's donation herself ( $M^{sr}$ , referred to as self reward), offering reward for the message recipient if she donates with a friend in a group ( $M^{gr}$ , referred to as group reward), and offering the economic reward for the donating friend of the message recipient ( $M^{fr}$ , referred to as friend reward). It is worth noting that the three types of rewards work in different ways.  $M^{sr}$  directly compensates the donation cost of the focal donor;  $M^{gr}$  compensates the sum of donation cost and cost of bringing friends; in contrast;  $M^{fr}$  indirectly influences the focal donor by reducing his/her cost of persuading friends to donate.

In the second stage, the subjects who come to the bloodmobile are informed of the standard gifts and special rewards they will receive based on donation amount upon their choice ( $Y_d$ ). Donating 300ml or 400ml (instead of 200ml) would earn the donor an additional economic reward, which we denote as  $M_{300}$  or  $M_{400}$ ; but at the same time donating more blood in a single episode incurs a higher cost, which we denote as  $C_{300}$  or  $C_{400}$ . In addition, donating 300ml or 400ml in front of a non-donating friend ( $f=1$ ) or donating friend ( $g=1$ ) may allow the donor to gain additional utility (either through positive image or altruism), which we denote as  $S_{300f}/S_{400f}$  or  $S_{300g}/S_{400g}$ .

Since our mobile messages is designed such that *no information* is given about how reward may differ by donation amount, a donor's first-stage decision on  $\{d,g\}$  is independent of the second stage decision of donation amount. This allows us to model the two stages separately. Another simplification is that we do not consider the possibility of bringing a non-donating friend separately from coming alone in the first stage. This is because all the group reward offered in our mobile message treatment is conditional on bringing a donating friend. Because the two stages are modeled separately, we allow donation amount to be dependent on whether a non-donating friend is present, in order to capture the potential effect of being observed by a friend.

Assuming the impact of all rewards is linear, we can write the latent utility function for the donor's decisions in the first stage as:

First Stage:

$$U_i(d = 0) = 0$$

$$\begin{aligned}
U_i(g|d = 1) &= \alpha^d - C^d + \beta^{DMSG} \cdot DMSG - C^{sp} \cdot GMSG \cdot (1 - g) + \beta^{sr} \cdot M^{sr} \\
&+ (\alpha^g - (C^g - \beta^{fr} \cdot M^{fr}) + \beta^{GMSG} \cdot GMSG + \beta^{gr} \cdot M^{gr}) \cdot g \\
&+ \gamma^{10} \cdot (1 - g) \cdot X_i + \gamma^{11} \cdot g \cdot X_i + \varepsilon^{idg} \\
Likelihood(d, g) &= prob(U_i(d, g) > U_i(d', g')) \\
\forall \{d', g'\} &= \{\{0,0\}, \{1,0\}, \{1,1\}\}
\end{aligned}$$

Second Stage:

$$\begin{aligned}
V_i(Y_d|d = 1, g, f) &= (M_{300} - C_{300} + \beta_{300f} \cdot f + \beta_{300g} \cdot g) \cdot (Y_d = 300) \\
&+ (M_{400} - C_{400} + S_{400f} \cdot f + S_{400g} \cdot g) \cdot (Y_d = 400) \\
&+ \theta^{10} \cdot (Y_d = 300) \cdot X_i + \theta^{11} \cdot (Y_d = 400) \cdot X_i + \varepsilon_{ifgY} \\
Likelihood(Y_d) &= prob(V_i(Y_d) > V_i(Y'_d)) \\
\forall \{Y_d|d = 1\} &= \{200,300,400\}
\end{aligned}$$

For each stage, we estimate a conditional logit model using maximum likelihood. The vector of parameters that we estimate for the first-stage decision are: i) the net utility derived from donation minus donation cost:  $\alpha^d - C^d$ ; ii) the decrease in mental cost when receiving the reminder message for donation:  $\beta^{DMSG}$ ; iii) the increased donation cost of social pressure if request to bring friend cannot be met:  $C^{sp}$ ; iv) the decreased mental cost of bringing a friend thanks to the reminder message:  $\beta^{GMSG}$ ; v) the increased utility derived from receiving economic rewards:  $\beta^{sr}$  and  $\beta^{gr}$ ; vi) the utility derived from donating in front of a friend (like warm glow)  $\alpha^g$ , and the cost of persuading a friend to join as a group. Specifically,  $C^g$  is the default cost of persuasion if no incentive is offered to the friend, and  $\beta^{fr}$  represents the cost savings if an economic reward is offered to a friend, in forms of either direct economic reward  $M^{fr}$ , or group incentive  $M^{gr}$ , or both.  $\beta^{gr}$  represents the increased benefits for the message recipient to bring a donating friend if the group reward  $M^{gr}$  increases by one unit; vi) a vector of coefficients on individual characteristics (including gender, age, weight, local resident or not, years of education) for each outcome:  $\gamma^{10}, \gamma^{11}$ .

The vector of parameters we estimate for the decision in the second stage are: i) the utility derived from donating more than 200 ml net of the additional donation cost:  $M_{300} - C_{300}$ ,  $M_{400} - C_{400}$ ; ii) the increased utility from donating more than 200ml in front a non-donating friend:  $S_{300f}, S_{400f}$ ; iii) the increased utility from donating more than 200ml in front a donating friend:  $S_{300g}, S_{400g}$ ; and iv) a vector of coefficients on individual demographics (including

gender, age, weight, local resident or not, education years) for each outcome:  $\theta^{10}, \theta^{11}$ . For the above parameters, the main sources of identification are our experimental treatments and individual demographics.

## 5.2 Structural estimates

Table 8 reports the MLE estimates for the first stage decision. The net utility of solo donation ( $\alpha^d - C^d$ ) is precisely estimated as -5.84. In comparison, the most effective behavior intervention (reminder message) or economic rewards (50 RMB of group reward) only lead to an increase of utility by 0.31 and 1.11, respectively. The highly significant negative cost for solo donation is consistent with the observation that only 1% of subjects come to donate during the campaign. Moreover, the net utility of bringing donating friends is estimated to be -2.81, which represents the additional cost involved in donating with friends. This suggests that many donors may have significant difficulty in getting donating friends.

We now turn to the effect of behavioral intervention and economic rewards in overcoming these costs. The reminder message for solo donation is effective in reducing the mental cost, with an estimated value of 0.31. However, the reminder to bring a friend has little extra impact on either solo donation or group donation. On the other hand, we find that the reward for self-donation contributes relatively little value beyond the reminder message. The estimated utility increase from self reward is about 0.10 for 50 RMB. In contrast, the group reward significantly increases the utility of group donation. The estimated utility increase from a reward for group reward is about 1.11 for 50RMB. We also find friend reward is effective in reducing the cost of bringing a donating friend (about 1 for 50RMB).

Table 9 reports the MLE estimates for the second stage decision on donation amount. We find that the presence of both non-donating friends and donating friends would increase the probability of the donor donating more blood. Interestingly, the effect of non-donating friend on this intensive margin is larger, which is consistent with previous literature documenting a strong impact of observer on donor's behavior (Ozbay and Ozbay 2014). In addition, we also find the economic rewards for donating more blood outweigh the cost of additional blood donation (the estimated value of both "net utility for donating 300ml" and "net utility for donating 400ml" is positive and significant). Such effect is stronger for the choice of donating 400ml as compared to that of 300ml.

Overall, the structural estimates echo our reduced-form findings. Below we take a further look into the distribution of primitives for different demographic groups.

### *5.3 Heterogeneity in the population*

Panel B in Table 8 shows a large heterogeneity in the distribution of donation cost for both solo and group donations across demographic subgroups. We focus on four demographic variables in our discussion: marriage status, local residency, gender, and education. As illustrated in Figures 5 and 6, we find marriage and local residency of a subject strongly affect her/his cost of donation, and the demographic variations follow the same pattern for solo and group donations. More specifically, married subjects are likely to enjoy greater cost reduction in solo and group donations (around 0.53 and 0.56 for each cost, respectively). Being local also significantly reduces the cost of solo and group donations, with a magnitude similar to that of age (around 0.50 for each cost). In contrast, gender and education have a significant impact on donation cost but its impact is opposite for solo and group donations. Taking gender as an example, while male subjects are in general more likely to have lower cost for solo donation than females, they on average have a higher cost to bring friends. These findings echo previous studies on the gender difference in altruism (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001). Similarly, less educated donors have lower cost for solo donation than highly educated donors, but in general have more difficulty identifying and bringing a friend to donate together. Finally, the correlation between gender and education is as low as 0.013, suggesting that the two demographics variables may influence the cost of solo and group donations through separate channels. Interestingly, the heterogeneity in the distribution of donation cost for the intensive margin (i.e. donation amount) is also large. Donors who are female, local, married and less educated are more likely to donate larger amount of blood.

The two types of heterogeneity, namely age and local residence, affect solo and group donations in the same direction. On the other hand, gender and education affect the two donation costs in opposite directions (Figures 5 and 6). These have important implications for blood banks. On one hand, blood banks can target past donors who are male, less educated, married and local to increase the conversion rate in donor recruitment. On the other hand, if blood banks wish to take advantage of group effect and motivate group donation, they should target past donors who are female, highly education, married and local. Overall, our findings suggest that blood banks should carefully align their campaign goal with donor targeting strategy.

#### 5.4. Counterfactuals

Equipped with the structural estimates, we perform a series of policy simulations to compare different combinations of behavior intervention and economic rewards, reported in Table 10. Consistent with the previous discussion, we find that a reminder message for donation is the only effective approach in behavioral interventions. In comparison, all three types of economic reward – self, friend and group rewards – are effective in driving total blood supply. However, they increase total donation through different margins. Self reward mainly increases the solo donation rate; Friend reward alone or group reward alone only increase the group donation rate by 0.04 to 0.05 percentage points; however, when the two are combined, group donation increases by 0.13 percentage points. The joint use of friend and group rewards are effective in that group reward motivates the donor to bring friends, while friend rewards helps her to persuade and compensate her friend. Finally, when the three rewards are used together, we see increase in both solo and group donations, but no synergy effect is observed. This finding is consistent with our model that reward for solo donation and reward for group donation tend to motivate two different types of donors in the population.

More interesting is the comparison between the effect of self reward and that of friend plus group rewards. The former has been commonly used by the blood bank, while the later is new and not used until the experiment. We want to highlight two key differences. First, compared with self reward, the joint use of friend and group rewards encourages the group donation rate to increase 0.1 percentage points but leads the solo donation rate to decline 0.06 percentage points. This pattern reflects the nature of group reward: when there is no reward for solo donation but high reward for group donation (for both the donor and her friend), then donors are much more likely to sort into group donation. The absence of self reward shifts solo donors to group donors. This shift is only possible if the inherent cost of group formation is not too high, as compared to the cost of solo donation; otherwise the decline in solo donation would outweigh the increase in group donation.

Second, we wish to emphasize the cost advantage of friend/group reward over self reward. As suggested in the last column in Table 10, the payment per unit of blood supply for friend or group reward is more than four times cost effective than that in self reward. This is because friend/group rewards would only occur if donors donate in a group. Thus in the majority cases where donors donate alone, the blood bank would not pay any reward --- those donors are

willing to donate anyway. The saved budget may be used to increase the stakes in friend/group rewards. As shown in Table 10, at the same level of reward (75RMB (1.5unit) for group reward + 75RMB for friend rewards vs. 75RMB for self reward, or 100RMB (or 2 unit) for group reward + 100RMB for friend rewards vs. 100RMB for self reward), the joint use of group and friend rewards would lead to more blood supply at significant lower cost per donor.

Finally, friend and group rewards can be combined with targeting. As reflected in Figures 5 and 6, the blood bank can target group rewards on female donors who are local, married and highly educated, to generate even higher cost-benefit efficiency in increasing blood supply.

## **6. Conclusion**

How should charities use digital intervention to encourage offline social interactions? Our field experiment reveals the complex nature of using mobile messaging to leverage blood donor's social connections, and generates insights on a donor's decision making process. We show that appropriate economic rewards are needed for the donor to overcome the social cost of motivating friends to donate; otherwise the mobile message of soliciting friends can backfire. The counterfactual analyses using simulation provide more precise recommendations for policy application.

This study answers a recent call to link online treatments with offline response (Aral 2015). It expands IS studies on social interactions using experiments (ex. Aral and Walker 2011, Bapna and Umyarov 2014, Zhang and Zhu 2011), by examining how charities take advantage of endogenous group formation to encourage one important offline behavior – blood donation. Specifically, our study suggests that individuals who are traditionally less active in online social interactions may have a lower social cost in the offline setting. Thus, firms and organization can take advantage of such comparative strength and use digital interventions to leverage their offline social connections. Methodologically, our behavioral model is linked tightly to the experiment design, which allows us to structurally estimate the parameters of interest. To our best knowledge, our work is among the first to integrate field experiments with structural modeling in the IS field, and our approach can be applied to examine the effect of other IT interventions.

The study also contributes to the growing literature of voluntary donation (ex. Jabr et al. 2014, Goes et al. 2014, Lacetera et al 2012, 2014; Andreoni and Rao 2011; DellaVigna et al

2012). While various monetary and behavioral interventions have been examined in the literature, they mostly focus on individual donors. Building on the existing studies, we are among the first to extend the scope of the study to examine how to motivate a donor to bring her friends to donate together. While this paper focuses on blood donation, we conjecture that our results are likely to be applicable to other pro-social activities, such as environmental protection, social work to help children in poverty or seniors with chronic illness, and other community services. Our results should especially benefit those organizations that are constrained by financial resources and face difficulty recruiting volunteers.

Our study also carries practical value. In recent years, the need for better policies to motivate voluntary donation in healthcare has been signified due to the increasing shortages in human blood, organs and tissues (Bergstrom et al. 2009; Kessler and Roth 2012, 2014). Our study shows that the additional blood collected using group reward can support more than a good number of additional surgeries. In addition, Rewarding group donors is four times cost effective than rewarding individual donors in motivating blood donation. Such cost is well below the value of having one additional blood unit available. In this way, our study opens a new path to address the above challenge in healthcare using mobile messaging to leverage a donor's social network.



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Figure 1: Benchmark with  $C^{sp}=0$




Figure 2: Add  $\Delta H > 0$  to Figure 1




Figure 3: Add  $\Delta\mathcal{L} > 0$  to Figure 1






Figure 4: Add  $C^{sp} > 0$  to Figure 1






Figure 5: Heterogeneity in both costs across gender, local and marriage status



\* F is short for female; M is short for male

Figure 6: Heterogeneity in both costs across education, local and marriage status



\* H is short for more educated; L is short for less educated



Table 1: Experimental Design

Test Group	Behavior Intervention			Economic Reward		
Message Components (Parameter in model)	Reminder to Donate (DMSG)	Reminder to bring friend		Reward for Self Donation (M <sup>sr</sup> )	Reward for group donation	
		(GMSG)	(C <sup>sp</sup> )		to self (M <sup>gr</sup> )	to friend (M <sup>fr</sup> )
T0						
T1	X					
T2	X			X		X
T3	X	X	X			
T4	X	X	X	X		X
T5	X	X	X		X	X
T6	X	X	X	X	X+Small gift	X+Small gift

Table 2: Randomization check

Test Group	Number of subjects	Male	Age (as of 2014)	Married	Local resident	Number of Past Donations
T0	14000	60.6%	27.87	39.3%	38.3%	1.43
T1	11000	60.6%	27.93	39.3%	38.4%	1.44
T2	11000	60.2%	27.96	39.3%	37.8%	1.42
T3	11000	60.9%	27.84	39.7%	37.9%	1.42
T4	11000	60.0%	28.01	39.6%	38.8%	1.44
T5	11000	60.9%	27.85	39.6%	37.9%	1.44
T6	11000	60.8%	27.73	38.6%	38.3%	1.44

Table 3: Summary statistics

Panel A: donation rate and donor demographics

Test Group	Total	Not Donate (%)	Donate (%)	Donor Demographics				
				Male	Age	Married	Local	Number of Past Donations
T0	14,000	13,901 (99.29%)	99 (0.71%)	70.71%	31.25	59.72%	21.21%	2.13
T1	11,000	10,892 (99.02%)	108 (0.98%)	60.19%	31.49	63.41%	19.44%	2.42
T2	11,000	10,880 (98.91%)	120 (1.09%)	65.00%	30.53	57.45%	16.67%	1.92
T3	11,000	10,905 (99.14%)	95 (0.86%)	72.63%	32.02	71.83%	25.26%	2.07
T4	11,000	10,878 (98.89%)	122 (1.11%)	66.39%	31.07	53.68%	24.59%	2.22
T5	11,000	10,871 (98.83%)	129 (1.17%)	63.57%	32.60	65.31%	31.01%	2.55
T6	11,000	10,876 (98.87%)	124 (1.13%)	73.39%	29.99	50.52%	20.97%	2.26
Total	80,000	79,203	797	67.25%	31.26	59.77%	22.84%	2.23

Table 3: Summary statistics

Panel B: Group donation behavior conditional on self donation

Test group	Total number of participants that donate	Solo donation		Donation with non-donating friend(s)		Donate with donating friend(s)	
		%	Amount of Self Donation (ml)	%	Amount of Self Donation (ml)	%	Amount of Self Donation (ml)
T0	99	87.88%	327.59	8.08%	375.00	4.04%	300.00
T1	108	88.89%	345.83	9.26%	380.00	1.85%	250.00
T2	120	84.17%	348.51	9.17%	381.82	6.67%	350.00
T3	95	89.47%	340.00	9.47%	388.89	1.05%	300.00
T4	122	86.07%	352.38	8.20%	390.00	5.74%	385.71
T5	129	83.72%	354.62	5.43%	400.00	10.85%	378.57
T6	124	82.26%	348.03	13.71%	382.35	4.03%	400.00

Table 4: Reduced-form regression results

Panel A: Full Sample with and without demographic controls, linear OLS

Dependent Variable [Sample avg]	Donate or not (1 or 0) [0.0071]		Amount of Self Donation (ml) [2.336]		Amount of Friend Donation (ml) [0.15]		Amount of Self + Friend Donation (ml) [2.486]	
T1	0.00275**	0.00274**	1.073**	1.071**	-0.0864	-0.0868	1.023**	1.020**
T2	0.00384***	0.00379***	1.501***	1.479***	0.105	0.103	1.605***	1.582***
T3	0.00156	0.00171	0.637	0.686	-0.0955	-0.0942	0.542	0.592
T4	0.00402***	0.00399***	1.628***	1.611***	0.114	0.112	1.742***	1.723***
T5	0.00466***	0.00478***	1.882***	1.929***	0.495***	0.503***	2.414***	2.469***
T6	0.00420***	0.00427***	1.664***	1.697***	0.141	0.143	1.842***	1.877***
Male		0.00101		-0.0156		-0.0733		-0.0928
Age		0.000399***		0.177***		0.00980**		0.189***
Weight		0.000118***		0.0521***		0.000889		0.0534***
Test of equivalence (p-value)								
T2=T5	0.541	0.462	0.426	0.350	0.0146	0.0130	0.132	0.100
T3=T5	0.0210	0.0228	0.00945	0.0102	0.000223	0.000220	0.000488	0.000528
T1=T3	0.377	0.442	0.363	0.425	0.955	0.964	0.370	0.428
T4=T6	0.892	0.832	0.940	0.858	0.865	0.849	0.852	0.776
T3=T4	0.0668	0.0902	0.0389	0.0552	0.191	0.201	0.0254	0.0362
N of obs	80000	79,662	80000	79,662	80000	79,662	80000	79,662
R2	0.0003	0.002	0.0003	0.003	0.0002	0.0003	0.0003	0.003

Note: \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table 4: Reduced-form regression results

Panel B: Conditional on self donation, without demographic controls, linear OLS

Dependent Variable [Sample Average]	Bring donating friend(s) [0.0404]	Amount of Self Donation [330.30]	Amount of Friend Donation [21.21]	Amount of Self + Friend Donation [351.52]
T1	-0.021	16.92	-17.51	-0.59
T2	0.026	21.36**	2.12	23.48
T3	-0.030	13.91	-18.05	-4.15
T4	0.017	27.07***	2.56	29.63
T5	0.068**	29.39***	36.93**	66.31***
T6	-8.15E-05	24.54**	1.37E+04	25.90
Test of equivalence (p-value)				
T2=T5	0.133	0.403	0.0474	0.0369
T3=T5	0.00101	0.13	0.00154	0.000611
T1=T3	0.796	0.777	0.973	0.855
T4=T6	0.543	0.792	0.935	0.832
T3=T4	0.12	0.203	0.185	0.0743
N of Obs	797	797	797	797
R2	0.019	0.014	0.018	0.024

Note: \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table 4: Reduced-form regression results

Panel C: subsamples by last donation time

Last Donation	Top Quartile (within recent 9 months)			Second Quartile (within 10-14 months)			Bottom Half (more than 14 months)		
Dependent Variable	Amount of Self Donation (ml)	Amount of Friend Donation (ml)	Amount of Self+ Friend Donation (ml)	Amount of Self Donation (ml)	Amount of Friend Donation (ml)	Amount of Self+ Friend Donation (ml)	Amount of Self Donation (ml)	Amount of Friend Donation (ml)	Amount of Self+ Friend Donation (ml)
T1	2.036*	-0.250	1.920	1.519	-0.102	1.414	0.334	0.00150	0.336
T2	2.703**	-0.0132	2.690**	2.177**	0.297	2.473**	0.429	0.0739	0.503
T3	2.172*	-0.349	1.822	-0.00429	-0.129	-0.133	0.0381	0.0557	0.0938
T4	3.613***	0.237	3.850***	1.512	0.164	1.673	0.412	0.000507	0.413
T5	4.279***	0.942**	5.352***	1.769*	0.105	1.872	0.635	0.432***	1.067**
T6	4.257***	0.321	4.578***	1.171	0.0581	1.383	0.475	0.0742	0.549
Male	-0.223	0.294	0.132	1.134	-0.423*	0.630	-0.202	-0.0885	-0.291
Age	0.462***	0.0239*	0.487***	0.115***	0.0212**	0.143***	0.0674***	-0.00207	0.0653***
Weight	0.0385	-0.0201	0.0183	0.0422	0.00573	0.0498	0.0428***	0.00878*	0.0516***
Test of equivalence (p-value)									
T2=T5	0.194	0.0210	0.0522	0.713	0.562	0.623	0.659	0.0334	0.278
T3=T5	0.0836	0.00190	0.0104	0.109	0.482	0.100	0.204	0.0264	0.0630
T1=T3	0.912	0.813	0.944	0.166	0.936	0.203	0.526	0.748	0.642
T4=T6	0.599	0.840	0.600	0.756	0.747	0.810	0.892	0.659	0.791
T3=T4	0.238	0.160	0.142	0.167	0.374	0.136	0.424	0.744	0.541
N of obs	21,796	21,796	21,796	18,619	18,619	18,619	39,247	39,247	39,247
R2	0.009	0.001	0.008	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.001

Note: \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.

Table 5: Donation amount and friend presence

Sample = Subjects in the experiment and donate

Dependent Variable [Sample Average]	Amount of Self donation [326.68]		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
T1	17.21*	13.57	12.31
T2	20.28**	22.36**	19.57**
T3	14.37	11.06	10.90
T4	26.55***	27.81***	24.81***
T5	28.18***	25.15***	24.51***
T6	22.90**	26.36***	22.68***
1(if come with friend)	29.14***	31.85***	26.53***
Male		-22.44***	-22.80***
Age		2.552***	2.083***
Weight		1.204***	1.291***
Local Resident			4.306
Married			-9.454
Observations	797	797	797
R2	0.032	0.211	0.288

Note: \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \* p<0.1.



Table 6: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Dependent Var.	Donate or Not				Amount of Self + Friend Donation			
Demographic Dummy	Married	Local	Age>35	Past Donation>2	Married	Local	Age>35	Past Donation>2
T1	0.00151	0.00272**	0.00238*	0.00150	0.439	1.024*	0.879	0.595
T2	0.00276*	0.00404***	0.00397***	0.00387***	1.110*	1.574***	1.564***	1.683***
T3	8.40e-07	0.000993	0.00129	0.00143	-0.0503	0.336	0.388	0.581
T4	0.00351**	0.00322**	0.00401***	0.00309**	1.450**	1.372**	1.718***	1.310**
T5	0.00270*	0.00294**	0.00235	0.00259*	1.362**	1.744***	1.448**	1.441***
T6	0.00397***	0.00386***	0.00458***	0.00327**	1.657***	1.598***	1.786***	1.526***
Demo Dummy	0.00574***	0.00447*	0.00647***	0.0145***	2.232***	1.825*	2.607***	6.596***
T1 x demo	0.00429	0.000174	0.00161	0.0122***	2.032*	-0.0151	0.632	4.137**
T2 x demo	0.00374	-0.00136	-0.000582	-0.000274	1.738	0.284	0.203	-0.834
T3 x demo	0.00529*	0.00439	0.00135	0.00223	2.009*	1.586	0.744	-0.127
T4 x demo	0.00169	0.00597	-1.92e-05	0.00964**	0.970	2.750*	0.0822	4.458**
T5 x demo	0.00665**	0.0123***	0.0107***	0.0217***	3.592***	4.812***	4.467***	10.22***
T6 x demo	0.000901	0.00251	-0.00154	0.00994**	0.663	1.794	0.364	3.371*
N of Obs	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000
R2	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.006

Notes: Columns for Married control for the dummy variable that indicates missing values in Married. \*\*\*p<0.01, \*\*p<0.05, \*p<0.1

Table 7: Survey Responses

Panel A: Responses across test groups

Test Group	Ever hear your friends donate?		Will you share this donation experience?		Willing to bring friend next time?		
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Not Sure
0	16 32.65%	33 67.35%	8 16.33%	41 83.67%	5 10.42%	27 56.25%	16 33.33%
1	13 23.21%	43 76.79%	14 23.33%	46 76.67%	15 25.42%	29 49.15%	15 25.42%
2	10 16.67%	50 83.33%	9 16.36%	46 83.64%	7 11.11%	34 53.97%	22 34.92%
3	10 25%	30 75%	10 24.39%	31 75.61%	8 18.18%	20 45.45%	16 36.36%
4	11 20.75%	42 79.25%	8 15.69%	43 84.31%	8 14.81%	32 59.26%	14 25.93%
5	13 19.7%	53 80.3%	10 15.15%	56 84.85%	7 10.14%	44 63.77%	18 26.09%
6	24 37.5%	40 62.5%	19 31.67%	41 68.33%	13 19.4%	26 38.81%	28 41.79%
Total	97 25%	291 75%	78 20.42%	304 79.58%	63 15.59%	212 52.48%	129 31.93%

Panel B: Responses between donors who come with friend and donors who come without friend

	Ever hear your friends donate?		Will share donation experience?		Willing to bring friend next time?		
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Not Sure
Without Friend	92 28.57	230 71.43	73 23.03	244 76.97	56 16.92	166 50.15	109 32.93
With Friend	5 7.58	61 92.42	5 7.69	60 92.31	7 9.59	46 63.01	20 27.4

Table 8: Structural Estimates for First Stage Decision (none, solo, group donation)

Base outcome: Do not donate

Panel A: Individual Primitives and the Effect of Interventions  
(Alternative-Invariant Coefficient)

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Net Utility from Donation	-5.84	0.14
Net Utility for Bringing Friend(s)	-2.81	0.50
Reminder for self-donation	0.31	0.13
Social Pressure for solo donation after receiving reminder for bringing friend(s)	0.02	0.08
Reminder for Bringing Friend	-0.52	0.42
Reward to subject for self-donation	0.10	0.08
Reward for subject's friend donation	1.01	0.46
Reward to subject for group donation	1.11	0.41

Panel B: Individual Demographics (Alternative-Specific Coefficient)

Solo Donation Alternative	Coefficient	Standard Error
Male and Weight in Upper Half	0.07	0.09
Female and Weight in Upper Half	0.58	0.14
Male	0.51	0.10
Current Age >33	0.24	0.09
Married	0.56	0.10
Local Resident	0.50	0.09
Education <=9 years	0.17	0.10

Group Donation Alternative	Coefficient	Standard Error
Male and Weight in Upper Half	-0.20	0.49
Female and Weight in Upper Half	0.68	0.44
Male	-0.37	0.40
Current Age >33	0.23	0.42
Married	0.53	0.44
Local Resident	0.54	0.38
Education <=9 years	-0.97	0.62

Table 9: Structural Estimates for Second Stage Decision (200ml, 300ml, 400ml)

Base outcome: Donate 200ml

Panel A: Individual Primitives & Effect of the Presence of Friend(s)

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Net utility from donating 300ml	1.18	0.39
Net utility from donating 400ml	1.50	0.37
Donating 300ml with the presence of donating friend(s)	0.86	0.69
Donating 300ml with the presence of non-donating friend(s)	1.99	1.07
Donating 400ml with the presence of donating friend(s)	0.86	0.66
Donating 400ml with the presence of non-donating friend(s)	2.86	1.03

Panel B: Individual Demographics (Alternative-Specific Coefficient)

Solo Donation Alternative	Coefficient	Standard Error
Male and Weight in Upper Half	0.30	0.31
Female and Weight in Upper Half	-0.36	0.61
Male	-1.30	0.38
Current Age >33	-0.66	0.42
Married	0.52	0.43
Local Resident	0.35	0.43
Education <=9 years	1.18	0.67

Group Donation Alternative	Coefficient	Standard Error
Male and Weight in Upper Half	0.67	0.27
Female and Weight in Upper Half	0.63	0.56
Male	-0.81	0.36
Current Age >33	0.55	0.35
Married	0.47	0.38
Local Resident	0.68	0.37
Education <=9 years	2.01	0.61

Table 10: Policy Simulation

	Average Prob. of Subject Coming for Solo Donation (1)	Average Prob. of Subject Coming for Group Donation (2)	Total Number of Donors (1)+(2)*2	Total Unit of Reward to the Donors	Reward per Donor
No treatment	0.69%	0.02%	0.73%	0.00%	0.00
Reminder for self-donation	0.94%	0.03%	0.99%	0.00%	0.00
Reminder for self-donation + Reminder for bringing friend(s)	0.97%	0.02%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00
Reward to subject for self-donation (SR)	1.03%	0.03%	1.09%	1.06%	0.97
Reward for subject's friend donation (FR)	0.97%	0.04%	1.05%	0.04%	0.04
Reward to subject for group donation (GR)	0.97%	0.05%	1.06%	0.05%	0.04
SR + GR	1.06%	0.05%	1.16%	1.16%	1.00
FR + GR	0.97%	0.13%	1.22%	0.26%	0.21
SR + FR	1.06%	0.05%	1.15%	1.15%	1.00
SR + FR + GR	1.06%	0.14%	1.34%	1.48%	1.10
SR (1.5 Unit)	1.09%	0.03%	1.15%	1.12%	0.97
SR (2 Unit)	1.15%	0.03%	1.21%	1.18%	0.97
FR (1.5 Unit) + GR (1.5 Unit)	0.95%	0.36%	1.67%	0.72%	0.43
FR (2 Unit) + GR (2 Unit)	0.96%	1.04%	3.04%	2.08%	0.68