

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

INFLATION STABILIZATION WITH
INCOMES POLICY SUPPORT:
A REVIEW OF THE EXPERIENCE IN
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND ISRAEL

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Working Paper No. 2153

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
February 1987

Paper prepared for the the Group of Thirty, New York, October 2-3, 1986. We are indebted to Stanley Fischer for helpful discussions and suggestions. The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program in International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

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ABSTRACT


In 1985-86 Argentina, Brazil and Israel initiated programs of stabilization after episodes of high and sharply accelerating inflation. Among the key features of each stabilization program were the use of wage-price controls, a fixed exchange rate and fiscal correction as well as a significant expansion in the nominal quantity of money. The combination of fiscal correction and incomes policy has come to be known as "heterodox" stabilization policy, thus opposing it to the conventional IMF programs which emphasize tight monetary and fiscal policies as the exclusive instrument of stabilization.

The stabilization programs in Argentina and Israel have now been in force for over a year and the more recent one in Brazil for half a year. There is accordingly enough evidence to make a first judgment on the success and the limitations of these new schemes. At the same time it is worthwhile spelling out some of the special features of stabilization and the resulting intellectual case for heterodox programs.

The paper focusses on the conceptual issues related to the use of incomes policy in the context of stabilization when inertia is a central feature. The analysis includes the relation between deficits and inflation, inertial inflation and the basics of monetary reform. We also review the actual stabilization experience in Argentina, Brazil and Israel. The paper concludes with a discussion of the political dimension of stabilization, showing the extraordinary political popularity of the new programs.

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The stabilization programs in Argentina and Israel have now been in force for over a year and the more recent one in Brazil for half a year. There is accordingly enough evidence to make a first judgment on the success and the limitations of these new schemes. At the same time it is worthwhile spelling out some of the special features of stabilization and the resulting intellectual case for heterodox programs. We leave little doubt that the concept of these new programs is entirely correct--a longstanding disdain for controls by the economics profession notwithstanding. But we also emphasize that the temptation to forget about fundamentals is extraordinarily large and ultimately fatal to stabilization.

A main point of our paper is to isolate the precise role these programs can expect to play. Our point is that they provide an immensely valuable breathing spell in which price stability without deep recession, and as a result very strong political support for the program and the

policy maker, yield a platform from which to make the inevitable adjustments in the budget which are the ultimate pillars of stabilization. We note that mistaking the breathing spell for success, and failure to use the political support at its height for the difficult task of fiscal correction, will mean that soon the program must slip. And when it does slip it does so irrecoverably. The focus then is on how these programs, unlike traditional programs, do provide an immediate, temporary and very favorable opportunity for basic policy reform. Even if they do not provide a magic relief from the necessity of fiscal correction they surely represent a significant opportunity to try and achieve policy reform where before, in innumerable cases, that proved impossible or was overly delayed because of the perception of immense political costs associated with the large unemployment and slow disinflation.

Table 1 gives an idea of the possible and impossible approaches to inflation stabilization. The table highlights two dimensions of policy: whether or not the program includes fiscal correction or austerity and whether the program has an incomes policy (wage, price and exchange rate freezing together with remonetization to be explained below). The standard program in the lower lefthand box is the IMF approach which consists of fiscal austerity but does not make incomes policy a key instrument. It is true that the IMF favors wage restraint, but price controls are not typically, or ever, an item on the conditionality list. The alternative is shown in the upper lefthand box where the heterodox programs are located. They combine an incomes policy with fiscal austerity.

Table 1 Orthodox, Heterodox and "Nodox" Stabilization

FISCAL AUSTERITY		
	Yes	No
	Yes	Poets
	Austral/Cruzado	
INCOMES POLICY		
	No	Magicians
	IMF	

The remaining two boxes are essential to understand what the temptations are in the course of stabilization and where they lead. The most common is to attempt stabilization by controls only, without paying attention to the sine qua non of fiscal correction. This box is crowded with many thousand years of failed experiments from Emperor Diocletean to the modern day experiments of the Peronists in 1973-4, of Richard Nixon, or of Israel in early 1985. Inevitably these programs come to an end after a more or less brief period of effectiveness. They fail when shortages become a sufficient political headache. There may be an additional phase in which magicians get a shot, without controls and without austerity, but that is typically the final phase before the patient, often too late, is rushed to the IMF. ¹

¹This is not the place to offer an elaborate explanation or defense of IMF programs, but it certainly must be observed that countries do not go to the IMF for inflation treatment, but rather to gain access to balance of payments financing. The fact that money and inflation are so central to IMF programs stems from the close association between public sector dissaving, financing and the external dissaving. But the link is not completely tight so that it is possible for a country to satisfy the external targets and yet fail on the domestic targets. This fact has led many observers to argue that the IMF should exclusively to external targets. An entirely different criticism

An important point in Table 1 concerns monetary policy. The heterodox program includes significant monetization as part of stabilization, but recognizes the need for fiscal austerity. By contrast the orthodox IMF program emphasizes monetary and fiscal restraint.

There is another dimension along which programs might be distinguished in four-way classification. Programs might be orthodox or heterodox and they can involve gradualism or shock treatment. In this distinction the present programs are classified as "heterodox shocks". An example of a heterodox-gradualist program would be the Brazilian Campos-Bulhoes stabilization of the 1960s. An orthodox-gradualist program might be the case of Chile. It is more difficult to remember an orthodox-shock example, perhaps because of a lack of survivors to recount the episode.

The paper is organized as follows: In the first three sections we review conceptual issues related to the use of incomes policy in the context of stabilization when inertia is a central feature. The discussion includes the relation between deficits and inflation, inertial inflation and the basics of monetary reform. In the following three sections we review the actual stabilization experience in Argentina, Brazil and Israel. The paper concludes with a discussion of the political dimension

focusses on an unwillingness of the IMF to require coordinated programs of wage, price, and exchange rate programs. The IMF certainly insists on exchange rate programs and even wage programs, as in Brazil's case in the early 1980s. The point of this paper is that there should also be a price freeze. Failure to include the price freeze means that the program lacks coherence and can only succeed by making unemployment high enough to be the coordinating device that a freeze would otherwise provide.

of stabilization, showing the extraordinary political popularity of the new programs.

1. INCOMES POLICY AND STABILIZATION

In this section we review the analytical case for wage-price-exchange rate controls as an essential complement to the fiscal stabilization that, as already noted, is the sine qua non of successful anti-inflation policy.

That aggregate demand discipline is a necessary condition for sustained price stability has long been known by economists and by well advised policy makers. Yet it may not be sufficient to stop inflation, or at least it may fail to work under conditions of tolerable unemployment. This is demonstrated by the failure of a number of IMF-supported programs that ignored the problem posed by inflationary inertia. As a result IMF programs often lead to dismal stagflation and ultimately to a resumption of expansion and little success at definitely reducing inflation. Not surprisingly, countries like Argentina, Israel and Brazil recently decided to focus on the supply side of inflation, attempting to stabilize prices by combining incomes policy with "monetary reforms".

Whether these experiments will ultimately yield success stories depends on a number of factors, including importantly aggregate demand management. The overriding lesson from the ongoing experiments certainly include the need for sound respect for fiscal discipline and the need to recognize that a good dose of initial overkill may be an inevitable ingredient for subsequent success.

One interesting issue is that such experiments were inspired on a sound game theoretical approach to inflation. It can be argued, as we do below, that an incomes policy is necessary to coordinate individual behavior in a way not recognized by oversimplified versions of a rational expectations economy. The central question is to understand what causes inertial inflation and how incomes policy can break the dependence of the inflation rate on its past behavior.

Inertial Inflation: The starting point for the discussion is the recognition that a large part of any prevailing inflation is essentially inertial. This observation applies equally to the United States, Europe or Latin America. Inertial inflation means that inflation today is approximately equal to what it was yesterday. Let p be the current inflation, p_{-1} last years inflation and "gap" denote the economy's cyclical position. The actual rate of inflation would then be:

$$(1) \quad p = p_{-1} + a\text{Gap} + e$$

where e denotes current period supply shocks. The essential point of modern inflation theory is the recognition that inflation is linked to the past through a variety of channels. It is not only "too much money chasing too few goods", which is the second term, or supply shocks like oil or agricultural price increases, but also the sheer fact that inflation yesterday means inflation today.

The reason for this persistence or inertia is primarily formal or informal indexation interacting with staggered wage setting. This may take the form of a legally imposed wage rule according to which wage adjustments today are based on the inflation over the past year or the past six months.² It may also be that much more informal wage bargaining may lead to the same result. Other than through wage indexation the same mechanism also works via expectations. In setting their prices firms will have to estimate their own cost increases and the price increases of competing firms. The best guess is that, cyclical and supply shock factors aside, inflation today will be approximately what it was yesterday.

Because everybody believes that inflation will in fact be approximately what it was yesterday the public acts on these expectations and will therefore set their prices accordingly and will not hesitate to give wage concessions matching these inflation expectations. It is much easier to give wage increases in line with expected inflation than go through the risk of a strike. If everybody acts in this manner then in fact the expected inflation turns out to be the actual inflation; and if yesterday's inflation is the benchmark, then today's inflation will come out to be much the same as it was in the past.

Cyclical factors and supply shocks, including the need to depreciate exchange rates to cope with the debt crisis are the chief reasons why inflation has exploded in many countries. The inertial part of

²We look at indexation in more detail below in discussing the Brazilian background to stabilization. In that context the shortening of the indexation period from one year to six-months and in the end three-months was a main source of the acceleration of inflation.

inflation, other things equal, would tend to make for very stable inflation, at some particular level. But the extra elements can cause inflation to move, and often to move sharply. The cyclical factor is quite obvious in that it is simply demand inflation or cooling down of inflation due to slack in activity and employment. But it is worthwhile to recognize an asymmetry. There is no upper limit for firms' price increases in response to excess demand, but in reverse the argument does not apply. Stopping inflation of say 400 percent by slack is very difficult. Even as restrictive policy cuts nominal spending, firms are forced in the labor market to make wage concessions based on past inflation. Their cost increases thus might be of the order of 400 percent and it is quite inconceivable that simply by reducing profit margins they would be able to reduce inflation significantly.

In the same way a cut in wage settlements below the prevailing rate of inflation will not make much of a difference to high inflation. Giving wage increases of 360 instead of 400 percent would mean a very large cut in the real wage (8 percent!) but a very minor reduction in inflation.

The idea of fighting inflation by slack thus applies only to an economy where wage reductions of 2 or 3 percent or cuts in profit margins of that order mean cutting inflation in half. When inflation is very high and very inertial then demand policies have a hard time making a rapid and large impact. Because a rapid and large impact is the only way that is politically acceptable, governments in high inflation countries see little hope but to try and stem further inflation deterioration, but do not see room for actually ending inflation.

The new stabilization programs recognize this problem in a way that IMF programs do not. They recognize the need for an incomes policy as a means of suspending the inertial forces, thus shifting the economy instantly from a high inflation state to a low one. This incomes policy should be understood in two ways. One is political. To stop inflation someone must start offering either cuts in profit margins or in real wages in order to introduce disinflation. The initial disinflation can then be passed along through indexation into a gradual path of further disinflation. Realistically, there will be no volunteers for such an approach. Everybody would like to jump to a low inflation state together, but nobody will jump unless the others also do. That means everybody wants to see the fact of zero inflation before they themselves will set their own price or wage increases at zero. But if everybody adopts a "wait and see" attitude then, of course, inflation will continue. An attempt to restrict demand would translate almost entirely into reduced employment and practically not at all into lower inflation. The dismal performance of the economy and the lack of success at inflation fighting would make any such campaign short-lived.

Game Theory and Incomes Policy: The scenario thus described puts inflation fighting squarely in the area of game theory. When economic agents interact strategically in the fashion described above coordination becomes essential to achieve good results. A system of wage-price-exchange rate controls is the coordinating device that establishes the facts that the economy left to itself cannot establish quickly except at extreme costs.

It might be argued that if the government does undertake to produce the right kind of monetary and fiscal policy, then the public cannot escape the conclusion that, in fact, inflation has been left dead in its tracks. Unable to escape that conclusion, everybody will act on it and hence inflation will be dead.³

But there are two separate and crucial slips in this argument. One concerns the government's inability to credibly precommit to future policies. The other, which is more novel, concerns the problem of coordination in a world of price setters. We review these in turn.

The government cannot commit itself definitely, credibly and beyond doubt. The institutional setting for such a precommitment does not exist (one thinks of constitutional amendments, the gold standard and what not). Because the government cannot lock away beyond doubt its policies, the public always recognizes that there is some possibility that policy will not change to a non-inflationary stance. Specifically, if the average agent does not quite believe that policy will change, then they all will behave somewhat defensively, charging some wage and price increases which then force the government to suspend the policy. The expectation that this is indeed the policy persuades the average agent to disbelieve the possibility of an instant end to inflation.

³How do we know that the economy cannot? That, too, is an issue in game theory. Schelling (1982) has written extensively on how to make threats stick. Ideas involve poison-pill strategies. Governments instinctively shy away from poison-pill strategies of no-return. As a result the public does not believe the fierce anti-inflation rhetoric and therefore the government in turn cannot afford to implement it. The late William Fellner (1976) developed these themes with great authority. See, too, Anti-inflation..(1982)

These ideas can be interpreted in a game theoretic perspective assigning the government a double task: to assure credibility of the aggregate demand policy consistent with disinflation and to coordinate the expectations and actions of individual wage and price setters. Assume that after a prolonged inflation, the Central Bank announces that it will stop printing money and that the Treasury announces that the budget deficit will be eliminated as a result of increased taxes or expenditure cuts. Even if the general perception is that nominal GNP will be stabilized immediately, prudent price setters should not take the lead in stopping sectoral price increases, as long as they consider the possibility of further price increases in other sectors.⁴ In a non-cooperative or non-coordinated game with many players each individual player has little information on other players' pay-offs. As a result there is no reason to believe that all players will hit the zero inflation-full employment equilibrium in the first move of wage and price setting. The uncertainty about the behavior of other players persuades the individual price setter to adopt a very cautious pricing policy.⁵ How many moves it takes or how long it takes for the economy to reach the equilibrium is an open question, depending in part on the learning mechanism used by individual agents.

⁴The situation is essentially equivalent to the analysis of wage setting in the General Theory (See Keynes (1936, chaps. 2 and 19). Workers in each industry resist money wage cuts because they cannot be assured that similar wage cuts will be enforced in other industries.

⁵See Simonsen (1986a,b) for a game theoretic formulation where it is shown how players using maxmin pricing lead to an equilibrium different from the Nash equilibrium assumed in full information rational expectations models.

The convergence speed may be painfully slow after a prolonged period of high inflation. The more prolonged the period of learning, the higher is the unemployment rate that results from excessive prices confronted with a given nominal income target sustained by the stabilization policy. The higher and the more persistent is unemployment the more agents will be inclined to believe that the authorities' determination may falter. Accordingly, rather than speeding up their price responses, they may persist even longer in their overly prudent disbelief.

The foregoing discussion provides the rationale for an incomes policy: governments should play the role of the Walrasian auctioneer, speeding up the location of a zero-inflation full employment equilibrium. From this point of view, incomes policy may be necessary to make economic agents behave in line with rational expectations models. It should be stressed that the central function of controls is not to constrain individual decision-making, but to tell each agent how other actors will play, clearing potential externalities in an imperfect information game. This role for controls, incidentally, dismisses a traditional argument against incomes policy, namely that governments are not better equipped than the private sector to discover the equilibrium. In fact, the central problem is not to identify the equilibrium but to orchestrate the simultaneous playing of wage and price setters to reach the equilibrium.

A more fundamental contention is that the temporary success of an incomes policy may lead policy makers to forget that price stability can only be sustained with aggregate demand discipline. The temptation is to misread the price stability and produce a boom. The misleading signals are

a true risk as is known from uncountable examples in history. Yet the converse is also true. Trying to fight a big inflation from the demand side only may lead to such dismal stagflation that policy-makers may conclude that life with inflation is less uncomfortable than life with an IMF-supported program. Worse yet, they often reach that conclusion only after a prolonged period of recession.

Of course, the chances of hitting instantly a zero-inflation, zero unemployment, zero shortage equilibrium via an incomes policy are remote. Wage-price controls will almost inevitably lead to some shortages unless there is a generalized recession that cuts demand. The central question is what is worse in terms of social welfare, a few product shortages that may eventually be overcome by imports or a generalized shortage of jobs. From this point of view, objections to an incomes policy should not be balanced against the extreme costs of recession and unemployment. This is especially the case when the problem is to fight a big inflation with strong inertial roots. One reason to prefer an incomes policy is that it can be managed with appropriate flexibility, across sectors and across time, moving gradually from price freezes to price administration.

The case for a coordinating role for an incomes policy because of information externalities arises only when macroeconomic noise and uncertainty are large relative to the microeconomic uncertainties in each individual market. This explains why, in a second stage of the stabilization program, wage-price controls should be removed gradually, at successive sectoral steps and not in the one-shot manner. The one-shot approach would simply bring back the uncertainty of individual players as

to what every other players will do. As a result at the stage of liberalization there would be defensively large price increases which might well wreck the inflation stabilization.

Incomes Policy Matching: We conclude this section by noting that the various instruments of an incomes policy: exchange rates; wages; public sector prices and the nominal money stock, must be carefully matched. Failure to align these policy instruments can easily lead to dramatically poor performance.

The clearest example of a poorly aligned policy might be the Chilean stabilization of the late 1970s. The budget had been moved to balance and, indeed to a surplus. Money was under tight control and inflation was gradually declining, although very slowly. To speed up disinflation the government opted to stop the exchange rate depreciation that had previously been used to avoid loss of competitiveness in the face of continuing inflation. But the government failed to recognize that wage indexation, geared to the past inflation, implied cost increases for firms without providing offsetting relief on prices. The exchange rate rate soon became grossly overvalued, leading ultimately to the worst kind of speculation and financial instability.⁶

The need for a matching of instruments applies also to the money stock. As we will discuss in the next section successful disinflation requires determined (though careful and limited) monetization of the economy.

⁶See Dornbusch (1986a).

2. THE BUDGET AND INFLATION

The common perception is that inflation is caused by budget deficits. We draw attention here to two important channels that run in the other direction: Budget deficits are high because of inflation. This more unusual direction is important in assessing public finance in inflationary episodes and to develop a judgment about the fiscal policy changes required in implementing stabilization.

The first reason inflation makes for deficits is often called the Oliveira-Tanzi effect.⁷ The fact of inflation, combined with lags in tax collection, implies that the real value of tax collection arriving in the hands of the government is lower the higher the rate of inflation. If last years income taxes were to be paid only this year with 100 percent inflation and without indexation of tax liabilities the government would find itself with only half of the real value of taxes it would receive without inflation or without lags or with exact indexation.

Of course, in any high inflation episode the lags in tax collection are sharply reduced and some form of indexation will make an appearance, but it turns out to be entirely impossible to make the entire tax collection fully inflation proof. Moreover, if inflation rates reach 20 or 30 percent per month, not to speak of the 20,000 percent in a hyperinflation situation, even very short lags have a major effect on the real value of tax collection. This effect is reinforced in that the

⁷It is named after studies by Oliveira (1967) and Tanzi (1977). Keynes (1928) and other commentators on the inflation experience of the 1920s already highlighted this effect. See Bresciani-Turroni (1928), Graham (1928) and Dornbusch (1985). On tax indexation in Brazil, prior to the inflation explosion, see Simonsen (1984).

public gains an active interest in postponing tax payments because of the large reduction in real payments that can be achieved in this manner.

The actual relevance of the Oliveira-Tanzi effect depends on the tax structure. The more it is based on withholding taxes and excise taxes, and the more rapidly these are turned over to the government, the smaller the impact of inflation. Conversely, the larger the share of income taxes, the less frequently these are collected and the less they are collected at the source, the more dramatic the impact.

An overnight stabilization of inflation thus has an immediate, often dramatic effect on the real value of tax collection. Without even changing the tax laws the fact of price stability implies that the government receives an increase in the real value of tax collection. The magnitude of this effect was of the order of 1-2 percent of GDP in the various recent cases.

The interaction of the deficit and inflation brings with it another important point. Suppose the deficit is financed by printing money. In an inflationary situation there may well be more than one equilibrium inflation rate. There will be low inflation equilibrium, with a small deficit (because inflation is low) and a high inflation one with a larger deficit. The details are given in the appendix, but this point is critically important because it suggests that exactly the same tax structure may be consistent with very different inflation performances. It makes the possibility of shifting the economy from high to low inflation more than an academic issue.⁸

⁸On this point see especially Bruno and Fischer (1986).

The second interaction between inflation and the deficit stems from the inflation component of debt service. Part of government outlays will be the service of the internal and external debt. Let i be the nominal interest rate, r the real rate and p the rate of inflation. Let B be the nominal stock of debt outstanding. Debt service then is equal to the nominal interest rate times the stock of debt, iB . For a given real interest rate more inflation means higher nominal interest rates and hence a higher level of outlays and of the deficit in the budget. This point is made immediately obvious by writing debt service as follows:

$$\text{debt service} = iB = (r+p)B$$

where we have used the definition of the nominal interest rate as equal to the real rate plus the rate of inflation. This link between inflation and nominal debt service has led to the recognition that two different measures of the deficit must be distinguished: the actual deficit and the inflation-adjusted or operational deficit. The former calculates the deficit taking full debt service as the measure of debt service while the latter only includes real interest payments, rB , and excludes the inflationary component of interest, pB . The rationale for the distinction is that corresponding to the inflation component of interest payments is the inflationary erosion of the principal. To measure the increase in the real value of government indebtedness the inflationary erosion of the debt should be subtracted from the addition to the stock of government liabilities outstanding. That is done by calculating the inflation-

adjusted or operational deficit defined as the actual deficit less the inflation rate times the stock of government debt outstanding. This concept of the deficit is also equivalent to calculating the noninterest deficit plus real interest payments on the debt.⁹

The importance of inflation adjustments in the budget is apparent when we think of a government with a debt-income ratio of, say, 20 percent of GNP and an inflation rate of 200 percent. The inflationary component of debt service is equal to 40 percent of GNP. The actual deficit therefore vastly overstates the increase in the government's real indebtedness.

This argument applies not only to the internal debt but also to the foreign debt. The deficit contribution of external debt, in local currency, is equal to the interest rate, say Libor plus 2 percent, plus the rate of exchange depreciation times the ratio of external debt to income. If inflation is high so will be depreciation and hence the inflationary component of the service of the external debt. If inflation were brought to zero, through whatever means, the budget deficit would be reduced correspondingly.

Money Illusion: If the public has no money illusion then in the presence of inflation its extra saving will be just enough to absorb the inflationary component of debt service. How otherwise would it be possible to finance budget deficits of 25 percent of GDP? There is, indeed, a serious theoretical flaw in using unadjusted budget figures to measure

⁹The calculation of inflation adjusted deficits is common in industrial countries, too. See Eisner (1986) for an extensive treatment.

supply-demand gaps. As long as an increase in the budget deficit is matched by an equal increase in voluntary private savings, aggregate demand will not be affected at all. The assumption of deficits gearing voluntary savings to finance them looks rather strange, as far as the adjusted budget is concerned. Yet, it becomes highly plausible when the problem is to finance the inflation adjustment of the public sector debt. In the case of the foreign debt this looks plainly obvious.

American creditors never increased their spending or their purchase of Brazilian goods just because Brazil was devaluing the exchange rate almost daily, in line with the domestic inflation rate, before the Cruzado Plan. The fact that they owned an increasing nominal amount of cruzeiros was not confounded with a wealth increase since their claims did not appreciate in dollars or in terms of purchasing power over Brazilian goods. In a word, the cruzeiro adjustment of the Brazilian public sector foreign debt was fully financed by external creditors. Banks were reluctant to increase their dollar exposure to the country, but were not reluctant to have this exposure translated into more and more cruzeiros.

If the public has no money illusion, the same principle applies to the domestic public sector debt. Bond holders will understand that the inflation adjustment of their credits should not lead to additional consumption. Here again, inflation automatically creates the nominal savings needed to finance the inflation adjustment of the government debt.

Of course, the no money illusion assumption can be questioned, especially in the absence of formally indexed public sector bonds. Even in a widespread indexed economy widows and retired workers might use part

of the inflation adjustment of their saving accounts to finance consumption. Yet, two essential points should be stressed. First, money illusion is not likely to be a major problem, otherwise it would be impossible to finance deficits of 25% of G.D.P. Second, even if money illusion is important enough to prevent the inflation adjustment of the public sector domestic debt from being financed entirely by voluntary savings, it brings us back to the Olivera-Tanzi effect. Once again, there is a circular causation between aggregate demand and inflation. Stopping inflation will lead to an automatic reduction in aggregate demand.

These distinctions between adjusted and unadjusted deficits are an important part in understanding the rationale of the new stabilization programs. If a government perceives that most of the deficit represents the inflationary component of debt service, with the noninterest budget in sufficient surplus to pay the real interest on the debt, then stabilization becomes more plausible. All that is needed is to find a way to jump from high inflation to no inflation. Failure to understand the role of the inflation adjustment could make it seem that an extraordinary deficit reduction through spending cuts or tax increases is required before stabilization can be considered. In this sense the famous IMF dictum, "a deficit is a deficit, is a deficit!" is a poor starting point for analyzing the fiscal fundamentals required for a successful stabilization.

3. MONETARY REFORM AND MONETIZATION

The recent stabilization programs in Israel, Argentina and Brazil had as an important and highly visible component a monetary reform. We review here briefly the essential features of such a reform. They are mainly two. The first, which is crucial, is to shift contracts from those appropriate to an inflationary economy to those appropriate in a zero-inflation environment. The second is the introduction of a new monetary unit, the main purpose of which, other than cutting zeros, is to increase confidence and consolidate expectations.

Contracts: In an inflationary environment with large uncertainty contracts will have a very short maturity. Long-term capital markets will dry up. But even so contracts will be for a month or even six months. These contracts will specify nominal interest rates or implicit prices that are a reflection of the inflationary expectations prevailing at the time the contracts are concluded. For example with an inflation rate of 10 percent per month a one month loan contract will carry interest rates of at least 10 percent per month. Rent contracts entered into at any time will involve nominal payments over say six month that reflect the assumption of increasing prices. Wage contracts will be indexed in a formal or informal manner so that when they come up for renegotiation they are adjusted for past or for future inflation. A major problem for inflation stabilization is to recognize the presence of these contracts and institutions which are in force at the time of stabilization. If the economy was to move from one

day to the next from high inflation to zero inflation, outstanding contracts and institutions would give rise to major problems.

It is immediately obvious that debtors can service loan contracts involving very high nominal interest rates only if in fact the inflation expected at the time of contract actually materializes. A six month loan concluded with an inflation expectation of 10 percent per month would carry a 77 percent interest rate for six months. If inflation disappears the nominal interest rate of 77 percent becomes the real interest rate and hence the debt service burden would be extraordinarily large. An adjustment in all loan contracts is required to avoid a massive and unintended redistribution from debtors to creditors and the attendant risk of pervasive bankruptcy and financial instability.

For wage contracts the problem is perhaps even more complicated. Suppose, as is realistically the case, that wages are readjusted every three or six months. Every time a contract comes up for renewal the money wage over the next three months is adjusted upward for the inflation which actually occurred over the past three months. With such a pattern of wage contracting an instant end to inflation is nearly impossible. Just as the government seeks to impose zero inflation some wage contract is coming up for renewal and workers will ask to be compensated for past inflation. The wage increase in turn creates cost increases and hence, inevitably, inflationary pressure. Accordingly, the transition to zero inflation needs to be accompanied by some restructuring of wage contracting to avoid this inertia effect. At the time of stabilization some wage earners will just have received their adjustment and hence will

find themselves in the high real wage position of their three month cycle while others will be almost at the bottom. Freezing wages in this situation would be perceived as extraordinarily inequitable and hence would serve as an impediment to stabilization.

Monetary reform is the broad term that characterizes the rewriting of contracts and the reform of institutions to make them compatible with the zero inflation target. In the case of wages, monetary reform requires that those who had recent increases and hence have high real wages must see their wages rolled back while those who are in the low real wage phase need upward adjustments. This reform could, in principle, be achieved by money wage adjustments in the old currency. The confusion of a new money may, though, help achieve the transition in a simplified manner. Note, too, that a new money provides an important instrument to avoid legal complications, uncertainty and challenges to the restructuring of contracts. Similarly for contracts involving future nominal payments a new money is a means of aligning the real value of payments with the expectations implicit at the time contracts were concluded. A tablita that converts the old money into the new according to a set time table of depreciation is the practical means of achieving this end.

Often monetary reform also encompasses a capital levy on the public in the form of a write-down of monetary assets. Interestingly, in none of the recent stabilizations has this been attempted. This fact is all the more noteworthy in that, unlike in the 1920s, government debts remained very large and hence made the idea of budget balancing via a capital levy particularly interesting.

Monetization: Monetary reform also often includes a change in the monetary institutions. Along with the change in the monetary unit the change in the institutional arrangements is meant to dramatize the end of inflationary finance.

The traditional way to signal new rules of the game is to announce the independence of the central bank and an end of automatic financing of the budget by the printing press. But it is important here to read the fine print. In the 1920s the stabilizations did, indeed, involve institutional changes and limitations on the access of the government to the printing press, but that did not in fact imply an end to money creation for two reasons. One was that in some cases the transition was characterized by a large, once and for all issue of money. In Germany's case in 1923 the ceiling was set at 500% of the existing money stock.¹⁰ But beyond this once and for all fiduciary issue there was also the possibility of the money stock increasing in the course of domestic private credit expansion or the monetization of reserve inflows. The experience from the classical stabilizations was one of extremely large increases in nominal money,--several hundred percent--consistent with price stabilization.

The explanation for this large, non-inflationary money creation is quite obvious. During the high inflation period the cost of holding non-interest bearing money becomes extremely high. As a result, real balances decline, or the velocity of circulation increases. This is the famous

¹⁰See Sargent (1982), Dornbusch (1985b) and Dornbusch and Fischer (1986)

"flight from money". The financial system accommodates the flight from money by creating highly liquid interest-bearing or indexed liabilities--the "overnights" which practically serve as money. Surely, one could not pay for a taxi ride with an indexed bond, but one can transfer funds any day from an indexed cash reserve account to a checking account by a simple telephone call to the bank before 10 a.m. In fact, living without M1 was a fashionable and profitable exercise. The fact that M1 did survive at all, though at an extremely reduced level, can only be explained by transactions costs and learning lags.

In the course of stabilization the reverse occurs. The disappearance of inflation raises the demand for M1 or transactions real balances. Unless deflation increases the real money supply, it is necessary to increase the nominal money supply through one means or another to avoid extravagantly high nominal and real interest rates. A non-inflationary expansion in the money stock is needed to meet the additional demand for money, the well-known reliquification or velocity problem. M1 should expand to replace other financial assets.

The problem is to fine-tune this expansion and to identify which aggregates must expand. Failure to expand M1, or too gradual an increase, means that the economy will slide into a recession because of a liquidity crunch. But too rapid or too large an expansion leads to a loss of credibility and reignition of inflation. The best solution might well be to set growth targets for total financial assets held by the public, allowing M1 to expand as long as other financial assets decline. Thus the government should accommodate the shift in the composition of the

financial portfolio without, however, expanding the size of the total liquid asset portion. What are the implications of such a policy for broad monetary aggregates, for example M4? Here one would expect rough consistency (relative to GNP) unless there is a significant shift from dollar assets to domestic currency securities.

Financial Institutions: A major issue in the sudden end to a high inflation is the fate of financial institutions and specifically that of commercial banks and financial intermediaries. During inflation the public seeks to avoid holding money because of the depreciation of the purchasing power of money in terms of goods. The higher the rate of inflation the larger the implicit tax on money and hence the larger the resources people are willing to devote to avoiding this tax. The natural consequence is the emergence of an industry that makes it possible to live with a minimum of real balances or, equivalently, to speed up the circulation of money.

Commercial banks and other financial intermediaries are the natural agents in promoting the moneyless economy. They will surround potential customers with branches and attempt to attract deposits by paying some interest, thus helping their customers to avoid a complete loss of the purchasing power of their monetary assets. The proceeds of deposits in turn are re-lent at the high nominal interest rates commensurate with the prevailing rate of inflation. Differentials between deposit and lending rates leave ample room for the costs associated with an expansion of the banking system. The common observation, then, is that during inflation bank branches and bank employment mushroom.

When stabilization occurs inflation disappears and so does the absolute size of the deposit-loan rate spread. There is then an extraordinary profit squeeze which forces banks to close down branches and cut employment in a violent fashion. The effect is totally predictable and it is very serious not only from point of view of labor relations but even more importantly from the perspective of financial stability. A successful monetary reform must take into account the fact that the financial industry is dramatically hurt by the end of inflation. Without mergers, employment cuts and a shift to fee for service banking, the banking system is likely to collapse in the immediate aftermath of the stabilization.¹¹

We turn next to an analysis of the country experiences.

¹¹There is a difference in the required adjustments depending on the presence or absence of fees. In a system without fees the banking system needs to achieve larger reductions in costs and hence in employment than under a fee-based banking service.

4. ARGENTINA: THE AUSTRAL PLAN

Argentina's extraordinary macroeconomic history reflects an interplay of adverse shocks, domestic and external, economic and political. But the basic difficulties are two: the unions are inside the country and the money is outside; the unions are British and public finance is Italian.

In June 1985 Argentina implemented the Austral Plan, the first of the new stabilization programs to combine incomes policy with fiscal austerity. In Figure 1 the recent inflation history of Argentina is shown as the quarterly average of the monthly rate of inflation of consumer prices. Prior to stabilization inflation had been increasing over the past five years from less than 100 percent toward the end of the destructive stabilization attempt under Martinez de Hoz to nearly 1000 percent and sharply rising in the spring of 1985. In May 1985 the inflation rate, at an annual rate, exceeded 2500 percent!

History: Table 2 gives details on the inflation rate, real wages and the real exchange rate, industrial production and the budget deficit.

Figure 1
INFLATION IN ARGENTINA
(Percent per Month)




Table 2 Argentina: Key Macroeconomic Indicators

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985:I
Inflation (% per year)	105	165	343	627	918
Budget Deficit (% of GNP)**			12	11	12.5
Real Wage*	87	80	100	120	134
Real Exchange Rate*	151	108	100	112	107
Industrial Production*	94	91	100	103	97

Note: * All indices 1983=100. **Consolidated cash deficit of the public sector, including operations of the Central Bank.

Source: Carta Economica and Coyuntura Economica and Morgan Guaranty

There is no natural beginning to the recent inflation bout. The last large inflation had occurred toward the end of the Peronist administration in mid-1975. At its peak that inflation reached 35 to 40 percent per month.¹² In the period 1976 to 1981 the military government achieved a reduction of inflation to an annual rate of less than 100 percent, but that reduction was bought at the price of a huge overvaluation of the exchange rate which ultimately precipitated massive capital flight and accumulation of external debt.¹³ Successors to finance minister Martinez de Hoz failed to contain inflation at around 100 percent, being handicapped by the preceding debt accumulation, the Malvinas war and the accompanying credit rationing in world markets as well as a terms of trade deterioration.

¹²See DiTella (1983), de Pablo (1980) and Arnaudo (1979) on the Peronist inflation and the failed attempt to stabilize it with controls.

¹³On the Martinez de Hoz debacle see Corbo and de Mello (1985), Diaz-Alejandro (1981), Dornbusch (1982, 1986a, 1986c) and Fernandez and Rodriguez (1982).

A notable event in the inflation history was the deliberate attempt to eliminate the real value of internal debts, public and private, in June-July 1982 by the Dagnino Pastore-Cavallo team. For the remainder of the military government, until fall 1983, a holding action contained inflation below 40 percent while achieving some recovery of economic activity. Budget performance throughout was very poor, a large part of the deficit representing losses on exchange rate guarantees granted by the Central Bank in the aftermath of the Martinez de Hoz overvaluation.

Stabilization: The Alfonsin government came into power in January 1984. Initially the government attempted to cope with the problem of inflation by gradualist policies under repeated IMF programs. But not much was achieved, in great part because large real wage increases caused cost and budget performance to deteriorate, forcing repeated major devaluations. The steady worsening of inflation, even in the face of half-hearted attempts at gradualist stabilization, ultimately forced the government to explore a different direction.

The shift in policies, in spring 1985, was triggered by two facts. The first was that the economy was well on the way to hyperinflation. At monthly rates the inflation had risen from only 18 percent at the time of election to the 25-30 percent range. The second was that the government faced elections in fall 1985 and hence could afford neither a German-style hyperinflation nor an IMF-style depression at that time.

Perhaps because the German hyperinflation possibility was so actively on the minds of the economic team, the idea of monetary reform as

a comprehensive framework for stabilization moved to the center. Because the team had a basically structuralist persuasion, an incomes policy was thought an indispensable part of the stabilization.¹⁴ At the same time the economic team had become distinctly more orthodox since the replacement of economics minister Grinspun by Juan Sourouille, recognizing that any attempt at stabilization without budget consolidation and correction of relative prices would inevitably fail.

The loss of confidence in gradualist policy, and an unwillingness to accept IMF austerity per se, led to the conception of the Austral Plan of June 1985. The plan struck a balance between the fundamentals--monetary and fiscal austerity--and pragmatism (or good theory) residing in the adoption of wage-price-exchange rate controls as the central feature of the disinflation program. The key features of the plan were the following:¹⁵

(a) Upon adopting of the program, the government increased public sector prices, depreciated the exchange rate, imposed import duties and export tariffs. These measures were designed to improve the budget and to align key relative prices prior to the freeze.

(b) A wage-price freeze and a fixed exchange rate on the U.S. dollar until further notice. The wage freeze involved a sharp cut in the real wage since there was to be no catch-up provision for the increases in public sector prices and in the exchange rate.

¹⁴There are many precedents for the use of an incomes policy in Argentine stabilization. One of them occurred in the context of the Peronist inflation of the 1970s, another one as recently as 1982 under Alemann.

¹⁵The most comprehensive treatment of the Austral Plan may be found in Heymann (1986). See, too, the collection of essays in diTella and Dornbusch (1986).

(c) A time table (tablita) was announced to adjust outstanding contracts for the immediate and unanticipated end of inflation.

(d) A new monetary unit was introduced--the Austral. The old money was allowed to continue in use and circulate at par.

(e) The program was accepted by the IMF and served as a basis of debt rescheduling with new money financing a significant part of arrears and current debt service.¹⁶

One Year Later: Where has the Austral Plan taken the Argentine economy over the past year? Table 3 shows the quarterly and most recent data.

Table 3 One Year of the Austral Plan

	1985:I	1985:II	1986:I	1986:June
Inflation (% per month)				
CPI	26.2	2.5*	3.8	4.5
WPI	28.5	0.8*	2.1	4.6
Nominal Interest Rate (% per month)	27.7	6.9	6.0	5.7
Money Growth (% per month)				
M1	23.4	8.5*	4.5	5.4
M4	24.3	7.9*	6.4	6.4
Budget Deficit (% of GDP)**	12.5	4.1	4.1	
Real Wage	134	95	97	98
Real Exchange Rate	107	93	88	87*
Industrial Production	97	99	111	121

Note: All indices 1983=100, *August-December, **including losses of the central bank. The interest rate is the active money market rate.*May
Sources: Carta Economica and Morgan Guaranty

¹⁶Paul Volcker is said to have played a significant role in achieving IMF and bank acceptance of the plan. He subsequently visited Argentina in the fall of 1985.

The first point to note is that inflation has been cut dramatically, but that it has not disappeared. On the contrary, by mid-1986 it was already at the rate of more than 100 percent per year and rising.¹⁷ The second point is that economic activity, as measured by industrial production has picked up sharply and is back to the previous peak levels of 1979-80, before the Martinez de Hoz experiment crashed. The Austral plan thus has two faces. While it has been less than total success at inflation eradication, it has achieved its results under conditions of sharp recovery. There is no comparable experience under an IMF program. In our judgment, the Argentine experience makes quite forcefully the case for programs that combine fiscal consolidation with an incomes policy. We return to the insufficient use of fiscal restraint below.

A year certainly is not enough to judge the full course of the program, but it is far beyond an initial phase. Even if the program at present has all the appearances of melting, it is not generally expected that it will collapse outright or that anything like the previous inflation experience is likely. On the contrary, the black market premium continues to be moderate. For the pessimist, the Austral Plan thus has at least given Argentina a temporary respite from a 2000 plus percent inflation. For the optimist, it has given a breathing spell to consolidate public finances and restore conditions of growth under moderate (if high by the standards of industrial countries) inflation. Whether moderate inflation is sustainable is, of course, an open question.

¹⁷In July 1986 the inflation rate was already 6.8 percent per month.

It is obvious what went right. There was a significant correction in the budget. Part of this correction took the form of a reduced domestic currency cost of debt service, while much of the correction came from a sharp increase in the real value of tax collection. This increase reflects the end to the inflationary erosion of revenues and the introduction of new taxes and a scheme of forced saving.

Even with these corrections the deficit remains, however, very large. In fact, there is some question about various government contingent liabilities which do not find a place in the flow measure of the deficit, but which do represent a potentially very serious threat to fiscal stability. At the same time there remain several points of concern with respect to taxation. For those few sectors or households that actually pay taxes, rates are probably too high. At the same time some taxes, for example export retentions on agricultural products, are directly distortionary and have as their only rationale the ease of collection. Thus although some fiscal consolidation is taking place, public finance remains a disaster area.

Until April 1986 the government maintained a fixed exchange rate on the U.S. dollar. Since then a policy of mini-devaluations has been followed to avoid a deterioration of external competitiveness. The ability to hold the real exchange rate relatively constant despite domestic inflation is explained by the large depreciation of the U.S. dollar in the world currency markets. A fixed peg of the Austral to the depreciating dollar meant that there was an automatic partial offset against the real appreciation caused by domestic wage and price inflation.

The dollar depreciation thus helped carry the fixed exchange rate policy for a few months.

The government at no time committed itself to a zero inflation target. Here is an important difference with Brazil. In Argentina the government promised fiscal stabilization and no budget based money creation, while in Brazil the promise was for "inflacao zero". The Argentine government was wise not to make a zero inflation commitment. The economy is basically closed and there is little competition so that oligopolistic firms and extraordinarily aggressive unions interact in sectoral games of raising their relative income shares. Because of the political force of the unions the government cannot avoid sanctioning most of the wage increases and, for employment reasons, most of price increases as well. The Argentine program, after instantly shifting to zero inflation for a brief moment, moved immediately into a second phase of administered inflation. An economy run with significantly more slack would perhaps have avoided the inflationary pressure but that might have made for much worse politics.

There is an interesting question as to where the expansion came from. One might perhaps most obviously point to the large and sustained rates of money growth, but several factors point in the opposite direction. A contraction rather than expansion should have occurred when one looks at the deficit which declined, real wages which fell and real interest rates which were extraordinarily high--70 or 80 percent per year on an inflation-adjusted basis in the second half of 1985. Among the plausible explanations for the expansion, the first is the restoration of

credit. In the period of intense inflation credit was unavailable for consumers and hence consumer durable sales slumped. With the end of extreme inflation consumer credit reappeared, though at extraordinary real rates, and that helped promote demand and production.

The second explanation relates to real wages. The depreciation and public sector price increases on the eve of the reform reduced real wages. At the same time, however, the purchasing power of incomes may have been to some extent increased by the fact that inflation came to a halt. When inflation slows, the part of income not spent toward the beginning of the month more nearly preserves its purchasing power. Thus, the halt in inflation is equivalent to a shift in real income toward labor which in turn has a high spending propensity.¹⁸

The third explanation concerns the budget. During the high inflation the deficit was financed by an inflation tax. The fiscal correction has shifted the correction from money holders to those who pay outright taxes (agriculture and large firms, for example). This redistribution, once again may have been a source of increased purchasing power for groups that have high spending propensities. But even with these factors in mind the expansion in demand and output may not be fully explained.

¹⁸An estimate by Carta Economica (July 1986) of the purchasing power of wages reports that the average level in the second half of 1985 was five percent below the first semester and that by June 1986 the purchasing power already exceeded the level of mid-1986. The difference between these estimates and the real wage data in Table 3 highlight the important, and relatively uninvestigated issue, of finding good economic measures of incomes during extreme inflation.

What Next? At the present stage of the stabilization program two major issues emerge quite clearly. The first is whether the government can achieve further budget correction and thus provide assurance that inflation can remain moderate. Nobody expects zero inflation, but the active issue is whether inflation can be kept near 100 percent. Of course, there is the question of whether triple digit inflation can be stable. But that is more a question of the shocks than of the current problems of fiscal consolidation.

The second problem is the poor growth performance viewed in a trend perspective. Per capita output today is more than 10 percent lower than it was fifteen years ago, and what is worse, the decline in per capita output is bound to accelerate. Net investment has been zero or negative for several years in a row and there is no prospect of a change. These facts bring out the link between stabilization and growth. Stabilization and recovery involve primarily the demand side. But at some stage in the recovery considerations of growth and the supply side must enter.

The budget correction is not only essential to contain excess demand and inflationary pressure, but also to promote investment. The link between the budget and investment occurs through two channels. The first is through credibility effects. If the private sector anticipates deficits and hence worsening of inflation, they will expect that the government will use tight money to make up for the lack of fiscal consolidation. Tight money presents the firm with the risk of being caught in an

investment with a high cost of debt service and with no customers. Hence firms are reluctant to invest, using price increases and overtime to respond to demand rather than durable expansion in capacity and employment.

The other link between the budget and investment comes from the side of resource constraints. In a fully employed economy, as Argentina is today, resources for investment can only come from reduced consumption, from reduced government spending or from increased net imports. To cut government spending is the poujadist-popular option, but it has proved politically impossible at least in the short term. Reduced consumption can, indeed, be achieved by a fiscal tightening. This is the correct option in a country where only 4 percent of total tax collection comes from income taxes. Finally resources can come from abroad. That would pose the problem of increased external borrowing, perhaps in the form of forced lending by the creditor banks or reduced spreads. It also brings the need for liberalizing restrictions on imports so that potential investors actually have access to foreign goods. Increased foreign borrowing should certainly be part of an investment campaign in that it bridges the short-run political problems and provides a disinflationary impact.

It is doubtful that the investment and growth problem can be solved by the budget alone. The budget at best can help provide a favorable background for other forces to promote investment. The most favorable sign at this time is the perspective of an Argentina-Brazil common market. Such a development would throw weight to the productive forces of the economy and might well be the decisive event to bring back

growth. With a return of growth public finance problems and distributive quarrels might well retreat to the background.

5. BRAZIL: THE CRUZADO PLAN


On February 28, 1986, President Sarney announced a major monetary reform, the Cruzado Plan. Twenty-two years after the Bulhoes-Campos stabilization of 1964-67 Brazil had once again come to face the political and economic difficulties of inflation largely running out of control. A highly interventionist and technically sophisticated program of stabilization was once again used to stop inflation without tears. We first review the background to the inflation acceleration and then proceed to an analysis of the plan and its current performance.

The Bulhoes-Campos Reforms: In the late fifties and early sixties annual inflation rates escalated from 17 percent per year in 1958 to 92 percent in 1964, first as a consequence of the Kubitschek expansionary policies, then as a result of the populist engagements of the Goulart administration. Between 1964 and 1967, the Bulhoes-Campos reforms, backed by military President Castello Branco, successfully brought down the inflation rate to 24 percent a year and restored both external equilibrium and Brazil's access to foreign credit markets. The side-effects on output were not only tolerable but short-lived, since the 5 percent industrial recession of 1965 was followed by a 9 percent industrial recovery already in 1966. Moreover, the road was paved for a seven-year period of high growth and declining inflation.

The reforms were a skillful mix of a budget deficit cut, incomes policies, exchange rate devaluation and capital markets indexation. By cutting government consumption and subsidies and by raising taxes, the public sector deficit was reduced from 4% to 1% of GDP. Exchange rate devaluations replaced the commercial arrears of early 1964 with a comfortable reserve position in 1965 and 1966. Indexed capital market instruments encouraged private savings and restored the mortgage market, virtually killed in the early sixties by the 12% a year usury ceiling on nominal interest rates. Tax indexation, besides stimulating private savings by no longer taxing inflation adjustments, was also helpful in reducing tax evasion (in 1963, when the inflation rate was running at 80% a year, the penalty on tax arrears was no more than 32% a year).

The incomes policy part of the plan, which played a major role in fighting inflation, and which became one of the sources of inspiration of the cruzado plan, actually meant wage deindexation. The central idea, described in Figure 2, was that in a staggered wage setting two concepts must be distinguished, the real wage peak W_0 and the real wage average W_m . Under this policy, the peak corresponds to the worker's purchasing power immediately after each nominal salary increase, but should not serve as a reference value, since it is quickly eroded by inflation. The average real wage is actually what the economy can afford to pay the labor force and what should be maintained by income policies, except for productivity adjustments. Since the average/peak ratio is a decreasing function of the inflation rate, peaks should be properly lowered whenever the inflation rate is expected to decline. This means that, with decreasing inflation

Figure 2
Real Wages and Inflation




rates, nominal wages should be adjusted less than proportionally to past cost of living increases.

From a technical standpoint the Bulhoes-Campos wage formula provided a setting for economy-wide expectations formation. It became an income policy tool because the wage adjustment interval was fixed at twelve months and because both the productivity adjustment and the expected rate of inflation were decreed by the government, leaving no room for collective bargaining.

Except for market adjustments in individual wage negotiations (which were never prohibited by the government), the Bulhoes-Campos wage rule would actually squeeze the real wages whenever future inflation rates were underestimated by the government. The problem was felt in 1965, 1966, and 1967, when the cost of living increased 45.5, 41.2 and 24.1 percent, respectively, compared to prospective inflation rates of 25, 10, and 15%. The outcome, a 24.8% real wage decline in manufacturing industry between 1964 and 1968, may be partly explained by the weakened position of the labor unions under the military regime.

A more consistent view, however, is that a substantial decline in real wages was inevitable, given the policy objectives of increasing indirect taxes, real rents and real public utility rates, cutting subsidies, and promoting a strong exchange rate devaluation. It could be the result of prolonged stagflation, it could be achieved by higher inflation rates, but still it was inevitable. The Bulhoes-Campos wage formula helped to reconcile this inevitable real wage cut with declining inflation rates and low output losses.

Figure 3
Real Wage Adjustments



Widespread Indexation: Imaginative as they might have been, the Bulhoes-Campos reforms involved a major asymmetry that could not last for long. Most incomes and financial assets were indexed, but not wages and the exchange rate. The almost inevitable extension came on stage in 1968. In the case of the exchange rate, a crawling-peg adjusted the dollar/cruzeiro rate at small and irregular time intervals according to a basic guideline consisting of the inflation rate differential between Brazil and the United States. In the case of wages a complicated formula was enacted to offset the effects of unanticipated inflation in the Bulhoes-Campos wage rule. In practice it meant that nominal wages were to be adjusted every twelve months in proportion to the cumulative increase in the cost of living plus a productivity gain. This indexation rule was backward-looking one which instead of stabilizing the average purchasing power W_m , simply restored every twelve months the real wage peak W_0 adjusted for productivity increases, as in Figure 3.

Since the average/peak ratio is a decreasing function of the inflation rate, the new wage rule implied that inflation could only decline so long as average real wages grew faster than the officially determined productivity gain. Moreover, since the law determined a floor rather than a ceiling to changes in labor compensation, it introduced an asymmetry between inflation acceleration and inflation deceleration. In fact, markets were free to increase the real wage peak W_0 , but not to reduce it, except through labor turnover, the only way to escape the law. Yet this was a costly device in the case of skilled labor and largely

ineffective in the case of non-skilled workers, since the latter were protected by minimum wage levels adjusted by the same indexation rule.

In short, backward looking wage indexation introduced highly adverse short-run inflation-output trade-offs, discouraging quick anti-inflationary policies and favoring monetary accommodation. The problem was not perceived until 1973, since during the golden years of the Brazilian miracle real wages could rise much faster than the officially determined productivity increases with annual inflation rates gradually falling from 25% in 1967 to 16% in 1973. Yet the expansionary monetary policies of 1972 and 1973 combined with the first oil shock to lift the annual inflation rate to 35% in 1974. Tight monetary policies were then tried, but it was soon perceived that indexation had anchored the wage-price spiral. Eventually monetary accommodation was accepted, annual inflation rates being kept in the 35-40% a year range until 1978.

Escalation: Two imprudent policy steps in late 1979 were to lead to further exalation of inflation rates. First, the government decided to control interest rates, accepting high increases in the money supply. Then a new wage law, besides introducing a number of complications, reduced the nominal wage adjustment interval from twelve to six months. As theory could predict, what was previously the annual rate of inflation became the six month inflation rate. Tight monetary policies implemented in 1981 and 1982 had to face the adverse trade-offs created by backward-looking indexation. The country experienced its first major industrial recession since 1965, but inflation rates only declined from 110% in 1980 to 95% in 1981 and 100% in 1982.

A dramatic balance of payments adjustment in response to the debt shock was imposed in 1983. Key policy changes were a 30% real exchange rate devaluation and, following IMF advice, substantial indirect tax increases and subsidy cuts. This, of course, implied a significant real wage cut that, under the prevailing indexation rules, could only be achieved by an acceleration of the inflation rate so as to squeeze the average/peak ratio to the proper level. In fact, inflation leaped to 210% a year, tight monetary policies producing only an unprecedented recession. Figure 4 shows the course of inflation acceleration. Eventually, in mid 1984, the government decided to turn once again to monetary accommodation.

Table 4 Brazil: Key Macroeconomic Indicators

	1982	1983	1984	1985
Inflation	95	155	221	226
Budget Deficit (% of GDP)				
Actual		19.9	21.8	26.2
Operational		3.0	1.6	3.2
GDP Growth	0.9	-3.2	4.5	8.3


Source: Banco Central do Brasil Brazil External Program, May 1986

In March 1985, the passage of power to a civilian president opened the way to increased wage demands by labor unions. The government first tried to reconcile substantial increases in real wages with reduced inflation rates by tightening price controls and by increasing the real interest rate on Treasury bills to 21% a year. In August, Dilson Funaro

45a

Figure 4

INFLATION IN BRAZIL
(Percent per month)



replaced Francisco Dornelles as Minister of Finance. Some price controls were lifted, interest rates were substantially lowered and real wages continued to increase at unprecedented rates. As a result, by the end of 1985 and in January and February 1986, the inflation rate escalated to almost 15% a month. President Sarney, under the risk of losing all political support, decided to react with a bold announcement, the "heterodox shock".¹⁹

The Cruzado Plan: The Cruzado Plan was intended to stop inflation by a standstill on all indexation. The key measures were the following:

a) Prices were frozen and the exchange rate was fixed at 13.80 Cz/\$US. The public was enlisted to defend vigorously the controls and the government committed to a zero inflation target.

b) Wages were converted into cruzados by computing their average purchasing power in the last six months with an increase of 8% in general, and with a 15% bonus in the case of the minimum wage; a trigger point indexation clause was introduced with a threshold of 20%;

c) The same rule, except for the 8 percent increase, was extended to rents and mortgage payments;

d) Cruzeiro bills and demand deposits were immediately converted into cruzados, without write-offs, by a cut of three zeros. Conversion rates for cruzeiro denominated liabilities with future maturities were set to decline by a daily factor, starting February 28th, of 1.0045 until maturity.²⁰ This conversion rule did not apply to indexed liabilities.

¹⁹The expression "heterodox shock" which now is commonly used to describe the Brazilian experience is due to Lopes (1986).

²⁰As an example, a promissory note of 1 million cruzeiros maturing April 30th 1986 is worth 770.73 cruzados, not 1000 cruzados.

The immediate success of the program was overwhelming. Consumers could compare supermarket prices with the listed official maximum prices and denounce violators to the police, according them the feeling that their voices could be heard. The fact that nominal wages were cut in some cases and adjusted substantially below past inflation in all cases did not cool off the popular support for the program. A demonstration prepared by leftist groups against the new wage policy was not able to draw more than two hundred people.

Table 5 Brazil: Macroeconomics Under the Cruzado Plan

	1985:I	1985:II	1986:I	1986:June
Inflation (% per month)*	10.1	11.9	0.5	0.6
Industrial Production	110	128	120	

*Cost of Living in Rio de Janeiro **Fiesp Index 1982=100, 1986 data refer to Jan.-March only.

Source: Conjuntura

Similarities between the Austral and the Cruzado Plan are evident. Some important differences, however, result from the fact that Brazil decided to stop inflation long before it reached the Argentine rates of early 1985. In Argentina there was no synchronization problem as far as wages were concerned, since inflation had come to the point of leading to monthly wage adjustments. In Brazil the synchronization problem did exist, since nominal wages were kept unchanged from three to six months. The solution, largely inspired on the Bulhoes-Campos reforms, was to convert wages into cruzados by their average purchasing power in the last

six months. Yet, since the Cruzado Plan had to be dressed in a fashion that would never recall a military uniform, three softeners were introduced: the 8% real wage bonus, the 15% real minimum wage increase and the "scala mobile" with a 20% threshold. Whether there was room for such real wage gains is a questionable issue.

Second, although the Plan tried to solve the problem of wage synchronization, it did nothing to meet the staggered-price setting issues. Prices were frozen at their level of February 27th, when the relative price structure had no reason to be close to equilibrium. Some sectoral prices, including milk, automobiles, pharmaceutical products and electric power were clearly frozen below their equilibrium point. Hence, the success of the Cruzado Plan was contingent on a short-term replacement of price freezes by price administration.

A trump card for the Brazilian authorities was that the Cruzado Plan was implemented under highly favorable external conditions. In 1984 and 1985 Brazil had already scored trade surpluses in the range of 12.5 to 13.0 billion dollars a year, bringing its external current account to equilibrium in spite of the huge interest payments on the foreign debt. The Cruzado Plan was implemented when the decline in oil prices, the decline in international interest rates and the depreciation of the dollar implied a five billion dollar annual improvement in the Brazilian external accounts. From this point of view, the Cruzado was far more strongly backed than the Austral.

As opposed to the Austral Plan, the Cruzado was announced as a pure incomes policy, since it was believed that fiscal adjustment had

already been promoted in late 1985 and that the Brazilian inflation of January and February 1986 was purely inertial. The budget, the Brazilian authorities might have claimed in early March, was already in equilibrium, or showing at most a very small deficit, not exceeding 0.5% of GDP.

Until late May the Cruzado honeymoon was incredibly happy- too happy to be sustainable, as the authorities should have suspected. Inflation not only immediately stopped with no recession, but retail sales expanded by 25% in real terms, real estate prices doubled and stock prices experienced an unprecedented boom. In the wave of optimism Brazil was described by the Minister of Finance as a country with Swiss inflation and twice Japanese growth, and the President decided that the price freeze that brought him so much popularity should be kept until the memory of inflation was definitely erased. As for the business community, its few concerns with low profit margins and with the political management of the price system were largely superseded by the euphoria arising from higher sales.

That this was a situation ripe for demand inflation to take off was the lesson ignored by Brazilian policy makers. They did not even react to some disquieting signals, such as the steep price increases of commodity futures and the rapid growth of the black market exchange rate premium. Plainly, demand was overheated, both because of the real wage increases and because the public sector deficit actually remained at 4.7% of GDP. Shortages, black markets and lessened quality were visible as of early June. In late July and early August the government announced a small scale fiscal package, and decided to liberalize a few imports and to

increase interest rates. Whether this will be enough to bring supply and demand to equilibrium is questionable. A more complicated problem is that, in order to sustain the historical growth trend, Brazil must raise its domestic savings rate from 15% to 20% of GDP, and up to now little has been done to encourage savings.

The Outlook: Whether the cruzado will become a success story or one more frustrated attempt to fight inflation by its symptoms is still an open question. A lasting success is contingent on three major steps.

First, a true fiscal reform is actually needed. The present budget deficit of 4.7% of GDP is obviously too high compared to private savings and to the country's capacity to attract foreign capital. Moreover, the expenditure side contains too little investment and too much consumption, subsidies and transfers. Government savings, namely revenues minus current expenditures, varied from 2% to 4% of GDP in the seventies. Recent estimates indicate that the government is now dissaving 0.6% of GDP.

Second, the price freeze is unsustainable. The success of the Cruzado plan depends on replacing the freeze with price administration. The official idea is that the freeze should be maintained until inflationary expectations are definitely abated is self-defeating, since shortages and black markets can only reignite expectations of price increases.

Third, the plan will only keep its credibility if a low inflation target replaces the zero inflation promise. Accordingly, some indexation mechanisms need to be reintroduced to encourage savings and to

develop long term credit markets. To prevent the emergence of indexed quasi-money, as occurred in the early eighties, indexation intervals must be fairly large (say, one year). Yet they should realistically recognize that no magic can erase the memory of inflation in a country that since the early thirties has never experienced a prolonged period of price stability.

6. THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE

On July 1, 1985 the Israeli government adopted an emergency program of stabilization. Already in force for more than a year, the program continues to show a good inflation performance.²¹ We start with a review of the background to the stabilizattion, then consider the stabilization, the experience since, and the current policy issues in Israel.

Background: The background to the Israeli stabilization of 1985 is given in Table 6. The 1960s had been a period of extraordinary growth and very low inflation. Population growth had been high, in part as a result of substantial immigration. Against this success the decade of the 1970s represents a sharp drop-off and the 1980s a dramatic deterioration. The increase in inflation, of course, was an issue but the more serious point was the slowdown in growth and the sharp change in the growth rate of population.

²¹The program is most comprehensively discussed in Bruno (1986). See, too, Fischer (1985a,b, 1986) and Dornbusch and Fischer (1986).

Table 6 Israel: Basic Indicators
(Average Annual Percentage Rates)

	1960-70	1970-80	1980-84
Inflation	6.4	41	178
Real Growth	9.7	5.2	2.0
Population Growth	3.4	2.7	1.4

Source: IMF International Financial Statistics

Where before the economy provided opportunities through sustained growth, it now had become bogged down and offered little prospect of a return to the performance of the 1960s. Where immigration had once been substantial, now emigration was becoming an issue. Of course, facing the prospect of a high birthrate among the Arab population along with a reduced birthrate and a pattern of net emigration among the Jewish population held out extremely difficult prospects for political life in Israel. The focus on a resumption of high and sustained growth therefore became the number one priority. But inflation and a lack of consensus on priorities kept the economy away from a reasonable performance. Above all there was an unwillingness to risk a stabilization that might lead to high unemployment and, of course, no disposition to consider drastic budget cuts.

At one level there is certainly neither a puzzle nor a lack of understanding regarding the basic reason for the Israeli inflation. The central place of the budget deficit and of indexation of financial assets and of wages was well-recognized. Table 7 shows the data for the budget.

Table 7 Budget Deficit and Financing
(Period Averages, Percent of GNP)

	1960-67	1968-80	1981-84	1984
Expenditure:				
Domestic	29.1	50.3	61.5	62.9
Foreign ^a	1.9	4.5	-1.2	-4.0
Taxes:	29.1	39.3	46.4	46.0
Deficit Financing^b :	1.9	15.5	13.8	12.9
Base Money	2.4	2.7	2.4	3.2
Domestic Debt	-1.9	5.6	6.4	3.9
Foreign Debt	1.5	6.9	5.1	5.8
Memo:				
Defense Spending	10.6	25.4	23.9	24.0

^aNet foreign expenditure taking into account unilateral transfers.

^bDeficit financing as measured here corresponds roughly to the inflation-adjusted or operational deficit.

Source: Fischer (1985a)

There is an extraordinary shift in the deficit between the 60s and the 70s. Sharply increased defense spending accounts for much of the increase in spending and in the deficit, but there are other factors, too. The most striking fact, of course, is the huge size of the inflation-adjusted deficit which averaged nearly 15 percent of GNP throughout the 1970s. Particularly noteworthy is the very large share of taxes in GNP. The ratio in Israel of 46 percent compares with the average of only 35 percent in the major industrialized countries.

Perhaps the most striking fact is that the total budget deficit in the last few years, and specifically in 1984 was not higher than in the last fifteen years. Monetary policy was outright passive: money creation was geared to financing the deficit. The deficit to be financed by base


creation, however, did increase by 0.8 percentage points to 3.2 percent of GNP. But this in itself might not appear to be a large change nor would it seem to be an absolutely large rate of money creation. The Israeli experience therefore calls for an explanation of why inflation should respond so sharply to seemingly small changes in the pattern of deficit finance. The transition toward really high inflation might not have been solely or primarily due to the shift in financing toward money. Other factors, including the reduced growth in demand for the monetary base and exchange rate policy also played a role.

Figure 5 shows the rate of inflation (quarterly averages of the monthly rate) for the period 1973-85, up to the time of the monetary reform. In these data it is apparent that inflation gradually increased from the level of about 50 percent to somewhat above 100 percent in the early 1980s. The dramatic escalation only occurs in 1984-85 and thus cannot be explained by a sudden budget shift. To explain the actual path of inflation, and specifically the explosion in 1984-85, exchange rate policy, the interaction between growth and inflation and adjustments in the financial sector must be taken into account.

Macroeconomic experiments of different kinds were attempted in the early 1980s, ranging from Chilean style overvaluation to a last-minute plan of adopting the US dollar as the national currency.²² In 1981-83, under finance minister Aridor, the exchange rate was allowed to become

²²The options proposed in June 1983 to then finance minister Aridor are reported in Plessner (1986). It is interesting to note that the document recognizes all the issues of the later monetary reform and many of the details.

Figure 5
INFLATION IN ISRAEL
(Percent per Month)



substantially overvalued. The real appreciation in 1981-83 reached more than 25 percent. The overvaluation policy contained the inflation rate in a 100-130 percent range because it provided gains in real wages at reduced rates of wage and hence price inflation. But, of course, the overvaluation meant that growth slowed down and that a balance of payments crisis was inevitably building.

The overvaluation and expectation of an ultimate depreciation accelerated the substitution toward interest bearing assets, thus reducing the base for the government's inflation tax. At the same time the reduced growth rate of real income cut back the growth rate of the demand for the real monetary base. With unchanged rates of expansion of the base (measured as a fraction of GNP) as in Table 7 the imbalance translated into sharply increased inflation. The shift toward an increased participation of money finance in the total deficit strongly reinforced this point.²³

The combination of reduced growth of the real demand for the monetary base because of lower income growth, institutional change in the form of a shift toward non-monetary assets, an increased share of money finance and the corrective depreciation at the end of 1983 together created a major inflation shock. Because of wage indexation in three month and later even single month intervals there were few lags in the system so

²³Melnick and Sokoler (1984) show that a reduction in output growth, and hence in the growth of demand for highpowered money has an important effect on inflation. Fischer(1982) shows cross country evidence on the ratio of highpowered money increases to GNP. By the standards of his sample the change from 1981-83 to 1984 is certainly very significant.

that wages and prices rapidly adjusted to these disturbances. Essentially the system was without any anchor or friction other than what the government could negotiate with labor or pay for via overvaluation and subsidies. Moreover, this lack of an anchor was recognized by the public and helped speed up everybody's adjustment of wages, prices and portfolios.

The Eve of the Stabilization: The last stages of the pre-stabilization period can be seen in Figure 5 which shows monthly rates of inflation. The overvaluation period came to an end in October 1983 with a large exchange rate depreciation. Discussion of stabilization had started in 1983 under Aridor and by 1984 had become wide-spread. The July elections failed to give either party a majority and as a result led to a National Unity Government which took until September to form.

Over the next six months two wage packages were in effect. Their success is clearly shown by the very low rate of inflation in December 1984 and January 1985. But equally recognizable are the adjustments in-between packages that led to sharp increases in the inflation rate. There had also already been a significant budget cut, but even so by mid-1985, it had become clear that a much more comprehensive and far-reaching program was required to stop inflation. The program was made more urgent by persistent losses of foreign exchange reserves.²⁴

²⁴These foreign exchange losses came primarily from capital outflows. The current account had already improved as a result of the preceding depreciation.

The Stabilization Program of July 1985: In June 1985 a commission was appointed to develop a stabilization plan and in July the program was announced and implemented by emergency decree. The main features of the program were the following:²⁵

(a) A proposed cut in the budget equal to 7.5 percent of GNP (\$US 1.5 billion)

(b) A 20 percent devaluation of the shekel and establishment of a fixed exchange rate relative to the dollar. The measure was accompanied by reductions in import duties and export subsidies.

(c) Freezing of all wages and prices.²⁶

(d) Exchange rate linked deposits were maintained (without capital levy), but their liquidity was reduced by requiring a one year minimum maturity for new deposits.

(e) A time horizon of one year, with a gradual phase-out of controls over the period.

(f) A U.S. supplementary aid allocation of \$U.S. 1.5 billion .
Two important issues in this program were the ability to secure labor's agreement on the wage freeze and to achieve the proposed budget cuts.

Agreements with the labor union (the Histadrut) are a common feature of Israeli macroeconomics. The labor unions, which own 25 percent of industry, have on various occasions collaborated by foregoing cost of living increases. In this instance, too, they helped out. Although

²⁵For a detailed discussion of the measures see Bruno (1986).

²⁶Difficulties would arise from an agreement for deferred wage increases.

ostensibly protesting the use of emergency decrees they accepted after a month a wage package that introduced an initial increase in compensation in return for giving up the cost of living adjustment and prefixed increases at several points over the subsequent six months. The net effect of the wage agreement was to lock in for some time a cut in real wages. The reintroduction of cost of living adjustments would be subject to a 4 percent threshold.

The most difficult part of the stabilization was clearly the commitment to cut the budget. It always seemed impossible to cut the budget. Every single item seemed beyond the government's ability to cut and, clearly, the idea of even higher taxes was quite impossible. In this atmosphere there was wide-spread doubt that a 7.5 percent of GNP cut in the deficit could be possible. The only places that seemed to offer themselves for cuts were the vast subsidies on exports and on virtually everything else. But, of course, further subsidy cuts would mean cuts in real wages or cuts in export profitability. Further real wage cuts over and above those implied by the devaluation were difficult to conceive. The alternative, reductions in export subsidies at constant exchange rates, seemed unwise since they would involve a loss in competitiveness and a weakening of the external balance which supported the exchange rate policy. Cuts in subsidies on basic food and on transport made most sense in terms of the supply side, but they might also be the most difficult to bring about politically.

The government's ability to cut the budget therefore was clearly the central issue. Because of the doubt about effective budget cuts there

was skepticism regarding the sustainability of the entire program. This was particularly the case among some of the economists of Tel Aviv University, who were outside the program committee and therefore could afford to indulge their skepticism in a most vocal fashion.

The State of the Program in 1986: In August 1986, 13 months after the inception of the program, all seems well, at least within limits! To the surprise of the skeptics and the delight of the authors of the program the success has been quite manifest. Inflation has been very low, the budget has in fact been cut, the real wage and the real exchange rate have not gotten vastly out of line. The real wage is now approximately back to its pre-stabilization level.

Success on the budget is no doubt the most striking achievement: Where during the calendar year of 1984 the deficit was 15 percent of GNP it declined to an annual average of 12 percent in the January-June pre-stabilization period. For the July-December period, following stabilization, it amounted to only 4 percent of GNP. The budget improvement was achieved by cuts in basic food subsidies and transport subsidies, by an increase in the real value of tax collection and by special property taxes.

Table 8 shows some of the macroeconomic data to judge the progress of the plan. First note the sharp deceleration of inflation: in the seven months after the program was initiated, cumulative inflation was less than in the single month of June 1985. Moreover the inflation remained comfortably low even after seven months. In March the inflation rate

continued low at 1.5 percent, but in April a level of 3 percent was anticipated, reflecting in part seasonal factors. There is no issue of shortages and certainly no idea that inflation is about to break out in a major way as it had at the end of the wage package in early 1985.

Table 8 The Success of the July Program

	Inflation	M ₂	Credit	Unemployment	Real Wage	Real Exchange
June 85	14.9	7.2	16.8	6.6	100	100
July 85	27.8	56.6	0.4		85	94
August 85-June 86 Cumulative*	21.3	60.0	4.5	7.2	88	96
June 86	1.6	-1.7		7.4	100	97

*The indices (June 1985=100) in the last two columns are period averages
Source: Fischer (1986) and Morgan Guaranty.

The second point worth recording concerns the behavior of money and credit aggregates: M₂ has expanded strongly, but exchange rate-linked accounts (Patam accounts, not shown) have declined sharply. This is a typical feature associated with the return of confidence in the domestic currency. Note finally that nominal credit has been under a very tight rein: total credit has expanded by only 6 percent cumulatively over the period and thus, in real terms, has in fact declined. We will return to this point in discussing interest rate developments.

The third point concerns real wages. Real wages declined in the early part of stabilization and remained significantly below their pre-stabilization level until earlier this year. By summer 1986 they had, however, increased back to their pre-stabilization level. This is a central problem of the

program, because wages had moved far ahead of productivity with government subsidies (and hence budget deficits) making up the difference.

A fourth point worth noting concerns the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate turned toward increased competitiveness during the stabilization. The initial devaluation helped bring about a gain in competitiveness and continuing dollar depreciation since 1985 has helped maintain the gain even in the face of moderate domestic inflation. Without the dollar devaluation over the past year it would have been difficult to defend the fixed dollar exchange rate.

Table 8 shows that the program did involve a rise in unemployment. This is an important point because fear about unemployment has on many occasions stopped decisive anti-inflationary measures. But the rise in unemployment was quite limited. The fact that inflation in July 1986 was down to 0.0 showed that, unlike in Brazil and Argentina, the fact of incomes policy need not involve an inevitable repressed and ultimately open of inflation.

Policy Issues

The two central policy issues for Israel today are to lock in the disinflation and to embark on a path of strong and sustainable growth. Often policies for growth involve expansion in demand. That is not the case for Israel. Economic slack is not significant, even after the massive fiscal adjustment that has taken place. Resources for growth therefore must come from the government sector and from reduced private consumption. Further budget cutting, and ultimately tax rate cuts are the important priorities this year, next year and for many years to come.²⁷

²⁷See on the growth issue especially the memorandum by Fischer (1986).

Supply side economics received a bad name in the U.S. because it was primarily a cover for a Keynesian fiscal expansion. But in the case of Israel, crowding-in of investment through reduced budget deficits and expansion in productive capacity via increased incentives are entirely plausible. There are no simple, fast recipes for growth, but it is clear that high tax rates used to finance an extensive system of subsidies can well be counterproductive. Before it becomes possible to cut taxes it will be necessary to cut much more into transfers. Even so it is encouraging to note that Israel has experimented successfully with reductions in marginal employment taxes, reducing the wedge between take-home pay and labor cost to firms.

In a short-run perspective the government needs to decide on its exchange rate policy. So far dollar depreciation has helped offset the impact of continuing, though moderate, inflation. If the dollar stops declining it is vital that the competitiveness of the traded goods sector not be sacrificed. Continued competitiveness is essential because the traded goods sector must serve as a locomotive for the entire economy and because renewed exchange rate speculation and its financial consequences must be avoided.

The availability of U.S. additional aid--\$1.5 billion in 1985-86 or the equivalent of 7.5 percent of GNP-- makes the exchange rate issue seemingly unimportant. But this perception mistakes the fact that for growth and employment competitiveness of the external sector is essential. At the same time it is important not to allow an overvaluation to occur which will, at some point, have to be eliminated with highly adverse consequences for inflation as, for example, in 1983. The government has recognized these issues by sticking to a fixed exchange rate policy, first on the dollar and more

recently on a basket of currencies. The fixed exchange rate commitment can be taken into wage negotiations. The government here can credibly ask for zero wage increases in exchange for a fixed exchange rate. The alternative is to offer indexation of wages and of the exchange rate at the cost of a resumption of a pattern of 30-40 percent inflation.

7. POLITICS

A very interesting and important aspect of the new stabilization programs has been their political impact. They were initiated by governments already sharply weakened by their failure to stabilize. But, where ordinarily stabilization is perceived as politically difficult and harmful these new programs have catapulted the politicians and technicians who initiated them to near-immortality, at least initially.

Public opinion surveys for Brazil, Argentina and Israel provide a ready means of checking on the political success of the stabilization plans. We therefore review some of that evidence here to reinforce the dramatic contrast between the food riots that on occasion emerge in the course of IMF programs and the extraordinarily positive response in these cases.²⁸

Argentina: A public opinion survey (Socmerc) has made available an assessment over time of the public response to policy and management.²⁹ The data reported in Table 9 show the fraction of the sample assessing the performance as positive.

²⁸Our analysis focusses on Brazil and Argentina, but we understand that much the same evidence exists for the case of Israel.

²⁹SOCMERC is a public opinion survey data base belonging to the consulting firm Aftalion*Mora y Araujo* Nogueira.

Table 9 Positive Response To The Government
(Percent of the sample responding positively)

	1984 Dec.	May	1985 Aug.	Dec.	1986 Apr.
Austral Plan			74	68	52
Economic Management	19	10	40	35	19
Government in general	46	35	57	52	36
President Alfonsin	72	64	74	71	64

Source: La Nacion

The notable point in this table is the immensely positive response to the Austral Plan and the sharp improvement in government popularity on all counts between May and August 1985.

Moreover, the positive response has been quite persistent. Even after the initial enthusiasm wore off, there was still very substantial support as is evident in the December 1985 rating. At the end of 1985 a public opinion poll showed that 35 percent of the sample felt that the Austral Plan had helped them and that a further 42 percent estimated that it had not affected them significantly. Only 9 percent felt that they had been strongly hurt. Only 18 percent of the sample felt that the Plan should be abandoned.³⁰

Brazil: Unfortunately there does not appear to be a continuing public opinion survey for Brazil that follows as in the case of Argentina the public's assessment of economic issues. But the evidence from more isolated surveys does lead to very much the same impression as is conveyed in the case of Argentina.

³⁰Reported in La Nacion, January 2, 1986.

In immediate "post-shock" surveys 84 percent percent of the respondents thought the reform was good and only 2 percent felt that it was bad. In the same survey 66 percent of the public felt they would benefit and only 8 percent believed they would be hurt.³¹

In a survey asking for a rating of the President on the scale of 0 to 10 the President received a grade of 6.5 in December 1985, prior to the Plan. By March 1985 his rating rose to a grade of 8.4.³² It is quite apparent that the President's popularity jumped sky-high, at least in the polls, as a result of the stabilization plan.

The public perceives a distinct improvement in their economic conditions. An ongoing opinion survey reports the following responses to the question "Have things become better or worse since the economic shock which introduced the Cruzado Plan?" and "Is Your Purchasing Power Today Higher, Equal or Less than before the economic shock?"

Table 10 Brazil: 1986 Post-Shock Opinion Surveys

	April	May	June	July
Did Things Generally Improve...?				
Yes	56	54	57	46
Is Your Purchasing Power Higher Today..?				
Higher	47	46	44	44

Source: Folha de Sao Paulo July 26, 1986 p.19

A survey following the July 1986 follow-up program (the "pacotinho")

³¹Folha de Sao Paulo, March 5th, 1986.

³²Folha de Sao Paulo, March 15th 1986

showed that 59 percent supported the new measures against only 27 percent expressing a negative opinion. Yet only 35 percent percent of the survey respondents felt that these new measures would bring them benefits while 49 percent felt they would not.³³

Explanations: Why do these new programs bring forth such strong public support whereas traditional programs are viewed as a political liability? We see two immediate explanations.

Perhaps the most important aspect of these new stabilization programs is that they occur in a context of sharply accelerating and extreme inflation. It is well-known that the public views inflation as utterly threatening. If this view is true for the moderate inflation experienced in the industrial countries, then it is quite likely even more true for the extreme experiences reviewed here. The strong public reaction observed in this case far exceeds what economists can explain in terms of the economics of inflation.³⁴ By the same token, price controls are invariably a popular political move anytime inflation is perceived as a problem. The move to stop accelerating inflation by controls thus amounts to a well-known recipe in political economy. Deeper research going to the psychology of inflation and controls is therefore certainly warranted.

A related point is the populism inherent in the new stabilization programs. The public is enlisted as price controllers and in this way they are given a direct, personal role. In a Brazilian opinion survey of early March

³³Folha de Sao Paulo, July 26, 1986.

³⁴See Fischer and Modigliani

1986 as many as 50 percent of the respondents said they were actively helping to control prices and another 39 percent said they would do so in the future. Active participation in price controls by the general public is seen as an exercise of participatory economic democracy.

It is striking to note that the public is actually willing to accept the need for sacrifices in order to secure stabilization. A survey in Argentina found that 46 percent of the respondents were willing to make personal sacrifices to help the success of the Plan, whereas another 46 percent said they could not reduce their standard of living further. Only 8 percent were unwilling to do so.³⁵

The second argument for popularity lies in the fact that fiscal stabilization does not involve a reduction in private sector aggregate real absorption of goods and services. The adjustment basically involves only a change in the incidence and distribution of taxation. An inflation tax finances the government during the high inflation period whereas outright taxation finances basically the same level of real government spending after stabilization. Since no current account improvement is required as part of the stabilization, the whole program amounts mostly to a reshuffling within the country of the burden of financing a given government spending.

There may also be redistributions between sectors. For example industries that collect sales taxes (say the tobacco industry in Argentina) lose out when the float disappears and workers gain from the stability of real wages. These redistributive features of stabilization differ from the case of a country where stabilization requires an improvement in the current account and hence a net reduction in aggregate absorption.

³⁵Aftalion, Mora y Araujo and Noguera (1985) p.8

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The new stabilization programs in force in Argentina, Israel and Brazil represent a critically important, viable alternative to traditional, orthodox, IMF-style programs. They grasp a central economic fact, the need for coordination rather than sheer slack, as an essential part of stabilization. From a political point of view they are dramatically successful, at least in the first stage, and as such they are feasible.

These new programs represent an important advance in macroeconomic policy, but even so they do not afford miracles. There is no substitute for a correction of fiscal disorder, the orthodox part of stabilization. Perhaps surprisingly, governments seem to be unwilling to use the very strong increase in their political standing to follow up on the initial stabilization with a program of enduring, substantial improvement in public finance. This unwillingness is very shortsighted because any program will ultimately buckle under as boom and shortages force a return of inflation. There may be no outright collapse, at least for a long time, but gradually the program tends to melt away for lack of sustainability, credibility and confidence. As a result political support inevitably falls off and with the loss of support fall the chances of achieving important changes in public finance. The chance of turning from stabilization to growth thus is missed.


In Argentina, Brazil and Israel a return to sustainable, long-term growth is a serious issue. Investment has fallen off significantly and the supply potential has expanded little. The important changes in public finance required to promote long-term financial stability have not taken place in

Argentina, are not in sight in Brazil and may not happen in Israel. The lesson for any other country, for example Mexico, is to recognize that the incomes policy approach to stabilization does not dispense with orthodoxy. But that it does provide an extraordinary political opportunity in the form of a brief breathing spell and momentum of popular support which can be exploited for the hard task of basic policy reform.

Appendix I. Inflation and the Budget

Figure A-I shows on the axes the inflation rate and the budget deficit measure as a share of GDP. The dashed schedule shows the Oliveira-Tanzi effect. As inflation increases the deficit rises because of the inflationary erosion, via lags in collection, of the real value of tax collection. The solid schedule is the Laffer curve for the inflation tax. At very low inflation rates real balances are high, but because of low inflation the inflation tax revenue is also low. As inflation rises the inflation tax revenue first rises and then gradually falls off because at high rates of inflation the increased cost of holding real balances comes to dominate in that it reduces real money demand.

The important point to note from Figure A-1 is that there are two inflationary equilibria, points A and B. At A inflation is low and the deficit is small while at B inflation and the deficit are large. If an economy were at B it would, of course, be of interest to shift it to A. The problem then is how to achieve, at a low cost, that transition.



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