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Charter Schools: A Survey of Research on Their Characteristics and Effectiveness
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ABSTRACT

The charter school movement is nearing its 25th anniversary, making this an opportune time to take stock of the movement by addressing the following questions: Where do charter schools locate? Who do they serve? Who manages them? Who teaches in them? Most importantly, what are the effects of charter schools on the academic performance of students who enroll in charters and on students who remain in traditional public schools? We review research findings that shed light on these questions.

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I. Introduction

The charter school movement is nearing its 25\textsuperscript{th} anniversary, making this an opportune time to take stock of the movement by addressing questions such as: Where do charter schools locate? Who do they serve? Who manages them? Who teaches in them? Most importantly, what are the effects of charter schools on the academic performance of students who enroll in charters and on students who remain in traditional public schools (TPSs)?

Charter schools in the U.S. were first introduced in St. Paul, Minnesota in 1992. The sponsors envisioned a new form of public schools, operating outside the cultural and regulatory bounds of TPSs, as laboratories for educational innovation. At the outset of the charter movement, critics argued that charter schools would drain public resources away from charter schools and raised concerns as to whether charter schools would serve all populations, including minorities, lower-ability and special-needs populations (Frankenberg and Lee, 2003; Fiske and Ladd, 2000; Cobb and Glass, 1999). Supporters, in contrast, argued that given the greater freedom from regulations, charter schools would be innovative and create competitive pressure on all schools to improve, while at the same time improving racial integration by letting families choose schools outside of neighborhoods where housing is racially segregated and by promoting fuller and richer integration in classrooms within schools where all students have chosen to attend (Kolderie, 2004; Finn, et al., 2000; Nathan, 1998).

These debates are not new, as most of these same arguments occur over the use of vouchers. In contrast to attitudes toward vouchers, however, the public view of charter schools is largely favorable, with opinion polls showing that public support of charter schools has grown over time. The 2014 PDK/Gallup Poll of public attitudes toward public schools (2014, p.19) finds 70\% of respondents favor the idea of charter schools,\textsuperscript{2} double the proportion reporting a favorable view in 2002. At the same time, however, public understanding of charter schools is muddled, with 48\% believing that charter schools are free to teach religion, 57\% believing that charter schools can charge tuition, 68\% believing that charter schools can choose students on the basis of ability, and only 50\% knowing that charter schools are public schools.

Our review proceeds as follows. In Section II we summarize the defining characteristics of charter schools and provide an overview of the charter authorization process, charter funding,

\textsuperscript{2} Phrasing of the question matters somewhat; the proportion favoring charters falls from 70\% to 63\% when the question does not refer to charters as public schools.
and types of charter organizations. Section III provides a largely descriptive summary of the geographic distribution of charter schools, comparisons of demographic characteristics of charter and TPS students including evidence on cream skimming, and comparison of characteristics of charter and TPS teachers. To set the stage for review of evidence on charter effectiveness, we detail in Section IV the methodological challenges in evaluating charter effectiveness and discuss strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches that have been utilized. Section V then summarizes the evidence on charter effectiveness. In Section VI we discuss research that seeks to go inside the black box to investigate how effectiveness varies with charter school educational models, teacher characteristics, and other factors. Evidence on the response of TPSs to competition from charter schools is reviewed in Section VII. A brief conclusion is provided in Section VIII.

II. What is a Charter School?
A charter school is a public school chartered under the auspices of a state government. While charter laws vary across states, two defining characteristics are: 1) charter schools cannot charge tuition; and 2) charter schools are not permitted to impose admission requirements and, if oversubscribed, must select from their applicants by lottery.

For charter schools to operate within a state, the state government must pass legislation determining how charter schools will be financed and delineating procedures for chartering of schools. At present, 42 states plus the District of Columbia permit charter schools to operate. States delegate power to grant charters to “authorizers”. There is considerable variation across states in delegation of this power, with several states designating more than one authorizer. In 2010/11, charters could be authorized by local school districts in 31 states, the state education agency in 21, an independent charter board in 7, a higher education institution in 9, a municipal government office in 2, and a non-for-profit organization in 1. Sixteen states designated only one authorizer while the remainder designated two or more National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS)\(^3\). In some states, a request for authorization to create a charter school goes first to the local school district in which the charter would locate, with potential for appeal to the state education agency if the district declines to grant a charter.

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\(^3\) We make frequent use of the extensive database on charter schools maintained by the NACPS: http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/home
Charter laws typically specify that a charter school receive a specified payment from the local district for each district student who attends the charter school. The payment per student averaged 80% of local district expenditure per student in 2009/10, with the percentage being lower, 72%, in urban areas (NAPCS). However, these differences do not necessarily take into account the fact that charter schools often rely on local school districts for certain services, including busing. In addition, the composition of student populations may differ between the two types of schools. For example, charter schools typically serve fewer special needs students, which are more costly to educate. Batdorff, Maloney, and May (2010) investigate funding for each state with the objective of taking account of differences in student composition to compare funding charter schools receive to the amount district schools would have received to educate the same students. Figure 1, drawn from the Batdorff, et al. data, shows the percentage by which charter funding is below district funding levels by state for 2006/07. As is evident from the figure, the percentage differential varies widely across states, ranging from a high of one third in New York to near parity in Minnesota. Indiana is alone in having higher charter funding than TPS funding. Batdorff, et al. highlight inadequate funding for facilities in charters as a key difference between charter schools and TPSs. Charters are more likely to appeal to philanthropic organizations for financial support, particularly for funding facilities (Nelson, Muir, & Drown, 2000; Farrell, et al. 2012).

Charter operators may be part of an Education Management Organization (EMO), a Charter Management Organization (CMO), or freestanding. Both EMOs and CMOs operate multiple schools, the key distinction being that the former are for-profit and the latter non-profit. CMOs have also been more successful in raising philanthropic support than TPSs, EMOs, or freestanding charter schools. This support has added to the controversy surrounding charter schools as many opponents see private organizations having too much influence in the future of public schools (Reckhow, 2013).

It is natural to expect that successful charter school models will be “franchised,” and this is in fact the case. From 2007/08 to 2010/11, the percentage of charter schools that were freestanding declined from 78% to 68%, while the percentage in CMOs grew from 12% to 20%, and the percentage in EMOs increased from 10% to 12% (NAPCS). EMO student share is greater than

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4 “Success” in this context means ability to attract students and secure adequate funding while also succeeding in obtaining renewal of charters from the relevant charter authorizers. We discuss in a subsequent section the evidence on academic performance of charter schools.
school share. In 2010/11 (NAPCS) 61% of charter students were in freestanding charters, 19% in CMOs, and 20% in EMOs (NAPCS).

Information about the extent of CMO operations is provided in recent studies by Farrell, Wohlstetter and Smith (2012) and Furgeson, et al. (2012) using broadly similar definitions. They identified 40 such CMOs operating a total of 292 schools in 14 states, located primarily in Texas, California, Arizona, Ohio, Illinois, New York, and the District of Columbia. They note that, with a broader definition—any non-profit operating two or more schools—there are roughly 130 CMOs serving on the order of 250,000 students. In contrast, with the exception of the for-profit organization of Edison schools (e.g., Gill, et al., 2005), EMOs appear to be less studied and accurate counts are not as readily available.

III. Location and Clientele

Figure 2 shows the nationwide growth in number of students served by charter schools and charter school share of total public school enrollment. While charter school share is still relatively small, 4.5%, charter enrollment has increased rapidly, roughly quadrupling from 2000 through 2012. In this section, we compare charter and TPSs and provide evidence about changes over time. We will frequently reference Table 1, which provides a national comparison on a broad range of characteristics including enrollment, location, and demographics.6

A. Where do charter schools locate?

i. Variation across states: Figure 3a shows the large variation across states in charter school share of public school enrollment. In this figure, states are ordered from highest to lowest based on charter share of enrollment within state. Eleven states have charter shares of 5% or higher; Arizona leads with a 12% share. In Figure 3b, states are ordered by state share of national charter enrollment. We see that California alone has 20% of all U.S. charter enrollment, followed by Florida and Texas with 9% each, Arizona with 7%, Michigan with 6%, and Ohio and Pennsylvania each with 5%. These seven states account for 61% of all U.S. charter school enrollment.

ii. Variation across city, suburban, and rural districts: We see from Table 1 that charter school enrollments are more heavily concentrated in urban areas than are TPSs, with much lower

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5 Ferguson, et al. (2012) considered an organization to be a CMO if it had four or more schools open by fall 2007 that were nonprofit since inception, did not primarily serve dropouts or similar special populations, and directly managed schools as reflected in the ability to hire and fire school principals.

6 Except where indicated, the data are for the 2010-11 academic year—the most recent year for which all variables in the table are available.
concentrations in suburban and rural areas. We next detail variation across the 30 metropolitan areas with the largest charter shares of metropolitan area charter enrollment in 2010/11. Figure 4a shows the national charter share for each of these metropolitan areas, while Figure 4b shows the share of the local market served by charters in each of these 30 metropolitan areas. From Figure 4a, we see that, in seven of these metropolitan areas, charter schools serve 10% or more of the metropolitan area public student population. From Figure 4b, we see that seven of these metro areas each have more than 3% of national charter enrollment with Los Angeles leading with 6.5% of US charter students. Strikingly, these 30 metro areas together comprise 63% of total U.S. charter enrollment. Focusing on central city districts, we see in Figure 4c, that New Orleans charters have by far the largest charter share of any central city district, followed in order by Washington, DC; Detroit; and Kansas City, all having a central city district charter share of 35% or more. From Figure 4d, we see that six of these cities each have more than 2% of national charter enrollment; Los Angeles leads with 5% of US charter students, followed by Detroit, Philadelphia, New York City, Chicago, and Houston. These 30 cities together serve 34% of US charter students. Thus, while charter schools currently serve less than 5% of the U.S. public school population, these figures show the variation across locations in charter enrollment and highlights the salient role that charter schools play in some U.S. markets.

Econometric research has investigated charter school location. Glomm, Harris, and Lo (2005) study charter school location in Michigan, finding that charters are located in communities with diverse populations as measured by heterogeneity in race and adult education. Bifulco and Buerger (2012) investigate charter school location in New York. They find, as in Glomm, et al. (2005) that charters tend to be located in districts where the population is diverse, while also finding that charters tend to locate where expenditure per student is high, teacher costs are low, and public school achievement is relatively low. In both of the preceding papers, the authors are careful to emphasize that the analysis is reduced-form and leaves open the issue of causality. While not focused on charter school location per se, Imberman (2011) instruments far charter location, using measures of building availability in order to estimate causal effects of charter schools on outcomes of students in public schools. His first-stage regression results demonstrate the important role of building availability on charter school location. (Imberman’s results

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7 The city of New Orleans abolished traditional public schools effective with the 2014/15 academic year with public education in the city now offered entirely by charter schools.
regarding impacts on student achievement are discussed later in our review of indirect effects.) Recent research has sought to develop structural models of charter school entry and choice. Mehta (2012) models charter school entry in North Carolina, abstracting from heterogeneity in student demographic characteristics. Using panel data for Washington, D.C. schools for the period from 2002 through 2003, Ferreyra and Kosenok (2013) estimate an equilibrium model of school choice and charter entry decisions. They find heterogeneity in household preferences, with African American and Hispanic households having higher preference for charters than whites, and with poor households favoring charters more than those with higher incomes. They also find high fixed costs to be a deterrent to entry in areas where charters would attract enrollment.

B. Student Selection: Who do charter schools serve?

By law, charter schools are required to select students by lottery when they are over-subscribed. In this sense, charter schools cannot selectively admit students. This does not imply that student composition of charter schools will replicate the composition of public schools. Charter school student body composition will be affected by charter school location. Furthermore, charter schools may selectively market themselves to families. In addition, charter and TPSs may differ in appeal to differing clienteles, leading to differences in school composition. In this section, we review and assess differences in characteristics of charter and public school students.

Comparisons using national data for 2010/11 in Table 1 show that charter shares of students served by grade level (elementary and high school) are roughly the same as share of overall student population served. Charter schools, on average, are smaller than TPSs. Charter middle schools are about 80% the size of TPS middle schools, and charter high schools are about half the size of traditional public high schools. Class sizes by grade level for the most common modes of instruction are shown in Table 1. For these school configurations, class sizes are relatively similar between charter and TPSs. There are other school configurations, not shown in the table, that serve smaller shares of the student population. In schools that combine across grade levels, for example, charter schools have substantially higher student/teacher ratios than TPSs, though it is not clear to what extent this reflects differences in grade levels served in combined schools.

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8 In self-contained classes, a given group of students is instructed in multiple subjects by the same teacher while in departmentalized classes, different subjects are taught by different teachers. Self-contained classes are relatively rare outside of primary grades.
Overall, it is clear that the smaller average class sizes observed in the past for charters relative to TPSs no longer prevails.

We next turn to comparison of the demographic composition of charter and TPS students at varying levels of geographic disaggregation.

i) National, State, Metropolitan and District Comparisons: Following (Powell, et al., 1997; Fitzgerald, et al., 1998; RPP, 2000; Miron and Nelson, 2002; Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 2010), we begin by comparing average characteristics of students in charter and TPS schools at varying degrees of geographic disaggregation. We then turn to a review of findings with respect to student selection into and retention in charter schools that use strategies to take account of the demographic variation across charter school locations, competitors, and other factors.

The proportion of students reported as eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (FRL) in charter schools has grown markedly over time, as shown in Figure 5a, from roughly 30% in 2001 to 50% in 2010. As shown in Table 1, the proportion of FRL students is now nearly the same in charters (51%) and TPSs (48%). This increase may reflect a growing proportion of poor student in charter schools, and/or an increase in charter school participation in the National School Lunch Program.

Charter school composition by race and, ethnicity has changed over time, as shown in Figure 5b. The most noteworthy change is the growth in percent of Hispanic students in charter schools, which increased from 19% to 27% between 2001 and 2010. The proportion of charter students that are African-American declined by approximately 4% over this period, and the proportion white declined by approximately 5%. Overall, as seen in Table 1, charter enrollment share of minority students is higher than TPSs, and the share of white students is correspondingly lower. The charter share of African-American students stood at 29% in 2010-2011, almost double the share of African-American students in TPSs. The share of Hispanic student was 27%, roughly 5 percentage points higher than in TPSs.

While sector-wide comparisons of the proportion of charter and TPS students in particular subgroups are useful to describe the population being served, they provide little information about the extent to which individual schools are integrated. In other words, the fact that the entire sector (charter or TPS) in a district serves a wide range of student populations does not tell us anything about integration. A district where the TPSs have equal shares of students from each
race might have schools that are highly integrated (i.e., each school has a mix of students that looks like the district-wide average), or it might have schools that are fully segregated (e.g., one third of the schools are 100% white, one-third are 100% black, and one-third are 100% Hispanic).

Table 2 provides a summary at the national level of segregation by race and FRL status. The first row shows that the proportion of schools with more than 80% one race is approximately 38% in charters and 41% in TPSs. Likewise, the second row shows that the proportion with more than 60% one race or, ethnicity is also relatively similar in the two sectors, at 65% in charters and 67% in TPSs. By these measures, segregation is relatively high in both charters and TPSs. These figures are far from the full story. The third row shows that the proportion of charter schools with more than 80% white students is 14.5%, while the proportion of TPSs schools with more than 80% white is 31%. The proportion of charters with more than 80% nonwhite is 41%, roughly double that for TPSs. The final three rows of Table 2 show concentrations with respect to poverty. More than one third of charter schools have at least 80% of students eligible for FRL as compare to slightly less than one fourth for TPSs. Approximately 60% of charters have at least half of their student eligible for FRL as compared to 54% of TPSs. In summary, then, charters and public schools exhibit substantial and similar degrees of racial and, ethnic segregation, but schools with a high degree of segregation are more likely to be charters if predominantly nonwhite and are more likely to be TPSs if predominantly white. Charter schools also exhibit more segregation by poverty than TPSs.

We next investigate segregation across central city school districts. Figure 6a shows the proportion of schools with more than 80% FRL students for the 30 cities with highest charter enrollment. The proportions are strikingly high in some cities. For example, in Chicago and New Orleans, 90% of charter schools have more than 80% students on FRL. In 19 of the 30 cities, the proportion of charters with greater than 80% FRL students is higher than the proportion of TPSs with greater than 80% FRL students. The reverse is true in the remaining 11 cities.

Using a similar approach, we investigate segregation by race or, ethnicity. Figure 6b shows the proportion of schools with more than 80% of students with one race for the 30 cities with highest charter enrollment. Again, this proportion is strikingly high in some cities, led by New Orleans with 92% and Detroit with 87%. The figure shows the proportions in charters and TPSs to be relatively similar for most of these cities. A similar conclusion emerges in Figure 6c which uses
a 60% rather than 80% concentration by one race or, ethnicity. Continuing the investigation of segregation by race and, ethnicity, we show in Figure 6d the proportions of schools with more than 80% non-white students and in Figure 6e the proportions of schools with more than 80% white students. From Figure 6d, we see that, in most of the 30 cities, the proportion of charters schools with more than 80% non-white is greater than the proportion of TPSs with more than 80% non-white students. Figure 6e shows, not surprisingly, that within these cities, few schools in either sector have more than 80% white students. Figures 6f and 6g tell a similar story when segregation is measured with more than 60% non-white and 60% white respectively.

It is important to note that there are exceptions to the general pattern summarized above. St. Paul, Minnesota is one such exception. Figure 6d shows that the proportion of schools greater than 80% non-white is approximately the same for charters and TPSs in St. Paul, MN, while Figure 6e shows that the proportion of schools more than 80% white is markedly higher in charter than TPSs. Reports by the Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity (IMO), (2013) and by its predecessor, the Institute on Race and Poverty (2008, 2012), have highlighted the racial segregation of charter schools relative to TPSs in Minneapolis-St. Paul area. The IMO (2013) report points to charters locating in mixed-race suburbs and attracting predominantly white students as increasing white segregation in charters and, thereby, increasing non-white segregation in TPSs. Understanding why this phenomenon is occurring in Minneapolis-St. Paul area is an important research issue.

Turning to the metropolitan level, we see in Figure 7a, that the proportion of schools with greater than 80% FRL is generally higher in charters than in TPSs. However, in some low poverty metro areas (e.g., Sacramento, Oxnard/Venture, Orlando, Salt Lake City), charter FRL share is lower than TPS FRL share. The proportion of charter schools with greater than 80% non-white is greater than in TPSs in almost all the metropolitan areas shown in Figure 7b. By contrast, as shown in Figure 7c, the proportion of charters with greater than 80% white is generally lower than in TPSs.

We next discuss comparisons at a finer grained geography. Table 3 from the CREDO study compares the demographic composition of charters to that of traditional public feeder schools from which charter students are drawn. From the table, we see that proportion of FRL students is 54% for both feeders and charters, both being 5 percentage points higher than in the universe of
TPSs.\(^9\) We see in Table 1 that charter schools serve a much higher proportion of African American students than do TPSs, 29% vs 17%. Charters also serve a higher proportion of Hispanic students (27%) than do TPSs (23%), but they serve a smaller proportion (28%) than their feeder school counterparts (34%). The latter suggests that charter schools locate in areas that have a relatively high proportion of Hispanic students, but, in those locations, they draw a smaller fraction of Hispanics than their TPS counterparts.

Another measure of clientele served is academic performance. Charter school students nationwide have lower NAEP reading and math scores than TPS students in both 4\(^{th}\) and 8\(^{th}\) grades, and lower science scores in 8\(^{th}\) grades. A central research question is whether the lower achievement of charter school students is a result of student selection, relative educational quality, or both.” We discuss in the next subsection evidence on student selection into charter schools and, in Section IV, the extent and nature of achievement differentials that might be attributable to differences in quality of education in the two sectors.

Still another domain for comparing clienteles served is special needs students. As shown in Table 1, enrollment shares nationwide of limited English proficiency are substantially higher in charters than TPSs, while enrollment shares of special needs students are lower in charters than in TPSs. Relative to the neighborhoods in which they locate, Table 3 indicates that charters serve a smaller proportion of English language learners than their feeder school counterparts, 9% vs. 13%, and a smaller proportion of special education students, 8% vs. 11%.\(^{10}\) Given the higher proportion English language learners served nationwide in charters than in TPSs, this suggests, as with Hispanic students, that charters locate in areas with high proportions of LEP students but, in those neighborhoods, they attract a smaller proportion of LEP students than their public school counterparts.

ii) Within-school diversity of charters relative to public schools.

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\(^9\) Charter school participation in the National School Lunch Program may be less extensive than TPS participation. If so, the actual proportion of poor students in charter schools may be higher than reflected in reported FRL eligibility.

\(^{10}\) Note that the results from CREDO in Table 3 show a lower overall proportion of English Language Learners than shown by the LEP data in Table 1. Two potential reasons are the following. The former are for 2010/11 whereas the latter are for 2007/08. The other is source of data. As explained in footnote 14 of the CREDO report: “Data on English language learners and special education students is available by state for all public schools from the National Center for Education Statistics, but it is not disaggregated to the school level to allow for computations by charter designation. For the 27 states, CREDO collected these data at the school level from each state education department and compiled the proportions for charter schools in those states.”
The above analyses show differences in populations served by charter relative to TPSs. These differences arise both from charter school location and selection into charter schools conditional on location. It is of clearly of interest to disentangle the two. To accomplish this research has examined the movement of students from TPSs to charter schools using longitudinal student-level data. This method allows researchers to track students as they move from school to school and examine whether students who exit TPSs to charter schools move to schools with a greater or lower concentration of students of the same race or, ethnicity. In addition, using the same approach, researchers can examine whether below- or above-average achieving students are exiting TPSs. In both cases, the approach provides a more refined counterfactual than making sector-wide comparisons.

However, this method does not provide a comprehensive picture of the student sorting resulting from charter schools, because it includes only the charter students who enter charter schools after having previously been enrolled in TPSs; it does not identify a counterfactual for students who enroll in charter schools beginning in kindergarten. Nonetheless, this addition to the picture of the changing peer environments of individual students who move to charter schools is valuable in capturing the effects of charters at the neighborhood level whereas comparisons at higher levels of aggregation do not capture the enormous local variation in schools, and comparisons at the neighborhood level after charter entry do not fully capture the effects of charters on school composition relative to that prevailing prior to charter entry. Only a handful of studies have used this approach, partially because it requires longitudinal student-level data, which can be difficult to obtain. However, when this approach has been used, the results for the segregation analysis have been mixed across the racial groups, but less so for the cream skimming question.

In an early study, Booker, Zimmer, and Buddin (2005) examined the effect of charter schools on the stratification of students in terms of both ability and race using data from California and Texas. In both states, African-American students transferred to charter schools with higher concentrations of black students than the schools they attended previously. In Texas, white students also moved to charter schools with higher concentrations of whites than at their TPSs, but the opposite was true in California. Hispanic charter students in both states had fewer

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11 In fact, in evaluating the effect on racial segregation, a very appealing approach would be to use lottery data and examine the racial makeup of the school a lottery “loser” attends and compare that to the racial makeup of schools lottery “winners” attend. This analysis would include not only students switching schools mid-stream (e.g., a student who switches from a TPS in 2nd grade and attend a charter school in 3rd grade), but also include students who start out in a charter school in the entry grade. At this point, no study has conducted this type of evaluation.
Hispanic peers than they had in their prior TPSs. In terms of measured ability, transfer students had lower test scores than the average student at their TPSs. These findings support the inferences discussed earlier from the evidence in Tables 1 and 3. In both states, charters attracted a disproportionate share of students with low test scores relative to the TPSs the students exited. In another early study using longitudinal student-level data, Bifulco and Ladd (2007) examined data from North Carolina focusing on racial distribution and found that charters have increased the racial isolation of black and white students. On average, black charter students left schools that were 53 percent black for charters that were 72 percent black. Similarly, white charter students left TPSs that were 72 percent white to charters that were 82 percent white. Both black and white charter students had more peers from college educated parents than at their previous TPS, but the percentage increase in college educated parents was about 6 times larger for whites than for blacks. On net, black students transferred to charters with lower average test scores than their previous schools, while white students transferred to charters with higher average test scores than their previous public schools.

In probably the most geographically comprehensive study to date, Zimmer and colleagues (2009) used longitudinal student-level data to examine how charters affected peer composition in five urban districts and two states. They found modest effects of charters on the racial mix of schools. In some locations, black and white students tended to attend charters with a higher concentration of students of their same race than at their previous TPS, but these differences were generally small. Overall, across the seven jurisdictions, the average increase in the Black concentration experienced by a Black transfer student was 3.8 percent, versus an average increase of 1.3 percent in the White concentration experienced by transferring white students, and an average decline of 5.9 percent in the Hispanic concentration experienced by transferring Hispanic students.

The study also looked at the ability distribution of students transferring to charter schools. In most cases, the charter students were near or slightly below the test score average for the TPS that they previously attended. Compared to their immediate peers in the TPSs they exited, students transferring to charter schools had slightly higher test scores in two of seven locations,

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12 As we note previously, this is the kind of impact that IMO (2013) sees in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, though without the strong identification strategy of the student-level longitudinal approach employed by Bifulco and Ladd (2007).

13 These averages give equal weight to each jurisdiction rather than weighting by the number of students or schools.
while in the other five locations the scores of the transferring students were identical to or lower than those of their TPS peers. Same-race comparisons indicate lower prior scores for charter students in five of seven sites among African-Americans and in four of seven sites among Hispanics. For White students the pattern was slightly different: In four of seven sites, white students entering charter schools had higher prior achievement than their white peers in both subjects, and in one other site they had higher scores in one of two subjects. These results for white students had little effect on the overall averages because white students constituted a minority of charter students in every location, and less than one-quarter of charter students in the four locations where their scores were consistently higher than those of their white peers.

Garcia, McIlroy, and Barber (2008) extended this research on cream skimming by adding a somewhat nuanced comparison while examining Arizona charter schools. The researcher compared the achievement levels of students exiting TPSs to enroll in charter schools with those of students exiting TPSs to enroll in other types of schools, such as other TPSs. Overall, they find that students who transfer from TPSs to charter schools have lower prior achievement levels than students transferring to other TPSs.

Two other studies that examine the racial mix of students are worth noting. The first of these studies surveyed parents about the choice to attend a school and compared their answer to their actual revealed preferences by the choice they made (Weiher and Tedin, 2002). They found that the parents reported similar values on school attributes irrespective of race and SES. In practice, however, parents’ choices were often at odds with their avowed preferences. While 60 percent of parents ranked high school test scores as a primary factor in choosing a school, the majority of these parents picked a charter school with lower average test scores than the TPS that their student left. Similarly, few parents mentioned race as a factor in choosing a school, but parents tended to pick schools with higher concentrations of students in their racial group than at their previous school. These results may suggest that race plays a role in choices families make. However, in a more recent study, Butler, et al. (2013) used the U.S. Department of Education’s Early Childhood Longitudinal Program data (which includes a rich set of observable characteristics) and examined educational enrollment choices families make across a large array of schools, including charter schools, and found that once a rich set of variables are included, race was not driving decisions to attend charter schools, but socioeconomic characteristics did.
In addition to concerns around issues of race and possible cream skimming, critics have raised questions about whether all students have access to charter schools, including special education students. As we saw in Table 1, charter schools do serve fewer special education students than their TPS feeder-school counterparts. Investigation of this phenomenon has been undertaken for two school districts, New York (Winters, 2013) and Denver (Winters, 2014). In Denver, Winters finds that the gap begins in elementary school, with a 1.7% difference in Kindergarten. This gap arises because fewer IEP students apply to charter schools. The gap then grows to 7.2% by fifth grade. Two features underlie this growth. Charters are less likely that TPSs to classify a student as IEP and more likely to declassify a student from IEP status. This accounts for half the growth in the percentage gap. Accounting for the other half of the growth, non-IEP students switching schools are more likely to move to a charter than a TPS, increasing the proportion of non-IEP students. Winters finds that differences in application rates lead to a 4.4% gap in 5th grade. This gap subsequently declines to 3.4% as more IEP students enter than exit charter schools. Winters’ (2013) findings for elementary schools in New York City point to differential application rates at the kindergarten level coupled with differences between charters and TPSs in classification of IEP students as the factors giving rise to the gap in New York City. Difference in exit rates of IEP students between charters and TPSs play little role in either Denver or New York City, suggesting that the gap is not due to charter schools “counseling out” IEP students. Winters finds no significant differences across students with different types of disabilities in propensity to apply to charters versus TPSs in Denver, but substantial differences in New York City. For example, almost all students with autism apply to TPSs in New York City.

As Winters emphasizes, these findings suggest the need for research to clarify the reasons for differential rates of application of special-needs student to charters relative to TPSs. It remains to be determined whether the gap arises because of actual or perceived differences between charters and TPSs in services for IEP students, because parents are concerned that a special needs child is more likely to be reclassified in a charter, or other factors influencing parental decisions. Study of reasons for differences in rates of IEP classification and declassification is also needed. The role of finance policies also warrants further study. As Bifulco and Buerger (2012) emphasize, there are substantial differences across states in the degree to which funding to charters varies with IEP or LEP status or with other student characteristics that affect costs of education. Also,
further investigation is needed to determine whether the findings for Denver and New York apply more broadly.

These issues have been explored a bit further with a couple of studies, but with not the same focus on the implications for student achievement. Instead, these studies focus on student moves and why they are made. In the first of these studies, Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin, and Branch (2007) using Texas student-level longitudinal data to track student moves between schools of varying quality and make the case that students exiting charter schools are motivated by school quality. More specifically, the authors found that higher achieving charter schools have lower exit rates than lower achieving charter schools, and the authors argue that much of the student mobility in charter schools is motivated to improve their educational situation.

In a more recent study, Zimmer and Guarino (2013) explore this issue with a different angle to examine whether they can find any empirical evidence of charter schools pushing out low-performing students. Some critics argue that charter schools may have incentive to push out these students to raise the academic profile and to reduce costs (Ravitch, undated). Using longitudinal student-level data from an anonymous district, the authors examine the achievement levels of students exiting charter schools relative to students exiting TPSs. First using an informal descriptive model, they did find that the academic performance of students exiting charter schools as measured by test scores is slightly less than students remaining in charter schools, but they also found this to be true in TPSs. In a formal linear probability model controlling for observable student characteristics, the authors find that low-performing students were no more likely to exit charter schools than TPSs. The authors note that this does not prove charter schools are not pushing out low performing students as they cannot distinguish the reasons students leave a particular school, but the evidence they provide is not supportive of the claim. They ultimately acknowledge their analysis is of only one location and argue that researchers should explore the validity of the claims in a larger set of locations.

While the research reviewed above has made major headway on the issue of cream skimming, important open issues remain. Disruptive behavior has been found to be a significant channel by which students generate adverse impacts on the learning of classroom peers (Carrell and Hoekstra, 2010). To the extent the data permit, it would be of interest in future work to investigate whether there are differences in behavioral measures (infractions, suspensions, absenteeism, tardiness) between students who apply for no-excuses charter schools and those
who do not, and whether students who exit no-excuses charters exhibit more or fewer behavioral problems than those who remain. It would also be of interest to investigate treatment effects of charter schools on behavioral measures, as, for example, in the Engberg, et al. (2014) study of magnet schools.

Synthesizing the findings on charter school demographic composition, we read the evidence as follows. Charter schools tend to locate in urban areas with high concentrations of minority and low-income students. This, rather than selection conditional on location, is the primary factor giving rise to the high degree of segregation by race/ethnicity and by FRL status that characterizes the majority of charter schools. The evidence further indicates, however, that household school choice decisions following charter school entry tend to perpetuate and sometimes accentuate such segregation. This is not to suggest that charter school authorizers would grant a charter to an applicant seeking to exploit opportunities to increase segregation, but increased segregation could be seen as a side effect of entry for charter schools striving towards desirable educational objectives. We return to this issue later in our discussion of school specialization.

C. Teachers in charter schools

Charter school teachers differ in their characteristics and in facets of their employment. Here we present comparative descriptive statistics about charter school teachers, while discussing research that seeks to explain differences in Section VI. Table 4 summarizes a number of differences between charter schools and TPSs, also providing corresponding values for private schools when available. All values are drawn from the 2011/12 Schools and Staffing Survey, a nationally representative sample conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics. We highlight some comparisons of charter school teachers to those in TPSs. Table 4 also provides information about private schools, but we leave to the reader to examine differences with respect to private schools.

Minority teachers make up a substantially larger proportion of teachers in charter schools than in TPSs, perhaps reflecting the frequent urbanicity and concentration of minorities in many charter schools. Gender differences are minor. Research has emphasized the relative youthfulness of charter school teachers and their relative lack of teaching experience. More than a quarter of charter school teachers have less than 4 years of teaching experience. Moreover, the average tenure of teachers in charter schools is just 3.6 years as compared to 8.1 years in TPSs. This
relates to teacher turnover in charter schools, a major issue to which we will return to. Charter school teachers have less training; 52.3% have a bachelor’s degree as their most advanced degree, while the corresponding percentage in TPSs is 39.4, this because 56.8% of TPS teachers have a more advanced degree. Charter school teachers earn substantially less, and a higher percentage have part of their earnings linked to student performance, though not a large proportion of earnings. Charter school teachers are required to work modestly longer hours. As we saw in Table 1, average class sizes are broadly comparable between charter and TPSs.

Other data on charter school teachers are not systematically collected, but various studies clarify other differences between charter school teachers and TPS teachers. Charter school teachers are frequently not certified or not certified in the area in which they teach while states require TPS teachers to be certified. This is why many TPS teachers have master’s degrees, which is required for certification in many states. In 2011, of the then 41 states that authorized charter schools, only 23 of them had the same certification requirements for charter school teachers as for TPS teachers.¹⁴ Fourteen states of the latter do not require that 100 percent of charter teachers be certified, the minimum percentage ranging from 30 to 90. The remaining states do not require certification, though the charter authorizer might impose requirements. It should be noted that NCLB requires teachers of core subjects in all public schools, including charters, to be “highly qualified,” which has likely induced more certification in charter schools. Podgursky and Ballou (2001) provide early data for 1997-98 from a survey they conducted of teachers in seven states that had charter schools.¹⁵ The proportion of charter schools that had more than 50% of teachers not certified was about 18.5%, with virtually no such TPSs. Stuit and Smith (2009) and Cannata and Penaloza (2012) provide more recent data. Stuit and Smith analyze data from the 2003-04 Schools and Staffing Survey and Cannata and Penaloza develop data for 2007-08 for charters in eight states, matched to TPSs by state, geographic area, student racial and socio-economic composition, and size. Stuit and Smith report that 14.5% of teachers in charters had no certification, the corresponding percentage in TPSs equal to 1.5. Matching does not reduce this gap; Cannata and Penaloza found 18.7% of charter teachers held less than full certification as compared to 3.2% in the matched TPSs. In the ‘No Excuses’ charter schools in Boston studied in

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¹⁴ Here we are paraphrasing Exstrom’s (2012) summary on certification requirements, which she derives from NCES (2011).

¹⁵ The survey is not necessarily representative as they examined states with charter laws supporting relatively strong autonomy and due to possible selection in response.
Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (2011), 56.7% of high-school teachers are licensed to teach in their assignment relative to 88.8% in Boston TPSs.

The data on whether teachers attended highly selective colleges are mixed. Baker and Dickerson (2006) use data from 18 states and the District of Columbia from the 1999 SASS. Using Barron’s college selectivity rankings, they report that 12.1% of charter teachers graduated from the top two selectivity groups, the percentage in TPSs equal to 8.1. In a more recent study with broader geographic coverage, Stuit and Smith (2009) report virtually no difference, with about 25% graduating from a selective undergraduate institution. In their matched sample for eight states, Cannata and Penzola (2012) find that charter school teachers attend somewhat less selective colleges. TPS teachers are also more likely to earn their degrees from education departments (Stuit and Smith, 2009).

Unionization of charter school teachers is drastically lower than in TPSs. In Podursky and Ballou’s (2001) early sample only 8% of charter school teachers engaged in collective bargaining. Stuit and Smith (2009) report 39% of charter teachers are unionized, while 95.4% of TPS teachers are in unions. NAPCS reports that only 12.3% of charter school teachers were unionized in 2009-10. Among those that were unionized, 64% were unionized by state law. Tenure is much rarer in charter schools than in TPSs. Podursky and Ballou (2001) report that only 15% of the charter schools they studied awarded tenure and 63% of teachers were on one-year contracts. Turnover of charter school teachers is substantial and substantially higher than in TPSs. For example, 25% of teachers in charter schools left their school in 2003-04 in the Stuit and Smith (2009) data, while the comparable percentage in TPSs was 14.

Whether these differences can affect the performance of charter schools is an open question. In section V, we examine the evidence of the effectiveness of charter schools, including whether operational features affect school outcomes. But first, in the next section we examine the challenges of estimating these effects.

IV. Evaluating Charter Schools: Methodological Issues

Among the various aspects of the charter debate, none is more contentious than whether charter schools are having a positive effect on student achievement. As previously noted, advocates argue that charter schools could not only have a direct effect on students attending charter schools, but could have systemic effects on students attending TPSs through competitive pressure—i.e., because TPSs now have to compete for students, they will work harder and
In this section, we lay the groundwork for discussion of charter school effectiveness by discussing alternative empirical approaches and their strengths and weaknesses.

In the case of direct effects, an analysis is complicated by the fact that students and their families choose to attend charter schools. This choice may imply these students are different as they may be more engaged students and families than a typical student attending a TPS. Alternatively, students attending charter schools could be students who have not had success in traditional settings and are trying charter school as a last resort. Therefore, any observed differences in performance between students in charter and TPSs may not be the result from weaker or superior educational services in charter schools, but result from different unobserved characteristics of students. If these unobserved characteristics are not accounted for in a research study, they can create a “selection bias” and could lead researchers and policymakers to invalid conclusions about the level of success of choice schools.

The most obvious and strongest approach for dealing with the selection bias is to assign students randomly to charter and TPSs from a pool of all students. However, such random assignment has not occurred. This is not surprising since randomly assigning students in such a way would run counter to the reform itself as part of the theory behind charter schools is to have students match their needs and interest to the offerings of the schools. Forcing a student to attend a school randomly assigned to them would break this link. In lieu of a pure randomized design, researchers have often used one of four approaches: 1) lottery based design (which simulates randomized design), 2) fixed effect approaches, 3) matching procedures, and 4) instrumental variable (IV) approaches.

Among these approaches, many argue that the lottery based design is the most rigorous as it relies upon lottery assignment of oversubscribed schools as a natural experiment proxying random assignment to schools. As such, however, these evaluations answer a narrower question: Do outcomes improve for students who enroll in oversubscribed schools? The efficacy of the lottery schools is found by comparing the subsequent outcomes of lottery “winners” who attend the oversubscribed school with those of “losers” who are denied admission and attend another school. In fact, one would expect schools with wait lists to be the best schools, so the results may offer little insights into the performance of undersubscribed schools (Zimmer and Engberg,
2014). In addition, many students who enter an oversubscribed school may enter the school outside of the lottery including a sibling exception and a lottery analysis may not have inferences about these students. Furthermore, Tuttle, Gleason, and Clark (2012) raise challenges to employing the approach correctly as often schools do not keep careful records of students who entered a school through a lottery or outside of lottery as one example of a challenge.

An additional concern of a lottery analysis is attrition, which can come in two forms. First, a student assigned to a charter school via a lottery may attend less than the full time of the grades offered at a charter school (e.g., a student assigned to a charter high school may only attend 9th grade and then transfer out) or may not attend at all. Furthermore, a student assigned to a TPS could end up in undersubscribed charter school or could enter a charter school at a later date. Second, a student could exit the data set altogether as a student might end up attending a private school, move outside of the jurisdiction of the data set (e.g., move out of a district), or dropout of school. To the degree that either form of attrition is non-random, it can create bias.

There are two ways to address the first form of attrition. First, a researcher could do an intention-to-treat (ITT) analysis, in which a student, for research purposes, maintains his or her original assignment to a charter school or TPS regardless of the type of school a student actually attends. This approach maintains the random assignment, which guards against bias, but answers the policy question of what impact does randomly assigning a student to a charter school (but not necessarily attendance) have on student outcomes. Obviously, this is a less important question than the impact actual attendance at a charter school has on student outcomes. Therefore, researchers, in addition or alternative to doing an ITT analysis, often do a treatment-on-treated (TOT) analysis, in which a researcher employs an IV approach using the random assignment as an instrument. This analysis focuses on the question of the impact actual attendance has on student outcomes, but has the drawback of reduced breadth of inferences that comes with an IV approach (which we will describe later). So there is a tradeoff of the two approaches with the ITT approach having greater breadth of inferences, but answering a less policy relevant question,

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16 It should also be noted that researchers often employ a “lottery fixed effect” in these analyses as there is not one lottery for all charter schools, but often a lottery for each charter school and the lottery fixed effect is designed to control for differences across lotteries, including the number of students on the wait list. However, the lottery fixed effect approach weights charter schools with longer wait lists more than charter schools with shorter wait lists, which makes the results less generalizable as the results may be driven by a select number of charter schools with long wait lists (Reardon, 2009).
while the TOT approach answers a more policy relevant question, but has less breadth of inferences.

For the second form of attrition in which students disappear from the analysis, neither an ITT or TOT analysis will alleviate the possible bias. The concern is that students attriting out of a data set may be very different than students who remain. For instance, in analysis of magnet schools, Engberg, et al. (2014) found that more affluent students exited the data set of the urban district they were examining as many students exited for a suburban district or private school if they did not get into a magnet school via the lottery. In that case, the authors use a bounding technique to regain an unbiased estimate, but the approach provides a less precise estimate. While some lottery studies do not provide explicit discussion of the attrition issue, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) provide evidence that differential attrition of lottery winners and losers is small, and Dobbie and Fryer (2011b) provide evidence that their results are robust to correction for potential differential attrition.

When lottery based analyses are not possible, a fixed-effect approach with student-level longitudinal data is often used. A fixed-effect approach minimizes the problem of selection bias by comparing the academic gains of individual students over time switching between a TPS and a charter school (i.e., “switchers”). An advantage of this method over the lottery approach is that it applies to schools with and without waiting lists for admission. However, some researchers have raised concerns with this approach (Hoxby and Murarka, 2007; Ballou, Teasley, and Zeidner, 2007). These critics note that the fixed-effect approach does not provide an estimate for students who attend charter schools for the duration of the analysis (i.e., “non-switchers”) as the analysis requires a comparison of student outcomes in both contexts. Switchers may differ from non-switchers in important ways, so the results may not be applicable for students who are continuously enrolled in a charter school. Researchers also wonder about the motivation of students switching into charter school midway through their educational careers. For instance, Hoxby and Murarka (2007) argue that a fixed-effect approach cannot account for the possibility that students who, for example, perform poorly on a test may be especially likely to transfer to a charter school the following year. The dip in the performance could be a real dip caused by poor educational instruction, a disruption in a student’s life unrelated to a school, or it could be just
noise in test scores. Regardless of the reason for the dip, the fixed-effect approach could produce biased estimates. Even absent bias, studies that rely on student-level fixed effects answer a different—but also narrow question: Are student outcomes for those that switch to charter schools better when the students attend a charter school versus a TPS?

A recent set of studies by CREDO, a research center at Stanford headed by Margaret Raymond, used an alternative approach to the fixed effect and lottery approaches (CREDO, 2009; CREDO, 2013a). These studies, which have been cited often both by researchers and stakeholders in the charter debate, used what they term a virtual control records (VCR) approach, which is a matching procedure where a “virtual” match for each charter student is found in a TPS. These students are matched based on known demographic attributes, grade in school, eligibility or participation in special support programs (including free and reduced lunch programs, English language learner status and special education status), and a baseline test result. Much like the fixed-effect approach, the VCR approach has the advantage over lottery based studies in that a broad set of charter schools can be included, not just oversubscribed schools. However, as with the fixed-effect approach, the internal validity of the analysis requires stronger assumptions than in lottery studies as the approach assumes that students that have similar observed characteristics and baseline test scores also have similar unobservable characteristics. Relative to the fixed-effect approach, the VCR approach has the advantage of including a broad set of students as the analysis is not restricted to only students switching between schools. It includes all students who have a baseline test score in a charter school. However, the need to have a baseline test score implies a potential limitation in the question the analysis can answer, as it cannot examine the accumulated impact for many students who first attend a charter school prior to baseline tested grade. For instance, if a student enters a charter school in Kindergarten and the first year a student is tested is 3rd grade, which would be the baseline test score used for matching students between charter and TPSs, the analysis will estimate the differential gain or loss between charter and TPS from this baseline test score to test scores in later grades (e.g., 4th grade, 5th grade). If charter schools provides the most benefit or are least effective at the early grades, this analysis would miss that part of the charter school contribution.

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17 All tests have some level of noise in their measurement, and some students will score lower or higher on a single administration of a test than the average score they would receive if they took multiple, similar tests. Thus, a student could score poorly on a particular test in one year and then the next year score higher as they bounce back to a score more reflective of their learning.
A fourth and final approach, which is less frequently used in examining effectiveness of charter schools (relative to the fixed-effect and lottery-based approaches) is an instrumental variable (IV) approach. An IV approach uses an “instrument” to control for the choices students and their families make and reduces the selection bias in estimating the effects of charter schools on student outcomes. A valid instrument must impact the choice of a charter versus TPS but must not itself affect the educational outcome. While an IV approach could have advantages relative to the lottery-based design and fixed-effect approaches as it may be more inclusive of students and schools, it is often difficult to find an “instrument” that is correlated with the choice families make and uncorrelated with ultimate educational outcomes. Another limitation of the IV approach is that the effect only applies to individuals who are at the margin on the instrument used (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996). For example, in the context of charter schools, distance to a charter school has been used as an instrument. This may be a valid instrument, but the results only apply to individuals on the margin based on distance from a charter. From a policy perspective, we would like to know the charter effect for the broader population, but the IV estimates do not provide this. So again, this approach answers the question of effectiveness for a narrow population. This approach has often been used when the outcome measure is not a repeated outcome measured both during and after treatment, such a test score, but often a single measured outcome that only occurs after treatment, such as graduation rates or college attendance.

These methodological considerations suggest that differences in findings across studies could result from differences in research approaches in addition to alternative policy settings in which charter schools are examined. We will discuss this point further as we synthesize findings across the existing literature.

V. Effectiveness of Charter Schools

In the last decade or so, there has been a rapid expansion of the number of studies that have examined the direct effects of charter schools; and, at this point, it would be hard to provide an accurate account of all the studies. However, only a subset of these studies has tried to address the selection bias inherent in estimating a direct effect. Nevertheless, the number of studies with rigorous research designs is numerous and there are too many to summarize individually. Therefore, we synthesize the findings by research designs highlighting the more prominent studies as well as studies that have looked at unique outcomes. We synthesize by research design
because, as we noted above, each research design is answering somewhat narrowly defined and different questions with different inferences.

A. Achievement Effects

We first synthesize across fixed-effect studies as this approach was used by the earliest and most often cited studies (Zimmer, et al., 2003; Bifulco and Ladd, 2006; Sass, 2005; Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin, 2007; Booker, et al., 2007; Imberman, 2011) and has been the most widely used approach for estimating charter effects. Synthesizing across the fixed effect studies in various geographic locations, researchers have generally found no effect, small positive or even small negative effects. Digging deeper into some of these studies, researchers have often found that student achievement for charter schools in their initial years are often negative, but student achievement improve as these schools mature (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Sass, 2006; Booker, et al., 2007; Hanushek, et al., 2007; Ni & Rorrer, 2012; Zimmer, et al., 2012). This suggests that policymakers should not expect charter schools to have a positive impact overnight, and it may take time for these schools to have an impact, if ever.

As previously mentioned, some have argued that the assumptions of the fixed-effect model are too strong and studies relying upon lotteries to assign students randomly to a charter and TPSs are more conclusive (Hoxby & Murarka, 2007). Based on this argument, along with the Institute Educational Science’ (IES) emphasis on randomized control trials when funding research, a number of lottery-based studies have recently emerged after the wave of fixed-effect studies. These studies have been much more supportive of charter schools with nearly all of these studies finding positive effects—in some cases, quite large effects (Hoxby and Rockoff, 2004; Hoxby, Kang, & Murarka, 2009; Abdulkadiroglu, et al., 2010; Curto and Fryer, 2011; Tuttle, et al., 2013; Wong, et al., 2014)—with only one finding no effect, a study by Mathematica of charter middle schools (Gleason, et al., 2010). However, even this study, while finding no positive effects on average across all schools, found some positive effects for urban charter middle schools.

Therefore, many advocates for charter schools fixate on the lottery-based studies arguing that these studies have stronger research design, but generally fail to note that these studies have weaker external validity than fixed-effect studies or observational studies in general.

Because both fixed-effect and the lottery-based approaches received a fair amount of criticism, two recent studies by CREDO used the VCR matching procedure discussed in the previous

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18 By our count, the fixed effect approach has been used in studies evaluating charter schools in at least 12 states.
section (CREDO, 2009; CREDO, 2013a). In these studies, CREDO tried to address the external validity weaknesses of lottery-based and the fixed-effect studies by including all schools, not just oversubscribed schools of a lottery-based study, and a larger set of students, not just the switchers of a fixed-effect study. While we previously noted that the VCR approach examines the effect of charter schools relative to a baseline test, which limits the ability to study impacts in the early grades, these studies were unique in that they included longitudinal student-level data from multiple states. The two CREDO studies included 16 and 27 states, respectively. To our knowledge, the only other studies that can make a claim of using data from multiple states are a RAND study using a fixed-effect approach (Zimmer, et al., 2009, Zimmer, et al., 2012) and the Mathematica charter middle school study (Gleason, et al., 2010) using the lottery-based approach.

CREDO presented results in a unique way, reporting the proportion of charter schools that outperformed their locally matched TPS, which made their findings easier to interpret for a lay audience, including the media. CREDO found in the 2009 study that 17 percent of charter schools outperformed TPSs in math, but this number grew to 29 percent in the 2013 study. On a similar note, CREDO found that 31 percent performed worse than their TPSs counterpart in the 2009 study, but only 19 percent in the 2013 study. While this suggests some improvement between the timeframes of the studies, the 2013 study’s overall national estimate of charter schools suggests little average impact with no statistically significant difference in math and a slight positive effect in reading of 0.01 of standard deviation. In general, these results have been interpreted in two ways. The more optimistic view is that overall performance of charter schools is improving over time. The more negative view is that many students performance in many charter schools are still lagging behind students in TPSs and, overall, the results across the two studies do not show a pattern of systematic improvement.

Comparing the results across the studies using lottery-based and observational approaches of matching and fixed effects, the studies using lottery-based approaches are much more positive. As previously noted, one could argue that the lottery-based findings should be the only ones trusted as lottery-based approach employs an approach that best mimics a randomized design.

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19 The 2009 study includes 15 states plus the District of Columbia while the 2013 study actually included 25 states plus the District of Columbia and New York City.
20 Mathematica also had a national study of charter schools managed by charter management organizations (CMOs) (Tuttle, et al., 2013) and a study of schools managed by the individual CMO of KIPP, but these studies were not meant to be representative of charter schools in general.
providing a stronger guard against self-selection.\textsuperscript{21} However, there are a number of reasons why the set of findings from the lottery-based approach and observational approaches could differ beyond the rigor of the approach. First, many of the locations studied in the two sets of approaches do not overlap. Because each state has its own charter laws and the local environments can affect the adoption of charter schools, the performance of charter schools could vary from location to location. Therefore, both sets of results could be right with results varying not because of the research approach, but because of the location. In one case in which the location overlapped across the different approaches, the results for the VCR approach were similar to the results from the lottery-based approach (CREDO, 2013b). Second, the two sets of studies could be evaluating two very different sets of charter schools\textsuperscript{22} and even different sets of students within the same charter schools (Zimmer and Engberg, 2013). As noted previously, while the fixed effect and matching approaches tend to include all charter schools with tested students, a lottery-based approach only uses oversubscribed schools and only students who enter these via a lottery. In addition to the CREDO (2013b) study, others have addressed these issues by using both lottery-based and observational approaches for the same set of schools and found substantively similar results (Abdulkadiroglu, et al., 2011; Furgeson, et al., 2012; Tuttle, et al., 2013).\textsuperscript{23} This suggests that differences in schools rather than differences in methodologies underlie the differences in findings. Evidence in this regard is provided Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (2011). In their demonstration that observational approach for their lottery sample gives comparable findings to their lottery estimates, go on to note that the observational approach suggests that “…the charter schools in our lottery study are among the best in Boston. Observational estimates of the effect of time spent in charter schools that were not included in the lottery study are economically and statistically significant, but only about half as large as the

\textsuperscript{21} An alternative explanation is that charter schools are more likely to be oversubscribed if they locate in areas where the TPSs are low quality. Therefore, part of the explanation for the strong performance could be that the nearby TPS are really poor performing (Deming, 2014). This does not suggest that the results are wrong in these analyses, it just raises questions of whether the results would hold if charter schools were scaled up to different locations with higher performing nearby TPSs.

\textsuperscript{22} In their demonstration that observational approach for their lottery sample gives comparable findings to their lottery estimates. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) go on to note that the observational approach suggests that “…the charter schools in our lottery study are among the best in Boston. Observational estimates of the effect of time spent in charter schools that were not included in the lottery study are economically and statistically significant, but only about half as large as the corresponding estimates for lottery-sample schools.”

\textsuperscript{23} At the very least, Zimmer and Engberg (2013) advocate that researchers using lottery-based analysis should examine whether students in undersubscribed schools or enter an oversubscribed schools outside of lottery have similar observable characteristics and value added gains in test scores as a check to see whether there are red flags of making inferences beyond the population examined.
corresponding estimates for lottery-sample schools.” It is fair to say that researchers have not come to consensus on charter school effectiveness because these differences in findings. An interpretation that fits the evidence is that some charter schools, including especially the oversubscribed schools, are in fact much more effective with respect to student achievement than their counterpart TPSs, while the majority of charter schools are not superior, and some are inferior, to their counterpart TPSs.

Differences in findings may also arise from peer effects associated with student selection. While the requirement for oversubscribed schools to choose students by lottery precludes selective admission by charters, charters may induce self-selection by adopting a more challenging curriculum, more demanding standards for conduct, longer school days, more stringent graduation requirements, or other policies that attract more able and motivated students. It is natural to wonder, for example, whether charter schools with “No Excuses” policies may induce such favorable selection. As summarized in, Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (QJE 2011, p 704): “No Excuses schools are characterized by small size, frequent testing, a long school day and year, selective teacher hiring, and a strong student work, ethic. Other features include an emphasis on discipline and comportment, teacher-led whole-class instruction, and the absence of computer-aided instruction.” Charter schools in Boston studied by Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (2011) had 35% more hours of middle-school instruction per year than Boston Public Schools (BPS), and 26% more hours of high-school instruction. Evidence of more stringent graduation requirements is provided in Angrist, et al. (2013). Boston charter high schools students in their study have 7.6 percentage point higher 12 grade repetition than their lotteried-out counterparts.24 As noted previously, and as Angrist et al. (2013) highlight in a thorough discussion and analysis, there are three broad channels by which selection could give rise to differential performance between charter and TPSs. The most obvious channel is if charter schools attract more academically able students than TPSs. A second is if less able students exit charter schools at a higher rate than in TPSs. A third is if peers in charter schools generate greater positive spillovers than in TPS counterparts. Lottery studies effectively address the first channel by exploiting random selection of students. The random selection exploited in lottery studies also addresses the

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24 This grade repetition appears to be concentrated almost entirely among male students: The four-year male graduation rate from charter high schools studied by Angrist, et al. (2013) is 22.5 percentage points lower (p=.03) than lotteried out counterparts, with that differential falling to 2.2 percentage points (p=.82) after five years. The corresponding values for female students are 4.2 and 1.3, with neither being significant.
second channel effectively if students who ever attended a charter school are thereafter counted as charter school students, as in the Angrist et al. (2013) analysis of Boston charter high schools. The third channel may, however, remain, even in lottery studies. Students who are not selected in charter school lotteries may attend schools with less beneficial peer attributes than those who are selected. This channel does not invalidate the estimated impact of charter schools in lottery studies, but gains achieved via peer effects have different policy implications than gains achieved through superior delivery of education. Investigating the potential role of peer effects, Angrist, et al. (2013) find, after eliminating transition grades, a 15 percentage point higher switch rate out of charter schools (p=.08) as compared to switches made by lottery losers. This differential switching gives rise to a 15 percentage point higher switch rate out of charter schools (p=.08) as compared to switches made by lottery losers. This differential switching gives rise.

Angrist, et al. (2013) go on to investigate whether the peer-effect benefits of this differential in peer baseline achievement can account for the superior academic outcomes in the charter schools. They conclude it does not. The same conclusion is reached for charter middle schools in Boston by Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (2011).

A recent Mathematica study summarized by Nichols-Barrer, et al. (2014) undertakes a detailed assessment of the potential role of peer characteristics and potential peer effects in 19 KIPP middle schools. These schools are among the 35 KIPP middle schools that opened in 2005 or earlier, with locations in nine different states and in Washington, DC. They find that students admitted to KIPP schools are observationally similar to students in nearby public middle schools. Similar patterns of attrition are also found, with lower achieving students being more likely to leave. They find that KIPP schools have lower replacement rates and replace with higher achieving students. They conclude that, taking even the high end of peer effect estimates from the literature, the resulting differential in peer achievement is not nearly large enough to account for the differential in academic outcomes between KIPP middle schools and their TPS middle-school counterparts.

As noted by Nichols-Barrer, et al. (2014), peer spillovers might arise from bringing together highly motivated students, and such peer benefits might not be captured by peer mean achievement. For example, it is plausible that, among students who are identical in demographic characteristics and prior academic achievement, those who voluntarily seek out middle schools that require 35% more school hours per year, as in the Boston middle schools studied by
Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (2011), are more motivated than those who do not seek out such schools. It is also plausible that concentrating such students together in schools, as occurs among lottery winners, would result in beneficial peer effects not realized by comparably motivated lottery losers. If peer motivation does convey spillover benefits, it is possible that No Excuses charter schools adversely affect non-charter TPSs by drawing the most motivated students out of TPSs. It should be noted, however, that the equivalence found by Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (2011) between the lottery approach and the observational approach provides evidence against this peer-effect argument. Suppose there are unobserved differences in motivation between those who apply for no-excuses schools and those who do not with the former being more motivated than the latter. The observational approach, which cannot match on unobserved motivation, will then have a less motivated control group than the lottery losers. Hence, the achievement difference between lottery winners and equally motivated lottery losers should be greater than the differences between lottery winners and the less motivated observational control group. The fact that no such difference is found suggests that unobserved motivation may not be a major factor and highlights the value of observational and lottery approaches in lottery studies. Devising additional research strategies to investigate the potential for peer spillover effects that might arise from unobserved motivation remains an important research issue for the lottery approach.

An alternative approach is directly to evaluate the no-excuses model by implementing it in existing public schools. While, to our knowledge, this has not been done by those who operate no-excuses charter schools, a remarkable set of experiments has been undertaken to investigate whether implementing changes deemed best practices from charter school into public schools can deliver the achievement gains found in no-excuses charter schools. In an experiment in Houston, five practices identified by Dobbie and Fryer (2013) were introduced into 20 low-performing Houston schools in a randomized trial. As summarized by Fryer (2014), the five practices were “…increased time, better human capital, more student-level differentiation, frequent use of data to alter the scope and sequence of classroom instruction, and a culture of high expectations.” In particular, the following were among changes that were implemented: Time in school was increased by 21%, 19 of 20 principals were replaced and 46% of teachers left.

25 KIPP contracted with Denver Public Schools in 2004 to operate a school that had been closed by the state due to poor academic performance. KIPP withdrew in 2007 citing inability to find a qualified leader for the school. See Sherry (2007) and also an interview with KIPP spokesman Steve Mancini: http://www.cpr.org/news/story/denvers-cole-college-prep-close.
or were removed, tutoring software was provided along with extra tutoring support to students determined to be of high need, more frequent assessment examinations were employed to evaluate student progress and identify students needing extra help, and an effort was made to inculcate high expectations including having schools and parent signing contracts analogous to those used in no-excuses charter schools.

Analyzing the results, Fryer (2014) finds statistically significant annual gains in math of .15. Analyzing the results, Fryer (2014) finds statistically insignificant gains in reading.²⁶ By way of comparison, these math gains are comparable to those found by Dobbie and Fryer (2013) for New York City charter schools and by Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (2011) in the non-lottery charters in Boston, and roughly half the size of gains found Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (2011) in over-subscribed charters in Boston. Lower impacts on reading than math are not unusual in lottery studies of charters, though significant positive effects are often found, e.g. Abdulkadiroglu, et al. (2011). Fryer goes on to describe and analyze interventions similar in spirit that were conducted in Denver and Chicago. In Denver, there were seven schools in the treatment group, and estimated impacts are comparable to those in Houston. In Chicago, there were 29 schools, but selection was not by randomization. Using a matching approach, Fryer estimates treatment effects in math about one third the size found in Houston and small reading gains on the order of those found in Houston.

Fryer provides a cautionary summary of the daunting challenges to be overcome in broader implementation of these changes in TPSs. For example, in the 20 treatment schools in Houston, 46% of teachers left or were removed, and 19 of 20 principals were replaced with over 300 candidates interviewed in the process of replacements for those who were removed. Fryer also points to fidelity of implementation as an ongoing challenge, noting the difficulties often encountered in efforts to scale up interventions. Nonetheless, the Houston experiment is encouraging with respect to potential gains from injecting charter best practices into low-performing TPSs.

B. Effects on Other Outcomes

²⁶ Fryer notes two issues that potentially affect the results. He observes (p. 36) that publicity in advance of the experiment might have induced selective attrition in advance of the experimental treatment that is not captured in the analysis. He also notes (p. 37) that students in the treated elementary schools are 1.4% more likely than the control schools to be missing a test score, and he indicates that the bounding approach of Lee (2009) (trimming the 1.4% of the treatment group with the highest annual gains) systematically alters the results.
In some cases, researchers have moved beyond examining test scores alone and are examining other outcomes, including alternative student measures while the students are attending charter schools including behavioral outcomes (like risky health choices) or attendance outcomes (Imberman, 2011; Wong, et al., 2014). Other researchers have examined long-term outcomes including high-school graduation rates as well as college preparation, attendance, persistence, and type (two-year versus four-year colleges) and, recently, earnings (Booker, et al., 2009; Booker, et al., 2011; Furgeson, et al., 2012; Angrist, et al., 2013; Dobbie and Fryer, 2013; Booker, et al., 2014). These studies have used a variety of approaches including fixed effects (for outcomes measured multiple times like attendance and behavioral), matching procedures, IVs (using proximity to charter schools as an instrument), and lotteries, each having strengths and weakness as previously discussed. However, across these approaches, unlike the test score results, the findings have been more consistently positive.

Coupling the overall results of the achievement and alternative-outcomes literatures together, it could be argued that while charter schools are not having a consistent effect on test scores, there is emerging research suggesting that they are having more consistent positive effects on alternative outcomes, which is consistent with some research of vouchers. For example, Wolf, et al. (2010) found no statistically significant effect on test scores for Washington, D.C. voucher recipients, but did find effects on high school graduation. In some cases, researchers have found this within their charter studies. Imberman (2011), using a fixed-effect approach in an anonymous district, found little effect on test scores, but large effects on attendance and behavioral outcomes. Similarly, Zimmer and colleagues (2009) found little effect on test scores, but found positive and substantial effects on high school graduation and attending college in Chicago. It is too soon to know whether this pattern will hold up as other researchers examine these outcomes in other places and over time. However, if it does, this may explain why charter schools continue to be popular, even with a lack of consistent evidence that charter schools outperform students in TPSs. It may be that families have goals for their child beyond improving test scores and families see charter schools as a means of achieving these goals, even if they do not achieve the goal of improving test scores.

VI. Inside the Black Box

Controlling for differences in students, it is of obvious interest to explain differences in educational outcomes between charter school students and those attending other schools.
A. Charter School Teachers

We first examine research on charter schools and teachers. While identifying effective teachers and measuring their relative productivity is challenging and controversial, that teachers affect educational outcomes is unquestioned. The relative autonomy charter schools have in hiring, rewarding, utilizing, and firing teachers is touted by charter proponents as a key advantage relative to TPSs. As noted previously, charter schools are usually not bound by unions, nor must they follow state regulations like those governing awarding of tenure. Charter schools usually face reduced teacher certification constraints if any. On the other hand, charter schools frequently serve students that may be more difficult to teach, locate where it is less desirable to live, lack state-of-the-art facilities, and may face tighter budget constraints.

In Section III we provided some descriptive statistics about charter school teachers. Among other differences relative to TPS teachers, charter school teachers are younger, less experienced, less educated, less credentialed, and they earn less. We discuss research that seeks to explain differences in observable characteristics of charter school teachers. The linkage between observable teacher characteristics and effectiveness of teachers is, however, mixed. Of the 34 “high quality estimates” of the effect of a master’s degree on student performance, Hanushek and Rivkin (2006) report that 91% of the estimates are insignificant and the remaining 9% find a negative effect. Of the 37 high quality estimates on teacher experience, 56% find no statistically significant effect, though 41% find a significantly positive effect. As summarized in Hanushek and Rivkin (2006), further investigation has found that teachers develop their skills very quickly, mainly in the first year, this nonlinearity in experience effects on teacher effectiveness likely explaining the mixed result. Of the 17 high quality estimates on teacher salary, 82% find no significant effect, though the remaining studies find a significantly positive effect. An alternative approach to using teacher characteristics in assessing their effectiveness is to estimate teacher effectiveness directly as a fixed effect on student scores. This approach has been applied in some analyses of charter schools. Thus, we also discuss this research, including a summary of the technique and issues in applying it.

The stock of teachers in charter schools depends on who is hired and who continues, whether by choice or dismissal. As noted in Section III, teacher turnover in charter schools is substantial if not extreme. We first discuss research that regards the stock of teacher characteristics in charter
schools. Next we discuss research concerned with the characteristics of teachers that continue to teach. Last, we discuss research on teachers that move to charter schools from TPS schools. Much of the research investigating differences in charters and TPS teachers relies on a version of a regression with a teacher characteristic as the dependent variable, a dummy variable if the teacher is in a charter school, and with a set of other explanatory variables like characteristics of the school including student characteristics. Some issues to keep in mind in evaluating this research are as follows. Giving a causal interpretation to the charter school effect is open to question since charter school entry is endogenous. If, for example, charter school entry is more probable in areas where the local teachers are relatively ineffective (e.g., gaining approval is easier), then the charter school may need to hire from a weaker pool of teachers to staff its classes. Of course, researchers take steps to address this kind of issue.

A second issue is that the “charter effect” is likely to combine supply-side and demand-side effects. If, for example, teachers that are less effective in increasing test scores are present in charter schools it could be because charter schools value this trait less and/or because highly effective teachers are averse to working in charter schools. Again, research has paid some attention to this confluence, but a lack of economic modelling that frames the empirical research makes it difficult to interpret the estimates.

A third issue is that an estimated charter effect on their teachers is arguably a residual effect, suggesting some element of charter schools that remains unexplained. With this view, the ideal would be to have a model that controls for practices and specific characteristics of schools that fully explains equilibrium teacher characteristics with then no residual effect of working in a charter school. This is the “black box issue” applied to teachers. The research generally seeks to identify charter effects independent of specific practices and school characteristics, but residual effects remain large. It is also possible that some teachers simply have an aversion (or preference) to work in a charter school, e.g., as a result of their political views.

Baker and Dickerson (2006) examine whether teaching in a charter school predicts teachers that come from more highly ranked undergraduate institutions. The hypothesis is that the flexibility in hiring that charter schools have (e.g., not having to satisfy certification requirements) and in retaining teachers (e.g., through their salary policies) will lead them to employ teachers from better undergraduate institutions. Data on teachers is for 18 states and the Washington DC from the 1999 SASS, including TPSs, charter schools, Catholic schools, and private non-Catholic
schools, specifically, members of the National Association for Independent Schools (NAIS). Key factors that are investigated are whether the state requires 100% or less certification of charter school teachers, a ranking of the autonomy of charter schools in the state developed by the Center for Education Reform, and the relative supply of students from highly ranked schools by state. College rankings are based on Barron’s, where the variable used in their analysis are dichotomous with “highly competitive” or “most competitive” considered as selective colleges. Logit estimation predicts whether a teacher went to a selective college using dummy variables for the type of school and other controls. These equations are specified separately for states that require 100% vs. less than 100% certification for charter teachers. Results from SUR logit regressions for states that require 100% certification and those that do not are as follows. The estimates imply that the odds a charter-school teacher will have attended a selective college is twice that of a TPS teacher and highly significant in states that do not require 100% certification, and 1.3 times as high and significant at the 10% level in states that do. The analogous estimates for NAIS schools are highly significant and, respectively, equal to 4.7 and 3.3. The “state high quality supply share,” which measures the state supply of graduates from selective colleges has a large and significant coefficient. Catholic schools are not significantly different from TPSs in hiring teachers from selective colleges, with point estimates less than 1. Rural and percent in poverty in the school are usually significant with point estimates less than 1. Evidence on the effect of salary is mixed, with average salary either not significant or increasing the probability of a teacher having a degree from a selective college.

The analysis provides evidence that barriers to hiring teachers in TPSs from selective colleges play a role in limiting their presence. While the analysis considers both supply- and demand-side factors to some degree, it cannot well identify the preference of graduates from selective colleges to work in certain types of schools relative to school demands to hire them. As we noted in Section III, the more recent evidence on charter school teachers indicates the same or fewer graduates from relatively selective colleges. One can only speculate as to why these changes have occurred.

\[27\] Regressions are also conducted separating by the ranking of autonomy of charter schools, and by states for some states. Regressions that, alternatively, use interactions are also run. Similar results obtain to those we report.

\[28\] An odds ratio is a ratio of probabilities. For example, if a charter teacher attends a selective college with probability .2 and a TPS teacher with probability .1, the odds of a charter teacher attending a selective college are twice as high as for a TPS teacher.
Cannata and Penaloza (2012) examine supply- and demand-side factors that determining charter school teacher characteristics, and how these vary across charter schools that are managed differently. Part of the analysis concerns identifying which teachers actively chose their school rather than essentially taking the only available job. A related question investigated is whether charter school teachers have more of a choice as to where they work as compared to TPS teachers. Identifying teachers that have made a real choice about where to work then permits more credible investigation about what characteristics of the school determined their choice.

The authors surveyed teachers during the 2007-08 school year in 59 charter schools and 59 matched TPSs in California, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, and Wisconsin. A total of 1,015 charter school teachers and 1,300 traditional public schools teachers were surveyed. Schools were matched on being in the same state, geographic proximity, grade-range served, racial-ethnic composition, socio-economic status, and size. Despite the latter matching, charter schools were still substantially different, with fewer students per school a significantly higher proportion of black students. Among the surveyed charter schools, 19% are operated by Best Academy (an EMO that operates in multiple states), 8% were operated by other for-profit and not-for-profit charter management organizations, and 73% were independent charters.

The survey had teachers report whether they “chose this school over positions at other schools because they wanted to teach here,” or “this was the only opening for which I was qualified” or “I was assigned to this school.” Those that answered “yes” to the first choice are considered to have made an “active choice.” Teachers that made an “active choice” were asked further questions about what influenced their choice, assigning a number from a 5-point scale to 21 school characteristics (e.g., “principal support” or “like-minded educators”), while also listing the top three characteristics that determined their choice. Part of the analysis regresses whether the teacher made an active choice on teacher and school characteristics, including a charter dummy variable, or using dummy variables for the three charter affiliation types. For teachers that made an active choice, their rankings of school characteristics are regressed on the same set of explanatory variables. Estimation is also done using propensity scores as another explanatory variable (using a regression of charter on school characteristics), as an additional control for school characteristics.
Mean analysis supports what has generally been found, that charter teachers are less experienced, less likely to be certified, are less likely to have graduate degrees, are more likely to be black, and are more likely to have become teachers while changing job type. Selectivity of the college attended is here lower in charter schools. However, there are important differences across the categories of charter affiliation. Only Best Academy teachers attended significantly less selective colleges. Best Academy teachers were also significantly less likely to be black.

Regarding having made an active choice, no statistical difference in the means between TPSs and all charter schools is found. However, in the estimation controlling for teacher and school characteristics, charter school teachers were more likely to have made an active choice. This is driven mainly by the non-affiliated charter schools, with the coefficient estimate on active choice for Best Academy charter teachers insignificant. Prior experience, being black (or other minority, non-Hispanic), and teaching in a school with a higher percent of FRL students significantly predict active choice.

School characteristics like “principal support” that an actively choosing teacher ranked as among the top three in choosing their job are assigned a 1 in logit regressions on school and teacher characteristics and a dummy variable for either charter school or a set of dummy variables for the three different charter school affiliations. Charter teachers significantly favored “agreeing with the school’s mission” and “autonomy over teaching” relative to TPS teachers, and significantly cared less about “close to where I live,” “positive reputation,” and “job security.” Again, though, these preference differences are explained by teachers in non-affiliated and other-affiliation schools, with no significant differences expressed by teachers in the Best Academy schools (in the regressions without propensity scores).

The salient take-away from the paper is as the authors express: “… the data suggest that charter school teachers are a diverse group and the variation between different types of charter schools may be just as important as the difference between teachers in charter and traditional public schools (p. 16).” In particular, the evidence is that the “Best Academy” teachers are very different from other charter school teachers.

Cowen and Winters (2013) and Carruthers (2012) use value-added estimation of teacher effectiveness in their analyses of charter school teachers. The key application to teachers of the value-added approach estimates teacher effectiveness semi-parametrically using teacher fixed
effects. We briefly describe the approach, borrowing heavily from Hanushek and Rivkin (2006), and then go on to discuss its application to charter schools.  

With multiple years of data, the approach regresses student scores on past score or scores, student characteristics, time variant peer student characteristics in the classroom and school, other time variant school characteristics (e.g., per student expenditure), and a teacher fixed effect. The teacher fixed effect estimates the achievement (score) gain attributable to the teacher if certain conditions are met, providing an overall measure of teacher effectiveness. Thus, the approach is silent about observable characteristics of teachers that might determine or be correlated with effectiveness, but provides a summary measure. To provide an unbiased estimate, the approach assumes that teacher effects are constant across students and settings, though the fixed effect could be interacted with say previous student score if value added to the test depends on the student’s baseline. It also assumes that any unobservable classroom/school characteristics are random, obviously a strong assumption. If, for example, highly motivated students are able to get into relatively effective teachers’ classes, then estimates of teacher effectiveness will be biased. Hanushek and Rivkin (2006) discuss some techniques to alleviate concerns about nonrandomness.

The multi-year specification controls for random measurement error and random classroom variation of unobservables. School fixed effects are sometimes used, thus controlling for time invariant unobserved school impacts, identification then within schools. With school fixed effects, however, the distribution of teacher effectiveness in schools must remain constant since the effectiveness estimate is relative to peer teachers. The multi-year approach also assumes teacher effectiveness is time invariant, which is reasonable for relatively short periods especially with more experienced teachers.

Estimates using the approach indicate large differences in teacher effectiveness. Comparing, for example, teachers at the 5th to the 95th effectiveness percentile, Hanushek (1992) finds that a good teacher increases average student learning of low-income minority students by one grade level relative to a bad teacher. Kane and Staiger (2008) provide experimental support for the approach by showing that value-added estimates of teacher effectiveness prior to their random assignment of teachers to classrooms provided unbiased estimates of teacher effects and

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29 See Hanushek and Rivkin (2006) for references and a more complete discussion.
explained “just over half of the teacher-level variation in average student achievement during the experiment (p. 3).”

While their focus is on the relative pattern of teacher attrition in charter versus TPSs, Cowen and Winter’s (2013) value-added estimates of teacher effectiveness are of interest in their own right. They use a rich data set containing scores in Florida on reading and math on the required standardized (FCAT) exam for all grade-school students for the years 2002-3 through 2008-9. They also have data on all teachers in charter schools and TPSs, and can well connect students to their teachers. Grade school students take the exam in 3rd, 4th, and 5th grade, and they use the 4th and 5th grade scores to estimate teacher effectiveness, with a rich set of control variables including the student’s 3rd grade score. Estimates with a school fixed effect are highly correlated with estimates without the school fixed effect. Using multiple-year lagged scores has minor effects on the effectiveness estimates, this suggesting nonrandom student classroom assignment may not be introducing bias. They estimate teacher effectiveness separately for teachers with less than four years of experience and for more experienced teachers.

Their estimated pdf of effectiveness of TPS teachers in Florida is rightward shifted relative to charter teachers in both reading and math, more so in math. The relatively higher effectiveness of TPS teachers is statistically significant, with mean difference about one-tenth of a standard deviation. They state: “we caution readers against an unrestrained interpretation of these results as evidence that TPS teachers vastly exceed charter teachers,” noting that there is the “possibility that TPS teachers are simply more effective instructors for the standardized statewide exam (p. 27).” Their caveat notwithstanding, they provide interesting evidence that charter teachers are less effective, consistent with the research finding less experienced and less educated teachers in charter schools. We discuss Carruthers (2012) value-added evidence below as it pertains to the subset of teachers that move to charter schools from TPSs.

As reported above, teacher turnover in charter schools is significant and significantly higher than in TPSs. Stuit and Smith (2009) use data from 2003-04 Schools and Staffing Survey administered by NCES and the 2004-05 Teacher Follow-Up Survey to investigate differences in teacher turnover between charter schools and TPSs, and what explains these differences. Variation in school policies, teacher characteristics, school characteristics including management of charter schools, and labor-market conditions are considered. Turnover can be moving to a new
school or leaving the profession. Sixteen states are in the sample, with 1,753,390 TPS teachers in 45,820 schools and 35,570 charter school teachers in 1,900 schools. Overall, 25% of charter teachers turned over after 2003-04, compared to 14% in TPSs. In charter schools, 14% left the profession, while 7% in TPSs left the profession. They perform multinomial logit regression, with “stayed in the school” as the reference choice and “moved to a new school” and “left the profession” the alternative choices. In addition to a dummy variable for being a charter school teacher, they include interactions for whether the charter school is new (has been operation for three years or less), whether it is managed by an EMO, and whether it has converted from a TPS or is a “start-up” charter schools. Controls for teacher and school characteristics, and for a variety of “organizational conditions” are also included, the latter consisting of 11 variables including, unionization, a dichotomous hours-per-week measure, and principal and teacher involvement and control measures obtained from surveying them.

We summarize some of the findings focusing on the logit estimated odds ratio of leaving the profession versus staying at one’s school. The estimated odds of a teacher leaving a charter school that is not new, is not a conversion charter, and is not managed by an EMO are 3.3 times higher than a TPS teacher and significant at the 1% level. The estimated odds for a conversion charter school is significantly lower, but remains well above that for a TPS. Whether the charter school is managed by an EMO or is new does not have a significant effect on predicted turnover. The estimated effects on moving to another school are in the same direction with the same charter characteristics significant (though of somewhat different magnitudes).

Variables that are significant in increasing the probability of leaving the profession are being under 30 or over 50, being uncertified, teaching in a secondary school, working more than 60 hours per week, and reporting being dissatisfied with one’s school. Variables that significantly reduce the probability of leaving the profession are having an education degree, teaching in a large school, and having the principal have substantial power over hiring. Some variables not found to be significant are being a minority teacher, having attended a selective college, teaching in an urban school, and teacher reporting of having administrative support, being involved in instructional decision making, the cooperative atmosphere among teachers, and satisfaction with salary.

While there are a number of differences between charter TPS schools and observable characteristics of teachers that are significant in predicting leaving the profession, the “residual”
associated with being a charter school teacher (in any kind of charter school) remains quite high. Of interest is explaining the remaining large difference in turnover, including identifying differences in forced changes versus differences in teacher choices. The follow-up survey provides some insight into this. The follow-up survey was administered to a sample of teachers in 2004-05 with questions that varied depending on whether the teacher left the profession or continued to teach in some school. The authors classify reasons teachers reported for leaving the profession into three categories, “life changes,” “voluntary attrition,” or “involuntary attrition,” the only choice in the latter category being “school staffing action.” Examples of explanation for leaving the profession in the second category are “for better salary or benefits” and “dissatisfied with teaching as a career.” Significantly more teachers reported leaving the profession in TPSs due to life changes than teachers in charter schools, and the reverse for both voluntary and involuntary reasons. For charter-school teachers, 14.9% reported leaving the profession due to a school staffing action, while only 5.9% of TPS teacher reported the same, the difference highly significant. As the authors point out, this might provide evidence of charter schools having more power to get rid of less effective teachers, but might also be due to more frequent closing of charter schools and efforts to comply with new restrictions imposed by NCLB (see above). Charter school teachers also reported significantly more frequently “dissatisfaction with previous school” as a (voluntary) reason for leaving the profession. Overall, the evidence is that a mixture of voluntary and forced actions explains the higher frequency of charter school teachers leaving the profession. “Laid off or involuntarily transferred” was reported as a reason for moving schools significantly more often by TPS teachers, as was “opportunity for a better teaching assignment” and “did not have enough autonomy.” The responses explaining moving suggest TPS teachers have more opportunity to continue to teach. Stuit and Smith’s analysis is informative and provocative, but direct evidence about whether charter schools are relatively able to retain more effective and/or get rid of less effective teachers is not provided. Cowen and Winter (2013) employ their estimates of teacher effectiveness to this end. They perform multinomial logit analysis predicting whether teachers stay in their school, transfer within their district, transfer between districts, or exit teaching in Florida. In addition to controls for numerous observable teacher and school characteristics (including salary), they include their estimate of teacher effectiveness (based on both math and reading scores in separate regressions),
a charter-school dummy variable, and the latter interacted with the effectiveness estimate. They find that less effective teachers exit teaching in Florida with significantly higher probability and teachers exit charter schools with significantly higher probability, the former arguably consistent with findings on observables and the latter consistent with all the evidence. We should add that the regressions control for teacher experience and its square, so the exit of teachers estimated to be relatively ineffective is independent of experience effects. The most important finding, though, is that the interaction coefficient in regressions using both the reading- and math-based effectiveness measures is not significant and with point estimates very close to 0. Thus, they find no evidence that charter schools are better or worse than TPSs in improving the effectiveness of their teacher pool. Whether this reflects equal efficaciousness, attrition beyond control, or some combination of offsets is an open question.

The last research we discuss examines the flow of teachers into charter schools. Carruthers (2012) focuses on the effectiveness of teachers that leave TPSs for charter schools, while Jackson (2012) is most concerned with the effects of charter school competition on TPS teachers. We first discuss Carruthers (2012). She uses a rich panel data set on teachers, students, and schools for the years 1997-2009 in North Carolina. Her data on student scores allows only value-added estimation of teacher effectiveness for those initially in TPS schools.

Carruthers’s initial analysis focuses on teacher observables. Mobile teachers (any that move out of TPS schools) are less experienced and have degrees from less competitive colleges. Teachers that move to charter schools have yet weaker credentials, are more likely to be unlicensed, and are more likely to be black. Multinomial logit is conducted to predict when teachers move out of their TPS, with the alternatives to staying being move to a charter school, move to another TPS, move temporarily out of sample, or move permanently out of sample, controlling for teacher characteristics and characteristics of the sending schools. Relative to staying, teachers that have high licensing scores, attended competitive colleges, have less than three years of experience, and are nonwhite are more likely to move to charter schools. Movers to charter schools are more likely to come from schools that are more nonwhite and schools where students are performing below grade level, relative to those that stay. Females are less likely to make this move. This methodology cannot, however, investigate how charter schools draw teachers relative to similar TPS schools (because the default option is to remain in a school).
The next analysis then examines how moving from a TPS to a charter school, relative to moving to a non-charter school, predicts various teacher measures, controlling for characteristics of the sending and receiving school. Relative to moving to a similar TPS, charter schools draw from other TPS schools less experienced teachers, fewer teachers that attended competitive colleges, fewer teachers holding graduate degrees, and teachers with lower scores on licensing exams. However, if we examine just licensed teachers, the latter findings are attenuated and reversed for licensing scores. Also, teachers that have been working for more than 25 years are more likely to move to charter schools than another TPS, and, especially, if they are licensed.

Motivated by the mixed evidence on observable teacher characteristics, Carruthers turns to effectiveness estimated by the value-added approach. Having scores for students of teachers in TPS schools, she estimates teacher effectiveness as a fixed effect on student math and reading scores (in separate regressions), controlling for student characteristics and peer school characteristics; and, in part of the analysis, for school fixed effects. The means of the fixed effects of teachers moving to charter schools are lower than for all TPS teachers and for teachers that move to other TPSs (which is also lower than the mean of all teachers). To control for characteristics of the sending and receiving school, she runs regressions like her previous ones but now predicting estimated teacher effectiveness, with moving anywhere compared to moving to a charter school. The regressions that use teacher effectiveness estimated without school fixed effects show that teachers that move to charter schools are significantly less effective than those that move at all, and the latter are already less effective than all initial TPS teachers. This could, however, reflect a bias in teacher effectiveness since it could be that teachers are moving to charters from schools with less motivated students. But the analysis with school fixed effects in estimating effectiveness find similar results, though charter schools drawing less effective teachers (than other TPS) is only significant for effectiveness measured using reading (not math) scores. Another finding in the analysis estimating teacher effectiveness is that first-year teachers are less effective, consistent with other research. This estimation also provides a baseline to interpret the quantitative estimates: “Thus the difference between a teacher moving to the charter sector and a teacher moving elsewhere is 38-47 percent of the effectiveness gap between new and more experienced teachers (p. 253).”

As the author points out, it is possible that charter schools hire relatively effective new teachers as the analysis regards only teachers that move from TPSs. However, 36.1% of charter school
teachers in her data did teach initially in TPS schools, and other evidence (e.g., Cowen and Winters, 2013) does not indicate offsetting hiring practices. Again, whether differences in teacher effectiveness in charter schools is explained by demand or supply factors remains an open question.

Jackson (2012) focuses on the labor-market effects of entry of charter schools, but he also provides evidence of the effectiveness of teachers that leave TPSs to teach in charter schools. His data is also from North Carolina for the years 1995 to 2005. He estimates teacher effectiveness of TPS teachers using fixed effects in the value-added model, but also does so using a vector of observable teacher characteristics in place of the fixed effect. The “predicted effectiveness” of teachers equals the coefficient-estimate weighted teacher characteristics used to explain student test scores. The predicted effectiveness approach has the advantage of allowing an estimate of teacher effectiveness for those not in the data used in estimation. Jackson finds that switching from a TPS to a charter school predicts observable teacher characteristics as in Carruthers (e.g., less experience), but also significantly predicts a lower “predicted effectiveness.” This provides a nice complement to Carruthers’s findings.

Jackson’s main analysis uses difference-in-difference to examine the causal effect of local charter-school competition on TPS teachers. He presents evidence supporting the notion that teacher markets are localized. He regresses TPS school-level teacher variables (e.g., log of average salary) on school and time fixed effects and a dummy variable for the presence of at least one nearby charter school (e.g., with 10 miles) that serves the same grade level. Thus, identification is within school. He finds significant positive effects on TPS teacher salaries, especially in hard-to-staff schools (in the top quarter of, ethnic minority and percent minority). Turnover at TPSs facing competition is not increased. The interpretation given to the findings is that supply and demand effects cancel as TPSs strive to retain teachers, but both forces imply higher salaries in TPSs. Teacher quality, measured by their predicted value, declines slightly at

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Jackson uses only data from the period (1995-1998) prior to charter school entry in his fixed effects estimation of teacher effectiveness to avoid potential biases from charter school entry. Entry of charter schools might lead to selection of new teachers into TPS schools. It also possible that entry of charter schools induces teachers facing competition to work harder, thus affecting their fixed effect estimate. This, then, limits substantially the data on teacher effectiveness that can be used in the subsequent analyses since there are no estimates for teachers that enter the data after the estimation period, which does not hold for the “predicted effect” alternative. On the other hand, the “predicted effect” measure of teacher effectiveness relies on observables that at least individually have not generally been good predictors of student scores as discussed above.
hard-to-staff TPSs, mainly explained by reduced teacher experience.\textsuperscript{31} This paper provides appealing evidence on the equilibrium effects of charter competition in the teacher labor market. The evidence from Florida and North Carolina is that charter schools as a group have somewhat less effective teachers and are no better in improving their teaching pool. This is consistent with the evidence on the overall effectiveness of charter schools in these states (Sass, 2006 and Bifulco and Ladd, 2006). While this aggregate evidence suggests charter schools face challenge in outperforming TPSs, this may well reflect newness of the charter school movement.

Moreover, the value-added evidence and the evidence on observable teacher characteristics indicate large variation in teachers in charter schools. No-excuses charter schools in Boston hire relatively more TFA teachers and alumni (Angrist, et al., 2013). In their study of effectiveness of New York City charter schools, Dobbie and Fryer (2013) find “…input measures associated with a traditional resource-based model of education—class size, per pupil expenditure, the fraction of teachers with no teaching certification, and the fraction of teachers with an advanced degree—are not correlated with school effectiveness in our sample.” Thus, their evidence for charters accords with evidence regarding teachers summarized in Hanushek and Rivkin (2006). They find instead that the most important of nine human capital measures is frequent teacher feedback. They report “The typical teacher at a high-achieving elementary school receives feedback 15.89 times per semester, compared to 10.23 times at other charter schools. The typical teacher at a high-achieving middle school receives feedback 16.50 times per semester, over twice as much as teachers at other charter schools.” More research is needed on teachers in charter schools that employ alternative educational models to add to understanding of how differences in management of charter schools impacts teacher effectiveness. It is of interest to investigate this as well in the context of the value-added approach.

Regressions show that teacher characteristics in schools vary with the environment, independent of charter status. But the charter effect remains important. This suggests there is much more to explain about what makes charter school teachers different.

Some effort has been made to examine demand-side versus supply-side effects on charter school teachers, but regressions that are run are reduced forms. This clouds interpretation of the coefficients. Developing models that lead to structural estimation are likely to help understand differences in charter school teachers, which are likely to differ substantially across the variety of

\textsuperscript{31} This effect is short lived.
quasi-markets in which they operate. Thus, modelling charter schools is a challenging yet important step to advance understanding of charter school teachers.

B. Non-Teacher Differences
While the average effects on educational outcomes across all charter schools within or across locations are important from a policy standpoint, they may not tell the full story as these effects could vary by policy environment, or by types of charter schools, or even school by school as operational features and practices vary. As we have already noted, findings across geographic locations vary, which may be a function of the policies in place across locations. For instance, some states have very liberal policies in terms of setting up charter schools, while others have much more conservative laws. Most studies have not examined charter schools across multiple locations. Therefore, individual studies have generally not tried to draw conclusions about the effect of variation of charter policies. Only the 2009 CREDO study has tried to bridge this gap and the results suggest that charter schools perform poorly in states in which charter schools operate under a cap limiting the number of charter schools or have multiple possible authorizers. In contrast, states where charter schools have an appeal process for adverse decision on an application have charter schools performing stronger. These conclusions should be viewed as initial insights as the differences in effects were small and the policy variable could only vary across 16 states.

Two studies have explored the charter authorizer issue further. The first study examined charter schools in Minnesota in which there are four possible types of authorizers and found no differential effects, but did find greater variation among charter schools authorized by non-profits (Carlson, Lavery, and Witte, 2012). The second study examined charter schools in Ohio in which there are again four possible authorizers and found that charter schools authorized by non-profit had lower achievement gains (Zimmer, et al., 2014).

Finally, some studies have noted that urban charter schools do better than non-urban charter schools (Angrist, et al., 2013; Gleason, et al., 2010). However, it is not clear whether this is a result of urban charter schools outperforming non-urban charter schools or if the TPSs in urban settings (which are the counterfactuals for urban charter schools) are just weaker than TPSs in

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32 Above we provided evidence of differences in teachers across authorizer types, while here the research discussed regards student outcomes.
non-urban settings. Nevertheless, it does raise the possibility that charter schools may be a more viable policy in urban environments.

A few studies have examined whether charter school type or the operational features affects outcomes. For instance, using student-level data from California, Buddin and Zimmer (2005) examined whether there were differential effects across conversion and startup charter schools and classroom-based versus non-classroom-based charter schools, which often use online curriculum. The research showed some differences between conversion and startup charter schools, but the differences were generally small. However, the differences were much larger between classroom-based and non-classroom-based charter schools with the non-classroom-based charter schools having lower achievement. This result is consistent with a study of Ohio charter schools that found virtual schools performing poorly relative to TPSs and other charter schools (Zimmer, et al., 2009). It is consistent at well with findings for Pennsylvania, which has among the highest proportion of online charter students. The CREDO (2011) report on Pennsylvania charter schools found that all eight cyber schools then operating performed significantly and substantially worse on both mathematics and reading than TPSs. 33

While some of the authors in these studies cautioned against drawing strong conclusions of these virtual/non-classroom-based schools as the they note that these schools typically serve unique students, it does raise some concerns about the rapid expansion of these types of schools in a number of states. In addition, as a major conclusion, the same authors emphasized that charter schools should not be thought of as a monolithic group.

There have also been evaluations of different types of CMOs and of CMOs as a whole. Mathematica evaluated the performance of CMOs using a matching strategy with student-level data and found no statistically significant effect overall for test scores or graduation, but did find a great deal of variation across CMOs (Furgeson, et al., 2012). 34 In a second Mathematica study of KIPP schools, which is a well-known CMO operator, Tuttle and colleagues (2013) used a lottery-based approach in evaluating 13 middle schools and found strong positive effects in math, but no statistically significant effect in reading. 35 The authors then employed observational

33 Perhaps in response to negative findings, Pennsylvania in 2013 rejected all eight applications for new cyber charters (Chute, 2013).
34 In the case of using graduating high school as an outcome, the authors only had data for six schools and found an advantage of 7 percent, but the effect was not statistically significant.
35 Some have argued that the strong reputation of KIPP schools is based on cream skimming and pushing out low performing students. Therefore, the Mathematica team examined whether they could find any evidence of either
approaches and found consistent results with these same 13 schools. Bolstered by the consistency of the results across the approaches, the authors then applied the same observational approaches to 41 KIPP schools and found strong positive effects for KIPP schools across multiple subjects. Again, these results suggest that charter schools should not be viewed as monolithic group.

As the above discussion indicates, charter school performance can vary by type of school and possibly by policy environment. It is also possible that charter schools performance may vary from school to school. By design, charter schools are given a great deal of autonomy, which may result in some schools doing quite well, while other schools may flounder. Studying educational practices poses challenges of classification, measurement, and causality. A small set of studies have collected information about the educational operation and practices of individual charter schools and tried to identify factors that led to improve performance. In some cases, researchers were not been able to identify many effective operational strategies or practices, which may be the result of small sample sizes and the challenges of identify nuanced differences in operations and practices (Zimmer and Buddin, 2007; Tuttle, et al., 2013). However, other studies have found positive effects for factors such as teachers’ focus on academic achievement (Berends, et al, 2010), intensive coaching of teachers (Furgeson, et al., 2012), strong behavioral policies (Angrist, et al. 2013; Dobbie and Fryer, 2011; Furgeson, et al. 2012; Tuttle, et al, 2013), increased instructional time, high dosage tutoring, frequent teacher feedback, using data to guide instruction (Dobbie and Fryer, 2011) as well as a general philosophy of “no excuse’ policies, which includes strict discipline (Angrist, et al. 2013). Given that an original impetus for charter schools was for these schools to be incubators of effective educational operations and practices, more studies need to open the “black box” of these schools to identify key features that other schools could adopt.

The above discussion highlights the importance of school specialization, which is closely related to questions of validity of research approaches. As explained above, research on charter school effectiveness attempts to address validity along two dimensions:

- **Internal validity:** Is an estimated impact causal?
- **External validity:** Does an estimated impact generalize beyond the sub-population being studied, i.e., is the sub-population representative of some well-defined larger population?

possibilities (Nichols,-Barrer, Gill, Gleason, & Tuttle, 2014). They found no evidence of cream skimming in their analysis, similar attrition rates, and that students exiting KIPP schools had similar test scores to students exiting comparison schools.

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If a single educational model were the best model for all students, then internal validity would imply external validity. But students differ, and there are likely to be gains from specializing educational models to fit the differing interests and capabilities of students. The greater the extent of such beneficial specialization, the more challenging is the issue of external validity as findings from a given sub-population would tend to apply more narrowly.\footnote{Recall that instances in which lottery-based and observational approaches have been applied to the same set of schools, similar impacts have been found. This favors external validity for those studies rather than gains associated with charter school specialization to unobserved characteristics of students in their self-selected applicant pools (Abdulkadiroglu, et al., 2011; Furgeson, et al., 2012; Tuttle, et al., 2013).}

While specialization along some dimensions (e.g., curriculum) is likely to be important, the potential for beneficial specialization does not imply that schools should differ on all dimensions. It is quite possible that some “best practices” should be part of all educational models, perhaps some or all of the elements highlighted by Dobbie and Fryer (2011) and the related no-excuses approach.

It is possible that educationally beneficial specialization can run counter to other social objectives. Two hypothetical examples illustrate. Suppose that a charter school provider develops an educational approach for minority students that provides superior educational outcomes to those provided by the alternative TPSs. This might lead to increased racial or, ethnic segregation. Suppose that TPSs provide superior services and opportunities for special needs students. This might give rise to disproportionate attendance of special needs students in TPSs. In these hypothetical scenarios, specialization enhances educational outcomes but increases segregation. In comparison of charters and TPSs, charter entry that increases segregation is often treated as negative evidence, \textit{per se}, against charters. The extent to which beneficial specialization implies increased segregation has been little explored, but grappling with this difficult issue may well be unavoidable as expansion of the charter school sector continues.

\textbf{VII. Competitive Effects}

While competitive effects of charters on TPSs have received less attention than direct effects of charters on their students, competitive effects may be as important, if not more important.

Despite recent growth, the charter school share remains comparatively small. Even if the recent pace of growth continues, it will be many years before the charter sector school grows sufficiently to have large direct effects. Meanwhile, there is potential for charter schools to have substantial effects on the broader educational system via innovation and through competitive
forces. We have discussed charter school innovations that might prove beneficial in application in TPSs. We now turn to review of research assessing charter impacts on TPSs via competitive pressures.

A. Financial Impacts

Financial impacts are among the most visible impacts of charters on TPSs. Charter schools draw students from TPSs, and, in doing so, they draw resources from TPSs. The channels of these financial impacts on TPSs may include payment from TPSs to charters as well as changes in state and federal funding from programs that link funding to enrollments. There has been relatively limited research providing systematic evidence of how TPSs adapt to the loss of finances associated with charter school growth. There are, however, studies that enumerate impacts and challenges of adjustment. IMO (2013) summarizes financial impacts on Minneapolis-St. Paul. Schafft, et al. (2014) study funding and financial impacts in Pennsylvania. Bifulco and Reback (2014) provide instructive case studies of TPSs’ financial adaptation to enrollment declines in Albany and in Buffalo New York.

The following issues emerge in this research. As charter schools draw enrollments from TPSs, the latter confront the painful task of closing schools to reduce the resulting excess school capacity while also confronting the challenges of attempting to reduce administrative and teaching staff levels. Teacher employment and tenure contracts often specify that any layoffs must be in reverse order of seniority. This and the higher pay received by senior relative to junior teachers imply that reduction in number of teachers is proportionately larger than the reduction in expenditures for teachers. Adjustment problems are often aggravated by the fact that a charter school does not draw students from a single TPS school. Rather, a given charter will draw some students from multiple TPS schools, resulting in declining class sizes in multiple TPS schools. Hence, closing one or more schools to address district excess capacity then entails reassignment of many students. Students forced by school closings to change schools may be more likely to contemplate non-district options than they would if they were not required to relocate (Epple, et al 2014). A further issue highlighted in discussion of financial impacts is uncertainty about charter school decisions. For example, if a charter school closes on short notice, the TPS district school must absorb those students.

District administrators find themselves grappling with these financial impacts while, at the same time, attempting to maintain or increase quality so as to avoid loss of more students. If TPS cost
per student rises as students leave for charters, per student payment to charters will rise as well if, as is typically the case, charter funding per student is tied to district per student funding. This may stimulate a vicious (from the district perspective) cycle in which rising payments per student induce charter school entry, further district enrollment losses occur, district cost per student and associated charter payment per student rise, and so on. An alternative perspective is that this dynamic increases the urgency with which TPSs reduce costs in response to enrollment losses.

Another dimension in which a TPSs district may be impacted is in market evaluation of the district’s creditworthiness. Moody’s (2013) highlighted potential adverse impacts of charters on credit ratings of struggling urban districts. There is no doubt that competitive pressures on TPS finances from charter schools are intense in urban districts experiencing rapid charter growth. These financial impacts and district responses are worthy of more study.

B. Challenges in Estimating Competitive Impacts on Effectiveness of TPSs

Estimating the impact of competition from charters on educational effectiveness of TPS is difficult for two reasons, one of which is conceptual and the other methodological. The conceptual challenge has two parts. First, it is difficult to establish good proxies for competitive pressure. The current literature generally assumes we know how a competitive threat is perceived by relevant actors. While the vast majority of research has used proximity to charter schools as proxy for whether a TPS feels competitive pressure, it may be more complicated. Competitive pressure may only occur when charter schools gain a significant portion of the “market share” of students. Or, pressure may only occur if there is a view that charter schools are outperforming a TPS, which hurts the reputation of a TPS. Or, the individual charter school may need to take a significant share of student from an individual TPS. Or, it could be a combination of all of the above.

The second conceptual challenge is associated with the complexity of providing education in general as education is provided through multiple layers, including teachers within classrooms who are managed by principals who are in turn provided resources and instructional and curriculum guidelines by the district. While actors in any single layer may feel competitive pressure, it might not ultimately affect the performance of students if the other layers are not equally motivated to improve. Alternatively, it might only matter that particular layers feel competitive pressures. For instance, a perceived competitive threat by teachers may be the only thing that matters because they are at the front lines of providing education. Or, it could be that
the key to improving school-wide performance is to motivate the principal. Or, it might not matter whether principals or teachers feel competitive pressure if many of the curriculum, instructional, and staffing decisions are made at the district level. In addition, each of these actors within these layers may perceive competitive threats differently, and each may have a different ability to react to these threats.

Adding to the complexity of drawing conclusions across studies is the real possibility that charter schools have different competitive effects in different types of environments. For instance, a growing trend among districts nationwide is to offer intra-district choice through open enrollment, whereby families can choose among all schools within the district, or through magnet schools. However, in many districts, enrollment is based entirely on geographic residency. Charter schools may have very different competitive effects in these environments. For districts with preexisting school choice, an already competitive market may diminish the competitive pressure created by charter schools. In contrast, the introduction of charter schools in a noncompetitive market with no choice program could have a much more dramatic effect. In addition, some districts may have growing enrollments and existing schools may be overcrowded. Here, charter schools could serve as a “release valve” for these districts. Other districts may have declining enrollments and the loss of additional students to charter schools could exert real fiscal pressure on existing schools. These observations suggest that developing theoretical models could help to guide empirical research on competitive effects.

The challenges we described so far do not include the methodological challenges, which are significant. If a researcher examines whether the performance of TPSs changes when charter schools are introduced nearby, they may not know whether any change in performance is a result of changing population or changing performance. For instance, a charter school could be introduced into a neighborhood and begin attracting students away from a nearby TPS. If the students exiting a charter school are disproportionately low performing, than the average test scores for students within TPS may improve, not because the quality of education of the TPS is improving, but because the school has less low performing students. In addition, there may be observable and unobservable characteristics of students and individual TPSs that should be accounted for when examining competitive effects. Furthermore, charter schools do not locate at random. Instead, they may locate in neighborhoods for a variety of reasons, including operators’
perception of how well they can compete with TPSs based on both observable and unobservable characteristics of TPSs.

Researcher can address some of these methodological challenges by using student-level longitudinal data. Longitudinal data can help control for changing population of students within a TPS by actually tracking the students moving in and out of a TPS. Furthermore, longitudinal data can help control for both observable and unobservable differences of students and schools by using a combination of student-and school-fixed effects known as spell effects, which compares the performance of the same students in the same school over time. However, many researchers have not had access to these types of data and have used school-level data instead. In our review, we will focus primarily on studies that have used longitudinal data. Nevertheless, there is some question of whether longitudinal data fully addresses all of the methodological challenges, especially the non-random location of charter schools. Therefore, it is our view that the analysis on the question of competitive effects is not as strong as research on some of the other questions.

C. Competitive Impacts of Charters on TPS Effectiveness

The earliest (and some of the most cited) works on competitive effects actually used school-level data. The first was a study by Caroline Hoxby (2003) in which she examined whether the share of charter students in a district affects tests scores in Michigan TPSs. She found positive effects. In a second study, also using Michigan data, but using distance to authorizers as instrument for charter location, Bettinger (2005) found no evidence that competition from a nearby charter improved test scores in TPSs.

Several more recent studies have used longitudinal student-level data generally employing a combination of student and school fixed effects for the identification strategy. Bifulco and Ladd (2006) used distance to nearby charter to measure charter competition in North Carolina and found no evidence that charters were improving TPSs. Sass (2006) examined whether test scores in TPSs in Florida were affected by nearby charters using charter presence, the number of charters, and charter shares within concentric circles around TPS as measures of competition and found a small positive effect. Zimmer and colleagues (2009) examined competitive effects across seven states using distance to charter school as measure of competition and generally found little to no competitive effect, only finding positive effects in Texas. Also in Texas, Booker, et al. (2008) used a wider array of measures including a market penetration measure at the district level. Second, they used a campus-level market penetration measure, which was defined by the
percentage of students at a particular campus who exited the school to go to a charter school. They found positive competitive effects. Winters (2012) used the same market penetration measure in New York and the results varied by specification, but in general, he concluded that the effects were mild at best.

Zimmer and Buddin (2009) were a bit more nuanced in their approach as they examined competitive effects using both principal surveys and student-level test score data in California. The survey results showed that TPS principals felt little pressure from charters to improve performance or modify practices. The student achievement analysis employed both student and school fixed effects and used an array of alternative measures for school competition including distance to nearest charter school, a charter school within 2.5 miles, and number of charter schools within 2.5 miles, percentage of students lost to charter schools.\textsuperscript{37} No evidence that charter competition was improving the test score performance of students in nearby TPSs was found.

The study that has made the strongest attempt of dealing with the non-random location of charter schools is study by Scott Imberman (2007) who used longitudinal student-level data and examined a variety of outcomes (i.e., behavior, attendance, test scores) from an anonymous school district. He also used a variety of approaches including school fixed-effects, school fixed-effects combined with school-specific time-trends, and instrumental variables. The results varied based on the approach, with the fixed effect showing positive effects in some cases (depending on the measure of the outcome), while the IV approach showed negative effects. As part of his analysis, Imberman makes the case that the IV approach is the most trusted approach and suggests that charter schools could actually have a negative impact on TPSs because they change the peer environments within schools and reduce the resources within schools. At the very least, his analysis underscores the importance of the identification strategy for estimating competitive effects.

In a unique study, Cremata and Raymond (2014) examine competitive effects in Washington, D.C. However, they approach the question with a different conceptual framework. Much like some of the previous research, they include measures such as market share and attrition from TPS to charter schools as a proxy for competitive pressure, but they also factor in the quality of the charter school in their analysis. They argue that a TPS may be much more responsive if they

\textsuperscript{37} The authors also used each of these measures of conversion and startup schools separately.
are experiencing competition from a high quality charter school versus a low quality charter school. They find that charter school quality is important as TPSs improve (as measured by reading and math test scores) when they face competitive pressure from higher quality charter schools. Therefore, competitive pressure may not be entirely a function of losing students or market share to a charter school, but losing students and market share to high quality charter schools. The Washington D.C. setting is noteworthy in that DC is second only to New Orleans among central city districts in market penetration of charters (Figure 3c). During the four-year period of the Cremata and Raymond study, 2005/06 to 2008/09, the charter share in DC grew from 27% to 41%. This large and growing presence of charters is arguably the kind of setting in which charter competitive effects are likely to be manifest.

Finally, in a different twist on the debate surround competitive effects, three papers have recently emerged that not only look at the impact of charter schools on enrollment patterns in TPSs, but also in private schools. Toma, Zimmer, and Jones (2006) and Chakrabarti and Roy (2010) exclusively focused on Michigan, while Buddin (2012) conducted a national evaluation. In each case, the researchers examined how enrollment patterns of TPSs and private schools are affected as charter school enrollment changes either within the same district or same county. Across all studies (although to different degrees) the researchers found that private schools disproportionately lose students to charter schools relative to TPSs. This may imply that charter schools actually exert stronger competitive effects on private schools than TPSs as private schools are so financially sensitive to losing students and their tuition dollars.

In aggregate, the current body of evidence on the competitive effects of charter schools is mixed, which may be disappointing to the advocates of charter schools. However, while charter schools have large shares in some districts as seen in Figure 4c, charters do not represent a large share of enrollment in most districts. Where charters have small shares, it may be unrealistic to expect charter schools to exert much of a competitive effect. In addition, many of these studies examine the effects of charter schools from nearly a decade ago. Much has changed since then, especially in some urban areas, and it could be charter schools are now exerting more pressure on TPSs. From this perspective, the Cremata and Raymond (2014) discussed above may be indicative of the kind of competitive effects charters have when charter presence is large and growing.
VIII. Summary and Conclusions

Since their inception in the early 1990’s, charter schools have grown to serve roughly 5% of US public school students. Charters are located disproportionately in urban areas. Charter school penetration varies greatly across states and localities. Seven states account for 61% of total charter enrollments; 30 metropolitan areas account for 63% of total charter enrollments. The concern that charter schools would induce white flight from public schools has proven to be largely unfounded; the charter sector enrolls higher proportions of African-American and Hispanic students than TPSs. Charters enroll proportionately fewer special needs students than TPSs which raises some concerns about the accessibility of these schools to all students. Class sizes in charter schools are comparable to those in TPSs. On the whole, teachers in charter schools are less experienced, are less credentialed, are less white, and have fewer advanced degrees. They are paid less, their jobs are less secure, and they turnover with higher frequency. Value added estimation of teacher effectiveness shows charter school teachers to be weaker in increasing test scores. Research explaining differences in teachers is in an early stage, and the relevance of differences in teachers to educational outcomes in charter schools is an open question.

The effectiveness of charter schools is far from uniform. Lottery studies of oversubscribed charter schools generally find favorable effects on achievement, often very large effects. The “No Excuses” model, in particular, has been found to deliver large gains. The invention of this educational model is arguably the most important innovation that can be credited to the charter movement. Whether this model can be implemented and can yield comparable gains in non-selective TPSs remains very much an open issue. A recent experiment in the Houston school district suggests that this may be possible, while also illustrating the tremendous challenges facing such implementation. At the opposite end of the quality spectrum, online “cyber” schools appear to be a failed innovation, delivering markedly poorer achievement outcomes than TPSs. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that, accounting for differences in population served, charter schools are not producing student achievement gains any better than TPSs. The evidence also suggests that individual charter schools seem to improve as they mature and the charter school sector as a whole is improving over time, largely from closure of underperforming schools. This research points to the important role that charter authorizers can play in weeding out ineffective charter schools, a role that many charter authorizers have yet to embrace. On a
more positive note, recent findings suggest that charter school performance on behavioral and attainment (years of schooling) outcomes may be stronger than achievement outcomes. Finally, research on the impacts of charter schools on the academic performance of TPS through competitive pressures has generally found modest effects, though one recent study provides evidence that TPSs produce larger achievement gains when confronted with competition from high quality charter schools.

It is common to end a review such as this with the admonition that more research is needed, and this is surely true. As this review indicates, however, research has already contributed a great deal to our knowledge about charter schools. Given the variation in charter schools, research that focuses on specific educational practices and their environments may have the most potential to be informative. While the charter movement is now nearing its 25th year, roughly half of the current charter share of public school enrollments has been garnered in the past seven years. In this respect, it is still far from mature. Polls indicate that the charter movement has gained widespread support among the public. If charter schools continue to grow, their direct and indirect effects may become more important. Increased stability of the charter sector itself may have significant impacts, e.g., by providing more stable employment opportunities for principals and teachers. Continuing to collect and analyze data on charter schools is crucial. It remains to be seen whether, as it continues to mature, the charter movement will fulfill fully the as yet unrealized aspirations of its founders.
# Table 1: Selected Charter School and Student Statistics, 2010/11*

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<th></th>
<th>Charter</th>
<th>Traditional Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of States Authorizing Charter Schools</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment (Number)</td>
<td>1,805,002</td>
<td>47,419,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment Share of TPE**</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>96.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure per Student****</td>
<td>$10,011</td>
<td>$14,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics (as % of enrollment)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White non-Hispanic</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRL (as % of enrollment)****</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location*****</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% urban</td>
<td>55.8%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% suburban</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% rural</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charter Grades:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-8 as % of TPE</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School as % of TPE</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students per Teacher******</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Self-Contained</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Departmentalized</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Self-Contained</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Departmentalized</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS Self-Contained</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS Departmentalized</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Self-Contained</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined per School:</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students per School:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-8</td>
<td>366.0</td>
<td>460.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>324.2</td>
<td>624.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAEP Proficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Grade Reading</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Grade Math</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Grade Reading</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Grade Math</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Grade Science</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited English Proficiency (2007/08)</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Education</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data from National Alliance for Public Charter Schools ([http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/home](http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/home)) and 2010/11 school year except where noted

**Total Public Enrollment=charter enrollment+ traditional public enrollment

***Data from University of Arkansas EdReform 2014 Report, which uses "nationalized" data from 40 metropolitan areas in 30 states (and the District of Columbia). Figures in 2014 dollars.

****Eligible for Free or Reduced Price Lunch

*****Percent is by enrollment (not schools)
Table 2: Segregation and Poverty in Public Charter Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Charter</th>
<th>Non-charter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 80% single race/ethnicity</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 60% single race/ethnicity</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 80% white</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 80% non-white</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 60% white</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 60% non-white</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 80% FRL</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 60% FRL</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20% FRL</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Demographic Comparison of Students in TPS, Feeders, and Charters, 2010/11*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feeders</th>
<th>Charters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of schools</td>
<td>29,797</td>
<td>5,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average enrollment (per school)</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total students enrolled</td>
<td>20,172,202</td>
<td>1,704,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students in poverty</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Language Learners</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Education Students</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Teacher Characteristics in Traditional Public, Charter, and Private Schools, 2011/12*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional Public</th>
<th>Charter</th>
<th>Private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent White, Non-Hispanic</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Black, Non-Hispanic</td>
<td>6.6**</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Hispanic</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Male</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Younger than 30</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Teaching Experience (Years)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Years at Current School</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Less than 4 Years' Teaching Experience</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Highest Degree=Bachelor's</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Regular Full Time</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required Hours (Typical Week)</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Hours per Week</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average School Year Earnings</td>
<td>$55,400</td>
<td>$46,300</td>
<td>$41,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Teachers Receiving Supplemental Comp for Student Performance/Average Amount</td>
<td>4.0/$1,400</td>
<td>15.8/$1,300</td>
<td>.5**/$1,100**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Any Professional Development</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**CV of estimate between 30 and 50 percent.

Figure 1: Percent by Which Charter Funding per Student is below TPS Funding, 2006/07

Figure 2: Charter Enrollment Growth

Data from National Alliance for Public Charter Schools ([http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/home](http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/home))

*Metro Areas consist of the MSAs surrounding the cities listed, with districts matched to MSA by zip code as defined by the U.S. Department of Labor.
Figure 5a: Percentage of Charter School Students Eligible for Free or Reduced-Price Lunch

Figure 5b: Percentages of Charter School Students by Race and Ethnicity

Data from National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/home)

Figure 6e: Proportion of City Schools with >80% White, 2010/11


Figure 6f: Proportion of City Schools with >60% Non-White, 2010/11

References


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